Episode 28 – Operation Reindeer gets the green light after SAAF Buccaneers discover Cassinga camp

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Tess Latham. This is Episode 28 and we're dealing with events in early 1978, mainly Operation Randia and the Attack on Kosinga. As with Savannah, I'm going to spend some time and a few episodes drilling down into Absorendia because it has left a legacy of recrimination and bitterness, particularly between Swapo and former South African Defence Force commanders. While most competence now have allowed bygones to be bygones, the Attack on Kosinga forms one of the cornerstones of Swapo's propaganda of this war, while engolan forces are more forgiving, as you'll hear the details I think you'll understand why. In the wake of Operation Savannah, border incursions and unrest escalated in Northern ofumberland. Swapo was now crossing into Northern South Africa in small, likely armed sections or groups. Every now and again, a larger group would cross as we heard last episode, with more than 18 surgeons fought running battles with SAD platoons to and fro across the cutline. South African political leadership believed the increased activity in early 1978 was directly linked to the effort by the big five Western countries, the US, UK, France, West, Germany and Canada, to negotiate a settlement regarding South Africa. Other negotiations stalled over two main issues, the timing of the SAD troop withdrawal and ownership of South Africa's main port of office Bay, there was still some hope. Swapo and South Africa could not agree on the troop timetable while of office Bay was completely off the table as far as Pretoria was concerned. My February 1978 Swapo's publicity secretary, Mohamedi Clabeinello, was in Wintook having phone back from New York-based negotiations. Swapo was completely against the idea that the SAD would be allowed to station 1500 troops in South Africa during the election process, and there was an hurt Wintain and Oscebello, they entered the SAD to be moved far to the south or preferably right out of the country. When it became clear in March that there would be no immediate settlement, insurgent activity died down a bit, with the infiltration rate dropping drastically. However, two civilians were murdered, both were Vombo-Hedmond. Even on the 25th of April, South Africa formally accepted the western proposals for a Namibian settlement which Swapo then rejected. While the diplomatic tide came in Wint, the South Africans were actually well on the way to planning a massive invasion of southern Angola once more, but first, the quiet of the past month would be broken. By March 27th, the Swapo team assassinated high-ranking administrator Clemens Kapoor, who was chief of the Herrero tribe. Because he was regarded as a foe of the South African government and the Democratic Turnhala Alliance, the DTA, it was suggested first that Pretoria had had a bummed-off. That of course was confused logic. As three two battalions Colonel Young Bratenbach wrote later, chief Clemens Kapoor was almost universally considered to be the most popular candidate for prime minister or president by the majority of southwesterners. But Kapoor also happened to be Swapo president Sam Neom's biggest political threat, and so the Herrero leader had to be terminated. Later Swapo admitted to killing him claiming he was a sellout. Then in April 1978 insurgencies and contexts rose once more. Swapo lost seven soldiers in a skirmish with three two battalion, a few days later, a security force patrol ambushed a Swapo section and killed five. But the last week of April saw another escalation, with a vambo's minister of justice Tara and Billy narrowly escaping death, when an insurgent blooms off up planting a mine just outside the minister's house. It's what security forces call an "own goal". On April 28th, a large group of Swapo guerrillas numbering around 100 attacked an SAD patrol in Western Vambo. Two Swapo soldiers died, and the fact that such a large section of Swapo was involved worried Petoria. Then the legislative building at Angwediva was booby-trapped on April 29th, and a day later a bus with at least 73 passengers on board was hijacked between Oshikati and Ryokana and then driven across the border into Angoda. These were unstable back home in South Africa. The far right was nipping at the National Party heels, calling them "weak" and demanding concerted action, while the ruling party was extremely concerned by the perception of the international community. While the MP was trying hard to be the party of reason, they were about to launch another cross-border incursion into Angola, which would lead to a stupendous outcry. This they knew. That's Petoria began to build a narrative that Swapo would bring this invasion on itself by its killing of civilians, but the Nationalists also knew they had placed a more stringent arms boycott should Operation Rennia go ahead. They were caught between a rock and a hot place. One of the more informative books about this time is Jan Bratenbach's "Eagles Strike". He was officer commanding 3-2 Battalion, and his book published for the first time in 2008 is "Chock a Block Full of Detail" about Operation Rennia from the inside. As we cover this operation, I'm going to turn to his first person account quite regularly. The Colonel is still alive, but I'm told he isn't "no mood to chitchat" about the past, so my attempts at reaching him have not been successful so far. Another excellent source was ANC Military Veteran and ex-compoint to receive his soldier Joseph Kobo. He was a logistics officer in Kasinger at the time of the operation, and just missed the battle after he'd headed off to pick up supplies two days before the attack in May 1978. Kobo was late getting back, and that probably saved his life as their SEDF launched their airborne invasion. Unfortunately, Kobo passed away of natural causes in 2019, so I cannot interview him regarding his time at Kasinger, but his book "Waiting in the Wing" has helped fill gaps, particularly about what Swapo was up to at Kasinger. Because of the disinformation and propaganda around the attack, Kobo and Bratenbach are actually crucial to the story. They fought on opposite sides, but they have a similar take on what happened at the town in May 1978. But first, the story about how the South Africans came to target the town in the first place. Chris Tyrion was the director of the southern African desk at military intelligence in 1978. The region was broken into the western or Angolan desk, the central desk, which included Zambia Botswana and Zimbabwe, and the eastern desk, mostly Mozambique. It became apparent to Tyrion and Komodan Biskov, who headed up the Angolan branch, that Swapo was increasing its presence in the Kundini province, but where was the main base? On the 27th of October 1977, the Rekis and Three-two battalion had struck at Ehake, which was Swapo's eastern front headquarters around 30 km north of the Cutline. By now, the South Africans had instituted a number of beacons along that Cutline running mainly east to west, these were spaced 10 km apart, so the Beacon 35 meant it was 350 km west of Rekona. The Beacons 22-35 were a particular interest to the SEDF and managed to rest control of this region between these two by forcing Swapo to evacuate Ehake. And yet, captured Swapo gorillas kept telling the South Africans about a place they called "The Farm", which was far to the north of the Cutline and crucial in Swapo planning. The Rekis had spent months searching for this place, but to no avail. The SEDF knew that "The Farm" was the forward technical command headquarters where plans chief of staff, Demu, and Mambo deployed his HQ. Every Swapo gorilla had to pass through this base on their way to the operational area of Umbalat. It was where these fighters drew weapons and kit, received advance training, and returned for a bit of R&R between deployment inside South Africa. The Farm was also known to contain quite a number of women and children. There were relatives of Swapo and planned fighters, and part of the camp included an area supposedly containing prostitutes. The SA Air Force was also searching for this base, and for months they found nothing. It got so bad that Colonel Blacky Deswatt was part of upstaff at Air Force, and militant intelligence Cristilian, who have just heard about, waged a bottle of whiskey that either Tireon's wreckies or Deswatt's Canberra's would find the farm. One day, a Canberra returned with the usual film strips of the southern ingot in front, and finally, the SEDF had its lead. The Canberra had photographed a town called Kasinger from 20,000 feet, and found what appeared to be a white-washed outline of the map of South West Africa arranged on an open space. When the intelligence boffins appeared more closely at the photographs, they realized that the open space was a parade ground filled with hundreds of Swapo troops. The map of South West Africa was the outline of the parade ground. Someone had made a big mistake by painting this map, which showed up clearly against the earthy colours of ingot. Tireon and the wreckies had been looking in the wrong place, in the bush near waterholes, chanas, near rocky art crops, not thinking for a moment that Swapo would locate the farm inside a well-established town. The photo interpreters at Joint Air Reconnaissance Interpretation Centre, or Jarrick, flipped through a few more rolls, and when I convinced this was indeed Swapo's main base, they'd found the farm. Tireon lost his bet, and Julie presented blacky to Swapo with a bottle of whiskey neatly packed in a wooden box. Unfortunately, when the Swapo opened the box, he found a miniature bottle of whiskey packed in straw. No one had said anything about the size of the bottle. Many intelligence doesn't always cover itself in glory. As soldiers and having met some of these, let's say, less informed men of the section, we would joke about military intelligence being a contradiction in terms. There appeared to be political diplories at times, and often were not the sharpest tools in the army shed, despite their arrogance and self-importance swaggering. By the late 1970s, the entire intelligence set up around Task Force 101 was South West Africa had been re-jigged. Their HQ was encroached from Tain Ebo, south of the Red Line, but centrally located, and with an easy reach of Oshikati, that's the HQ of Sector 1-0. This team began to cross reference points on the ground to the farm. Commandant Johann Simon had reorganized intelligence, which was now start with far more effective officers than in the previous two decades. The Commandant's team prepared overlays, reflecting a list of contacts and sightings of plan insurgents. They mapped infiltration routes, waterholes, fences, and telephone wires, which were used for navigation purposes by infiltrating Swapu sections. Water was the most important element for Swapu, as they walked to South West African bush, and here, Jeric and other intel staff outdid themselves. The waterholes, and what were known as chanas, were vital. A chana is a wonder of surface geology. Because of the thick bush-covered Calhari sand, water was only found at these water holes and chanas, and chanas were low grass-covered turf-bottom depressions, where local crawls concentrated in close proximity. These chanas could provide water during the dry months. The water table you see is quite close to the surface, and water could easily be tapped by digging a shallow well using a small spade, and in some cases, you can actually use your hand to dig and you'll reach water in a minute. The population living around these chanas and waterholes were largely Swapu supporters. They were guanyamas, and as they were told interrogators and quoted by Jan Breitenbach, they were flesh of their flesh and blood of their blood. While this seems like a wonderful opportunity for Swapu and Plan, it was a weakness. The South Africans mapped these villages, waterholes and chanas, and now had an excellent list of roots to be used. Remember, this part of Angoda is as flat as a tabletop, and in those days, as I've said, there's no GPS. Swapu insurgents used the wires and waterholes, the chanas and dodgy crawls and villages, as well as cooker shops, to navigate into and out of Ambulent. The SADF now had a distribution system for sharing intelligence between various agencies, and this led to the joint intelligence centers bringing up. Dates of infiltrations became more reliable, along with roots, strength of Swapu sections, operational bases and sometimes even Swapu and Plan targets. Using these methods, the SADF pinpointed a place called Chettiquera, 30 kilometers north of Beacon Line, as an important center for Swapu. This was given the nickname Vietnam. There were a number of satellite bases south of Chettiquera, alias Vietnam, towards the cutline itself. By March 1978, the South Africans had a pretty complete picture of the enemy's actions and training centers. But they saw alarm them. Chettiquera was manned by up to 300 Swapu fighters, with a few hundred more arraigned along the satellite bases. They were well dug in with extensive trench and bunker systems, defended by mortars, heavy machine guns and B-10 anti-tank weapons. The Swapu had made one critical mistake. They ran these bases in a line north to south. There was not much attempt made at securing their flanks. The northeast in particular had no defence networks, and it was clear that Chettiquera could be attacked by an SADF mechanised approach, hooking into Swapu's open flank, as Jan Braydenbach puts it. The main target, however, remained Kasinger, and this was codenamed Moscow. It was 250 kilometers inside Angola, and there were significance where there was a bush in Myanmar forest between it and the cutline. There was also a sprawling base, large by the standards of Angola, and protected by an intricate trench and bunker system. There were heavy machine gun positions along with 82 mm mortars, B-10s, and possibly said Intel anti-aircraft guns. But it had gaps, particularly on the western side. As we'll hear in upcoming podcast, it was the anti-aircraft guns that were going to pose a major threat during the airborne assault of Kasinger. The Intel folks weren't sure about the anti-aircraft guns, but the parabets we're going to find out, for sure. The other challenge was 20 km south of Kasinger at a small town called Tecce Muteti. That's where mixed Cuban and Fumpla battle group was based, along with a squadron of T-34 tanks and motorised infantry carried in Russian BTRs. The infantry also had a few soft-bodied trucks, which were used to carry troops and toe anti-aircraft guns that could be swivel to fire horizontally. It was this battalion that was going to cause the SADF a lot of trouble in the upcoming attack on Kasinger. Intelligence suggested the Swapo strength that Kasinger was up to 3000 troops, depending on the movement into an art of Avambalant. A strong contingent of veteran fighters were housed in a tented camp a few hundred metres out of Kasinger to the northwest. It was during these intelligence gathering weeks that the SADF picked up another piece of interesting information. Apparently, the South African sapper of under mesh would be an abducted at a water point in Avambalant in February 1978, was incarcerated in Kasinger's small jail. Because of this, the SAA force promised they'd avoid bombing the little building. It was true, by the mesh'd had been jailed there, but he had already been moved by the time of Operation Rangia. Luckily, it would appear, because one of the buccaneers dropped its 1000-pound bomb onto the structure during the attack flattening it. A strong Cuban training and advisor team was also in Kasinger mentoring Swapo and plan troops. So, Kasinger was an enticing target all around, and quite obviously from a military standpoint, it was strategic. Earlier, an East German signalling unit had been sent to Kasinger to help Swapo deploy a sophisticated radio communication network, but this turned and turned excellent source of information for the SADF. Their electronic warfare teams based at Rundu and Kadimum Ulylu began intercepting the East German messages. The SADF had hired Spanish-speaking Chileans as well as Portuguese-speaking staff and began picking up the radio traffic between Cuban combat units, pilots, air traffic control, and advisor teams. Immediately, it became apparent that mid-19s and 21s were based at Bier, Luena, and other areas in the west of Angola, and could be rapidly redeployed south through Lubango and Menong. That was a major threat, as it was only a short hop from there to Kasinger. Passand Kasinger and Chatequero, the planners back in South Africa, were very interested in a string of smaller bases to the East, most laid between Beacon's 25 and 31, and most were quite shallow, only a few kilometres from the border. The deepest was Omapapa around 30 kilometres in sign Angola. Until three two battalion destroyed the Swapo base and the East at Eheki, the insurgents would develop well-defended static bases. Now, they'd learn to be more mobile in the south of Angola, preferring to shift their locales as regularly as possible. But Swapo commanders based further west towards their Atlantic Ocean had not learned their lesson. They persisted in establishing permanent, easily identifiable camps around Chatequero, which is going to make things a little easier for the South Africans in the coming battles. So by now, there were around 5,000 Swapo guerrillas deployed from Kasinger southwards with a few more thousand training at Kasinger and further north. Opposing them, were 5,000 South African troops stretched along the 1,000km border from Kaulkafield to the eastern Kapevi. Task Force 101 was commanded by Major General Ian Gleason, who was in charge of all territory north of the Red Line, up to the front line country borders, Angola, Zambia and Botswana. 101 units were also permitted to cross the border in hot pursuit operations, but only to a depth of 50km. It was a tangled web of protocols. These limits were formalised in later years, as you'll hear, where commanders could cross into Angola without waiting for permission from Army HQ, but were strictly told to attack Swapo and not Fuplar, all the Cubans. Later, there were granted permission to travel 100km into Angola, but any operations deeper had then to be authorised by Army HQ. While this was going on, 3-2 battalion were permitted as far as they could walk into Angola with all the kit on their back, provided they didn't call back up from south of the cut line. This meant the battalion was deploying its own guerrilla platoons on a permanent basis inside Angola, pestering Swapo and Fuplar. Intel also began to circulate, that Swapo's forward operational bases were filling up fast, and it was time for the South Africans to begin a very special training cycle, preparing the parachute battalions and mechanised units for the upcoming Operation Rania. We'll hear about that next episode. Please rate the podcast on your platform of choice and email me through the website abwarponfoss.com. What direct message me on Twitter, my handle is @DaysLatin. Until next, we bye. [BLANK_AUDIO]