Episode 19 – The SADF conducts an off-the-record briefing and the start of the struggle to control Bridge 14

Welcome back to South African Border Wars podcast with me, your host, Desilatham. This is episode 19, and we're dealing with a fallout after the Battle of Ibuw and the preamble to the next battle for Bridge 14. As the Battle of Ibuw ended, terrible news emerged about the shooting down of one of the crucial spotter plans. Remember last episode, I mentioned Captain Williamson, who helped locate the missing five South African mechanized troops who managed to survive the Irlands being knocked out, then having to walk back to Cele. Captain Williamson, Cessna 185, was hit by ground fire on the 25th of November, leading to the loss of all three on board, including Lieutenant Thomson and Captain Taliyad, close to Ibuw a few days after the Battle ended. Ibuw was the first defeat for the SRDF inside Angola, and drove home three major weaknesses, which Defend HQ realised had to be fixed and quickly. First was a lack of highly mobile heavy artillery and air cover. Ibuw had shown that a well set up fire position with Cuban and Russian technical assistance could not be easily overcome. As we're into here, re-equipping the SRDF would be difficult because South Africa was already facing military and other sanctions because of apartheid. Second was the need for intelligence. The information was patchy and the SRDF began to actively recruit more Portuguese Army refugees who crossed the border from Angola. The third weakness was how the citizen force should be deployed. The draft system at the time was a lottery, which meant that soldiers spent a year in the Army and were then rotated back to Sibi Street. As the Americans had discovered in Vietnam, 12 months deployment is not long enough to gain experience. More about that in a moment. So we know that by the end of November, international media inside Angola had been present as some of the battles with the South Africans were involved and the cat was out of the bag despite attempts at keeping the extent of their involvement secret. Back home, the National Party controlled public broadcasts of the SABC meant there were no independent broadcast permitted inside the country. The only broadcast not following the government line was from a tiny pop music station, LM Radio based in Mozambique. But there was a tradition of independent newspaper ownership and South African journalists were now writing openly about the SRDF fighting all the way to Lohana. International news agencies such as Reuters were suppliers of global news to many of these newspapers as well as associated press and Ajahn's France press. This attempted covering up what was going on was also proving more difficult as the injured SRDF members were flown home along with their dead. Two Puma helicopters would also be lost during Savannah. The first was flown by Captain John Millbank along with co-pilot Chris Hotsenberg and flared sergeant Pete O'Neill Detoury. It was hit by a Cuban anti-aircraft fire from a hill around 18 kilometres north west of Seller. The pilots managed to force landing then hid from the Cubans and popular troops for nearly 24 hours before making it back to safety. The second Puma was lost in an accident that saw captains F. Ummelman and C.D. DeVitt as well as G.W. Kettit losing their lives. These losses were emounting, although the public was still largely unaware of exactly what was going on. Major General F. DeVitt had ordered reinforcements into Angola by road on the 25th of November. F. DeVitt had controlled a far stronger force than the initial units, which began operations of Anna back in October. It comprised a battery of 140mm missile launchers and infantry battalion from Tucson, a troop of Ilan's 60 armoured cars and a 20mm anti-aircraft battery. A little later, more medics and a mobile radar unit were also sent into southern Angola and ordered to head to Seller around 300 kilometres south east of Luanda. The reports of what the S.D.F. were up to had now become a dull roar back home. It was time to reveal a few more bits of information. So dearly on the 1st of December 1975, the government yielded. Senior executives of all the mainstream newspapers were invited to a meeting in Pretoria for what was called an "off-the-record briefing" by S.D.F. Chief Admiral Birman. To say that the editors together together at the meeting were shocked, would be an understatement. Admiral Birman proceeded to explain that the MPLA had pushed Anita out of Luanda and was now attacking the FNLA Hell Towns of Weige and Umbries in the north. S.D.F. troops were more than 700 kilometres inside Angola, although he left out the orbit about the evacuation of troops at Umbresette, well over 1,000 kilometres from the south-west African border. But that was not all. Most of the South African troops killed to date had been fighting inside Angola. That was not what had been released to the public before, nor did they release the number of dead, which was around a dozen. Forty-seven South Africans had been wounded, there had been reports that the Cubans had unleashed some heinous weapon on the S.D.F. and that there were hundreds of soldiers being hidden in a secret wing of one military hospital at Fuutrecha Huchta. The government was trying to set that record straight. "FNLA morale was low," said the Admiral, and the Roberto's black and Portuguese troops did not see eye-to-eye, making the relationship with the erstwhile ally more difficult to manage. He said the MPLA had around 23,000 soldiers, and were regarded as well-trained, while the FNLA supposedly had 27,000 and Anita deploying around 12,000. Of course, the FNLA had more like 5,000 soldiers, and most of these were hardly trained at all. You needed to, was probably able to field fewer than half the number released by the Admiral, while the MPLA figure was also inflated. The Admiral also admitted that the strategy had involved an outcome, but this outcome was now rather blurred. "It was no quick end for the struggle," he said, "even if the FNLA and Anita had managed to surround Luanda, without Western backing, the MPLA was likely to win this initial war." He also mentioned that Swap was arm-during the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, or plan, was now operating out of a few bases inside Angola and Zambia. Many of these were attacking civilians, and had been carrying Anita and FNLA membership cards, but were actually aligned with the MPLA. This was a lot to take in, for the members of the press. Anita's Jonas Savimbi had initially supported Swapo, but in September 1975 announced he'd no longer provide them with any support. This pushed Swapo closer to the MPLA for strategic and ideological reasons. This was also hard to swallow for people who knew South West African politics. Anita and Swapo shared common ethnic identities, and this change of heart by Anita was to pose the challenge for plan in the future. They needed Southern Angola as a launch pad to strike South West Africa, but Anita was the enemy. With the MPLA, now most likely to prevail in the Civil War, Swapo would naturally gravitate towards the likely rulers, and the MPLA would only really control West and Angola to the border, which squeezed Swapo into a small operational area. The briefing ended, and the shocked editors drove home. The big problem was they could not openly write about what they'd hurt, disquiet, continued to spread. Swapo's rights about what happens when covert action is taken by political leadership, which then cannot control the citizen's response, and this was a case in point. Also, the Opposition United Party held their own press conference where their leader for Simonstein John Wiley appealed to the Nationalists to reveal all. "Tell us exactly where we stand," he demanded, and he was not alone. Even staunch allies of the Nationalist Party, the pro-government of Reconceny's papers built and report were running editorials that were clearly concerned about the real situation on the ground. While operations of Anna continued, matters back in South West Africa had actually worsened at the same time. The Angolan War had created ripple effects throughout the region, and Swapo activity in the north of South West Africa had increased. Plan operatives speaking of Reconce had been interrogating Angolan refugees as they fled South seeking information about the SADF, this worried defence force headquarters as it implied advanced intelligence gathering capacity. Then follow-up actions, which would become a much feared SADF move following sabotage or murders, were reported in late 1975 with two planned bases destroyed. Most of the insurgents fled, seven were killed. Hot pursuit raids tracking Swapo insurgents had now become standard, although these were being kept secret from the public. On the 20th of November 1975, Swapo had attacked a patrol with mortars, but all ten members of the mortar platoon were killed, and SADF soldier also died in that incident. Less than a week later, four SADF soldiers died during a hot pursuit operation into Angola, and by the end of 1975, 17 permanent force and national servicemen had been killed in the border war for that year alone. Thus Swapo's arm-dring plan was now deploying platoons of around thirty men at times, far larger than previous insurgency, and this was to cause an inevitable need to throw more manpower into the fray. When the military action began by the early 70s, the public would tell that the Bush War would take a short while, that the insurgents would be defeated quickly. It was becoming clear to the military establishment that that was an accurate, Swapo was growing more powerful and was throwing more men into the border war. There had been debates in public about the idea of a national service that could be extended. At that stage, it was still a lottery and limited to six months or a year, the signs were that the draft would be increased, perhaps to encompass the total white male population, while the SADF had become more diverse, the nationalist government hadn't. It believed in white domination, and its fixation on race meant it could not call in all males black and white to fight communism. It could only trust whites, because it only gave whites. That's the vote, this was a seminal moment. Had the draft extended to more South Africans, we know that the political future of the country would have been different. By forcing only a select group inside a minority into an army that naturally caused black opposition to actually increase. If they weren't to be trusted, then they'd obviously gravitate to the other side. I mean, what would you do when someone deploys an "us and them" strategy? The counter-insurgency campaign was not going to be a quick fix, and it had become apparent that the government of South Africa needed to somehow prepare the population for this long hall. On the 5th of December 1976, Officer Commanding Western Province Command Brigadier L.R. Robertson delivered a speech that was paused for thought. He said, South African soldiers would have to realise that the future border service was going to be the rule and not the exception. As a World War II vet, his comments were taken deadly seriously. You should know a thing or two about how wars progressed. A few days later came more shocking news, which added weight to Brigadier Robertson's comments. A major skirmish had taken place in South Africa, where 61 Supper insurgents were killed along with three South Africans. As we'll hear in the next episode, the entire political initiative was about to come unstuck in two places. The American Senate passed the Clark Commandment, barring aid to groups involved in military operations in Angola, and the OAU voted by Margin of a single vote cost by EDIM. That meant to support the MPLA ahead of two other independence movements, FNLA and UNITA. As we head towards the end of Operation Savannah, there was to be one more major battle inside Angola, and it involved something called Bridge 14, which took place on 9 December 1975. While the SADF was involved in a protracted withdrawal, the idea was to crush as many MPLA units as possible and then hand over the regions to UNITA. Middle group Foxpat, and a common-un George Clase, was involved. This battle group originally had a command of common-un Edie Webb, had fought through Angola since the start of the operation in October, so it's fitting that they were there at the end. The battle group would be faced with a large Cuban and MPLA force near Katofe, around 230 kilometres south east of Luanda. South African air reconnaissance spotted the Foupler headquarters 20 kilometres north of the Inier River Bridge at the small town of Katofe. The bridge had been blown up, and the road wasn't passable over a medium-sized river because it was summer rainfall, season, and it wasn't flat. Intelligence had also been improved, and our information arrived that the Foupler and Cuban units were a battalion strong. They had deployed the infamous multiple rocket launchers BM-21 Stalin, Organ, or Red Eye, as the South Africans called them, overlooking that road and the bridge. Three armored cars were spotted, along with advanced artillery positions, and at least 24 trenches, only 200 metres north-east of the Inier River Bridge. Platoons of Foupler troops could also be seen south of Inier River, where the road diverged at a wire junction. Both Unita and MPLA troops have been trying to gain the upper hand, amongst civilians, in that area, adding to the confusion. The terrain favored the MPLA, and they had set up their defensive positions with overlaid killing zones. It was clear to the SDF that bridge 14 was strategically important, and they learned that the MPLA was trying to rebuild it. However, it needed to be secured as a key point on the road north and south. Commodern Crace was not aware that the state and national security agency back in Pretoria had already decided they were not going to send any more troops into Angola, if it was time to leave. Crace had put through a request for at least another company or two of white or black troops or both, but on the 5th of December, he was told this wasn't going to happen, so he focused on bridge 14, first ordering sappers to cut down large trees from a nearby forest. They were going to build a wooden bridge over the Inier River to attack the MPLA in the north. The engineering corps, which I haven't mentioned much before, was going to prove tactically vital at this last battle. They'd been trained in basic bridge building using local materials, particularly wood, as the SDF high command unit would be impossible to deliver the amount of cement and other materials required, meant a long trip all the way from South West Africa. At the same time, Commodern Crace wrecked the area and decided to set up an observation post on the top of two medium sized hills that overlooked the river. One was called Ubamba and the SDF gave it the codename Top Hat. The other was Copucco, codename Big Bang, both were west of the bridge. The only problem was the SDF was south of the river and the units sent to occupy these hills could not cross the Inier. It was in full flat. A helicopter was called in and the reconnaissance commander was dropped close to the two hills on the evening of Sunday 7th December. They were heavily armed with mines, grenades and loads of spare ammunition. The going was tapped on the sides of this muddy mountain. They could hear the South African artillery firing towards the Fuffler positions during the night. Sergeant Vanenberg was at the head of this recon platoon and was suddenly hit by a machine gun fire from a group of Fuffler who had set up a position on the hill. Captain Fenter was hit in the hand and Ajatant Officer Condoradi, who was too RC, managed to move the rest of the platoon out of the firing line. After a short exchange of fire, Fuffler withdrew. The medic, staff Sergeant Butters, bandaged Fenter and tried to save Vanenberg. The small South African group was now hunkered down in a strong defensive position in case Fuffler returned, but they had a decision to make. Continue onwards to the hilltop, or with the draw. Captain Fenter needed to get his sergeant to medical assistance and decided to withdraw, but there was no response in seller to his repeated radio calls. They walked back towards the river and shortly after dawn on Monday 8th December, he finally made radio contact. But Sergeant Vanenberg had already died. A short while later, helicopter support arrived and the recon unit was cazevanked out carrying their dead comrades. Later he was to receive South Africa's middle of courage, the honorisks, posthumously. The small-scale operation had failed, but upcoming was a much more important battle for Bridge 14. With that, we'll end this episode and pick up the story next week. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps increase visibility, where you can contact me through the website, abwarpodcast.com, or Twitter @dezlathan. Until next, goodbye. [Music]