Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host Des Latham. This is episode 110 and peace moves are afoot. However before that there was going to be a truly shocking incident for the SADF. When we left off last episode the Cubans and the Angolans were gearing up to face another invasion by 61MEC and FOSAI. Operation Excite as it was to become known. But for once the Cubans had decided that they'd seized the initiative and were about to launch a two-pronged assault towards the South Africans from Zangongo. Just a quick recap 61MEC had arrived in the eastern theater with a tank squadron, four motorized infantry companies from 3-2 battalion including the anti-tank troop in four RATL-90s and four more ZT-3s. There were three motorized companies from 101 battalion in Kaspers, one motorized company each from one parachute, 202 and 701 battalions who were in Biffles. The SADF artillery support was significant, a battery each of G5s, G2s, Valkyrie rocket launchers and one 20mm mortars. This was tasked for Zulu under command of Colonel Michael Delport. The South Africans had been building an approach ramp up to the Kalkre dam which allowed the Ulufans and the RATLs to cross over for the invasion. Ostensibly the plan was based around Tichypa, then hit them with artillery but also pushed the Cubans back from the dam which provided water and power to Vamperland. It was a key point in the war. The SAF had an interesting ruse in mind and more about that in a moment. So on the 16th of June 1988, Commandant Mike Muller began moving the artillery across the low level bridge at Kalkre to deploy 8km further northeast where there was some tree cover to protect them from the MiGs. This bridge could take the weight of the guns but not the tanks. They had to cross the Cuneney river via the earth ramp and the dam wall road. Muller set up his forward HQ in the thick bush 8km north of the dam. Three 120mm mortar teams moved to around 12km south of Tichypa within range of the Cuban outpost to the southwest of the town. Close by two 3-2 battalion companies would carry out missions towards the town protected by the mortars. This was Swapo territory and locals hated the SAF and created as much trouble for them as possible, including beating on drums and pots as alarm signals that 3-2 battalion's reccees were passing by, led by Major Pierre Franken. "On one occasion we had to pass a horse at night and we knew there was a FAPLA patrol lying up in a dip just to our left," he told Fridge Bridgeland. The horse whinnied and ran off. People began to charge around behind the reccees. In the dark, FAPLA troops passed them. "But they didn't see us," he said. The unfriendly residents were sending messages to the Angolan army and the Cubans. By Wednesday, 22nd of June, one of the forward 3-2 battalion reconnaissance platoons reported something of interest. A massive column of dust from the north, a large column, was heading south. The Cubans appeared to be on the move. Luckily, the field engineers had completed the giant earth ramps up to Calquidam, and Muller moved the Ulufans and his main force across that night. They were doing a good job, but they didn't seem to be able to get out. They were designated Combat Group Charlie. Muller had broken up his force into three sections. Combat Team 1 with a Reutel 90 squadron, two mechanized infantry platoons, six Reutel 81s as the main group. That was the unit center within 12 kilometers of Techeba. Combat Team 2 of Mechanized Infantry Company, three Reutel 90s and six Reutel 81s were deployed four kilometers south of Team 1, and Combat Team 3 with a tank squadron, four Reutel Z-21s, and two military platoons. All of these were on the move. Four Reutel Z-23s and two 3-2 battalion infantry companies were to protect Muller's HQ, and another mechanized infantry platoon was sent about six kilometers south of them. On the 23rd of June, 1988, reconnaissance units reported a heavy Cuban artillery bombardment ahead of the dust cloud. It appeared an attack force was heading south, and it was eventually spotted on the 24th by members of 3-2 battalion. Reckies also saw Cuban columns moving south from Techeba towards Calque. This stopped the attack, and the Reutel 90s were also on the move. This stop-start advanced the technique preferred by the Russians. Bombard, move, dig in, bombard, move, dig in. There appeared to be a two-pronged assault underway. Things were going to move along at a steady clip from here on. The Cubans and FAPL forces heading out of Zangongo were part of a two-pronged plan, and this one was heading to attack SAGF units at Cuamato. 201 Battalion, with elements of Reutels and Mortars, stopped that advance and the occupation of the town, and the Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. Brigadier Chris Serfentane, who was commanding Sector 10 in Ovambola, did not know exactly what the Cubans were up to, but it was clear from Recchi's intelligence something big was going on. They had moved into the southern town of Chichipa in large numbers along with at least 100 tanks and some of the latest military radar and missile tech. They had shown their hand by trying to shoot down the Impalas and a Bospork spotter plane. They were clearly aiming at the strategically important Kalk Red Am. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The Cubans retreated back to Zangongo. The SAA Air Force conducted their clever trick. At last light on the 26th of June, a sortie of Impala took off from Undangwa Air Force Base to simulate a bombing run onto Chichipa and the Cubans took the bait. It was Sunday afternoon and the SAADF thought that the enemy would be resting, although that was not the case. Castro had already ordered the two simultaneous assaults towards Kalk Red Am and from Zangongo to Kwamata, so the Cubans were very much wide awake. It was just before dark. The SAA Air Force was betting on the Cubans keeping the base. They didn't like to fly at night. Once the Impalas were picked up by the Cuban radar just as they crossed the cut line, the South African planes climbed as they would normally do for a standard bombing run. Instead, the G5 battery inside Angola and a second gun in placement at Roacana released weather balloons that were dragging foiled tails. These they hoped would be picked up by the radar. Then the Impalas dove to just above ground level and the trick worked. The Cubans launched half a dozen of their SAM-6 missiles towards the balloons. The artillery observers spotted the SAM launch sites and sent the coordinates to the G5s, the G2s, the mobile rocket launchers and the 120mm mortars. A six hour barrage began that battered to Chichipa from the south, with the enemy responding in desultory fire at first. They managed only ten rounds in response while taking heavy casualties around the HQ. Their communication links were severed for some hours. And 3-2 Commander Colonel Jan Hooghoud declared himself satisfied. Job done. But things are never that simple, because they had also hoped that the Cubans would send out their armour in order to be ambushed by Task Force Zulu. That was Colonel Mike Delport's artillery group. The Cubans were apparently too shaken to respond immediately. That was going to change rapidly as 3-2 Battalion Veteran Lieutenant Titi de Abreu was to find out. His platoon of 36 men had led an artillery observer into the G5 base. After a few days, the G5s were back to base. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s came back to the base. The G5s came back to the base. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. The G5s arrived at Chichipa. 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Muller then picked up the distant sound of engines to the north as he sat in his HQ after he'd radioed the order to pull back. He knew the 3-2 battalion was out there and would give an early warning. Or perhaps it was his artillery gunning their engines. He wasn't sure. It wasn't his artillery. The 3-2 battalion section had indeed spotted the enemy tanks and they were frantically trying to radio Muller, but their radio had failed. While the South Africans were still unaware of the extent of the Cuban assault coming towards them, the medium-sized force of a mechanized infantry company of 12 RATL-20s from 61 Mech, together with 3-2 battalions, anti-tank troop and 8 RATL-81s were operating north of Kalkwe Dam. This column was led by Major André Vermeulen, with Major Hannes Nordman in charge of the area, anti-tank RATLs. Early in the morning of the 27th, around 9 a.m., the column ran slap-bang into the forward Cuban assault group. It was an undulating, grassy landscape and they were descending a northern slope of a hill towards thicker bush on the valley floor. The plan was to emerge and creep up the southern slope of the next rise. As the RATLs moved into the bush at the bottom of the dip, a Cuban soldier suddenly stood up and fired an RPG-7 from point-blank range, around 25 meters away, hitting a RATL-90, which blew up, its armaments exploding. By some kind of miracle, the crew survived, leaping out before the ammunition went off. There were armored cars in the bush with FAPLA and Cuban infantry. This was now a critical situation. A company of T-54 tanks shot over the top of the nearest hill, joining the infantry, and Major Nordman knew this was a large force. It just kept coming. There were a lot of Cuban tanks. 26 BMP-2s, he said afterwards. These were armed with Saga anti-tank missiles. The Cubans were carrying RPG-7s. They were very aggressive. This wasn't the FAPLA groups of the early 80s, wilting under attack. This was a well-trained and motivated infantry, deploying excellent fire and movement skills. The South Africans were completely outgunned, but Nordman was thinking fast. Because his RATL-ZT-3s were in a bush-covered valley, they couldn't fire their missiles, but they could move quickly. It was now up to the RATL-90s to pit themselves against the tanks, and these sped towards... the T-54s, as well as two ZU-23 guns on tracked arm and chassis, alongside several trucks. The RATL machine gunners opened up on the FAPLA and Cuban infantry. Then one of the T-54s got a shot off with its 100mm gun that hit another RATL-90, killing the commander, Lt. Mealy Mayden. He was 19. Mike Muller ordered the Uli von Tanks to head towards Nordman and from Mühlen. It was a desperate situation. Nordman, by now, had been wounded in the neck and his hand, and had been shot down by Schrapnel, but he continued fighting. Then the RATL-ZT-T-54 had brewed up, and a group of Cuban troops on the back were killed. The two 23mm guns and a small number of the trucks were also burning. The Cubans began to break off contact. The RATL-81s, which carried the mortars, had fired up to 500 rounds, it was claimed later. One of the reasons, the Cubans began to wilt. But they fought on still, as their SEDF tried to remove Meyering's body from the RATL, along with the wounded. It was a failure. It was a furious battle. The Uli von Tanks finally arrived, and the Cubans retreated before the South African tanks with their 105mm guns. Back in his HQ, Muller realized that something out of the ordinary was going on with the Cubans. This was a major assault force, and they were also operating extremely aggressively. They had a target and a plan. This was not the usual exploratory force. It was on a mission, and he knew full well what that mission must be, to take Kalkre Dam. So he ordered 61 Mech to consolidate. But not to follow the Cubans. It was a wise decision. Close to 100 tanks could be deployed by the Cubans, and opposing these were a handful of Uli von Tsen RATLs. The result of a follow-up operation would not have gone South Africa's way. Two Cuban tank squadrons began to move, attempting to outflank their SEDF forward units, targeting the withdrawing 61 Mech from both sides. But the SEDF artillery once again was brought to bear, and the Cuban outflanking maneuver stopped. 61 Mech was now zigzagging southward. It went south for several hours, keeping the enemy in sight. The Cubans were everywhere, and 3-2 Battalion kept up a constant fire on these companies, holding them back. Then a third column of Cubans were spotted, along with the other two flanking groups, but a targeted bombardment by the South African artillery hit two of these transport vehicles. This was very much an SEDF retreat now, and Brigadier Sirfontaine gave permission for Muller to set up a compact front on the high ground, just 10 kilometers north of Kalkre Dam. Last stand. It was the South Africans' turn to try and dig in, in a defensive position, but they were definitely facing a much stronger force on the march towards them. It was better armed, and ominously, the enemy controlled the air war. The Cubans were coming. It was 3pm on the 27th of June 1988, when the first South Africans spotted 8 MiGs, 2 flying top cover, 6 flying low. Muller radioed a warning to his HQ. Reocana picked up a second call from his own Hilltop Observer, who spotted the MiG-23s on their way to Kalkre Dam. He radioed a warning back to base in Oshikate and sprinted out, spotting 8 MiGs turning over Reocana, the 6th low-level aircraft levelling out south of the river near Kalkre Dam. Later, SA Air Force Commander Dick Lloyd spoke of this attack as very different from the previous inept performances of the Angolan Air Force, their attempts at high altitude to bomb the South Africans during operations like Modula, Hooper and Packer. The MiG attack was led by skilled Cubans. An academic attack, he called it. 16 bombs were dropped, and 6 hit the target. Furthermore, the pilots were flying in such a way that the South African air defences were almost useless. The two top cover were looking out for SA Air Force interceptors, while the 6 others hugged dirt roads at only 300 feet until they reached Reocana, where they screamed over the airfield, turned and lined up in pairs southwest to northeast along another dirt road on the South African side. The first pair overflew the dam at about 1,000 feet to acquire the target, climbed and called in the other 4 MiGs. These dived straight towards the dam wall in pairs, then levelled out in a kind of cross-angle attack, first from southwest to northeast, then directly east to west. Each plane dropped two 250kg parachute-retarded bombs on each pass, and just because they could, they slowed right down to ensure a hit, firing their 23mm cannon at the same time. Six of the 16 bombs hit the dam wall, damaging the structure. Two SADF troops on the wall were caught by both the bombs and the MiG's cannon fire. One was cut up by the flying concrete and shrapnel, the second leapt off the wall, falling 15 meters to the sandy ground below, spraining his ankle, but the adrenaline was flowing and he managed to run to safety despite his injury. Then, just to rub it in, one of the Cubans in his MiG-23 executed a victory roll as he sped from the dam. The MiG-23 was able to hit the dam wall, reminding the South Africans that they had been caught totally unawares. The MiGs wheeled about and turned for a second attack, sweeping in and firing their 23mm cannon. The SADF anti-aircraft battery had woken up and opened fire and turned a simple 20mm hand-aimed automatic cannon. This had an unfortunate effect. One of the MiG pilots dropped his bombs early, and that fell directly onto a buffel parked near one of the large steel pipelines, which took water from Calcret to Avambeland. Eleven members of 8th South African Infantry were sitting near the buffel, eating their lunch under the trees. This was a massive 250kg bomb that blasted the buffel and the trees and killed the 11 men instantly. This was also the SADF's worst single loss after 23 years of fighting this long border war in southern Angola. Along with Lt. Mayering, it meant that 12 men had died on this day. Seven of the dead were only 19 years old. They were 23 years old, and the oldest was a veteran of 23. But the MiGs didn't get off scot-free. They had broken the rule of a single wave, and because they had come back for a second attempt, the hand-aimed, old-school SADF 20mm cannon damaged one of the MiGs so seriously that it crashed, returning to Kohama. The pilot ejected safely. Hannes Nordman was lying in an ambulance being treated for his neck and hand injuries alongside these eight SAI vehicles. Then the doctor decided to move them on for further treatment moments before the MiGs began. The MiGs bombed. Another lucky escape for one of South Africa's most courageous soldiers. The SADF survivors of this MiG attack explained how it seemed to carry on forever. Chaos as the men tried to dig their way under their vehicles. Some could see the MiG pilots, they were flying so low, peppering the SADF with their cannon. Ein Kronewald, one of the eight SAI soldiers, said simply, "It wasn't a nice sight." Which is another of those laconic understatements made by soldiers who have seen enough not to exaggerate. Recrimination followed. The Times of London reported that, "Military balance shifts against Pretoria," while the Washington Post said, "The nightmares of Pretoria's generals are coming true." Which, whatever you think of journalists, were accurate depictions of the real situation. It was a political disaster for the National Party. For Commandant Mike Muller, it was something more. It was a failure of the air defense units, the anti-aircraft crews had been too slow, and he reported this officially afterwards. The SADF had broken their own operational rule, and eleven men paid for it. There was always a Mobile Air Operations Team, or MAF. MOAT officer, along with an SA Air Force intelligence officer, stationed at critical points in forward positions during an operation like this. But there were no MOATs stationed at Calgary, nor around Tejipa, so warnings of enemy plane movements were channeled along ordinary ops lines, and that meant up to five minutes could elapse before the warnings reached the anti-aircraft teams. It's another of these hindsight comments from officers that were spot on. It was another example of how breaking the basic rules of operational warfare leads to casualties. This is not finger-pointing, just pointing out basic logic. As we all know, war has rules. You break them, you pay. Willow had a much bigger problem. The MiGs had destroyed one of the earth ramps leading to the road at the top of the dam. A dozen Ulifants were now trapped on the Angolan side of the Kineni River. What happened next is for next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps raise the visibility of the series. Or you can direct message me on Twitter at DesLatham. Until next, tot ziens.
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