Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Deas Latham. This is episode 112. So here we are, the sound of peace settling in over Vambo Land. It was the end of 1988. The South Africans were actually in a much better position than it appeared. Yes, they were losing Namibia and going to lose the vital strategic port of Valfa Spey. But let me explain. When the United Nations passed Resolution 435-78 in the midst of the post-colonial period of African countries untying themselves from European nations, the initial plan was far more radical than the final agreement. Still, UNITA was left out of the discussion. They would continue to fight against the Angolan MPLA. In 1978, the UN Security Council unanimously, unanimously adopted Resolution SR435-78. And from then on, Pretoria led the UN on a merry dance by increasing its military involvement in Angola, not decreasing. The United States joined the South Africans in calling for the Cuban withdrawal from the country to be part of any future negotiations. This had eventually led to the dramatic signing on the 22nd of December 1988 of the implementation of SR435-78 with a period of three years. The period of transition set to begin on April 1st, 1989. Elections would be held in Namibia by November 1989 and by mid-1990, the country would be independent. From early August 1988, the South Africans had already begun a process of withdrawing their troops from southern Angola. The final day of withdrawal of SADF personnel was set for the 1st of September and when the Battle Group 2-0 commander notified the UNITA commander that they had been ordered south, the latter, couldn't believe it. Battle Group 2-0, the only SADF force in southeastern Angola, had been assisting UNITA to maintain the siege of Cuito Cuanavale after the end of Operation Packer. This withdrawal by Battle Group 2-0 southwards was part of Operation Displace and by the 16th of August, the Joint Monitoring Commission, or JMC, had been formed at Roacana. This JMC finalized the terms of the ceasefire by the 22nd of August and the formal ceasefire was signed between three parties Major General Willi Meyer, representing South Africa, General Leopoldo Frias from Cuba and Angola's Colonel Antonio Rosé. The SADF elements arrived at the Angolan-Southwest African-Namibian border with 10 days to spare and had to wait around as the Joint Monitoring Commission and world media organized themselves for the crossover at Rundu at a temporary steel bridge that was to take place on the 1st of September. On the 20th of August 1988, the last of the South African troops crossed the temporary steel bridge into South West African Namibia, watched by the world's media and the Joint Monitoring Commission, 36 hours earlier than the planned time. A convoy of 50 vehicles with around 1,000 soldiers crossed over singing battle songs. After officers of the three countries walked across the bridge, the South African sappers began to dismantle the temporary steel structure. It was a bittersweet moment for them. For most, as they looked back into Angola, the scene of so many battles, where they had sweated and toiled since 1975, pushing back a tide of Marxist movements with their Russian empire builders behind them. No one was going to say thank you to these men, and it would be left to the survivors to thank those who didn't make it back south alive. For some UNITA commanders, there was still disbelief. They realized there was no way they could continue to fight indefinitely, against the Angolan army without some support from South Africa. Their only hope lay in the rapid withdrawal of the Cubans, which would then mean a more equal fight against the MPLA and FAPLA. What followed were nine more rounds of negotiations revolved around the dates for the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, and finally these ended with the agreement I mentioned in the last episode, called the Tripartite Accord, signed on the 22nd December in New York. This accord finalized the dates of the Cubans' staggered withdrawals from Angola, and the implementation of UN Resolution 435 to be completed on the 1st of April 1989. Because the Soviet Union had collapsed and Cuba was bankrupt, the Angolans were forced to accept South Africa's extra demands concerning troop withdrawals. SWAPO and the ANC had hoped that the SADF would be sent home long before the Cubans, which would lead to a possible increase in cross-border activities for MK further south, but the ANC had already been kicked out of Angola. While the resolution specifically laid out the dominant role which was supposed to be played by the United Nations, the South Africans had managed to insert a more pronounced role for the five main Western powers. Moscow's weakness and China's insolation period meant that Pretoria's demands were being entertained. SWAPO had also been forced to accept a constitutional assembly which worked on a two-thirds majority, protecting minorities from extreme laws which could be passed by a simple majority. When the December agreement was signed, it would have been expected that the Namibians would have been granted the status of a UN-governed territory until independence, but this was not the case. Even after the signing, the SADF was to remain inside Namibia, while the Apartheid government in South Africa was also given important administrative tasks, both in the period before elections and then between the elections and Independence Day. The South Africans continued to control the South West African security, and the United Nations continued to monitor the security forces and law and order, not the other way around. For SWAPO leader Sam Neu-Yoma, this was particularly infuriating. Little did everyone know that he had plans to try and embarrass himself. There was a prickly round of discussions about the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, or UNTAG. The role of the UN was reduced in early 1989 when the Security Council decided to cut the military component of UNTAG from 7,000 units, from 7,500 to 4,650 troops. Originally, the Permanent Members wanted to cut this still further, but the non-aligned movement, the Organization of African Unity, the Namibian Council of Churches, and most Nordic countries were opposed to further cuts. They were really worried about the South Africans. Namibia at that point became the only territory in the world to fall under control of the UN, and Namibia is 20 times the size of Denmark. That meant that 4,650 UNTAG soldiers, along with around 500 police, would be operating in a huge area, trying to reduce intimidation and ensuring fairness before elections. The military component consisted of three elements: 300 military monitors and observers, three infantry battalions, and a number of logistics units, all of these mainly drawn from Finland, Kenya, and Malaysia. Four additional battalions were held in reserve on a week's notice to move into Namibia. The troops, sourced from Bangladesh, Togo, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. In the event, the reserve battalions were never called to Namibia, despite what was going to happen next. The strength approved by the Security Council for initial deployment actually went down from 4,650 to 4,493, with fewer air support personnel than forecast arriving. The 200 monitors were then deployed at a variety of locations in Namibia and Angola, mainly confined to monitoring the dismantling. In Namibia, they were sent to SADF and SWATF bases. In Angola, UNTAG was based at Lubangu and with a liaison office in Luwanda as well. This was going to have repercussions, particularly starting from the 1st of April, April Fool's Day 1989, when the South Africans reported what they called a major incursion of SWAPU across the northern border. SWAPU leader Sam Nyome had been poised to return to Namibia as a "liberation hero" after 30 years in exile and lead his party to victory in independence elections on November 1st. Instead, he seemed dead set on making a military point at everyone's expense. The UN peacekeeping force was basking in the glow of a newly delivered Nobel Peace Prize, busy with the bureaucratic details of setting up an infrastructure for monitoring free and fair elections in Namibia in what would be known as the largest peacekeeping task in UN history up to that point. This didn't work out that way initially. Hundreds of SWAPU guerrillas suddenly began streaming across the border on the 1st of April 1989 in large groups of 50 or more. The flood was picked up by elements of the SWATF and police who alerted the South Africans. Pretoria was stung into action and shouted "foul!" as the aggrieved party, calling for the UN to deal with what they saw as an obvious attempt by SWAPU to take advantage of their pullout. Meanwhile, was enjoying demonstrations and celebrations throughout Namibia when the administrator general told the special representative that further armed SWAPU personnel had crossed the border and firefights and contacts were occurring on a broad front throughout the Ovambo area of northern Namibia. A series of similar reports came in during the 1st and 2nd, indicating military action and casualties on a scale not seen for many years in the Namibian conflict. Pretoria showed what was then called using diplomatic channels to point out this was a flagrant violation of the December 22nd Regional Peace Agreement. At the same time, they were watching what their colleagues in SWATF were up to, and it wasn't pretty. South African Foreign Affairs Minister Puk Puta sent a warning to Peres Tekwea that SWATF and the South West African police appeared unable to cope with SWATF's incursion and that the SADF would have to be mobilized unless significant UN action took place immediately. Remarkably, UN Special Representative Mati Asasari and the UN Force Commander sent the Secretary-General an urgent joint recommendation that the SADF confinement to bases be lifted. This recommendation was accepted, and the South Africans were back at war, albeit under the auspices of the UN. The arrangement under which this was to occur was in the following terms. Certain specified units, stated the UN document, to be agreed, in other words, not 3-2 battalion, will be released from restriction to base to provide such support as may be needed by the existing police forces in case they cannot handle the situation by themselves. The situation will be kept under constant review, and the movement out of existing bases will throughout be monitored by UNTAG military observers. It's hard to believe these days what a foolish action had taken place, what clownish self-serving lunacy caused Sam Neoma to order his men across the border while he said, he sat somewhere uncomfortably far away and out of danger. Neoma was personally criticized for almost snatching defeat from the jaws of victory and imperiling the US-brokered peace agreement. It was a blunder of biblical proportions. He was not cast in a very healthy light by world diplomats, who regarded this action as a stupid provocation. He was supposed to wait another six weeks. Be patient. After 23 years of war, and here he was, launching a military invasion, on the eve of independence. Diplomats and UN officials accused Neoma of an appalling ignorance of the provisions of the treaty that was supposed to have set his homeland free, and of making a tactical miscalculation that back in 1989 was called unparalleled in liberation politics. But Neoma was not a signatory to the December 22nd agreement, and since the accord made no specific provision for swapo guerrillas inside the territory on April 1st, he said he was within his rights to issue the orders. The South Africans pointed out that the much-touted, blue-berayed UN peacekeepers were now being ridiculed as ineffective in the face of the unexpected swapo onslaught, and were obviously unprepared. They had only 120 troops patrolling the 300 plus kilometers of bush country from where the swapo guerrillas crossed, a tiny UNTAG vanguard. They were spending most of their time monitoring what the SADF was up to, looking the wrong way, so to speak. Budget haggling at the UN meant that UNTAG's funding had been trimmed from $700 million to $416 million, and its training and lead time before deployment had been reduced from six weeks to only four. UNTAG was caught by surprise, like everyone else, with just 15% of its intended troop strength bearing the brunt of recriminations over the incursion. Namibians were curiously monitoring the monitoring, with the U.S. Department of Defense also taking on the task of monitoring them. These smartly-dressed UN troops from Denmark and Finland shopping for African curios along Bintouk's Kayser Street or drinking beer in the hotel bars. Most Namibians were asking why they weren't where they were supposed to be, up north in the bush, where the swapo incursion had led to fighting and deaths. The Pakistanis were based at Oshkarty, but appeared to spend their time sipping tea, reading novels, and idly jotting down the registration numbers of passing cars. They were not deployed to monitor Kufut and other SWATF units, who were now conducting search-and-destroy missions to flush out SWAPU. These missions were leading to reports of a number of civilians being caught in the crossfire, as well as a kind of "take no prisoners" tactic. But it was Nyoma who bore the brunt of the global criticism, even as he tried to point fingers at Kufut and SWATF. Nyoma was regarded as something of an enigma to many observers of African politics, ordering and then defending the incursion baffled independent observers. He was certainly going to be president of Namibia. What use was this silly invasion? Some kind of macho posturing? Trying to get rid of a few spare RPGs and AK rounds? Nyoma then tried to insist his guerrillas were already inside Namibia before the date of the incursion, and that he merely ordered them to assemble in makeshift bases and await the protection of the UN peacekeepers. That was proven to be true, as captured SWAPU commissars told the UN that they had been instructed by their commanders in Angola to enter Namibia on the 1st of April, avoiding the South African security forces if necessary, in order to establish bases in Namibia under UN supervision. UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar held a closed-door report to the Security Council on Monday the 3rd of April, and said there was a SWAPU infiltration of the border even though it may not have been an offensive intent. The number of bodies lying in Avambaland at that very moment disproved that comment. Other SWAPU guerrillas captured in the coming days of fighting and interviewed by UN officials revealed the opposite. Namibian church leaders and journalists confirmed this. More guerrillas interviewed by these journalists and church leaders said they were ordered to cross the border with their weapons: AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, machine guns, RPGs, and Soviet-made shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. And then to establish bases under the protection of the UN force. Their leaders apparently did not tell them that the UN peacekeeping force on the border area was virtually non-existent, that their incursion was likely to be viewed as a hostile act by the South African-led troops, and that under the December 22 peace accord they were actually supposed to be moving north to SWAPU bases above the 16th parallel in Angola, up to 200 miles from the Namibia border. SWAPU denied they had broken any agreement and blamed the South Africans for any fighting. By April 4, more than 1,000 SWAPU had crossed into Abamba land, and Pretoria was making even more ominous noises. Behind the scenes, the OAU was trying to get SWAPU to halt, and finally, on the 8th of April, Neomu ordered his fighters back into Angola under escort of UNTAG. By then, at least 210 SWAPU guerrillas and 24 security forces had arrived. A large number of contacts took place as SWAPU withdrew, with the South Africans ignoring the UN's role, regarding it as useless. By the 20th of April, the signatories of the peace process met once more, and Pretoria finally agreed to pull their units back to base. Ironically, it was also agreed that the SADF would be allowed back out of the bases on May 13 to help UNTAG police the SWAPU pullout. Bit of a mess. Limited Neomu's order was either a colossal bungle, or one of the most callous orders ever issued in guerrilla warfare. The fighters did not know the truth. Another UN official said they "blindly walked into a turkey shoot" thinking they were going to be there and the UN would take care of them. The SWAPU sections had obviously thought this was the case, because they went in large sections, as I said, 50 or more. They had never done that, unless it was a large operation which they only tried once or twice in their entire life. And they took no precautions to hide. They simply marched in, happy to be going home. Neomu has a great deal of blood on his hands, and in this case, his soldiers' blood. Neomu's goal was actually to establish a SWAPU military presence in Namibia before the election process got underway, to buttress his movement's claim of responsibility for achieving independence, and therefore polishing his own image as a military hero. In fact, Neomu was the leader of the SWAPU, and in fact, the leader of the SWAPU, was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. He was the leader of the SWAPU. As they completed their deployment through the territory, UNTAG personnel found that the Namibian people were perplexed and confused about what was happening and what UNTAG really was. Namibia had a public information system which was geared to maintain stability, with partisan newspapers and a public broadcasting system prone to disinformation tied, as they had been, to the South Africans for so many years. The UN launched a massive and expensive information campaign using radio, TV and visual materials, as well as print and even word of mouth. Its 42 political offices dotted around Namibia also targeted local opinion formers, often the churches, the farmers, the unions, political parties, and made direct contact with the people, including addressing gatherings under trees after church services. So information proved to be one of the key elements in UNTAG's operation. By the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal. In the end, more than ever, the UNTAG had been able to achieve the same goal.
PodcastTranscript AI