Episode 20 – The Battle at Bridge 14 part I

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 20, the battle at Bridge 14. Operation Savannah was supposed to be winding down, but two of the most important clashes were to take place at the tail end of this op. I explained last week how the bridge over the Enhia River near the town of Katofe was seen by both the MPLA and the SADF as a key position. It lay 250km southeast of Luanda on the main road, heading towards the crucial Benguela Railway, where minerals from Katanga Province of the neighbouring Congo, or Zaire as it was now called, could be transported to the Atlantic ports of Lubitu and Benguela. One of the main strategic aims of the South Africans when they entered Angola during Operation Savannah was to take these two ports and the railway line from the MPLA. Hand them over to UNITA or the FNLA, and thus weaken the enemy. So far during this operation, the SADF had defeated the MPLA's armed wing FAPLA, overrunning dozens of towns and villages, and taken both Lubita and Benguela. BAT had also suffered its first big defeat at the Battle of Ibou, only a few days before Bridge 14. The defeat was due to a number of SADF weaknesses when it came to equipment. The Eland armoured car was a great little vehicle, but it experienced difficulties in the extremely wet summer mud. The artillery, deployed by the SADF, was World War II vintage, and the army needed a medium or long-range solution or both. The lack of proper air cover was another weakness, and the intelligence and mapping capacity was also limited. All of these would be addressed shortly as South Africa ratcheted up its military spending and manufacturing. So we left off last episode with the SADF south of the Inhia River and the engineers planning to rebuild Bridge 14 using wood from a nearby forest. We also heard how a Special Forces unit had been dropped north-west of the river in an attempt at seizing the high ground, but this unit was caught in an ambush. One of the members was killed and it withdrew. They had been evacuated on Monday the 8th of December, the D-Day, for the bridge to be secured. Colonel Swart was wary of being outflanked by the FAPLA and Cuban units stationed north of the river, and ordered Battle Group Kilo, under the command of Lieutenant Tom Steinbach, to head east. He led a company of UNITA infantry, along with an armoured car group and anti-aircraft section. Later, it shifted its position northwards to deal with the possible threat posed by FAPLA. At 4:15pm, Kilo was 12km north-east of Sanga, on the road to Cabala, when they stumbled across 14 Cuban soldiers, with around 16 FAPLA troops. A firefight began, and the enemy retreated, leaving behind crucial documents, including maps. These pointed to a significant ambush being planned 23km north of Sanga, and the Battle Group headed to the position, in order to deal with this threat. Swart was worried, his left flank was exposed around Aje in the west, and a squad of Irlands, along with UNITA troops from Bravo Battle Group, had been sent to bolster that flank. But they only managed to reach Calenque, a few kilometers away, because a smaller bridge there had been blown up as well. So the left flank remained a problem, and FAPLA had taken up positions along the two main roads to the west. This was a powerful force, a battalion strong, and included 85 Cuban troops, under the command of a Cuban officer, and they had set up numerous positions to ambush FAPLA. By Tuesday, the 9th of December, a small detachment of Portuguese Special Force soldiers, fighting with the South Africans, had managed to climb to the summit of a hill, the SADF codenamed Hengokop. But they came under fire from FAPLA mortars, and Colonel Swart began to grow more alarmed about the situation on his left flank. To the east, or the right flank, things were better. UNITA was in control of the approached town of Musende, and Battle Group Orange began its march towards Ponta Salazar, south of Malangia, on the same day. Foxbat, meanwhile, was tasked with heading westwards to create the impression that the SADF was going to attack Kubala. By the 10th of December, this battle group moved out, comprised of a battalion of UNITA, led by a troop of armored cars and backed up by a 140mm cannon. The idea was to force FAPLA to respond, and in doing so, the South Africans could determine their position and their strength. It worked. By the afternoon of the 10th, Task Force Zulu was being bombarded by anti-personnel artillery. Colonel Swart then paid back. He then gave Battle Group Bravo a visit, as they prepared for action at Hengor. Bravo was now being led by its new commander, Major Marius van Graan, while his 2RC was Captain Leon Vessels. Meanwhile, Captain Bouvert was moving his artillery unit towards Conde, not far from Hengor. Unfortunately for the South Africans, one of his guns became bogged down in the mud. Remember, it was rainy season, and many of the roads and tracks were impassable. At that moment, FAPLA opened fire with 122mm rockets, and Bouvert managed to extricate. About half an hour later, Colonel Swart decided to head back along the same road from his visit to Bravo, and as he passed Bouvert's evacuated position, a 122mm rocket exploded alongside his truck. The Colonel was slightly wounded and needed treatment, so he ordered Major Kritzinger to take over command of Battle Group Bravo, as he headed back south to be banished. A South African spotter plane was then hit by ground fire just after 3pm, but it managed to continue flying, and then Commandant. Commandant Van de Veste has then tripped a landmine on the main road to Hengor, but miraculously suffered no injuries. Monitoring all of these incidents, the slightly wounded Colonel Swart then issued orders to the Parachute Regiment's Captain Johan Blaauw to try to set up an observation post at Hengor. This was a clever move. While his western flank remained exposed, at least the Parabats could keep an eye on enemy movements on Task Force Zulu's left flank. They were elite troops, and the company could deal with a battalion-sized attack from FAPLA. Sappers, meanwhile, had been hard at work constructing a new wooden span at Bridge 14. Just after nightfall, on the 9th of December, FAPLA troops stationed close to the bridge opened fire from their trenches, using AK-47s, RPGs, and some were actually close enough to lob hand grenades. The engineers continued working through the night despite FAPLA's attentions, and remarkably, had almost completed the wooden bridge by dawn on the 10th of December. Foxbat, though, was coming under withering and accurate fire from FAPLA using their. 122mm rockets. Eventually, the SADF Sapper's luck had to run out, and Sapper A.R. Willemse was hit in the head with shrapnel and died a short while later. Two Junita soldiers were also wounded in that salvo. Foxbat fired back with the 5-0 Browning machineguns, and then the weather played its part. A downpour led to a stop in the fighting for a moment as both sides sought shelter. Except, of course, for the artillery. That barrage was constant, and FAPLA scored a direct hit on the Sapper's vehicle carrying the wounded, it was parked under a tree when an anti-personnel round hit the branches above the vehicle, killing Sapper UK von Schmittau and wounding three others. A number of other Sappers were also now being treated for shell-shock as the bombardment continued, and the task force's two doctors, Haynes and Pretorius, were struggling now to cope with the number of wounded back at Kisela. FAPLA then ceased its bombardment at 1pm and moved its artillery to new positions, and began firing once more just before sunset on the 10th of December. It was still light at 6:15 that evening when Cuban and FAPLA infantry launched an assault backed up by mortars, RPGs and machineguns. They were targeting bridge 14, and this group reached a point where they could see the South African Sappers working on the bridge. How long would the SADF manage to hold this position under such pressure? Some FAPLA troops had crawled closer and took up a position on a sandbank in the river itself to the southeast when darkness closed in. Had they pressed home their advantage immediately, the South Africans would have been hard-pressed to stop the assault. Instead, FAPLA halted where they were. Back at HQ, the slightly wounded Colonel Swant was taking stock and things were precarious. He got word that Commandant Kreis, who'd led a patrol along the north of the Anhear River, had hit a problem. He'd been lifting mines when his unit was ambushed. Private Tommy Lotso was killed, and DHD Marais was seriously wounded in the stomach during the firefight. Despite the casualties, Kreis persevered, but a second group of FAPLA attacked the patrol again, although they were driven off, with FAPLA losing five men. The SADF, though, was picking up significant casualties, and the key point was not controlled. One of these key points was a strategic little village that the SADF had codenamed Kraljki that lay on the east side of the main road. Commandant Kreis had been heading there when he came under fire. The Cubans, though, had got there first, and there was no way to continue or dislodge the enemy, so Kreis withdrew along with his two casualties. While things looked increasingly threatening for the South Africans, during the night of the 10th of December, Colonel Swant was informed erroneously that FAPLA had taken control of Bridge 14. The Cuban and FAPLA artillery barrages had pinned down 120 UNITA soldiers, along with their SADF officers, as they clung to the high ground on a hill called Hippo, which actually overlooked the bridge. It got worse for Commandant Kreis when it transpired that Battle Group Foxbat's only radio operator had been casavacked, suffering from shell shock, and the rest of the unit was also suffering now from exhaustion. They needed rest, and yet they had to continue fighting. Meanwhile, Commandant Okoa, who was the commanding officer of the Cubans in FAPLA, had similar goals to Colonel Swant. The Angolans fighting each other on both sides, UNITA and the FNLA with the South Africans, and FAPLA and the MPLA's armed ring with the Cubans, all of these units were highly trained. Of all the battles and skirmishes thus far, the battle for control of Bridge 14 was probably the most challenging, as the infantry forces were evenly balanced. Commandant Okoa, however, commanded far more effective artillery and heavy weapons. In particular, the 122mm rocket launcher, Stalin's organ, overshadowed the SADF's limited artillery, capacity. Compounding this, each FAPLA mortar section was comprised of 12 tubes, whereas the South African Zunita and the FNLA were restricted to eight per section. We need to step back just for a moment and consider one aspect that was in favor of the South African's mobility. The MPLA had decided earlier to deploy the vast majority of its armored vehicles to the north of the capital Luanda. These vehicles were being used as part of the offensive forces pounding FNLA leader Holden Roberto, who by now had been pushed out of Ambriz and was in full retreat towards the Zairean border. This success was the opposite in the south, where the Cubans and FAPLA were far less mobile. This was going to be crucial in the final days of Operation Savannah. Had the Commandante been able to deploy more mechanized infantry and armored vehicles, perhaps Foxbat and later X-Ray would have found the going more difficult as they exited Angola. So, Colonel Swart decided Bridge 14 must be retaken. But a direct assault was not the cleverest tactic at that moment. The FAPLA artillery had the advantage. So Swart focused his attention on a smaller bridge called 15, which lay a few kilometers away in the town of Casamba. He knew that if one of his units could cross Bridge 15, they could approach the all-important hill codenamed Top Hat, as well as the Copis. From there, they would control the terrain to the north, all the way to Catofe, which also meant they could secure the bridge. So Swart was able to control the terrain to the north, all the way to Bridge 14. It was then, and with some relief, that he received an intelligence update, which proved that Bridge 14 was still in South African hands. A strange situation, though, had developed. The sappers returned to reinforce the wooden bridge early in the morning of the 11th of December, while small groups of FAPLA soldiers could be seen in the distance monitoring their movements, but taking no action. This impromptu ceasefire came to an end at precisely 11.30 in the morning, when FAPLA artillery resumed its bombardment, but in a far more limited fashion. Perhaps ammunition had begun to run low. Still, there were enough anti-personnel rounds exploding around the sappers to send them scurrying back to cover. After a half hour of dueling artillery, the sappers announced that they had managed to strengthen the bridge enough for the South African Airland Armoured Cars to cross. A reconnaissance commander duly crossed the bridge just after midday and headed north cautiously. It hurried back a short while later, chased by FAPLA's infantry and anti-tank sections. So that night, Colonel Swart met officers of Foxbat Battle Group to decide what they would do next. It had become apparent that the opponent, Commandante Okoa, was not prepared to commit his infantry to another direct assault. They were not aware of the reason, but it did mean the initiative had shifted back to the SADF, although they had no time to waste. What the South Africans didn't know was that Commandante Okoa was waiting for another battalion of FAPLA troops to arrive from the north before resuming his infantry attacks. So Swart duly drew up new plans to attack FAPLA, and at 0200 hours on the 12th of December, Battle Group Foxbat Commandant Kreis received new orders. Take copies and ensuring flanking protection. Kreis had been waiting for just such an order. At 10 that morning, he briefed officers and NCOs about the planned assault. It would be broken into three phases. First was to move the motorized Junita infantry under Captain R2 to travel over Bridge 14 and to reach the road that joined Bridge 15. Phase two would see Captain Kangahuchi and the second company of Junita troops take Kraljki, that all-important little village east of the road. Phase three would see Captain Ferreira and his Portuguese Special Force soldiers backed up by a third company of Junita troops moving to a point alongside the copies. These phases, though, would only work if the Cuban and FAPLA artillery were dealt with. The morning of the 12th, Foxbat was ready to roll, and an Irland armored car group under Lieutenant van Vuren took off with the company of Junita infantry in support. A second group headed to Hippo Hill while two 81-meter-long FAPLA troops were deployed. The second group headed to Hippo Hill while two 81-meter-long FAPLA troops were deployed. The second group headed to Hippo Hill while two 81-meter-long motor sections set up positions just west of the road. Luckily, this was a hard surface road. It was tar. A great deal of rain had been falling constantly, as I mentioned, and the Mobile South African Force was now in a good position to seize the initiative, unless Commandant Okoa received his reinforcements immediately. Task Force Zulu's radar section had also taken up a position alongside the road behind the copies, protected by a company of infantry and a group of Irland armored cars. The FAPLA units were dug in and armed with a machine gun. Blau then focused his 120mm mortar section on the Cuban mortars. In minutes, the vehicles were aflame and a number of Cubans were dead or wounded. Blau then switched target again, this time aiming at the third line of artillery facing his men. These were FAPLA's 120mm mortars, which were knocked out in minutes. The FAPLA and Cuban defences were crumbling as Blau took aim at the rocket launchers, which had already fired two salvos at the South Africans but missed. Blau's 140mm mortar section didn't. The SADF had sent their best spotters and placed them on the high ground and they radioed coordinates which were accurate and the 140mm mortars took out the rocket launchers in seconds. Meanwhile, Lieutenant van Vuren had led his armoured car group across Bridge 14, followed by two companies of infantry joined by the Portuguese Special Forces Unit. Phase one of the attack was over and the SADF had succeeded, but they'd used up a lot of ammunition. Phase two saw the infantry under Captain Kangahuchi securing the right flank and assaulting the FAPLA defences at the all-important Kraljki. They overran the position in minutes, helped a great deal by the artillery which had softened up the FAPLA trenches. Van Vuren didn't have much time to gloat. He then came under direct fire from a FAPLA mortar group which had gone undetected and was based on a rocky bank of the Inhia River. A single Elant 90 shot put pay to the FAPLA mortar section and it was only three days later that the FAPLA mortars were destroyed. Phase two saw the infantry under Captain Kangahuchi securing the right flank and it was only three days later that the South Africans realised that this was not FAPLA at that section, but a Cuban group and one of the men lying near the destroyed mortar was alive. Alberto Morales Belma would be captured wandering around in the bush 72 hours after the battle for Bridge 14 ended and he was eventually sent to Sela as a wounded prisoner of war. So during the battle a unit of FAPLA troops based near one of Blau's mortar sections panicked when they were hit and ran into the dense bush. Some climbed aboard one of their troop carriers, and tried to make a run for it to the north. In what would later be described as a surreal moment, the truck actually passed one of the Irlands. They must have believed the little armoured car was their own. A single shot from the Irland 90 was fired at point-blank range into the back of the truck, killing more than 20 Cubans on board. While all of this was going on, Lieutenant van Vieren was pushing onwards towards Bridge 15, fighting as he went. His new orders were to try and head off a number of armoured vehicles seen approaching the SADF units, which had moved north along the border. As he turned towards the road, a large group of Cuban soldiers suddenly jumped up from the long grass and ran towards the Irlands. van Vieren and his men had a problem as they sought to deal with this threat. They had run out of ammunition for their machine guns. The Lieutenant ordered the hatches closed, but van Vieren was too slow, and one of the Cubans managed to shoot him in the hand through the hatch. He switched his 9mm pistol to his left hand and shot the Cuban who fell off the vehicle, and the Irland group headed back to the main route to rendezvous with the SADF logistics at a point called Almeida. Spare ammunition was waiting for them there, which was fortunate because the battle was not over, and it was already one of the most intense of the entire operation. So we must end for this episode, and pick up the rest of the story of the battle for Bridge 14 next week. Please rate the podcast on your platform of choice, or you can send me an email through the website abwarpodcast.com, or direct message me on Twitter @desleithen. Just a quick thank you to all those sending me messages and stories, just a quick thank you to all those sending me messages and stories, one is Keith, who is an infantry second lieutenant based at Roacana, and has a great story to tell about shutting off the sluice gates. Maybe Keith will be willing to discuss this further, if so, I'll include some of his story in later podcasts. If you have personal stories that you want to share about Operation Savannah and its immediate aftermath, please feel free to send me these through as well, and any others from the South African border war. With that, we must secure the perimeter. Until next, ciao! Captioned by Cotter Captioning Services. I'll see you next time.