Episode 104 – The SAAF raids Lubango and a tired 61 Mech launches the Battle of Tumpo II

[Music] Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Dez Latham. This is episode 104. Last we heard about the failed first battle of Tempo Triangle, officially known as Tempo I, which took place on February 25th, 1988. You know that things aren't going well, but battles are numbered, and there would be three attempts at overrunning Fappler in this defensive position, east of the Quito River, outside Quito Cuenivali. Still, some good news that filled it in a few days after the audacious attack on Swappers facilities in Llebongo. This was a town that lies nearly 300 kilometers north of the Cutland in the Angolan Highlands, a jump off point for Fappler and Swappers, as they send soldiers into the fighting in the southeast, along the southwest African border. A bomb had exploded in Asha Karti's first national bank in Evamberland on the 19th of February, killing 20 people wounding six. The South Africans wanted revenge, and decided to target Swappers training base at Llebongo. Planning for the raid began immediately after the blast and continued all the way through until the next morning led by Colonel John Church of the SAF was. The crews went to bed for a few hours of sleep before their plan take off time at 0600 on the 20th of February. But a noisy wedding wasn't full flow nearby at Crude Fontaine Town, and there was little sleep. At dawn, the groggy crews climbed aboard the eight mirages led by Yohan Rankin, who decided to teach the rebels a lesson. He led his eight aircraft at low level and it full afterburners over the town, blasting them with sonic boons and a highly expensive fit of peak before heading on to Undungwe Ebay. They were surprised to find a full breakfast laid on their base OC Colonel Kus Butter, and proper briefing facilities had been set up, the crews had not seen that level of organisation before when arriving at the Bush Military Area. The mirages were refilled, the men were briefed, at 0800 they took off from Undungwe heading northwest towards Llebongo. Major Norman Miner led this attack, his mirage at the most accurate navigation system. Errors were less than a mile at waypoints. As they flew low level from the southeast, the compact warning receiver or CRWS began picking up signals from a Soviet barlock search radar they'd been spotted. Miner descended lower and lower only a few feet off the deck by the stage, but his navigation system was spot on, so he folded his map, confident he'd find the target. It also appeared that the Soviet radar had lost them. Then a problem cropped up. Anyone who is driven or flown by a map knows there's a challenge at the folding points. One of my flight instructors showed me an excellent technique, how to fold maps for specific flights, something I've used to this day. Unfortunately for Miner, it apparently not taken this into account. As Brigadier General Dick Lord explains in his book from fledgling to eagle, is a famous dictum from World War II that states battles always take place on the joins of maps. As the mirages swept in for the bombing runs, Miner opened his map and failed to spot the anomaly. The two targets were on other side of the joint in the map, and this caused the ten minute of a degree error in the coordinates. That doesn't sound like much, but each minute of a degree equates to one mile on the ground. Miner led Trumpinell and Johann Rankin straight over the all-important LeBongo airfield, then they initiated their Farhui attack you heard about, the lobbing of the bombs. The bombs landed in the bush ten miles away from the target. Luckily the coordinates for the second target, which was swappers to Bias and Jekko training center, were spot on. Three of the mirages dropped their bombs on the first run, but Major Willy von Kopenhagen had to turn and head back for a second attempt, after he realised his sight conditions were not in the correct position for an accurate release. That's a very dangerous thing to do. The sams were now beginning to lock on, but he managed to avoid being hit by both ground fire and the missiles, and all eight mirages made it back to Undungwa and Krutvente, safely. The Swapo training facility had been damaged, but not put out of action. Still, the South Africans felt they'd caused some chaos so far behind enemy lines. A totally unexpected raid had shown that the SAF was still had some punch left. It also showed up Pappla's radar, apparently part of the enemy system had been down for maintenance, which provided the SAF was with a window of opportunity, although no one on board the mirages knew that at the time. Back on the Eastern Front, outside Guido-Quanavali, Colonel Pat McLaughlin had decided to launch the next assault on the Tumpo Triangle at night. Unlike the first attempt to take Tumpo, this time 61 makes Mike Müller wanted to use the northern route through the Chumbinga high ground, then down the tricky heartbreak hill into the Anhara Lebanda, and then to charge directly at Pappla positions. The night of February 29 was chosen. It was the leap here. With the battle said to continue and to choose their first march, if necessary. While the final plans were being checked and double checked, on the other side of the river, the Cubans had sent combat engineers to remind the route in the north, and these men ran into a reconnaissance patrol, either it was the South Africans or Unita. The SADF didn't report this anywhere, so we think it's probably Unita. They patrolled apparently turned and fled into the darkness and Pappla engineers laid another 150 mines. They were now 15,000 mines in total across this part of Eastern Guido-Quanavali. But now the Angolans were almost certain the next attack was going to come from the North East, but Toria was not aware that the Angolans knew with almost 100% certainty the direction of the next South African attack. Müller was going to lead two squadrons of Alufan Tanks, a squadron of Rathlinites, a company of mechanised infantry and rifles, two three two battalion infantry companies, as well as engineers, a multiple-tuned medical unit, and two battalions of Unita. However, this was what was described on paper. The reality was somewhat different. The two Alufan squadrons were actually merged into a single squadron because only 16 of the 22 tanks were now running, where Ante on the equipment had rendered the others unusable. Only 19 Rathlinites were now serviceable, while the number of G5 guns had slumped to 12 out of the 16 and three of the Valkyrie mobile rocket launchers were now left. McCloughlin had asked Müller on the eve of the attack whether they should even bother. Their force much weaker than they'd liked. Müller was adamant they continued. Forsyre was held in reserve. The South Africans also planned a deception raid by four Rathlinites backed up by a platoon of 30 mechanised infantry who were going to make a noise south-east of the Tumbo triangle. This was an attempt to confuse the Angirlins. They were not going to be drawn into that diversion. By departure time, crucial kit had also not arrived. The force was awaiting the tank-mine rotors, special flails that were attached to the Alufans which triggered the months. This delayed the start until 9 p.m., when the attacking force rolled onto the Chumbinga high ground, approaching heartbreak hill. It was misty and rainy. If the South Africans were caught in the open the next day, the Migs would not be able to spot this column. That was the good news. The bad news was the rain caused the glitch with the night scopes that had failed in the rain and the drivers couldn't see where they were going. They halted. Pustratingly Müller decided to wait for daylight. This was going to have an adverse effect on the assault. McLaughlin wasn't convinced they should stop. They eventually agreed that the assault would go ahead at first light. Way too for them on the east bank of the Quito River was a much-reduced enemy force. Fapler had been withdrawing westward constantly since the first assault on Tumbo on the 25th. The reiki is counted over 700 Angirlins troops withdrawing over the Quito bridge. Just a single brigade, the 25th was left on the eastern bank. That meant around 800 troops, along with five tanks and three BM-21 rocket launchers were there. But on the west, the Angirlins had tartaned their forces. The 8th, 13th, 21st and 59th brigades were squeezed together a potent amount of firepower. They had also been bolstered by a Cuban infantry regiment. Monitoring all of this was Russian Major Alexander Petrovich Sergei, who was embedded as a translator with the 25th brigade. A few Cuban advisors were based on the east bank and they made up the bulk of the tank crews as well. So a dawn on the 1st of March, the South African tanks began to move again, and by 10 that morning they had crossed the Amara Le Pande and had traveled a kilometer along the southern bank of the Dala River. Then they hit thick bush and were inside the Tumbo triangle. Everything was quiet, too quiet. The SEDA planners had thought that by switching the assault from the south east to the north east, this would have caught Fuplar flat footed. The only problem was Fuplar commanders expected the next assault to be a switch. When the SEDA was to review the plans later, they discovered that no Fuplar units were actually facing south. They had aimed everything directly at the east and north east, so confident that their artillery would stop any attack across the Angara Le Pande and the newly laid minefields were a real threat. As the Ulyfans trundled down from the Chimbinga Hargrang, Mulla had already denied a request by his tank owners. He wanted to open fire on an area where their new Fuplar's mobile rocket launches, the Stalin organs were parked. That was on the west bank of Equito and Mulla didn't want to give his position away. The noise of the engines had alerted Fuplar, but in the thick mist it was difficult to tell how far away or where exactly the South Africans were. Had the SEDA fired on the Stalin organs, the bursts of fire coming from the tank barrels would have been visible through the mist. The Stalin organs fired a few ripples of rockets themselves, but these were far away from the South Africans and Mulla ignored them as the column moved forward 100 meters at a time, inching towards Fuplar's positions. By late morning there were four kilometers north east of the Quito bridge and close to the edge of the Quito River flatline, a thick area of Bush Significes. that arrived at that point. As Moulin's force inched forward, his cloud cover began to burn off. Just before midday, the first wave of MiG-21s and MiG-23s were spotted by the wreckies, heading towards 61mex column. Shortly thereafter, one of the MiG-21s was hit by ground fire and crashed, killing the Cuban pilot, and at first the SIDF on the ground reported that the Angolans had hit their own aircraft with the ZD-23 guns, but the jet fighter had actually been hit by an American stinger missile fired by Yodita. Listening on the main comms monitoring the attack from his bondage point was 61mex clav halt. We'd been assigned a subltral. This type of news was always caused for celebration, as the MiGs enjoyed full air supremacy and gave us a hard time, he said. Moulin's ulyfons crept forward, headed up by a tank using one of the mine rollers, flailing away detonating mine after mine. This was the trigger for FF artillery, which opened up with 120mm and ZD-23 fire. They couldn't deploy the M-46 heavy guns because the column was so close they were inside their minimum range. Moulin ordered the rifles and tanks into fireballed action against these gun emplacements, and then lay down half an hour of heavy fire on the Angolans. The South African G-5s began to find their range, picking off the Angolans artillery with spotted and wrecky assistance, until Moulin had managed to reach a point about three kilometers east of the Quitteau bridge. It was now that the full force of up is defensive position came into play, at least 20 different points across the rest side of the Quitteau river bank, in front and on the flanks of 61mex heavy vehicles. It was from here that the Cubans and Angolans fired 82mm mortars, B-10 recoillers guns, and AGS-17 fragmentation grenade launches as well as saga anti-tank missiles at the South Africans. I can't begin to describe to you how incredibly heavy the encounter was, said Moulin off. Officers claimed the volume of shells fired was the biggest engagement fought by the SDF since World War II, and the South African tanks and rifles fired hundreds of rounds back. Gradually, far plus positions were being worn down, picked off one by one, smoke and dust, ashes and vegetation floated across the battlefield, obscuring both sides from the other. Then two Ulyfans ran into mines, and the SDF discovered that hundreds of antipersonal mines were laid between these tank mines. Anyone jumping off a damaged vehicle could be killed. Unita troops riding along with the South Africans took the brunt of the casualties, swept off the back of tanks and rifles at times by the mortars and other shells flying in from Fopla's artillery. At around 2.30 in the afternoon, the Angolans managed to outflank the South Africans, and Moulin pulled back. A short while later, a rifle was hit by a 23mm gun, but by some miracle, no one on board was killed or wounded. Soviet advisers kept a close iron proceedings, and Major Sir Gae of noted that the South Africans were stuck at the tree line, and were now being pippered by 12 Soviet tanks, T-55s, which had also lined up on the western bank of the Quito River. Unita was suffering very badly. They were the main infantry, and were trying to get close enough to the tanks and other armoured vehicles to inflict some damage, but these men were exposed. Those 23mm were just wiping the Unita's blocks off the tanks. Moulin told Fred Bridgilland later, "If I close my eyes now, I can still see it clearly." The 23mm shells were blasting into the infantry. Men were disintegrating. Moulin's Ulefun tanks were breaking down. Their oil and fuel filters were clogging in the dust, and the engines began to overheat. They had now fought for 800 hours through several battles without being fully serviced. Their idea could not get the heavy jacks and lifting equipment to the front in time, despite engineers' desperate appeals. Any machine would eventually break, and the Ulefun stopped where they were. Six more tanks were now broken down in the minefield. The Tiffany's got no rest, fighting from the ARVs, repairing the tanks, pulling them out. Moulin began to ponder, warring information he'd received in an intelligence briefing the previous night. As his tanks broke down one by one, he remembered the intel that there were ten tanks based on the eastern bank of the Quitte du River, and he was concerned there were now on their way towards his marooned men. There were only three, but he did not know that. He radioed McLaughlin to get approval to withdraw McLaughlin radio General Cutt Levinbach and Ville Mayer, who granted the request. As they retreated, a rifle detonated another anti-tank mine as a kind of confirmation of the danger of further action. They all managed to make it out. The end McLaughlin radioed Moulin back and ordered 61 Mick into battle that same night. By now, however, Unita had been clubbed, and the South Africans were stunned by the amount of firepower brought to be against them by Foupler. Some of the lower ranked officers said after this battle that Moulin should have kept going, that Foupler was about to fold. A more focused look at the facts contradicts this. If you analyze Foupler's defensive positions, it's quite clear that had the South Africans pushed forward hundreds of guns and cannon-facing the handful of rifles, and what was left of the Ulufant Squadron would have mauled their idea. And don't forget, of course, the Migs flown by Cubans, who were also likely to continue to play their part. It was a miracle! While Unita had been hammered as they sat on the back of the South African tanks and rifles, not one South African was killed or wounded. The men of 61 Mick were deeply affected by what had happened, while their senior officers were dubious of any further result. The enemy minefield was much deeper and more extensive than expected. These mines, and I covered an area between the Guido and Tumpo Rupus, five kilometers wide, hundreds of meters deep. Foupler had also set up a highly mobile system, where their anti-tankans were being moved back and forth, making them very difficult to hit. Behind these were the tanks, which outnumbered the SAD of heavy weapons, by Moulin 2-1. The Russians and Cubans had been very busy in the days before the Tumpo battles, and installed their feared 23-millimeter guns on the high ground, from here they sowed carnage in the Killing Zone. The entire defensive position created by the Angolan's was designed to swing in all directions except the West. It made no difference if the SAD of Rolden from the North, East or South. They were going to be hit by well-organized units from anywhere, and as you know, the SAD general staff had refused to countenance any attack from the West. They were not enough early fun tanks to be useful anymore, a critical weakness. And lastly, 61 Mechs Rattles were seriously exposed when they faced a single 23-mill cannon, which had the capacity to shoot rounds all the way through Rathalarm. And yet right now the irony of war kicked in. Most of the South African troops involved in this Tumpo 2 battle believed they defeated the Angolan's. It was talk amongst the men of how soon they'd cross Guido bridge and head into Guido Konavali itself. In the bubble-axe that night some troops said they would overcome the town and then continue heading north towards Menon. A bullet-proof attitude had returned to these men fighting in their fourth month inside Angola. It was like the second win that Athletes get Rode Holton as Memoirs. The main reason they felt like this was the fact that there were no SAD of casualties. The men somehow ignored the terrible pasting that Anita had taken. Their Cavalier attitude would unravel quite quickly from here on. These men, many who are now suffering the effects of shell-shock and PTSD received the news they'd been hoping for. Most of 61 Mechs infantry were going to go back home in a well-deserved rest. Colonel Paul Fusher had been sent back to South Africa months earlier had managed to raise a new brigade to take over from 21 SA brigade, which was now in its last legs to spot the feeling that they were experiencing this second win. Because the SA deer have been training its men and counter insurgency ups, Fusher had found it extremely difficult to raise this new brigade. So we turned to a citizen force formation, which was officially designated as 82 SA mechanized brigade and part of eight SA armoured division. These were reservists. They were not full-time soldiers. They had served their two years national service and were now caught up for camps. Operation Hooper, which had been limping along for months, formally ended, and Operation Packer was about to begin. Also about to begin, we were a series of meetings to bring about the end of the SEDF's involvement in Angoda and Namibian independence. The diplomacy was going to shape the near future. A tentative Cuban knock on the dog took place in November 1987 in New York, where the South African mission to the United Nations was approached directly about a possible solution. A major breakthrough came in late January 1988 when Luanda and Havana told the United States that a meeting that they accepted the necessity for all 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola to be withdrawn. U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker and Angola and Foreign Minister Alfonso Fandono Mbinder met with Cuban Politburo Member Korg Riscay on February 1 in Washington. The fact that Riscay and Crocker had gathered anyway together was usually significant. The Cuban was Fidel Castro's most senior trusted lieutenant in charge of foreign affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. It fought with Castro and Che Guevara and the Serra Mastra Mountains in the 1950s before they'd overthrown the Buddhist dictatorship. Riscay was also pragmatic, unlike many in the Cuban Communist Party. The South Africans there were to meet him shortly realized it was not the enemy that they'd been mentally trained to hate. In fact, Riscay became known as Worm Kasparse to Pretoria's negotiators, a kind of term of endowment. Worm Kasparse was a popular Afrikaans cartoon character while Fandono was also more middle of the road in Angola's MPLA cabinet. He'd gone on records saying that talking to the Nietzsche was going to be necessary at some point. Then this went further. During negotiations Fandono, the Angolan put one of his family members who just happened to be Angola's Justice Minister by the name of Fernandez Fandono to talks. And Fernandez Fandono was an expert in Afrikaans politics. They were still a sharp war, and before any settlement was negotiated, the SEDF would send more men to the deaths at Tumbo Triangle, in a third attempt at trying something that it failed twice before. Something truly significant was also now taking place. Castro had sent his feared 50th division, the men who usually protected his capital Havana to southern Angola. By now, there were 3,500 troops from the specialist military organization based in Krenenny Province close to the South West African border. SEDF military intelligence had detected their movements, which is exactly what Castro wanted. Victoria, he said, needed to know just how exposed South West Africa was, and the noose was not tightening on the apartheid government. More about this next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage. You can direct message me on Twitter @DizLatin. Until next, goodbye.