Episode 15 – Angolan independence day passes while Task Force Zulu and Foxbat continue fighting

Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Leutham. This is episode 15, the Battle of Liberto with task 4 Zulu, and a return to the central front where task force Foxbat had been fighting their way north. On the 7th of November 1975, Zulu's battle group Alfa was on the road to South Africa's next goal, Liberto. It's a bay just north of Benguela, which had been seized by the SADF and handed over to unito forces after a crucial fight for the airport. The MPLA's fapler had decided that Liberto would be too difficult to defend against the twin South African assault, Zulu approaching from the South and Foxbat from the east, so they decided not to defend this harbour town. Liberto's regard it is one of the most natural harbours in Africa, but was only developed at the start of the 20th century by the Portuguese who had concentrated their development in Luwanda to the north and Benguela to the south. Remember, Benguela was the terminal for rail traffic from Katanga in Zaire and strategically vital. Unita had been bombing the line for months, so by now, not much rolling stock was on the line. But the Portuguese had developed the beta harbour tying the copper districts of Zaire and Zambia directly to the Atlantic coast via Benguela. There were more than 73,000 people living in Lobito in 1970, which had also developed a thriving industrial zone that included boatbuilding. The SEDF rolled into Lobito on the same day, 7th of November, and the next day, Tosgroo Zulu linked up with Tosgroo Foxbat led by Eddie Webb. This was a big moment in the operation. The two South African Tosforces had been fighting apart from each other for almost a month, and now they shook hands at Lobito, then eyed Luwanda, the capital, to the north. Foxbat had seen considerable fighting as we've heard in the series already starting in late October 1975. Fuplar columns of varying strength had focused on the all-important Kubala crossroads, where Webb managed to deflect them particularly around the town of Lombala. It was south of Kela, where the advancing MPLA forces ran into Webb's forward elements, which then laid down a powerful artillery barrage, which failed to stop the South Africans. The death of a Cuban brigadier who led the advance, he was driving a civilian's citron, he was hit by a 106mm recoilless gun, that had drained the energy out of the Fuplar attack. Because Webb had taken the western route it had caused consternation in Luwanda. The MPLA and the Cuban advisors were now fighting a war on two fronts, and this made it more difficult to ascertain what the ultimate aim of the South Africans was. And not to forget, of course, the FMLA under Roberta was busy in the north as well. Clearly Luwanda would be a choice target, but just as clearly, the SADF knew that the MPLA was beginning to gather powerful military resources at that point. Webb led Poxbat westwards again, trying to cut off the retreating Cuban and MPLA forces, now racing north, away from task force Zulu, which was moving inexorably northwards up the coast. It was a classic hammer and anvil moment, and was successful, where Webb held crossroads near the coast, awaiting the MPLA forces, and managed to cut off some Fuplar units. After the usual pleasantries between Colonel Von Yiddin, of task force Zulu, and Commodant Eddie Webb of Fuxbat, they decided the best course was to split up once more. Fuxbat returned to the central front, and Von Yiddin's Zulu force continued up the coast. He was near the seaside town of Sumbir, when independence stayed on the 11th of November 1975. The South Africans were supposed to wrap up their invasion of Angola on or before this day, but that had not happened. But on the day the Portuguese high commissioner, Leonel Cortoso, ended 500 years of Portuguese rule with a curt speech expressing regret that he could not celebrate the country's independence. That would also be impossible in the situation where Angola had now descended into a full-blooded civil war. On the same day, Cortoso was whisked to Luanda Harbour, where he boarded an awaiting warship and sailed back to Portugal. The former colonial masters had thrown up their hands and left as quickly as possible, which in our eyes in the 21st century appears almost discertious. But remember, the Portuguese had experienced a military coup led by left-wing officers who were sick and tired of the drain on the country's resources as it fought independence movements in Portuguese Guinea and Angola and Mozambique. The latter two countries were far, far away from Portugal, physically, and their own soldiers had questioned the logic of dying in these distant African nations for no apparent strategic gain at a time of post-colonial politics. It was also beginning to dawn in the South Africans that they had underestimated the vast expanse of Angola and just how long it would take to drive along sometimes poorly constructed roads let alone fight through to the coastal towns. Now they had missed the all-important independence day deadline and should they have been withdrawing rapidly out of the country. The National Party's strategy had failed. They had been trying to secure the southern Angolan area while simultaneously trying to convince moderates inside the OAU to somehow agree to an alternative process of peacekeeping where the MPLA had already seized the initiative. They say that history of full of these, what would have happened in 2020, are sought in retrospect kind of views, and yet we must ask why did the political leadership order the SADF to continue with attacks after the date of independence? If the strategy was to use that day as the fulcrum to make further decisions, that was shooting itself in the foot strategically, it was fighting for fighting sake, and they must have known this. Cuba had already thrown its weight behind the MPLA along with Russia, while the Americans were studiously avoiding direct intervention. They just left Vietnam and that desires to meant that it would not be very forthcoming when it came to regional direct interventions. The Russians were on the ground along with hundreds of Cuban soldiers, the SADF knew this. One of the FNLA and Unita troops and their political leaders, it was an attempt starting the 11th of November to negotiate some kind of solution. As Willem Stincum explains in his excellent work South Africa's border war, 1966-1989, an official spokesman for government in Pretoria said, "After mediation by go-betweens, the South African forces which comprise at that stage around 300 advisers and structures, and personnel, as well as weapons, remained in anticipation of a political solution, which was the prospect held out by the mediators." That was an almost sarcotic misreading of the situation, I'm afraid. The Cubans and Russians were preaching armed resistance to colonial aggression and had put bodies on the ground to ensure the MPLA won the war. The South Africans were seen as colonial aggressors. No twisting of any truth could deem this otherwise, and any reading of it from here on saw the National Party fixating on ensuring that default back home supported them, so their external strategy always played second fiddle to this overriding internal political reality. As long as the voters thought they were doing the right thing, then they'd throw the SEDF into further combat. So naturally, the prospect of mediation was pie in the sky, and the shaky armistice that began on the 11th of November lasted less than a day, and the SEDF would be the target. Things were confusing. Holden the Roberto's FNLA were stationed close to Luanda, and he had had a grandiose vision of riding into the city having liberated it from both the Cubans and the MPLA. The only problem was, Roberto was taking his time, preparing for the supposedly triumph and return. He was based at Amber's tantalizingly close to the capital, where the lots of Luanda were visible to his FNLA troops, yet spent three months fighting sporadically in a somewhat arbitrary way while maintaining his original plan of focusing on Luanda. Others FNLA had achieved some kind of success through October, but they were then slowed by an unwillingness to commit to a full frontal attack before the 11th. The Roberto had polished his plans for the attack, that he eventually started too late, as we're going to hear next episode. Because he was refusing to coordinate attacks with Unita and the South Africans, he doomed his own men. The biggest challenge Roberto faced was a lack of field commanders who had experience in leading men in a conventional attack. He had problems securing ammunition and fuel as well. Jonas Sabimbi of Unita had recognized both weaknesses in his own army and relied on the South Africans for field commander knowledge, the so-called advises and instructors. Roberto was a curious figure. He had an inflated sense of his own ability coupled with an arrogance streak, believing that the Congo royal family of which he was one had some sort of god-given advantage over everyone else. So he was winging it alone in this war. The SEDF continued moving north on Independence Day, but when they arrived at the bridge over the Quikomba River, they found it had been partially destroyed by the MPLA. And worse, Fuplers artillery sections had taken up positions on the high ground overlooking the road. An Ilant 90 was then hit by an RPG 7, wounding two of the soldiers inside, alpha battle group R9, a spot of trouble. The wounded were removed and the Ilant 90 was found to be only slightly damaged by the arm-appeasing RPG. A group of sand soldiers backed up our three armoured cars, rushed towards the area, but the Fupler artillery had set up their positions enabling them to sweep the road and approaches to the bridge with heavy fire. The South Africans then moved one of their own mortar sections into position with the view to returning fire, but before they could get a single round off, Fupler dropped a mortar right on top of the SEDF position. Twenty men were wounded eight critically, one later died in the single incident. The SEDF had come to a grinding halt, but there was help at hand. Toss for Zulu had been bolstered by the arrival of three twenty-five pounder artillery pieces along with more ammunition and food flown into the airport now held by the South Africans just to the South. It was fortunate they did, because the fighting saw Fupler forces throwing everything they had at Commandant Delville Linford's alpha battle group, hours of artillery barrage with [BLANK_AUDIO] 122mm rockets and mortars passed, and Fubler was firing extremely accurately. That night, the medical teams worked swiftly to cope with the large number of South African wounded and they were evacuated to Rundu by aircraft from a nearby grass airfield. The SADF 25 pounders were then rushed up the road and finally made contact with Linford's Alpha Group in the darkness. The commandant was relieved and he ordered Captain Bouvair and his artillery section to booboo egg out of range of the Fubler guns. The next morning, the 25 pounders were placed on dead ground out of sight of Fubler's spotters and Bouvair and Linford searched for an area where they could set up their own observation post. By now, they were using MPLA surveillance photographs they'd found in Benguella, which helped, as the South Africans began planning their counterattack on Fubler's artillery. The cannons opened fire short while later and after a few shots, the 25 pounders began to hit their targets. But at the same time, Fubler opened fire with everything they had once more and because they had ranged their weapons, this was going to be a close call. But they had no chance of hitting the South Africans artillery, which systematically took out the enemy positions. Fubler then made the mistake of moving the 122mm rockets and the SADF observation post could spot where they were firing each rocket because each one set up a cloud of dust and gave away its position. By midday, Fubler's artillery had been silenced. Some of their 18-vux battle group Brava then arrived, along with task force Zulu leader Colonel von Jürgen and the SADF began to move forward once more. First they cleared the Fubler artillery positions, finding two bodies, but it was also clear that the enemy had lost far more men with the discovery of many pools of blood. They had retreated leaving most of the ammunition and heavy weapons behind. It was now the 13th of November and battle group Brava entered the coastal town of Sumber, known as Novorodondo in those days. Captain Bevere's artillery based themselves along the side of the approach road, when a strange sight greeted the South Africans. Dozens of prisoners had been released from Sumber Jail and they began to run around the streets, clearly elated at their windfall. It's thought that most of these men were captured unita or effinale soldiers. Meanwhile Fubler units withdrew northwards once more, now heading on the coastal road towards Luanda, which was around 230km away. And now the full extent of the Cuban support for their ingotans was becoming more visible. The South Africans knew that three ships had docked at Porta Amboim, a small port to the north of Sumber, carrying hundreds of Cuban soldiers and the latest Soviet hardware, including tanks. The ships, Coral Island, Laplata and Vietnam Haroika, had docked in October, giving the towns defenders more than enough time to prepare to meet the SEDF. Colonel von Hirten was in a quandary. The road from Sumber forked with one route leading eastwards to Kobala, and the other north westly hugging the coast, and this route led to Porta Amboim. He had to ensure that the threat posed by this powerful Fambler army bolster by Cubans could not be deployed, shoot his force, head eastwards and then take the main road towards Luanda. There was also a railway line linking Porta Amboim to Kobala, meaning the MPLA could move its material to defend other city quickly. Task Force Bravo was ordered to attack Porta Amboim, and then withdraw south-easely to join Alpha, as they headed to Kobala on the highland main road around 100 km inland. One of the largest and most powerful flowing rivers lay in the epath, and all roads northwards towards the capital, Luanda had to cross this river. The Quervo River was characterized by deep ravines, and could not be crossed other than over a proper bridge. The South Africans had nowhere affording the Quervo should the bridges be blown, which is precisely what Fambler did. Battle group Bravo and the three five-pounders met as fires 15 km from Porta Amboim, when they arrived at the Quervo River Bridge on the coastal road. The ground in this area is also swampy, while most of the rivers dominated by deep ravines, a fast-flowing African river was going to prove to be a major problem for the SEDF. Capt. Dupinai and a company of FNLA infantry were sent forward to inspect the bridge. Five hundred metres south of the bridge, they were peppered by enemy mortars. By now, the all important aerial photographs had run out, and Captain Bavaria was called in to target the mortars, and a hundred and twenty-two-millimeter rocket sections, which had also begun to fire on the South Africans. Bavaria was handed a standard road map printed by the automobile association to assist his spotters. Somehow it took only four ranging shots to line up the one hundred and twenty-two-millimeter rockets, but the faplan Cuban artillery were also finding the range of the South African artillery. The number of rockets landed less than 50 metres away from Commandant Bratenbach's armoured car and troop carriers. A full-blooded artillery duel was not underway, who would manage to maintain focus in strike-first. It was not dusk, and the South Africans were unable to continue. The fire from Fappler was too heavy and too accurate. They withdrew to Sumbir, and a small detachment was sent along the main road to Gaberra, which also meant crossing a bridge across the Querva River. And once more, the detachment reported back that the bridge had been destroyed, and Fappler had opened fire with heavy weapons the moment the South Africans had rounded the bend approaching the river. It was now the 14th of November, three days after the SCDF were supposed to have left or shown signs of leaving Angola, and there were still more than one thousand kilometres from the South-West African border. Colonel Farnier then took stock of task force Zulu's position. He'd been star-mead in the final push to Luwanda. He'd also lost touch with task force Foxbat, which had been inching its way north from further east under Commandant Eddie Webb. He sent battle group Alpha to follow a small dirt road, which they did for 160 kilometres. After two skirmishes with Fappler units, they arrived at a tiny bridge over the Querva River, which had also been blown up. By the 16th of November, Alpha was back in Sumbir. Back in Rindu, there were major moves afoot. 101 task force HQ had decided to take over control of all operations more directly. So late in the evening of the 19th of November, Colonel Farnier then received an order to leave Alpha group with two Elant 90s at Sumbir, while the rest of Zulu shoot with Jor to support task force Foxbat to the east. Three days later, a wary Farnier then led 500 troops into the town of Jor, where Brigadier Scuman had set up his headquarters. It was going to be a somewhat shocked Colonel Farnier then, whom along with task force Foxbat Commander Eddie Webb were going to be recalled, and it would be the end of their war. But that's for the next episode. You'll also hear about the FNLA struggles in the north against the MPLA, and Holden Roberta's failed attempt at riding triumphantly into the wonder. Please rate the podcast on iTunes if you have the inclination, it helps increase the visibility of South African border wars. You can also contact me through the website abwarpodcast.com, or direct message me on Twitter @desleythem. Until next, I'll see you next week.