Episode 23 – The SADF re-equips after Savannah and the Ratel is born
20m 42s
Operation Savannah, launched by South Africa in October 1975, was initially the deepest and fastest mobile invasion since World War II, aimed at supporting FNLA and UNITA forces against the MPLA in Angola. However, it quickly turned into a strategic disaster. The SADF’s Eland armored cars and Unimog/Bedford trucks were ill-suited for African conditions: they bogged down in mud, lacked firepower to penetrate Soviet T-34 and T-54/55 tanks, and were outranged by Cuban BM-21 rocket systems. This forced a reliance on speed and close-quarters fighting, which later inspired the development of the Ratel IFV—a six-wheeled, dual-purpose infantry fighting vehicle that provided unmatched mobility and protection, though it lacked a stabilized gun.
Politically, the invasion alienated African nations. The OAU recognized the MPLA in January 1976, and the US Clark Amendment cut American support. South Africa’s diplomatic ties shrank by half. By March 1976, the SADF withdrew in an orderly fashion, but the MPLA and Cubans quickly occupied key towns. The operation failed its core goal: preventing Swapo from using Angola as a base. Instead, Swapo gained secure staging areas, intensifying the border war for the next 15 years. The SADF’s tactical competence impressed adversaries, but the strategic outcome was a costly failure that led to thousands of deaths across Angola, Namibia, and South Africa.
[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 23 and we are dealing with the Fornade from Operation Savannah, which began in October 1975 and ended in March 1976. What started as the deepest and fastest invasion of any country by a mobile army since World War II turned into a strategic blunder for the South Africans. The South African Defence Force Battle Groups had fought well and the opportunity had presented itself early in the engagement for the chance to change and go to his history. A combination of diplomatic and military setbacks, though, through December 1975 and into January 1976, altered that picture. Operations Savannah had mixed consequences for their idea. The main issue was equipment that was dated and the officer call was also still trying to range itself free from the decades of neglect that had followed World War II as building steam comp rides. Military hardware was also based on the European War, not an African War. The lack of comparable firepower had shocked the South Africans when they came up against the Cubans and Russians, along with Fuplar in the last weeks of the operation. The island was a remarkably good small armoured car but it bogged down quickly in the torrential African tropical dampers. Something much more powerful and with greater ground clearance was needed, along with the capacity to move infantry. The motorized infantry's main vehicles during Savannah, the Unimog and Bedford trucks, were incapable of taking the battering that the unforgiving African felt disht out. The four wheeled island cars were unable to cope with both the RPGs, Vide-Buff-Uplers and the sudden muddy roads. The going was dry, they were a good vehicle. When the going got wet, they were a liability to both a crew and overall strategy. Infantry and sappers spent more time digging them out of boggy felt than fixing them for tactical use. At the Battle of Erbil, our outline two podcast bank left the SIDA for the particularly difficult gap to fill. The Soviet T-34s and T-54s and 55s used by Fuplar and the Cubans had far greater firepower than the little islands with their low pressure 19mm gun, which could not penetrate the Soviet tank armour easily enough, although in the case of T-34s, they were World War II vintage. Another Second World War vintage was the G2 140mm or 5.5 inch guns used by the SIDA. In Angola, these were outranged by the Soviet equivalent 18 km versus 23. The BM-21 Stalin organ tactical rocket system used by the Cubans had also caused chaos when deployed correctly. The defence force had begun re-equipping itself in 1974 as they converted the French panide AML to the Ilar 90, but this naughty car, as they were called by the Tupis, had to be supported by a big brother. And that big brother and the first major breakthrough in terms of equipment was the design of a radically new armoured car, the Rytal IFV. Three years after the Rytals first prototype rolled off the test facility, the Minister of Defence reported in Parliament that the vehicle was ready for production. Our fort-along-side Rytals in Angola and can attest to the incredible firepower speed and maneuverability over an African landscape. They appeared to float over rough terrain traveling up to 80 km/h, smoothly. Watching them as a thrill and facing them, not so much. Its only major weakness was the fact that it did not have a stabilised gun and had to stop to fire and then give up much of its mobility. It was however the single most important weapon system used during the South African border wars. First, it had six not four wheels and later flat-run tires were added. It was the SADF's most mobile vehicle in the bush through the years of war in the 1970s and 80s. The infantry fighting version used a rapid firing 20mm cannon which had arm-appearsing and high explosive ammunition, the highly effective Rytal 20. The gunner on board could switch instantly between the two, which was another significant development. It was also a dual purpose. A platoon of infantry could be loaded on board and these men could stand with the upper bodies free and fire or close hatches and fire through numerous portals. This meant that small squads of infantry were introduced into a battlefield as the Rytal hurried across the African felt. Soldiers could be deployed in seconds as it continued to roll. Another important effect was to save the infantry energy by driving straight into a battle. There was no need for them to run alongside or behind as was the case with tanks like the T-34. After running a mile with hundreds of rounds of spare ammunition and a mortar, a soldier would be exhausted then have to fight. The Rytal changed this. It gave the South African infantry an unheard of degree of mobility as their Pulse Skulls rights in his book The SADF in the Border War. As the troops entered the fighting zone, it were protected from small arms fire but not the RPGs and 23mm anti-aircraft gun, both of which were used by Swapu and Bumpler. Various types of this armored vehicle were produced as a weapons platform. Designers incorporated the 90mm gun from the island on top of the Rytal chassis and was highly effective as an anti-tank weapon. While the 90mm was not really up to the task of tackling the Russian T-54 and T-55s against lightly armored targets and infantry, it was lethal for other reasons. Its main protection against the T-54s and T-55s was its ability to move quickly and during close quarters of fighting, this capacity saved Rytal crew over and over again. Fighting in the African Felt meant close quarterbathels, often tanks and armored cars would be within 30 metres of each other. This was no desert storm environment or even the flatlands of Europe. The dense bush of southern Angola made it difficult for the Soviet tanks to open fire at any distance as the rounds would explode against the thorn trees and thick vegetation. That thick bush also protected Swapu and Fuplar troops as it did the SADF. The decisive fact in the Rytal's favor was speed of reaction and here the SADF was vastly superior to its adversaries in Angola. Traveling with the motorized section would be the Rytal command where the leader of the mechanized force would travel as a mobile headquarters and was armed with a 12.7mm machine gun. Another model was the Rytal 81mm platform while anti-tank missile platforms were also developed later. I had a occasion to be part of an ambush on T-34 tanks and other Soviet armored vehicles in 1981 and saw this training firsthand and all SADF troops quietly thanked God when they saw the Rytal was around providing mobility and protection. The Rytal was actually the second infantry fighting vehicle or IFB in the world. The first was built by the Soviets and was the BMP-1 which entered service in the USSR in 1969. Later the United States were developed to Bradley, the British built the warrior and the Germans developed the Marida so the Rytal like the BMP was an extremely clever early invention. As the Germans proved in World War II any new mobile system that was developed had to be followed by a whole new way of fighting for the infantry. Up to now the SADF had used light vehicles to transport its troops such as the Bedfords or the Unimogs. Motorized infantry led by a handful of Elon 90s had proved to be only effective when they were not faced by effective artillery or airpower or both. We'll return to the development of new weapons through the series right now we need to consider the other effects of operations of Anna which was political. On the 18th of January 1976 the OAU had voted to support the MPLA as the new government of Angola. The South African invasion of that country had backfired politically. It was inevitable that the OAU would have eventually backed the MPLA with the Americans adopting a hands-off policy and the Russians distinctly hands on along with the Cubans who had now exporting their brand of revolution across the world. In a nutshell the suspicion of what Moscaur and Havana were up to was overshadowed by the Blunt assault on the fellow African nation by a white minority government in South Africa. It was always going to be beyond the capabilities of any spin doctor to wriggle around that fact. South Africa was not pretty much alone in the world when it came to its actions. Pretoria had been condemned by its enemies and was now being shunned by the West mainly due to its apartheid policies and by Western allies who had their fingers burned only recently such as the Americans in Vietnam. Washington definitely did not want to send its troops back into a hot war on behalf of Cold War sentiment just yet. The Nationalists were actually fighting many wars on many fronts in South Africa. The main conflict was back home as the ANC's armed wing MK began to attack infrastructure, along with the PAC. While these two movements didn't see I-2R ideologically they did agree on one thing the need to fight the Nationalists inside South Africa. Classic form of resistance campaign began that was to sapped the SAD of's energies much later in the mid 1980s. Then on the 27th of January 1976 the US House of Representatives voted to 323 to 99, well the Clark Amendment which as I've mentioned exacerbated the isolation of Pretoria. Further exacerbating the situation was the fact that the FNLA had disintegrated in Angola and the MPLA now turned its main attention south to the South West African border. It could also turn its diplomatic attention to UNITA. The withdrawal from Angola by the SADF was steady guarded by General Fendiwant's expert hand. It was deliberate and orderly with the northernmost forces leaving first in a diverse collection of vehicles from vegetable trucks and civilian cars to motorbikes. Closer to the South West African border they passed citizen force soldiers dug in protecting their departure and finally these long-haired and bearded veterans made it home. Meanwhile most of the refugees ended up at camps around Perera da Escha before being shipped back to Portugal or settling inside Africa. The Chappendah function of the FNLA rebroad art secretly in the dead of Nutt and these men formed the nucleus of what became 3/2 battalion.
opportunity to travel in and go to the sections of that battalion in the early 80s and were saved at least twice during firefights by these men So I'm naturally biased But all sides agree on one thing Three two battalion was to become the most feared unit of the border wall as we're going to hear As of the South Africans withdrew south and January in February 1976 each unit then leapfrogged the other Inside and go holding each line as they move back systematically to the border by the fourth of February The S.A.D. of Railguard was only 50 kilometers from South Africa's border and it was a relatively large force of around 5,000 S.A. citizen force soldiers The Cubans in MPLA hurried to fill the vacuum created by the departing S.A.D. of and the Chappin defection while your needa was squeezed South easily by their advance By the 7th of February 1976 MPLA had occupied San Salvador in the far north the last town that had been held by the Efinale and MPLA force of at least 6,000 men backed by thousands of Cubans then began hiring south equipped with artillery and aircraft Unite was pushed out of its administrative capital at Hwambu in central Angola the former Nova Lichbauer By the 10th of February 1976 the Cubans and MPLA had reoccupied the strategic ports of L'Obi to and Benguela and a day later that took Sada Banderra There was a narrative built up later by the Dorsanto's government that the S.A.D. was chased out of Angola Reality was the South Africans withdrew then the Cubans arrived But the strategic reality whatever BJ forces bluster Chantabskir was that Petruria had bungled its attempts at ensuring the South West African border would remain clear of Swapu Savannah had actually doomed of Umbuland to a significant series of battles over the coming years that would kill thousands of people It was a bitter pill for the veterans of operations Savannah They took swaves of Angola from the Communist forces only to hand these back without a part Some questioned why their friends had died for what reason had their shed blood only to retreat tactically What was the strategic gain they asked with good reason? On the 23rd of February the MPLA was officially sworn in as the OA used 47th member While the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ducked and died during a Senate committee hearing in the same week saying the Americans had been unaware of South Africa's plans to invade Angola Other Kissinger had been missing critical intelligence briefings or he was lying It was true that the CIA were on the ground in October 25 without Senate knowledge, but the agency was reporting that the SADF was acting in concert with American wishes Diplomatic courier messages also tested the fact that both the US and France had been asking the South Africans to get directly involved to hold the spread of communism Politics is a dark place where bad people play they say Politicians needed to somehow recover from the strategic blender to their ego A month later on the 27th of March 1976 the men who'd formed the future state security apparatus of a party Magnus Milan Constantinien Ben Russ stood with PW Butter on a makeshift dius at the Rheukana and took the salute as the last South African troops rumbled the out of Angola What of the officer corps such as Jan Bratenbach who'd formed three two battalion and Foxpats Delbilde? These included the men who'd been in Calecu last town the SADF held in Sidingola Two days later more than 3,000 Portuguese refugees of all races fled over the border into South Africa They were being pushed by the MPLA and Cubans who arrived at the A-W-A border in the first week of April 1976 A meeting was then held in the 5th of April at Calecu between the Cubans, the Angodans and the South Africans Foreign Minister Hilgad Muder told media later that all agreed to allow the pumping of water to a Wembelen to continue And that power would be switched on and that the vital barrage and its workers would be protected It's time to take stock two of the casualties 29 South Africans died in operations of Anna more than a hundred had been wounded 20 others died in accidents and through illness or state parts more than a thousand unita and if another troops were dead Possibly much more although the numbers have never been made public Thousands of Foupler troops died along with dozens of Cubans and a few Russians again. We don't have the accurate data The world had reacted to the shock at the attempt by the SID of to take control of a foreign nation BJ forces contact book of African leaders willing to talk to whom was trimmed to half a dozen There being works published about this operation folks some say forced as attempts at Daytona for black Africa was not severely Could tell by operations of Anna which is just muddle-headed analysis by a podigest for Pretoria. I'm afraid The truth was the number of countries which continued to have diplomatic relations with Pretoria was reduced by an act of 50 percent So I'm not entirely sure why some debate where the Savannah did the South Africans any good strategically militarily though the SID of gain a great deal as we're going to hear shortly Zambia was still willing to talk to the South Africans before the operation and as a vital strategically located country Its decision afterwards to cut ties with Pretoria was directly related to Savannah as a state that border the Caprivi strip This was not good news Only court of war Zaire Senegal Malaria and Kenya were now openly supporting talking to Pretoria the rest were openly supporting Swapu And the ANC and the P.A.C's armed struggles The major point of possible victory had been those first few days in early November 1975 when Holden Roboto's FNLA were close to Luanda in Ambrice And they had a golden opportunity to seize the country While the overall history of South Africa I believe would not have altered significantly It was always destined to become the independent country of Namibia the military effect would have changed Hanside is all very well in telling of history Roboto had failed miserably and he had failed his own people and the SID of battle groups providing support for him and Anita This is a military story which has of course a political overtour But imagine what would have happened strategically if the South Africans had succeeded in overthrowing the MPLA in the first days of its search to power No doubt the MPLA would have ended up in the bush Barching a guerrilla campaign against the FNLA and Anita government with the South Africans giving some sort of support The border war may have ended up another thousand kilometers north of the South West African border Imagine the logistic challenges The other obvious point is that Anita and the FNLA were doomed to find each other Because Roboto was an ethnic fundamentalist who had no interest in working with Anita He was only interested in his Bakongo people and Janus Savimbi the Anita leader would never have entertained this sort of ethnic barbarism In the end we can indulge in scenario planning and my attempts have led to a consistent answer That the MPLA backed by Cuba in the Russians would have always ended up seizing power in Angola It's hard the Cold War was playing out at the time because the Americans had lost interest after their own disasters Particularly Vietnam Remember South Africa's overriding ambition was to limit swap his ability to cross the Angolan border into South East Africa And in this they failed During the next 15 years of this war the failure would lead to many Angolans, Namibians and South Africans Cubans and Russians dying in the border war Quis van Hedin of Task Force Zulu called Operation Savannah a war of lost opportunities PWB said later that if the Americans had showing their teeth that Russians might have capitulated because they don't like to fight away from their fatherland This was proven correct in the disastrous Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 where Russian troops definitely did not like to fight away from the fatherland But Burt was also doing what he'd become even more adapted doing later avoiding the real issue which was giving blacks the right to vote It is true that the threat of a communist inspired expansion had been one of the main reasons to remain in South West Africa But Burt had become convinced that he could use military tactics to deal with a civilian inspired political conflict Later that would lead to SAD of troops being used in peacekeeping in South South Africa's townships Something that the Defence Force officer corps was definitely unhappy about Pretoria though proved one point The SAD of was not to be tripled with and both the Cubans and Russians were impressed The Defence Force had given notice that it may have been outgunned but it wasn't outfought The smart Castro is blustering about invading South West Africa when his troops finally arrived at the southern and golden border They stopped and then negotiated with the South Africans Had they continued into South West Africa the Americans may have changed their minds And the South Africans we know would have given the attackers a severely bloody nose But what happened next proved the strategic blunder the insurgency into a Vumberland started in earnest during the last week of March 1976 And now Swapo was in a much stronger military position than before operations of Anna started back in October 75 It now had a safe border behind which it could withdraw Swapo said to have administration posts, training bases and logistics structures right on the South West African border From where it launched insurgents, southwards, whenever it chose worse the Xamian leader Kenneth Coender had changed his mind about the MPLA and Swapo And now allowed clan members to establish themselves on the soil of his country openly Before this they had done so clan to sign me Only Botswana remained strictly neutral towards the Patria of all the front-end states But Jonas of Envy had survived and Unita was going to be a thorn in the side of the newly ensconced MPLA and Swapo for the next two decades With that, we need to halt and
to cure the perimeter. Next episode will return to the insurgency in a Vumberland through 1976. Please rate the podcast on iTunes and other podcast platforms that helps escalate the visibility of the series. You can also send me a direct message through Twitter @deaslauthmpe or through the website abwarpodcast.com. Until next, goodbye. [Music]
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Operation Savannah (Oct 1975 – Mar 1976) was a South African invasion of Angola that began as a rapid advance but ended as a strategic blunder.
The SADF faced major equipment shortcomings
The Ratel IFV, introduced later, revolutionized South African mobility with six-wheel drive, 20mm cannon, infantry transport, and high speed over rough terrain.
Politically, the invasion backfired
Despite tactical withdrawals, the SADF gained combat experience, but Swapo gained safe havens in southern Angola, escalating the border war.
Casualties
Summary:
Operation Savannah, launched by South Africa in October 1975, was initially the deepest and fastest mobile invasion since World War II, aimed at supporting FNLA and UNITA forces against the MPLA in Angola. However, it quickly turned into a strategic disaster. The SADF’s Eland armored cars and Unimog/Bedford trucks were ill-suited for African conditions: they bogged down in mud, lacked firepower to penetrate Soviet T-34 and T-54/55 tanks, and were outranged by Cuban BM-21 rocket systems. This forced a reliance on speed and close-quarters fighting, which later inspired the development of the Ratel IFV—a six-wheeled, dual-purpose infantry fighting vehicle that provided unmatched mobility and protection, though it lacked a stabilized gun.
Politically, the invasion alienated African nations. The OAU recognized the MPLA in January 1976, and the US Clark Amendment cut American support. South Africa’s diplomatic ties shrank by half. By March 1976, the SADF withdrew in an orderly fashion, but the MPLA and Cubans quickly occupied key towns. The operation failed its core goal: preventing Swapo from using Angola as a base. Instead, Swapo gained secure staging areas, intensifying the border war for the next 15 years. The SADF’s tactical competence impressed adversaries, but the strategic outcome was a costly failure that led to thousands of deaths across Angola, Namibia, and South Africa.
FAQs
Operation Savannah was a South African military campaign in Angola from October 1975 to March 1976, initially a fast invasion that turned into a strategic blunder.
The SADF used dated equipment like the Eland armored car and Bedford trucks, which struggled with muddy terrain, lacked firepower against Soviet tanks, and were outranged by Soviet artillery.
The Ratel was a six-wheeled armored infantry fighting vehicle developed by South Africa, offering high speed, mobility, and infantry transport; it was a key weapon system in the border wars.
The Ratel allowed infantry to ride into battle protected from small arms fire, deploy quickly, and save energy, unlike running alongside tanks.
The operation backfired politically: the OAU backed the MPLA, the US passed the Clark Amendment isolating Pretoria, and South Africa lost diplomatic ties with many African nations.
No, the operation failed to limit SWAPO; instead, SWAPO gained a safe border in Angola and launched more insurgents into South West Africa from 1976 onward.
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