Episode 17 – The SAS Steyn’s role in the remarkable evacuation from the beach at Ambrizette

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Deiz Latham. This is episode 17, and we're approaching the end of operations of Anna, which had started out so well, but was rapidly turning into a strategic nightmare for the South Africans. One of the fastest mechanized invasions since World War II had resulted in the essay idea of now deep inside Angola, and in the case of Brigadier Rousse, who was a liaison officer based in Ambrise with the FNLA, he was cut off on the coast to the north of the capital, the Wander. It was mid-November 1975, and the MPLA and Cubans were starting to move, determined to rid the country of the FNLA. Meanwhile to the South, Unita was holding onto its main gains, which now extended from the South-West African border to the main railway line linking the coastal ports of Benguela and Lobito, and the resource Rich Cutonga region of neighbouring Zion. The political strategy was about to come into pressure. Although the US, France, and Unita, as well as the FNLA, had all requested the South Africans remained inside Angola and support the Jonas Savimbi, things were changing. Remember, hold on the Roberto had decided to attack the capital with SADF support and attack that ended in dismal failure along Luanda's death road. Brigadier Rousse now faced possible capture, along with South Africa's 3-5.5-inch guns that flown into northern Angola to assist the FNLA and the hapless assault on the capital on the 10th of November. As I explained last episode, he had already considered committing suicide rather than being captured. The guns were now parked under mango trees in Ambrise awaiting extraction, along with 26 SADF soldiers who had worked with Rousse. The artillery teams also remained, and the SADF faced an embarrassing international situation with close to 40 men and all this equipment trapped in the north of Angola. The South African government had hidden the truth about the SADF on the ground from the public despite obvious proof to the contrary. Now they were more than 300 soldiers leading Unita and FNLA units, or fighting alone, and Pretoria had to move fast. The plan to fly the guns out had hit a big snag, and Brigadier Rousse met with hold on the Roberto, the FNLA leader, and suggested a quick secondary attack to secure the north bank of the Dande River, and also requested that the FNLA continue its stall defensive on Lucala and Melange. These were two towns to the south of the capital, along the main road to Zaire. However, the FNLA was in no shape to renew their offensive, and Pretoria completely overestimated their strength. Cuban and Russian ships were now docking, bringing Migs and other aircraft into Angola after the SADF's rush to the capital had jolted both Fidel Castro and Leonard Bershnep. The Dyer was cast, so to speak. Bershnep had hesitated to support the MPLA, while Castro had been rather more proactive, but now the American support for San Africa and the brazen invasion by the SADF had changed Moscow's view. There were 100% behind Augustine Netto's MPLA, and its fapler armed wing. As this escalation of hardware increased, the SADF still had not managed to fly out their all-important artillery, and now it was the third week of November. There was no way a lumbering C-130 or two could make it to Ambrose and Back, without the likely possibility of being shot down by the phantages. The window for this extraction by the SAF was head closed. The CIA had also withdrawn without telling the South Africans. The first Brigadier Ruiz found out about this was when he realized, but the 24th of November, that the Americans had quietly decamped without prior warning. Unlike the very public humiliation in the panicked departure from Saigon in Vietnam, only two years before, this group of CIA operatives had been extracted without any fanfare, because of course they were never in Angola in the first place. The South African Navy had been operating along the coast of southern Angola since the start of operations of Anna. The anti-submarine frigate SAA's president Kruger and at the command of Captain R.D. Kingon had spent three weeks loathing about, as William Stonecombe puts it. Now they had an emergency. The SAA's Kruger was under strict radar and radio silence, and in mid-November had been steaming along the coast in the vicinity of the Canary River, which brought his Angola and South West Africa. Ambries was more than a thousand kilometres away to the north. The SAAD of HQ had thoughtfully planned to place the ship relatively close, in case there was a need for an urgent evacuation and that moment had arrived. The Defence Force buffens had ordered that a Puma helicopter be based aboard the SAA's Kruger, along with extra automatic weapons. There was also a cutterboat, latched on deck, as well as several Gemini inflateables that are associated with special force operations. Towards the end of November, the Kruger's sister ship SAA's president Stain and the Captain A.S. Davis was dispatched to relieve her. The cover story was that the SAAS Stain was going on a fisheries protection patrol. It wasn't true. Captain Davis had very specific orders. He was to maintain station at a position, along the central Angolan coast, avoiding any contact with other vessels, and to evacuate personnel at Ambries and Benguela, or Lobito, at short notice. He was also told to monitor and record ground force transmissions for later analysis. Like Kingon, Davis was ordered to maintain strict radio and radar silence from when the vessel departed Cape Town, only to be broken in a dire emergency. The SAAD stayed on debut with the SAAS Kruger and took over the Gemini boats, the Puma helicopter and automatic weapons, as well as a special maritime map that was to prove a bit of a life saver in the short while. They then steamed northwards up the Angolan coast. A few days later in the 27th of November, the strict radio silence was broken, and Brigadier Rua sent an emergency request for any evacuation for his liaison team and the three artillery Kruger's plus guns. Davis checked the map and realised that Ambries was not suitable for his frigate to get close enough to shore, so that the Gemini boats and the cousin could load up both men and artillery and escape. He suggested a harbor to the north known as Ambries Z, today known as Enzetto. That was 70 kilometres north of Ambries along the coastal road, which was now almost impossible due to the ongoing rainy season. This was going to be a close call for the Syafritans. Luckily, the fast-moving frigate was only a few hours from Ambries Z and Captain Davis ordered full steam ahead. They would arrive off the port at around 2300 hours that night, and Davis asked Brigadier Rua's to hurry immediately so they could conduct the evacuation in the dark that evening. It was then that Rua's had to break radio silence again and send a message to Naval headquarters back in South Africa that he was going ahead with the evacuation. The operation was approved. If successful, Davis would radio a single message, "Super," and if a failure, he would message the word "duck." This was humor in the face of extreme danger. The S.A.S. stain was known in the Navy as "superduck" because of the number of the birds that appeared on its crest. It was also a kind of joke on Davis himself because he was large and tubby, and quite a character. He was fluent in French, and in fact could hardly speak off his cons, and was prone to riding around the naval base at Simonstein on a little scooter. He had also seen a lot of action in World War II and was now approaching retirement. It would be a shocking international incident if Captain Davis and his frigate were sunk by the Russians or Cubans lurking nearby. Davis ordered the stains nameplate to be removed and a tattered and dirty ensign to be flown while all the usual glittering chromed embossed bits had to be covered with dirt and an attempt at reducing the chance of being recognized. Things began to go wrong soon after the stain arrived off the shore of Umbresette. Ruse had broken radio silence again and said he was still on the road north from Umbres. It had rained and the road was inundated and he would not make the rendezvous by 2,300 hours. The new evacuation time was to be 0500 the next morning the 28th of November. That was close to dawn and the South Africans were trying to get their men and equipment out of the way before the sun rose and the residents of the Harbatan awoke. Meanwhile Davis was picking up increased radio traffic from the Russians who were not far away to the south in Luwanda. While the Russian ships were generally located around the capital, it was more concerned about their planes which were flying up and down the coast between Luwanda and the oil-rich enclave of Kabinda on Angola's northern border with Zaya. Worse, he'd picked up both Russian ships and planes on his radar screens and Davis was now aware that he could be sailing into a trap. Had Brigadier Ruse been captured and now the frigate was in a situation where it could be attacked and sunk, that would be a double disaster for the South Africans. An arms embargo had been imposed on the country by the United Nations after Pretoria refused to begin the process of elections in South West Africa so replacing the frigate would have been all but impossible. Secondly, the political fallout and propaganda damage done to the national party leadership would have been significant. Remember Parliament still did not know that the SADF was fully involved in Angola? Although, in 1975, it was pretty much a one-party parliament of Nationalists. The UN General Assembly had passed a resolution 3411(c) on the 18th November 1975 which proclaimed that the United Nations and the international community have a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and the liberation movements and towards those imprisoned, restricted, or exiled for the struggle against a party. Only Israel, Taiwan and Chile were prepared to support the SADF along with other pariah nations in the world, including Latin American military dictatorships such as Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. None of these countries could build a frigate if the SADF was sunk. Davis was now waiting off a brazetto full of concern as his frigate rode the Atlantic swells. Sunrise was set at 7 hours 10 and the moon would rise at up. O200 hours 30, they had a very short window from 5 to 7 in the morning to evacuate dozens of men and artillery, along with the encryption machines and other vital equipment. Dave was inched closer to the coast on the morning of the 28th. At O400 hours, Brigadier Rua's signal that his men were now in position close to the harbour. But it had no pier, although it had a storm wall, so the evacuation was shifted to the beach in the hope that the large swells were contained. Where they now played its part, instead of a bright moonlit night evacuation, navigation was being hampered by the fact that it was heavily overcast, and Dave was crept closer to the rendezvous point, helped by the excellent map. But the overcast where they actually assisted the South Africans restricting the Cuban and Russian surveillance from the air. The biggest danger apart from being spotted was the large sand bar just offshore. At O400 hours 24 and as the SAS stain was around 3.5 nm from the beach, two vehicles headlights were spotted on the land. They were flashing recognition signals at 10 second intervals. Dave has quickly ordered a reply to be flashed, and Russ radioed to report there were no enemy forces nearby. At O400 hours 40, Dave has launched the three Gemini inflatables under the command of Lieutenant RN early. Then he ordered the cutter to be loaded into the Atlantic, and the evacuation was on. This was not going to be easy. There were three meter swells, although the wind had dropped and the sea was oily rather than rough. But a quarter of a mile from shore, early, signaled to Russ using a lamp covered with red masking tape. Brigadier Russ responded immediately, he appeared to be safe, and early breathed a sigh of relief. They had partly feared that the whole plan could have been a ruse, but now time was of the essence. He took the cutter and wind Gemini into shore and close to the sea wall, the heavy swells were calmer, and then he knew that the plan would work. Early's Gemini hit the shore quite close to Amresita Town Square, closer than he would have hoped. Meanwhile, the Towns residents slept on, apparently blissfully unaware that there was a South African warship so close by. On the beach, the S.A.D. have had been divvied up into groups of five, but it suddenly became apparent too lieutenant early that he was going to run out of time. The sun would rise long before all the men in equipment were aboard the S.A.S. stain. It was time to fire up the Puma helicopter on deck, which would be used to lift the heavy communications and cryptographic gear, at 0545 Captain Ben van der Besthesen of the S.A.S. Air Force took off along with his flight engineer Sergeant BB Smith. Five minutes later they landed at Amresita, by now the noise of the Puma, which is a very large chopper, surely had woken residents, and yet no one moved in the town. The first to clamour aboard the Puma were Brigadier Ruus and two of his men, Captain Malcolm Kinghorn based in Amres with the Brigadier had basically ordered his commanding officer aboard no arguments permitted. Ruus duly clamoured up into the Puma. The helicopter returned to the ship and made four more trips to the beach, lifting out equipment and personnel, while the rest were raced through the waves on board the cutter and Gemini's. At 600 hours 43, the last man climbed aboard the S.A.S. stain. The Puma was lashed down, the Gemini's stored, and the cutter chained on deck. It was time to beat a hasty retreat, and Captain Davis steamed out to see full speed ahead. Back at Silvermine Maritime Communications Centre in Cape Town, naval senior officers were starting to have serious misgivings about things having waited since 5 in the morning for word. Davis had still not reported other "super" or "duck", and it was now 0900. Suddenly, Davis broke the silence with a confusingly cryptic message. Super-successful "duck", what did that mean? Was it a success? A super? Or was it a failure? A duck? Later, it transpired that the signal's officer had been confused by the original order, and the tension back in South Africa only eased once that had been explained. Two days later Brigadier Ruos and his team landed at Balthas Bay halfway up the South West African Atlantic coast. Captain Davis immediately turned the S.A.S. stain around and set sail back towards southern and golden waters. Operation Savannah was not over, and they were still S.A.D. of units inside the country. You may have been required to conduct another evacuation. Don't forget folks, that of course this operation was not happening in a little Angolan vacuum. Back in South Africa, the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 was going to see a massive increase in black resistance to apartheid at the precise moment that its political leadership began to fixate on a military solution to every problem. Take Commodante Jan Braithmuck, who led Bethel Group Alpha as a case in point. He was still stuck in Angola, ordered to hold Lebito, while HQ figured out what to do about the FNLA and Unita. At the same time, his brother, Braithm Braithmuck, was in court back in South Africa, standing trial as a terrorist. On the 26th of November 1975, Braithm Braithmuck was sentenced to 9 years in jail for offenses under South Africa's terrorism act. At the same time as his brother was fighting a covert war in a neighboring country on behalf of South Africa. Braithm Braithmuck pleaded guilty to entering South Africa to start an organization which would be named Arda Actus or Okella and intended to be the "white wing" of the band African National Congress. Warfare in South Africa is full of stories of brothers who fight against each other. My previous podcast on the Anglo-Beware War featured the "Devet Brothers", General Christian Devet, a bitter-ainder boy leader noted for his innovations and courage in fighting the British, and Pete Devet rejoined the British and fought against the Boers and his brother. The Braithmuck's believed in two different political worlds, and it's incredible how they had the courage of their convictions. You can judge Arda, but you cannot fault their courage. One was fighting a war deep inside a foreign country, and the other was fighting a war for the rights of Black South Africans. Both were fighters or soldiers, I guess one person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist. And so, we must stand back for a moment at this point to consider what us was going on in Angola. Unita and the South Africans now controlled a huge area from the east-west road in the northern central region through Melanje down to the South-West African border. The FNLA was still thought to be in control of northern Angola, while the Cuban and Russian backed MPLA were in charge of a thin slither of territory from Luwanda and just to the South all the way to the Zairean border. At first glance, the political outcome was still in balance, except for the OAU. Nations there hated the rights of African government more than their feared Russia's proxy war mentality, which was expanding communism and newly independent African nations. A pivotal moment in any military exercise had emerged, what now? It was after Independence Day. The Americans were cooling off. The Russians and Cubans had escalated their military support for the MPLA. The African nations at the OAU were split between those who supported the MPLA, and those who thought a proper election process would be the only way to ensure democracy. Remember, many of these African countries were grappling with their own post-colonial issues, and were vassal states in a way of the countries of the Cold War, America and the Soviet Union mainly. Pretoria thought they could drive a wedge into the OAU, but what actually transpired is the S.S.D.F's role in direct military intervention doomed B.J. forces' political dream of a white minority-dominated country, accepted at the table of diplomacy by Black-ruled African countries. New Pretoria's strategic plan was broken in two places. Firstly, the FNLA did not exist anymore as an army. It was shattered, and Holden Roberta would retreat to become an exile inside air within two months. This meant the MPLA would not be isolated in its slither of Angola, slowly running out of food and power, as you need to in the FNLA tighten their grip, for the Cubans, their gamble of supporting the MPLA had paid off. When now on, the real war was on one front, the South. Back in Pretoria, the French and American ambassadors were sent secret messages about what role they were prepared to take in the ongoing war in Angola. More was expected from the French than the Americans. French oil companies like Dottal were exposed in the oil-rich cabinda province of Angola. So this was the second break point. The Americans had initially sourced most of the uranium for the atomic bombs from Zaire, but as that country's civil war appeared never ending, they had shifted their sourcing of the strategic mineral elsewhere. They just weren't that interested in Zaire, or even oil-rich cabinda enclave anymore. That partly explains why the CIA had suddenly disappeared, and Brigadier Rousse was left high and dry. With that rumours halt, and secure the perimeter. Next episode, we'll hear about what happened when the Pretoria government decided to reveal all at a press conference on December 1st, 1975, and what happened to Colonel Jan Bretenbach and Commander Delva Linford and the hundreds of South Africans still deep inside Angola fighting on in operations of Anna. Please rate the podcast on iTunes if you have the inclination, you can also contact me through the website abwarpodcast.com or direct message me on Twitter @dezlaitham. Until next, goodbye. [Music]