Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 101. It's the second week of January 1988, and Poplar's 21st, 59th and 25th Brigades have taken up the front line in what was to be a three-layered defence ahead of the Tumpo Triangle, that's where two roads join just north of the Tumpo River, and that's east of Kuita Kwanabali. Behind these three brigades, 16th and 66th hunkered down in expectation of an SATF follow-up attack, which had started on the 14th of January. The third Angolan line of defence was just west of the Kuita River, manned by the 13th Brigade, joined by a Cuban battalion. By now, Poplar was communicating by fixed telephone line, going back to an earlier technology system. Which made it more difficult for the South Africans to intercept their messages. From the beginning of January 1988 to the end of March, the SATF was going to make six frontal attacks on these well-entrenched Poplar positions, and now the generals in Pretoria were almost literally breathing down the necks of the tactical commanders. 61 Mech, Forsyth and Unita had been repulsed after taking ground. The South African troops disgusted as they watched the land they'd fought for being seized by Angolan units around. As a result of the attack, they decided to move to the north of the Kuita River. On the way to the Kuita river, they found the Chimbinga High ground. The haphazard nature of the SATF's attack, part of Operation Hooper, was caused by the territory and also by a confused series of orders. After the attack on 21 Brigade, some of the Reiki observation teams were moved to positions between the Kuita and Kwanawale rivers, well behind enemy lines, to the north of Kuita-Kwanawale itself. From here, the observers could see the airfield and the Kuita bridge. The main danger for these specialists were the crocodiles. The Kwanawale River was the main danger. The Kwanawale River teamed with them. But after some scouring of the banks, one team led by Justin Vermaak spotted two Makoros, or canoes made from a hollowed tree trunk, and crossed over after dark. They were prepping for the next major assault, which the SATF HQ had indicated was supposed to take place by the end of January, but ended up starting almost a month after their first assault on 21 Brigade. One of the strategic weaknesses plaguing the SATF now was the slow response and planning. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. After the assault, some of the Reiki team were brought back to the main base at Rindu. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. They had no idea what they were doing, and so they had to be prepared for the next attack. further west, teams of reccees under Johnny de Gouveia and Bux van de Beek were watching Menang Airport, spotting the MiGs and choppers taking off heading towards Kuito Kwanavali. While the Pretoria heavyweights considered Hooper, things were moving swiftly on the ground. A few days after the 14th of January, Vermaak's team arrived at the OP from the bivouac and found a UNITA scout standing at their tree. He pointed eastwards and said, 21 Brigade, 21 Brigade. Vermaak and another reccee, Gary Yeff, climbed the tree and scanned the flight plane nearby, saw nothing. But the UNITA scouts said they should look more closely. Suddenly they saw dozens of FAPLA troops gathered in the shade of the trees across the open plain. The reccees called in and artillery struck, but then an argument broke out between Vermaak and the artillery commander until Sector 2-0's Colonel Paul Fauchier butted in and ordered the artillery to fire. Vermaak gave the order, Gulf 9, request a full bombardment, right 4,000 metres, up 1,000 metres. The artillery commander wanted more specific information, but the reccees didn't have time to waste. It looked like the entire 21 Brigade was now congregated along the edge of the plain. This is TV, I have the whole of 21 Brigade visual, Vermaak radioed back. They are on foot and set up to cross, there is no time, I repeat, right 4,000 metres, up 1,000 metres. Fire on my command. Vermaak was waiting for FAPLA's brigade to move and eventually it did. This is TV, they are crossing, fire! A few seconds later, the South Africans huddled in the OP saw the trails from the mobile rocket launcher missiles approaching the spot. Chaos erupted on the grassy plain. FAPLA troops tried to find protection in the long grass, others tried to run back but the missiles plunged into their midst. The G5 shells began landing a few seconds later and the full bombardment was on the ground. The G5 shells began landing a few seconds later and the full bombardment was on the ground. The G5 shells began landing a few seconds later and the full bombardment was on the ground. The G5 shells began landing a few seconds later and the full bombardment was on the ground. bombardment was deadly, although, for Mark said later, they were not as accurate as he would have liked. A few shells fell close to the Reckies. Eight minutes after the fire command, he ordered the ceasefire. While the number of dead and wounded was unknown, the brigade had suffered a psychological blow. They couldn't move around behind their own lines without being picked off by the SED of artillery. On the other hand, morale was dented on the South African side when a 61-mech serviceman was killed in an accident. His rattle turned and dashed for cover during an air raid alert. He was crushed between an overhanging tree and the open hatch. As the rest of 2-1 brigade dug back into their old positions along a two-kilometer north-south line, the Angolan sappers laid new minefields, while 59 brigade was busy with the same preparations further south. Every day that the SED have delayed was another few hundred mines in their path. By early February, 50 more and 55 tanks had rolled into their positions on the east bank of the Quito River, and by now the really dangerous threat to the SEDF had begun to arrive. Fifty division under the command of General Arnaldo Oquea Sanchez, head of Cuba's mission in Angola. The general was going to find that Fidel Castro was an extremely unforgiving taskmaster when things went wrong. Havana had had enough, as I mentioned last episode. Castro had sent his elite force from their main task of getting his capital in Cuba all the way to southern Angola to fight against the South Africans, the 50 division. Castro also asked Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos if his commanders could take over responsibility for defending Quito-Guanavale in a kind of classic colonial master act. Castro didn't trust the Angolans, but as you're going to hear, that wasn't going to make much difference, and poor General Sanchez was going to be a scapegoat. Not to get ahead of things, let's hear what happened next. Sanchez had the same problem that the SEDF frontline commanders had, political masters far away trying to dictate tactics. Oquea Sanchez was following Fidel Castro's orders all the way from Havana, where the Cuban dictator had set up his war room of maps and phones, the works, and ops room for his own operation. Oquea Sanchez was a little confused. He was told he should not defend Quito-Guanavale at all costs, that if the situation deteriorated, then he would cover a retreat that Castro may call. But Castro had told dos Santos there would be no retreat. Sanchez knew he was being set up telling Fidel's brother and defense minister Raul Castro that I have been sent to a lost war so that I will be blamed for the defeat. On the other hand, Pretoria was dithering. They decided eventually, on January 25th, that the rearming and the new plans were ready, and the next target was not 21 Brigade, it was 59th. 61 Meck Lieutenant Clive Holtz explained how they all knew that 59th Brigade was the key to FAPLA defenses. It was imperative to attack their position and destroy them, he wrote in his book, At Thy Call. FAPLA's three tank battalion was waiting in support, so this was not going to be easy. Because 59th Brigade was FAPLA's strongest, their aim was to hit them until they collapsed. Then 21 and 25 Brigades would fall back towards the town, hopefully without too much fight left. Just to complicate matters, and as with all wars, disease was beginning to play its part. Hepatitis had struck the South Africans, and the commandants of both Forsyth and 61 Meck were suddenly laid low. Jan Milan and Kurs Liebenbach were replaced by Commandants Cassie Schumann and Mike Muller, who had returned early from his leave to take over from Liebenbach. 61 Meck was going to be the flank defense for Forsyth as they steamed into the attack on 59th Brigade. The South Africans at this point were hunkered down at their base area on the eastern side of the Chambinga High Ground, about 30 kilometers from 59 Brigade's base. There they practiced their drills, readying themselves for the big push, with all men fully aware that this next assault could be even more difficult than the last. The war had descended into trench warfare in many ways, a kind of mixture of Second World War battles between the Japanese and the British in places like Myanmar or Burma, and the desert warfare of North Africa. Tanks crunching through subtropical bush, aiming at trenches. The first task for Forsyth was to crush 21 59th Brigade outer pickets that lay about 5 kilometers apart, then to take up their new position in dense bush on the northeastern edge of what is known as the Anhara Lepanda. That was an open area, flat, featureless, sparsely vegetated, fanning out eastwards from Kuito Bridge to the Chambinga High Ground. When they made it there, it would be about 13 kilometers to Kuito Bridge, and they'd be able to keep Fapla's troops visible from this higher ground. Fapla commanders were not entirely sure where the next major assault would come, and from whom. They had, of course, their own observers and reconnaissance units out scouting, and were helped by MiGs that flew over the SADF positions constantly. Still, when the next attack took place, it could come from three main points, the north, through the high ground itself, or the south. Mark Muller was pondering his own challenges. He had to somehow get his large and powerful force through to 59 Brigade without the Angolans cottoning on to his tank squadron, two companies of mechanized troops, two armored car squadrons, a mortar platoon, and an engineering troop on the move. Moving these without notice was going to be touch and go. Also touch and go was the hard nut known as Heartbreak Hill, which began at the crest of the Chimbinga high ground, then fell 60 meters in an almost sheer cliff to the South African's flank just inside the bush line at Amhara Lipanda. The cliff wasn't so much a cliff as a sheer sandy slope. The Reckies had warned that descending this was going to be tricky, and if they had to climb it, they would have to climb it. The Reckies had warned that climbing back up was almost impossible without whinging. Towing vehicles up and down was even more difficult if there was an engine failure. The third main problem for Muller was the Angolan logistics and support. They had managed to haul a heavy mobile bridge to Kuitu Kwanawali, which spanned the gap left by the SAF's bombing raids. Fapla was shifting hundreds of tons of material into the town and then moving the ammunition and food to the brigades along the Kuitu Kwanawali. However, a large flat-bottomed metal ferry was useful in getting much of the supplies into place, and very quickly too. So we knew we were in for a big fight, admitted Muller. The original date for this attack was the 5th of February 1988, but artillery regiment commander Jean Larchback announced that two of his G5 guns were out of action, back in South Africa being repaired. There were only 16 G5s, and he already had two others unserviceable. Spare parts were in short supply. Another delay, another chance for Fapla to resupply and rearm, digging more trenches, laying more minefields, preparing their kill zones. Colonel Fouchier then handed over control of 2-0 SA Brigade to Colonel Pat McLaughlin. Fouchier was needed elsewhere. He was about to form a new operational brigade, which was supposed to replace 2-0 after Operation Hooper. At the same time, the SAF was not unhappy about the delay. They had been trying to move their French Cactus system to the front for added protection against the MiGs. These were 20-year-old technology, and the transport systems for them suffered in the African bush, but the SAF was also deploying the seized Soviet systems, including SAM-7 shoulder-fired ground-to-air weapons and Soviet SAM-9 missiles mounted on captured BRDM-2 armored cars. The South Africans were also learning to use the ZU-23 guns, feared as they were by the Rathel squadrons, for their capacity to drill right through the armor. Time to turn these around. And use them on the enemy. McLaughlin was based 7km north of the Kwateo River. Both Fouchier and 61MEC moved into their positions by the early hours of February 14th. Then the men were told to get some rest. There would be none, starting at dawn. Back in McLaughlin's heavily camouflaged bunker were officers from Intelligence Operations, an SA Medical Corps doctor, a Padre, and an Air Force liaison officer. Also there was highly experienced Commander Dion Ferreira. As the men of 4SI and 61MEC, along with their UNITA allies, rested, another important sideshow was on the go. On the 13th February, Robbie Hotsliff's 3-2 battalion launched an artillery attack on Menong, an audacious plan to prevent FAPLA planes from taking off to bomb the SA-DF at Kwito. I'll cover what happened there next episode. Let's just say that Hotsliff was sort of successful, although it didn't totally halt MEG attacks, as I'll explain. Another misty first light. Two SA-DF battalions were ready in place, joined by UNITA's professional and highly respected 3rd Regular Battalion. There was mist and fog on the ground. The MEGs would be blind. Good news for the South Africans. The Russian planes would only become a problem around mid-day, and at 8:45 Colonel McLaughlin gave the command to go. The SA-DF artillery opened up in 59th Brigade, based just off the Chumbinga high ground, about halfway between Gwatiut and the Chumbinga high ground. Two UNITA semi-regular battalions who were in support of the 3rd attacked 21 Brigade's outpost from the north. That was a diversion, and a highly successful one. FAPLA command believed for several more hours that the main attack against them was going to take place along the same line as the previous SA-DF attacks a month before. 59 Brigade was initially ordered to move up in support of 2-1, but they hadn't done so before the SA-DF's real intentions became clear. 61 MEG crunched through the bush on the high ground, leading Forsyth. They had cleared the bush north of 59 Brigade, between the two Angolan battalions, then headed directly west towards 61 Kopi, that pimple of high ground that lay just outside the thicket. When they split, Forsyth with UNITA would turn south, striking 59 Brigade on their northern flank. 61 MEG had been moving since 8:45, cutting the path through the thick bush, Forsyth following, three columns parallel, so they didn't get strung out. The mist began clearing at 11:00 PM, and the 1100 soon the MiGs would be back. 61 MEG was taking precautions, stopping. The MiGs began dropping their parachute bombs. Mist. Rattles picked up speed once more. A cat and mouse game. It was after midday when the column reached the western edge of the Chumbinga high ground, and Reckies, who had plotted the routes, guided 61 MEG towards their first main target, as Forsyth turned left, heading south with UNITA. Waiting there was 59's three northernmost units, each comprising 400 men. 61 MEG slithered down the sandy 60-metre cliff, Heartbreak Hill, breaking cover between 59th Brigade to the south and FAPLA's 21 Brigade further north, near the Quartier. By 1400 hours, Forsyth were further south, slightly behind 61 MEG, heading towards FAPLA's battalions. Kassi Schumann's tank battalion, backed up by Rattles 90s and 20s, as well as the Rattles 81s, the Mortars, made contact with FAPLA's brigade at 1500 hours. Ullifant gunner Spickels-Tablant, in charge, fired a 105mm shell into a 23mm anti-aircraft gun emplacement, silencing the fearful weapon. It was one of these that was going to cause havoc in the South African lines in a short while. UNITA's diversionary attack on 21 Brigade to the north was also going well, timed perfectly, so that the Angolans were suddenly aware that two main attacks were going on simultaneously. This increased confusion and was going to lead to 61 MEG facing tanks in a short while. Forsyth was leaping forward in 100m bursts, stopping, firing in concentrated arcs, reorganizing, moving forward. Another T-55 was shot out in the bush, then one of the Ullifants had what was known as a "cook-off". Its own 105mm shell blew up in its barrel, leaving the long metal shaft a blackened stump. Fortunately, no one hurt. The tank limped to the rear, its action over. Now Forsyth arrived at FAPLA's main bunkers and trenches. Some of 59 Brigade began to flee, others died. Within minutes it was clear that the Brigade HQ had also fled on their way to Tumpo Triangle, about 10km to the west. The Angolans were trying to stem the tide and ordered their 3rd Tank Battalion to head south-east and link up with the 25 Brigade based on the edge of the Chambinga High Ground, far to the south overlooking the Chambinga and Hubei rivers. The Tank Battalion had begun to move south, then turned north aiming at 4 size infantry and rattles. They wanted to hit the South Africans from the trees. In fact, they were planning to attack the South Africans from Tumpo Triangle on the edge of the Anahara-Lapanda. The Reckies spotted this movement and warned Muller about what was happening. So he turned south to face this threat, leaving behind a flank force of one armoured car squadron and a company of mechanised infantry. He had travelled about 2km just inside the bush when they arrived at Ashawna, a dip of open ground which intruded east to west into the tree line and around a kilometre wide. This was dangerous open ground. The light was fading, and Muller had the invidious situation of rushing over the Ashawna, exposing his men to a combined force of both FOPLA's 3rd Battalion and 25 Brigade. What was going to make this battle even more threatening is that many Cubans were now far more active on board the tanks, both as drivers and commanders. They were far better trained than the Angolans and this was going to cost the South Africans. As 4 size rattles poked around doing some observations, they didn't realise that 3rd Tank Battalion was aiming at their western flank. Still, Muller took the usual fire belt drill action, all weapons pointed at a most threatening looking section of bush ahead through the open Shawna and lo and behold, two enemy observers fell out of the trees. They were Cubans. Muller had seconds to react. He suddenly understood that 59 Brigade was retreating towards Tumpo, so he gunned his rattle and gave orders for his column to move into battle formation into the Shawna, tanks in front, rattle mounted infantry and rattle 90s on the flank, rattle 81mm mortar machineguns. His command rattle just behind the tanks in what is known as the basic arrowhead attack formation. Holt was in one of the rattles and describes the moment, it was quite late by now, the evening shadows were lengthening. We were crossing the Shawna and feeling very vulnerable, so we tried to get into the bush line on the far side as quickly as possible to avoid being taken out, but that was playing somewhat into the Cubans hands. One of the commanders on Tumpo's side had a clever ambush in mind, as you'll hear. Oliphant tanks began taking out the enemy tanks. At least one was burning and exploding as the rattles plunged into the bush on the other Shona, lighting up the evening sky. They were now barely 50 meters inside the opposite line of bush when the first tanks appeared, and that's when 61 Mech Tank Commander Captain Christo de Blanche noticed the ambushed T-55. It was parked held down in deep bush at right angles to the South African line of advance, clearly aiming to hit their SADF mechanized vehicles from the side. It had lurked there quietly and safely because I had ordered my 881mm mortar crews to lob their bombs 1,000 meters into the southern bush line, where my intelligence team estimated 59 Brigade to be fleeing west, said Muller later in an interview with author Fred Bridgeland. The Cuban Tank Commander had realized that the SADF was going to deploy the arrowhead formation, so he allowed the tanks past, then he'd aim at the rattle immediately behind in the center of this formation. That would be where the South African mechanized commander was. The command group plunged into the bush, missing the tank completely, when it suddenly burst into gear and rushed towards the mechanized column at high speed, its commander standing with his head through the open hatch in the turret. This caught the rattles off guard. They could not reverse in time. De Blanche jumped off his tank and rushed towards the enemy tank with a hand grenade, hoping to drop it through an open hatch. That didn't work. He had to dive for cover because his own men had opened up with their 20mm guns, pinging off the tank armor. De Blanche ran back, asking for an R4 rifle, as he turned with his weapon, he saw that a gunner in a nearby tank had taken out the Cuban who also popped out to shoot De Blanche. Chaos in the African bush. The light was fading. As the commander slumped dead, the tank fired around, taking out a rattle rear axle, one of the tricks Fopper had learned over the years in dealing with this highly mobile South African vehicle. Two other Ulefone tanks then arrived and destroyed the T-55. The carnage was not over, and the South Africans were about to suffer a terrible incident. More about that, next episode. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage. Or direct message me on Twitter, at Dez Latham. Until next, I'll spade. Music by Ben Thede.
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