Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 13 and it's October 1975. Two SADF task forces are busy in Angola. Foxbat is in the southeast. The other, Zulu, has just taken the port of Namibia and will head north aiming at Benguela and Lubito. After initially swinging back eastwards to the main road. We begin this episode with an update about what had developed with Eddie Webb and his Foxbat task force out to the east. The name Foxbat emerged as both Webb and the other senior officer, Commandant van der Waals, were both Parabats. Foxbat was also the name given by NATO to the latest MiG fighter produced by the Russians. Lots to chew on there. So by October 25th, 1975, Foxbat was on its way westwards from Bangalore. To meet up with Task Force Zulu at some point before the all-important date of 11th November. That was when elections were taking place in Angola. Despite the fact it was now well on the way to an intractable civil war. But the politicians in Pretoria stressed to the defense force that they had to vacate the country by then. As we've discussed, the political strategy was muddle-headed and created major problems for the frontline soldiers fighting this operation. The attack, by the way, was a photostat of a road map. They used the road and by the evening of the 25th of October had arrived at the bridge over the Kwewe River, just east of the small town of Altahama. After a quiet night, the task force left before dawn on the 26th, heading to Lumbali. Webb was aware that there were two companies of FAPLA infantry based in Lumbali, around 250 strong, he believed, so decided to approach the town from the south and left the road. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. He'd also received information that the FAPLA units were supported by the army. Back in Benguelo on the coast, MPLA staff officers had radioed Luanda to appeal for reinforcements, particularly T-34s. At the same time, Foxbat Commander Webb decided to head back east to Altahama, the all-important crossroad town, the way he'd just come. He'd been keeping an eye on another FAPLA unit, which was now behind him, and he was aware that Foxbat could be outflanked and then isolated. Things were not going well back at Altahama. The tension between UNITA and FNLA had boiled. A planned operation by the FNLA to head north had failed, and 600 of their men were now heading back south. They ran into UNITA, which had set up roadblocks outside Altahama, and they were ordered to disarm. This caused chaos in the standoff. The Central Front had other issues. SADF headquarters in Rundu had no idea that Webb had managed to defeat FAPLA at Lumbali. They only learned of this on the 28th of October, two days after the town fell. Webb was also receiving... ...confusing orders. So he decided to wait for further orders even further east, at Bailundu. He rodeoed SADF command at Rundu on the 28th, asking what he should do next. It so happened that Major General Konstant Valyun, Brigadier Yanni Geldenhuis, and Colonel Gleeson had decided to fly into Angola to discuss the latest situation reports with UNITA and FNLA leaders on the ground, so they were unable to make immediate decisions. Communication with these officers could not be established, so Colonel Haramsa in Rundu, suggested that it made sense for FOXBAT to begin moving north along the Santa Comba Road. But they were also aware that Task Force Zulu was moving northwards from the coast, and this could mean splitting FOXBAT. One battle group would head north, the other on the main road westwards to Benguela, where Delville-Linford's SAN-31 battalion would run into serious trouble, as we're going to hear. So Commandant Webb duly split his force, sending Major Holzhausen off north at dawn on the 29th. The battle group was armed with a recoilless 106mm cannon, a mortar, and two Irland armored cars. A company of UNITA troops joined his battle group to beef up the numbers. A short while later, they halted at the Cueva River Bridge, now known as Bridge 25. A jeep could be seen rushing towards them. On board, two UNITA troops reported that FAPLA units were close by and had opened fire on them. At 1.30, the FAPLA company appeared, but their transport vehicles were then hit by Holzhausen's recoilless gun and the enemy troops. The FAPLA unit was then pushed to the north, then to the south. During the inspection of the vehicles, the SADF came across the body of a Cuban soldier. He was a colonel, dressed in his full uniform. FAPLA units were being pushed closer and closer to Luanda, with the South Africans now fully aware that they had not managed to take all the ports south of the capital, and time was running out. It was almost the end of October. They had less than two weeks to make a final impact before the November 11th withdrawal. By now, Foxbat was no longer the rag-tag and bobtail force of earlier years. As Delville Linford puts it in his book, As the Crow Flies, Foxbat consisted of three companies of offensively trained UNITA troops travelling in seven buses, five troops of armoured cars, two 106mm recoilless guns mounted on jeeps, four UNITA manned 81mm mortars, three intact missile teams, and four 12.7mm Browning heavy machine guns. Also part of Foxbat, but not always accompanying the task force, were ten 106mm recoilless guns, four Panhard 90 armoured cars, and one Panhard 60. All were UNITA controlled, but could be called on to assist at short notice. Another secret weapon the South Africans had managed to liberate was the twin-engine Beechcroft Baron B-55 light aircraft, which UNITA had found deserted at Huambo. SADF collected the plane and managed to fly to Rundu, where it was serviced and then fitted with a Browning machine gun. An experienced South African Air Force pilot Major Pete Ace was detached to Rundu to fly the plane, and now the two task forces attacking Fapla and the MPLA, in Angola, had access to an excellent aerial reconnaissance capability. It was called "Dinky Toy" as an ironic twist, but unfortunately, things would not end well. Dinky Toy was then flown over the route that Holzhausen was to take on the Santa Comba road, and they spotted a large Fapla force. Another UNITA unit was sent to join him further strengthening the battle group, and he continued on his way to Lubongo, which he took later on the 29th of October. Then, a disaster for the South Africans, they spot a plane, which had been flying up and down the country, crashed, killing all four on board. An SADF team later could not determine what had caused the accident, but now they had lost an important eye in the sky. One of those on board was Colonel Desmond Haramsa of 101 Task Force, who was being deployed as a liaison officer because he was fluent in Portuguese. In a terrible correlation, his son Captain Louis Haramsa would be killed in action in Angola six years later during Operation Protean. In October 1975, General Fulun held discussions with UNITA leader Jonas Avimbi in Quito, central Angola. They discussed the military and political situation, and briefed members of the SADF there once more about how critical it was to get out of Angola by election day, the 11th. Brigadier van der Waals was present, and Fulun ordered him to complete the withdrawal plans for both Foxbat and Zulu. Luckily, he had already drawn up a broad outline, which included being flown out of Angola on board a South African Air Force C-130 aircraft, while the Foxbat armored car squadron would move south on its own. Another interesting little aside here, van der Waals was approached by the Central Intelligence Agency representative based at Quito, who asked if the South Africans were indeed going to leave Angola on the 11th. When van der Waals answered they were, the American asked to be flown out with them. As we'll see, they did eventually leave Angola on the 15th, and the CIA agent apparently hitched a ride out by C-130 although both the Americans and South Africans have never confirmed this. To the west, Zulu Task Force Alpha Battle Group Commander Colonel van Heerden had decided to head east to Lubongo. From there, he would swing north once more along the main road, heading towards Kukula, then turn northwesterly through Kuelengwesh to Benguela on the coast. He'd been joined by an Irland 90 troop commanded by Lieutenant Nel van Rensburg. Remember, the SADF had taken Lubongo a few days previously in our last video. They explained that, and that was on their steady march through Angola, so that town was presumed safe. On the 29th of October, Commandant Lindford sent a reconnaissance party up the road from Lubongo to see what was going on, and they reported that FAPLA had set up some defensive positions around Kukula, although it appeared FAPLA had chosen difficult ground to defend. And there were only 50 men that could be seen in that position, but they were armed with 82mm mortars and 75mm artillery, as well as at least one 82mm reconnaissance vehicle. a coalescent gun. so Alpha Group attacked as quickly as possible. FAPLA opened fire when the SADF was around 300 meters away with anti-tank weapons, but all of the shots went overhead. Something was seriously wrong with the enemy's aim, and they were driven away from the trenches in a few minutes. When the SADF examined the mortars and guns, they found that the weapons were brand new and that the sights had never been ranged correctly. A few FAPLA casualties were counted, and the SADF took Kukula. This meant they could swing into the secondary road and head for Kuelenguish and then Benguela. They were climbing to higher ground, and suddenly a massive downpour caught Alpha Group, which was forced to halt, so they decided to stop for the night. Then, at about midnight, a group of vehicles approached from the north, and before they had a chance to turn the SADF members' open fire with their 90mm cannon, it took out the leading Land Rover while FAPLA bodies were found inside, along with a Cuban officer. They only learned how important he was two days later when a FAPLA radio call was intercepted, which reported that Comrade Batala, a Cuban, was listed as missing in action. He was charged with defending Kuelenguish from the approaching SADF, and his death had grave implications for the MPLA. It must be noted that the Cubans, like the South Africans, had a habit of senior officers being deployed on the front lines. Both armies were born of a fight against imperialism of some sort, where the culture implied that the leaders actually led, rather than sat around. In the end, the SADF was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. It was the only one who was able to win the war. This would be repeated throughout the next 15 years of warfare between these two armies, and the begrudging level of mutual respect also grew year after year, as we'll hear. So, the FAPLA defenders of Kuelenguish melted away as the SADF drove closer and headed further northwest towards the goal of Benguela. However, there were a few significant towns to take before this port, including Katenge and Koporolo, which was alongside the Korporolo River and a large mountain. It was now November 1st. Time was running out. Alfa pushed onwards by 60 kilometers and arrived at Chongorol, which was undefended. The residents there said that FAPLA had set up defenses along the Koporolo River, around 20 kilometers north of the town, and were ready for action. Commandant Linford was traveling in point position, in the Airland 90, right at the front of the task force. He spotted the FAPLA positions, and it was then decided to outflank the enemy and collect information from the higher mountain alongside their position, known as Sierra do Uco. After some recon, Task Force Commander van Heerden decided that they should try and avoid damaging the large bridge of the Koporolo River, as it would be required when the SADF retraced its steps at some point in the future. Battle group Alfa would head down to a small drift, crossing south of the FAPLA positions, then outside, The problem was, this battle group got lost. Then, in what must be seen as a semi-crazy decision, Colonel Dries van Heerden and Major van Koolen decided they would approach the bridge on foot. So at 2pm, they had wriggled close enough and realized that there were no defenders, which surprised these experienced officers. They did spot explosives had been placed along the pillars of the bridge, but there were no electrical connections. FAPLA had fled with their heavy weapons and failed to blow the bridge. Task Force Zulu was now on the road to Katenge, the last town of note before Benguela, and flanked by the vital rail link. Both Task Force Zulu and Foxbat were now close, and the danger grew that they would somehow fire on each other, as communications were extremely difficult. Foxbat, which had approached from the east and reached as far as Barbera, which is not far from Katenge, then Commandant Webb, who led the Task Force, decided to withdraw, as FAPLA had been reported behind them at Kobal. Zulu drove, into Katenge, a single line of houses and businesses. It was now a ghost town. Nothing moved and no one could be found. A perfect place to set up a temporary HQ, which is exactly what Colonel van Eerden did. He ordered the local airfield to be measured as they were running low in food, and this could serve as a landing strip for Dakotas to drop off mini-meal and dried fish, amongst other provisions. They had loads of tinned food, after seizing these from the FAPLA convoys, but the troops were hankering after pup and fish. Commandant Breitenbach and his battle group Bravo were given the task of defending this HQ. The Nadi Kars and their captain Jack Dippenaar drove onto the high ground north-west of the town to keep an eye out, along with a company of UNITA troops. There were three hills ranged along the banks of the Katenge river, and they set off towards the highest. But FAPLA was waiting. Dippenaar's armoured cars rode over the first, then the second hill, but at the third, they were almost hit by high explosive rounds fired from an unknown weapon, and being fired extremely accurately. They turned back, and were sent back for reinforcements. Little did the South Africans know, that the FAPLA battalion they were now facing had been training and preparing for this battle for some time. They had ranged their weapons properly, and since August 1975, been mentored by Cuban advisers. They were also the best prepped FAPLA unit, probably, in the entire region, and now the South Africans were going to have to try and overcome this highly motivated force. FAPLA and the Cubans had selected the highest hill overlooking the all-important main road, heading towards Benguela in order to defend themselves. They had set up anti-tank weapons on the hill dominating the high ground. The array of weapons facing the South Africans was impressive, including RPG-7s, two recoilless 82mm guns, and two 75mm cannon, all ranged very precisely along a road the SADF would have to take. This was a completely different level of fighting capability, and the SADF commander van Heerden was still not fully aware that the men he was to face were of a different caliber to those he'd faced so far. FAPLA under-estimate your enemy, they say. Behind this hill, there was even more going on. FAPLA had set up a number of 82mm mortar positions, as well as four 120mm single-missile launchers, the feared Red Eye, which we've met. And behind this prickly set of armaments was their tactical headquarters. At first, Task Force Zulu had to extricate itself from this sticky position. What the SADF didn't know was that more than 70 highly trained Cuban soldiers were manning these weapons. And they had a great deal of fighting experience. The thick bush in the area meant the South African Ilan 90 Noddy cars could only be deployed off-road in a limited fashion. Just to compound the problems facing the attacking force, they would also have to approach this hill across an extremely narrow bridge. Captain Dipenar recognized the danger. They were being squeezed into a narrow, confined area, whereupon the defenders would blow up the bridge, and then it would be a turkey shoot. The recoilless guns would have peppered the Ilans, which would have been lined up in a row along this narrow road, and then gunned down any infantry alongside. It would have been suicide to continue without some alternative plan. Dipenar decided to send the infantry in on the right side of the road in a single line. The thick bush meant that they would be out of sight of the high ground until the last moment. A firefight then broke out with the FNLA troops working with the South Africans to lay down fire while the Ilans would poke their guns out, fire a shot in reverse. An SADF mortar section behind these men was then targeted by the extremely accurate fire from FOPLA. They had obviously ranged the area really well, and the mortar bombs were uncomfortably close to SADF mortar section Sergeant Kleff and Staff Sergeant Gash. Needless to say, these two beat a hasty retreat. Both infantry and Ilans were beginning to run out of ammunition, so they also returned to the town. Colonel van Heerden knew now he was in a predicament. The force facing them was too well managed and powerful to attack head-on without some creative military tactics. He had to find an alternative way to deal with this FOPLA battalion and its Cuban artillery. Their road map showed a tiny secondary route that headed directly westward to the small town of Cristovao, then swept back to the main road 30 kilometers further. Perhaps, he thought, they could outflank this powerful FOPLA force in the meantime. So it was then that Alpha Group was dispatched along this track. Meanwhile, Commandant Breitenbach and Major Slubbert, with his bright shock of red hair and beard, made their way to high ground 5 kilometers from the FOPLA position to take stock. At 3 p.m., the South Africans tried for a third time to overrun FOPLA. They managed to use the thick bush alongside the road as protection and reached about 2.5 kilometers from the FOPLA artillery. The Ilans were firing constantly, and as they halted on the second hill, they discharged a large number of smoke grenades to protect the infantry who were now going to try and cross the narrow bridge. Meanwhile, the mortar sections were firing constantly. In 15 minutes, they used most of the ammunition and the pipes were so hot that some of the rounds were set off prematurely. A number of SADF troops were injured, including one by the name of Els, who was burned so badly he had to be cazevacked back to Rundu and then Pretoria. But the constant and by now more accurate Ilan and mortar fire had unnerved the FOPLA battalion and the Cuban artillery units on the high ground. FOPLA artillery suddenly stopped firing and retreating, leaving their own infantry alone ranged along the slopes to face the South African heavy weapons and soldiers approaching at speed. FOPLA were dug in north of the road just below this hill. They had pinned down previous SADF infantry attacks so that troops were lying prone, avoiding the machine gun and automatic weapon rounds. That's not a good situation for the South Africans. It was their third attempt at taking the strategic road, and FOPLA was still making things very difficult for them. Heavy machine guns were moved into position to provide cover, and then the infantry began to advance using fire and move techniques. The men were spread out and squads would run forward a short distance while their allies fired between them, then drop and provide covering fire colleagues. This is an extremely dangerous form of attack for a partially trained company as friendly fire incidents can happen in the heat of battle but it's also extremely effective if conducted at high speed in thick bush. Fapla had never seen this technique used before and the shock of seeing troops moving so fast was too much and finally they broke and fled. It was 6 p.m. It had taken three hours of hard fighting to take this hill and the SED of commanders had been given notice that the next few battles were going to be far more challenging than the first few. A number of FNLA troops fighting with the South Africans were wounded but miraculously no one had been killed on the South African side. However a large number of enemy bodies were found in the trench. The SEDF was going to run into even more effective defenses as they tried to seize the town of Benguela. The battle for the airport was to prove to be one of the most difficult moments these men would experience in the entire Operation Savannah. Well that's it for this week. Time for a debrief before the assault on Benguela. Please rate the podcast on iTunes if you have the inclination. You can also contact me through my Twitter handle at Des Latham or send an email through the site abwarpodcast.com. Until next, goodbye. Transcription by CastingWords
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