Speaker 1Pistol shots ring out in a borrowed night Enter Betty Valentine from the upper hall She sees a bartender and a pool of blood Cries out, my God, they killed them all Here comes the story of the hurricane The man the authorities came to blame For something that he never done
Speaker 2The five of you out there that made it this far Amazing Today's podcast is being done in front of a live studio audience I'm in my son's room and he's lying on the bed So if you hear any movement That's him shuffling to get out of the room Because, what? What are you talking about? I'm recording Why are you talking about me? Okay, well, you said you would hang out in the room, so Yeah, but you didn't say you'd talk to me Okay, well, you know, you're on the podcast, so Okay Today we're going to continue with Heart Chapters 8 and 9 of The Concept of Law And I know what you're thinking, all five of you Like, what the hell? When are we going to finish with this guy? Well, actually, we're going to do this episode And one more on. We're going to talk about international law later on But Heart is just really super important And you can't really understand what's going on in the subject without him So, look, if you're like, I don't want to know any more about Heart You can skip the rest of the episode But for everyone I'm going to try to make it exciting and interesting Last week we talked about Heart on legal interpretation And we said that for Heart, law is necessarily indeterminate There's just no way that anybody can Completely guide Actions of other people Social acts of guidance will necessarily run out Either because when you pick out an example As an authoritative precedent You don't know how close a case has to be to that example Or because legal texts will have general terms And all general terms in legal texts will have general terms So, Heart emphasized that judges will have to look to morality In order to decide cases where the law has run out So, it's not like judges never look to morality They do look to morality when they're deciding cases It's just that they don't do it when they're trying to figure out what the law is When they figure out what the law is They look to, what do you call it, the core The center of the law And they settle meanings of general terms and statutes But that's not the same as looking to morality So, the fact that law In interpretation and morality are not connected Doesn't mean that law can't be connected to morality in other ways And what Heart is going to argue In chapters 8 and 9 Of the concept of law Is that actually law and morality Are never necessarily connected And that's his way of characterizing legal positivism For him, to be a legal positivist Means that law and morality Are not necessarily connected As you may notice This is different than the way I characterized the debate Between legal positivists and natural lawyers In the beginning Of the podcast And as I've been going through it There I said that if you're a legal positivist You believe that legal facts Ultimately Are determined by social facts alone Never by moral facts Whereas Heart Who really is the You know The legal positivist par excellence He characterizes legal positivism As being the doctrine where Law and morality Whether we're Let me put it In the way he puts it There's no necessary connection Between law and morality I think that that's A mistaken way of Putting the point To putting the doctrine That's because I think it's obvious That law and morality Are necessarily connected In certain ways And I don't think it's A really helpful way To characterize the debate I think it's I think Really what we want to know is Is law law because Of social facts alone Or because of morality as well But Again That's not the way Heart does it And so One of the things that He does in In chapter 89 Is he wants to show The ways in which Law and morality Are in fact similar to each other But he also wants to show you How they are also Importantly different And therefore There's no necessary connection Between law and morality So I think Heart has A lot a lot Of interesting things to say About the relationship Between law and morality Even if I don't think the way He characterizes positivism Is the most perspicacious But anyway Let's Let's Let's jump in And so the first thing he says In Chapter 8 Is that Law And justice Seem to have some Important connection When you When you Think about what judges do You think about Them doing justice And the symbol of the law Is often The symbol of justice Blindfolded Holding scales And so One of the things That Heart wants to Explain is Why you would think that Law and justice Seem to go together And so First thing he says Is that Not everything That is morally bad Is unjust So Let's say You know You're walking Along on the street I stick out my foot And you trip over Over my foot That's That was a bad thing to do Maybe actually quite funny But It's a bad thing to do But you wouldn't say It was unjust The only thing That would be unjust Is if the person Hurt themselves And then you didn't Compensate them afterwards So not everything That just That That That Concerns Justice Can Let me put it The other way around Excuse me Not everything That's morally bad Is unjust So What is justice Consistent For Heart Justice Involves The Maintaining Or restoring The balance Of benefits And burdens So we have The idea That certain Benefits And burdens Are appropriately Distributed In society And Justice Is Society Is just When those benefits And burdens Are allocated In some Appropriate way You might say In some fair way And Injustice Is when those Benefits and burdens Are not Allocated Appropriately Or where the Balance is disturbed And You want to Restore The Appropriate balance One Aspect Of So there are Lots There are lots Of different Kinds of justice Right When we In legal philosophy There's not Really the There may be the The genus Justice But there are lots Of different kinds Of justice Sometimes we talk About Distributive justice Sometimes we talk About Retributive justice So distributive justice Is the Distributive Distribution Of goods In society Income Wealth Retributive justice Is ensuring That people Who Commit crimes Get their Just desserts We talk About Corrective justice That is where Wrongful gains Or wrongful Losses Are Annulled There are lots Of different kinds Of justice One of the things That Hart Wants to focus On is What We would Nowadays Call formal Justice Which is Treating Like Cases Alike So Something is Somebody's acting In a formally Just manner When they Treat Like cases In like ways And unlike Cases In unlike Ways And one of the Reasons That we tend This is according To Hart One of the reasons That we tend To think Of Law And justice Is going together is because law seems to involve, when you're following it, seems to involve necessarily an element of formal justice. That is, when you're following the rules, when you're following the law, you're necessarily treating like cases alike, where the likeness here is the standard given by the rules themselves. So if you're applying the no vehicles in the park rule, you'll be treating vehicles like all the other vehicles, not letting them go in the park, and the non-vehicles like the vehicles in the park. So if you're applying the no vehicles in the park rule, you'll be treating the vehicles like all the other vehicles, not letting them go in the park. And the non-vehicles like the vehicles in the park. And the non-vehicles like the non-vehicles by letting them go in the park. So there's a way in which when you follow the law and when you follow the rules, there would necessarily be an aspect of formal justice that you're upholding. Hart calls this justice in application. By applying the rules, you'll be acting in a formally just manner. But this, it's really important, Hart points out, and I think he's obviously right about this, that you can't think that the fact that following the law involves a degree of formal justice really means that the law is necessarily just. Because there's really a difference between justice in application and a justice in the rules themselves. So, you know, think of Jim Crow laws. There, a judge could apply, you know, a judge could apply racially discriminatory rules by treating like cases alike. So white people could get certain jobs and non-white people couldn't. And then you would be treating like cases alike according to the rules. But the rules themselves are unjust. That is, the rules themselves are not treating morally relevant categories alike. Because whether you're white or you're not white has no bearing on whether you're entitled to have a certain job or not. So the fact that judges, when they apply the law, are acting in a formally just way in application, that doesn't mean that the rules that they're applying are formally just, because they may not be carving the cases according to morally relevant similarities. Okay. That's the, that's the first thing he wants to say about law and justice have some kind of connection, but it's not a connection that's really morally that significant. Because the rules themselves may be quite unjust. Okay. Then he wants to, he moves on to the question of moral rules in general. How are moral rules like legal rules and how are they different? One of the things he says in the something we'll talk more, um, after the break, uh, which is that legal and moral rules often coincide. I mean, their contents are often extremely similar. Um, both the law, both law and morality concern the conditions for social survival. So not to, you know, there are rules against assaulting people, um, engaging in fraud, destruction of property, things that the law deals with and morality deals with because they constitute the conditions for, uh, a community to survive. Um, morality tends to be more general though. Uh, legal rules can be rather particular. You know, morality has nothing to say about how fast you should drive. I mean, you should drive safely, uh, or not recklessly, but the law can say, you know, 55 miles an hour on this road. Um, so they often have the same content of the morality tends to have a more general content than law. Um, other similarities between law morality that Hart mentions is that both, number one, they're binding without consent. That is, you can't say I never agreed to the moral rules. That's completely irrelevant. I mean, morality tells you when consent matters, but consent doesn't matter to morality itself. And same thing about the law. It's not never, ever a justification, um, to disobedience, um, to say you didn't consent to the law. You say the judge, judge says, why, you know, you're, you're stand accused of not paying your taxes, stand accused of, um, sticking your foot out and causing somebody to trip. And you say, well, I never consented to the law. And that's just never a justification. Um, both law morality, uh, prescribe bare minimums. That is, uh, you know, they, they, they tell you what you're really not allowed to do. I kind of, they say like they constitute floors of acceptable behavior. Um, so that's, that's actually an interesting feature about morality and law. Um, and they're both supported generally by significant social pressure for conformity. So in general, uh, morality is enforced socially and same thing about the law. You know, the law is also enforced officially, but it's also enforced socially. Uh, saying, saying that you broke the law, um, committed a crime is generally a social stigma, stigma attached to it. Um, but there are important differences. um, between, uh, law, uh, legal rules and moral rules that Hart points out. Uh, number one is that, um, their importance, um, moral rules are almost always extremely important. They protect extremely important social values, but that's not true for legal rules. I just saw on social media earlier, um, uh, there are rules for when you can call yourself lasagna, when, uh, when, uh, somebody who makes lasagna can call the, their product lasagna, it has to have 12% meat sauce in it. So, you know, that's not, you know, morality doesn't concern itself with, with, with things like that. Um, but the law often involves itself with, with trivial matters. Uh, the laws are filled with trivial matters. Um, both, um, um, morality is immune from deliberate change and you can't repeal morality. People can't get together and decide, okay, this is not a moral rule anymore, but that's law. You know, that's one of the interesting features about laws that it, it, you can change it deliberately. This is what we talked about the importance of the secondary rule of change. Um, uh, a couple episodes ago, um, morality has an element of voluntariness to it that law, um, may not have. So it's always an, it's always an acceptable excuse to say you couldn't help it. It may not be a justification, but at least it's, it's an excuse. Like if you couldn't help doing it, if you were sleepwalking, if, um, I don't know if, um, you were involuntarily intoxicated or something like that, um, you can, um, you can appeal to people's sense of morality in order to excuse your behavior. But the law may not accept that. The law may have strict liability. It does have strict liability in many instances, both in the criminal law, less so. But in, in tort law, uh, there's a lot of strict liability. So even if you couldn't help it, you can still be on the hook. Um, and finally, um, the kinds of pressure that the, that back each of these rules are, are, are different. So deviations from moral rules, um, are generally backed socially, whereas the law though backed by social pressure, um, is backed also by financial and physical sanctions. Okay. So those are, so again, what Hart here wants to do is he wants to say, you know, law and morality, law and justice, they have a lot of things that are, they have a lot of similarities, but they have a lot of differences too. And so we want not to conflate the two categories. Okay. We're gonna take a little break. We'll, we will be back, um, uh, talking about chapter nine and the minimal content
Speaker 3law. Wake up, Maggie I think I got something to say to you It's late September And I really should be back at school I know I keep you amused But I feel I'm being used Oh, Maggie, I couldn't have tried anymore
Speaker 2Oh, Maggie, I couldn't have tried anymore Liga Positivism is the doctrine according to which there's no necessary connection between law and morality Natural law is typically seen to be the opposite of Liga Positivism So natural law theory is often taken to be the thesis that there is a necessary connection between law and morality As you know, I don't think that's the best way to characterize I think the better way is that legal facts are ultimately dependent on moral facts as well But Hart wants to characterize it as being a necessary connection between law and morality Natural law, I just will mention Is often taken to be the view that morality is objective and discoverable by human reasoning So when people talk about natural law theory They often are not talking about a jurisprudential view about the foundations of law Or a connection between law and morality But rather about the nature of morality itself Which is that it's objective and discoverable by human reasoning I don't know if you've ever seen this You go into the voting booth and then there's this thing called the natural law party So you can vote for Democrats or Republicans Or you can vote for the idea that morality is objective and discoverable by human reasoning So if you're moved by that, you can vote for them Okay, so Hart begins by saying There's a way in which natural law theory is correct There's a way in which law and morality are necessarily connected He calls this the doctrine of the minimum content of the natural law The idea here is not Let me just talk a bit about the idea of necessity here You know, when we say there's no necessary connection There are lots of different kinds of necessity that philosophers talk about They talk about logical necessity They talk about metaphysical necessity Sometimes they talk about nomological necessity Hart here will say that law and morality are nomologically connected Which is to say that Given the way human beings are The law will have to contain Certain kinds of moral rules Just by virtue of the kinds of beings we are That is, it's almost like a It's like a biological necessity That human beings are going to have to have If they are to survive As part of their law Certain kinds of moral rules Now, this is not to be confused This is called nomological necessity The idea, nomological, nomos The idea of like there's a kind of Scientific necessity To the relationship between law and morality But he's definitely going to deny That they're metaphysically connected That is, there's nothing Metaphysically incoherent About imagining human beings Who have a law that don't contain The minimum content that I'm going to describe in a second So when he talks about that law and morality are connected In this case, what he's talking about is nomological necessity One of the things that he wants to argue And kind of give natural law its due Is the idea that survival is an undeniable human good And the law has to be, at least in part, geared Toward satisfying the function of maintaining social survival There's going to have to be rules in every legal system That protect life, limb, and property There's, you know, there's going to be rules About taking life, about murder About maiming About who owns what There's going to be rules about How to incur voluntary obligations So there's going to be rules about promising Contracts Things like that There'll also be rules about When you have to compensate other people For wrongs that they've committed And the reason why There's going to have to be these kinds of rules Is because There are five features In any human community That necessitate these kinds of rules And the first one is the fact that we don't have Exoskeletons At least not now We may have They may develop It's actually quite likely that In a decade or so We'll start wearing a mask We'll start wearing exoskeletons But we're not born with shells We're physically vulnerable to one another And we're roughly Physically equal To one another You know, it's not like some people Are 70 feet tall And some people are 2 feet tall It's You know, roughly People can take each other In a fight We're altruistic To some degree But it's limited You know, we help people But we're not completely altruistic So there's limited altruism We live in a world of scarcity There's not unlimited supplies Of everything we want And even though we're rational There's a limit to our rationality So there are five things That make the minimum content Of the natural law necessary We're vulnerable to each other We're roughly equal We have limited altruism We live in a world of scarcity And we have Limited rationality So there's going to have to be rules And those rules Are going to have to be backed By pressure of various sorts If we're to live together Now the fact that Every society is going to have to have Rules And good rules Doesn't mean that those rules Are going to extend to every segment of society Some people And it's lamentably the case In virtually every society That's ever existed That some groups Will not be protected by those rules So even though the survival of the group Will be protected by the rules That doesn't mean that every subset Of that group will be protected In fact, legal systems have Throughout history Been extremely unjust With respect to segment society So while it's true that Every legal system will contain rules That you can say Well, these are really good rules That doesn't mean that those rules Will be just to everyone And it also, of course, doesn't mean That some people Won't use those rules To oppress other people Of course they do And they do it all the time Okay, so This is This is Hart's Doctrine Of The Minimal content of the natural law So we want to say Insofar as that people are Find natural law theory attractive That there isn't Necessary connection between law and morality That connection has to be Understood in terms of Nomiological necessity And it does not follow From this That That Law Will be The Any particular legal system Will be A morally just Legal system In the way in which Natural lawyers have Wanted it to be the case I mean natural lawyers have thought that Legal systems are By virtue of being legal systems Just And this is something that Hart is Quite eager to To reject I'm I'm going to take a break now because what I'm going to do in the next part, in part three, in the final part, is go through the six ways in which Hart thinks that law, that, what Hart does is he examines the many reasons why people think that law and morality are necessarily connected. And what he's going to do is he's going to rebut each one to show that law and morality are not, in fact, necessarily connected. So I want to go through those carefully because they're very important for his positivism. So I will be back with another song and more positivism in a bit.
Speaker 4Jackson's cool, said Jane is in her vest. And me, I'm in a rock and roll band. Riding a studs big at gym. You know, those were different times. All the poets, they studied who's the verse.
Speaker 5And those ladies, they moved their eyes.
Speaker 3Sweet Jane. Oh, Sweet Jane. Oh, Sweet Jane.
Speaker 2Okay, part three. That was Velvet Underground, Sweet Jane. You notice I give just enough for it to be fair use. So, and I know this because I know what fairness is because I'm a legal philosopher. Okay. Which happens. Actually, a perfect segue into our last part where we talk about the ways in which people think that law and morality are necessarily connected, but they would be wrong according to Hart. Okay, first thing Hart mentions is the idea that every legal system requires not just coercive power over its people, but it requires acceptance of authority. Now, let's distinguish between two subclaims here. One is that in order for a legal system to exist, some have to take the internal point of view towards that legal system. And then there's another claim here, which is what you might associate with Maxine. And that is that every legal system requires that the subject population accept the legitimacy of authority. So, let me take each part. So, does the fact that every legal system require that some members of the group take the internal point of view towards the law show that the law and morality are not the same? I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't necessarily connected know why. First of all, as we know from a couple episodes ago, the condition for the existence of a legal system that requires the internal point of view only applies to officials. It does not apply to ordinary citizens. So, it may be true that some people have to take the internal point of view towards the law, but they can be a very small subset of the legal system. That's the first thing. But the second thing, and more importantly, is we emphasize that the internal point of view is not the moral point of view. That is, to take the internal point of view towards the law for heart is to take it as reason-giving, but you can have any reason for thinking, for taking the law as reason-giving. You can be committed to the law because you want to pick up your paycheck, because just tradition, long-range self-interest, pure habit. So, there could be lots of reasons why anyone takes the internal point of view towards the law, which has nothing to do with morality. So, if you think that the internal point of view is necessary for the existence of a legal system, even for those for whom it is necessary, it need not be morally based. It could be based for non-moral reasons. The second thing is that. The Weber point, which is. So, Max Weber had argued in his sociological work that any type of legal system is going to have to be based not just on coercion, it's going to have to be based on acceptance by the population of the legitimacy of the authority. Why? Well, just because there's just not. There's not enough of them. There's not enough of official. There's not enough officials for them to coerce everyone else. The way in which legal systems get people to comply is by trying to win over their hearts and minds. Now, of course, they also use coercion, but it's much easier if you can convince. Through various types of propaganda and ideological manipulation to get people, or actually by being legitimate, by being morally upstanding, to get people to comply because they think it's their obligation to do so. Now, even if you thought that that was the case, that's, again, a nomological claim. It doesn't actually show that. But there needs to be a metaphysical connection between law and morality. All it shows is that there is a sociological connection that may be law-like, but not metaphysically grounded. That is, we can fully imagine a legal system in which nobody accepts the legitimacy of the law except for officials, but everyone complies. It's because they're afraid. Maybe technology gets to the point where the state can control us in that way, and that would still be a legal system. It just wouldn't be one in which compliance had anything to do with people's moral judgments about the legitimacy of the state. Yeah, so that's not a reason to think that. That's not a reason to think that. That's not a reason to think that the laws of morality are metaphysically connected. Number two, Hart points out that the law contains many moral terms, so we talked about fair use just a little while ago, the 14th Amendment contains the Equal Protection Clause, tort law requires that people act as reasonable people under circumstances. The law contains lots of moral terms. Hart's response to that is, "Well, okay, law may contain lots of moral terms, but why does that show that law and morality are necessarily connected?" You can imagine a legal system not containing those terms, and that would still be a legal system. It may be like a bizarre legal system. Yeah. It may be like a bizarre legal system, but it would be a legal system nonetheless. The fact that the law contains moral terms is just a kind of contingent feature of the legal systems we're familiar with. Number three, judges need to exercise moral discretion when deciding cases. Now that's, again, true. Hart fully admits, but when judges are exercising moral discretion in deciding cases, number one, they can make mistakes, and they typically do, right? They're trying to do the morally right thing, and they may fail, so that's one reason to think that law and morality may come apart, is that judges may try to hit the target and they may fail, but number one, and number two is. Actually, I forgot number two, and I'm not going back and editing this out, so that should be enough for now. The fact that judges have to exercise discretion in. Oh, right, I remember now. Right. When they're exercising discretion in deciding cases, they have to exercise discretion in deciding cases. They're going beyond the law, and so therefore, law and morality are not connected, because when they're deciding. When they're. applying law, they're not relying on morality. They have to appeal to morality because the law has run out. So morality plays a role here precisely because the law has run out. Okay. So that was the second reason. Okay. What's the fourth reason that people think that law and morality are necessarily connected? Well, it seems as if our standards for evaluating whether a legal system is good or bad depend on moral considerations. So if you say that a legal system is a good legal system, what you mean is it's a morally good legal system. So the way we critique a legal system seems to be necessarily connected to law. So if you say somebody is a really good basketball player, you don't mean they're a really morally good basketball player, or you say the car is a really good car, you don't mean it's a morally good car. When you say a legal system is a good legal system, you mean it's a morally good legal system. So it seems as if morality and law are necessarily connected here. What Hart wants to say is that it's true that we evaluate the law based on moral considerations, but the law may fail in those instances to actually be good. So you could say a legal system is good if it satisfies certain moral criteria, but it fails to meet those criteria, but it's still a legal system. So therefore, law and morality are not necessarily connected because even though our criteria for appraising legal systems are morally based, we still judge them to be legal systems even when they don't match this criteria. Now, I just want to say that I think that this shows why characterizing positivism as being no necessary connection between law and morality is a really bad way of doing it. I mean, it seems to me quite obvious that law and morality are connected at least necessarily by saying that our criteria for evaluating legal systems are morally based. It's true that the law may fail to live up to those standards, but it really does seem to be conceptually connected or metaphysically connected to say that the way in which you're supposed to evaluate a legal system is different than the way you're supposed to evaluate a car or a basketball player, and that that difference is moral. That is, that that's a moral distinction. So I think Hart is, I mean, he's right to say that something would be a legal system even if it's not morally good, but he's wrong to say that that shows that law and morality are not necessarily connected. I think it shows that law and morality is necessarily connected. It just doesn't show that legal facts ultimately depend on moral facts. Anyway, the fifth reason to think that law and morality are connected, according to Hart, is that law implies justice and application. That is, anytime you follow the law, it seems as if you're embodying a kind of an ideal of formal justice. And this is something that we talked about in part one, we rejected, because it's true that when you follow the law, you're engaging in your, you're embodying a virtue of law. And I think that's a really good point. Formal justice. But you may be also ignoring another aspect of formal justice, namely that the rules themselves may be unjust. So the fact that you're, there's justice in application doesn't mean there's justice in the rules themselves. Again, I just want to say that I think that this is a reason to reject the idea that law and morality are not necessarily connected. I mean, if it is the case that there's a, there's a, an element of formal justice every time you follow the rules, then it seems that law and morality aren't necessarily connected. So I just don't like the way that Hart's doing it. But he's of course right that, that, you know, we wouldn't say that a legal system was just when judges and officials apply the rules because they're treating like cases like in the sense of acting according to the rules because the rules may sell may be horrible, maybe terribly unjust. And so I think that that's a very important point. Um, lastly, this is the, the last reason to think that, um, law and morality are necessarily connected. Um, and this is really, I think the, the, the, the most interesting, most important point. I want to dwell on it for, for a bit. Um, Hart says, you know, if law is really unjust, you shouldn't obey it. And so it seems as if law and morality are necessarily connected because if law is really morally bad, you should really not obey it. Well, Hart says, yeah, yes, this is true, but that doesn't actually mean mean that the law that you're not supposed to obey is not the law. It is the law. We shouldn't confuse the idea that according to positivism, one's always legally obligated to comply with an unjust rule which satisfies the conditions of legal validity and the rule of recognition with the claim that one is always morally obligated to obey the law. So this is so important that I want to dwell on it. A lot of people feel like there's something deeply immoral about positivism because they say, look, something can be an unjust law and it's still the law and you're still legally obligated to obey it. And somehow that seems monstrous because how can you be obligated to obey something that's really unjust? And what Hart's response is to say, yes, of course you're obligated in the sense that you're legally obligated, but you're not morally obligated. And it's in some sense the task of legal positivism to get across the idea that the fact that the law tells you to obey doesn't mean that you should obey. I mean, yeah, legally, you should obey, but morally, you shouldn't. So many legal positivists throughout history have been legal reformers. And what they've tried to do is try to get across the idea that we should be clear-eyed about what the law is. The law is a set of rules that satisfy certain kinds of conditions set out in other rules. That does not mean that you morally should obey. The natural lawyer wants to say that if a law is really unjust, then it's not law. Whereas the positivist says, no, no, no, no, it really is law. It's just law that you shouldn't obey. Hart points out that if we deny that laws, that are unjust, are not laws, then how do we study them? In fact, how do we even critique them? How do you say, don't follow that law? Because under the natural law view, it's not law. So one of the things that Hart was really interested in getting across is that positivism does not imply that when something satisfies the criteria set out in the rule of recognition, that that means that you're morally supposed to obey it. In fact, if it's really unjust, you shouldn't obey it. But we don't do ourselves a favor. We don't help by denying that what the state of the law is. We don't do ourselves a favor. normative legal positivism and the idea is that the reason why we should be legal positivists is because morally speaking we'll act better if we treat law as that if we treat unjust laws as laws rather than denying that their laws and so that we can make a we can make an argument on moral grounds for being legal positivists now in a way Hart is kind of making this claim right now that morally speaking we will be we can engage in the in the project of legal reform and legal critique if we treat law as not being necessarily connected to morality that is from a moral point of view it's better that we think that law and morality are not connected now I I just think that that's a terrible way to accept legal positivism I think that's a bad way to accept legal positivism is because how I I don't know how legal philosophers know what the best way to get people to either comply with morality or not I mean we're not so sociologists, we can't engage in conceptual engineering. We don't know what the best way to motivate people to disobey unjust rules. It's not something that's within our toolkit. So I think that I don't like arguing for legal positivism on normative grounds, because I think it's not something that we actually know anything about. Anyway, I am going to stop right now. And I will, we are going to pick up with Law's Empire next week. And I hope that you all have a safe and happy week. And I'm going to take you out with some more
Speaker 4Sweet Jane. And Jane, she is a clerk.
Speaker 5And both of them save their monies. And when they come home from work, oh, sitting down by the fire. The radio does play the classical music, their jam, the march of the winter soldiers, all your protest kids. You can hear Jack, say, yeah, get out of here. Sweet Jane, come on, come on,
Speaker 3baby. Sweet Jane.
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