Epigenesis and Rationality with Dr. Catherine Malabou

Today on Chasing Leviathan, we pursue the big questions. Can we save Kant's Transcendental and is it worth saving? My guest is Dr. Catherine Malibu. She is a professor in the Philosophy Department at the Center for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University in the Philosophy Department at the European Graduate School and in the Department of Comparative Literature at the University of California Irvine, a position formally held by her mentor, Jacques Derrida. We discuss what a synthesis of modern philosophy and neurobiology would look like, and I learn that there may in fact be multiple modes of necessity. So come, have a seat with us, and learn to listen with me. Tell us a little bit about yourself. What was your journey into philosophy and to critical theory so that we can get kind of situate this? And eventually, I'd love to also hear what made you think, you know what? I need to write a book about Kant and how this question popped up for you. Yeah, so my general trajectory is, well, I was a student in philosophy in Paris and then I wrote my thesis under the supervision of Jacques Derrida, still in Paris, and the thesis was on Hegel. And in this thesis, I developed the concept of plasticity that is present in the phenomenology of spirit, but not really elaborated by Hegel, so I decided to elaborate it myself, at least to try, and I did it by showing that plasticity had a temporal meaning. So it was, in fact, a thesis about time in Hegel. And then I got interested in the brain. When I discovered that plasticity was not only a philosophical concept, but also a neurological concept, and that maybe there was a link between both, between the two. So I started exploring neurobiology and the most recent discoveries on the brain, arguing for its plasticity, that is, its capacity to change in good or bad senses, creative and destructive at the same time. So I did a lot of work on this neural plasticity. And then I had the feeling that my work could not really be received in Europe, at least in France. People did not really understand why I was interested in the brain. They thought it was not a real topic for many reasons. So I decided to move and to teach in the UK, where I teach regularly, and then I got this position in the US. So this is how things happened. So now why this countbook? It is because I don't know if you know that, but maybe 10 years ago, that was the emergence of this movement called Realism, or Speculative Realism. And the book became very famous by a young French philosopher called Contain M'Iassou, and this book is called After Finitude. And in this book, this book is clearly an anti-Cantien book in which M'Iassou demonstrates that count has eluded the issue of the origin of cognition. By using the concepts of A priori, we would have A priori concepts in our minds. A priori, or what he calls, count transcendental. We would come to this world with all equipped with a transcendental set of categories. M'Iassou says this is a this is a vowel of the real origin of knowledge or cognition. Well, I will tell you more about that, perhaps in the discussion. But what is important is that M'Iassou says, at some point in the book, we have to dismiss the category of the transcendental. And I know this is not possible because we will talk about that. For many reasons, I think that transcendental and can can be re-elaborated in a new way. So I started discussing this argument by M'Iassou that we should stop thinking that we have A priori categories in the mind. Yeah, and I get definitely, I read the book, by the way, I want to say phenomenal book. It has been a hot minute since I've read anything like this. It's been 10 years since I was in a master's of philosophy. So it was good. I definitely stretched my brain in good ways. And I'll also apologize in advance for M'Iassou. My French is not there. So if I butcher the. Perfectly pronounced. Well, that's just because I'm copying you. I knew better than to say, you know, "Mela Suks," you know, when I was reading the book, I had no idea. I mean, you know. So as I'm looking at this, I think for our audience sake, the two terms I think are probably most important for them to understand. What is the transcendental and what is effiginosis? Because I think, obviously, if you don't understand those two terms, the whole. You can have a really hard time understanding this entire argument. Yes. So if you could start by just telling, giving a brief explanation of what is the transcendental that would be great. Yes, it is a very tricky question, definitely, because the transcendental, which is not the transcendent, because transcendence means outside, it means far away from transcendental on the contrary means internal. So transcendental, first of all, does it need something internal to the mind in control? And what is it? It is the set of categories that we need in order to be able to cognize the world. So what is the set of categories? These categories are the logical categories, implied in all scientific approach to the world. So the categories count as talking about our quantity, quality, relation, modality, or implied in judgments, judgments of cognition. So it is this set of categories is like a logical structure inscribed in the mind. When I say that it is a tricky question, it is because Kant says at the same time, this logical structure is not innate. Right. We have to make this big difference. We have to understand the big difference, and this is why it is tricky between transcendental that is a priori given and innate. Why is it not innate? It is not innate because at the same time, and this is the problem, we have to learn them. When we go to school, when we then go to university, we have to learn these categories. So they are present, so to speak in the mind, and at the same time, they have to be discovered. If they were innate, we wouldn't need to study them. So there is a gap between the structure and the empirical discovery or acquisition of these categories. Mayasu is not convinced at all. And says, no, no, no. In reality, what Kant is saying is that they are innate. This is not able to really prove their existence. Their existence is presupposed. How can he really show, demonstrate that we come to the world with these virtually present categories. They must be innate in some way. And if that is true, then Kant is more or less a liar. He says it is fabricated. The transcendental is a fabrication. So this is the problem. Epigenesis, and then I will relate the two terms. Epigenesis, what was in Kant's time, biological theory, opposed to pre-formationism. It was a quarrel about the embryo. Just the embryo all formed in the womb and just all formed that is present in miniature in the womb and then just developing in size after birth. Or, and this is pre-formationism. Or is the embryo starting with one cell and then two cells? Is there a genesis of the embryo in the womb? Is the embryo, the fetus, developing out of differentiation? So there's a gradual process of formation. And this is epigenesis, epigenesis. You find this term of genesis. Preformation is him. He's against any form of genesis. It was the more or less the religious vision of the embryo, a kind of anti-evolutionist vision. Kant is clearly on the side of epigenesis. This is what he explained in the third critique. But what is very, and this was the point of departure of my book, which is extremely interesting, is that when he tries to defend the transcendental showing that yes, it exists and it is not innate, he uses the category of epigenesis in order to demonstrate that the transcendental comes from a kind of genesis in the mind. It is not entirely given, as if it was all preformed, but depends on a kind of genetic process, which is extremely surprising, because how can we think of an apriori genesis? If we are dealing with pure categories, how can we imagine that we have this process of one cell, adding to another, etc. And yet, Kant uses this metaphor and talks about a system of epigenesis of pure reason. So I use this argument. I develop this argument, because it's only a few lines in the first critique. I develop this argument in order to answer me a "suscratic" and affirm that yes, the transcendental is not innate. No, the transcendental is not innate, because it develops. It has a plastic formation. Yeah, so. I hope this was. No, no, this is great. So in terms of the transcendental, I was trying to think of another possible word picture. Yes. So one of the things that becomes important later in your book is you kind of draw out to the conclusion is our capacity for self-reflection and the ability to change ourselves, and that capacity is the. you reference us looking in a mirror, right? That life looks in a mirror and is able to address itself. It is one way to think of the transcendental, and I understand that there's a weakness in this analogy, but for our listeners, it's think of the as the transcendental as the mirror itself, and it's not our self-reflection, because we have to be present in the mirror for that, but that it is the mirror. But at the same time, it's a mirror that we form or that changes over time. That's the genetic part. So yes, you're right. So if we say that, if we just say that, it may look very abstract, and someone could say, "But what are you talking about? Like, life looking at itself in the mirror?" And I admit that my metaphor might be very abstract. In reality, this makes sense only if we refer to the brain. So my move in that book, the risky move I made is that we can't understand the transcendental outside the development of the brain. And in my opinion, Kant would have admitted that. That in fact, this epigenetic movement of the transcendental is the prefiguration of the brain development, because as you know today, scientists talk about an epigenetic development of the brain. The brain develops self gradually as there are. So in fact, when I said, "Life looks at itself in the mirror," means that the brain is able to document or chart its own development. Right. To look at itself. To look at itself through thinking, through creation, through any kind of objects that we create. And so, trying to turn which way I'd like to go, how about before we get into your conclusions, which I found really fascinating. And I think you mentioned that they are, that you want to do a further development of them, which I'm excited to see. But why don't we talk about the three different readings that you kind of developed throughout the book and what you consider to be wrong readings of Kant? You know, that minimal pre-foremationism, high-degers own view of time. And so, people can understand kind of the state of the discussion and see how you answer that. So, yes, okay. Thank you. I think that's maybe it will sound pretentious, but this is not my, but I have to say that I think that nobody has read this epigenesis metaphor in the first critique rightly in the right way. When Kant says, no, the transcendental is not innate, it has its own process of formation. It hasn't been understood in the right way because you're right. There are three great big types of reading. The first one. That is supposedly very Kantian because it has been developed by Kantian official scholars tends to say in reality, Kant has to admit a certain pre-formation of the transcendental. Otherwise, we would not be able to understand how the transcendental can remain the transcendental between without becoming empirical. An epigenesis takes place in time and so it cannot remain a priori. It has to happen in real life, so to speak. So, in order to defend the idea of the purity of the transcendental, that is something that never happens empirically, but remains located in the logical structure of the mind. Kantian readers, official readers of Kant have argued that whatever Kant says, there's a minimal pre-formation in his reading. I don't agree with that at all because if you state that, you don't understand the reference to epigenesis in the third critique, you don't understand this famous paragraph 21 of the first critique. In which Kant affirms that there's a system of epigenesis of pure reason. The second type of reading is totally anti- Kantian. Comes from thinkers like Purse, essentially, and developed further by physicists and also biologists. And this reading tends to say, no. I mean, the development of the categories in our mind is entirely evolutionary. It's the mind construct itself through the progress of generations. So, the first human being, if such a thing exists, had to construct the categories entirely empirically, and then his followers inherited this process and improved it. And so, I mean, all along the generations. So, it means that the categories of our mind, the logical structure of thinking and cognizing, is entirely a posteriori. It constructs itself out of inheritance. This is the essential argument of Purse. Purse. Yes. So, if I can just ask a couple of questions for both of these. One is, one of your critiques, and I think this is a good one and an interesting one for the first minimal preformationism, is the way that reason becomes arbitrary. And this is where we go back to the biological discussion that we're denying evolution and that it's just this arbitrary divine gifting, which is basically just pushing the answer of the logical categories. You're just pushing the genesis further back, right? Exactly. And you evacuate the question of origin. Yeah. So, maybe they don't say it is divine, but yes, you can induce that very soon. Right. Yeah. Yeah. Right. I mean, that's like, if it's not the divine giving it, it's definitely just like gifted from somewhere. That's where you'll see kind of a need or a neoplatonist reading, right? Yeah. And then for, and I thought about this with the neurobiology and I remember listening to John Surrell talk about the philosophy of mind. And I'm curious if this critique works. He obviously, we think that Descartes got a lot wrong, but the Cartesian thought that even if it's just an illusion of consciousness, the illusion does count as consciousness. And you make some reference to this in your book, but that's what popped into my head when you're talking about the neurobiological current state of discussing the brain and mind. Is it just takes the consciousness and just says it's an illusion? But even if it is just an illusion, the consciousness is functioning as consciousness. Yes, it is functioning as consciousness. All the issue is to know where it comes from. Because you're right, it's interesting to introduce consciousness in this debate. More or less, the transcendental is consciousness. It's the immediacy of thinking, of being present in the world, that's Sarah. The problem is where does it come from? For, well, continental philosophers mostly, consciousness is immediate. And precisely, it is made possible because of the transcendental, because there's this structural ability of our mind to be immediately awakened. You were asking me, how is your day going? That's the miracle. You know, you open your eyes and you're immediately conscious. Consciousness for the card is defined by its immediacy. You awaken and this can be translated into, well, at the level of the, let's say, evolution, it means that there's no evolution of consciousness. It has always been immediate. My children will also be aware of where consciousness, et cetera, et cetera. There's no history of consciousness. This is something immediate. This is the structure of the mind. On the other side, biologists and, let's say, cognitive philosophers affirm that this is an illusion. What is an illusion is not consciousness. It is the illusion of its immediacy. That in fact, consciousness, the emergence of consciousness has requested centuries of evolution. And that even now when I wake up in the morning, in fact, the immediacy that I immediately feel is the result of many cerebral processes that happen at a very fast that happen very quickly, so quickly that I'm not aware of them, but without them, I wouldn't be aware or conscious. So you see, this is this illusion of immediacy that is at stake in the discussion. - Yeah, it's interesting. One of my favorite and I think most easily understood critiques of Descartes was by Jean-Baptiste Vico. And basically, he just said, like, Vico was especially interested in pedagogy. And one of the things he said was, like the Cartesian method does not work with kids. (laughing) You can't build in little bits. It's not like-- - Exactly. - Yeah. - There we, you see already in Vico that consciousness is an elaboration. It cannot be, yes, immediate. Yeah, absolutely. - And then, so then we have a third reading. I'm sorry? - Yes, yes, I forgot about the third reading. - Oh, yeah, no, no problem. I stopped you and I asked, I'm just trying to understand the critiques. Make sure, I'm not gonna lie, because the way you set it up and the way that you were picking apart the readings, I wasn't sure if I was understanding the reading because when I would read it, I'd be like, "This doesn't make sense." And then you would get to the end and you say, "It doesn't make sense." I'm like, "Oh, okay, I do understand." (laughing) - That soap was very helpful. - I didn't agree with the second reading either, because it is a reductive reductionist, I don't know how to say that, reading that. Doesn't allow for any kind of idea of what a structure is. All structure would have to be constructed over time and I don't think it's right. - It feels like it folds consciousness into too small of a box. - Yeah, exactly. It reminds me a lot of how, no one actually lives like epiphenomenalism is true, that consciousness is just the reaction of our bodies, not the actual creator of movement in our bodies. We're like, no one lives that way, yeah. - No one lives that way, so I totally agree with you. So I was not satisfied, even if very interested. - Yes. - And then we have a third reading, by Heidegger, that is very powerful in Kant's and the problem of metaphysics, the book that he wrote just after being in time, in which he explains that the transcendental as Kant elaborated it is in reality the very structure of time, which is very difficult to understand immediately. What does that mean? Kant precisely is saying that the transcendental, as we just said, is not empirical, so why time? - Heidegger, difficult to understand, I'm surprised. Yeah. (laughing) - Yeah, very difficult to understand. And at the same time, this is a wonderful reading of Kant's extremely vicious and extremely revelatory. I mean, I must say that before reading Heidegger, I never understood the first critique. I was learning it as you learned a multiplication table. You know, like a series of technical things you have to take for granted, you know? I couldn't, I mean, I said, okay, this book is uncomfortable, the first critique, I will just learn it by heart without, you know. I can't tell you how encouraging that is because that's exactly how I felt. And I'm like, oh, I must be stupid. - No, I mean, how can you do otherwise? I mean, it's very technical, it's very stern, it's very, and I was, yes, when I read "Continue Problem of Metaphysics", first of all, I had the same experience that at first sight it was incomprehensible. And then Heidegger is telling us, no, no, no, no, behind all these technical terms that are out, there's a genuine philosophical question, which is, we need to re-ground metaphysics. And even if Kant is fighting against metaphysics in all the book, Heidegger says yes, but behind this fighting, behind this critical rejection of traditional metaphysics, there is a genuine gesture of re-elaborating metaphysics. And to elaborate it on the basis of finitude, which has never been done before, because metaphysics, as you know, was about eternity, the divine, et cetera. And Heidegger says for the first time, in the history of philosophy, we have a metaphysics of finitude. Metaphysics as finitude, hence also, you know, the critical title of me as to spoke after finitude, which means after Heidegger as well. So metaphysics of finitude, what does that mean? In fact, Heidegger explains that this transcendental set of categories that Kant is talking about would not make sense for an eternal creature. Finitude is precisely the situation of a being that has to find the categories in his mind, in her mind, without having to re- without having to invent them because we don't have the time to do so. So in a certain sense, this a priori set of categories that we have in our mind is a can of time saver, we are in a hurry, 'cause we are finally. This is exactly what Heidegger says. And this situation of having to cope with a very short lifespan, is in fact the true metaphysical question. The true metaphysical question is not as usual, as traditional philosophers used to say, let's try to escape our condition and think of the eternal, the infinite, as I said, no, let's think of our own condition, which is very limited creatures, very limited subject, limited in terms of time, in terms of strength, in terms of ambitions, and let's call metaphysical, this situation of a kind of poverty. What Heidegger also, yes, designates as poverty, that we have nothing. And is this, and I might be getting the term wrong, but he, especially I think before the turning, you mentioned in your book, being towards death. Yes, exactly. Yes, that we are conditioned by the fact that we have an end. Totally. And that we have an origin as well, a beginning. Correct. Because for Heidegger, death is ahead of me, but also behind me. I don't know where I come from. And this is the transcendental situation. We don't know where our categories come from. With you. To answer that, they must be preformed in a certain way. It's too, it's too, it's not a. Just to give up. Yeah, it's an answer that cannot be grounded. I mean, we don't know. We don't know. And we don't know why we are mortal. There are no answers to these questions. And this is what Heidegger calls time in a more. When you have ordinary temporality, like past, present, future. But Heidegger says, no, we have to think of the transcendental as an enlarged notion of time that designates what he calls temporality, as opposed to time. Temporality designates this situation of someone who has very little time, who is. You know, this essential poverty, that. Yes, or the equivalent is being for death, which is for Heidegger what he calls temporality. And it goes beyond that is to delve into the realm not of ontology, but of ontoth theology. Yes, exactly. That we're basically. When you talk about the infinite, you don't have access to the infinite, except through some measure of the divine. And which for Heidegger is a disavowal? Or what really calls oblivion? When He says the question of being has been forgotten, has been. has fallen into oblivion, it means we've always tried to escape finitude. So, all of a sudden, the first critique became for me after I understood this book by Heidegger. I think at least I think I understood it. The first critique became like a crying story. I mean, it became a page-turner, because then it became extremely interesting. Because Heidegger had learned to me how to read it by seeing that what Kant was describing was the situation of someone who had very little time and had to do with it. With an enormous ambition of cognizing the world, enormous ambition and very little time, and very little means, very little tools, a very limited set of means. So, the critique. I didn't find it totally satisfactory in after all. When I realized that at the same time, Heidegger was not considering the biological situation, responding to this ontological situation. For him, all considerations about the brain, about our. what he says, he characterizes them as inauthentic. Metaphysics has to remain pure. And all. Well, yes, biological consideration. Yes, but this finite being that has so little time has also a biological body responding, I mean, coinciding with this finitude, Heidegger said, "No, no, no, I'm not interested in that." And it doesn't say anything about the term epigenesis, which necessarily has a biological meaning as well. So for me, this reading by Heidegger, which that is so beautiful and fundamental, remains a little bit idealist. And so, that. And this is what you do in your book so well, is you carry us through these three readings, and then you come to. Let me see if I can rephrase this, and see if I'm understanding what you are really attempting to do is to create a synthesis between biology and physics, between determinism and freedom, through the epigenesis of consciousness. Yes, exactly. And that's eventually. This is kind of just the start, but that's the great work that's coming, not to put any pressure on you, but. Um. What do you think that work is contained in here? I think you mentioned something about. about how you think this is just the beginning of what you're writing, but I did not write down the pages of her. That's a very bad side of me. That. Always think when I finish a book, they will give way to a new development. And in fact, what. After this book, the next one was about anarchism. Oh, okay. Yeah. So, um. If I pursue this work, it will be. in the form of a confrontation between epigenesis and dialectic. Coming back to my first love, who was Hagle, I would love to develop. a confrontation between epigenesis as a development as counts, conceives of it, and Hagle dialectics. That function. uh, similarly. Yeah, they'll say they sound very similar, like I. He sounds very similar. I get wondering. Yeah, so if I do something. And I wish I can do it, uh. it would be this confrontation. Yeah. I think I will start it because I. I'm due to participate in a Hagle Congress somewhere next year. So maybe I'll give the first little version of that, version of that. Uh, well, that sounds awesome. Can you explain, uh, kind of, how you think you achieve that synthesis, um, that answers these. these three, uh, failed readings of Kant? Um. Well. As you. I think understood, I was interested. I am interested in both readings, first, a Heideggerian one, like Finitue de Sera, and second, a biological one. I take, because, uh, as I said in the beginning, um, I'm very interested in the brain. And, um. I don't think that you can do brain science or a critical approach to the brain without affirming that there's something transcendental in the brain. So what I tried to do in that book is to reconcile, uh, a purely logical and abstract vision of the transcendental with an empirical one. But at the same time, escaping both positions, and showing that a brain development and transcendental epigenesis, uh, have to be, uh, have to be synthesized, uh, have to be, uh, uh, yes, reconcile, thought together, etc. So I think this is what I, uh, like, if you want a kind of. uh, critique of pure neurology, something like that, you know, produce a kind of, uh, Kantian approach to neurology, but not rejecting neurology, but on the contrary, integrating it into, um, what can't cause critique, you know. Um. Yeah, and so for me, I think the light bulb moment, uh, page, uh, 173, um, I don't know if there's different versions of this, but this is the version I have. Uh, you say the epigenetic transformation of necessity and causality, starting from reason itself, reveals that contingency derives less from a possible modification of the laws of physics, than from the existence of different levels of necessity or lawfulness in which physical necessity is but one dimension. And so that necessity exists beyond just physical necessity, that's one part of necessity. And so, uh, when we talk about physics, um, has a different model, and not, I wouldn't say a model, it has, it has a different set of parameters, uh, than biology does, but all of those contribute to necessity. And this kind of goes back to, um, the fact that the laws of physics have given rise to something which can recognize the laws of physics, which kind of gives us the, invariable nature of the categories when faced with things like physics. But when you look at things like the critique of judgment, also the categories can change because the because in the critique of judgment, you're dealing with categories that are dealing with the the power to self reflection itself. Exactly the power of self reflection itself. And that's why that's why in the third critique, Kant adds, so to speak, a new category to the the ones developed in the first critique, which is proposiveness. Yes. That was not present in the first set of categories. And proposiveness in the third critique becomes a category of the category of causality, enough necessity, both of them. And which means that in Kant himself, from one critique to to the other, there is an epigenetic development because because the proposiveness was not present in the beginning. It means that the categories are able to develop themselves to evolve. And this I think may as you just take into account at all because as you say very rightly for him, Kant would only talk about physical necessity and would not allow for the contingency of the laws of nature. Presently this is what Kant does in the third critique. So may I just argue, is only valid if you take the first critique only into account? And I also wanted to add something important that we hadn't touched on, which is the epigenetics as a science. Yes. Because we talked about epigenesis, which was, as I said, this biological theory. But since let's say the mid 20th century, that was the development of the science called epigenetics. That studies the translation of the DNA into RNA. And is that the origin of the formation of different physical individuals? I mean, our epigenetic character is the way we look, so to speak, like the individualization of the DNA. And the brain, as we said, also is said to have an epigenetic development, meaning that it depends the evolution of the brain depends a lot on every kinds of influences from the outside, education. So the brain is at the same time a structure and something that evolves and differentiates itself through the different influences, just like our genetic development, also is exposed to the influences of education, of environment, of experience, etc. I think this is important. And may as well, at all, account for that. For him, necessarily, it's only physical, yes, it concerns only physical laws, never, yes, biological laws that are so flexible, so plastic. Because purpose is a function of life, right? Like an asteroid hurtling through space doesn't have a purpose per se, unless it is given by some form of consciousness, even animal consciousness. So, and what we see is there are some categories that seem to stay the same because they're related to physics, but the categories related to life can appear, disappear, reappear, and change in, course, because they are linked to the evolution of consciousness itself. Absolutely, absolutely. I mean, consciousness itself is a living being. But this does not mean that we have to adopt per se's point of view and saying that the construction of consciousness is entirely apostereory. I think we need to, as I said, to find a middle point between the pure abstraction of the transcendental and its biological being. Yes, and I think that's where I feel like, and maybe I tend to regress to mental pictures, but what I feel like people like Pierce, Mayasu, what they're saying is they're giving us view of consciousness without a mirror. This idea that consciousness does not act upon itself, and you cannot leave out that dimension because that dimension is incredibly powerful. And it is the difference, it is strange that when you start to understand this process, you start to understand the difference, not the difference, but the synthesis of determinism and freedom. Exactly. And you know, this reflection is precisely what can't cause critique. It's the critical dimension of the mind. So one thing is the set of categories necessary to understand the world as a wrap. Another is the way in which the mind reflects on itself, reflects on its own power, on its own categories as a wrap. And this mirroring is what can't cause critique. And this critical dimension is negated by philosophers like Pierce or how do you say Pierce or Pierce? You know what? I don't actually know. I always, I always, yes, okay. Yeah. But I'm not sure. I'm not sure. And yes, it is this critical dimension that philosophers like Pierce or Pierce negate by saying no, no, no, this doesn't exist. I mean, reflexivity is an illusion. Or it is made only possible because of this evolutionary structure of the mind, but it is not a structure. And I think that it is very dangerous to say that. Because for me, freedom, as you say, we are determined, this is true, but we're also free. And freedom means, first of all, for me, the capacity to reflect on who we are. I mean, without this reflexive dimension, then we are only mechanisms, pure mechanisms. And I don't think that's true. And because we can reflect, we can change. And that's the fundamental nature. I did, and if I am just totally off base here, feel free to just say, no, it doesn't work. I did some work in record 10 years ago. So I might just completely butcher this. But if I don't know if you've read time and narrative. But when he talks about the three types of mimesis, prefiguration, configuration, and then refiguration, which is interesting, you know, the ideas of time pop up as we're talking here. But is that, and maybe this is what you want to do next with Hegel, because it reminds me a lot of this process of epigenesis, this idea of we have our pre-understanding of the world, we have our categories. And then we deal with the actual story we're told that courses from a narrative standpoint, which I understand consciousness is more than narrative, but that's a major part of it. And then you have, once you have, you have dealt with the story as a whole, you know, you have your pre-understanding of story, then you have your understanding of the story, and then you take that, and you read that back out into the world. Is there, is that very similar? Is that like, I obviously asked from a narrative standpoint, but is that a good way of thinking about how epigenesis happens? So thank you so much for that, because it's really a coincidence, because I'm teaching recur at the moments. But not time and narrative, even if we talk a lot about it, but oneself as another. That also requires a lot of narrative categories, and he in this book, Rika, very often refers to time and narrative. So yes, it is very interesting. And as I said in the book, in the Kant book, Rika also has a strong concept of epigenesis. Maybe we can start with this epigenesis for Rika, designates the present moment, that is the sign-ups, as it says, between very long, I mean, an archaic past. So far away that we cannot even date it, and teleology that is a very distant future. And Rika says critique, the critical instance is to articulate both in this present moment that he calls the epigenetic moment in the middle of time. And this is where the narrative starts. The power of, as you say, of configuration, the first mimesis is the capacity to invent a story that is to reconcile necessity and contingency. by creating, yes, a narrative that situates itself between this very remote origin and this very remote future. A narrative is what holds together the absence of origin because it's too far away and the uncertainty of the future. So it perfectly resonates with what Heidegger is saying, but what it adds is that for Hikker, it can only take the form of a narrative. It cannot be, and he is very adamant on that, it cannot be a book like being in time. Philosophy is not able to answer the problem of necessity and contingency. Building narratives is the only way to deal with it. So philosophy has to encompass narrative in some sort of way. Because Hikker doesn't agree with Heidegger that only philosophy can address the problem that we were talking about a moment ago, like this being that has so little time as Sarah. Because Hikker says the only way of addressing it is to create a narrative, is to configure and reconfigure finitude. Can you explain, and I think I understand, but I love the title before tomorrow. Thank you for that answer, by the way. I'll probably go back and what and what should rewatch your explanation there. When you say before tomorrow, what is that title in reference to? It's a reference to the a priori nature of the transcendental. And says it is given before all experience. So this is before. And tomorrow is the after, which would be the purses approach to the construction of consciousness, everything happens after aposteriori. And before tomorrow is a translation of a priori, aposteriori. And epigenesis would be, as Hikker says, the synapse between both. Yeah, I would, this is what I would answer. If that makes sense. Yes, and I think you also, and I could be wrong here, but you also mentioned a biological wager that neurobiology is going to go. That you think that as the research continues, it's going to go into more epigenetic path. Yes, for sure. Yes. Even if you know the dialogue that I was mentioning a moment ago between preformatism and epigeneticism is reinstated today by the dialogue between scientists who maintain that everything is genetic. That is in a way preform and everything is epigenetic. So in a way, historical or developmental. There's a strong quarrel at the moment in biology is everything genetic, like intelligence, for example. Or is the mind and the brain and the body developing through time and remaining open to influences are also, you know, the debate is still on very much. So they're done. And so I had that feeling at the end of the book that you were wagering the epigenesis will come out on top. I also worked on intelligence because I was so interested in the artificial intelligence. And I read so many books that still affirm today. I mean, that intelligence is innate and entirely genetic. So it's also a political question. You know, it's also a political issue behind all that. There's a political issue. Like are some people more talented, more, yes, more genetically superior to others, you know. So, perhaps my conclusion is more political than scientific. But when I argue that epigenetics will win, it's also a matter of saying that no one is superior, you know, that there's no innate. Yes. Enates the priority. Yeah. Yeah. As we, I want to be conscious of your time. As we kind of wrap up here, what are some final words that you would leave to our listeners, both for the application of this and maybe a call to action for them. First of all, I would like to say that very difficult books undoubtedly extremely difficult like the first critique by count can be while read in a certain way, perfectly accessible and containing so many urgent questions. So I would, it would be an invitation to, to philosophy, I mean, to stop thinking that philosophy is out of reach, you know, and reserved to, to a few of us. So that would be my first point. It needs work. It needs, of course, it needs a discipline. It's, but everything like everything else, you know, you cannot play the piano without exercising. It's the same thing for philosophy. So yes, do philosophy, please. That would be my first point. The second point is remain open to what happens in the scientific realm. Biology, he's has known a constantly revolutionary transformation since I would say, yes, the second half of the 20th century, the discovery of epigenetics etc. This also remain open to all scientific revolutions happening in your time. I think this is also very interesting, very important. There are many reviews, many journals, many books that can help. Because I think that people most of the time remain to attach to old visions, for example, of genetics. They don't know that the human genome has been sequenced in 2003 and that we found that in fact very, very small portion of our genome was coding. And that's it, you know, like remain open. Remain epigenetically open. So besides your own, your own book, which people should read. What are some other resources people could read to become acquainted with this issue? Obviously, the critique of pure reason you have Heidegger, you have your own book. What would you recommend? On count, you mean? To just with the issue that you're dealing with here, you know, even because there's a biological component to it too. So is there a good introduction to the biological time? On biology, I think the work by Edelman on consciousness, the work of, but he's French Jean-Pierre Chonjeu. I don't know if neuronal man. I don't know if he's well known in the US, but I used it quite him quite a lot with his theory of synaptic selection. Yes, I think this is very interesting. Everything that revolves around the epigenetic development of the brain. There are many, many books now available. I also enjoy. I didn't quote him in the book, but I think he's very important. Of course, his doc is the selfish Jean, the extended phenotype. This is my favorite, the extended phenotype. On epigenetic development. You know, the difference between genotype phenotype. It's very interesting book. Terence Deacon as well. You have Terence Deacon in the US who's very interesting. The development biologist, Lynn Margulis. She works on symbiosis. The development of, you know, how we have the microbiome and how our immune system has to deal with internal hosts like fungi, etc. I think it's very related to my book. I cannot explain that now, but it all, you know. So yes, I would say many, many recent books in cell biology. Yes. And then from the conscious standpoint, maybe something that make it more accessible to people so they don't have to dive right into. metaphysics. Yes, yes. it is true, it is very difficult. I would say that you know the books by Delos are great, she's Delos, you know, this book on counts practical philosophies very good. I don't know because I'm sorry I have French references but no worries. I'm sure that in the US you have also book of vulgarization of calm that might be, I think the editors of content, Cambridge edition, Paul Gyer is very good. Yeah. Yeah, I put you on the spot so that's entirely my bad. So don't feel don't feel any responsibility there. So thank you and I think that's a great place for people. Thank you. Thank you for your questions. It was a very interesting discussion. I was wondering in the beginning I said oh my god, how will it be? Yes. Your email came out of the blue and thank you so much because this is great. I think you're enjoying it. It's very, very good, very nice. Thank you and it's a real pleasure to have you on. So I just want to say thank you and to our listeners feel free to we'll have the links down below to some of these books and to dig deeper into Dr. Melibu's work. Thank you so much BJ. [Music]