Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me your host Des Latham. This is episode 103. It was D-Day for the next attack across the open ground east of the Tumpo Triangle just outside Kuita Kwanabali in southern Angola. The town was now regarded as a moral prerequisite rather than a strategic necessity. Luanda's position here was no surrender while in Pretoria the political leadership knew that they could not actually take the town. This would have prompted an escalation which the national party could not afford at this moment in their history. The South African economy was weak and the public support for this long war in Angola had ebbed significantly. As you've heard the Cubans and Angolans with the Russian advisors were dug in and ready in the east of Kuita Kwanabali. Dozens of tanks, thousands of men covered by SU-22 and MIG fighter jets and ground support aircraft. M-46 heavy artillery ranged and ready. The terrifying ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns horizontal ready to pound the rattles. Mike Muller's 61 Mech was going to launch itself into this flatland on the 25th of February 1988. A direct assault on a heavily fortified position with fewer men. Not what the military handbook says as we all know. If you don't have the element of surprise then you need at least a 3 to 1 odds in your favour. However poorly trained you believe the other side may be. The Angolans by now were not as poorly trained as the SADF liked to think. FAPLA had been fighting the South Africans since 1975 and had learnt a great deal over the past 13 years. MIG activity had been rising. One of their bombs had struck an SADF logger killing four soldiers. By the 24th of February word came through on the command net. It was announced that all platoon commanders were to report for orders and be briefed on the next attack plan. What I saw on the whiteboard sent a shiver up my spine, wrote Clive Holt, one of 61 Mech's veterans we've heard from previously. The sketch plan of the Tumpo area looked like the car park outside a rugby stadium on the day of a test match. There were five enemy brigades waiting for the SADF and in front of these a huge series of minefields, behind them a powerful artillery. "One did not have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that this assault would be at the cost of still more lives," writes Holt. Military analysts such as Willem Steenkamp and Helmut Rohmer-Heitmann point out in their regimental history of 61 Mech that when you view the defences and the terrain it remains unclear why the South Africans decided to attack Tumpo at all. This was going to be a collision between an unstoppable force and an immovable object. The South African NCOs and the officers who gathered in front of this whiteboard were told that this was their final battle before going home on pass. Those who emerged in one piece of course. Mike Muller was a thin, wiry man with a dark moustache and had to take his force of around 2,000 men across the Chambinga high ground once more and faced two options. The first – climb the gentle eastern slope, then down the steep and sandy Heartbreak Hill from where the South Africans had launched their attack on France. The second – climb the gentle on 59 Brigade on Valentine's Day. The second was further south, where the slope westwards was longer, not as severe as Heartbreak Hill, towards the old Portuguese road from Cuito Canavale to Mavinga. This stretched across the expanse of an open Anjara-Lapanda. His main attack force was his own 61 Mech, with 20 Ulefone tanks, a mechanized infantry company and rattles, a troop of four anti-tank rattles ZT-3s, as well as a team of 120mm mortars, supported by a parachute regiment assault pioneer platoon, and a group of anti-aircraft specialists, armed with SAM-7 missiles and 20mm guns. There were sections of engineers, and Junita's 800-man 5th Regular Battalion would join in. They were going to pay a heavy price. His flanking defense was a rattle squadron, a troop of three tanks and a mechanized company, along with a 120mm mortar group, three more companies of 300 infantrymen of 3-2 battalion, and Junita's 3rd and 4th Regular Battalions, total number 1400. Forsyth had its own issues right now. Commander Cassie Schumann had been struck down by hepatitis. The infantry battalion was going to be held in reserve. Muller decided he would attack directly over the open ground on the old Portuguese road, which was more a rutted track these days than a road. It was overgrown, sandy, and had been abandoned at times, because it was impassable during the rainy season. Waiting in his direct line of assault was Fapla's 25th Brigade. The plan was straightforward, at least on the whiteboard. 3-2 battalion, led by Major Dines van Staden, would launch the opening attack on the Angolan trenches from the south, working along a northerly direction, then turn south once more to strike Fapla from there. While this was going on, 61 Mech would move in just to their north, less than 5km away. They were going to be the main attack. Junita's 5th Regular Battalion would create a diversion even further north. While Junita's 4th Regular would hit Fapla at the Tumpo River, west of 3-2 battalion, or to their left. What the South Africans didn't know is that Cuban President Fidel Castro, who was micromanaging the war from his office in Havana, had ordered 59th Brigade to pull back over the Quito River, shortening Fapla's defence line. This was going to confuse some of the SADF into believing that the Brigade had bolted when they saw the Rattles and Ulfhans attacking. Muller's entire combat group, assembled on the 24th of February, east of the Kunzumbia River source, which was 45km from Fapla's first defence line, and at 20:30, the mechanised column began moving west. The Rattles were fitted with little red convoy lights, but most of these had stopped functioning. Some of the drivers were directed by their commanders, who stood on the top of the turret, holding onto the gun barrel and leaning forward to try and see where to go, passing on the information to the driver: left a bit, right a bit, slow down, speed up, stop, there's a tree. This column crept forward. Fortunately, there was just enough moonlight for the vehicles to stay in touch, and by 0100 they'd reached their launch position. The troops were tense. They weren't far from enemy lines. 3-2 Battalion continued moving towards their target, infiltrating towards Fapla based at the source of the Tumpa River, and they were moving from the south-east, hoping to get there before dawn. They soon realised that 59th Brigade had left. They'd fled, thought SADF commanders, unaware of the orders from Castro. Behind these initial defences were Fapla's 25 Brigade, which was preparing to fight. The shooting began closer to 0600, when the SADF artillery opened up on Fapla, the G5s and 120mm mortars blasting the area just east of the Kuita River. The Angolans, though, were waiting for this, and had spotted the South Africans, replying with a furious barrage of their own, and it was light enough now for the MiGs, which appeared overhead. The SADF began to move fairly quickly, closing in on the enemy trenches. All was going according to plan until just before 8am, when the mechanised force was only at 1.5km from the enemy's outlying posts. Commandant Muller's command vehicle was the most incongruous of all the tanks and rattles that day. He was on board the Ulufant that had lost most of its barrel on the Valentine's Day attack. The barrel had blown up, leaving a blackened bit sticking out of the turret. If the enemy had ever seen it, we may well have won before lunch. They would have died laughing at the exploded stump, he told Fred Bridgeland later. At this stage, 61 MiG was keeping to a path marked through a minefield by the recce's inside the treeline at the eastern edge of the open Amhara-Lapanda, the plain that had been well calibrated by Fapla, awaiting this very advance by the South Africans. Muller moved slightly southwards, waiting for the right moment to attack, and soon gave the order to turn, opening up into tactical formation, then bursting into the open ground. Suddenly a huge explosion rent the air. The lead tank had detonated a mine only 100m into this flatland, a new Soviet M57 anti-tank mine, much more potent than the M58s and M49s, blowing off Muller's tank track and destroying the suspension and shock absorbers. The tank was now well and truly out of action. Muller switched to a rattle as his new command vehicle for the rest of this battle. The force had now halted to deal with the mines, which meant of course they were in a perfect position to be bombarded by Fapla's artillery. Muller ordered a turn to the left, then another tank detonated a second mine, then a turn to the right, a third mine was hit. The South Africans were in a pickle. The only way to deal with this was to backtrack, or more accurately, reverse. "After about an hour we were ordered to backtrack a couple of hundred meters so that the engineers could clear a path through the minefield," wrote Clive Holt. This meant sticking to their existing tracks, not easy to do with the driver turning blind and relying on instructions from the turret. It was raining shells as Fapla and the Cuban artillery opened up with everything they had. "It was bloody hellish," said Muller afterwards. "They put down M46, D30, BM-21 and ZU-23 fire on us." The triggered mines had alerted the Angolans to exactly where the main attacking force was. The MiGs, meanwhile, arrived overhead in force, which meant that the South African artillery had gone quiet. They had wheeled their guns back into cover. Unita was armed with American shoulder-fired missiles but not one was used. Muller found out later that for some reason none of these troops were close enough to the front line to be of any use. Three tanks were now out of action and the bad news is that as Muller retreated it became apparent that the minefield was much deeper than they realized. Moments later the combat group took its first casualty. The anti-aircraft section based about one and a half kilometers north had begun to fire at the MiGs but the enemy artillery observers were in the trees and spotted the SAM-7. The next M46 bombardment was accurate and Corporal Hendricks was hit by shrapnel and killed. One of the Withings recovery trucks was also exposed and hit by one 30 millimeter M46 shell and destroyed. Adding to the confusion of battle was the order to close their windscreen flaps reducing the reflection making it harder for the MiG pilots to pick out the rattles. These are armored steel flaps on a spring-loaded release system that is triggered from inside a rattle covering the windscreen. So that no sunlight can be reflected. It also means the driver can't see anything through the flaps and they could be lifted only from the outside. Artillery shells began landing close to these rattles. The spotters had found them and the commanders began swiveling their turrets around and using the gun sights as viewing ports. They saw the recovery vehicle on fire. They saw the crew jump out. None had died or been wounded in the strike which was a miracle. Then a second shell landed closer to the stationary rattles. Gunners had their range. The next would probably land on top of one of the South African attack vehicles. It was a critical moment. Muller radioed for one of the Casper launched mine breaching plough adders as they were called. Those cords of explosives fired over a suspected minefield which would hopefully detonate the mines. But the string failed to explode. Exasperatingly. So Muller ordered one of the rattle 20s to open fire on the string. It still didn't explode. So now the South Africans had to call an army. In a section of nine men from the assault pioneers to creep up on the plough adder and detonate it manually. This of course was almost a suicide mission. The Angolans were firing constantly on the rattles while the MiGs circled their cannon peppering the column. Into this carnage crawled the nine men using sticks and mine detectors to test their way. Leopard crawling and marking each mine with a flag. Every meter forward took five minutes. The tension was so great it was almost visible. It took another hour but by twelve hundred hours thirty the tanks were on the move again through this flatland at speed. Pioneer Leader Lieutenant Loki Lo and all his men were awarded the Southern Cross medals for their courage. It took another hour but by twelve hundred hours thirty the tanks were on the move again through this flatland at speed. Pioneer Leader Lieutenant Loki Lo and all his men were awarded the Southern Cross medals for their courage. It took another hour but by twelve hundred hours thirty the tanks were on the move again through this flatland at speed. Pioneer Leader Lieutenant Loki Lo and all his men were awarded the Southern Cross medals for their courage. It took another hour but by twelve hundred hours thirty the tanks were on the move again through this flatland at speed. Pioneer Leader Lieutenant Loki Lo and all his men were awarded the Southern Cross medals for their courage. Muller's assault was now five hours behind schedule and they roared across the Anahara-La Banda towards the outer positions held by a battalion of Fapla's 25th Brigade. Vinita's 3rd Regular Battalion moved up the trench line but discovered that Fapla had also left the area to the north of the 61 MEC's position. Castro's orders had been obeyed and this was going to cost the SA-DF as the Angolans had managed to concentrate their defenses even more closely. They didn't care about the SA Air Force because it could not launch support grounder tanks to help Muller. They didn't care about the SA Air Force because it could not launch support grounder tanks to help Muller. They didn't care about the SA Air Force because it could not launch support grounder tanks to help Muller. They didn't care about the SA Air Force because it could not launch support grounder tanks to help Muller. They didn't care about the SA Air Force because it could not launch support grounder tanks to help Muller. They were having too much trouble keeping the MiGs at bay themselves, heavily outnumbered and facing more technically advanced planes. The MiGs were also being flown by better pilots now, these were the Cubans. It was on this day, 25 February 1988, that two SA Air Force sorties bumped into MiG-23s. In the first engagement, Major Willy van Koppenhagen and Captains David Kleynhans and Reg van Eerden were alerted that they were being tracked by Russian planes. In the first engagement, Major Willy van Koppenhagen and Captains David Kleynhans and Reg van Eerden were alerted that they were being tracked by Russian planes. In the first engagement, Major Willy van Koppenhagen and Captains David Kleynhans and Reg van Eerden were alerted that they were being tracked by Russian planes. In the first engagement, Major Willy van Koppenhagen and Captains David Kleynhans and Reg van Eerden were alerted that they were being tracked by Russian planes. In the first engagement, Major Willy van Koppenhagen and Captains David Kleynhans and Reg van Eerden were alerted that they were being tracked by Russian planes. As they turned, the MiGs broke off and flew away. During a second sortie, Commandant Rankin, Major Frans Cotzi and Captain Trompinel were warned that Cuban piloted MiG-23s were on their tail. The warning was old school. An ex-Mirage pilot, Major R.C. Duplessis, was monitoring enemy radio calls from the Electronic Warfare Control Centre. Sitting next to him were two Chilean pilots who were interpreting the Cuban pilots' commentary in Spanish. The MiGs were at medium altitude and had seen the Mirage pilots. The Cuban pilots began to describe the Mirage colour scheme, yellow-green camouflage, which apparently was not blending in well enough. The Cuban pilots began to describe the Mirage colour scheme, yellow-green camouflage, which apparently was not blending in well enough. The Cuban pilots began to describe the Mirage colour scheme, yellow-green camouflage, which apparently was not blending in well enough. The Cubans dropped down behind the Mirages. Rankin immediately ordered the flight to jettison their spare fuel tanks. Rankin immediately ordered the flight to jettison their spare fuel tanks. Rankin immediately ordered the flight to jettison their spare fuel tanks. And then the SAF's Mirages turned directly towards the MiGs for a dogfight showdown. And then the SAF's Mirages turned directly towards the MiGs for a dogfight showdown. The SAF's Mirages turned directly towards the MiGs for a dogfight showdown. managed to get behind the MiGs but before they could fire the Cubans hit the afterburners and the much faster MiG-23s shot off. Rankin fired his cannon and missiles and watched Nell's missiles being outdistanced by the fleeing MiGs. The fact that their camouflage had been almost useless worried Rankin and the other pilots so that night they hauled out dark brown paint and joined the ground crew in repainting their own Mirages. The squadron's technical officer happened to walk into the hangar while Operation Repaint Mirage was going on and almost had a heart attack. Air Force Logistics Head General Fricky Brown reported this wondering if Rankin should be court-martialed. Air Force Chief General Dennis Earp backed Rankin and all the other Mirages were duly repainted in darker brown and green. Back on the ground 61 Mech was facing one of the most intense bombardments any South African had seen. Muller moved his column further west where tributary ran into the Tumpo River. An advanced company of 3-2 battalion then made the fatal mistake of leading him into the next attack by marking their position with yellow smoke. The smoke was joined by FAPLA's fire and many UNITA troops found themselves in danger as they rode along the top of the tanks and the rattles. Dozens were killed and wounded as the M-46 shells exploded around the column. By now the rattle commanders had reopened their screen flaps taking a chance that the MiGs would miss trying to rely on speed and maneuverability to avoid being hit from the air. As they saw UNITA soldiers fell off these rattles wounded his colleagues would drop down check on his condition and if dead take his ammunition and firearm and then jump back on the South African heavy vehicles to continue fighting. The carnage was difficult for most survivors to describe later. As 61 Mech and 3-2 battalion launched into the forward positions one of the rattles received a direct hit from an M-46 shell which ripped off its door and shattered the commander's legs. Two other crew were wounded. One of the ops medics pulled the commander out of the burning rattle laid him on a ground sheet and then used scissors to perform an amputation of the commander right there. Every ambulance and medical vehicle was now involved in ferrying the 32 battalion UNITA and South African wounded to the rear. Another M-46 shell hit a damaged oliphant killing the driver who failed to close his hatch in time. FAPLA meanwhile was pulling back relying on the deadly artillery barrage to slow the South Africans down and it was working. Munna's force was as deep as a kilometer into 25 5th brigade's position in the southern end of the 2nd defense line. Now he had to make a quick decision. The SADF artillery was unable to provide any support. The G-5s and rocket launchers undercover. The MiGs roving around making it impossible for them to move out and fire. Worse for the SADF rattle gunners the sun was now setting and they were facing the light in their eyes blinding them and the SADF vehicles were perfect targets in that situation. Munna asked for permission for them from Battle Commando Colonel Pat McLaughlin to withdraw. He agreed and 61Mec turned and retreated. This column drove into the Chambinga high ground at dusk. They hoped that it would protect the units. The darkness was shattered by a direct hit from an Angolan M-46 shell. One of their ammunition trucks was carrying mortar shells. It went up like a Roman candle but the driver Sergeant Kukumu was quick thinking and moved the vehicle away from the column immediately. He saved quite a few lives doing that. Kukumu though couldn't get away from the truck. The truck so dived into a nearby FAPLA foxhole that protected him from the vehicle which burned and exploded for hours afterwards. He remained unhurt. FAPLA had fired thousands of shells that day knocking out seven South African vehicles. One SADF observer said he counted over 1,300 accurate shell bursts around 61Mec's tanks and rattles. The army definition of an accurate artillery shot is one that falls within 20 meters of a vehicle or a soldier. In the dark another medic was dispatched to try and see what happened to the tank driver or those comrades said he'd been decapitated. This was the new tactic by the SADF. They had to try and pick up their wounded or recover any vehicles after dark. During the day the megs were just too dangerous. There was another reason though to tidy up after dark. The top brass did not want the national servicemen to see the effect of an accurate FAPLA artillery barrage. A number of troops began to collapse. Their nerves were done. Shell shock it's called and after the number of shells that fell on these South Africans you can see why. While 61Mec troops licked their wounds behind them 3-2 battalion was also counting the cost. The men who usually went into battle with cloth hats had been ordered to don helmets likely for a lieutenant and a troopee. Both were hit in the head by shrapnel during this attack and survived with a few scratches. Had they been wearing their usual sun hats both would have died. As 3-2 withdrew along with 61Mec they came across South African artillery. The captain in charge was breaking down. He had been in Angola fighting and facing daily bombardments as well as meg bombing runs without a break for three months and the concentrated shelling of the 24th of February was too much for him. As we all know everyone has their breaking point. Battle fatigue proved to be a major challenge after the first battle of the Tumpo triangle. Van Staarden was moving back to the east side of the Chembinga high ground with 3-2, a third 13km trek on foot, even his hardy men began to drop that night from heat exhaustion, and they still had to recross the Chambinga swamps. They'd gone into this attack with light gear, carrying only one water bottle, so they broke open their sail iron drip bags that each troop carried, and against regulations drank the liquid. A military intelligence officer walking with 3-2 collapsed, he was delirious. All night the South African G-5 shells whistled overhead, but Staden had allowed the exhausted company to take a break until first light when they stumbled out of the high ground. 61 Mech was cleaning their articles, some full of dried blood, after carrying their dead and wounded. The men were dazed and confused. Dawn broke on the 26th of February, and a heavy atmosphere hung over everything. No one spoke. They had failed to take the triangle, and worse, casualties had been high. Statistically Pretoria could say it was a success. More than 170 FAPLA killed along with 10 Cubans, 7 of their T-55 tanks destroyed, and the SADF had lost 4 dead and 10 wounded, but Junita had been hammered. No figures were released, but by the end of the 3 Tumpo battles, it's known that the rebel movement had lost more than 1,000 men. It's speculated that at least 300 Junita died in this first battle. It is also true that the SADF had lost more than 1,000 men. The SADF had found the Cubans a completely different kettle of fish. The Cubans had laid the main minefields that had created carnage for 61 Mech. Some had been missed by the Requis. One minefield just inside the treeline in the direct route that 61 Mech had taken was cunningly laid and followed the lie of the land. It was a logical place to lay a defensive position, something that the Angolans missed at times, but not the Cubans. The Cubans also commanded the artillery batteries and were the main pilots flying the MiGs. They were having an effect. Either way, the battles of Tumpo Triangle were not over. The 61 Mech troops were also expecting to go home. They had been promised, after all. In the words of Claude Halt, "It is as if the wind had been taken out of our sails and we were just drifting aimlessly without any direction, except forward into another attack, which I don't think any of us were enthusiastic about at the time." There was unfinished business in Tumpo, and the Kuito bridge still stood. Curious? Colonel Pat McLaughlin decided the next attack would take place at night. That would mean the MiGs would be unable to offer support, and perhaps FAPLA would be taken by surprise. Mike Muller's 61 Mech battalion was going to head back to the Triangle. McLaughlin believed the SADF had superior night-fighting training and tactics and that FAPLA would be finally driven from the east bank of the Kuito River. What he and the intelligence didn't know was that the Russians and Cubans had been specifically training the Angolans in night-fighting for months. He said, "It's a good thing that we didn't know what they were going to do. They are far better prepared than the South Africans realized." It's another indication of what happens when two armies fight over a prolonged period. When one alters its modus operandi and the other does not, there is an advantage when it comes to tactics. Still it wasn't all doom and gloom for the South Africans. News had filtered in that a major bombing raid had taken place in Lubangu, where waves of Mirage F-1AZs had managed to hit the all-important Angolan airbase in the town, 300 kilometers across the border. The target was Swapo. Planting a bomb at the First National Bank in Oshikati that killed 20 people. It also wounded six, ironically including the daughter of the pro-Swapo Lutheran bishop of Vambaland, Cleophas Dumeni. More about that raid next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes, it helps raise the visibility. If you want to contact me, head off to abwarpodcast.com, there's a contact form on the homepage, or direct message me on Twitter @deslathan. Thanks for watching. I'll see you next time. Bye.
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