Episode 29 – Two parachute battalions begin training in earnest for Operation “Wedding” aka Reindeer but there’s a hitch

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Chris Latham. This is episode 29, and we're covering the period after the start of Operation Rania, which was the take place in early May, 1978. First, the planning phases, of which there were many. By early that year, intelligence had convincingly proven that there were a number of Swapar bases that were critical to the organization's operations in southern Angoda, and these had to be attacked. Last episode, the main base was at Kasinga, 250 kilometers north of the Cutline, the South African Border. There were signs that Swapar was increasing its attacks on the farm areas around Ovambalan, and their idea was determined to stop these. Swapar's forward operational bases were filling up and heavy support weapons were being moved south. The commercial farming areas were likely to be subjected to a flood of incursions, particularly since these were also time to coincide with the heart of the rainy season. After the first photographs taken by South African Air Force Buccaneers, I spoke about last episode, at indicated Kasinga was the main HQ of Swapar's armed People's Liberation Army of Namibia, a flurry of intelligence gathering began. The Rekis, or reconnaissance groups, entered Angoda with a more accurate picture of where they should focus. While three two battalions for reconnaissance wing augmented these specialists, along with more flights by Canberra's at 20,000 feet, assisted by Mirajas at times. The big question that emerged was the size of the SAD of force needed to attack Kasinga and the second target of Chetakwera, as well as a number of smaller satellite bases around the latter. Meanwhile, a heavy blanket of secrecy enveloped the planning for the upcoming attack on southern Angola. One of the most important characters of the upcoming assault was three two battalion commander Colonel Jan Braytonbach. He had passed through Kasinga on the way back during Operation Savannah three years before, and what's more was a parent trooper with experience in Biafra and Nigeria. He'd also launched one reconnaissance commander, the Rekis, which were an SAD type organization. Of course, he had no idea what Boerta and the Cabinet as well as Army Head for Ljudin were planning. There were a number of other parent trooper commanders in the SAD of who could have been drawn in to this attack, but HQ settled on Braytonbach partly because of his experience in Angola. When he was called into General Filion's office, he was expecting to face some sort of disciplinary hearing, which Braytonbach attracted because of his direct manner. As he entered the office, the short general remained seated behind his desk. This was an unusual way to receive a senior officer of Colonel and above. Furthermore, Filion didn't offer Braytonbach a seat, and merely said, "Jan, I want you to take command of batted troopers who are going to jump in and destroy a Swabbo base in Angola." Later Braytonbach explained it was like being hit in the solar plexus. The general mentioned the targets were Chitra Quera and Kasinga, and said one of these was reserved for the Air Force. Braytonbach remembered entering the town during Savannah, but things were rather vague. They drove through without stopping on their way south out of Angola in 1975, and he was trying to recall what the town looked like. He had actually stopped 20 kilometers towards the border at Teccha-Motetti for a routine break, while waiting for Delval-Linford's Alpha Group San Botanian to catch up. "As for Chitra Quera," Braytonbach was to say later, "it could just as well have been a crater on the moon." The general said the attack would happen soon, but did not provide a date. "As soon as possible, the batted troopers are already called up. You must join them right away at La Taba Ranch," said Filion. Braytonbach accepted the job, then realized he'd last jumped as a paratrooper into Tet Province and Mozambique with a Reduition SAS sometime back. Filion hustled Braytonbach out of his office with a comment that the paratroopers were unfit and needed to get into shape. One paratrooper battalion were waiting while second and third paratrooper battalions were citizen force units, CF, that meant they needed to be called up from Sibi Street. They were on their way to La Taba Ranch, which was a training area adjacent to the Kruger National Park on the La Taba River. It was previously a private game reserve, but it had been bought by the army to train specialist soldiers like paratroopers and sometimes the wreckies. The nearby river was full of crocodiles, lions often broke through the Kruger fence, and elephants were a constant threat. Braytonbach went off to a briefing by the director of army operations at HQ, Brigadier Hunnis Butter. He told him that the plan at that stage was to drop second and third paratrooper battalions on two bases. They were between 20 and 40 kilometers north of Beacon 8.5 and beyond the cut line. This would change later as you're going to hear. Braytonbach figured out that Butter was talking about Chittacquera. Before the airborne assaults, the South African Air Force bombers and fighters would hit Kasinger, code name Moscow, 250 kilometers north of the border. Then they'd returned to Andungwa, refuel, rearm, and take off once more to provide a strike on what Butter called Vietnam. That was the code for Chittacquera. The paratroopers would arrive after this pasting and attack Kasinger and an adrop, meanwhile Chittacquera, would be attacked by land. Braytonbach realized something else. If he was to be in charge of these three paratrooper battalions, how would he be allowed to jump himself and wear Chittacquera or Kasinger? So he decided instead that he'd base himself on board an aloe wet helicopter so he could control both targets simultaneously. That was when he first heard the name of this upcoming operation that was to change the bush war. That called it Brailof or Wedding. What a stupid code name it was to allocate to a Gangho parachute assault he grumbled to himself. Then it was changed to Operation Randia, and as he says, "Someone with a warped sense of humor, Santa Claus's soldiers were coming." The paratroopers arrived at Lataba Ranch, alias in Pala Base because of the herds of Impala. Two and three paratroopers were to emplane and see 130s at Buttercliffe and they were to be flown to Palabora close to the central Kruger Park, and then from there they'd be driven to Impala Base. Because the men of two and three were a territorial unit, as I said, there were campers, in other words, they had jobs as civilians. At least once a year they had attained a training camp for less than a month, and here and there some advanced themselves called up to do a three-month extended deployment in a Vambalat. They'd been used as a reaction force based in Andungwa, which is not exactly what paratroopers are trained to do. They usually spearhead assaults and are an offensive strike force, not a reaction force. When the paratroopers eventually arrived at Impala Base, they really thought it was just advanced training and had no idea whether they waited them in May 1978. The next few weeks, these 450 men woke before dawn, ran long distances through the bush while skirting elephants, eight breakfasts of leathery eggs in greasy bacon, and hunks of bread washed down with sweet coffee, then headed on to weapons training in battle drills. These included liar firing, crawling, machine gun practice along with mortars and firing the Russian RPG-7s. Some wondered why they were practicing to assault fortified guerrilla bases in sections and companies. Battle drills were also odd, including rapid grouping after a parachute drop, attacking trenches and bunkers, all of this at sub-unit level, in other words, small sections. They were used to jumping out of choppers deployed in follow-up operations and suddenly, here they were, practicing conventional parachute drops. How odd. Some began to guess what they were up to, but of course, they had still no idea what the target would be. Other techniques were even more conventional. They were practicing fluts or forward lines, own troops. That was learning how to use coloured flares to mark points for South African Air Force bombers or ground support to pick out friend versus folk. It was the extraction drills that unknowed a few others, along with the FACs or forward air controllers, which meant calling an "air strikes" under fire. Finally, and even more nerve-wracking for some, they had to train to withdraw on foot under fire just in case extraction failed. This was in case they had to fire all the 250 kilometres back to the cut line, but of course, they had no idea why they were being asked to train. Let's alone, that they'd end up jumping into a town that far into Angola. No one had ever done this, so while they imagined it was likely. The final training was to be sessions of hand-to-hand fighting, the use of knives and even unarmed combat. Then something really strange happened. General Fulyun ordered that these men hand in their bayonets. That was a soldier's last line of defence, after the 7.6-2 rounds had run out, and they were staring the enemy in the eye. Braytonbach had a fit, reminding Fulyun and the other SEDF officers that the men were going to be clearing bunkers and may run into an enemy soldier after running out of rounds. As you're going to hear in future episodes, that is precisely what was going to happen. So it was weeks of eat, sleep, train, jump drills, landing drills, emergency drills, extraction drills, jumping from trees and logs, parachute landing falls or PLFs. Running into C160s, then carrying out drops, collecting parachutes, repeat, repeat, repeat. They practiced two real jumps out of the C160s. First, two battalion and then three. Many were practicing with unmodified canopies or pumpkins, as they were known. These were PT-10s and were almost impossible to control. Dumping a jumper, where gravity took them along with the wind. Fortunately, these would be replaced by more modern parachutes by the time of Rennia. Then they were ready, but they would be a glitch. After all the preparations, someone blabbed and rumours began circulating that the SEDF was planning a major assault. The plan is, had some leeway because the rumour mongerers were suggesting that this was going to be a cross-border assault to assist the Redision SAS. Still, Army HQ decided the mission was no longer viable, and both two and three parachute battalions were duly informed to stand down and head off home. They were shocked, but they were told, because their trains so hard they were still going to jump with full kit including RPG 7's, mortars, bombs, rockets, radios, and with live ammunition. Most were also carrying 11 R1 magazines, and the total weight they were going to jump with was around 60kg, and they duly did their obligatory and what they thought was their last jump. That went well, and then they were all sent home. Bratonbuck returned to Pretoria HQ with a fresh tan, but now he developed his nickname which was 'Brainman' or 'Branman' because he spent so much time in the bush, and also because he led black troops. No one was very politically correct back in that day. It quickly became apparent from intelligence gathering in southern Angola that despite the rumours circulating back in South Africa, Swapu was not aware of any imminent conventional invasion by an airborne army. Perhaps this false message could be the SIDF's lucky break. This meant the attack was on again, but now it needed some kind of cover story. That was jeemed up by army in Air Force HQ and called 'Exercise Quick Soldier'. The plan was to publicly announce a war game style exercise to test new battle drills and the new rifles the armored troop carriers. The airborne units would be mobilised alongside one-side infantry battalion in a combat group called 'Julliet'. This new mechanised force would then head off to Ashi Vale or Nia, at Tasha Pan, close to the Angolan border, but only after a very public display north of Kimberley at the Smiths-Turif training area. That bordered the orange river. It was also going to be put on by 72 mechanised brigade and would involve two and three parachute battalions. It was mentioned that was the reason why they'd been training so hard at Lataba farm. This deployment was considered normal by international observers, so far so good, at least from the SIDF's point of view. Swapu meanwhile was aware of these developments, but did not believe an invasion of Angola was likely at least imminently, perhaps by late winter it was in the offing, but not at the beginning of May. All incoming troops ended up in Ashi Vale anyway, further confining any possible double-guessing by the Angodans, so when this battalion finally headed off to northern of Umbaland, it was thought Swapu would take note, but wouldn't suspect the real intention. The Russians also failed to pick up intelligence about this attack despite their spy and top South African navy officer Dieter Gerthardt, who at this stage was sending intelligence to Moscow and, despite their new satellite spying technology. The SIDF Julie sent invitations to the international and local media to join exercise quicksilver near Kimberley and various foreign military attachers Julie arrived with their staff. Eventually a large group of observers of various sorts arrived at Smithstrift at the end of April and beginning of May 1978. 72 motorised infantry brigade or the stalking horse, as some called it, unsuspectingly rolled up at Smithstrift and their new or rifles. It was and immense display by those who saw this exercise, or rifles firing, earlunch attacking, artillery live ammunition testing, mechanised warfare and full view. The observers however noticed that the two parachute battalions appeared to have been withheld. Perhaps they were going to put on a show by the last day, May 4th. Far away in the main city centres of South Africa, around 450 paratroopers bid their families goodbye and then climbed aboard the trains. These men were briefed that they were going to join the exercise near Kimberley. The trains chucked past Blumphantain and then turned eastwards and headed towards Koffee Fontaine. So they thought, we're not going to Tempe, the home of one parachute battalion. And hour later, in the middle of the felt, the trains suddenly halted at night. The men disembarked to find they were marooned on an isolated farm, surrounded by tents and a few dilapidated buildings. They grumbled, preferring Tempe, while they are based in here if they were going to conduct a run of the mill exercise. Some of the more wide awake realised something else may be going on when they spotted De Brén Mann, Colonel Jan Bratenbach. The penny had dropped. The airborne attack on Krasinger, it was to follow, was going to be vastly different things to different people. As I've mentioned Swapur was going to paint a picture of 7,000 racists descending on a refugee camp to slaughter women and children. The essay DF was going to paint a picture of a few good men fighting a camp full of soldiers who were slaughtering South African civilians with mines and bombs. Newspaper reports in South South Africa would call this upcoming operation the most significant paratroop action since the Second World War, such as the German capture of Fort Irman Namel. As Willem Steynkamp points out, those involved remember this operation as one that was strictly limited and which went disastrously wrong at first, yet ended with most objectives being reached. The reality is Rania was much more ambitious than Brailof because the initial plan had not involved a completely airborne attack. What was extraordinary is that it would be the first time in the South African army's history that an airborne attack would be carried out. And as anyone who has studied military history knows, airborne attacks often go disastrously wrong. The list is quite long. The Germans invasion of Krete in 1941, for example, was spearheaded by over 20,000 men, most of whom were derived by transport plans and gliders. While the Germans succeeded in eventually taking the three airfields on Krete, more than 3,000 were killed and Hitler would never attempt such an undertaking again. They would instead be used for specialist insertions or ground-based elite infantry, but never a full-scale paratrooper insertion by air occurred again. And then take the famous bridge to far battle during World War II as another example. That was when the British First Airborne Division sent to take a strategic bridge in the Dutch city of Anum, landed far from its objectives and faced unexpected resistance during September 1944. After nine days of fighting, the men of First Airborne were overwhelmed and lost almost 75% of their troop. They never saw battle again during the Second World War. They suffered 6,000 casualties out of 8,000. It was a complete disaster. However, the British regarded Anum as proof of their soldiers' courage and endurance. Anum became a byword for the fighting spirit of the British people. But in reality, it was a major defeat. Earlier, the D-Day landings had included over 18,000 paratroopers, and that was a success in spite of troops landing off course and missing equipment. So you can forgive the planners for believing they'd get it right, a second time in Anum. Back to 1978, and the South Africans knew a paratrooper insertion could be achieved. What's more, they had the ideal man to lead the jump, special forces expert and former paratrooper Colonel Jan Platenbach. And what of this place called Kasinger? During Portuguese colonial times it had been a small mining town with a long sprawl of buildings built around a deposit of high grade iron ore. Omnously, for some of the South African paratroopers, it was also less than a kilometer from a winding tributary of the Kabbangar River. Some were going to discover how difficult it was to survive landing in a relatively deep river with 60 kilograms of equipment. Kasinger was deep inside hostile territory, which meant the airborne units would have to be extracted by helicopters to a safe area nearby before they were flown out in C-130s and C-160s. This area became known as the Helicopter Admin area, or HAA, around 30 kilometers to the east of Kasinger, where there was enough open ground. Because the SAF was, had so few super frellins, that the bulk of the men would have to be lifted out using the smaller Puma choppers that could only carry 10 men each, this meant shuttling the choppers back and forth from Kasinger to the HAA. The plan is thought that two hours would be long enough to clear the bunkers and trenches and extract the men, as you'll hear that was hopelessly optimistic. What made the whole idea even more incredible was that the Angolans could call on Cuban-paralleled MIG-21s as air-to-ground support. These would have made short work of the Puma's and super frellins, unless the airborne assault could have been restricted to these two short hours, following which the paratroopers would leave as swiftly as possible and avoid being shut out of the air in the Puma's or super frellins. It was also a Fuplot force-based only 16 km south of Kasinger at Tetshe-Motiti. The South Africans knew they were around half a dozen T-34s along with Soviet BTR armoured personnel carry as they were with hundreds of Cubans and Fuplot troops. Looking back on this moment, we should also consider the political gamble. Ups savannah had cast South Africa as a Nazi state intent on invading its neighbours in the mold of Germany attacking Poland. Some in Pretoria were in two mines, as the men gathered at the isolated farm outside Bumvertain. Yes, the main aim was to kill planned commander Dimo Chamambo to destroy ammunition and equipment and also seize important military documents, which may be Russian or Cuban and origin, and then to destroy ammunition dumps equipment and the weapons. The documents were important, but Pretoria was playing a diplomatic card. They could wave the ease in front of the Western media's proof of cold wars in arrogance. They believed abducted Sapa Yohan van der Mesh was also in the small jail that Kasinger remembered last podcast, and if they found him, the operation would be deemed an internal success for National Party propaganda. Kasinger was only one of the targets. The other was Jettakwera, where the mechanised force would attack Overland. This was going to be a close call for the SEDF, and would also be another incident reinforcing Victoria's as pariahs' status. Friends would become few and far between after this attack, particularly when Swapa alleged over 200 of the victims were children. This has been disputed, but try convincing those who've listened to the survivors relating harrowing stories every year when Swapa gathers in Kasinger to commemorate May 4, 1978. I've listened to those reports and I've also spoken to S.A.D. of veterans involved, and they admit there were casualties amongst disability and population, including children, but they dispute the number. As we all know, a single death of a child during military action is unacceptable, and yet we must ask a follow-up question. While we're so many heavily armed Swapa cadres, based inside a camp, they said was packed with refugees. Furthermore, aerial photos of Kasinger show quite clearly that it was heavily protected by trenches and bunkers and anti-aircraft positions, and a large cash or military material was discovered such as ammunition during the raid. Refugees are never housed inside a militarized space, and this is totally against both the Red Cross and Red Crescent policies. What was Swapa thinking of what they say about civilians dying is true? It's time to hold for this episode and secure the perimeter. Next episode, we'll hear about the opening phases of the attack on Kasinger, and the second major assault at the same time on Jetiqueta. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, Spotify, et al. And if you're interested in sending me a message, head off to the website abwarpodcast.com or through Twitter. My handle is @desleyedem. Until next, goodbye. [Music]