Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars, with me, your host, T.S. Latham. This is episode 106. More than two decades of conflict in Novemberland and southern Angola had worn down South African military domination. Tactical superiority was no longer certain. The initial approach, which had been innovative and inspirational, fast, seat-of-the-pants, smart, had slumped into attritional, raging bull, blow-for-blow brutality. It was March 1988, time for one last push by the SEDF against their FAPLA enemy, with their Cuban and Russian allies alongside. As you heard last episode, Commandant Gerard Lowe and most experienced officers of the Border War thought the overall plan to attack the Tumpo Triangle for the third time was a bad idea. Jan Breitenbach called it Cuban President Fidel Castro had made it very clear he wanted the east bank of the Cuicto River held at all costs. As long as the Cubans, Angolans and Russians held the bridgehead, it meant the SEDF could not attack the town directly. Not that this was South Africa's aim, at least not their official aim. The plan, they said, was to seize the east bank, cross over to the west side, blow up the bridge, which would then put an end to FAPLA's assaults on the UNITA town of Mavinga. However, the Angolans thought that Cuito Cuenavale was the main target, and so did many South African troops fighting against FAPLA. There was the town, strategic, right in front of them. Do you think that had the Angolan army broken and run, that the SEDF would have just stopped across the Cuito River? Pretoria's aim was to stymie FAPLA's assault on Mavinga, which was being held by UNITA, and didn't want to take Cuito Cuenavale. But South African veterans, who were born and raised in the U.S.A., and veterans who were part of this assault, admit that had FAPLA crumbled, they would have pushed onwards into the town. Pretoria, as you've heard, was playing a game of degrees, infuriating the professional soldiers with their political flip-flopping. The political players had become lukewarm about the hot war in southern Angola. The next battles took place as part of Operation Packer, and cynics could say it should be called Operation Scent Packing. It was not going to be General Kutt-Lebenbach's brightest moment, as you can imagine. It was not going to be General Kutt-Lebenbach's brightest moment, as you can imagine. It was not going to be General Kutt-Lebenbach's brightest moment, as you can imagine. It was not going to be General Kutt-Lebenbach's brightest moment, as you can imagine. It was not going to be General Kutt-Lebenbach's brightest moment, as you can imagine. Throughout the 23 years of this war up to now, the tactical commanders on the ground and the officers and NCOs were given orders and then left alone to get on with their battles and their skirmishes. It's inherently empowering when your top commanders delegate power downwards. It means your system is stable, the soldiers are resolute and resilient. Now, every minute of the battle was lapped up by the general staff well behind the lines, who interfered and changed their minds as they appeared to have completely lost touch with what was going on. Worse still, they were prepared to ignore the established rules of military strategy. These rules are so intrinsic to conflict and human nature, even capitalist basic training camps, known as MBA programs, use them, those tenets stated by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, amongst others. So with that small diversion as a way of introduction, we rejoin Commandant Gerard Lowe and his O-Manner. It's 4pm on Tuesday 22nd of March 1988, and the attackers are heading towards FAPLA's well-defended positions on the east bank of the Kuito River. Three 2 Battalion and Khrut Kru Regiment troops were joined by UNITA's 4th Regular Battalion on the western slopes of the Chambinga high ground, and then swept the area, trying to blunt any FAPLA reconnaissance from moving east of their Mahara-Lapanda flatlands. UNITA spent a lot of time lifting mines, but it wasn't enough. More than 15,000 landmines awaited the SADF, and this was going to lead to a lot of trouble for the Ulefant tanks. Laid in layers, the Cubans had doubled up the fields of death by putting down anti-tank mines along with 130mm shells, and when these detonated, the effect was going to be biblical. Regiment Khrut Kru had been shooting up the landscape southeast of the Tumpo River as a ruse, but FAPLA and Cuban commanders knew that the SADF assault was going to come from the north. Lowe's force reached the eastern slope of the high ground just before dusk on the 23rd of March. Then he waited for night vision scopes, which arrived earlier that day to be installed, so important for their movement in the darkness. The tank squadron also received 7.62 machine guns, which were supplied at the last minute, which indicates how poorly logistics were functioning by now. The signalers' chest boxes, as they were known, were also provided at the 11th hour. None of this ideal. Lowe lined up his tanks and the trucks carrying UNITA into a column consisting of two line-ahead formations, which moved parallel to each other, and these shuffled off into the dark. His logistics supply point was then set up, and as the mobile force descended Heartbreak Hill on the western side of the Chambinga high ground, he ordered a medical center to be established for the upcoming surgical operations. The rest of the mobile force descended on the northeast edge of the Anahara-Lapanda, just east of the source of the Dala River. In the pitch dark, the wreckies lost the trail. They had plotted the route and led the advance, but the terrain was dotted with sand dunes covered with trees, one dune identical to the next, and there were also men and women of the area. There were also many tracks which had churned up the paths. "The wreckies got confused in the dark and took the wrong route," Lowe said afterwards. About a kilometer further on, the wreckies realized their mistake, but it was too late. It's not possible to turn an armored column of this sort around in the dark, in the bush, in the sand. So the attack halted while the wreckies headed off south, eventually locating their lost track, and then led the column through increasingly dense bush to rejoin their path. 3-2 battalion had already arrived at their waiting area, about six kilometers from the Ford-Fupler trench, where 2-5 brigade awaited them. Lowe's men were advancing carefully in the dark, and by four in the morning, 3-2 had begun to lay phosphorus sticks in the sand that glowed green. This mobile column was supposed to be moving directly into the attack zone starting at 6am, but Lowe delayed things for 15 minutes. It was overcast, the sun obscured, and the visibility he believed was too bad. He was also worried about the wreckies, so he moved on to the attack zone. 3-2 battalion had already arrived at their waiting area, about 6 kilometers from the Ford-Fupler trench, where 2-5 brigade awaited them. Lowe's men were advancing carefully in the dark, and by 4 in the morning, 3-2 had begun to lay phosphorus sticks in the sand that glowed green. He was also worried about getting lost again. Conversely, the poor visibility had kept the MiGs away. Then the tank crews needed to replace their nightscopes with dayscopes. After another half an hour or so, the UNITA troops sprang onto the back of the Ulifans, sitting on the engine covers, and the tanks began to lumber over the Lopanda Hanara. Fupler's artillery began to shell the area, though they could hear the tanks, but the bombardment was off-target. This wouldn't be the case for very long. A radio alert was broadcast that MiGs were in the vicinity, and the men in command of each tank and rattle took immediate action without orders, scattering like cockroaches in a floodlit kitchen, as Lowe described it later. Others said it was a panic action, and not a good look. The men were skittish. They had not trained long enough. Even though they were motivated, they had heard the stories of Tumpa 1 and 2. Lowe was even more angry about his spooked soldiers, because the planes that had caused the panic were actually their own mirages trying to find Fupler's 25th brigade. It took Lowe some time to draw the vehicles back into the two parallel lines, and then they set off once more, still protected by the thick cloud. But they were using exactly the same route that Mike Muller had used in Tumpa 2, and this was easier than bundu bashing, as they'd done earlier, but it also meant they were breaking a cardinal military rule. Never attack a reinforced position twice along the same route if you've failed before. Looking out to the southwest, after a few days of battle, the Tumpa 2 and Tumpa 2 were in the same route as the Tumpa 3. Looking out to the southwest after a few days of battle, the Tumpa 2 and Tumpa 2 were in the same route as the Tumpa 2. Looking out to the southwest after a few days of battle, the Tumpa 2 and Tumpa 2 were in the same west, after crossing the Anjara-Lapanda, the South Africans could see the town of Kuito-Kwanawali through the trees over the Kuito River. Their hopes were dimmed, however, because at that moment one of the two flailing mine rollers had capsized. Now there was only one left. This meant that the right-hand column had to enter the minefield without a machine to trigger the ordinances hidden under the earth. And it wasn't long before a massive explosion rent the air. A mine had blown off the track of one of the tanks, flinging a bogey wheel meters into the air and just missing the command rattle. Listening to all these sounds from the other side of the river was Cuban General Ochoa Sanchez's top field commander, General Contra Arias. He'd set up what he called a warning minefield to alert his artillery. When the mines were triggered, he realized that his sophisticated defense system based on channeling was working. The minefield was part of an intricate plan to force the tanks to move into an area where the massed artillery, would pepper them with anti-tank missiles and high explosives. The minefields themselves had various explosive devices, sewn in belts up to 300 meters wide and stretching for 50 meters at a time. And now it was 9 a.m. Lowe ordered one of his ploffetter strings to be fired over the minefield, but it failed to detonate. The engineers gingerly prodded their way forward and detonated the string, but reported back that it hadn't stretched across the entire minefield. The commandant ordered a second string fired, but it failed to detonate. The engineers gingerly prodded their way forward and detonated the string, but reported back that it hadn't stretched across the entire minefield. But that also failed to detonate. The engineers were now trying to speed things up and crawled across the minefield in a rattle, but this tripped an anti-personnel mine which blew out a tire. Then the engineers lowered themselves to the ground and using standard mine detecting equipment, shuffled along and managed to reach the end of the ploffetter, then detonated the string manually. By now, Fapler's artillery was well aware of where the SADF was because the ploffetter created a huge dust cloud, and the BM-21s in particular began to land around the mechanized brigade. Lowe had moved behind a slight slope so the missiles flew over their heads, landing in the Dala River Valley, leaving pockmarks of black. shell craters. Centrafrias, the Cuban commander, had decided that his trenches should be deepened before this assault, and also constructed sturdy bunkers behind the minefields. Behind them was an array of artillery, mortars, guns, mobile rocket launchers, all stretching across the higher ground. And if you listened last episode, you know the South Africans were now entering what Lowe later called a diorama. The Cubans and Angolans could see their SADF quite clearly now. The South Africans could not see FAPLA at all. A Cuban crewed tank battalion, the third, was waiting for Lowe's men, along with FAPLA's 66th Brigade and 16th Brigade. Another 12 spare tanks had been ferried across the Cuito River, and these were arraigned along firing positions. FAPLA's men were now in a far stronger position than they'd been during TMPO-1 and TMPO-2, which did not bode well for the SADF. Lowe decided to move forward in a single line along the route blasted by the plough adder strings, being led by the SADF. The SADF was led by the Ulefant with the mine roller attachment. Moe Rafir Ratel Squadron was left behind in reserve and to cover any action from the flanks. This was a moment of truth, and the truth was the SADF were trundling down a slope in full view of FAPLA's artillery in good light. Alpha Squadron ahead, followed by Bravo and Cuito Cuenavale was now spread out, the town clearly visible. The Angolans had Saga anti-tank missiles, which they'd deployed at this moment. These flew overhead, flashing their danger. The artillery was now, refining its range. The blasts got heavier and heavier, and closer and closer. Alpha Squadron was just inside the tree line, and Lowe ordered them into combat formation, the bombardment making this extremely difficult. Bravo Squadron's movement was slowed by the accuracy of FAPLA's artillery. The Angolans had also cut down all the trees from here on. The stumps were another hindrance apart from the minefield. It was now open sand and grass all the way to the east bank of the Cuito River. As Alpha advanced with Bravo, FAPLA's artillery began to hit the exposed Unita troops sitting on the back of the minefield. They were pulverized. Hundreds were to die in this battle, and the dying started now. Three Olifants then triggered mines almost simultaneously. One of these hit a mine boosted with 130mm shells. This blew off its entire suspension. The tank was now pinned down, its bogey wheels spinning through the air in the bush behind the squadron. I told everyone to stop and fire girdle action, Lowe told Fred Bridgeland. Each tank and rattle commander picked a spot. FAPLA had the upper hand, and Lowe realized that his important tanks were badly exposed. The only thing that saved more from being knocked out was the fact that the minefield had been laid into the treeline. If they had been out in the fully open grass, things would have been far worse. One of the ARVs managed to tow out a tank, but a second was unable to shift the heavy Olifant. The noise was incredible. Hundreds of rounds striking the area, shells flying in, rocket boosters and motors flying. Shrapnel spinning through the trees. Smoke and dust filled the air, and Lowe found it difficult to see what was going on. He ordered Alpha Squadron to withdraw and to hold the line slightly behind while he concentrated on trying to save Bravo Squadron, which was being peppered. He joined one of the ARVs, pulling the tank that had lost its suspension and was lying in a hole caused by the 130mm shell. Anti-personnel mines now were also detonating, and Lowe realized he'd probably been saved from these by some kind of miracle. At one point, Lowe ordered his tank to help connect the two chains on the tank. Try as they might, the Olifant in its hole would not move. Lowe, in what obviously was a moment of great courage, ran over to the tank and hammered on the hatch, telling the men inside to climb out and run off towards the ARV as the tiffies began to cut the ARV and Lowe's Olifant tank loose from the stricken tank. Brigade HQ asked what was going on. They were extremely nervous, but Lowe believed at this point his men could still succeed, and he radioed that the battle would continue. His tiffies, though, found they could not unhitch themselves from the wounded Olifant. The iron bar and shackle had buckled, twisting these two vehicles in a kind of death embrace. They hauled out a metal saw, the last resort, pinging shrapnel flying around them as they cut themselves loose. The third damaged tank was now being dragged along the treeline, which meant that the ARV, another Olifant, and Lowe's tank were now exposed along their flanks to the missiles being fired at them from across the open ground. The worst possible angle. It meant the entire sides of the tanks were exposed, a much larger surface area than the front or back. The damaged Olifant was the one that was the mine roller, and the tiffies could not disconnect this flailing device. More accurately, the tiffies refused to disconnect it. Such was the fierce nature of the fire at these vehicles. Lowe admitted defeat. He radioed HQ, saying they had to break off TMPO-3. They had used kinetic ropes to drag the mine roller tank and couldn't cut it. It was then that the tank cut loose with their military knives. In desperation they opened fire on their own ropes with machine guns and their R4s. Finally the ARV was loose and leapt forward. But now they had abandoned the mine roller along with the other beleaguered Olifant. Two of South Africa's strategic weapons were marooned. Both sets of crews, however, managed to get away. Then Lowe's tank was hit by a shell. It banged, and for a moment he was unsure what had happened. Luckily he didn't fire back. Because… Later he discovered the shell had hit his gun barrel, denting it. Had he fired, it would have blasted his own barrel to smithereens. It was time for the SADF to destroy two of their own tanks before withdrawing. From the time the tanks had arrived during modular to this moment, all commanders had been repeatedly briefed that if a tank was marooned, it must be destroyed. This would mean FAPLA could not inspect the all-important battle tank. Brigade Commander Colonel Fouchier said he had asked General Kelly. "Look at Liebenbach, sitting together at the Colonel Ford HQ twenty kilometers behind the battle. What should they do?" "No," said Liebenbach. "Don't blow them up. They would return to recover the tanks later." Now this was the height of arrogance. The SADF had been unable to make it through the minefield in a major battle. What kind of miracle would see the South Africans wander back through the death zone and just tow out their tank? During their withdrawal, another Olifant lost its tracks during a sharp turning maneuver. And they had to leave this relatively undamaged vehicle behind. FAPLA's MiGs then made their appearance. It was late afternoon by now, and the mechanized unit had madded back to UNITA's defensive position called Kabarata on the south bank of the Dala River. The planes bombed the tanks and the rattles but missed. But FAPLA's artillery was finding its range again. Because the MiGs were so busy, the South Africans could not fire their G5s. They were sheltering under the trees. Dozens of UNITA casualties had been piling up. Some South Africans claimed afterwards that this battle was not too bloody. The reality is up to 400 UNITA troops were listed as casualties. It was so bad, a mass grave had been dug for the number of bodies. Lowe retreated to the area where he'd trained his men those weeks before, near the brigade tactical HQ. It had been a heavy defeat, but the repercussions were just beginning. Only two of the Ulufans had been recovered. Four recce commando specialists along with 3-2 battalion headed back to the tanks but they were too late. The Cubans assisted FAPLA and had moved into the minefield where the tanks were marooned and then dug themselves in around the vehicles. This was one of the major propaganda coups for the MPLA of the entire war. And at this moment, when communication is so important, it's where the National Party government failed miserably. Their narrative is that they failed miserably. That is what happened in the end of the war. Their narrative, that they were merely supplying some support for UNITA, backfired spectacularly. They had lied for so long, P.W. Buerta and his cabinet no longer appeared to be able to face the truth. It's not surprising, really. Back in South Africa, the National Party was now fighting a very serious uprising in most of the townships, where youth had finally decided to make entire wards no-go zoned. Pretoria had slipped into a dark place, where death squads were lurking around. No one was above suspicion. The Civil Cooperation Bureau, a shadowy force of men breaking rules of warfare, trying to beat the ANC and PSC by basically joining them. The international community had stiffened its anti-apartheid resolve, and Pretoria's back was against the wall. The leadership were drawing on old narratives of toughing it out. Buerta aimed at who'd rather die than allow elections of blacks to take place. The political effect, what was happening, was proving classmates correct, as usual. War is the continuation of an expression of policy, of politics. The strategy had gone out of kilter, with a lack of clarity about why exactly were the South Africans dying in southern Angola, for what. In previous years, that had been keenly observed and clearly communicated, but now, when the most stress was placed on the political system, cracks were forming. Each ruling elite needs to balance power within itself, with branches of government between agencies and, importantly, dealing rapidly with threats to stability. The Pretoria government itself had become unstable, and its bureaucratic balancing instincts were now muddle-headed. The second major shift was in the action of its allies. The United States and the United Kingdom in particular, both were pressurizing Pretoria to stop the war in Angola. While Washington had been sending specialists to southern Angola, some lived amongst UNITA members. This is still not fully discussed to this day. The reality was the Americans comrades-in-arms. The long-term goals had not diverged. The balance of power equation had shifted for the Angolans as well. More about this next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage. Or you can direct message me on Twitter at DeerSlave. Until next, tot ziens. Take care.
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