Episode 208: The Colorado River Compact, Part IV: The Six State Solution

There are some men in history who seem to plant themselves and then just dare the world to move them. Off the top of my head, I'm thinking of President Andrew Jackson who, love him or hate him, had all the characteristics of a mule when going after his aims, whether that be killing the Bank of the US or stopping nullifiers in South Carolina. It's actually kind of fitting that the symbol of the Democratic Party, the donkey, actually comes from Jackson's 1828 presidential campaign, after opponents had outright called him Andrew Jackass and he actually liked the label. Then there's Kato the Younger, one of Julius Caesar's most consistent and bitter foes during the fierce Civil War that marked the first century BC. I could be misremembering this story, and please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe it was Kato who announced that he would take all his meals sitting upright in a chair instead of the Roman tradition of reclining on couches to eat until Caesar had been defeated. Here's the thing, Caesar won the Civil War and Kato wound up committing suicide in the country. But until that happened, he sat in that chair for all of his meals. There are probably many more honorable mentions that I'm forgetting right now, but I want to make sure someone on that list is fixed in your mind, Arizona Governor George W. P. Hunt. Hunt was many things, progressive, pro-labor, anti-capital punishment, and thoroughly against the 1922 Colorado River Compact. And it was his sheer stubbornness more than anything else that kept that all important interstate agreement in limbo for years. So much so that the other states decided that maybe they were better off not having to deal with Arizona at all. I'm your host David Recousin and you are listening to A. Z. The History of Arizona. Welcome back everyone. Last week we watched as all Ford progress on the Colorado River Compact came to a screeching halt as Herbert Hoover did, indeed, run up against the brick wall by the name of George W. P. Hunt. Now most folks had figured that the compact would get through Arizona state legislature. Despite the amount of proclaimed opposition from that body and from Hunt's office. Even now most people thought that after those yokels down in Arizona had a few months to stop and actually think about what they were doing, they would surely just go ahead and ratify the compact. In associate even sent a telegram to Delph Carpenter up in Colorado to report that a special session of the legislature would certainly be called later in the year once public pressure had built up enough for it. Because of this view, U.S. president Warren G. Harding had already decided to ramp up the pressure a bit by announcing in February 1923, while the Arizona legislature was still debating the compact, that his administration would not consider or approve any plans to develop the Colorado River Basin unless an agreement of some kind had been ratified first. So as much as Arizona maybe wanted to do its own thing, the president himself was saying that he was just not going to allow it. And again people at the time thought that this would be enough. With L. Ward banister and influential Colorado attorney remarking that if the feds were going to stick to their guns on this and not approve anything until the compact was ratified, then quote, "There is not the slightest question, but that Arizona will ratify." However, this only proves that banister and many many others simply didn't understand Hunt, or at least hadn't recognized that this was a hill the governor was more than ready to die on. More than that, Hunt decided that Arizona would still push ahead with looking at how it could develop the river for itself and not even bother with the feds or the other basin states or California or anyone else who would try to rein them in. To that end, in early May 1923, the governor convened a two-day conference to talk over the compact and to devise an Arizona Colorado River policy. He would invite around three dozen people, telling them that this meeting was going to closely align with his views about needing to plan for the future of Arizona ahead of whatever needs California was demanding at that instant. And you really get the sense that Hunt stacked the deck of this meeting as of the roughly 36 people invited only four of them were in favor of the compact. Notable in his absence was someone I mentioned last week, Malford Windsor of Yuma, who was both President of Arizona Senate and an old friend and early support of Hunt. To add something of a break over the compact, Windsor pointedly decided to stay far away from this conference because he didn't believe that it would amount to anything. But he did send a 15-page letter, which among other things said, quote, "I believe Arizona's highest interest lies in ratification as speedily as possible of the compact. It is a genuine, deep-sated belief that the treaty is equitable and practical, essential to the early development of the Colorado River, and to the greatest cause of industrial progress vital to Arizona." This letter would be printed in the Arizona Republican and also spread out to as many delegates as possible. But as I have said, Windsor was solidly in the minority on this one, and everyone else threw themselves into thinking about what Arizona could do if it didn't shackle itself to these other states. What Hunt himself favored was that the state issue bonds and finances own dam at Glen Canyon, which is entirely in Arizona, you know, so no having to share anything with the other children. The state would need to raise between $25 million and $100 million, but the upside would be cheap hydroelectricity for all. Now there were a lot of people in favor of Hunt's so-called Arizona plan. However, others also began to point out issues with it. One of the biggest, raised by a delegate from Mojave County, is that the state wouldn't be able to meet the interest payments on these bonds. Another objection came from Thomas Maddick, a Tucson Republican who also happened to be the former state engineer. Maddick said all that Hunt's Arizona plan would do is put the state in debt for building a dam that would essentially serve as flood control for California. Instead, he insisted on Arizona ratifying the Colorado River Compact, but only after it got in a room with California and Nevada to hash out how much water each state would get. Still others, who'd been all in on the thought that private enterprise could develop their own hydroelectric dams, were disappointed that Hunt was now suggesting that the state itself built one on its own dime. So by the end of the first session, the Arizona Republican, which remember is not exactly an unbiased source, summed up the discussion as "ameless, uninforming, and not well informed." On day two of the meeting, another determined foe of the Arizona plan got up to speak. U.S. Representative Carl Hayden, who was one of those four people the conference I talked about who were actually in favor of the compact, gave a speech, telling his fellow delegates that what they were doing right now was just going to make everything that much harder. There was no way they were going to come up with something that was a remotely agreeable substitute for what had been banged out in Santa Fe the previous year. Also, they had to keep in mind that the whole idea of the compact was to avoid interstate court fights and allay the concerns of the upper basin states. If Arizona was bound and determined to head in this course of action, they could expect to find incredibly stiff resistance from both Congress and President Harding. Despite these concerns, at the end of the conference, Hunt appointed a Committee of Nine to continue studying the issue and then draft language for the next legislative session to consider. But nothing was ever remotely worked out. So following this conference, we still have both sides who are deeply adults with each other. Hayden would stay in Arizona for months, going on a summer long speaking tour to gin up support for the compact. Here he made the same arguments that we've heard before. There was enough water in the river. This compact beat the states going to court. The federal government was the senior partner in developing the Colorado and the compact was the means to do it. While speaking to a group in Prescott in August 1923, he also made a rising tide carries all boats argument, saying that even if California's population were to double and they were to gobble up a bunch of electricity from the proposed dams, was that necessarily a bad thing? According to Hayden, it would mean a greater demand for products that Arizona could supply. He said, "There can be no cause for jealousy, but upon the contrary, we should rejoice at the prospect thus presented. For anything that promotes the welfare of the Great Southwest, of which we are an integral part is bound to read out to our benefit." So all you California foams out there just relax would you? Which brings up another point that Hayden made at that meeting, getting together with California and Nevada to work out a water sharing agreement between the three of them just as the compact intended. However, Hayden wasn't the only one going across the state. Following the conference, George Maxwell, he of the Highline Canal idea and the most vehement opponent of the compact also went around Arizona in May denouncing the agreement. And wouldn't you know it, according to Maxwell, there was just opposition to the compact everywhere. He then went on to California where he would write Hunt in June, employing the governor not to do anything, make any agreements, or even hint at thinking about discussing a compromise. Maxwell would write, quote, "The Boulder Canyon scheme is dead, and the pact is dead, unless Arizona should fall down and make herself a laughing stock by shifting her ground and showing the white feather at the 11th hour. If Arizona stands her ground, I am sure California will go against the pact in the future." To quote Luke Skywalker, amazing, every word of what you just said was wrong. But before we get into that, I want to also highlight that on July 5th, 1923, a report on the Colorado River and Arizona's water needs by a USGS hydrologist and river expert E.C. Leroux was published. In it, Leroux lobbed several criticisms at the compact, the biggest of which had to do with the water allocations. Unlike others, Leroux didn't believe there was a surplus of water. On the contrary, he believed that everything in the river had already been spoken for. This news was very encouraging to Hunt as Leroux was an undisputed expert on the Colorado and not some rabble razzle like Maxwell. However, it should also be noted that Leroux had something of a chip on his shoulder. As it was well known that he was upset that the Colorado River Commission had not consulted him or asked for his ideas on an interstate compact. As an expert on the river, he thought he should have been extended that invitation. He attributed the fact that he had been invited to Arthur Davis at the US Reclamation Service, with whom he did not get along with at all. So there could possibly be motivations other than scientific for his denouncement of the compact. The one place where his report did strike a blow against Hunt was in his dismissal of a Highland canal to take water from Northern Arizona and run to Central Arizona. This is a dream we've heard all about before and was particularly championed by Maxwell. But now the standard had been taken up by Fred Colter, a rancher and state senator from Apache County who had been a one-time candidate for governor. He not only believed that the Highland Canal was possible from an engineering standpoint, not to mention economically viable, but was an imperative. In 1923, Colter and some like-minded friends had gathered to form the Arizona Highland Reclamation Association, and through this organization, filed on every single bit of the Colorado River that flowed through Arizona. Colter would also propose 40 separate projects to dam, pump and/or channel the river's water down to the Salt River Valley or Penel County. One of his big hobby horses was building a flood control dam at Glen Canyon and a hydroelectric dam at Bridge Canyon, which is on the western side of the Grand Canyon. According to state historian Thomas Sheridan, more than anyone, Colter kept the dream of a Highland Canal alive through the 1920s and 1930s. Sheridan writes, quote, "He, Colter, organized public meetings. He ground out propaganda. He published maps showing the roots of his impossible canals. And even though Colter himself failed to win the governorship on several tries, he terrorized any candidate or elected official who dared to suggest that Arizona ratify the compact." Indeed, it's worth saying that when Arizona finally does ratify in 1944, Colter was dead and in his grave. But back in 1923, Colter was still very much alive and making lots of noise for his canal and hunt was listening to him. In September of that year, the governor took the recommendations from the Committee of Nine and presented an Arizona-focused development plan to the Federal Power Commission, though this eventually went nowhere. That same fall, he put out failures to California and Nevada to have a tri-state conference. But California refused to participate in any conference that did not involve all the basin states. At this point, we should see how things are starting to shape up on a national level. The first item to note is the termination of Arthur Davis as the head of the Reclamation Service by the newly appointed Secretary of the Interior. Now, the reasons for Davis's dismissal are mainly political and bureaucratic. But it must have seemed like divine justice for all the compact haters out there. He had been a major driving force behind the compact, as you can probably tell by the number of times his name has popped up in recent episodes. However, if Hunt and others thought that the dream of the Boulder Canyon Dam or Colorado River compact would go out the door with him, they were sorely disappointed. The new Secretary of the Interior basically said that the termination of one employee was not necessarily changing the administration's stance on things, and pretty soon the Secretary himself was one of the compacts biggest supporters. Also, the dismissal of Davis rattled some cages over in California because Representative Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson, the forces behind the swing Johnson Bill to build the dam and Boulder Canyon had just lost a major ally. Davis had been an avid supporter of building the dam. To the point that, as you might recall from previous episodes, the other basins states thought he was a little too cozy with California. So, with their ally now gone, Hiram and Swing decided that they really needed to get their act together and get their bill passed already. In December 1923, the next iteration of the swing Johnson Bill was introduced into Congress. And remember that Hunt hates the swing Johnson Bill, and often spoke of California's "desire for plunder" and the "ruthless manner in which the swing Johnson Bill, now pending in the Congress of the United States, attempts to dispose of Arizona's rights in the Colorado River." Perhaps even more alarming than swing and Johnson reintroducing the legislation, however, was when William Mojoland, the grasping, scheming head of Los Angeles' waterworks and supply, showed up at a Congressional committee hearing and announced that the city needed more water, like a whole lot more. The large, looming existential threat of both the swing Johnson Bill and Mojoland's demands helped convince enough people at the Compact may not be good for Arizona that Hunt was able to secure an election victory over Dwight Beherd in 1924. Hunt made not approving the Compact a key part of his campaign, saying that as Governor he was going to "save the Colorado River." From this, some Arizonans would joke that while Jesus walked on water, their state had a governor who ran on the Colorado River. Fred Colter also announced that he was going to try and unseed Hayden as Arizona sole representative in the U.S. House, but eventually he chose to withdraw from that race. The Compact folks did have one victory when Hayden was able, over the vigorous objections of Hunt and his allies, to prevent opposition to the Compact from being added to the state's Democratic Party platform. So going into 1925, it had been more than two years since the Compact had been signed, and nearly two years since Arizona had rejected it. And with the terribly anti-compact governor George V having won another term by a pretty good margin, it didn't look like things were going to change any time soon. But the other six states, you know the ones who had actually ratified the Compact already, were starting to get antsy. And here we again was bringing Delph Carpenter from Colorado who suggested a bold idea. Why not just ignore Arizona completely? I mean, six states have ratified the darn thing, so why not have any state legislature go back and ratify a new version? A version that would be identical to the first, except for adding language saying that it would become effective as long as six or more states approved it. From a legal standpoint, it was a neat solution. Everyone else would get what they wanted, despite Arizona having taken its ball and gone home. And if it ever changed its mind, Arizona could enter the Compact at its leisure. Heck, this solution might even apply enough pressure for the state to just get on board already. A keybacker for this plan was Herbert Hoover, the head of the Colorado River Commission, who unveiled it at a conference in December 1924. Despite the fact that he was now suffering from Parkinson's disease, Carpenter started visiting the other basin states, arguing in favor of signing this new six-state agreement. There was only token resistance to this plan, such as up in Wyoming, which worried about signing an agreement without Arizona's cooperation, but it was also apparent there was no practical alternative. So by mid-March 1925, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, and New Mexico had approved the new six-state solution. But as always, the major speed bumps came in the lower basin states. The first came from Nevada, where the governor had serious reservations about doing an end-run around Arizona, and that diplomacy was the much better tactic to eventually get the seven-state Compact ratified. That is until he actually met with Hunt in January 1925 to discuss water issues. Following that conference, he walked away convinced that it was highly unlikely that Arizona would ever get on board. So with Nevada now in, all eyes turned to California. As you might expect, just from my pure storytelling angle, this is where things really got choppy. Just as had happened when the state had originally ratified the Compact in 1923, many opponents came out of the woodwork saying that they would only ratify this six-state version if there was a reservation in it saying that the Compact was contingent on the building of a dam at the Boulder Canyon site. Really, I suppose I shouldn't have to say things like that anymore. You can always assume that any time California is asked for something, their conditions are always going to be building the Boulder Canyon dam and their precious All-American Canal. And this demand did have the same effect as last time around. People pointing out that if California just added things willy-nilly, then everyone else would want to get their pet project in, and then everyone was back to square one. Everyone else had passed a clean version of the bill, and California needed to do the same. Hoover even stepped in to try and sue things over by saying that President Calvin Coolidge was all for building a dam that he would pursue it in Congress, but if California insisted on putting this language in, it would destroy the unity of the other states. Except, he kind of shot himself in the foot here, because in his message, he only mentioned building a dam for stopping flooding, which people in California took to mean that he only supported a dam for that purpose, not one for storing water or producing hydroelectricity. As much as he tried to clarify that he was all for producing electricity and for making sure everyone got their irrigation water, it wasn't enough for California. In late March 1925, the state ratified the six state compact, but with the reservation left in it. The compact would not be binding until the federal government approved building a dam on the Colorado at or below the Boulder Canyon site. This had the immediate effect that Hoover had feared. The upper basin states suddenly felt very threatened that the lower basin was charging full speed ahead with projects without considering their water rights at all. Hoover called for a meeting of the upper basin states in Denver at the end of August 1925, where they unanimously approved a resolution opposing all new development on the river until the compact had been approved. So that meant no Boulder Canyon dam until everyone agrees on it, California, and things just kept getting worse, because in the meantime, Arizona had responded to the attempt to go around them with the six state compact by passing the original compact. Well, kind of sort of. The state legislature had pulled the California and passed a concurrent resolution approving the compact, but with several important reservations. They wanted rights to all the water of Arizona tributaries, which is a drum they have been beating for some time now. They also wanted in writing that the additional million acre feet allocated to the lower basin, which remember had been put in the original compact just to a peas Arizona, was solely and exclusively theirs. And it wanted to be charged only that million acre feet even at the state used more water. Finally, it agreed to split the remaining water in the river with California evenly after Nevada took out its small take. The funny thing about this is the legislature had actually passed this despite Hunts protestations and he quickly moved to Vito, except this was done as a concurrent resolution not a bill so the legislature said that the governor couldn't veto even if he wanted to. Hunts biographer David R. Burman even says the governor believed the legislature had gone this route specifically to thwart any veto from Hunts. None of that didn't stop him from vetoing anyway. It appears that the governor was so against the compact that even with these lopsided reservations he couldn't stomach any sort of agreement that took any Iota of control out of the state's hands. But the fact of the matter is that we now have three different versions of the Colorado River compact swimming around out there. If you'll forgive the pun, the first is the six state agreement that five out the seven basin states had approved. The second is the version California had ratified, which included the building of the Boulder Canyon Dam as a prerequisite. And the third is what Arizona had just passed, a version of the seven state Colorado River compact with its important reservations. So obviously somebody had to get together with someone else to synthesize all this into one agreement everyone could get behind an attempt to do this was made in Phoenix in August 1925 when representatives from Arizona, California, and Nevada gathered together to discuss how to divide the Colorado River between the three of them. California actually came to this conference hoping to gin up support for the Boulder Canyon Dam even though they knew it would be a tough sell. However, from the get go, it was apparent that Hunt was unwilling to budge on anything. His opening remarks were a strongly worded indictment of the compact and a point by point recap of Arizona's position. The state was happy with the current set of laws and their interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, Hunt announced, which was exactly what the compact creators were trying to get around. He also said, "If Arizona signed the Colorado River compact in its present form, we would be signing away our future rights to utilize the resources of the river without recompense." Of course the delegates from Nevada and California were turned off by Hunt's words and his tone, and they let him know it. That I was ready to go with Hunt on things like power royalties from dams, but they were dismayed that he would not go as far as to accept the basic allocations from the compact. They also joined California in solidarity that everyone needed to agree that the dam on the Colorado near the Boulder Canyon site had to be a priority. Arizona would not do this, so the whole conference fell apart. And believe it or not, that's why I want to leave things for this week, with the hopes of passing a seven state version of the Colorado River compact thoroughly dashed, and even the six state version was looking incredibly shaky. In fact, this condition would persist through the end of 1925, and then through 1926, and into 1927. Arizona's obstinance, and by that I really should say Hunt's obstinance, was the stumbling block that everyone just kept tripping over again and again. Compact opponents believed that this meant the end, and defeat both the onerous agreement and the projects from other states they loathe, looking at you Boulder Canyon Dam. However, join me next week, as we see that this continued intransigence not only didn't kill the compact, but also failed to keep the swing Johnson Bell from coming to a vote. I'm your host, David Rockhausen, and you've been listening to A.Z., the history of Arizona. Good bye.