Economic Statecraft – Neuordnung der Weltwirtschaft

* Musik * BTO, Beyond, The obvious, der Ökonomie-Podcast mit Dr. Daniel Städte. Featured bei Handelsblatt. Hallo und herzlich willkommen zu neuestem Ausgabe meines Podcasts. Ich freue mich sehr, dass ihr auch in dieser erneut Tonentenwoche wieder mit dabei sind. Der Krieg Miran scheint länger zu gehen als ihr Gaufthaben und vor allem näheren sich die Meldungen über Schäden bei Infrastruktur bzw. auch an Schüffen, die sie in der Straße von der Mos aufhalten. Damit wachsen die Risiken für die Weltwirtschaft. Und das führt zu der Frage, war das Donald Trump bewusst, dass die Risiko eingeht? Hat er gedacht, ach, es wird schon so einfach wählen wie ein Venezuela? Ohne hat er gesagt, das Risiko ist da, aber ich muss es tun, einfach deshalb, weil es bestand, dass man einer großen Strategie ist. Es werden sie sagen, Donald Trump und große Strategie das kann doch gar nicht sein. Ich habe heute aber ein Gesprächspartner da sagt, neja, wenn man auf den Konflikt blickt zwischen den USA und China, dann gibt es schon so etwas, wenn eine große Strategie, diese große Strategie ist voraus, dass man zum einen die US-Wirtschaft gerund legend umbaut, weg von einer durch und durch finanzialisierten Konsumgesellschaft hin, sondern Gesellschaft, die wieder mehr investiert und auch produziert, sich wird auch gerade waffen. Und zugleich eine Strategie, die sagt, wir müssen China eindämmen. Ich fand das ganze hohe Levantes so aktuell, es ist im Prinzip Geoökonomie in der Praxis, wo genau deshalb schauen wir uns das in der heutigen Ausgabe genauer an. Ich hoffe, sie find's genauso spannend, fangen wir also an. BTO, Beyond The obvious, featured by Handelsplatten. In diesem Podcast haben wir uns schon mehrfach mit dem Thema Geoökonomie beschäftigt. Und heute, müssen wir es erneut tun, was angesichts der Ereignisse im Iran auf der Hand liegt. Es gibt einige Analysten, die einen, wie ich finde, besonders klarem und interessanten Blick auf die Welt haben. Ein davon ist Michael Everry. Er ist der Senior Glow Resulidist bei der niedränderischen Rabobank und sitzt in Singapur. In einer Reihe von Peepern hatte er in den vergangenen zwei Jahren seine Sicht der Welt dargelegt. Zunächst hatte er in einem Peeper mit dem Titel "Economic Policy vs. Economic Statecraft" klargemacht, dass wir offensichtlich, wenn wir ökonomisch auf die Welt blicken, eben nicht das sehen, was wirklich passiert. Er sagt, "Economic Policy", da geht es darum, Zinsen zu senken, zu erhöhen, Infektion, ein zu dem Wachstum zu befördern, etc., mit dem Ziel, irgendwie den Wohlstand an Nation zu erheben. Er kontrastiert diese Economic Policy mit "Economic Statecraft". Da sagt er, geht es eben nicht darum, einfach den Wohlstand zu erhöhen, sondern man nutzt wirtschaftliche Instrumente nicht um wirtschaftliche Ziele zu erreichen, sondern um geopolitische und als nahe Sicherheitsziele zu unterstützen. Das ist ein ganz wichtige Unterschied. Einfaches Wachstum zum Thema Wohlstand oder wirtschaftliche Stärke als geopolitische Waffe. Deshalb spricht er auch eben von "Economic Statecraft". Und er dann erklärt, wie sich der Blickwickel im Nord, liegt man nur auf Wirtschaftswachs und Wohlstand, kommt man bei ganz wichtigen Fragestellungen zu ganz anderen Antworten, als wenn man eben sagt, die Wirtschaft dient der geopolitischen Stärke der Economic Statecraft. Er hat dazu eine Art Tabelle erstellt, wo er nacheinander die typischen Dinge durchgeht. Schauen wir uns die einzelnen Kriterien einmal an. Freie Handelsabkommen. Für Konomen unstrittig eine gute Idee, denn sie führen zu mehr Wachstum und zu mehr Wohlstand. Jene, die er geopolitisch denken, sehen das anders. Sie würden Fragestabkommen nur taktisch einsetzen und eigentlich nur dann, wenn es einen direkten ökonomischen Nutzen gibt im Sinne von, man stärkt die eigene Wirtschaft im geopolitischen Webbewerbbel anderen Region. Zölle zum Beispiel würden natürlich ökonomen sagen, ganz schlecht. Sind aus sich denjenigen, die an die Staatskraft sozusagen denken? Was anderes? Sie sagen, Zölle können durchaus dazu dienen, die nationale Sicherheit zu erhöhen. Stichwort "Mher Produktion im Lande". Das Gute für Subventionen. Wer den Staat stark machen möchte, um in einer geäpolitischen Auseinandersetzung erfolgreich zu sein, sieht Subvention nicht kritisch. Ökonomen durch das Schoen. Ökonomen würden sagen, Kapitalkontrollen gehen gar nicht. Jene, die er in die Staatskund denken, an die staatliche Kraft sagen, warum nicht? Kapitalkontrollen können uns helfen, unseren Interessen durchzusetzen. Und auch bei der Fiskalpolitik ist es so. Ökonomen haben am liebsten Redeln. Diejenigen, die an die Staat denken, sagen, wir brauchen sie wohl frei, Raum wie möglich. Das heißt, es gibt eine ganz andere Sichtweise auf das gleiche Problem. Und "Every" macht dem Punkt und sagt, wenn USA es so, die haben erkannt, es geht nicht mehr um Ekonorik-Policy, sondern es geht darum, eben die Wirtschaft so umzubauen, dass sie unseren geäopolitischen Zielen diht. Das war die Kern seiner Aussagen im Herbst 2024. Und er macht klar, dass es eben diesen Konflikt gibt. Es gibt staatliche Eingriffe, die Ökonomisch schlecht finden, die aber eben die Staatskünstler, diejenigen, die Staat aufbauen wollen, als er notwendiges Instrumentse. Ein Jahr später, nachdem er die Tesen geschrieben hat, im Herbst 2025, hat er überprüft, was die USA denn tatsächlich gemacht haben. Und er signtlich scheint viele für zu sprechen, dass die USA dem Skript folgen. Der Titel des Peppers im Herbst 2025 war übrigens durchaus interessant. Er sprach von "Reverse Peristräuger", Trump als umgekehrter Gorbatschaff. Weder erinnern uns, Gorbatschaff ist er nicht angetreten, um es auf Wettung und Abzuschaffen. Er wollte sie umbauen, er wollte sie umbauen, von einer Wirtschaft die ausschließlich auf Verteidigung, auf Rüstung, auf Industrie konzentriert war, zu einer Wirtschaft, die eben auch die Konsumwünsche der Bevölkerung erfüllt. Bekanntlich ist der Umbau damals ziemlich schiefgegangen, weil jemand am Anfang die Wirtschaft kollabierte, eshoffation gab und eine entsprechende Verarmung der Bevölkerung. Diese Wettunion fand ichs bei Larry Empferium zu unterstützen und brach in der Folge zusammen. Trump, so Michael Everey, versucht heute das Gegenteil. Er möchte eine übermäßig finanzialisierte Gesellschaft, die vor allem Konsum orientiert ist, in Richtung produktiver Investitionen, vor allem auch für die militärische Produktion umbauen. Das heißt, damals Russland, viel Verteidigung, viel Industrie, wenig Konsum, heute USA, viel Konsum, vor allem viel Konsum auf Kredit, wenig Produktion, und bressieb zwei Gegenpunkte, man will sich annäher. Und Trump's Ziel ist deshalb, whatever it is, anders als ein Capitalism, with the National Security Face. Tatemotto, wir haben von den Capitalismus noch, aber wir greifen ein, um eben die Wirtschaftsordnung so umzubauen, dass wir auch in der Lage sind, zukünftig im Webverb mit China und vom geopolitischen Webverb mit China zu bestehen. Deshalb wundert sich Everey nicht darüber, dass es nie um mehr Kanteilismus gibt mit Zölln und Exportkontrollen. Er würde auch sagen, dass es mit restem USA wäre, eine Art Warschau abpackt, mit wirtschaftlich verbündeten Staaten zu schließen. Es könnte mir natürlich sagen, bis jetzt ist es ja so, dass die Europäer eher nicht so richtig als verbündete Wagen um werden. Every would aber sagen, na ja, die Wahrheit ist, die Europäer wird eigentlich in die amerikanische Orl und hineingezwohlen. Deshalb ist auch die Diskussion zu Thema Kapitalverkehrskontrollen in Form dieses Reveres Marshallplans, beziehungsweise Maralago Accord, wir haben darüber schon jeden Spruch vor einigen Monaten durchaus nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Wie gesagt, die ist so richtig offiziell, aber versuche, den Freienfluss und Kapital zu eigenen Gunsten zu beeinflussen, gibt es von US-Seite durchaus. In die Kategorie der Instrumenten, zu dem Thema, fallen übrigens auch die Dollar-Stable-Coin, aber darauf kommen wir gleich noch. Ebenso wichtig ist eine zunehmende, staatliche Rolle in wichtige Schlüsselsektoren. Wir innen uns, Donald Trump hat begonnen, sich sogar an Unternehmen zu beteiligen, quasi an staatlichen Investor, wenn er glaubte, es wäre Betresse der USA. Everybody. befreit das Ganze so. In diesem Sinne scheint Trump das Ziel eines Kapitalismus mit nationaler Sicherheitsfassade zu verfolgen. Das Folgendes beinhaltet. Eine Verschmelzung von nationaler und wirtschaftlicher Sicherheitsstrategie. Ein finanzpolitisches System mit der untergeordneten FED. Neomerkantelistischen Handel, das heißt Zölle, nicht tarifere Handelshebtenisse und Exportkantrollen. Ein faktisch fragmetiertes Dollar-System durch Dollar-Stable-Kreuz und Bitcoin. Die Schaffung eines in Anführungsstrichen Warschauer Paktzidäologisch ausgerichtet hat, integreter Volkswirtschaften. Eine neue Wirtschafts-Zwichtlungsstrategie für andere Volkswirtschaften. Kapitalverkehrskontrollen für Kapitalabflüsse und darüber hinaus auch für Kapitalzuflüsse. Beiche Budgetbeschränkungen für Schlüsselsektoren und Sparmasnahmen für andere. Eine staatliche Rolle in Schlüsselsektoren und freie Märkte, die von der Financialisierung hin zu produktiven Investitionen gelenkt werden. Preiskontrollen und Dirigulierungen zur Beseitigung strukturere Wachstumsemmnisse. Freie Arbeitsmarkte weiterhin mit einem kleinen, sozialen Sicherheitsnetz, aber größer um Fokus auf Bezahlbarkeit, statt Sozialleistungen, während gleichzeitig die Nettozuwanderung umgekehrt wird, um die Löhne zu erhöhen. Es geht also um einen grundlegenden Umbau-Dou-Es-Wirtschaft. Und dann kommen die Sebel-Koise-Spiel. Dazu schreibt "Every" etwas sehr bemerkenswertes. Wenn ein ausländisches Unternehmen einen Dollar-Stable-Koien halten möchte, erhält ein US-amerikanischer Stable-Koien-Emitynt, die devisen des betreffenden Landes, verkauft sie an die zuständige Zentralbank gegen Dollar, leitet die Dollar an das Westfinanzministerium weiter und tauscht sie gegen eine Schatzanweisung ein. Anschließend gibt er dem Unternehmen einen Stable-Koien-Ausdösegebnis. Dollar fließen in die USA, während die USA ihr Haushaltsdefizit mit Schatzanweisungen zu niedrigeren Zinsetzen finanzieren. Es verlassen keine Dollar die USA, sondern lediglich tocken. Und die ausländischen Bestände an US-Starts schulden erhöhen sich nicht. Stable-Koins sind also Instrument, um das Triff in die Lämmer zu umgehen. Triff in die Lämmer zu Erinnerung, dass es die Situation, dass das Land, wenn es die Weltreserbewerung stellt, immer Hannes-Divizite fahren muss, um quasi die Welt mit ausreichender Liquidität im korreten Fall, mit du Ester Liquidität zu versorgen. Das war ein Grund dafür, warum Brettonwut sich funktioniert hat. Und so gesehen ist es ein Ansatz zu sagen, wir behalten US-Dominanz, aber eben ohne die Nachteile des Triff in die Lämmer zu haben, Stichwort, Hannes-Divizite, Stichwort, Deindustrialisierung. Die USA erhalten also die Vorteile der Dollarhigumonie, ohne Nachteile. Kein Wunder, dass die EZB darüber alarmiert ist. Die hat durchaus verstanden, was es bedeutet und schreibt ein Blogbeitrag mit dem Titel vom Heipzöge Fahr, was Stable-Koins darüber bedeuten, folgendes. Sollten US-Dollar Stable-Koins im Euroraum weit verbreitet sein, sei es für Zahlungen, Sparen oder die Abwicklung von Transaktionen, könnte die Kontrolle der EZB über die Geldpolitik geschwächt werden. Diese, wenn auch gleich in der Entwicklung, könnte Muster-Widerspiegeln, die in dollarisierten Volkswirtschaften beobachtet wurden. Angesichts des Netzwerkcharakters von Stable-Koins, oder damit verbundenen Skaleneffekte, während solche Entwicklungen schwer umzukehren. Die größer ihrer Reichweite, desto schwieriger wäre es, diese wieder abzubauen. Eine solche Dominanz des US-Dollars würde den USA strategische und wirtschaftliche Vorteile verschaffen, da sie es Ihnen ermöglichen würde, ihre Schulden günstiger zu finanzieren und gleichzeitig globalen Einfluss auszuüben. Ich glaube nicht, das stand heute US-Dulm-Koins zur Zahlung in den Innerhalb des Euroraums verwendet. Aber Perspektivisch kann ich schon ein Problem sein, wenn zunehmend auf dieser Art und Weise Kapazale in USA angelägt wird und nicht mehr in Europa. Ohnehin ist die Frage, was Europa gegen die Sebelkonston könnte. Besetzt muss der Europa immer nachgeben, wie er wiederaligt. Europa hat gesagt, es würde nicht 5% des BIP für die NATO ausgeben, bis auf 1, 2 Ausnahmen tut es das jetzt. Europa hat gesagt, es würde kein unfaires Handelsabkommen mit den USA abschließen, hat es aber getan. Das ist die Realität. Wenn Europa versucht, DOLLARS-Dabelkollens zu blockieren, wird es agergeben. Stichwort NATO, Handelsbeschränkungen, Ukraine-Waffenlieferungen, Lieferung von Energie und auch bezüglich der Zusage der US-Modembank Fett im Falle von Problemen in Finanzmärkten auch zu Gunsten Europas zu definieren. Das Ganze kiminiert bei Michael Everry in der Warnung. Die Märkte sollten nicht annehmen, dass dies nur eine verrübergehende Phase ist. Die tieferwurzelte langjährige Ideologie des Neomarkantilismus müsste wohl erst wieder durch den Freihande besiegt werden, was schwierig ist. Die offene Frage ist natürlich, hat Donald Trump wirklich eine solche Strategie. Und wenn ja, kann sie funktionieren. Die Risiken sind erheblich, aber, besorgt nicht ausschließen, dass sie eine Strategie hat. Sie verfolgt, das ist so der Umständen auch funktioniert. Und genau um das, besser zu verstehen, habe ich mich mit Michael Everry zum Gespräch verabredet. Bevor wir zum Gespräch mit Michael Everry kommen, noch ein Hinweis für Höhre und Töra, die zu den Themen Wirtschaft, Politik und Finanzender rund um die Uhr auf dem laufenden Seil möchten, wird doch kein Hannesbad abonemor haben. Und in dem Link Hannesbad.com schriegstrich mehr Perspektiven, finden Sie zurzeit ein H+Fottersangebot. Für nur 1 Euro können Sie vier Wochen lang auf alle Ebenhalte zugreifen und sich so von der Qualität des Hannesbad zu überzeugen. Der Link zum Angebot finden Sie wir immer, auch in Schoenort zu dieser Ausgabe. Doch nun zum angespräch ich mit Michael Everry. Michael Everry ist Senior Global Strategist bei Rabobankon, dann er der originellsten Marko-Denker unserer Zeit. Er denkt nicht nur in den üblichen Kategorien von Sinsen und Inflazion, sondern verbindet Geopolitik, Geschichte und Ökonomie zu einem Gesamtbild, das er Grant Markro Strategy nennt. Everry hat in den letzten zwei Jahren eine bemerkenswerte Serie von Analysen veröffentlicht, die zeigen, wie die Trump-Administrationen wirtschaftliche Instrumente systematisch für geopolitische Ziele einsetzt. Von Zölln, Westable Coins, bis hin zu einem neuen, wahrschauer Pakt verbindet Herfaxwirtschaft. Die immer bei Englischsprachigen Interviews jetzt ein paar Highlights in der deutsche Besetzung gefirgt von kompletten Interview am Ende dieses Podcasts. Zunächst habe ich Michael Everry gefragt, dass im Unterfi zwischen Ekonorid Policy und Ekonominik Statecraft, die schüsselbe Griff seiner gesamten Analyse. Ekonominik Statecraft ist ein viel umfassenderer, viel älterer als Konzept, bei dem alle wirtschaftspolitischen Instrumenter auf ein gemeinsames Ziel hinarbeiten müssen. Dieses Ziel dreht sich normalerweise um nationaler Sicherheitsinteressen im weitesten Sinne, es geht darum, eine einfache, abatiefgreifende Frage zu beantworten. Wofür ist das BEP da? Jeder Politiker, der diese Frage nicht beantworten kann, betreibt offensichtlich kein Ekonominik Statecraft. Jedes Land braucht ein Leidböht, ein Verständnis dessen, was es erreichen will und warum. Dann habe ich darauf hingewiesen, dass wir in Deutschland im Grunde unseren Wohlstand nur erwirtschaften, um den Sozarschern auszubauen. Eher Antwort darauf ist so erwarbar wie er lüchtern. Gut, das können Sie als nationales Interesse definieren, aber dann müssen Sie auch fragen, wo für andere Länder ihr BEP nutzen. Wenn Ihr Nachbar seinen BEP nutzt, um in der schnellsten Geschwindigkeit seit dem 2. Berkig aufzurüsten oder eine Wirtschaft aufbaut, die Sie unter Druck setzen kann, ihre Industrie abzieht und ihren Lebensstandard so weit senken kann, dass Sie sich Ihren Soziarschern nicht mehr leisten können, dann sollten Sie vielleicht umdenken. Und dann waren wir auch schon beim Iran-Kick und die Zusammenhang bei der Grenz-Vellegie bezüglich Fina. Die Chinesische Marine wird der amerikanische in 5 bis 10 Jahren überholen, bevorausdenkt muss jetzt handeln. Die Straße von Hormus kontrolliert und damit das Öl, das durch sie fließt und von dem Hina abhängig ist, hat einen enormen Hebel. Man kann Hina sagen, ist seit jetzt von uns abhängig für eure Energie und deshalb setzen wir die Regeln. Und wie geht es nun weiter? Evere beschreibt drei mögliche Ausgänge sie rankonflikts und warum selbst Chaos für die USA vortelhaft sein könnte. In Effekt, die alle in der Mitte liegt, kommt dann der Pax Amerikaner. Im Erfolgszenario kommt der gesamte Naher Osten unter eine Pax Amerikaner, ein Westprotektorat. Amerika setzt dann aggressiver Modell um, dass sich auf Latein Amerika ausdehnt und dann fällt Europa quasi automatisch in diese Reihe. Im Chaos-Szenario eine Störung in Homostrift, China und Europa-Hater als Amerika, weil die USA über minizulanisches Öl, eigene Produktion und eine relativ kostenabetrasch verfügen. Selbst Chaos kann also zugunsten Amerika spürken, es schadet dem Rest der Welt einfach mehr. Ich miss den Grund, dass das der US-Strategie in Homostrift zu kreaten, als es in dem Zeitpunkt war, war in 1973 und der Covid-Krise und der Ukraine-Krise immer wieder. Und was wird das für Europa? Ja, hier diagnostiziert jeder eine hebliche Selbstüberschätzung. Und ich denke, es ist enterschärfsten Aussagen aus dem Gespräch. Die Superie Europäer sind immer wieder in den Raum, sagen, dass das Mann eine new Strategie in dem Weg ist, ohne dass er nicht mehr in der Welt ist. Und ich möchte, wie viele Überlegenden Europäer immer wieder in den Raum und sagen, dieser Mann hat keine Strategie. Und sie kommen dann ohne ihr Hemd wieder heraus. Und ich frage mich, wie oft das nach passieren muss, bevor Europa begreift, dass er entweder so viel Glück hat, wie kein anderer Mann auf der Welt, oder dass er Amerika, wie schon immer in der Lage ist, die Europäer wieder und wieder zu bearaschen, während es nachher. Während es nach europäischen, kulturellen Marschstüben weh nicht raffinistet Zeit. In European cultural terms. So dann haben wir die Ukraine diskutiert. Hier analysiert Everey das Europäer für die Lämmer sehr genau. Weder Niederlage, Norsik, sind Akzeptabel. In Europa sagt, der König-Ukraine nicht fallen lassen und das ist geopolitisch nachvollziehbar. Gleichzeitig ist Europa nicht bereit, die Ukraine gewinnen zu lassen, denn wenn die Ukraine, tatsächlich beginnen würde Russland zurückzudrängen, wenn sie ernsthaft drohen würde, die Territorien zurückzuerobahlen, die Russland für sich beanspruchte, vor allem die Krim, dann reden ernsthafte Militärstrategien über taktische Atombaffen. Europa sagt also, Ukraine darf nicht fallen, abgehagt, Ukraine darf nicht gewinnen. Und was will Europa dann? Stratisch entlang einer festen Linik kämpfen, so enormen Kosten oder gibt es einen besseren Deal. Etwa einen eingefrorenen Konflikt nach dem Modell Norden zu Korea. Wir haben dann noch eingehende diskutiert, was dann bedeutet, die Wirtschaft umzubauen. Ein wichtiger Hebel hierbei ist die Allerkation von Krediten, statt für Konsum eben mehr in die Produktion. Michael Every erklärt, warum man einheitlicher Zinsatz in einer Welt der Steakkraft des Funktionals ist und das mit einem Einbricksambarspiel. Wenn Sie sich in einer existenzierigen Krise befinden oder eine Krise in der Straße von der musbewärtigen müssen und die Energie rationieren, sollten Sie dann wirklich dem freien Markt überlassen, ob jemand einen strahlende, beleuchteten Tiertherapeuten laden eröffnet, wenn er stattdessen eine Munitionsfabrik aufmachen könnte, hier müssen politische Entscheidungen getroffen werden. Wenn Sie den Zinsatz von 5 auf 6 erhöhen, leiden alle. Wenn Sie ihn von 5 auf 2 Säcken profitieren alle, die nützlichen Talle der Wirtschaft und die Unnützen und traditionell kaufen alle mehr Vermögensferte. Every beschreibt dann, wie Dollar Stablecoins das vorn erklärte, triffende Lämme aushebeln und Dollarhegemöni auf ein neues Stufe heben könnten. Sie brechen damit die bilanzielle Verknüpfung zwischen Leistungsbilanz und Kapitalbelerns auf. Wenn ein ausgländisches Unternehmen einen Dollar Stablecoin halten möchte, nimmt der OS-Emittent die lokale Währung tauchst du über die Zentralbank in Dollar, gibt die Dollar dem OS-Finanzministerium für eine Tee-Bill und stellt dem Unternehmen einen Stablecoin aus. Das Ergebnis, Dollarhörs fließen in die USA, während die USA defizit mit Tee-Bills zu niedigeren Zinsen finanzieren. Kein Dollar verlässt die USA, nur tokens. Und die externe Verschuldung steigt nicht. Das ist transformativ, wenn es in großem Maßstab umgesetzt wird und ich glaube nicht, dass irgendjemand sonst ein globales Equivalent schaffen kann. Der Typ auf Deutschland macht immer klar, dass wir eigentlich nie ein richtiger Freude freihandels gewesen wären. Und das bei einer Pontierung, die ich finde, ziemlich gut passt. Deutschland war nie ein freihändler zu keinem Zeitpunkt seiner Geschichte. Die Deutschen sind allergisch gegen Handelsdefizite. Sagen Sie mir bitte, wann Deutschland das letzte Mal ein Handelsdefizitatte und gesagt hat, das ist ein Ordnung. Sie wissen also so gut, wie ich das nie passiert ist und nie passieren wird. Ergo, Sie sind keine freihändler. Sie sind Merkel-Tilisten. Sie erzählen sich selbst, Sie sind ein freihändler, aber sie sind es nicht. Und sie nutzen Fiskal-Politik-Hazebel um sicherzustellen, dass der Überschuss bestehen bleibt. Zum Schluss habe ich Michael Everie nach den konsequenzen der ganzen Analyse für Vermögensbette gefragt. Seine Anfone ist radikal und seine Ausblick auf 20/26 ebenso. Wenn Sie objektiv fragen, wofür die Gesellschaft da ist und die Antwort wäre, nun um Vermögenspreise in die Höhe zu treiben, damit ein bestimmter Prozentserzt der Bevölkerung sehr reich wird und der Rest nicht. Ein außerirdischer würde sagen, wirklich, haben Sie das nicht schon vier, ein halbierzehntelang versucht und es ist spektakulär gescheitet. 2025 gab es die Panik wegen den Zöhn und das Jahr 2026 wird zum Jahr 2025 sagen, halt mal mein Bier denn jetzt wird es ernst. Warten Sie ab, wenn die nächsten Monate die Stablecoin-Gesetzgebung in den USA kommt, das wird alles verändern. Diejenigen, die es verstehen, ob als Interviewern oder als Länder, die neue Modelle finden müssen, werden am besten aufgestellt sein. So weit einiger Highlights als mein Gespräch mit Michael Everie. Das ganze Gespräch im Original finden Sie wie immer am Ende dieses Podcasts. Ja, was machen wir jetzt daraus? Everie hat nüchtern festgestellt, dass wir in Deutschland nie so richtig frei händler gewesen sein, sondern immer mehr Kategisten. Das ist historisch, schwerze bestreiten. Von friedrichen List, Überbissmark bis zum Euro, der als strukturell unterbewählte der Wechselkurs in Export-Sipventionierte, immer haben wir darauf gesetzt, große Exporter zu erzählen. Die Rüstungs-Sipate fast Everie ebenso sachlich zusammen. Kriege gewinnt der Bemonition nicht bedrendete. Und dass die Rüstungsaktion auch in Deutschland rekordhöhe erreicht haben, ist zwar schön, ist aber kein Ausweis dafür, dass die europäische Parteitungsfähigkeit wirklich zugenommen hat. Na viel jungen Krieg, muss man da, das Wissles anderen Podcasts, durchaus skeptisch sein. Ich finde es auch spannend, die Rolle von deuer Stabilcoins. Wenn Michael Everie zeigt, wie sie genutzt werden können, um die amerikanische Chemonie auf ein neuer Stufe zu heben, das ist durchaus ein ernstzunebendes Celalier. Wir alle könnten, denn das Stabilcoins nutzen, um aus der halbdesokalen Backensystems Geld anzulegen. Es ist keine Aufruf der Steuerhinterziehung Gotteswillen, am Michael Everie hat erklärt, dass es durchaus auch so genutzt werden könnte. Für Europa sieht Everie vier Zynarien. Entweder, wir haben ihn geschlossen, oder eine kleine Kerngruppe geht voran, wer kennt es ja schon quasi, Koalition erwilligen, oder aber Europa fragt man es hier komplett. Das viele Zynario ist die Unterordnung Europas und Amerika. Drei Zynarien bedeut das seiner Sicht das endlich strategischen Autonomie. Im vierten Zynario der Unterordnung hat diese strategische Autonomie nie existiert. Ich persönlich glaube, wir werden uns unter Ornen müssen, die geben unsere Schwäche. Nächter betrachtet erleben wir keine geopolitische Unordnung, sondern eine bewusste Neuordnung der Weltwirtschaft, mit Amerika als Akteur und Europa als Zuschauer. Da ist übrigens Michael Everie, die ich finde, sehr nah an Zoltenposa, ich erinnere an die Folge der absolute Wirtschaftskrieg, denn da haben wir ähnliche Diskussionen geführt. Aus Sicht zum Michael Everie ist klar, wer das Konzept des Econobics-Stakecraft nicht versteht, kann ihm auch nichts entgegensetzen. Und ich verbutestät im Raum, dass die Erkenntnis in Europa noch nicht angekommen ist. Labille, die Behören und Hörer, in der Neut sehr herzlich fürs Zuhause zu dagen. Ich freue mich für immer auf Fragen, Feedback, Kritik und Anregungen und auf einem Video hören am kommenden Mittwoch zur neuen Ausgabe vom BTW. die O Refresh diesmal mit Prof. Werner Plumpe erklärt, warum Wirtschaftskriege die Normalität sind. Bis dahin alles Gute, ihr Deine Stellter und jetzt, nicht vergessen, das ganze Gespräch wird mal der Everry im Original. Viel Spaß damit. BTO, Beyond The obvious Featured per Handelsblatt. * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * * Musik * which would not be consistent with any of the plans that the European Commission has. So that would not be a platform it can proceed from. But if Trump fails here, if Iran can resist the American military effort in the same way that Hamas is still clinging on in Gaza, or if Trump is militarily defeated, or if Markets force Trump to retreat completely, then effectively the US has hit a brick wall. Trump can still try and become extremely aggressive in different areas and on different fronts, but the global scheme that he has starts to unravel. So this is actually the biggest gamble, not just of his second term, not just of his presidency, of his entire life. And in fact, it's the biggest gamble that the US has taken for generations. So that's also, by the way, very, very bad for Europe, if it fails. Because we do not enter a peaceful world where the rules-based order makes a comeback because Trump is humbled. We enter a world in which the US goes home, and is perhaps only interested in the Latin American sphere and the North American sphere, and says the rest of the world can do whatever it wants, which is what it did, of course, during the late 1920s and early 1930s. And if that were to happen, Europe's situation becomes absolutely dire in just the same way. So Iran matters critically, and there is no good scenario for Europe. Michael, I think we have to dive deeper into it to make it clearer to our audience about the scenarios. But first of all, it sounds like, you know, for European ears talking about Trump having a strategy, of course, sounds a bit strange because most people would say, this guy doesn't have a strategy. Of course, as you lay it out, the issue is concerning production capacity. That's why Trump tries to re-industrialize the US. I think to build up more industrial capacity, also to build up more capability to produce weapons, which is important. And we know that without China, as you pointed out, without Chinese materials, our Chinese deliveries, the US cannot basically not be defense itself, not talking about Europe. If you now look at the war, for example, in Iran, we already see the show that it's much cheaper for Iran to fight the war than for the West. I think it was the cost of stopping drones and so on. So do you see the risk that he basically stumbled here in a scenario where he cannot win because it's the case is just proving that the US has to do something about its abilities, so basically who the fact first re-industrialized and then tried to do this fight? Well, let me start with the last part of the question and then work back to the strategy. In an ideal world, we'd always do everything at the correct pace that suits us best. That's very rarely the case in international relations. You can make an argument, the White House makes that argument. I don't know if it's true or not, but they actually now, because there was a genuine imminent nuclear threat. So let's lead that on the table. If that were true, that would already, again, mean they couldn't do it at the pace they wanted. They also couldn't do it at that pace. If China was able to coerce them with raw, so rare earth elements and critical minerals, during the process of that re-industrialization. If China were to arm Iran aggressively so that it was bristling like a porcupine, which they had signed contracts to do, by the way, then that means that America would no longer in the future be in a position to do it. So you don't get to pick your timing. You have to work with the world you're in, not the ideal world, and re-industrialization will take time, unfortunately. In terms of the economics of it, what you're talking to correctly in terms of the cost of a cheap drone, a Shahid drone versus a Patriot interceptor, for example, that's correct. That's part of the American dilemma that they've built beautiful expensive systems, which don't work against far cheaper alternatives from the enemy, but things are changing. Ukraine actually have cheaper interceptors than Shahid drones, and America will pivot towards that Ukrainian technology. They already have. The Israelis have now laser technology, which I believe Germany is interested in buying, where you can shoot down drones and missiles for about 10 or 20 euro cents. Now, of course, the platform is expensive, but once it's there, all you need is electricity, which is of course controversial in Europe, too, but provided you have electricity that itself provides some benefit. So the economics can keep shifting. This is not fixed. And in strategy, just as in competition in business, you have to stay ahead of the curve. But let me just answer briefly on that strategy. I have had this conversation many times, working for European bank, being British, living in Asia, having lived in mainland Europe myself. I'm not a typical Brit. I'm busy on Deutsch-Bregchen. So I speak a few European languages badly. I'm not your typical monolingual Brit. I understand where the view of Trump comes from in Europe. I find it highly ironic, because I am constantly surrounded by people who are far better qualified than Trump on paper in a technocratic sense, far more worldly, far more cultured, who continually either go into meetings with him or are involved in negotiations and come away having lost their shirt. And this happens with the Americans again and again and again. So the superior Europeans continually walk into the room saying how this man has no strategy and walk away without wearing their shirt. And I wonder how many times this has to happen before a Europe starts realizing that just potentially he's either the luckiest man in the world or as America has always been able to do to the Europeans. It's quite capable of surprising them again and again and again whilst displaying in European cultural terms very little sophistication. So I have to say that and it may disgruntle your audience, but I'm trying to do it with a good heart in the, it's important to recognize differences in culture and see that for example if someone speaks very bad English, which you don't, that doesn't mean they lack intelligence. So but you know and don't worry about my audience, one who's used to having controversial stuff on my, or as you call the controversial quote unquote, stuff on my podcast. But let's dive deeper into the two scenarios. So scenario one, the US and Israel are successful. Now we have to define what does success mean. Does it mean like Venezuela and a line and you regime or what does it be? But it says clearly economically would mean to get China out of Iran. I think that's what both probably success would mean if you talk about economic stake craft. So then it's then that US moves onto the Pacific in order to make sure it Taiwan doesn't happen. We should talk about this. And then I would also like to better understand what you mean, what it really means in implications for Europe because it's not very interesting. Both then also in the interesting we should go deeper there. So let's start with the scenario. Sure. So if we start with the scenario of success and as you said, that's ambiguous, but it has to mean in effect that all of the Middle East comes under a Pax Americana. So effectively it's it's a US protectorate, the entire territory rather than buying American toys, which they don't use. For example, the GCC countries have a lot of fighter jets. They're not flying. They have a lot of military vessels, which could be in the straight of four moves, keeping it open right now. They're not doing it. So they buy them. They don't use them. But to actually have something where they may still not use them, but they are genuine the understanding that they only work for America or with America. There's no one else who they can wink at or do another deal when America is falling asleep in the afternoon after a heavy lunch. That would be success. If that's the case, then together with Venezuela, America starts to not just starts, it moves aggressively ahead with the template, which will expand to the rest of Latin America. Brazil would probably be next along with Colombia from a food perspective. North America would see Mexico and Canada really firmly locked into a USMCA where the US sets the external tariff, which would effectively be the equivalent of Germany running the eurozone, which some people joke darkly, they actually do. The other two countries just being part of it, but effectively America being the one with full sovereignty. Then, once you've done that, Europe effectively starts to fall into place, because at the moment Europe is scrambling around. We'll come back to that in a moment. Africa, of course, is still a battleground, but most of what the US needs to then be able to say to China, look, you can either become a hermit kingdom with Russia. Russia, we can actually extend a hand to and say, would you like to have a larger global platform? Russia is already making noises saying they would like to come back into the US dollar system potentially, which is interesting. What if Europe keeps its sanctions on and America takes them off? Well, that splits the West and the Alliance again. But it then says to China, if you are going to try and escalate from here, much of the world is against you, and we can make life very, very uncomfortable for you for the next five or ten years upstream, which is what I was saying earlier. So you're relying, for example, if you can't buy soybeans from America, you can buy them from Argentina or Brazil. What if you can't buy them from any of them? And if you can't buy them from any of them, you don't need much meat. So that, to my mind, is a threat, obviously. China has their own threats. It's economic warfare being threatened, but that's infinitely preferable to physical warfare, infinitely preferable to make it clear to people. This would be very, very uncomfortable if you did do that. So ideally, everyone, of course, just gets along. That's what we would all aim for. If we can't have that, this is what I believe the American strategy is. And it allows them to them rearm at pace and again, peace through strength to try and find a new modus for Vendee with China, which I genuinely believe It's what they are looking for, a modus vivendi, but one where both sides understand the other has a degree of economic mutually assured destruction, which is what we had with nuclear weapons. These are either Soviet Union. That's if it works. If it doesn't, as I said, the Middle East falls into chaos. Absolute chaos. Because if Iran is destabilized where you have an Afghanistan or an Iraq, again, disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, which is absolutely chaotic for everybody in the world. America less so, and I'll come back to that in a moment. But it's still very bad news for everybody, including the Middle East. It's not good news for China either. On that note, I have to just throw something in which you didn't raise, but I think it's very important to bring up. Now, I had already mentioned that my 2026 outlook said America will disrupt upstream commodity supply chains as a counterbalance the Chinese coercion in downstream supply chains and midstream. There are views out there, which are certainly, they testulate well with what I'm saying. And they argue this, don't dismiss the fact that this might be a US strategy to create chaos in Hormuz. Because while it looks ridiculous, given that the scale of economic destruction, which is about to roll over us, if this is not sorted out within a week, it could at its worst look like 1973 and the COVID crisis and the Ukraine crisis all at once. That's just incredible to contemplate. At its worst, it could look like that. America could hypothetically rely on some of the Venezuelan oil, which has already been stockpiling, try and pump the output there up, stop exporting crude itself and just use it at home. And actually, while taking some pain, absolutely, emerge maybe with one or two fingers missing. But the rest of the world loses an arm in the leg, at which point in relative terms, were this to be the case? If this is a strategy, America has effectively in relative terms, reinforced its position for the 21st century, while everyone else would be saying Trump gambled and got it wrong. And this is chaos. And maybe that would be the public meme, but America could be far more insulated in terms of fertilizer, in terms of energy, in terms of food, in terms of helium, which is needed, by the way, in order to create semi-conducting alternatives. And everyone else who has very intricate strategies to go back to Europe, which has strategy of the strategy of the strategy, none of which ever work, would be sitting there with lots of very interesting powerpoint slides and acronyms and very little energy and very little fertilizer and much less food and those semiconductors and therefore no military. But also quick question at this stage in a year. China is not prepared, isn't it? China I read has huge reserves on oil and China in the past as well as everything to increase its domestic energy production. So they use coal, they use a wind solar nuclear, so isn't actually China well prepared for such a scenario and of course we are not prepared? Yes and no. China is very well prepared. China has always used economic state craft for its entire existence going back thousands of years. So this is just an example of how one has to recognize the game the one is playing. China has always used economic state craft. That's why it's so well prepared. But it does still have weak spots, no one can completely be immune to a downturn in the rest of the world. For example, if China, if there's a global recession now, plus American tariffs, plus more protectionism, who's China going to export to? If they're not able to export to everybody, then they need to be doing much more domestically and that starts to destabilize parts of their domestic regime. So that's it's a one way street or it's a very comfortable journey towards a brick wall in its own way. But what China is hoping on that front is that the rest of the world acquiesces to its model to avoid anything disruptive happening before it hits that brick wall. So that's one. The other one, of course, for those who understand agri systems, they know that China is not food secure. It's much more food secure than it used to be. But its animal feed still requires vast inputs of soybeans in particular from North and South America. And if that flow dries up, then the Chinese diet would have to change dramatically. Now, maybe that's something China can live with. Maybe politically they can say to the population, this is the price one has to pay to fight American imperialism. Yeah, I would never rule that out. But it certainly, it changes the dynamic, should we say, at the very least. But to pivot back to Europe, Europe is incredibly poorly placed. In fact, if we talk about stocks, as you know, well, this is the time of year when Europe should be stocking up on gas, ahead of winter. And already stocks are incredibly low. And prices are about to go through the roof. And were this Hormuz scenario to roll on and on. And I'm not forecasting what will happen. But the dynamics look very bad today, as we speak. Then Europe would either be buying that gas at a staggering price, just as Asia is being forced to step in and out bid you for cargo after cargo, which we saw during 2022. Or Europe would not fill the gas tanks ahead of winter. Or Europe will buy from Russia again. So the number of geopolitical choices and strategic choices is limited. And they're all extremely unpalatable. And again, this comes down to the fact that Europe talks a lot about grand macro strategy. Doesn't act. And that's partly the problem that Europe, of course, has so many different voices. There are 27 grand macro strategies within Europe. Or go, there aren't any. We have to talk about Germany because we have, as you know, one of the speakers as Jens Lahore talks of this very powerful, this our nickings and means, we come down to this. But Russia, you mentioned Russia and the side you said, okay, Russia benefits Ohio prices because, you know, they said to China and this could help China. Russia to get a bit more weight compared to China because, come, they think Russia has to do whatever China wants. On the other side, we have the war in Ukraine going on. And you know, the discussion over here. And you know, the discussion is always like, you know, if you don't stop Putin now, he's going to invade all of Europe. So what's your view concerning the future role of Russia and this economic statecraft scenario between each China and the US? And how do you see the European position towards the war or should we just accept reality? Well, first of all, I would advise everybody, not just Europe to accept reality. I could, I could never give any advice other than that to the entire world. In fact, it's when one doesn't accept reality, the problem starts. I think that's, but I think the struggle accepting the reality is to be honest. Oh, no, look, I wouldn't disagree. We all do. But definitely Europe is no exception to that. I think talking geostrategically and I'm not trying to criticize because this is such an emotional issue and it's such a principle-based issue. But what you see again and again happening with Europe, these are the Ukraine. Is Europe says we cannot let Ukraine fall. And I think there's a great deal of geopolitical sense in that. Equally, Europe isn't prepared to let Ukraine win because if Ukraine were to genuinely start pushing Russia back, if it genuinely started to threaten to retake the territories of Russia now, says our Russian, Crimea above all, it's not my call to make, but much more serious military minded figures than myself start talking about tactical nuclear weapons and the worst case scenarios. It's a very, very high-risk, high-return strategy and every time Europe contemplates that, it backs off. So effectively, what Europe is saying is we don't want Ukraine to fall. Absolutely. Tick that box. We can't allow Ukraine to win at which point what is Europe trying to do? Just fight Russia statically over a fixed line at terrible cost in blood and treasure to Ukraine, first and foremost, and then to Russia. And who benefits from that? And I don't mean that in a cynical sense, like does Europe really benefit from that given what the cost will be to that? Does Ukraine, does Russia? If no one can move forward, World War I style, or is there a better deal to be struck saying, okay, this is a North Korea South Korea frozen conflict, at least we can rearm without actually fighting, which is what North Korea and South Korea do. And is that not what Trump is trying to achieve? I don't know. But is that? Some would say it is. Some would say it isn't. But from Trump's perspective, at least his supporters would say it is, because then that allows the US to start focusing on other regions. As soon as they've moved away from Ukraine, they've been able to pivot, first of all, to Venezuela, now to Iran. And then after that, as I said, they can start looking at Asia, although they don't want to fight in Asia. The whole point is not to fight in Asia. And Europe, meanwhile, Germany is spending real money on weapons now. It genuinely is. But as I say to people all the time who tell me, well, look, look at the price of defense stocks. That's a clear indicator that Germany's rearming. And I say, it's the complete opposite. It's the complete opposite. It doesn't have to be, but it can be. If you produce not very many goods and you sell them at a higher and higher price because there's a flood of money coming your way, your share price will go up. You're no more able to defend yourself than you were before. Here's a catchphrase of mine I've been using for a while. And America sees this too, which is why Trump is screaming at his defense firms to cut executive bonuses. And he's been telling them he may use the defense production act to force them to increase output. You win wars with bullets, not profits. Europe is attempting to rearm using a large fiscal stimulus in some countries and a small one in others without nationalizing the companies. And as a result, the companies, not 100% certain if the money will suddenly change because of a change in their political weather, they're not building as many factories as they should be. They're still making [BLANK_AUDIO] profit margin on these piece, which is where shares continue to go up. And while I'm no military expert, military experts who I speak to, because why should it always go to the source, tell me that while yes, there is an improvement in some areas, which is good, definitely. Overall, Europe is no more able to really defend itself today than it was four years ago. So four years, which is nearly as long as World War II, not a lot of progress. Because also we have the issue, and we mentioned the social welfare state before, we have the issues that we talk about a reality check that we have issues. So we have issue one is we struggle with an aging society. We have massively increased the social welfare state after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We have followed an energy policy. I'm no, you're comment like me, which has been, I would say, probably also lacking a bit of reddit checks. And we have not accepted yet to do some changes here in addition. And I think that also applies to China and to the US, I guess. We have the issues that we have racked up huge public debt levels. And so in some countries also private debt levels, unheard of in peace time. And now we have faced the issue of, you know, spending money on defense and internationalization at the same time, dealing with huge debt and dealing with the issue of hidden liabilities for the aging society. And you mentioned in the first few minutes of our conversation, Trump and the Fed. And I would like to come to the point around, you know, I'll be in a world where basically we also will see a very different financial system, just in order to basically get rid of the huge debt levels. Yes, I think we will. But there's a huge amount of disagreement over what it will be. So for example, there's one school of thought, which I have a lot of sympathy for. And I think has a lot of intellectual credibility, which argues that we have created such a mess through decades of fear, money, you know, profligate fiscal policy. And you can add from that school of thought over regulation, et cetera, et cetera, government intervention in the wrong parts of the economy. The only way out is a hard reset and to go back to gold, for example. Now, I'm not an advocate for that for a couple of reasons. Although I can completely understand the intellectual case that's made for it, I don't dismiss it lightly. And I travel a lot of the same way with the people making that argument where we disagree is that they tend to think that regardless of what happens now, countries who would do that are still completely eclipsed by China anyway. It's game over. And yeah, I make the case after having, you know, lived in greater China and studied it, et cetera, et cetera, and studied Soviet economics in the past. China has not done anything that the gold team would argue as being what one should do in order to win. China runs the most incredibly profligate fiscal policy. China runs massive, massive off-book debt via state banks and state corporations. But what it does do is with its fear at fiscal policy, it runs neo-mechancelist policy. And neo-mechancelism is to deliberately make sure that you control as much of the supply chain as possible, capture value ad, and run a trade surplus with others. Now, Germany used to do that via what I joke was neo-merkle-cancelism, where Germany claimed that it was a great free trader when it wasn't. Germany's never been a free trader ever. There was no period in German history where it's been a free trader. You are allergic to trade deficits. No, no, because also we lack the economic understanding because you know that running a trade surplus is fine, but we're also exporting our capital in the world and we are one of the most stupid investors globally. So, well, that's not necessarily value creating. That's a separate but valid issue, the point being, if you're a free trader, you should be able to say, hey, we ran a trade deficit for the last five years. That's great. And then maybe the next five years are on a surplus. It actually doesn't matter whether you run a trade surplus or a trade deficit because we're free traders. You know, as well as I do, that will never happen and it hasn't ever happened in Germany. Oh, go, you are not free traders. You are Merkel-cancelists. You tell yourself you're free traders, but you're not. And you use physical policy offers as a lever to make sure that you keep running that surplus. I mean, German politicians have said this openly. And the euro, and it's a euro, of course, helped a lot. So, euro was. Naturally. Was given Germany an unfair advantage part in the end. We should all ourselves on our own foot because of the fact that the euro was so weak. We basically stopped becoming more efficient and effective in my view. So, it was short to benefit, but it's one of the reasons why it can't be the German economy started such a position. Well, a good debate can be had about that, but I'm not specifically German economist. So, I'm not going to go there. I'll leave those words with you. But the gold argument, China didn't follow anything that the gold people would do. It used fiscal, fair, neo-mechanthalism to dominate supply chains. Economic statecraft is what worked. And my argument has been for years that the US will do the same to try and reverse the mess that it's in now. So, I fully expect to see a very different looking Fed going forward. And I'll unpack that in a moment. I expect to see the Treasury being dominant over the Fed rather than the other way around. I expect to see a much larger state role in the economy. We already expected to see much larger tariffs. And the effectively, we will see a lot more of the policy that China is using, which is actually policy that Germany and the US have both used successfully in the past in order to develop, in order to get it back there. But in terms of the Fed, there are so many things one can unpack, so many things. But I want to again bring it down to very basic questions, because I think if you get the basic questions right, you get the answers right. What point is there in having one interest rate? For example, if you have Fed runs Fed funds at 5%, and you raise it to 6%, because there's inflation, you smash the useless parts of the economy, and there are many useless parts of the economy. If we're thinking what is GDP for? So you mean basically credit for financial speculation or credit for buying existing assets? Well, that's one way of looking at it. Credit for buying existing assets or credit for new productive investment. So whether it's a new bank loan going into new capital stock, or whether it's credit for consumption or credit for pushing up existing assets, that would be one taxonomy. But you can even look at it across sectors. For example, I could put new loans into capital stock for a new business, which would be a pet groomer's, for example, or a pet psychologist. They have them in California. My dog is depressed. My cat's feeling a little bit like it's having a mid-life crisis. Is that useful during a war? Now, we have a free market economy. Everyone's free to take their own choice, et cetera, and say, I'll have a risk. I'll take a risk on that. I think people like it, I'll make some money on that. That's capitalism. If you're in the next central crisis, or you're facing a crisis in the state of hormones, and you have to ration energy usage, should you really be letting the free market decide whether someone wants to open a bright, glowing, brilliantly lit, you know, air-conned or heated pet therapist when they could be opening a factory to make ammunition? This is where typical choices have to be made. So if you put the interest rate from five to six, everybody suffers. If you lower the interest rate from five to two, everybody benefits. The good stuff benefits, the bad stuff benefits. Traditionally, everybody buys more assets. Everybody leverages up. Everybody buys existing assets. People buy bonds because, you know, price and yield are inverted, obviously. People then say, "Well, if the interest rate is now low and the yield is low, therefore, of course, the stock dividend should be higher, and therefore, proportionately, I'm going to go on by assets there. It doesn't mean the company is making a single more product. It's not one more bullet being made. So everyone feels richer. Everyone in the imports more from countries who are actually their rivals who are trying to de-industrialize them. And the India circus goes round and round. So the point I'm making is, if you think in terms of economic state craft, whether it's the fed or whether it's Europe, logically, I cannot see how you can make the case, or anyone can make the case that the way that the monetary system, the monetary policy now works, is functional. It's not fit for purpose. You need to have the dynamism of the private sector, but the private sector does not seem to be capable of making the correct choices over what is necessary in an economic state craft or existential environment. Oh, go. One would imagine we will go back to where we used to be prior to the 1980s, where you have hypothesated capital in different sectors or differential interest rates, which are fixed in certain sectors through having limited pools of funds. For example, five billion for mortgages, 10 million for industry, three billion for agriculture. And the interest rate is bit up within that sector. Now, that's a complete, anathema to how market's world today. There's, I don't think there's anyone alive in markets who still knows how that system works. Maybe they're very elderly. I remember. I know I never worked in it, but I remember it existing when I was young. But that's absolutely where we may logically have to go back to and not just in the US. And that's exactly again how China works, by the way. Would you say that's a taxonomy in Europe? You know, it's just basically also an intervention by the as you're in your politicians around, you know, capital requirements for banks. Does this already point us this direction? Or is it more an example for, you know, having the wrong priorities? Well, you can do, for example, if you look at some of the tools that we used in the past, like TLTROs, now I'm not a euro bank specialist to talk, but some of my colleagues are some of the finest minds I've ever worked with, by the way. And they point out that yeah, there are tools in the toolbox and TLTROs are the ones they point to in particular where you can offer differential rates of borrowing to try and achieve certain things. But in this example, they would have to be very sharply differentiated and you would have to have unfortunately either very, very willing market participants who understand the gravity of the situation or you would have to have very tight regulation to make sure that people don't then borrow for one purpose and use it for another, which is, you know, which is human nature. But problematic as that is for all kinds of reasons within our current architecture, I will repeat again, I don't understand how that architecture is fit for purpose. If it has to be at least competitive and at most combative versus a different system. And let me give you one more example of that if I may. I was at a conference in Singapore last year with two senior ex-military figures and they were doing the round of private investors saying that you need to put money into defense stocks. That's where the future will be. And by the way, I look, I agree this is a sector that will be incredibly important. But I ask them if people are expecting to make a 20 or 30% return, how do you expect to achieve economies of scale that can match what Russia is doing or what China is doing if they're prepared to operate at a loss, which they are. And you insist we have to scoop 30% off the top, which isn't a bullet so that someone lives very well to drive a nice car and have a nice holiday. I don't understand conceptually how Western liberal democracy can't get its head around this. But obviously, as they say, it's very hard to get someone to understand something when their job depends on them not understanding it. It comes down to shift from consumption towards production. It comes down to shift towards, you know, whatever, you know, really scaling up in certain areas like offense. How can it be done because probably you don't know if they aren't the either because I just struggle if I look at the just elections in Germany and regional elections and let us see as a result, I can just say, you know, it's a completely nile of realities what we're having in the critical discussion and in the voting behavior. Well, let me come back to the politics of it in just one moment. Each country with a different starting position faces very similar problems with a few, a few differences. But it has a relatively similar template for where they need to go or be at different speeds because of those problems. So let's take the US, for example, you would have to use the legacy US military power to start to control the physical economy again. I already described that if you physically controls choke points around the world, you physically control the supply of minerals and energy, you're in the position to tell people in financial markets what they shouldn't do. So again, well paid people on trading floors can scream at each other all they want if one other person controls with you do or don't eat that night, you will listen to them. It's incredibly rude truth and read in tooth and claw as we say, but that's a reality. Equally, the fiscal deficit needs to be spent on the right things, not the wrong things. Yes. So you need to cut down on fraud, corruption, et cetera, et cetera, spending on consumption. But you need to make sure that you invest in areas where the market won't do it or you need to lever the market into doing it, which Trump is doing. He's telling people you will invest here and here. For example, very controversially within Europe, the trade deal you've signed with the US but haven't ratified not only imposes a tariff on Europe, it also imposes I believe a 550 billion investment package going into Europe or 600 billion. Now that is effectively a capital control is also coerced capital because instead of you exporting to the US getting dollars and then buying US Treasury's or stocks or whatever you want with them, which is how capitalism works. The US is telling you you will export to us. First of all, we're going to scoop 15% for the tariff, which we will invest where we want. Largely in military supply chains. Secondly, that money you've then earned from us, we are going to tell you where to invest it. We are going to dictate the return and it's going to be in building a bridge here linking two strategic points. It's going to be invested in a factory making bullets there. It's going to be in a production facility to refine rare earths over there because the market will not do it itself. So that's part of what's going to have to happen. On top of that, you have to have a federal reserve which understands this that is part of that plan which fights inflation because inflation is bad but understands that financialization is also bad rather than the good thing which is what the Fed is for now. The Fed is all about financial markets, not the physical economy. They don't have any experts on agriculture sitting around the Fed table, experts on financial markets as if you can eat assets you can't. And you need tariffs. You must have tariffs because you are dealing with an economy which has the lowest cost of production possible, continues to push it lower and will ensure that you can never develop those supply chains to allow you to industrialize in the same way Germany didn't allow others to do it within Europe prior to the Eurozone crisis in the same way that the British when they ruled the waves never allowed anyone else to industrialize because they had the gunships and they were cheaper than everyone else by controlling supply chains. China uses markets to achieve the same thing now. But if I put that to you in Europe that would mean the ECB remit changing completely that would mean a European wide tariff that would mean a change in energy policy to try and use as much domestic stuff first of all as possible alongside green because you must do green to that would mean a change in defense policy to restructure everything so you have one unified defense policy so you don't duplicate things across 27 different economies. That would mean one foreign policy etc etc you can see how staggeringly difficult some of this is going to be to achieve. And so either Europe has to logically move together and say we move as one at one speed or Europe has to coalesce into clusters were a large enough body of Europe six of us do this the rest of you can come along which is a fragmentation of Europe. Or Europe fragments completely or Europe says will go with America and America effectively runs the state craft play for us and we are a very secondary fiddle to America and we don't really have sovereignty but we work well within that system and logically I cannot see any other outcomes. I heard other conversations with you and so one of your points is that the American Trump administration push towards I say supporting certain political parties in Europe fits into the last category basically ensuring that Europe is aligned because you know we have a different migration policy whatever in the American camp. I think that's probably want to make a comment on this and then I also looking at the time I would really like to understand how stable coins are part of this play as well. Sure so very quickly on the politics we didn't talk about the electoral politics of it and obviously that's a mess everywhere it's very hard for democracies to get anyone to stick to a plan that will hurt for a while and you have vested interests and the worst our political and economic polarization becomes the more the parties are elected who actually won't play along at all. So the time is short for this to happen the the sand in the hour glass is running out I fear everywhere but in terms of the American attitude America obviously today is anti European Union because they don't like pan national structures. They're abundantly clear in their national security strategy very basically one sovereignty to go back to the nation state is a very Brexit style attitude that doesn't mean of course they then don't mind subsuming other economies under there so for example if America takes Mexican and Canadian economic sovereignty in setting an external tariff they don't have any problem with that but this is the reality of it. I think America wouldn't have a problem with the European Commission if it was echoing every American policy so if you if on the lane say whatever you're doing we love it I think that's more efficient given that's very unlikely to happen America again openly openly says in the national defense strategy that they will support NGOs and political parties in European countries who are more pro-American which by the way to be completely fair and transparent Europe does with the Democrat party and Europe does in every other economy around the world where there is a pro-year. Or pro markets or pro rules based order political backdrop or group or NGO they finance them and very very lavishly so this is just how real policy is played Europe isn't used to seeing itself as a country or a block where that is happening it sees itself as someone that does it rather than having it done to it but on the stable coins these are a much overlooked and potentially pivotal part of the strategy because effectively it's not going to be a real deal. Because effectively they are a revolution whereby the US is talking about creating private money digital private money very similar in kind to what we used to call sterling bills of exchange prior to World War One when sterling was on gold and arguably the most useful international trade currency at that time was not the British pound it was a bill of exchange donated in sterling not issued by the British government but by two third parties. Between each other internationally around the world so that private money supported British power back by gold America is attempting to digitally create a stable coin backed by tea bills primarily so that two things can happen first of all individuals largely in emerging markets but potentially even in Europe depending on where interest rates are said can say I would like to hold American dollars functionally even though they are not dollars they are a digital. So I want to hold them on an app on my phone. not in the bank with a tax man can't see it. Now, the Americans can see it. Maybe they will own tax it, but the European tax man can't see it if it's outside the banking system. And I can still order things online. I can still do business on a network internationally and domestically, because everyone else will be on it too, and no one can touch it. Now, is that tax evasion? Well, yeah, but it is, but it's no different in a way than saying, "I'm putting all my money into vouchers from a particular company." They become money monetized to a degree. And in emerging markets, the demand for them will be extraordinary, I believe, because for all the question marks over the US and over the dollar, they're much larger over the local currency, particularly with high taxation rates in many emerging markets. So that would see a huge bid for T-bills, pushing down the cost of borrowing in America, helping them fund the Pentagon, helping them control physical supply chains, giving them real control of the real economy, and then financial markets flow back from there. So that's one way it can happen. The other way, of course, is that they can pay people who are exporting to them. So, for example, Europe can say, "Right, we're going to send you, you know, 10,000 euro widgets." There you go. And America says, "We're not paying you in dollars. We're going to pay you in these stablecoins." Now, they're not money. They're a token backed by a T-bill. You don't own the T-bill. The T-bill stays in America in American hands. All you have is a digital certificate, effectively. It's on the blockchain. It's transparent. You can see you had it before you. You can see where it's going next. You can choose not to pay tax on it if you keep it outside the banking system, etc., etc. You can use it in an international network. If, for example, Qatar, after this war is over, says, "We only want to be paid for LNG in stablecoins." You've created a network for them immediately. That's how the euro dollar also works. But you're stuck with them. America, effectively, still has a trade deficit with the rest of the world. But it doesn't build up its debts with the rest of the world. The T-bill exists, but the interest rate is low and it's held domestically within the US. All the rest of the world has is a digital IOU. You actually break the balance sheet connection between the current account and the capital account by just creating something which isn't actually money. So that's two ways that they can be used and they are transformative if they are adopted at scale. And America has carrots to make that happen and sticks. And I don't think anyone else can create an equivalent globally. Because the Europeans won't be happy because you know we're disgusted and you already also reach the FTF. For example, they say we have to keep more capital in Europe for European investment. And because you have a trade surplus, you also have a capital export. As you know, there's discussions that Europe won't like it. But I have two questions. There's a regard. One point is our unstable coins are risked to the banking system because if you know, in the US for example, more people put money to stable coins instead of the banks. The banks lose part of their business and just might have some people fear it might be destabilizing. And secondly, what does it mean to the global role of the US? Okay. On the banking system, potentially yes, for the reason you've described, potentially also of course, if they are misused and as currencies or money-type tokens can be, you know, if bubbles occur in them. But in terms of the banking argument, that's why the clarity bill as a subsidiary to the Genius Act hasn't passed yet to determine whether they can pay fees as opposed to a yield. That hasn't passed yet. Trump actually tweeted just the other day, the banks can't hold this up anymore because if this piece of legislation doesn't pass, I will let them just set fees anyway at which point it's not in legislation, but I'll just let them do it. Now, my argument there is what a bank's for. If we're asking what is GDP for and I've asked what is the Fed for, what a central bank's for, what a bank's for, well, we've already discussed. You said it. They should be for making new loans into productive capital. That doesn't happen in America. 80% of loans are for consumption or for buying existing assets. So were banks to have a problem? Were you to see a banking crisis? Were a political Fed to say, "Okay, there you go. We'll swallow you all up." What do you do if you use a much more hardcore way of dealing with banks than in the past, where instead of bailing everyone out one to one, you do what Sweden did in their crisis many decades ago and you say, "Okay, you're a wiped out. Here's base capital. Start again. Or by the way, this bank only lends into the physical economy now. We don't lend for assets. We don't lend for consumption. We lend into the physical economy. It's a way to remake the entire banking sector rapidly. I'm not saying it is the case, but I'm saying don't roll out the fact that the crisis and the chaos is actually part of the solution in the same way that it could be with hormones. That you change the banking sector by having to remove the ones that don't do anything useful. Now, in terms of the second part of the question, if this is done right and I'm not saying it will be, if it is the US dollars' role in a different form in a much more segmented form, in a much less free market form, even though it has more of a private sector component to it, in terms of the stablecoin, I believe this is absolutely cemented for the next couple of decades if not the rest of the first half of this century. So all the talk about it being on the way out and the euro being set to eclipse it, I think is nonsense. The euro isn't going to go away. I'm not saying anything like that. But you alluded a moment ago that Europe wants to keep money within it while it runs a trade surplus. How do you do that when, as you said, the mirror of a trade surplus is a capital account outflow? So already that's nonsensical. You just need to start working out. Where are you investing money? What's the correct thing to be investing it in and what's not? It's you need to be moving away from the traditional, rigid, neoliberal parameters that Europe was actually built on. Europe sees itself as being very socially liberal than it is, but it's also very neoliberal. And I'm not saying that's a good thing or a bad thing. I'm not making any value judgments. I am merely saying economic state craft, if it is to be adopted and everyone else is adopting it, has to have much more freedom of action. Listening to you, I said, okay, I understand. I follow this, I understand this. I see the logic. Of course, we don't know how it's going to play out. We don't know how the world is going to end in the run or whatever. But coming down to the essence is, we get into a new world. We have been in a world where for decades, enterprises have gone up much faster than the size of the economy. So relative to GDP as a person has gone up. Listening to you, I just have one takeaway. It doesn't matter which asset I own. As a prize, it has to come down relative to GDP. Well, I think some do. They won't come down uniformly. And some things cancel arguably outperform. But even there, I would agree with you and that people say to me, well, Michael, you're saying, for example, commodities are going to boom. And I will say, well, yes, but not too much. Because there is no sector in which you are allowed to make that much money. The whole point is, you can't just sit there and say, well, I have X and no one else does. Therefore, I'm richer than God. Or richer than crisis. That's just not the way it's going to work. You have to maintain social stability. And to bring it back to brass tax within Europe, within America, within emerging markets, we don't really have a great deal of social stability now. I think we can agree that society is fragile and is sowing different stresses in different ways. And if you were to say objectively, what's society for? And you would say, well, to push asset prices up, so a certain percentage of the population get very rich and the rest done. An alien looking down at you would say, oh, really? Have you not tried that for four and a half decades? And it's failed spectacularly. I was like, yeah, but clearly what we need to do is more of it right now. But unfortunately, that seems to be the human condition. As I said, it's very difficult to get people to understand something when their job or their income depends on them not understanding it. Michael, you're based in Singapore. Are you based in Singapore? Because you think it's the best place to be placed in such a world? I'm based in Singapore because it's a fantastic place. I didn't choose to move here ahead of any particular policy. Singapore is a country obviously with very limited natural resources. And as a result, as always, played the economic state craft game exceedingly well. I believe it will continue to do so. Obviously, it's going to face challenges as everyone else is. And moving from an period of globalization, which suited it very well to one of much more real polity will require some pivots. But in the past, it's done very well in our environment. And I think, as I said, it will continue to do so. And I hope everyone can do. That's a message I want to get across here. I'm not keeping this secret. It's not a formula I don't share with people. It's a drama I've been banging to try and warn people. I said it the day Trump has reelected. This is what it will mean. And people found it interesting, but patting me on the head as if it was a rather wild exaggeration. 2025 then proved me right. And I said for 2026, this year we'll say to 2025 and panic over tariffs, hold my beer. Because this is when it gets real. Now I wait for the stable coins to happen in the next couple of months. And you are right. It will be transformative. And those who understand it are those individuals with their own businesses, their own lives, their own portfolios, or countries who understand how they need to find new models and new systems. They will be the ones best place. And I wish everyone will. I hope so, Michael. Thank you very much for your time as well as a bright broad discussion. And I can just tell you, I would be very happy and glad if you could sometimes talk in the future again, maybe with new developments. But for today, thank you very much. It was really interesting. You're very welcome. Thank you.