Episode 109 - A Bosbok survives a missile near miss as both the SADF and the Cubans gear up
21m 2s
In June 1988, escalating tensions along the South-West African border led to a major military build-up by Cuban forces, particularly near Tejipa in Angola. The South African Defence Force (SADF), under command of Commodore Jan Hohot, deployed a small platoon of 500 soldiers to conduct guerrilla operations against Cuban outposts, aiming to disrupt their advance without engaging in large-scale combat. However, the operation quickly spiraled into a deadly confrontation when Cuban forces, now more confident and mobile, deployed tanks and anti-aircraft defenses. The South Africans were ambushed, forced to flee through hostile terrain, and narrowly escaped with minimal casualties, though several men were lost. A critical failure emerged when the SADF attempted to bomb Cuban missile systems, only to be intercepted by advanced Sam surface-to-air missiles. Miscommunication, poor coordination, and inadequate reconnaissance led to the near-loss of a key aircraft during a low-altitude mission. Meanwhile, Cuban forces fortified their positions, reinforcing defenses and planning a two-pronged assault on key towns. The SADF, in response, developed a complex plan—Operation Hilti, later renamed Prone Later—detailing conventional offensives and special operations to regain control. Despite these plans, deep strategic weaknesses were exposed: the SADF failed to anticipate the Cuban use of long-range, high-tech missile systems and underestimated the threat posed by Cuban and SWAPO forces. This marked a turning point in the conflict, demonstrating the growing asymmetry in military capability and signaling that, while the SADF remained active, the war was increasingly on the defensive. The situation foreshadowed a broader shift toward peace negotiations, as both sides recognized the unsustainable nature of the prolonged conflict.
Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host Dez Latham, this is episode 109.
We left till last week hearing that the Cuban 50th Division had been moving towards the
South-West African Border.
A clear message to Pretoria that Fidel Castro was no longer going to tolerate the losses
that he and Pablo had endured in southern Angola.
All this as the South Africans, Cubans and Golands Americans and Russians were negotiating
the future of Namibia.
Time was running out.
And in particular for a small group of men, a platoon, if you like, it was going to take
the brunt of a meg bombing close to the Colquidam just across the Cutline.
Sent to deal with this threat was Commodan Jan Hohot, who by now had discovered that the
biggest threats seemed to lie around the small town of Tejipa around 50 kilometres inside
Angola.
Besides thousands of Cuban soldiers, it had also begun to sprout radio antennas in what
appeared to be anti-aircraft positions.
Because the South Africans were stretched so thinly, the South African depensable's top
bros could only send 500 soldiers who were planned assault on the town all 3 to battalion men.
The idea was to send a second conventional force which would be set up and moved to
Rokana for much larger incursion.
This duty fell on 61 Mac, its weary men now slightly recovered out of a bit of Ahranara
back in South Africa.
And the equipment was repaired, in particular the battered tanks.
There was no other conventional battalion posted in Avambaland and the order came for the
battalion to get ready to move once more.
The Cuban threat had led the SCD to call a general mobilisation of citizen force troops,
and our general Janik Halenhaus was prepared to go full PR.
The Rokana falls hydroelectric scheme was in danger, and the Cuban build up on the lower
reaches of the Kanani River meant this strategic point needed protecting.
This single scheme powered most of Namibia, while it also sent water to Avambaland.
It was not going to be an easy task, by now thousands, some say at least 10,000 and possibly
as many as 11,000 Cubans had shifted South.
Mini within 55 kilometers of the Katlan, in the West and Theatre, around Tachipa.
There were also around 2,000 Swapov fighters alongside the Cuban Allies.
Facing these were just 500 members of 32 battalion initially.
Shortly after June the 9th, 1988, Hocha sent the first three companies across the Colquered
Bridge on board 10 Macidi's Unimogs.
They were armed with 81mm mortars, 14.5mm machine guns, and their 106mm recoilless guns.
These were the only real protection from Cuban D55 and T64 tanks.
Hocha wanted to avoid a direct scrap with a large Cuban army.
These three companies were going to conduct guerrilla operations to harry the Cubans, blowing
up the infrastructure, mining the roads, and trying to target Swapov in particular.
I told them just maintain the situation until 61 Mac gets her, said Hocha.
The three were split, two headed off up the conenny towards Tachipa, the third north-easterly
to the area just south of Zangonga, where it was thought the main Cuban assault would
be launched.
They were the early warning.
The Cubans were in fact going to do just that.
The Cubans had started deploying in the classic Russian style conventional approach with their
own company supported by a dozen tanks.
These would move south as close as 12km from the Colqueredam and Reurkana.
The artillery laying down a barrage ahead of the movement to chase away any South Africans
then to push forward with migs in support.
By now the Cubans were driving between Tachipa and Zangonga in single vehicles, sometimes
jeeps, sometimes just a diesel tanker.
They were obviously no longer afraid of the SADF in this part of Angola after so many
years of being forced to conduct large convoys.
The Cubans were sending one or two companies ahead of these assault groups, who were digging
a few kilometres ahead of the main body, and three two battalion reconnaissance picked
up these point trenches quite quickly.
Hochak was upset that the Cubans and the Angolans were running around in the bush so openly.
It was time he said to "Rath them up".
The commandant had no idea that his order was going to lead to a marathon run for some
of his men through the Angolan semi desert.
The companies outside Tachipa reported that there were two main Cuban outposts south of
the town, one to the west, the other to the east.
There was a dirt road between the outposts that headed south and after consulting company
Commander Captain Maurice Devanish, Hochak decided to prod the south-western outpost first.
They had received a little mortar fire just to warm them up, then three two would monitor
the road, hoping that reinforcements would be sent from Tachipa and Devanish's men would
ambush them.
Three two moved into position during the night, 90 men in Unimog, along with two 81 millimetre
mortars, two heavy machine guns and one of the 106 millimetre recoilers guns.
It was early June, a cold morning awaited, but soon the mortars were in position, ready
for action.
Moments later, five Cubans sappers were spotted walking along the nearby road, sweeping
the surface with mine detectors.
The three two section heard vehicles in support of these men, but decided to shoot them anyway
in one sustained burst.
Missed later, Fuplar Company ran into view and the small sections stood up and attacked
the enemy, shooting as they went.
Things were waited against three two, however, because armored cars could be heard nearby,
and the assault was stopped dead in its tracks, then the three two men turned to escape
the danger.
They radioed their mortars, which had been set up around two kilometres in the rear, asking
them to open fire, and they dropped a curtain of shells in an arc around the retreating
three two section, which was now sprinting back to the Unimog.
A BRDM burst from the bush, and three two shot dead its Cuban commander as he stood in
the open hatch.
The other BRDM's withdrew, and at that moment the South African soldiers heard the tanks.
What they hadn't realized was that there was a third Cuban outposts, and the South Africans
had started their mortar-backed assault less than a kilometre from this position.
It was heavily defended, now they were caught in open country.
It was at this moment that their sprint was going to turn into a marathon.
Punishers ordered to his men on the trot was to make it to the Unimogs, track the equipment
in the back, particularly the all-important radios, and then high-tail it out of there.
There were being attacked by two groups of tanks, around 20 and all, zeroing in on them
from two different directions, but somehow they made it to the Unimogs and threw the gear
in the back of one.
The driver took off as the men began to swing themselves aboard, but then drove straight
into a whole dug-bar water.
The second Unimog plowed into the back of the first, and that was that their transport
was damaged beyond repair as the second radiator was pulverized.
Leave the vehicles was the call, run for it.
The Unimogs were in fire as they fled, Devonish hoped the radios would be burned to a crisp
before the Cubans got their hands on this vital device with its co-s and frequency hopping
technology.
The first inkling ho-hard had about badly things had gone wrong, was after Devonish had run
his first ten kilometres through the Sandy Bush and then radioed an update.
Dead update was interrupted by the arrival of a T-55, Devonish ran off again, and the
next call was later that afternoon, but then he'd been running for quite a few hours.
Ho-chot was worried, how many men were dead, how many had escaped?
He knew how much propaganda had emanated from your hunt, pop-ups was being wounded, and
then wheeled out in the Havana, he didn't want another man going through this humiliation.
Pretoria's politicians were going to have a cadenza, they cared less about the soldier
and more about the bad press that were going to receive.
At least 11 men were missing, according to Devonish, 11.
This was terrible, where they alive, wounded Ho-chot.
By the end of the day, Devonish had outrun the Cubans despite their tanks and tracks.
Quite a feat.
But the South Africans had been at the receiving end of what they used to call a contact, where
Swapper would be detected, and they would run through the Bush trying to escape from
the SDF Special Forces tracking them down with buffels and caspers and choppers.
The worm had turned.
One piece of good news, Devonish was now joining his fellow Marathon runners, who told him
that no one had been seen going down, it appeared all three two men were alive.
Ho-chot then fixated on the equipment tossed into the back of the Unimogs, hopefully the
stuff was melted and burnt out.
Devonish reported, he tracked back and found the Unimogs were gutted, nothing was left,
but he didn't know is that the Cubans had already found some of the equipment.
A boss walk light plane was ordered up, their spotter aircraft, nothing could be seen,
no sign of the missing men.
The end of the first six arrived at dawn the following morning, still carrying the weapons,
but down to only a handful of rounds.
They had fought their way out, a miracle really.
Five others walked into the Reurkana base that night, exhausted but unscathed.
People had run the equivalent of a marathon in their quest to avoid being shot up by T-55s
and B-I-D-M's.
The original plan to move on to Chippa was shelved after the South Africans ordeal, and
now it was back to poor war tactics of hit and run.
They'd start with the outposts, take them out one by one and hopefully using their mobility
avoid being trapped as the Cubans sent their powerful mechanized forces south from Sangong
or in response.
Cat and mouse was back.
But Ho-Hot and the SDF didn't know was what was waiting for them and it was going to
be a big shock.
As usual, first things first, time for the Reckys to head into the area to gather intelligence
about what lay on the road east of T-Chippa.
The Reckys were duly sent out and radioed back with some news.
They had seen large missiles glistening in the sun alongside the road, but had no
idea what these were. Commander Dick Lord, South African Air Force Head, was adamant that
these had to be taken out as marigers and impolars would be in danger in the coming assaults
around Tachiba. The reggae's were told to help direct the first bombing run on the missile
systems at seven the next morning, using flares and marker beacons. Remarkably, the men
crept into position during that night and placed their markers despite the heavy presence
of Fuplar and the Cubans. It was early the next morning that Lord radioed Hohart with some
bad news. It was too dangerous to bomb this missile system. The migs were flying all over
the show and he was calling off the salty. Then a sort of communication and strategy mismatch
took place. After telling the reggae's to put out their beacons and return to base, Lord
contacted Hohart saying they'd be back that night for an attack. But now the reggae's
had switched off their high power radios and Hohart could no longer reach him. If you could
fly onboard a boss book climbed to higher altitude, you may just be able to reach these
reggae's on their smaller low power radios. Lord gave permission and Hohart joined the
boss book pilot who'd received strict instructions to stay below 1,000 feet and not to stray too
far north over the Angolan border. Both orders were going to be disobeyed with an almost
disastrous result. They flew below 1,000 feet into Angola roughly 20 kilometers across
the cut line from Rheukana, no sign of the reggae. Although Hohart sitting alongside the pilot
was trying every frequency he could. Nighthead fallen. He was reading the codes by
torchlight and yelled, "Man, go higher for god's sake or we wasting our time." They
climbed above 1,000 feet, a GL, and close to 30 kilometers into Angola. When in the dark,
the pilot shouted he'd spotted a flare. It wasn't a flare. It was a surface to air missile
that had been fired at the boss book. Curving into the air, then turning and flying straight
towards the aircraft. The pilot dived straight down and the binoculars and torched smashed
into Hohart's face as the G's turned everything upside down. It screamed over their head, missing
by around 20 meters, making a giant, frushing sound, and then headed over Rheukana where it
exploded, breaking windows and causing consternation. The pilot wasn't quite a bit of trouble, courtesy
of Hohart's insistence on flying higher and further. But the Mirage and the pilot attack
was cancelled. The Sam gang on the ground was alert, and the near miss had shaken up the
SA Air Force top-cross. Still, the attack was rescheduled for the next morning, although
quite how they thought this was going to be possible with everyone now wide awake down
there. I don't know. The poor boss book pilot had no rest. He was ordered back up the
following morning. Now Hohart was joined by three two battalion intelligence officer Captain
Hermann Mulder. They made contact with everyone, the SA Air Force, the backup units, but not
the forward wrecking group. Hohart again ordered the pilot higher, apparently he hadn't learned
his lesson. Apparently the pilot hadn't either, because he followed the order. Still, they
thought they were facing Sam III's, which had a much more limited range, but they were
wrong. By now the first two impolars had taken off from Ondungwa, and their boss book had
climbed above 4,000 feet, flying east into the sun, when they spotted a flash from the
edge of a shunner about 35 kilometers away. They thought it was a windshield of a car,
said Captain Mulder, to author Fred Bridgland. Next moment I saw a blue welding flare which
seemed to hover above the ground for a second, then it was coming in our direction like a
streak of lightning. Mulder yelled a warning and for the second time in 24 hours Hohart experienced
aerobatics as the boss book went into a vertical dive. The missile missed, the equipment bounced
off everything and the flares they were carrying pierced the canopy, cracking the glass. It
was the hand of God that saved us, said Mulder, more like the hand of the pilot. They landed
shortly afterwards, everyone trembling. The pilot was in for another bulking. Meanwhile,
the impolars were forced to break off their bombing run. When the SAF was completed its
analysis, they realised that the boss book and their impolars weren't flying against
Sam 3's. They were taking Sam 6's far more advanced weapons that were long-range up to
60 kilometers. They could fire well into a vumberland if the Cubans chose to do so. They
could aim at the SA Air Force aircraft in South South Africa. The impetus and tech war had
shifted to favor the Angolans. This was clearly not a position from which the SAF could easily
recover. It was imperative for the South Africans to get rid of these missile systems as they
had early in the war in Kahama during the preamble to operation Pratir, for example. Easier
said than done. While this was going on, the Cubans were analysing the intelligence they
gathered from the captured SEDF vehicles and concluded that the South Africans were planning
a major attack on Tachipa. The actual attack was to take out the surface to air missiles,
but once again, the SEDF was hedging if the Cubans retreated to Tachipa, the SEDF would
have followed up. Fidel Castro's 50 division and the Foupler Allies spent much of the
next few weeks into June 1988 reinforcing the defenses around Tachipa. They laid more
mines, built bunkers, and dug anti-tank barriers, which had worked so well against the South
Africans and Unita around Guido-Quanavali during Operation Packer. There was also a buildup
of Cuban forces around the town and aggressive patrolling by Svalpa and Fidel forces to establish
the positions of the South Africans. There was something else being put together. Castro
planned an operation consisting of two parts. In the first, a two-pronged attack would
be carried out. The one thrust from Zangongo to capture Kormato, then a three-column advance
from Tachipa to capture Kalkrei and to be joined by forces that had gone through to Kormato.
That moved to the second part, which was an air attack on Rilcona if Tachipa came under
pressure from the SEDF. Castro sent a highly secret memo to both England and Russia explaining
this coming operation. The South Africans were busy. On 30th of May, in the 1st of June,
operational instructions for Operation Hilti were released to the officers who were planning
South Africa's invasion. The app was renamed Prone Later, the development of a conventional
and counter-insurgency plan for Northwest South Africa and Southwestern Angola. The instructions
also called for a subphase, called Operation Exit, to regain military control of South
West Angola about August 1988. Following Operation Exit, Operation Faction
would begin, its aim, the restoration of SEDF influence, and all areas of dispute within
three weeks. The last app was called Florentine. As usual, it would be the installation of UNITA
in the area of dispute, as HQ called it, and to support them against a far-planned Cuban
attempt to retake the area. On 27th of May 1988, Brigadier Chris
Serfentine was appointed 1-0 SA Division Commander, while Colonel Roland De Frist was appointed
his Chief of Staff. These SEDF plans were like a mechanized woodpecker, same idea, repeated
over and over. The plan would make use of 1-0 SA Division, as well as elements of the
SA Air Force, the SA Navy, operating off the Angolan coast, and the insertion of SA Special
Forces deep in the far-planned Cuban area. To counter the immediate threat of the Cuban
advance to the South-West African border, the 1-0 SA Division T moved to South-West Africa
on 7th of June 1988, and that was two operational headquarters at Oshikati. It worked on the blueprint
for the next ten days. General Keldinase ordered 61 mech to mobilize immediately across
the Canany River, at Co-Gradam towards Tejipa. Mark Müller and his mechanized units had
recovered from the battering at Tumpo, spending four weeks in May, reconditioning their outfit.
The plan was formulated to send the SEDF's all-important Ulyfun tanks across the dam and
deeper into Angoda to deal with the Sam Threte. The hitch was a low-level bridge that lay
west of the wall could only take the weight of a rattle and then only just. It would crumble
under the weight of the heavy Ulyfun tank. It was also rowed along the top of the dam wall,
and that structure was deemed strong enough, but the wall had put paid to the plan of building
approaches on both sides. Müller intended sending his entire force into Angoda in one batch
overnight, so these approaches had to be built somehow and quickly. The Cubans had got
wind of what was going on, and they expected some kind of SEDF response. Too far field
engineer Squadron was called in, the team that had been based on the eastern theatre of
operations, they were highly experienced in laying mines and building bridges, digging
trenches and bunkers and mines sweeping. They would use bulldozers to create earth-ramp
ramps up to the dam wall, but this was a job to be completed at night, to make it more
difficult to collect intelligence. But it also meant the sound travelled further, and would
have been monitored by the Cubans or Foupler. Still, they were hoping this would possibly
escape notice, and the South Africans began building the ramp immediately, pushing sand
and earth against the dam wall during the night, then hiding the large bulldozers and
graders during the day. The HQ for 1-0 division, now in Ushikati, began to look at the order
of battle, and the order of battle included one tank squadron of 11 Ulyphons, as part
of 61 Mech, four science-3-2 battalions, along with 81 armoured brigade. That was large,
including a G-2 battery armoured cars, anti-aircraft sections, engineers, signolers, medics
and a field worker. 71 motorised brigade was comprised of two mechanised infantry companies
made up of the Cape Town Highlanders, field regiments, signolers and medical platoons,
a parabbat battalion group of three companies, one-zero artillery brigade and reserve.
On the other side, the Cuban 50th Division was led by Brigadier General Bâtrescio
de la Guardia Front, and made up of three special forces battalions known as Spetsnas,
three tank battalions of around 110 tanks, and artillery regiment, six infantry regiments
of up to 2,000 men each.
Three!
Cuban and Swapo raiding battalions and missile air defense batteries, including a range of
Sam's, with more than two dozen helicopters and about the same number of MiG-23s. The SADF
was going to be surprised by the organization that faced him, but as you'll hear next
episode, peace moves were well on the way and this 23 year long war that had killed so
many was not going to last much longer.
Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps raise the visibility of the series. If you
want to contact me, you can head off to the website abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact
form on the homepage or direct message me on Twitter @dislay. Until next, first page.
[MUSIC]
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The Cuban 50th Division intensified its presence near Tejipa and the Colquidam, threatening South African forces and prompting a strategic response.
South African forces, including 61 Mech Battalion, launched a small-scale guerrilla operation to harass Cuban positions, but were quickly caught in a larger confrontation and forced into a dangerous retreat through the Angolan bush.
A critical intelligence and operational failure occurred when South African Air Force bombing plans were thwarted by advanced Cuban surface-to-air missile systems, exposing the SADF to deadly threats and revealing a significant technological and strategic disadvantage.
Summary:
In June 1988, escalating tensions along the South-West African border led to a major military build-up by Cuban forces, particularly near Tejipa in Angola. The South African Defence Force (SADF), under command of Commodore Jan Hohot, deployed a small platoon of 500 soldiers to conduct guerrilla operations against Cuban outposts, aiming to disrupt their advance without engaging in large-scale combat. However, the operation quickly spiraled into a deadly confrontation when Cuban forces, now more confident and mobile, deployed tanks and anti-aircraft defenses.
The South Africans were ambushed, forced to flee through hostile terrain, and narrowly escaped with minimal casualties, though several men were lost. A critical failure emerged when the SADF attempted to bomb Cuban missile systems, only to be intercepted by advanced Sam surface-to-air missiles. Miscommunication, poor coordination, and inadequate reconnaissance led to the near-loss of a key aircraft during a low-altitude mission.
Meanwhile, Cuban forces fortified their positions, reinforcing defenses and planning a two-pronged assault on key towns. The SADF, in response, developed a complex plan—Operation Hilti, later renamed Prone Later—detailing conventional offensives and special operations to regain control. Despite these plans, deep strategic weaknesses were exposed: the SADF failed to anticipate the Cuban use of long-range, high-tech missile systems and underestimated the threat posed by Cuban and SWAPO forces.
This marked a turning point in the conflict, demonstrating the growing asymmetry in military capability and signaling that, while the SADF remained active, the war was increasingly on the defensive. The situation foreshadowed a broader shift toward peace negotiations, as both sides recognized the unsustainable nature of the prolonged conflict.
FAQs
The Cuban 50th Division was moving toward the South-West African border, particularly around Tejipa, to counter South African military presence and protect Cuban and Angolan positions.
South African forces deployed a small platoon of 500 soldiers to conduct guerrilla operations in Tejipa, aiming to harass Cuban troops and disrupt their supply lines without direct confrontation.
A South African company ambushed a Cuban outpost, but was forced to retreat after being attacked by tanks and armored vehicles. The unit managed to escape, though several men were missing and equipment was lost.
Cuban surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses were active and detected the bombing missions. The South African aircraft were nearly hit, and the attacks were aborted due to the threat level.
South Africa launched Operation Hilti (renamed Prone Later), which included a phased invasion plan to regain control of South-West Angola and later support UNITA forces against Cuban advances.
A low-level bridge west of the dam wall could only support a light vehicle and would collapse under the weight of heavy tanks, forcing the South Africans to build a night-time earth ramp to cross the dam.
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