Episode 16 – Luanda’s “Death Road” leaves the FNLA in tatters and the CIA decides to up and off

[Music] Welcome back to South Africa's border wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 16 and we're covering operations of Anna, which took place between October 1975 and early January 1976. Then was the invasion of southern Angola by the Assad Defense Force in response to the outbreak of a civil war in the country involving the three main independence movements that had fought against Portuguese colonial rule. These were the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA. I focused on this episode shifts in a while to the FNLA's assault on the capital, Luanda, but first an update about the SDF. Brigadier Scumon, who was in charge of the region, had set up his base at Cella in the southeast and he had plans. The first was to replace the command at the both task forces, so he duly summoned Zulu's colonel Fahirin to a meeting. Fahirin left battle group Alfa behind at the port of Sumbar, south of Luanda and arrived in Cella on the 13th November, along with 500 members of his now-arragged force. He was told that task for Zulu was to be led by Colonel CJ Swat, he was being replaced. Commodant Eddie Webb also received a military equivalent of a dear Johnny and he was replaced as Foxbat officer commanding by a Commodant George Cress. The SDF swapped out these hardened soldiers at precisely the same time, as the anti-MPLA forces were to suffer a reversal of fortune. Last episode I explained how the FNLA's Holden or Reboto had been biting his time, planning a direct assault on the capital, Luanda, from his lair to the north at Abrizz. So much biting had been going on that the coming assault was to be a complete fast as we all hear. His initial plan was to head into the capital on the 10th November, the day before independence. This would have been highly symbolic, a triumphant entry into the heart of MPLA territory. But Cuban soldiers and weapons had been pouring into the capital since early October, and every day wasted was another nail in the attacker's coffins. The MPLA had a plethora of heavy weapons, while the FNLA had a few panard armored vehicles, and one piece of long-range artillery. This rag-tag group of semi-trained soldiers was going to be scared stiff when they face the MPLA's main weapon of choice, the Russian PM-21 multiple rocket launcher, Akhar Red Eye. This World War II era weapon may be an obsolete, but in the country of LeBlanc, the one-eyed man as king was something to that effect. As the South Africans had discovered, the 122-millimeter rockets were not particularly accurate, nor lethal for troops well trained and dug in. But for those walking about in the open, 20 or 30 of these landing nearby was fatal, and for under trained soldiers terrifying. By now, the CIA had taken to delivering periodic shipments of light weapons to Roberto, but because the Americans on the ground were actually concealing the operations from the U.S. Congress, the shipments were irregular and lacked heavy weapons. Meanwhile, Brigadier Ben Rus of the SEDF had been based at Ambrids as liaison officer, and the relationship was far more proactive, because Rus was back to 100% by his cabinet. Parliament had no idea what the defense force was up to, it was all secret. The National Party of South Africa pretended the SEDF was only advising UNITA and the FNLA as the two Angolan movements fought the Soviet-backed MPLA, but the reality was hundreds of South Africans were actively fighting inside Angola. The full details of what they did only emerged years later. Rus was also able to secure armaments all the way from Rundu in South West Africa, including bazookas and heavier weapons. When SEDF Major General Constantin Fulion reviewed the plans to attack Luanda, he was seriously concerned. The first major challenge was Roberto's troops, they lacked training, and as William Stinkeum says, hardly top of the line. Yet a few hundred partly trained tribesmen from his Bakongo people, along with 120 Portuguese mercenaries, a few faint hearted Zairean troops thrown into the mix, and a handful of resident advisors. These of course were Rus and members of the CIA. Roberto had no tanks, no heavy weapons, and a force that was more like a rebel. The geography of the region was also unfavorable. The approach to Luanda was bordered on the west by the Atlantic Ocean and on the east by marshland, more extensive now because it was the middle of the rainy season. For the more, Roberto's troops harbored a traditional fear of marshes, believing they were full of man-eating snakes and refused to consider attacking through the maze of waterways. This meant that approach along the main roads, which of course meant that the MPLA could set up and range their numerous heavy weapons, guns and banks of 122 millimeter rockets, and just wait for the inevitable direct assault. The Cubans who were in charge of most of these heavy weapons had been found wanting when it came to Bush Warfare. They were excellent at deploying weapons in a conventional defensive position, but woeful when it came to African erratic-style warfare with a highly mobile type of fighting it entailed. They're fair earlier to stop the SEDF and its headlong rush through Angola, also meant these MPLA units suffered from their own moral challenges. For Lune and Rus knew that the FNLA had to try approach Luanda away from the roads using the waterways, but they also knew there was no way Roberto would do this. It's interesting to note that the South Africans did not want to take the Angolan capital, Luanda. Imagine the collateral damage that would have caused with hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in a conventional war. This is again where you have to stop for a moment and consider strategy. As you've heard, the SEDF was following government plans, which linked to a political solution of some kind. It was not supposed to be a military solution, where another state was crushed in a war. The drive into Angola was to secure southwest Africa's northern border. In doing so, they would hand over control of southern Angola and its ports to Unita, and the FNLA's allies, which would then be a useful buffer zone against their main enemy, Swapo, the southwest African people's organisation. I've spent a number of episodes explaining how the invasion developed, and as you know by now, the SEDF should have been out of Angola by independent state on 11th November. Every day beyond this state was threatening the tenuous strategy which had started out as hopelessly naive. Every day that the SEDF remained in the country, it battered South Africa's propaganda campaign internationally. Sure, the nationalist spec home could boast to their voters, who listened as seriously to the SEDF and broadcasting corporation about the so-called advisers helping defeat the MPLA in what one American called the most effective blitzkrieg since the German invasion of France in the Second World War. They could swagger about in their trilobies and matching the stars at party meetings about how the communists were being dispatched, but the real story was Prime Minister BJ Foster and his defence minister P.W. Butter were now doing real damage to their strategic ambitions. Lawanda was crumbling, and that is true. Food rationing and restrictions had been imposed and the morale of the civilian population was low. The hydroelectric scheme at Dondor in the southeast had been damaged and was under unita attack, which meant that power failures were happening every day. Water suppliers were damaged by both the unita and FNLA units who were focused on the traditional sectarian areas of Angola. The MPLA did not control the north, nor the south. The basic idea of ensuring Angola was broken seemed to make sense as a military strategy, but it was a broken political strategy. For the militarists, not controlling the narrative inside the national party, with its history of preaching about a struggle against the English, Angola was a godsend. The Roy Jafar, the red danger, had yet to emerge fully in nationalist propaganda pamphlets, but it was coupled by the SWART Jafar, a fear of black majority rule. Now leaders like P.W. Butter and Munkdismalan were ascended. The militarisation of South Africa was about to begin. Brigadier Russ and Ambris had advised the FNLA's Roberto to secure the regions under his control as unita was doing. This would mean that the MPLA would be forced to negotiate a political solution and was the smart move in this African game of battle chess. Roberto was not smart. He was angry, vengeful and worse, arrogant, and a resentful sectarian who thought the Baconga people were blessed by being better than all others. He believed in some kind of god-given superiority for both himself and his Baconga. Earlier in November, on the 4th, Magnus Malan and Constantfalunet paid a secret lightning visit to hold in the Roberto at his port there, where they tried to convince him that the director salt along the main roads was not the wisest military strategy. Roberto refused to entertain any other option. They asked him to reinforce the ground he had taken in fighting over the past seven months. After securing the core regions under his control, you should send guerrilla attacks at night into the MPLA strongholds, destroy the capital's water and power supply, and eventually they would be dragged to the negotiation table. But the Roberto was in a rash, a suicidal rash, as we'll hear. P.W. Burton, the cabinet, had a big decision to make. What kind of support would they offer to a man who believed he needed none? The first which was almost fatal for the men of the artillery was to send three 5.5-inch medium guns to support the FNLA assault. These were duly loaded aboard C-130's at Warticle of Air for space on the morning of the 8th of November, and flown into Angola under the command of major JCDF Bosch. Three Canberra bombers would also fire missions to support the attack. From the South African's point of view, the plan was to bomb MPLA defensive positions around the Wunder on the morning of the 9th of November, while Bosch's guns would fire a barrage of anti-personnel rounds shortly after it's to soften up the enemy. Meanwhile, the battalion of the FNLA's best troops under a Portuguese former secret service agent called Colonel Santos a Castro which sees an important bridge over the Bingo River to the north and north east of the capital. Roberto's main force would then roll down the main road, and once across the Bingo Bridge, the artillery would move in behind and fire in enemy positions defending the city itself. The important facture to note was a need for cohesion and coordination. We're in dealing with two different armies let alone the movement of aircraft and artillery establishing timing would always have been a challenge. Unfortunately for the SEDF, Roberto's concept of time and scheduling was somewhat haphazard and ultimately self-destructive. And there were issues with the SEDF as well as we're going to hear. On the morning of the 9th of November at 0500 hours 40 shortly after dawn, the SEDF artillery barrage began at precisely the moment that the SEDF was Canberra's flew overhead and dropped their bombs. While the artillery barrage worked, the bombs didn't because only one of the dozens dropped by the Canberra's actually hit its target. The SAA Air Force was flying at extremely high altitude and this made pinpointing the defensive positions difficult. Still, companies of MPLA troops withdrew from the area unnerved by the bombing. Having kept their side of the bargain, the SEDF now waited for Holden Roberto's Colonel Y Castro and his best men and then they waited some more. What had happened that morning was Roberto had a work in late, then he had what was reported to be a leisurely breakfast. His men began to move 40 minutes late and drove straight into a large group of 800 Cubans and MPLA waiting for them on the other side of the Bingo River Bridge. They had guessed the F&LA would come down the main road like fish swimming in a barrel and that's what Castro did. The Cubans armed with a variety of heavy weapons including recoilless guns and the BM-21s had set themselves up on high ground overlooking all approaches to the bridge. It's clear that had the F&LA attack through the marshes, they would have faced similar defensive positions but not in such a confined space as a road. The artillery pinned down the F&LA troops. Castro tried to convince his anceos to move the men into the marsh but they refused. Traditional and ancient fears of marshes were too much and these heavily armed soldiers borked believing the aforementioned man eating snakes would gobble them up. Brigadier Rousse, monitoring events, was now beyond worried. He suggested that the Roberta's men swing further around eastwards and try an outflanking maneuver but their commanding officer was unmoved. It was full frontal or death and death it would be. The main road into Luanda now became known as death road because of what took place. Hundreds of F&LA troops were forced into direct attacks on heavy weapons in well-secured positions running down fire and brimstone and everything that approached the Bengal River. One by one Roberta's armoured cars were hit and knocked out. The F&LA troops to the credit continued attacking and moving mortars into position to try and strike against these Cuban heavy weapons. And now we need to talk about a little conspiracy theory. One which emerged later was that someone had removed the mortar rounds firing pins which then rendered them useless. It was suggested that the white CIA officers had done this and the rumours spread to the SCD from the ground. Late investigations by the economist journalist Robert Moss writing in 1977 found that the CIA had only managed to deliver 10 heavy mortars and six recoilers guns to the F&LA the day before the attack. Instructions for the use and pins were delivered at the same time but the two sets of atoms somehow were separated and the manuals and pins were lost. However, this is a red herring. The exposed mortars and recoilers guns would have been unable to secure a victory at the strategic bridge no matter what these conspiratorialists say because the entire strategy was hapless to say the least. The SCD have had officers steeped in the tradition of Boer Warfare and conventional training that stipulates a direct assault on a heavily defended position along a confined trail in broad daylight without massive numerical superiority is lunacy. It's just not a clever way to fight a war. The F&LA troops trying to cross the bridge were in a death zone and were now dying in large numbers. This was too much and they began to desert their positions. Quoting from John Stockwell's book "In Search of Enemies" he writes that the F&LA soldiers hearts burst with clutching terror as they dived to the ground, were stood helplessly mesmerised, watching the next salvo landing in their midst. The trickle of men retreating turned into a flood, it was a route for the SEDF, it was a disaster. The artillery was now exposed without infantry support and russe ordered the guns to withdraw further north towards Umbres along the coastal road. Then he radioed Rindu HQ in South West Africa with the bad tidings. Rindu HQ messaged the South African cabinet, what do we do now? The disaster's defeat of Roberta's men was not fully grasped by the political leadership back in Pretoria. It was now time to get out of the North of Angola by all means, still the cabinet hesitated. If you look at the men making these decisions and many more to come over the next 13 years of war in Angola and South West Africa, you'll see a pattern that had already been formed. They believed in the gun in the Bible that used it to defeat the Zulu at blood river, the English at Majuba and Spion Coup, and in a similar way to Roberta in the superiority of the white race fighting blacks in Africa. It was a strategic blind spot as you're going to hear many times in the coming episodes. The defeat in these circumstances is always blamed on the ally who in most cases was black. The FNLA was led at this point by a tribalist who believed the same, except he thought his Bakunga people were greater than everyone including whites and Africans, and later blamed the SEDF and non-Bakunga blacks in the FNLA, along with the CIA for his botched attempts at becoming a kind of Angolan Caesar. Politically, there was still a tiny chance that the South African strategy at the OAU would work. A miracle moment was possible. The MPLA regime had not been recognised because the independent state celebrations of 11 November were taking place without any form of election process. The UN was in a quandary. The OAU had made no statement of support. The left-wing government of Portugal was also mute. And behind the scenes, the American government had continued to pressurise the South Africans to remain inside Angola and fight, but they thought it was the communist threat. You can see it's easy enough to criticize and yet at this time voices ensured the South African government were raising difficult questions about what the strategic gain would be in attacking Lwanda. The Benguela railway I've mentioned was basically in UNITA and SEDF hands at this point. Its value to Angola was immense as it transported the copper ore out of Zaire's Katanga province almost directly west to the Atlantic Ocean and then onwards to Europe, America and Asia. It's also true the South African cabinet did not know just how close to complete collapse the FNLA was. Roberta's obsessively arrogant determination to attack full-frontal and late had finally shattered his army officer and NCOs resolved to fight. In the next eight weeks, the FNLA would be pushed far to the northeast away from all the important towns in cities. The CIA would also decide to withdraw support from anti-NPLA forces in the region while the remaining colonial Portuguese had begun to flood out of the country in huge numbers. There were now 4,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and those numbers would rise as we're going to hear. And the SEDF had an even bigger immediate problem. The artillery unit was now stranded in northern Angola and about to face an assault by the NPLA and the Cubans. Brigadier Russ and 26 of his staff, as well as millions of rounds of cryptographic equipment, was also stranded. He decided that he would take his own life if he was captured. Luckily for him, the South African navy had other ideas. We'll return to that story next episode. Please rate the podcast on our tunes. You can also send me a direct message on Twitter @Dislaython or head off to the website abwarponcast.com and email me from there. Until next, Totsins.