Episode 111 - Two Scorpions in a bottle and peace after 23 years

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Desleython. This is episode 111-111. And cricket, that number is known as Nelson. It's unlucky for the batting side and players are expected to stand on one leg as the bowler launches his ball. It's perhaps symbolic that we get to episode 111. And precisely the moment that the South Africans agree to peace after 23 years of fighting over South West Africa. Within a few months the country will officially be known as Namibia and soon all SEDF troops will have been withdrawn. I was working as a journalist starting in 1987 and had the honor to attend the trial-partout signing ceremony in Brazil in the Congo and experience that was strange, weird, otherworldly. The Cubans, South Africans, and Angolans signed the accord observed by the Americans and the Russians. Afterwards everyone drank vodka and mampur. The Russians brought the vodka and threw away the bottle caps. The South Africans brought the mampur and did the same. Just a crocker had managed the impossible, but as he told people afterwards, the Cubans and the South Africans were like two scorpions in a bottle. Both sides circling each other, but not prepared to strike the killer blow. More about this piece in a moment, but first the fallout from the terrible MIG 23 attack on Culp Cray Dam that killed 11-8 side troops on the 27th of June 1988. We ended last episode hearing how the MIGs had easily overcome the South African anti-aircraft defenses and damaged their Culp Cray Dam, hitting it with 6 250 kilogram bombs. As the recriminations and finger pointing followed the blowing up of the buffle near the dam that led to the deaths of so many young South Africans, Commodant Mike Muller of 61 MIG had a challenge. His tanks and the rattles were stuck on the north side of the Canany River, the earth ramp that had been built up to the dam wall to allow the tanks to cross had been destroyed. Muller's combat team Charlie was stuck on the north side with the Cubans showing signs of upping the anti. The dam bombing by the MIGs had changed Muller's mind. He originally wanted the tanks to form a tight log at 10 km north of Culp Cray, but they'd be sitting ducks with the Cuban pilots showing how good they were and in control of the air wall. Their Sam VI's were also quite capable of taking out the empires and mirages, so Muller decided it would be better for the tanks to retreat and head 40 km to the west towards another bridge at Suavec. The Cubans were quite aware of this and were sending their own tanks towards the bridge to cut off the South Africans. The rattles were deployed along with the mechanized infantry to watch the Cuban central brigades. Muller moved the artillery west to protect the tanks which were now exposed and a short sharp exchange was reported where eight Cuban vehicles of different sorts were hit by a South African G-5 barrage. Shortly after the bombardment, Muller pulled the G-5s out of southern Angola across a low-level bridge near Culp Cray dam that could withstand their weight. If you remember, this bridge was not strong enough to take the weight of an early fun tank. It was under cover of darkness that the SEDF pulled their critical resources out of Angola and during the same night, the rattles and other vehicles were also moved into South West Africa. Muller stayed behind in Angola with the Olufans as the tanks began to trundle westwards towards Suavec using a dirt mountain track with one motorized infantry company and a mortar group for protection. The Cubans didn't fly at night, so this was the moment for their escape. Later Muller was to say that the Cubans had missed a trick by not bombings far back as well, but it appears they were sending the South Africans in that direction because something very significant was going on behind the scenes. Peace talks. None of the officers on the South African side knew that this was going on. Top brass had kept them out of the loop. It was a need to know basis. Once the tanks crossed the bridge without incident, they swung eastwards to take out position south of the Culp Cray dam while two-five field engineer Squadron rebuilt the earth ramp blasted by the MIG-23s. But just before midnight, on Monday, June 27th, 1988, Muller was ordered to withdraw all his forces from Angola. Commandant Jan Hochart was also ordered to pull all his three two battalion units back to South West. I was told in no uncertain terms that from that night onwards, not a toe was to be put across the border into Angola, said Hochart. That was a surprise. Suddenly, it was over. This 23 year war that had started in November land ended with the announcement that a peace agreement had been signed. 16 days later on in Ireland and New York harbor, South Africa and Gola Cuba, all agreed to the terms of peace with both the Cubans and the South Africans withdrawing the troops from the region as a main clause. Havana and Luanda had hoped during 1988 that the Americans would vote Michael de Carcass and the Democrats into power, which would mean the end of support for UNITA and a harder line on South Africa. Instead, George W. Bush Sr. became president, which persuaded the Angolan and Cubans to be more flexible. Three days after the U.S. election results were released in November 1988, the parties reconvened in Geneva and within a week they had agreed to have phased Cuban withdrawal over the course of 27 months. In exchange, South Africa pledged that South West Africa would be independent by the first of November 1989. On the 13th of December 1988, South Africa and Gola and Cuba signed the "Brazable Protocol" which affirmed their commitment to these conditions and they set up a joint military monitoring commission, JMMC, to supervise the disengagement in Angola. This would also include Soviet and U.S. observers and all hostilities would cease on the 1st of April 1989. On the 22nd of December, the "Brazable Protocol" was enshrined in the tra-partate accord, which required the SADF to withdraw from Angola and reduces troop levels in South West Africa to just 1,500 within three months. Simultaneously, all Cuban brigades would have to be withdrawn from the border to an area north of the 15th parallel, then 3,000 Cuban military personnel would leave Angola by April 1989. An additional condition was that South Africa would cease all support for UNITA and Angola would cease all support for Swapar armed movement plan as well as the ANC's MK and the head to leave Angola. Everything was sealed on the 22nd of December 1988 when South African Foreign Minister Bukbuta and Gola and Foreign Minister Alfonso Fondunum and Cuban Foreign Minister Isidol Mahmethyabili signed the "Trial Natural New York Accords" which would change everything. Without resorting to too much grandiose puffle, I was part of the signing reporting on the entire fair as a journalist. The media call was flown to Brussels in the Republic of the Congo on border Saffey flat. In December, we were ashied into President Sussan Guessar's royal palace. This is not a conclusion for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It's southern neighbour across the Congo river, and those days the DRC was called Zaire. You could understand at a rather surreal moment, then across the hallway with the Cubans, the Angodans, the Russians, our enemy. The people died fort against as a soldier during Operation Prater in 1981, seven years earlier, standing alongside the South Africans, and just a crocker. Afterwards, the media were ashied back to the waiting plane, sitting on the apron in broiling heat, as the South Africans we were told, and the Russians drank copious amounts of their vodka and mumpur. Apparently, Bukbuta had taken a whole case on board, and the Russians had opened their vodka bottles and thrown away the tops, saying that meant the bottles had to be finished. With the Americans and Cubans looking on somewhat bemused, the Russians and South Africans spent two hours polishing off the bottles. Then, the Victoria delegation led by Bukbuta staggered back onto the plane, where the media were quietly broiling in the human equatorial air. On the flight back that night, Bukbuta began to crank jokes, as the aircraft flew over Lusaka. It took control of the cabin crew public address system, and obviously drunk suggested a possible bombing raid was now going to be carried out on the ANC, who were at that stage in exile and based in the Zambian capital. More bad jokes followed, but I will spare you the details. And so, South West Africa was on its way to becoming Namibia, and the SADF was on its way home, so were the Cubans. The last South African troops left Namibia in November 1989, and the country formally became independent in March 1990, after UN supervised multi-party elections. The last Cuban left Angola on the 1st of July 1991. Next episode, I'll provide more details about what happened in this run-up, including the role played by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group or UNTAQ. But in the meantime, let's go over some analysis. Between 1987 and the end of 1898, the Cubans and Fappler lost 94 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, nearly 400 other vehicles, close to 5,000 soldiers, along with 15 missile systems destroyed, 9 Migs lost, and 9 helicopters. The South African's lost 3 tanks, 11 armored vehicles, no logistic vehicles, 31 men were killed, along with 2 fighter aircraft lost, but no helicopters. While some have suggested that impure data terms, the South Africans must have won this war, the win is in inverted commas. As I've explained, only the bureaucrats, you counted beans back in Pretoria, used this kind of logic to make themselves feel better. The Angolans and Cubans had money to burn, they had hundreds of tanks. tens of thousands of troops, the South Africans had two dozen tanks and could not spare to lose one man. What about the entire war? By the standards of warfare, both sides did not suffer the kind of casualties seen in many other wars where over 25% casualty rates were recorded at times by battalion's regiments and sometimes even armies. It's generally agreed that 2,284 South Africans died in the 23-year war compared to 11,335 Swapu and Farplough troops, along with 5,000 Cuban soldiers and at least 3,000 civilians, perhaps more. The latter number will never be known, with so many caught in the clashes over such a long period, oscillated in the villages scattered about Angola. Folks, there's a huge debate about these numbers, but as I've said, the important thing is not to fixate about the data, because we'll never have closure on that. The SCDF could not countenance any casualties, whereas the Angolans relied on taking casualties. It wasn't a political train smash for Luwanda, which was a one-party state and crushed all independent journalism. They just lied more about the losses than the South Africans could, but both sides lied. But Butter had told a gathered group of peace of course signatories in New York that the South Africans were thinking twice about allowing hundreds of these sons to be killed as the Cuban aggression grew. The citizens of both countries suffered through these lies just in different ways. 1989 and the Cold War had blown over, along with the hot war. The African National Congress funders The Russians were broke. Cuba's President Fiddler Castro had given up on his worldwide revolution further, realizing that his backers Moscow had failed in the contorted communist experiment. The Berlin Wall crashed down in 1989. Eastern European countries were freeing themselves from the Russian occupation, rejecting a system that had oppressed and destroyed, and equally in southern Africa the apartheid regime was doomed. It had also oppressed and destroyed. Moscow had been pumping around ten million dollars a day into Cuba's economy, an ideological subsidy, but Mikhail Gorbachev turned off the cash flow. By the end of 1989, Cuba was down to just a weak supply of petrol. Hungary stopped supplying spare parts to Cuba, which used their buses, and in a bizarre about turn Cuba then turned to Pretoria in 1991 for assistance, asking for the national party the former enemy to help source bus spares. Cuba still turns to Pretoria for assistance by the bar. The ANC government imports doctors from Havana, preparing them to hiring their own doctors because of Cuba's military support for their struggle against Pretoria. The ANC continues to cough up millions of dollars in donations to Cuba, which is once again on its last leg, but prefers to remain a one party state where there is no freedom. But I'll digress, back to 1988 to '95, a period of global change. Someone has to win a war, you know, so the post-1988, peace of court signing led to a flood of deranged propaganda pretty much from all parties. Pedal Castro crowed about the Angolans with the Cuban allies, along with Swapu, defeating the South Africans. This is not how SEDF generals and the Troopie saw it. Croca had pointed out that both sides had fought each other to the moment where like scorpions they circled each other. The full scale invasion of Numbibia by the Cubans would have been exceedingly bloody. It was something that Castro was not willing to entertain, nor something that the National Party political leadership in South Africa relished either. They had been fighting the ANC's MK and the PSC's Uplah in a non-conventional war back home which was low intensity but a war nonetheless. And it was one they had begun to realise they could lose. So the National Party had taken to launching death squads in poison attacks, giving up completely on their idea of being seen as a civilised state. The political ideology that had fueled both sides was broken. Communism was done so as a party. Naturally, Pedal Castro bloated. Thousands of his men had paid the price, so he had to provide some sort of victory parade for the masses in Havana. Naturally too, the South Africans had thrown thousands of their men into Angola and over 2,200 were dead, so they needed to claim an ethical victory if nothing else. But for both sides it was a peric victory because the families of these men asked, for what did their loved ones die? It is an ancient question that dogs us, you cannot squirm from it. So in 1989, the need to still control South Eastern Angola and continued fighting the MPLO just without direct South African backing. Much of the noise about who won what and where concerned the battle of Guito Guanovali. This single battle has seemed to fixate everyone because if its overturns of earlier wars and battles, the tanks, the armored vehicles, the trenches, the artillery bombardments, the mass the tax on fixed positions, the strategic importance of one town. The narrative broadcast in South Africa was that Guito Guanovali was never a target, so therefore the SEDF was not beaten, despite never seizing that town. The Cuban narrative hinged on their belief that the SEDF would have liked to have taken the town if they wanted to. And furthermore, the South Africans had failed to secure the region, the territory, east of the Guito River. Unitas said the MPLO was defeated at Guito Guanovali because the Angolan state, with all its Russian, East German and Cuban backers, had failed in their large-scale October 1987 assaults, targeting Mavinga and Unita HQ at Jamba, neither had fallen. So looking at all of this is rather confusing and to be blunt, a tad tasteless, like political hyenas, these people were all boasting about winning. As if claiming a win was somehow going to make up for the cold bodies buried in the soil of Angola or back in South Africa. It was a great war, they would say, fought for great things like victories and chaps, wonderful medals to wear with your well-pressed step-outs when you next gathered together. But as soldiers it oaked us, did it not. What was the reason that our brothers and some of our sisters, on whatever side you supported, were blastered to shreds. Pretoria had kept their stiff upper lip technique when it came to what was going on in Southern Angola for so long that when the end came in 1988, it was a shock for the die-hard supporters and for the SEDF officers, which had contained a real threat from Angola and Cuba for many years. For the professionals who had fought well despite overwhelming odds, the sudden peace appeared to be a stab in the back. But that the first thing to suffer in war is the truth. Buyers and conjecture aside, here are a few things we perhaps could consider. Starting with the Cubans. After the grand, hubris-full speeches by Castro had died down, he said that all Havana was rarely trying to do was to be strong enough on the ground to avoid defeat. They had to get into Quito-Quanabali to support Angola forces and wage historical actions in order to stop an assault. This was a far cry from the state of Ames in 1987, where Cuba, Russia and the Angolans sit off to seize the entire South Eastern Angolan towns of Mavinga and Jamba from Unita, and were stopped by the South Africans. Put another way, they were defeated. The SEDF had achieved the objective of saving Unita from annihilation and keeping the Cubans Russians and Angolans fixated on this part of Southern Africa, and thus managed to push communism further away from Avambaland and South West Africa, and of course South Africa until communism collapsed. But it wasn't a victory. The SEDF was a very powerful and dangerous scorpion trapped in the bottle with the dangerous and powerful Cubans and Russians, and the Imperial. Pretoria bent over backwards saying that because Quito-Quanabali was never the objective, the Cuban narrative is wrong, but as I've explained, militarily had the Cubans exited Quito along with Fuplar, it's likely that the SEDF would have moved in and then handed over the town to Unita. Then the SEDF would probably have blown up the main bridge to the North near Kahama, as well as the other on the Quuanabali River, and left the Cubans to fight over an area further north. That is highly speculative, but having spoken to a few vets who are less defensive about who won, what, and where, this is probably the route Pretoria would have taken. Ho-Hart and Breitenbach have said this so to the thinking men in their wreckies. The South Africans did not win this war. The aim of all wars is political, a political solution. Pretoria wanted to keep Namibia as part of its territory and it failed to do so. It lost the territory, but it won a peace that was inevitable. This border war was part of an era where post-colonial regimes were on the ramparts seeking military victories to accept their masses, dying colonial regimes like apartheid were also doing their best to copy the heroes of the Boer War, outweating the English, or the Cubans with another excellent bit of technical mobility. There have been a few curious comments by General Janie Heldenhands after the war. For example, he said that Quuanabali was not the objective, but if it had fallen into South African hands without a fight, they would have occupied the town. Then he said, but only if they could defend it. That is strange. For most of the Southern and Golan campaign, the SEDF had taken towns and handed them over to Unita and withdrawn. Suddenly Heldenhands claims the South Africans would have changed their military logic for one town. We must not forget that this war was fought over Namibia. The people of that country did not want the South Africans to run their country for them, no matter what anyone now believes about how badly all well it has been run since independence. I have spent many years before independence and afterwards in Namibia, like many of the And while a soldier there, I was fully aware that the majority of the locals wanted us out. I was also aware that the SEDF was doing a great job in keeping some deadly people out of the territory, people who would murder at the smallest provocation. And yet, as the civilian population became more liary of the SEDF, some of the actions taken by the security forces in dealing with the people of Avambal and led to a massive vote in favour of Swapu in the upcoming Namibian elections. Hellness is on record as saying the Cubans opened up the second front at Tecchipa because they'd been stymied in the attack in the east at Quitte Kuala Valley. This was a political decision to save face before heading to New York to negotiate the final peace agreement. That's probably true, but so what? It worked, so pointing out the obvious is hardly winning a war. Hellness also said that had the Cubans entered South West Africa, and the South Africans in his words would have gone to town. A major war would have broken out, which Pretoria was ready to fight, but he's fooled himself. The South African political order was not willing to let this happen. His people retired of the body bags, 23 years of fighting for what? For Namibians, who in the majority did not want the SEDF there? He appeared to have forgotten the truth about war. It's politics by the means. It's not a thing unto itself, that is only how a professional soldier thinks, and only tactically not strategically. I met international operators in places like Onjiva inside Angola, who were veterans of Vietnam, former Green Berets, and special forces. While he drank his beer at Onjiva Airport, beer that had been flown in for his team, I asked one, "Why do you fight here in Angola as an American?" His answer was quite chilling and honest, "Because I like to kill," he said. It wasn't his war, but he didn't care. It was war he sought, unlike the majority of the citizen force and national servicemen who supplied most of the manpower to the SEDF in the border war. They fought to survive and to live, but killing people was not their lifelong dream. This former Vietnam vet said he had a PhD in philosophy from one of the universities in California, but he also had a penchant for dealing in death that he discovered while fighting in Vietnam. He had a particular skill. The majority of soldiers fighting are not like that. What about the air war? The SA Air Force had been more effective with less than the Cuban and Angolan counterparts. The SA artillery had been better. The bombardments are counting for thousands of casualties, while the Angolan barrage fell way off target. But in the end, the Cubans controlled the air war. The mobility of the SEDF in the bush caused endless trouble for Fapler, and the average Fapler soldier was less motivated and poorly trained compared to the average South African. All of this is true. Asking who won the border war may be the wrong question, however. Asking why it was fought is what we've tried to do over the past two years. Providing hopefully a detailed description of the motivations by individuals who acted honorably and with dignity and with courage. Most of my brothers were surviving on instinct in this war. The ones that survived, either the shooting or the mental scarring, are now retiring from the other jobs. They're in the 50s and 60s, like me. We need to look at what we have. Some are visiting southern Angola as 61 Mac and other units do. Meeting with Fapler and even Russian vets, cracking open a beer or five, sitting having a bride overlooking the battlefields. 102 South Africans are now farming in southern Angola. It's a beautiful part of Africa as we all know. The people are friendly, even those who've lost their legs and landmines planted by South Africans. They appear to hold no overt grudges. The Angolan army wants to host more military tourists. These men who can take a trip back to their past metaphorically may also be taking a trip into the future by visiting these zones. The Angolan economy was shattered by civil war, ruined by corruption, the Marxist running the country destroyed it by stealing the oil, the dos Santos family cursed Angola with its dignity and greed. The Cubans, well, they have their own demons to deal with post-castura, barely able to eke out an existence these days, trying to free to America, which is less than 100 miles away, while the Chinese build military outposts on their island. Another one party stayed using the Washington Havana belligerence to extend its lifespan artificially. By departing from Angola and other African conflicts, Havana's political mind is refocused on their own backyard. The days of Shagu Avara running around trying to sell revolution for a handful of AK-47s to anyone who will buy is over. Finally, just a word. The effects and fallout from this war continues, and is spawned an entire tribe of what we call wannabees. These folks pretend they were involved in the war and regale others with lengthy examples of the courage under fire or the involvement in the wreckies or the lies. Just out of interest, South Africans are not the only country suffering from this. The Russians have also complained of a similar group of wannabees who lie about their involvement in Angola or lack of involvement to be more accurate, some in the US as well. Members of the Russian Veterans Association have exchanged letters with the South African veterans, saying they, "We have a common history. They have reminded veterans that despite history being written by the winners of a war, the Russians and the South Africans are in a unique position. There were no losers amongst these two nations." There have been other letters written by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia or plan some of the fighters have reached out to SADF veterans and members of SWATIF. One is Fulia Angola, a plan reconnaissance soldier who was active in the Caprivi, and who has said that because he fought South Africans in the same dust, the same sandy terrain, we came to know each other well. Because of this, he says, "We have more in common than we have differences." Veterans have visited southern Angola and expressed condolences, atoned, if you like, and the sorrow that both sets a family's feel after a battle was tragic and intense. Remember, they were fighting for. There is a call for more familiarization amongst veterans. This has been going on now for some time as 61 Mech and other organizations travel back to the battle zones in southern Angola to meet Fuplia Commanders. They had fought against back in the 80s. For South Africa, Namibia Angola, the conflicts now appear to be raging within, rather than between. Next episode, I'll address the untie handover, which is a bit chaotic, as you'll hear. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage, where you can direct message me on Twitter, @deslaven. Until next, Totsin's. [MUSIC]