Speaker 1Welcome back to South African Border Wars with me, your host, Des Latham. This is episode 100. D-Day for the renewed attack on Fablas 21st Brigade was reset from January 5th to January the 13th, 1988, a Friday, and for those who suffered from Triskaidekaphobia, a fair Friday the 13th, it merely served to increase their worries. Five-Side was now being led by Commandant Jan Malan, who had replaced Leon Marais. 61 Mech was under temporary command of Kurs Livenbach, who had relieved Mike Muller, who had headed home for a six-week break and to move his house from Pretoria to Zumeb. Unita's 3rd Regular Battalion was under command of the former Portuguese Anangolan Army's General de Mostinge Chilingutila, who was the rebel movement's chief of staff. 4-Side and Unita were going in from the east of the Quartier River source, using the Chambinga high ground, while 61 Mech would squeeze through between 21st Brigade and 59th Brigades, then take up position on a nearby heavily forested little hill. As you'll hear, this became known as 61 Kopi, and it's one of those hills that appears to be merely a pimple on the landscape, but then one that turns into a major strategic position. The Kopi protruded just west of the Chambinga high ground, east of the Kwanawali River. The Kopi was also 3km south of 21 Brigade's perimeter and north of the Dala River. It was hemmed in on three sides by rivers, and to the east lay the Chambinga thickets on the high ground. There are many small rivers that rise around the high ground east or south of Guito, and the Dala was one of those. This landscape was going to feature as a kind of third force in the upcoming battles, as had happened previously in the SADF's attempts. At dislodging Faplau, from east of the Kwanawali and Chambinga rivers. The South Africans had been pummeled daily by now by the MiGs. Sometimes they swept in over in groups of four, sometimes two, sometimes alone. The MiGs missed regularly, but the troops took no chances, moving around constantly to confuse any spotters who were working with Faplau. On the other side, Faplau was also moving around trying to confuse the Reki spotters, so this complex dance continued day after day. The G5s fired constantly at night. The blasts shaking the SADF troops awake. Then they'd lie listening to the whisper of the departing 155mm shell, waiting for the distant crump as it ploughed into the ground alongside 21 and 59 Brigade soldiers in their trenches. By now, some of the National Servicemen who'd arrived in November were wondering why nothing had happened, and morale was low. They'd missed their New Year's Eve parties at home, then some began reading Faplau's propaganda pamphlets with a new sense of danger. One of those was, Clive Holt, who describes how he first came across these pamphlets in early 1988, and was quite shocked by the images of the SADF soldiers who'd died somehow included on these leaflets. But the shock passed quickly, and appeared to drive a burning anger amongst the troops. A similar thing was actually happening on the other side, as the South African Air Force dropped their pamphlets on Faplau. These days, the Russians and Ukrainians use Instagram or Facebook. Same effect, different technology. Then, of course, there were the ground shouts going on as well, where the SADF psychological warfare teams were cutting trees, or at least playing recordings of chainsaws, to give Faplau the impression of bridge building going on. Then they'd also play loud music just before firing the G5s. The truth was, this was not a war to savour right now for most of the troupies. They'd adopted a naffy attitude. No ambition and eff all interest, or inspiration, depending on your preference. This was a cool attitude rather than one that burned with rebelliousness. It was a calmness, a reticence of emotion that exuded a mental preparedness. By the time Operation Hooper kicked off, these men were beyond ready to fight. They'd come under fire and been bombed almost daily for weeks, so the chance to ride into combat and take some action themselves was actually welcomed. For many, this may be hard to believe. However, it makes total sense. I think we were very close to bulletproof stage. Clawb Holt writes in his book 'At Thy Call': They thought everything had been thrown at them, but unfortunately, this preconception was going to be thoroughly tested shortly. We would crash back down to earth with a bang before too long, says Holt. The MiGs came close on the 6th of January. Explosions shaking the rattles of 61 Mech. The men dug their foxholes deeper once more. On the 8th, the troops were moving into position for the strike on Friday the 13th. When they were hit by Stalin organ fire, the rockets and MiGs swooped in once more. Some of the men began to lose it a bit, going slightly bossies, a bit nuts, from the constant bombardments. Wapla, on the other side, felt the same. The 155mm shells from the G-fires were a constant tune in their heads, the pressures jabbing at their chests, then the body-shaking blast pressure. They lay with their mouths open so they wouldn't blow their eardrums. 61's mission to the south was to trap elements of the 21st Brigade, hemmed in by high ground to the east once the attack started, as well as their Kwanawale and Kuita rivers to the west. The idea was to drive them to a place that became known as the Tumpo Triangle. It was a wire junction in two roads, just north of the Tumpo River. The SADF knew the 21 Brigade were holding two main outposts on the crest of the Chambinga High Ground, just inside the thick bush. One was two kilometres south of the Kwatea River, that's the river that ran east to west. And the other was three kilometres further south. After these were overcome, the SADF and the UNITA allies would swing towards 21 Brigade's main position just beyond the thick bush on the high ground, about a kilometre south of the Kwatea River. As they were attacking roughly from a north-eastly direction, the natural impetus for FAPLA would be to take a gap back to Tumpo, south-west of their position. And that's where 61 MEC would do the mopping up. UNITA's third battalion was to take aim at the northern outpost just below the Kwatea River, and Forsyth would hit the southern outpost. The South Africans laid low on Wednesday the 11th, and then began forming up late in the afternoon, armed with anti-tank guns and some with Stinger ground-to-air missiles. They were UNITA. Watching this, the troops were happier after the experiences with the MiGs for the last month. They were briefed before the major assault, and 61 MEC rattle teams were told that they should remain inside their vehicles even if attacked by MiGs as they rolled towards 21 Brigade. Forsyth began the approach just after midday on the 13th, after the mobile rocket launchers and G5s had softened up the two outposts. More than 300 rounds were pumped towards these FAPLA troops, renumbered around 800. The SA artillery continued with 81mm and 120mm mortars, as the SA Air Force flew in as well, the incendiary bombs setting fire to the forest around FAPLA's position. These men were motivated. The long wait was over, and it was quite a sight. The sounds were extreme. As 1,000 men aboard various types of rattles and support vehicles gunned along, flanked by two columns, each comprising 11 Ulefantaks. The tangled bush slowed the attack. It's one thing to plan this sort of assault on a sand model, another to actually try and force your way through the subtropical bush. FAPLA began opening up on the rattles with their own artillery, and the Ulefants and rattles shut their hatches as the shrapnel peppered the trees. In the south, Forsyth rolled over FAPLA's trenches, with little opposition, and turned north to assist UNITA. The northern outpost was a different story. There, FAPLA units fought with grit, from bunker to bunker and trench to trench. Forsyth was slowed as they ran into a minefield. One rattle was damaged, its wheel blown off. A small FAPLA force here was doing the unimaginable. They were holding off around 1,800 SADF and UNITA troops, using a combination of weapons, including the much feared 23mm anti-aircraft. The Angolans were now retreating in an orderly fashion. It was a fighting retreat, not the usual rout, which slowed the SADF down, and the incremental advance was slowed further. Forsyth and UNITA were moving in 200m jumps. One FAPLA bunker with 20 men inside fought to the last. Eventually, an Ulefant tank drove right up to its entrance, and fired a high-explosive shell directly into the structure, killing everyone inside. To the south, it was mid-afternoon by the time that 61 MEC had reached their position on Forsyth's left flank, and it was now time for Forsyth and UNITA to aim directly at 21 Brigade's main position. Three of the Ulefants had been damaged by the terrain, their tracks ripped off by the tree stumps and the rocks, the uneven terrain creating havoc even for these powerful, heavily tracked weapons. FAPLA's positions were also cunningly laid out, with strong bunkers, overlaid fire positions, minefields. This made the attack extremely difficult. Another rattle was then damaged by an anti-personnel mine, and a MiG-21 dropped a bomb close enough to one of the Ulefants to take out its all-important site periscope, and it was out of action. By the time Forsyth moved in to attack 21 Brigade's main position, there was less than an hour of light left. Forsyth was also facing heavy fire from FAPLA's rockets, mortars and artillery, as well as the MiGs and T-54/T-55 tanks. Even more damaging, however, was FAPLA's 23mm guns, each from the MiG-21. fired hundreds of rounds of armor-piercing shells which peppered the rattles with their 3,500 kilometers per hour velocity power. Miraculously, these hit two rattles without harming the crew. One round destroyed the driver's viewing periscope. The other penetrated a rattle's turret, flew all the way through to the opposite end, whizzing just over the head of the crew member. Clive Holt was then designated to climb into a tree and operate an ad hoc observation post. He was carrying a radio and binoculars and watched the Ulufans hit two T-54-55s. The citizen force tankmen of Pretoria Regiment were proving to be more than useful. It was their 90 millimeter guns that did the trick. The impetus grew. The SADF was now moving more quickly towards 21 Brigade in the fading light with the rattles and Ulufans now driving directly over anti-personnel minefields surrounding the Angolan positions which provided a route for the infantry to the target. Then a Russian BTR carrying ammunition was hit and it was to explode for the rest of the night. A direct fire fusillade from a Stalin organ hit one of the Ulufans. The Angolan multiple rocket launcher was just 150 meters away and the tank lost one of its tracks. It was the Ulufans that began to take their toll in Faplas bunkers though, taking out the deadly 23 millimeter guns one by one. Then the Pretoria Regiment hit two more Russian tanks. 21 Brigade troops realized that the South Africans were getting the upper hand and some began to break and run towards the Kwanawale River. It was now that Commandant Kurs Liebenbach was stunned by an unusual sight. Enemy tanks, trucks and infantry were fleeing towards the river between his own 61 mech vehicles and foresight. His rattled 90s shot out three more tanks and four armored cars. The drivers appeared to be completely unaware of the South Africans on their left. The battle had now been underway for a while. The Ulufans were now on the move. The Ulufans were now on the move. The soldiers were moving away for about an hour but already Fapla units were retreating. Then something even more bizarre took place. An entire platoon of nude Fapla troops dashed past. Liebenbach's men were so shocked they didn't fire. Perhaps this platoon was trying a new form of special weapon but it's not every day that naked enemy soldiers run past you in the fading light. It was apparently because UNITA had distributed pamphlets in which Fapla soldiers were urged to remove clothing as a part of a mission. Another of the famous southern Angolan storms though was building up as the night fell but Commandant Jan Malan leading Forsyth was determined to continue the attack. He ordered illumination rounds fired but so much smoke and dust was obscuring the battlefield that try as they might the G5 and 120mm illumination rounds failed to light up the scene and the clouds were now low making visibility even worse. So Forsyth, UNITA and 61 mech stopped for a few hours that night then relaunched their attack at first sight. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. The G20 were first light on the 14th. 21 brigade had retreated to the Tumpo triangle and their MiG supports were already overhead at dawn. The South Africans were firing white phosphorus shells at Fapla's reserve brigade further south known as the 25th and the MiGs then turned their bombs missing the crucial rattles and infantrymen. One of the MiGs was then hit by a SADF anti-aircraft fire and its pilots bailed out. Then four vehicles were spotted in a nearby Shona. The South Africans called down the MiGs and some of the Fapla troops could again be seen peeling off their uniforms. The problem was most of the SADF at this stage had no idea what the motive was. They thought they could be on fire perhaps hit by phosphorus. The mortars made short work of this group and now the flies were buzzing. It was day two and the body count was going up. Forsyth had descended from the Chambinga high ground chasing 21 brigade and had now stopped just 10 kilometers from Kuito Kwanavali on the main road which ran north east. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. The G5 and G20 were now on the move. Commandant Malan was ordered by Ops Commander Colonel Paul Fouchier to clear the east bank of the Kuito River all the way to the north of the Dala River. As Malan sped off his men began to collect Soviet war material including five T-54-55 tanks as well as two heavy-duty M-46 field guns and UNITA which advanced alongside Forsyth also picked up ZU-23AA guns which they'd used apparently to shoot down the MiG you heard about a few minutes ago. After another day of fighting Forsyth and 61Mech withdrew their lagers east of the Chambinga high ground and took stock. Seven enemy tanks destroyed, two captured, an array of rocket launchers seized along with field guns. Four armored cars had been blown up, two seized and three more SAM-8 missile systems captured although not intact. Faplas dead and wounded amounted to 150. UNITA had lost about a dozen men killed and 18 wounded and the South Africans had one wounded man. The ground around the tank zone resembled something out of a Vietnam movie said one of the veterans afterwards. The Ulufans and the 20mm rattles had also built up an unusual coordination there in the bush. The rattles turret moves much faster than the tank turret and the Ulufan gunners would watch where the 20mm fired then turn their slow turret and hit the same target. Despite the apparent success all was not as it seemed. 21 Brigade was still together. They had not been shattered. They had retreated and lost about a seventh of their number. However losing around 25% casualties is known as unsustainable. One seventh is not annihilation. But there was worse news to come. Back in Cuba President Fidel Castro had reached the end of his tether and like all military minded men he did what military men do. He went on the offensive where he had put out feelers to discuss peace at the end of 1987. Now he was to play his ace and what he did was to play the ace in the game. It was a unit called the 50 division and it was so well drilled it usually protected Havana his capital. Now it was on its way to southern Angola. This was a very serious threat to the SADF. Where the other units prior to this crack organization had been somewhat haphazard the 50 division was a completely different proposition. They were armed with the latest Soviet gear. More critically SADF intelligence was picking up the gun and shooting up that they were actually going to be part of a planned invasion into northern Namibia. This was not what Pretoria had planned for. Back on the battlefield near the Quito river it was midnight 14th January 1988 and the ammunition inside the tanks and BTRs continued exploding. Otherwise things went quiet. The commanders realized that the warnings issued before this battle by highly experienced officers such as Jan Breitenbach were now coming true. There was no reserve unit that could now drive past the recovering Forsyth 61 mech. No tanks, no spare rattles to drive straight at the shaken 21 brigade skulking in the Tumpo triangle a few kilometers from Quito Conavali. The SADF had once again broken the cardinal rule of warfare. They transferred 3-2 battalion to Menon instead of setting them up to reinforce this assault. Some have suggested that it's unfair this hindsight analysis. However that's just offensive posturing. Jani Helnes was trying to be half pregnant. So was P.W. Buta. These nationalist politicians thought they could have their cake and eat it. That they could have a little war and perhaps a little victory. Imagine the men of these units if you can on both sides. They were fodder for the folks who were unable to deploy the basic concept of courage of conviction. But for the South Africans their arch enemy Fidel Castro was about to do just that. Whatever the reasons are of his Soviet style one party oppressive state. He was going to put his military where his mouth was. By now the MiGs were like a swarm and the South Africans were just very lucky they had not received direct hits from the air to ground support. Of course it was poor training and worse management perhaps compounded by a real fear of the SADF capacity to hit planes with the anti-aircraft guns that led to the MiG pilots low success rate. Whatever the main reasons it could only be a matter of time. Before the MiGs found their range. Take the morning of the 15th of January when a host of parachute-braked bombs fell inside Forsyth's Lager. The blasts rocking the rattles once more as Commandant Malan waited close to Cuito Cuanavale for permission to advance. He was denied permission and as Forsyth and 61 Mech withdrew Unita took up their positions in 21 Brigade's newly evacuated trenches and bunkers. From Cuito Fapla's artillery had the range. It was only 16 km away and Angolan artillery began to get to work targeting South Africa's allies. Meanwhile Fidel Castro had set up a southern Angolan war room back in Havana. He was directly involved in planning and tactics and strategy. He sent all the advisors he could, more than 200 including officers, artillerymen and tank commanders to the front, the elite leadership. As the SADF prepared its next moves Castro was maneuvering a large tactical group of tanks, mechanized infantry, and artillery from Menon to Cuito Cuanavale. He sent a message with these near arrivals: "We will fight to the end! There would be no retreating from Cuito Cuanavale." This town at the confluence of the Cuito and Cuanavale rivers was turning into a mini Stalingrad at Verdun. While the Angolans were in two minds about what to do about Cuito, the Cubans and the South Africans were not. Luanda was toying with the idea of moving their defensive line back to Menon. Havana was against the idea. Castro had issued the order that the defense perimeter to the east of the Cuito River should be reduced by putting 59th and 25th brigades towards much better fortified positions close to the river and the town. This would compress their lines and make it harder for the South Africans to overrun them with their limited armor and infantry. Castro said there was too much risk in leaving the two brigades where they were, strung out to the west and southwest of the SADF positions. The 8th brigade was ordered to resume its food supply convoys from Minang to Kretukwana Valley, just in case there was confusion. There was another uppercut that Castro was considering. Moving his 50th battalion towards the Kunene River now and to start an alternative front, this would stop the SADF in its tracks as the South Africans would have to counter this new and much more dangerous threat to the west. While Castro was pondering and pointing at his maps back in Havana, things were moving ahead in southern Angola. First, Fapla's 21 brigade had actually counterattacked and pushed Junita out of their old positions at their HQ and the two strong points in the Chambinga High Ground, helped with fresh troops from 8th brigade. Watching this was artillery spotter Robert Trautmann, still up a tree north of the Kwatea River. He watched as Fapla went back to their old positions. All the energy sapping fighting and the loss of life appeared to be a waste of time. Major General Willi Meyer arrived at the front shortly afterwards and lay in the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. He was then sent to the front of the 4th brigade. Now of course the troops weren't idiots. Many looked at him like he was mad. What exactly were they doing then, fighting from trench to trench, if the leadership was just going to walk away from their gains? What happened next is for episode 101. Please rate the podcast on iTunes. It helps raise the visibility of the series. If you want to contact me, you can head off to abwarpodcast.com. There's a contact form on the homepage or direct message me on Twitter at Des Latham. Until next, bye. Transcription by CastingWords
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