Episode 22 – The SADF Day of Disaster as Operation Savannah winds down

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Lathons. This is episode 22, and we're looking at the end of Operation Savannah, which was winding down by early January 1976. We dealt with various battle groups set up by the South Africans as they sought to secure southern Angola, including Foxbatten last week Orange, which had experienced a major battle, South of Crabala. A fourth battle group called X-ray led by a commandant S.W.J. Quitzer had been formed in early December 1975, and was tasked with securing the important Benguela Railway line. Anita Lita, Janice Vimey, had asked S.A.D.F. commanders to help him control this line, which was crucial in order to deliver Congo commodities to the coastal port. If he controlled the railway, then the MPLA in Luanda would find the income severely curtailed and would also be a propaganda coup. X-ray was comprised of a Anita company along with an armoured car group and an artillery section, and faced fapler at a major battle at Luso on the 9th of December. At the battle, the MPLA armed wing lost over 250 men to the South Africans, along with a substantial amount of equipment, including heavy weapons, which were duly handed over to Anita after three days of fighting. So then, meanwhile, wanted X-ray to occupy the railway tunnel of Tixera de Susa, which was a few kilometres from the Zambian border. So X-ray had duly set off, and were trying to reach that town before the end of December, but by mid-month the going became increasingly difficult and was overshadowed by a series of international events. First on the 17th of December, the parading of four South Africans before the international media in Luanda as I explained last podcast. This created S.A.D. of claims that was not directly involved in fighting in Angola, not that most of the informed South Africans believed that story any more back home. All four members of the technical services core attached to battle group Foxpat and had been captured between Cella and Quebala, which was around 700 kilometres inside Angola. The shocks came quickly after this. Also on the 17th of December, Defence Minister P.W. Butter announced that due to what he called the "exagency of these circumstances," the latest national service intake would have to remain in the army for another month. That was a bit of a shock for men who were preparing to take up the normal lives back in Sylvie Street and it also implied a fair amount of panic decision making by the government. Just to try and offset that, Butter said specifically that it was not a panic measure but is intended to increase effectiveness. Had he announced this was the measure for future intake, South Africans may have believed him. The reality was the S.A.D. of was now in a serious squeeze and it involved manpower. The cabinet had completely underestimated what it took to invade and secure most of another country, particularly the size of Angola, and repaying the price. Military analysts world over were not aware that the S.A.D. of had only one option left. To withdraw from Angola as quickly as possible or face the consequences of a rapidly arming MPLA supported by Russia and Cuba. Remember the Americans had already pulled out, and none of the NATO alliance countries such as France or England were not prepared to get involved in any way, so Pretoria was pretty much on its own. More pressing for the national party's senior cabinet ministers was not to lose face, nor to lose the areas of Angola that they'd managed to overrun in the first month of operations of Anna. That was more than three quarters of the country. The other ally, the FNLA, was now on the run in the north, and it was only a matter of time before the MPLA could focus all the attention on the South Africans. Fapler was being supplied by a plethora of heavy weapons. The Cubans and Russians were flying migs. Heavy artillery was stacking up at Luendipot, and the army's mobility was improving by the day. Back in South Africa, the shock of telling national servicemen that instead of two weeks to go, they had another month had left morale heavily hit. The S.A.D. have thought that this was enough time to mobilize the trained reserves. Most citizen force units were then placed on a six-hour standby. Incredible if you consider with this meant to those men. The word began to go around South Africa that the month actually meant three months. They followed a scramble for parts for vehicles. They tried to secure fuel in ammunition, and the S.A.D. have even tried to print more maps of Angoda, which were in very short supply. All these would be required to get the 2,900 S.A. troops out of the country and back home. Meanwhile, there were already 12,000 Cubans in Angoda helping to find unita and the FNLA, still carrying arms in the South. At the time, another of the MPLA, nor the national party, were aware of exactly how many of the enemy faced them on both sides, and they both exaggerated data to try and frighten each other. By the 18th of December, a few African countries which had been vacillating about who to support openly came out behind the MPLA. The national party's grand strategy had failed catastrophically for the foreign prisons of Africans. They had hoped that by weakening the MPLA but pretending not to be involved directly, the organization of African unity would continue to be unsure of which army to support the MPLA or unita. The four white peer W's shown off to the media finally prompted Nigeria, for example, to openly support the MPLA. What was worse for the South Africans is that the prisoners of war appeared to have been well treated despite Prateria's warnings before operations of anger than any prisoners would be tortured or murdered. The MPLA's United States ambassador, Elicio de Ferguerredu, made a speech at this time about how the fighting in Angoda was not about tribes or ethnicity, which is what had been reported after that point, but was a struggle against foreign aggression perpetrated by Zaire, South Africa and other agents of international imperialism. The four white SAD of prisoners of war proved his point. Compounding the strategic disaster for the nationalist party was the actions not taken by the organization of African unity. Up until the 18th of December, the organization had issued a few desultry statements about how terrible everything was, but had done nothing more publicly about Angoda. Behind the scenes, Nigeria had shifted position to support the MPLA and diplomats held meetings with other African states to support that movement. Somewhere hesitant, as the MPLA was clearly being used in the Cold War by Russia, and as newly independent states that didn't want to turn into puppets for any Europeans, whatever their political colour. Another major strategic blow to place on the 19th of December, when the United States Senate responded to a campaign led by the Democratic Party's Dick Clark, Frank Church, and John Toney to cut off aid to anti-MPLA units. That boat was successful by 54 to 22, with 24 abstentions, and was one of the reasons why the CIA had left so suddenly. On Christmas Day, General Constantin Palyun arrived in Sella and told Sevimbi, "Holden the Roberto, and other resistance leaders that the SEDF was now going to withdraw." They were shattered. As I explained earlier, Christmas 1975 was tense with many battles inside Angoda going on through the period. The news blackout that the nationalist party had created hoping their defence force could run around in Angoda in secret was blown, and rumours began circulating across South Africa. Chemical weapons were mentioned, ghastly deaths, SEDF troops and dozens lying dead in a firing country. All exaggerations, but the effect was a political mayasma for Pretoria. I often wonder about exactly what Pretoria's leaders thought would happen. They clearly had not read von Klauswitz on war recently. In its volume 1 book 1 chapter 6, von Klauswitz points out that the great part of information obtained in war was contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by the greatest part is of a doubtful character. What Pretoria had thought would be easy in terms of sowing doubt on information backfired. von Klauswitz also points out that "surprise lies at the foundations of all undertakings without exception." But the surprise the SEDF managed to cause an October in part of November 1975 had evaporated as international journalists when are running around all over Angoda and a large part of South Africa now believed the greatest part of information that was of a doubtful character. So P.W. Butter issued another commentary through Cape Times correspondent Tom Copeland saying that the government would be quite happy to exit Angola if the MPLA could guarantee that Swapu would not be given free reign to conduct insurgency operations into South West Africa. Before that could happen, the OAU had already decided to get more proactive, and in an urgent summit that was scheduled for the first week of 1976, and wanted to vote on what to do about the South Africa's invasion of Angola. This was a worst-case scenario in a situation where Pretoria had been lying for months about what they were up to, and newly independent African nations were not going to accept any word from the SA government at this point. There had been some hope earlier in December when the first OAU meeting schedule to discuss Angola had been postponed, but now the situation had actually worsened for Pretoria, which may have won that first vote. The OAU postponed its emergency meeting once more to 18th January, but between Christmas and mid-January there would be a few more engagements and something that the SADF HQ called "The Day of Disaster" was imminent. That was the 4th of January 1976, when SADF anti-aircraft gunner stationed in Central Angola near Musendi spotted what their thought was an enemy helicopter. So far their attempts at shooting down enemy aircraft had largely failed, but this time they were succeed. The only problem was it wasn't the enemy. It was an SAE Force Aerospatial SA330C Puma helicopter from 19th Squadron that was flying staff officers between Musendi and Karayanga. A 20mm anti-aircraft battery, which was protecting battle group Orange, opened fire as the Puma approach that low altitude and straight at them at the 12 o'clock. No one had bothered to tell the battery that a friendly helicopter was on its way and was misidentified as hostile, and because of this there was no guns safe or guns. tight order issue. The 20-millimeter anti-aircraft gun immediately opened fire and raked the entire length of the puma, hitting it more than 20 times, leading to the chopper plunging straight to the ground and flames. The pilot in command was not killed in the initial crash, but rescues could not free him from the wreckage before the helicopter burnt out. A badly burnt and wounded passenger, Commandant Martin Fuster, was thrown clear of the puma and impact and was the only survivor. He was immediately evacuated. Those who died included pilot 30-year-old Captain Ferdinand Imelman, co-pilot Captain Constant Daniel DeVitt, who was 26, bright engineer Sergeant George Kelet who was also 26, and Brigadier Johan Didrik Bhutkitha, who was the commanding officer of number two military area. The loss of such a high-ranking officer by friendly fire shook the idea of command. On the same day, Raffelman, Bita Villain, Marais, named on from Five-Sai, part of battle group Orange, died of wounds received when an enemy hand grenade exploded in his position near Dondo in central Angoda during an attack by MPLA and Cuban forces. The 18-year-old was evacuated by helicopter with other wounded to silver port of a died on route. Years later, the National Party propaganda publication about Operation Savannah left out the bit about friendly fire causing the puma crash. The family of the deceased men learned the truth through word of mouth, the most panaceous of information flows, but this time it was not of doubtful character or false. So by early 1976, Prime Minister B. Joe Foster and Defence Minister B. W. Bhutkitha were in agreement. It was crucial to get the S.A.D. of out of Angoda without losing too many men or ground taken since October 1975. About 5,000 citizen force troops were mobilised to cover this withdrawal. After 8th January 1976, they began pouring into northern south of East Africa along with fleeing civilians coming from the opposite direction. About half a million in total. Now there was the OAU vote still to consider. As the New York Times reported in January 1976, it seemed irrational that most black leaders regarded the presence in Angoda of thousands of white soldiers as a greater menace than six times more Cubans assisted by a Soviet so-called technicians. With quiet Soviet help and open lobbying by Cuban delegation in Addis Ababa, the OAU was now likely to reverse its policy and recognise the MPLA regime in Luwanda. First the vote in the OAU in mid-January where the MPLA failed by one vote, after Uganda's dictator Edie Amin abstained along with Ethiopia and Africa was split 22-22 on the issue. Zaya and Zambia were among those backing the cause of two allied movements, Unita and the MPLA, despite Unita's backing by white South Africa. More public revelations followed with PW Butter then telling the Washington Post newspaper that by 3rd February 1976 there were 3,000 to 4,000 South African troops inside southern Angola across the border about 50 miles north. That just added fuel to the OAU fire. Duly on 11th February 1976, the follow-up poll in the OAU eventually saw Edie Amin cast his vote for the MPLA and the organisation recognised it as the government of Angola. 27 of the 46 countries gave it the thumbs up. Not exactly arousing majority and it appears it may not have been legal as Zaya was to point out. The OAU secretariat announced that a ministerial meeting would be held in Ethiopia later in February to provide a forum where countries most bitterly opposed to the popular movement could challenge the recognition announcement. Zaya of course was one of these. Directly after the vote the country's foreign minister in Guzucar Levant said in Washington that the OAU vote had been illegal. Because the OAU charter says the simple admission of a member requires a simple majority, but in the case of two pretenders it is a major decision requiring a two-thirds majority. The OAU as everyone knows was a disastrous organisation which was eventually forced to change its name to the African Union and identity as well partly because of its loose attention to this sort of detail. Meanwhile the Cubans and the MPLA continued advancing slowly south, concerned with their now lengthening logistical lines and hampered by SID of mines and damaged bridges. But the Cuban military did not draw the South Africans into any further battles, despite Fidel Castro blastering during a speech on the 15th of March from Connecrian Guinea threatening to attack and even extend the war into South West Africa. When President Neto gave his chances that the Kineni dams would not be interfered with the SID of brought all its troops out of Angola by the 27th of March. The retreat brought mixed receptions in the Republic with a nationalist party supporting Africa's press, speaking about intervention being a "luch the mastaki". While a retired South African Air Force Brigadier J.G. Willis referred to Operation Savannah in a letter to local newspapers as South Africa's Bay of Pigs. For the men who fought in Operation Savannah it was a matter of pride that they had achieved so much and yet the strategic implications resonated for the next 15 years as we go to here. Next episode we will also hear about the fallout from Operation Savannah and the increased contacts between Swapu and the SID of Inner Vombaland. Please rate the podcast on your platform of choice. If you'd like to contact me you can direct message me on Twitter @daislaitham or through the website, abworepodcast.com. Until next, be safe and fast-paced. [Music]