Episode 27 - A prelude to Operation Reindeer and the SADF airborne attack on Cassinga

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Leutham. This is episode 27 and we're focusing on the end of 1977 through to early 1978. Later that year, Operation Randia would once again shake South African political leadership and cause more ripples in the global pond and also leave a legacy which Swapak continues to commemorate to this day. Just as an aside, this week I had a chance to discuss various tactics and matters with General Roulant de Fris, who is one of the most important military tacticians of the South African Defence Force. He was instrumental in setting up 61 mechanised battalion group so through the next few episodes we'll hear his first hand account of various action and his innovative leadership concepts. At times, I'll include the voices of those who fought on both sides which I'm sure will hope you'll find informative. Remember, this is not a series that seeks to glorify war. It seeks to inform and educate those who have no idea what significant events and issues are at the heart of our recent past and also to honor those who are no longer with us. Because as you know, those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it in no way as this more apparent than in southern Africa. Major General Janie Helden has to command in southwest Africa in September 1977, and as we've heard last episode, he arrived in the territory as the bush war morphed into a full-blown insurgency. There was consternation across of Ambaland as Swapar increased its attacks on traditional leaders and the security forces. For Helden Ace, a major theme had developed in managing the insurgency. As you've heard, his orders were diverse, but the main idea was to keep Swapar infiltrations at a low level so that the Turnhalla Alliance could develop into a counter-revolution political powerhouse. That was not going to be easy. Swapar was infiltrating in sufficient numbers by late 1977 to cause the SADIF severe headaches as Leopold Skoltz put in his great book The SADIF in the Border War. In a nutshell, the major problem was initiative. Swapar was determining the pace and scale of this war, and the SADIF needed to change that and quickly. The first obvious place to begin was the concept which Colonel Jan Breitenbach had instituted to art guerrilla, the guerrilla movements using three two battalion amongst other sharp tools. Breitenbach was a pioneer in this concept at least in the SADIF. With a core of ex-FNLA troops, he was to build this unit into one of the most feared battalions probably across Africa in the post-colonial period. They were highly efficient soldiers, spoke Portuguese and other engordan and southwest African languages, and operated secretly clandestinely. Their strength was cross-border operations in an era when Pretoria was limiting action across the Cutland, that area of cleared bush along the south of the south-west African engordan border. Breitenbach wanted to turn southern engordan into a no-go zone for Swapo. This would knock the insurgents off balance, and he believed doing so consistently would eventually call Swapo and its armed wing plan, or the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, to collapse psychologically. The official and secret director from the SADIF HQ was to deny Swapo an area of 50 kilometers north of the border. However, by the end of 1977, it was clear that even with three two battalions and credible successes, the border was almost as porous as before, and Swapo still held the initiative. Back in Vintuk, Kraldenhase was pondering the scale of the response. In one of his reports, back to SADIF HQ at Furtreche Huchte, he warned that it would be folly to fight a protracted defense of war against an insurgency, all that would mean is their SADIF would sustain casualties and eventually lose. By carrying the war to the enemy, he wrote, "By inflicting disproportionately heavy casualties, the task becomes manageable. SADIF units will have again to be trained in the way of their forebears." I would have liked to have spoken to Yani Kraldenhase, but he is no more passing away in 2018. For what he meant by the way of the forebears was the manner in which the Boers outfought the British during the South African War, the Anglo-Boer War. The Boers there were the guerrillas and the British the conventional soldiers. Kraldenhase's approach was built in Braytonbuck's principle and adopted by the SADIF HQ. In a document called the SADIF Basic Doctrine for Counter Insurgency Rural and dated November in 1977, the concept was outlined more methodically. Up to now, the SADIF Strategic Doctrine was based on British Army tactics. Here's Roland de Fris with some background. As the war was developing in Africa and elsewhere, we needed to think about operating in combat groups. At that site, we were still audently following the British doctrine from the Second World War, as bouncing along routes with vanguards and advanced guards and rear guards and flanking guards, etc., etc. We knew that could not work. So we started thinking about mobile warfare. At that site, I was already doing a lot of reading. I was reading German concepts, Austrian concepts, with regards to mechanized warfare, mobile warfare and such. Then I was also studying the books that was written by Guderian, Panzer leader and books that were written by people like Friedrich Belellen from Manantin, who I personally met later on. This obviously called for fundamental changes. Up to now, the basic defensive reaction technique meant that the insurgents could operate almost without fear in the south of Engurler, despite three two battalions' attentions. That's because the SADIF could not cross the border in large numbers. Freedom of action was largely the prerogative of the enemy, and the SADIF had perforce to dance to their tune, as Heldin has pointed out. This had to change, because defensive tactics never win a war against a guerrilla insurgency, or probably against anyone. The SADIF had to go over to offensive tactics to beat Swapu. The object of any future action should include the destruction of the enemy, along with all the logistics and infrastructure. And it was with this in mind that the plans for what was eventually called Operation Rania were drawn up. In December 1977, an informal gathering of South Africa's political leadership took place at an unpretentious East London seaside cottage. It was located at the resort known as Obos, south of the city, and the cottage was owned by BJ Forster, South Africa's Prime Minister. Right, Hervillum Stencom reports that the details of exactly what was said they are buried in secret files, but the decisions would have far reaching effects on southern Africa, more by this in a second. Forster remember was still pushing back against Burta and Magnus Malan, who wanted to throw the diplomatic handbook out the window and invade Angola as regularly as possible. Operation Savannah had damaged Pretoria's diplomatic efforts in Africa, and Malan and Burta were of the opinion that most African nations would never support a white minority run in South Africa, and they were correct. Savannah had wrecked Forster's Dayton policy, but there was also no denying that the increased Swapu incursions meant the SADIF had to take radical measures to capture the insurgency. In October 1977, the principal spokesman Major General Wally Black said there were around 300 insurgents in the operational area, and contexts and firefights between security forces and Swapu averaged around a hundred a month. That was more than three a day. The SADIF also believed there were around 2,000 Swapu insurgents in Angola and around 1400 in Zambia. As relevant a priest said to me, this was a corporal's war because the basic SADIF patrol was usually a 10 man section led by a corporal. One of the most memorable clashes was also to take place on the 27th of October 1977. That's when one of these small sections led by a corporal ran into a large unit of 80 Swapu gorillas in a Vumberland later in the afternoon. The patrol was vastly outnumbered 8-to-1, but instead of running away, the South Africans went on the offensive. The calculated risk paid off reinforcements were dropped by helicopter and the contact turned into a three day long running battle that seized sword across the cutline. At the end, 61 insurgents were dead, along with five security force members, a 6th Thite of his wounds a month later. Those in other battles of World War II or even Vietnam and even Afghanistan would scoff at these casualty figures, but remember this border war was low intensity. And this battle happened to be the biggest battle fought in South West Africa since the territory had been captured from the Germans in 1915. To put it another way, six months of casualties had taken place in 72 hours. If that wasn't an increase in the insurgency, then nothing was. As force then, the cabinet gathered in the obelsea cottage, there must have noted the fact that the army was calling for more offensive action and the signs of Swapu activity had increased. The outcome of the cutline battle was a loss for Swapu but SADF intelligence did not crow about it. There was no reason for jubilation. If Swapu was mobilizing so many men and women, what would happen in the next year or two? Diplomatically, the reason for Swapu's intensification made sense. South Africa had been meeting with the big five Western nations, the US, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada, to negotiate a settlement in South West Africa where the SADF could then withdraw. The general election was planned followed by independence for the territory. But these negotiations stalled for two reasons. Firstly, Victoria refused to hand over Volphus Bay, which had been South Africa's property since the 19th century, as we have heard. Secondly, The Pretoria refused to remove all SADF members before independence and wanted these to be withdrawn in a phased approach. The United Nations was not trusted by Pretoria and the UN would end up sending a military force into the territory during the period of elections. Pretoria recognized that because the UN was backing Swapo as part of its post-colonial narrative, it would obviously be anti-Solatric. So let's return for a moment to Obus. A planned foreign operation was apparently dreamed up at this meeting. Along with foster, Minister of Defense, P.W. Butter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. Butter. Chief of the SA Defense Force, Magnus Malan, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Brant Fouris, that were joined by the Chief of the South African Army, Constant Foulune. The main subject of the meeting was the negotiations around South Africa and how to ensure that South Africa's continued support of the Democratic Turnhalla Alliance, or DTA, would win the UN supervised elections planned for Namibia in 1978. During this meeting, author Edward Alexander in his book The Cassinger Raid said it was decided that Swapo needed to be dealt a significant blow, a kind of sucker punch that would convince those living in a Wombeland that voting for Swapo was a waste of time and dangerous. P.W. Butter later said that political success in a Wombeland dependent on military success and that the SAD should strike deep into Angola to make a point. His position dominated the discussions and gained credence when the increased insurgency of the New Year in 1978 forced Foster's hand, here are a few of the incidents. On the 2nd of January 1978, the Security Force patrolers hit in a Swapo ambush, but two Swapo members were killed in the firefight. A couple of days later, Swapo shot dead two Avambo traditional leaders for being SAD of sympathizers, then in January 8th, four Black civilians died, and six were wounded when a planned landmine detonated under their vehicle. Shortly afterwards, the Security Force soldier and two insurgents started in a contact, then two more SAD of troops were killed in another clash. Later in January, two more contacts killed eight insurgents in one SAD of soldiers. This was heavy going, 18 cases of infiltration from Angola, but things were going to get much worse. In the first week of February, Avambo travel government Minister of Health and Welfare Toivo Shia Gaia was assassinated. There's a clear link between his execution by Swapo and a meeting in Vintok on the same day, the 7th of February, where representatives of the Western Five and South African officials gathered to talk about the planned elections. A clear message was being delivered by Swapo. There would be no negotiation with South Africa, and backing the resistance movement was the United Nations. On February 10th, the Western Five gathered in New York for last chance talks on a negotiated settlement, and representing South Africa was Rowan Minister Pekboita. Swapo leaders Sam Newyoma and other movement officials were also in the American city. On the same day of the New York meeting, and just to add weight to Swapo's position, the border war escalated once more, with reports that a group of insurgents were pursued over the border and eight had been killed. On the 19th of February, the Caprivi experience that direct assault was Swapo based in San Zambia, crossed the border, and fired an anti-tank RPG at a South African troop carrier, killing four SEDF soldiers, including two middle-ranking officers. And of Umbalan was now experiencing many clashes and skirmishes, around the same time Swapo opened fire on a water supply point, killing two security for soldiers and losing two themselves in the follow-up operation. But the biggest shock in late February for South Africans was the abduction of a South African engineer called Sapper Johan van der Mesh in Central of Umbal near the cutline. He was eventually repatriated in 1982, and really hear more about this incident in later podcasts. But as you can see, as the diplomatic flurry accelerated, so did the war. A few days before the end of February on the 21st, a large group of planned insurgents abducted a teacher and 119 children from the St. Mary's Mission in Central of Umbal. This was an Anglican church, only a few hundred meters south of the cutline. Three of the children escaped and told SEDF they had been forced march across the border and taken to a planned training camp. The hawks in Pretoria were now itching to respond. Diplomatically, a number of things then took place which had a direct impact on both the war and future negotiations. Firstly, Sam Newyoma was interviewed by the South African Broadcasting Corporation's Cliff Saunders, much maligned during a project, but his Q&A with Newyoma caused some problems for Swapo. You see, Newyoma was preaching the gospel of an armed resistance divorce from the idea of a democratic election. We have to try and remember the invective of this time was dotted with us and them positions, so it was no surprise, capitalist versus communists. When Swapo came to power in the Mibbia, said Newyoma, those who were fighting with the SEDF, the traitors, as he called them, would be done away with by the people. When independence came, that actually didn't happen, but that was much later. So in February 1978, Newyoma said that, "Black majority rule is art. We are not fighting even for majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in the Mibbia for the benefit of the Mibbia people. We are revolutionaries." The influence of the Cubans and their history was duly noted, the fact that they were on the ground. It was likely that the Mibbia would end up as a one party socialist state, so the dime was cast at least in Pretoria's eyes. Swapo was only pretending to win democracy, but they really wanted us to dominate through terror. History is an odd educator. I was present at the Mibbia in Pisa Court signing in 1988 in the Congo capital of Brussels, and Swapo had changed its tune by then. Just out of interest, a little aside here, that was on the 13th of December 1988, a day before my birthday. As the Soviet Union had collapsed, and Cuba was honored out of Angola, the pressure was on Swapo in those days. The cold warhead puzzled out, the Berlin Wall was about to come down, the revolution was not being televised anymore by Eastern Europeans and Moscow. Newyoma and Swapo were forced to change tack at that point and pushed to the negotiation table by the Russians, and at the same time, the South Africans were pushed to the table by the Americans. Back in early 1978, Newyoma's statements were a diplomatic cannon fighter for the apartheid government. He wasn't interested in Black Majority rule or elections, he wanted power through the barrel of his gun. Plan guerrilla combat units infiltrated northern of Umba land from Swapo military fronts in southern Angola, and many instances civilians were crossing the border into Angola to join Swapo, and were escorted by armed plan fighters on foot. It first became to Fuplar or Angola in army camps despite Fuplar's denial. After the war, many first-hand accounts were documented explaining how closely the two military organizations worked, which was no surprise. This close relationship, though, was going to backfire on Fuplar over the coming years. So these new Swapo interns would be rested and fed at these temporary camps, while some received medication, as they were to be transported to Swapo training facilities in Angola. Then plan fighters who escorted these men and women would return to their operational areas in Umba land. At this stage, the SAG if it cleared most people from a distance of around ten kilometers on both sides of the border, and it cut down much vegetation to improve visibility. What was the SAG to do about these insurgents, and the fact that hundreds of Umbos and other people were crossing the border to join Swapo? They clearly had to deal with plan training bases, and so an intense operation was planned, which became Operation Rainier, an event the Namibian government calls the "Casinga-Masika". There's been much debate around this attack on Kasinger, where it's thought around 612 men, women and children recalled, at least according to Swapo. Telling this story is difficult. No one agrees about anything. For the South Africans, the plan based harbored terrorists, not civilians. For Swapo, the plan based was a refugee camp full of women and children. Some say a thousand men and women and maybe as many as 300 children died. Even today, Namibians involved con degree on exactly what happened, and even those present on the ground contradict each other. In fact, Swapo has no records of what happened there except for photographs of mass graves, and even these, I debate it. By the way, SAG reports will also be contradictory. So I'm going to try and explain Operation Rainier's significance, nevertheless, because Swapo remains the party in power in Namibia, and use these sorts of events as reminders to the local population about their significance. Most citizens of Namibia were born long after this operation, and are more worried these days about employment and education than they are about who did what in Kasinger in May 1978. But it's an important rallying call for a government that's been in power for 30 years, and each year they will art survivors who tell their stories which are powerful and emotional. So back to 27th February 1978, when Magnus Malin submitted a request to the Minister of Defense PW Butter to launch an attack on five Swapo bases in southern Angola, which at that stage was called Operation Brailof or Bridal as an wedding. Four of the five points of interest were between eight and 39 kilometers inside Angola, and known as Ehek, Wilemba, Dom Dondola, and Chitgara, and were within a 40k radius of each other. The fifth Kasinger was the furthest north by far. South Africa's cabinets, including Defence Minister PW Butter, initially turned down the plan to attack Kasinger because it had a large number of refugees believed to be living [BLANK_AUDIO] the swap of trainees. Arming and killing women and children would create problems for their party government. It would be the second invasion of Engola within a couple of years following Savannah. Forster was also worried about something else. It's long ago folks but there was something called the Information Scandal going on in science on Africa. National party supporters were using ill-gotten money to buy newspapers such as the citizen. There was a campaign to include churches in the propaganda for apartheid post the disaster that was the Soweta uprising of 1976. Forster worried that attacking this large camp at Kasinga would provoke the international community. Chief of the Army General Constan Fulyun did not take too kindly to foster his pre-barrication. It has been reported that Fulyun threatened to abort the whole operation into Engola if Kasinga was to be excluded from the SAD of planned attacks. This was followed up later by General Fulyun sending a formal memo to Defence Minister Magnus Malan on Wednesday the 8th of March 1978. The title of the memo was the "Roll von Kasinga" and the "Millitarra Ansluck" "DNC-based Africa" or the "Roll of Kasinga" and the military onslaught against southwest Africa. Included in this document was a list of 22 items that Fulyun said proved Kasinga was a military camp and he argued aggressively to include the small town in the upcoming operation. In fact, Fulyun went further according to Kasinga, the main target. There are interesting reasons provided by Fulyun. Plan commander Dimal Ha Mambo had his HQ in Kasinga. That was also the central point for all Swapo military operations in South West Africa and that all mind-laying refresher courses were being presented at Kasinga. Kasinga, though, would stain the SAD of copybook, no matter what has been said and by whom. As Colonel Jan Braytenbach wrote in his book, on the assault on Kasinga, he was there, of course, called "Eagle Strike" for May 1978, was a day of glory or a day of shame. Just to add a religious spin on the attack, the 4th of May 1978 was also a sentient day. So next week we'll hear about how the SAD have finally approached Operation Rainier and their attempted killing three birds with one stone. Please rate the podcast on iTunes or your platform of choice. You can also reach me on Twitter and Facebook, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter, Twitter. Until next, goodbye.