Episode 38 – 32 Battalion ends Ops Reindeer then SWAPO attacks Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi

Welcome back to the South African Border Wars podcast with me, Your Host, There's Lathan. This is episode 38 and it's time to scrutinise the fallout from Operation reindeer, particularly their technical singer during 1978. As you heard last episode, the SADF regarded the invasion of Angola as a success, however as we know, war is politics by other means and in this, the South African state had failed. It would also lead to Swapo's Operation Revenge, which would kill far more SADF troops than the airborne assault at Kasinga. The strategic plan of Operation reindeer was to weaken Swapo at the point the United Nations had demanded elections. The idea was to show how militarily weak Swapo was but this strategy backed fire spectacularly. Instead it actually strengthened Swapo's position internationally, attacking a town without any warning was always going to cause civilian casualties and therefore bad PR. It was regarded as not only unethical, it was criminal, while Kasinga was actually part of a group of abandoned mining towns and villages in the region, it had been rebuilt by Swapo with their Angolan government support to use as the logistics and transit camp for its fighters. According to a Swapo white paper created later, 624 of its fighters and civilians died there on the 4th of May, 1978, 611 were wounded. Among the dead were 167 women and 298 teenagers and children. Since many of the fighters were women or teenagers and many were not in uniform at the time of the attack, the exact number of civilians among the dead has never been established with certainty. Victoria's official line after this raid was that Kasinga was a great military success, but it had almost gone seriously wrong as we've heard. The paratroopers were way off target and later botched decisions to withdraw early, led to the Cubans approaching a real danger that the evacuation would become a catastrophe. The South African Air Force's determination stopped us from happening, but it wasn't a good example of an organised attack on a town despite what's been said over the years by the SADF. And that's why they never tried it again, a bit like the Germans who landed paratroopers at Crete in May 1941. They also never conducted an airborne attack of the same kind after that disaster. The South Africans inflicted heavy casualties, but missed the Commander Dima Amambu and other senior leaders who appeared to have fled at the start of the bombing raid. The SADF casualties were low for an audacious airborne attack, which meant the ruling nationalist party would not face internal sanctions in South Africa. Three soldiers were killed, one was missing in action, presumed dead, and eleven wounded. This was politically rewarding, except of course for the loved ones of the four men, other MIA, or dead. The concept of preemptive strikes was now regarded as valid as their overall strategy, at least according to General Constantine Foulune, however future attacks would always take place over land. The long-term strategic effect of the attack on the Angolan town was to turn most of the world against Pretoria, creating an almost perfect moment for Swapu. Later, in 1998, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission also concluded that at least from the SADF's perspective, Kasinga was actually a military facility which exonerated some of the senior army staff involved. While the South African government boasted how a Paltry 300 odd paratroopers took out to Swapu Transit Town, Swapu's narrative swamped the storyline. It was also just the tonic that Swapu needed to jolt some of the vacillating neutral nations into gear. The white regime now resembled the Nazi regime, and the storyline was tailor-made in a newly post-colonial Africa. And yet, we know that Kasinga was a crucial Swapu Transit camp, because former MK Captain Joseph Korbal was based there. Korbal called Kasinga the main Swapu command post in southern Angola, and said that there had been a build up of military supplies for an obvious Swapu infiltration campaign with that town as a linchpin in the entire plan. But probably the most damning evidence that Swapu was using the camp as a military transit point was the photographs and ironically a lack of photographs. There was a vast array of sophisticated events of trenches and administration offices along with bunkers. These were situated so as to almost encycl Kasinga, and they included access and communication trenches and observation points as well as forward foxholes. There was no sign of the usual protection for non-military inhabitants, nor any sign of the use of the Red Cross on roofs of houses to indicate this was a civilian and non-military area. The selection of the town was for military reasons. The terrain around Kasinga favoured a defence, it was on a slight rise, anyone attacking would have to run uphill, at least if they were arriving over land. Then the Kallonga river formed a natural obstacle to the western side of the town. To the south, the MPLA and Cuban armoured garrison was drawn up at Tecumutetti, which explained the gaps in the southern trenches because Swapu believed an overland attack would run slap bang into these units first. Then the lack of photographs of dead civilians and children was confusing. And to this day, Swapu has refused to allow any of the bodies to be exhumed in what they claim was a mass grave full of children. This is sharply different to the Iraqis, the Creations, and others who want the truth of genocide and killing revealed. But there's also a critical flaw with the SADF's comment that the photographs were proof that this base was exclusively for military use. You see the defence force had planned its visual coverage, and apart from exaggerating Swapu's actions in Kasinga, it also briefed photographers to focus on images supporting the South African cause. These were only to be photographed with weapons by their side, negative images such as suffering victims or children were to be avoided. Again in war nothing is clean, the photographers seem to ignore the order in places, including pictures of bodies without weapons, and one of a dead SADF paratrooper. Furthermore, on a political strategic level concerning security, the war really became an attempt at delaying any elections in South West Africa, which most believed would take place as early as 1978, and would be won by Swapu. This has been vehemently denied by many, we say the Democratic Turnhalla Alliance was in the running as well, but I'm afraid whomever believes this is indulging in political fantasy. So the political strategy to bomb Kasinga was confused. It boiled down really to the lives of South African white males being exchanged for time as Pretoria held onto its South West African buffer zone against communism in order to improve its negotiation position. And still, Operation reindeer wasn't quite finished, there were two more events which need closer scrutiny. Firstly, three two battalion was ordered into Angola two days after the attacks on Kasinga and Chatequeta. This was to assaults a dozen smaller objectives in the Omabapa, Namudi and Enhombie areas, which were east of Chatequeta. Secondly, there was Swapu's Revenge, which we'll hear about shortly. Three two battalion, as we've heard, was a unit pretty much unique in the SADF. It was composed of a group of former F&LA troops and ex-Portuguese soldiers from Angola led by South Africans. The men hadn't nowhere to go after Portugal's leftist coup and Angola's new political dispensation controlled by the MPLA. The men of three two were not quite mercenaries, not quite the foreign legion and were nicknamed Buffalo Battalion, or sometimes just Buffalo, after the black troops who fought against the Confederacy during the American Civil War on behalf of the Union. Ironically, now, black soldiers would actually be fighting for a white minority government, although three two soldiers thought of themselves as freedom fighters for their country, Angola. Under its commanding officer, Commandant Hurt Nell, the battalion had already bared its teeth in months of continuous counterinsurgency up across southern Angola. So these Swapar bases, which were designated as objective Charlie, all lay between three and thirty kilometres north of the Cutline and between Beacon's twenty-six and thirty. Much about what happened next has not been published, but we know that on May 6th, five rifle companies of three two battalion and a platoon of 81mm mortars, as well as the troop of 140mm medium guns lined up for the overland invasion. They set off before dawn on the 6th of May and first contact was made near Minguela at 8.30 when Swapar opened fire on the mechanized unit with mortars. Nell's troops assaulted the base and Swapar fell back to Namudi, four kilometres west. The battalion only arrived there in the early afternoon and prepared for the next assault, but were delayed then attacked early on the 7th of May. Resistance was weak and the base was overrun by noon. Then it was onto the next target on Mipapa, but once again the thick bush caused delays and three two battalion lagered that night. Hopper fired on the lager through the night with a 122mm rocket's base that on Nellimona caused no casualties. By the next morning, May 8th, the real battle for Ombipapa began. Three two were dropped in by Puma helicopters to speed up the assault, which took Swapar by surprise and Ombipapa was eventually overrun along with smaller bases at target 13 and two small camps near Ombipapa. Dissultry fighting took place over the next two days as the bases presumed to be occupied and Ombipapa were empty and two small unknown camps at Ombipapa were located and burned down. By May 10th, three two battalion raided, Hanga Dima, Mamwandi, Bao, Namiche and Tetoli. The exact number of casualties in these firefights and battles are unknown and they are on the afternoon of 10th of May 32 battalion crossed back across the cutline into South West Africa and that was the end of the South African initiative for the moment. Swabba meanwhile was planning revenge and their response would kill more than three times the number of South Africans that died in Operation Ranja. This took place at Kadimma Malulu, the unofficial capital of the Eastern Caprivi which had been acquired zone for years as we heard. There was sporadic insurgency activity by Swabba and Karnu, the Caprivi African National Union which operated out of Zambia but by 1978 the area was relatively peaceful and Karnu was taking issue with Swabba over the joint activities. Pretty much in the same way that M.K. had argued with Swabba about the military strategy, Karnu felt that Swabba was focusing on Urbambu land for the West and not the Caprivi. That would happen next, took everyone by surprise except for Swabba and those in the know inside Zambia. S.A.D. of Army wives and families lived in Kadimma Malulu enjoying the beauty of the Zambizi rivers surrounded by unspoiled bushfold, herds of elephants rambled around, jackals could be heard as well as other animals during the night. It was a relatively soft deployment, that was about to change. Yes, there were incidents at the small fortified base known as Winella which was southwest of Kadimma. That's where the S.A.D. of Enzambian Caprivi troops spent the hours staring at each other in something that resembled the West in front or career or the Ukraine these days. The Zambizi flowed into a bend here and created a natural bolt. They were a couple of hundred meters apart. Sometimes small arms or mortar fire would be exchanged but very little damage was caused to let alone injuries, which is why Swabba's revenge attack was going to be so shocking. A few weeks after Operation Rendia, intelligence reports began to filter in about activity in Zambia. On June 8, 1978, for example, a number of Swabba commanders were reported at a base in the Bush near village called Sinsambela in Zambia, the southwest. A few days later, Swabba and Zambian officials met nearby at a place called Mongol. Soon after the second meeting, S.A.D.F. camps reported an increase in sniping. Clearly, something was going on. What was changing was that a large cache of weapons and ammunition had been carried into the area to the north of Kadimma Mililo, with the Zambia National Defence Force assistance. The ZNDF were there as a protection against any S.A.D.F. plans to cross the border, kind of insurance. The South Africans were growing perturbed and defense HQ ordered an increase in the number of bomb shelters at Kadimma Mililo, which began to be built. Bush was also cut down around Wanele, so the field of fire could improve. The S.A.D.F. was in the process of building a wall to provide extra cover, and a new engineer base was planned east of the Kwanda River. But the Caprivi is an isolated place. It was difficulty in sourcing material for these defenses, and transport was also difficult to obtain, so things were proceeding slowly. None of these extra defenses were in place by the time SWAPO's leader Sam Newyoma paid a visit to his bases in southwestern Zambia. That was in early August, and the reason for his visit was revenge, although the only thing the S.A.D.F. intelligence knew for certain is that Newyoma was there. Intelligence thought perhaps it was to remotivate his men and women fighters after the shock of Kosinga. They also believed it could be a political move because the newly appointed United Nations commissioner for southwest African Namibia, Marti Atasari, was scheduled to visit the Caprivi later in August. All would be revealed and it wouldn't take long. On August 13th, there was a sudden surge in Zambian border violations as a series of motor bombs landed near the S-trip and heavy machine gun fire pinned down South African troops who were training near the base. Alarming new intelligence circulated a few days later, on August 17th, the local SWAPO leader called Commandant Solomon Huwala had apparently ordered two SWAPO companies over the border from Emusho to set up closer to Mapacha. The problem was, Mapacha was where the S.A.D.Fs main airfield had been built. What they didn't know was that Huwala's men had deployed a large number of 82mm and 60mm mortars. That wasn't all. SWAPO had managed to set up Czech ZB26 light machine guns, RPG27 missile launchers and even a 14.5mm anti-aircraft gun. Just for good measure, SWAPO deployed a 122mm red-eye single tube rocket launcher just north of the cut line, only 4km from Winella near the bulge. But it wasn't at Winella that the red-eye would cause the most damage. By August 22nd, these weapons were in place and plans were almost complete. Just one more thing remained and that was to warn their allies, the Xamians. So Solomon Huwala sent a group of his men with a message to the Xamian administrative and police base at Sashek, indicating an attack was imminent and that they should expect a South African counterattack, which could come by ground, or by air, or both. The garrison-Julie prepped its nine SA-7 heat-seeking missiles in three launches and passed on a warning to fellow commanders along the border. Xamian forces were now ready. Of course, all this radio messaging had been picked up by the South Africans and intelligence at defense HQ in Petrovia was alerted. One parachute battalion, an 81mm mortar group base near Blum, were put on a 60mm stand-by and a specialist medical team in Petrovia was also ready, along with a troop of 140mm guns of 14-field regiment. At 7.30pm on the night of August 22nd, officer-commanding 13 sub-area Komodant Deaga called a group meeting at Katimumulilo, an attack was likely within 24 hours, he said, and his officers were made aware of just how serious a threat this was. And yet, it appears some did not fully appreciate his warnings, as you're going to hear. Intelligence pointed to 600 SWAPO fighters being involved, he would apparently target both Winella and Mapacha Airbase and perhaps Katimumulilo 2. But the SA-DF had some teeth of their own, including a battery of 144mm guns and 81mm mortars. They also had two groups of heavily armed combat teams ready to respond. Combat team offer was headed up by Lieutenant Harry Harvey and comprised two infantry platoons and a 60mm mortar section, along with two troops of Ilant 90 armoured cars. Combat team Bravo was led by Lieutenant Flipkherber, an infantry platoon from the SA Cape Corps backed up by six Ilant 90 armoured cars, and an 81mm mortar group. The reality, however, in military terms, was SWAPO held the initiative. By 21 hours 40 on August 22nd, the 140mm guns were in the air heading for Krunfentern, where they'd be based, until there was some clarity about SWAPO's aims, everyone was on tental hooks. Midnight passed and still there was no action. At 0100 hours or early on the 23rd of August, Radio Zambia broadcast a message warning that the war against the South Africans would be intensified shortly. This was standard propaganda at the time, but what it was really signaling was the start of Operation Revenge. At 010015, a number of 122mm Red R rockets were fired from the launcher north of the Caprivi, which washed overhead and then exploded with shattering force inside Katimim Militer's military base. Five more followed, all missing the main buildings of the base, except for the last. This burst through the roof of a prefabricated barracks and blew up, pulverising everything inside and setting the building ablaze. And it was this single rocket that killed more South African soldiers than the entire airborne assault on Krasinger. Exploding in such a confined space, the shell reaped havoc. At first, when rescues arrived, they believed two SADF troops had died, but the carnage hid the true number. Ten SADF soldiers died. Ten were wounded. This had never happened to the South Africans. Most observers were utterly shocked by the SADF deciding to leave men inside a soft-covered barracks after so much prior intelligence, showed without doubt that a major attack likely to include heavy weapons was imminent. It wasn't just gung-ho, it was arrogant and proved our cock-eyed commanders could be when facing Black soldiers. They automatically presumed their men would win each engagement because they believed Blacks were inferior. How did it happen that more than 20 men were huddled inside a prefab after everything we've heard? The entire Western Capribe was in red alert and yet men were either sleeping or drinking coffee like it was a normal night back in Sibi Street when the 122mm rocket exploded. The SADF explanation later was the men were cold and others needed rest. These men were trained soldiers and were expected to face hardship so that excuse is bogus and soft-serving nonsense. As we'll hear in the course of the series, it wasn't the last time that a somewhat laissez-faire approach was taken regarding young South African lives and an arrogant attitude that prevailed about Swapo's military capability, but this show wasn't close to being over. 25 more rockets landed across the Capribe, some fell south of Winella and others hit the civilian areas of Ketima, including a school in the residential area. Then the Zambian defense force that Sasheki began firing the 82mm mortars at 0100h24 targeting Winella once more. Shortly after that, Swapo's mortar teams deployed north of Capribe followed up for good men. Indonesia, hitting Winella sporadically. The South Africans responded quickly, with Winella's 140mm guns firing at Swapu's mortars, which stopped almost immediately, but the Xamians were a different matter. They had shifted their mortars in the vicinity of Sasheki the day before, and this meant the SADF took more than two hours before they managed to silence the 82mm. The Xamian civilians began to flee Sasheki as the South African mortars found their range, eventually hitting one of the trenches there and slightly injuring six ZNDF troops, but not causing much damage. By 0-327, the Xamians seized fire, and Operation Revenge was over. The problem for the Xamians and Swapu was that they'd now set off the inevitable counter-attack. There was no way the South Africans would lick their wounds passively, and so at 0-400 hours, the SA Army top brass decided to head for the PPV. The luminaries included Major General Gianni Heldness, who was General Officer Commanding of South Africa Command, and a medical team in Toe there. Army Chief Lieutenant General Constant Filion and his Air Force counterpart Bob Rogers took off from Victoria, and they had their own version of retribution in mind. Swapu's command done to Solomon Huwala was indeed correct, the counter-attack was going to be swift. It was swifted even then he imagined, because it was decided to speed up the response, considering Alpha and Bravo groups had been prepped and they were ready to roll. They knew that Swapu and the Xamians would expect some kind of assault at first light. Instead, within half an hour of the bombardment, combat team Bravo moved out of Mapacha, heading for the borderline, and by dawn the small group of vehicles was heading towards Swapu base number 11, around 30 kilometres inside Xamia. The plan was to catch Swapu off guard by starting early, and they almost did. By 1,100 hours 30 they reached the base but found it deserted. There was evidence of around 100 Swapu soldiers base there, with tracks showing made fled on foot, about half going north, and the other half north west. They had also left a mortar base plate and 300 bombs, and in emplacements another 2-60 millimetre mortars were found, along with a 75 millimetre recorder's gun and 8-82 millimetre mortars. Bravo took these and returned to Mapacha, without making contact. But combat team Alpha had a completely different experience, as you're going to hear in next episode. Just a quick note, at times these episodes may arrive slightly late, as my workload leads to some deadline issues, but I'm trying to land one a week, or at least within 10 days. Thanks for the messages I'm receiving from around the world, really interesting group of listeners out there, and you're keeping me on my toes. You can contact me via my website, abwoolpodcast.com, or direct message me on twitter, @DeathLathen, for any comments and all suggestions. Until next, dotsies. [BLANK_AUDIO]