Emergency Podcast: Iran Strikes Back

[Music] I'm Andrew Schwartz and you're listening to the Truth of the Matter, a podcast by CSIS where we break down the top policy issues of the day and talk with the people that can help us best understand what's really going on. Things are changing rapidly in the United States situation and Israel situation with Iran. I asked our Middle East Program Director Mona Yacobian to come on and give us some perspective. We're talking at 4 p.m. on Monday, June 23rd. So I want to date this podcast because we don't know what's going to happen in the next few hours. Do we, Mona? Absolutely, don't. I think at time and date and hour stamp and maybe even minute stamp is in order given how quickly things are evolving. Absolutely. So I want to ask you, Mona, about the significance of the U.S. strikes over the weekend on Iran and I also want to ask you how now on Monday has Iran responded and what is this signal in the way that they did respond? Well, I don't think it's an exaggeration. Andrew to say that President Trump's decision to go after those three Iranian nuclear sites could be perhaps the most consequential decision of either term of his presidency. It's the first time in recent memory that the U.S. has undertaken such an incredibly large-scale attack against Iran. And it could, depending on how things evolve, it could be a defining moment in the region. Clearly, President Trump made the decision that this was an opportune moment to go after, in particular, Faradah, the underground nuclear enrichment facility. He saw an opportunity. I think this is, of course, after Israeli operations. He took it and now we have to see what comes next. And so Iran did respond this afternoon and what is their response signal in the way that they did their response on the U.S. base in Qatar? The response, really, in a way, I think it's sort of a Goldilocks response, right? In that the Iranians did enough to signal they're still standing. There are some sort of parallels between the numbers of missiles they shot at El U Day, the largest U.S. military base in the region and the numbers of missiles or bombs dropped on Iran. So they seemed to be signaling tit for tat quite literally, but they choreographed it in such a way and telegraphed it, I guess, more importantly, to the U.S., to the Qataris, such that there were no casualties. That was purposeful. So big enough to make a bit of a splash, but not so big as to prompt a massive U.S. counter response. And why won't the U.S. respond just because there's no casualties? Do you expect that the Trump administration will view this as no harm, no foul, the missiles were intercepted, no one got hurt? What do you expect next from the Trump administration? The majority of the statements coming out of senior Trump administration officials and the president himself. I think they're looking to keep this a fairly bounded military intervention. Maybe we could call it a one and done. I don't think they're interested in getting drawn into an open-ended military confrontation with Iran. This is Andrew very reminiscent of what happened in 2020 after the U.S. assassinated or killed, the assassins, Salamonni, the Iranians responded again, telegraphing what they were going to do. It was enough of a strike to catch everybody's attention, no casualties. U.S. did not respond and the situation began to de-escalate. I think this is similarly what the U.S. is looking to do right now. Mona, there's been some indication, some reporting based on satellite imagery and other sources on the ground that Iran moved, enriched uranium away from Isfahan before the United States was able to strike it with Tomahawk missiles. Where do you think it could possibly be? Do you think the Israelis know where it is? The United States knows where it is. And how important is it for that material to be destroyed? Well, I don't think anyone knows where it is. I think that's actually the problem, right? That 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, not at all clear whether it remained, I think it was in Ferdinand or whether it was transported prior to the U.S. strikes. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, they themselves say, "We don't know where it is. Why is that important?" Because if Iran retains a highly large stockpile of highly enriched uranium, then it's very hard to make the argument that its nuclear program has been fully dismantled. And even if they still have this material, do you and other experts believe that they've been set back significantly due to the strikes from Israel, due to the strike from the United States? I mean, clearly they've taken a hit. But in the absence of clear bomb damage assessments from the ground, and again here too, it's unlikely that the IAEA will be able to come back into Iran and inspect and see where things happen. We really won't know for sure. And I think the fear or the concern is that Iran may have shifted its calculus and may indeed perhaps make a race toward some kind of even crude nuclear weapon. As a result of all of what's happened over the last couple of weeks, we'll have to see, but we certainly, I don't think anyone can say with certainty, the extent of damage right now to Iran's nuclear program. And Mona, what about what is its stake for Iran's immediate neighbors and for the Middle East more broadly? Well, I think the stakes for Iran's Gulf Arab neighbors are nothing short of existential. So this really gend the Arab Gulf in particular really made a strategic decision not to have sort of pot confrontation with Iran, but rather to push for a de-escalation of tensions in the region in the name of the imperative that they feel to diversify their economies, to exceed economic growth both in the Gulf and across the region. So what they're seeing now, I think, is in a way a nightmare scenario, a kind of large scale conflict between the U.S. Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other, the potential for spill over into their countries. What happens inside Iran is Iran broadly destabilized. Does that lead to refugee flows into the Arab Gulf countries, all kinds of unknowns right now that I think are very, very unsettling for the Arab Gulf? And let me ask you this, can we expect the Gulf Arab nations to support the U.S. effort and Israel's effort? You know, I think, but they are in favor of right now is de-escalation. They came out and pretty strongly condemned Israel when it began the attacks. They were also calling for de-escalation after the U.S. attacks, and they've also condemned now Iran for its strikes on Qatar's, you know, the El-Adeb base in Qatar. They have been very consistent in calling for the need for de-escalation and to find diplomatic solutions to this looming conflict. Mona, I want to ask you about sort of the second and third order consequences of this strike. When we think about how the peace might be made, you have to think about China and Russia. What kind of role do you think that they could potentially play in building a peace here, a lasting peace in the Middle East between Israel and Iran, the United States and Iran? It's notable, Andrew, in a lot of ways, is actually really kind of how minimal the role is that both China and Russia have played. I mean, the Chinese, I think we've had maybe one or two statements from Xi, you know, calling for de-escalation, raising concerns about these really strikes and so forth. Similarly, with Putin, he hosted, of course, the Iranian foreign minister today in Moscow. But honestly, I actually think we're seeing in a funny way the limitations of their role in the Middle East at a moment of great crisis. Neither one has the leverage, the depth, the diplomatic bench to really be the peacemaker. That I don't see. I think the US actually is really plays that critical role and will play that critical role going forward. If the Iranians seem to be trying to de-escalate a little bit, even which is strange, given that they've just shot missiles at a US base, but what you're saying is that, you know, it was a light attempt at a retaliation, they telegraphed it. What will bring them to the table? It's notable to me that it took a very, very long time to negotiate with Iran to get to the JCPOA, that the Obama administration structured. So what is it going to take to get them back to the table now, after all of this? It's a great question, and I think it's an open question. Can they be compelled back to the table? Because their rhetoric anyway has been such that they've underscored how the US, you know, it has now committed an enact of war against them, that they cannot trust the United States, that they will never negotiate under pressure. That's their rhetorical position. Whether in reality that's bluster and they are at a certain moment willing to come back to the table remains to be seen. At the end of the day, I do think that the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader, and those around him, they're going to prioritize regime survival. So if regime survival means they find a way back to the table, then they'll find a way back to the table. But I'm not sure we're there yet, or maybe not even close. We'll have to wait and see what happens in the coming days. I wonder if they can actually create a situation where their regime can survive. There's a lot of talk about regime change, both on the side of interest not wanting regime change or that to be the goal. And then there's other remarks that show that maybe that's what the situation is here anyway, that really that's really what we want. What do you think can compel them to reckon with all this? I mean, I think we have to watch and see what happens inside Iran. Israel is continuing its strikes. We've seen a broadening of the types of targets they're going after. I think reporting suggests that they may be even going after the Baciage, which are really those forces responsible for internal security. It's an incredibly volatile situation inside Iran today. We know that the Supreme Leader is hiding in a bunker somewhere, and even his ability to communicate with senior leadership is in question. So I think we're at this moment, Andrew, right now, where we're kind of with it's really a series of unknowns, not clear. Not clear how stable the regime is, not clear what kinds of capabilities they retain to preserve themselves. Again, I think we're going to only time will tell. And we're also in a very volatile situation. So things are changing as we noted at the top of this. They're changing by the day, if not by the hour. So Mona, I want to close by asking you, you know, overall does it feel safer today than it was a day or two ago or less safe? Concerned about the ways in which these kinds of challenges are being managed. So yes, Iran's nuclear sites were bombed. We don't know the extent of the damage fully yet. We don't know if Iran still retains some sort of nuclear capability. And as I said, it's calculus may have shifted so that it makes the decision that in fact it's going to try to rush to weaponize. So that would put us in a much more dangerous place. And I guess also I think we have to think about the precedence that are being set. The use of military force to address and ideally try to resolve this issue around Iran's nuclear ambitions. Nobody is interested in Iran getting a nuclear weapon. The question is, what is the most effective and sustainable way to do that and to do it in a way in which the international norms and governance surrounding nuclear non-proliferation are also upheld? I think those are going to be frankly big questions that we all should be watching closely in the weeks and months ahead. Has the show forced like this and there has been no show force like this. But has force in the past helped the situation or hurt the situation as opposed to negotiations? Well, I think it depends on the objective, right? It depends on, I mean, if this was about or is about coercive diplomacy with the intent of getting Iran to the table as we talked about. Then I think and it's successful in doing so. And we can see where the use of force in a limited manner with clear objectives is effective and makes sense. If however this morphs into something else and we've talked about regime change, I think that's a concern and that really leads to fears that we're heading into an unknown, that we're heading into a space in which there are, that we could be entering into an open-ended conflict. I'm not saying we're there. I think really we're going to know a lot more in the coming week or so. Let's see what happens on the ground inside Iran. And then I think we'll be able to more effectively judge. Was this use of force effective? Did it accomplish objectives? Are we safe for now? Have we moved toward negotiations and a way to actually take kinetic gains and translate them into strategic and lasting gains? I think that's really the key question. Mona, thank you so much and I know we'll be talking in the days and weeks to come. Really appreciate your time today for this emergency podcast given what's happened. Thanks so much for having me and we've enjoyed the conversation. If you enjoyed this podcast, check out our larger suite of CSIS podcasts from into Africa, the Asia Chess Board, China Power, AIDS 2020, the Trade Guys, Smart Women's Smart Power, and more. You can listen to them all on major streaming platforms like iTunes and Spotify. Visit csis.org/podcasts to see our full catalog.