E4M_1.4: explanation vs justification

You're listening to the Ethics Pharmatics Podcast. It should be new to you, I think the stuff will be amazing. So we're back. It's you. Hi, good stuff. Good morning. Good morning. Glad to be back. And this is the first episode where we will do some reactions to, reactions to the podcast. Yeah, right. Because our pilot episode, 1.1, went out live at the weekend and we do have listeners. As the sort of main novelist of the Italian 19th century, Manzoni, in his famous promisive post he used to say, you know, he used to refer to his seven readers. And we have seven listeners, but then seven listeners has certainly been sending us a lot of feedback. I know. And actually, I would like to talk about one of these emails that we got since the first episode went live because it was very helpful and was very precise and picked up on something the two of us, one of the cases, the two of us discussed in the first episode. I'll just remind listeners that might have not listened to the first episode. What that case was. And since it's your case, Christopher, you just correct me if I get that wrong. So the case was one in which, and I think it was from a GP that you interviewed during your PhD, this GP basically confessed to using prescribing the contraceptive pill to teenagers to tell them not to smoke. And I think the way you originally presented the case in our episode was something like that basically the GP would tell these teenage girls, look, I'm only going to prescribe you the pill if you don't smoke or if you are not smoking or if you promise not to pick up smoking or something like that. And so it was almost like a kind of threat. And I guess the reason why we used that case in that version was to talk about paternalism because it was clear that that is a kind of paternalistic way of practicing medicine. But I think what maybe didn't come out, and this is what the email that we got from our listeners was about, this is actually a good colleague of ours that has been in touch. I think what didn't come out is that we, and particularly me, Christopher, I use that case to make a distinction between what is paternalistic and what is more or wrong. And I guess what I wanted to say was that not necessarily everything that is paternalistic is wrong. There can be paternalistic interventions that are not necessarily wrong. But I want to basically correct myself and say, well, that case is not just paternalistic, but it is wrong at least under the following description. And this is again our way of emphasizing the complexities, the complexities of philosophy and the complexities of medicine. It depends, I think, very much on the details. But definitely, if the GP says, and this is a person of authority, an adult, someone with a medical degree that tells a teenager, oh, I'm only going to prescribe you the pill, which is the thing that has done more to liberate women in the 20th century. So it's not just very important for individuals, but it's also a social symbol. I'm only going to prescribe the pill if you do X, even if the X is unhealthy or don't do X, namely smoking. Even if we can agree that smoking is unhealthy, I think that's not just paternalistic. That's wrong. And Dr. Soutan, do that kind of thing. And because we're recording this mainly for our medical students, we want to be absolutely clear that we don't recommend that we don't endorse that. We don't think that our medical students should become the kind of doctors that use these kind of tricks. I've been said that, and I think this is where you're very welcome to come and Christopher. I think maybe two things. First of all, I would like to say there are versions of that story, where it's still paternalistic, but not necessarily wrong. And then I also want to say, I think that story shows why we're doing this podcast. And I'm sure we'll have plenty of time to talk about that today. But we're not doing this podcast and we're not doing ethics at the medical school to tell medical students, medical doctors what to do. We're providing them tools for analysis to make their own decisions. So we have to be very, very careful. And we do that every semester when we get a new cohort of two, three hundred medical students in making that distinction, we're not here to judge. We're not here to tell them what to do. We're only here to provide the theoretical backgrounds and analytics skills to make these kind of decisions. And just to emphasize that, maybe let me run through a version of the story, which I think fits more what we discussed in the first episode. So I would say the version of the story in which the doctor says you only get the pill if you quit smoking, that's both paternalistic and wrong. And then we can discuss what should happen to a GP that does that kind of thing. Should they lose their license? Maybe that's too much, right? But should they be reported? We can discuss that. Here's a version that I think it's paternalistic. And then you can tell me, maybe Christopher, whether you think it's still wrong or maybe this is maybe more complex. So that's the version in which the doctor has a kind of policy that whenever teenagers come for prescriptions, you know, can be the pill but can be something else, they also use that 10 minutes to remind them, you know, that smoking is very unhealthy, that picking up smoking as a teenager is particularly dangerous and things like that. I would personally say, but again, this is not about our political or ethical opinions. It's just about the analytic tools to have these discussions. I would personally say the second version of the story is paternalistic, but it's not necessary wrong. So maybe that's the better version of the story to do the kind of theoretical job and the kind of distinction that we were talking about last time. What do you think? Well, I think it's, for example, great that we have got this respond. So we can now discuss it in the podcast. And I would say on a personal level, I agree with you regarding what you just said. I still think, however, that when it comes to this podcast, and also as I hear, you're also saying as well, is that I honestly don't consider it much interesting what we find morally wrong or not. And I also think maybe that was implicit in the first episode and that's why it's good to make it clear now that, you know, I don't think it was ever the question to consider if it was wrong or not, but she did. First of all, as you say, we don't know the situation exactly. And secondly, there's a lot of, you know, border, borderline cases where it is very difficult to tell if it's paternalism or if it's the doctor or the health authorities, you know, being in charge and deciding what to do on behalf of autonomous patients and citizens, right? So concrete in this case, you know, I think the whole point is not to state whether it's wrong or not what this GP did simply because in many ways, you know, it's all about exactly your ethical position, if you consider it wrong or not. So I would, I think, I think we agree on that. And I think, I think it's kind of ironic, but it's also very much in the, in the fashion of the time that already with episode four, we're reflecting on ourselves, we're very self referential. I think, you know, that's normally in a, in a podcast series, I think, you know, around episode four or five comes, you know, sort of, you know, either kind of looking back or, or a prequel of some sort and things like that. And we're doing something like that. We're already reflecting on our own podcast in episode four, so we're already running out of topics. No, there are plenty of topics to talk about, but I think you're absolutely right, Christopher. I mean, it was very important that we, that we responded to that comment, not just because, you know, I might have slightly mispoken in the evaluation of the details of the case in the first episode. I think that, that's okay. That just happens. And also, like, let's be honest, the listeners can tell that we're basically improvising, right? We don't have that much of a script and we're comfortable with that. So that's okay. But I think, as you say, methodologically, it was also important to make this point, we're not here either when we're doing the podcast, but also when we teach at the medical school, we're not here to judge, we're not here to tell students what is right and wrong or what we think is right and wrong. But we are here, for example, to do things like, to explain the difference between something being right and wrong and someone thinking that is right and wrong, right? So that's those kind of distinctions. Or, for example, and maybe we got carried away a little bit in the first episode, but the kind of distinction between some intervention being paternalistic and an intervention being wrong. We're there to help students and professionals navigate these kind of complexities. The actual judgment calls, the clinical decision making, you know, we can only support that. We cannot replace human judgment. Maybe the AI will replace human judgment and really replacing human judgment in some cases, but definitely not us or our podcasts. Do you agree? Yeah. And I think now, I mean, Elville, now we've been a little bit inconsistent as well, right? I'm telling that we are not judging and that we have already done it with this specific case. this be the case where we have made it clear about our personal opinion regarding this specifics case under these circumstances that we just stated. But in general with this podcast we are, we'll try to be explicit that we're not going to judge because it all requires, you know, explicit conditions based on what we consider. And the empirical details are going to be very, very important. And the whole point is also for the analytical sake of it that, you know, everything is of discussion in such a ethical podcast, right? Yeah, and I think I agree with you. And I think I would also become from saying, and this we say to the students all the time, right? You know, when, when, when, when they have ethical discussions, obviously they're allowed to bring in their own point of view, whether it's an ethical standpoint or a political standpoint, right? The crucial thing is that it's clear that it is their point of view. And the, the thing that is even more important than that is that they have good reasons for holding on to that point of view. If they can rationalize it, if they can explain it, if they can justify it, then obviously their own opinion is very welcome in the classroom, the way in which our own opinion is very welcome in this podcast or in the, or in the text we write. So it's not that that's sort of, you know, biased just because we believe in it. But the fact that we believe in it doesn't sort of wrap it up in a way that that it suddenly doesn't need explanation and justification and good reasons. And this was maybe not a very elegant way to finally bring us to the topic of today, which is exactly the topic of the difference between explanation and justification. And, and I think this is especially relevant for medical students who until they come to us. And for example, we can, we can be quite a quite open about the fact that at the, at our local medical school year in Copenhagen, the, the students come to us in the fourth semester. And so at the end of the second year. And, and I would say until the moment they come to us, they are basically used to just deal with explanations. And, and then suddenly comes this other concept that is similar but different from the concept of explanation, which is the concept of justification. And, and to put it in very broad terms and then we will get into some detail. Obviously explanation is a empirical concept and justification is a normative concept. And, and before you may be sorry, would you then explain to the listeners what do you mean by normative? Yeah, that's, that's, you know, that's the big question, isn't it? So, but maybe, you know, maybe let's start from an easier one and, and, and I'll build up to that. So, I think one important thing to realize is that when we explain something that does not necessarily provide a justification. And, that's another version of something actually that we discussed last week. And, I think what was episode two, which, watch this place will be released very soon. So, that something is the case, doesn't make it right. I think this is an important principle. It's a very simple principle that we find out that something is the case. True, for example, a process of explanation, doesn't provide a justification for that. And, and I think this gap is the gap of normativity. And, and, and, and, and funnily enough, it's kind of related to the gap that we were talking about earlier, namely, you know, that something believe that an action is wrong, doesn't make that action wrong. And, this actually, as, if you think about it, and this is why I'm linking it up to the stuff about through the evidence from last week, this has got not to do with ethics to begin with. It's just the methodological point, right? It's just the same way in which, I mean, Christopher can see it. I can see, but listeners cannot see it. We're sitting at a round table, and there is one single book on this table, right? Now, it does happen to be the case independently of what we believe that there is a book on this table, right? But the fact itself that we believe that there is a book on this table does not make the book, right? The book is on the table independently of our beliefs. So, I think any thinking being is able to all down to these thoughts at the same time. So, the difference between the book actually being on the table independently of our perception, and then the fact that we perceive it, right? And, you know, because of our perception of the book, both of us believe that there is a book on the table, right? Now, all I'm saying, basically, is that those two are separate, are methodologically separate, right? It could be that we are, and this is the famous, actually, I was a, I hope the listeners will mind me sharing autobiographical details. I was at an exhibition here in Copenhagen with my youngest daughter at the weekend, and one of the most touching thing at this exhibition is that there was a mini portrait of René de Carr, which is, you know, one of the great philosophers of the modern era. And the car is famous for exactly this kind of, this kind of thinking. So, for, about, for example, self-deception. So, how does the car explain the, the difference between the book being on the table, and our belief that there is a book on the table? Well, we might be deceived, right? Now, and the likelihood of our deception is an important. The very possibility of our deception is what distinguishes between the existence of the book and our perception of the book, right? And this is, in very simple terms, this is the same distinction as last week between through the evidence, but I think this week we can maybe talk about it in terms of the book being on the table. That's part of our ontology and our perception of the book on the table. That's part of our epistemology. And it's, and then obviously if we have evidence, namely if we have good reasons for thinking that the book is on the table, then we also know that the book is on the table, right? So now, so this was a very long-winded way to go at the gap, you know, to create this gap between truth and perception. And I'm, and this is not the same gap as the gap between explanation and justification, but it was one way of explaining how this kind of gaps arise in our thinking. And, and do you want to try to apply this first distinction between ontology and epistemology to the medical cases, or shall I move on to the other distinction between extraterrestrials? I'll just formulate what you just said. And then we can see if you agree to, so for the listener to hear it in different ways, right? You can also say that, you know, explanation is about stating the causularity regarding something. If this cup breaks, there's an explanation of it. I hit the cup and it fell on the floor and there we have gravity and so on. I, with explanation, I provide you a causularity, or I suggest you one kind of causularity. People can disagree and provide a different kind of causularity. Say, oh, it's because I was angry or whatever that, or I was stressed, and that's why it happened, whatever. But was the other. Yeah, no, no, I think, I think you're actually doing a better job than just the occasion. Well, justification is more about explaining not just the causularity, but why in a more ethical, why is it good or bad or why did I do it in, you know, more than just explanation the causularity, if that makes sense. I think we can definitely play with the cup example. I think it's different from the book example, but so then let's just keep those separate. So we use the book example to create this kind of like original cup and that we call the cup between our ontology and our epistemology. And now we're moving on to a different kind of cup, which is the cup between explanation and justification. And I think we can definitely do it with your cup example. So imagine that this morning, you know, in order to record this podcast, you'd come into the office and there was already coffee waiting for you and you just threw the coffee cup on the ground. And now I think what we can do with this kind of example is to discuss both the explanation and the justification. So the explanation might have been that you're angry, right? Maybe because, you know, the podcast is not getting enough listeners or maybe because, you know, something happened at your GP practice yesterday that made you angry or, you know, you had a bed evening out with your mates or whatever, right? So that would be an explanation. That tells you why and tells us why you did it. Now, depending on your reasons, though, that might or might not be a justification, right? So for example, I would have thought that maybe, you know, throwing, you know, coffee on the floor of my office just because the podcast is not getting enough listeners, you know, there's that would have been maybe an overreaction. So that's no justification. It's still a true explanation. That's the reason why you did it, but it doesn't justify it. But if on the other end then, afterwards it comes out that yesterday, you had a patient that was really, you know, doing really poorly, and you didn't manage to help them, and you couldn't sleep, and you're still kind of frustrated by that, and that's why you did it. Then I would think, okay, this one is not just an explanation. That's actually starting to look like a justification because I understand, or I mean, I'm not a medical doctor, but I can sort of imagine the frustration. Imagine how the frustration carries over to the next day, and I think, you know, if it's about the health and the future of one of your patients, who cares about coffee on the floor of my office kind of thing. So I think if you take these two cases, or these two versions of the same case, of Christopher throwing the coffee cup on the ground, I think both of them provide an explanation, but only the latter one might provide the justification. And again, we're back at where we started today, right? The listener, or even you, or the listener, can disagree and say, you know, maybe we'll get an email tomorrow saying, oh, look, you don't know. That's absolutely outrageous to waste coffee just because you didn't sleep well, or because you're frustrated about your professional problems and stuff like that. But that's not the point. We're using these cases, called them taught experiments, called them clinical case studies, however you want to call them, whether they are real cases or made-up cases, we're using these cases to help students and professionals within healthcare navigate the complexity of medical decision making. And then it doesn't matter actually whether you're having a bad day at the office yesterday justified throwing the cup to the ground. That doesn't matter. The important thing is understanding the distinction between explaining why that happened and a justification for that action. And importantly, as I think we saw, and as we were talking about earlier with paternalism, something being paternalistic, but not necessarily wrong, and other times it is paternalistic, and wrong, and other times it is paternalistic, and therefore wrong. In this case, I guess what is important is that we can imagine explanations that do not provide the justification, but we can also imagine explanations that do provide the justification. And the exercise is just to understand the difference, and hopefully even such a banal case that are involved in medicine like the coffee cup, like the book, and we could go on about the few other items that are on our desk. Hopefully those kind of cases help us navigate this complexities, help us draw these distinctions, but let's say it one more time, since this is like a kind of self-critical episode. Again, sometimes maybe in describing the case, in analyzing the case, we might be carried away by the sort of pedagogical and methodological sort of aim of this exercise, and maybe exploit the case, and end up giving an evaluation of the case that is not gonna make everybody happy. But look, you know, you're the GP, you know that you're not gonna make all your patients happy. It's not about that, is it? - No, and I also think another important point to a distinguished man to do when it comes to justification, which I think also is shown by the example you provide, is justification about the epistemological aspect, which I think when it comes to ontology and epistemology, I think we should have an episode about that. I think we need it because we're gonna use those terms a lot. But what I mean is justification about something technical, you could say. I'm justifying this treatment, whether it works or not, if there is a good effect. That's a very descriptive kind of justification about how the world is that I can provide these arguments or evidence as we talked about to suggest what the truth is when it comes to this. But then there is also that should be distinguished to as you describe the normative kind of justification, what is right and wrong from an ethical point of view. - So what kind of case is important? - Yeah, no, I think that is an important distinction. I'm just wondering what kind of cases are you thinking about? I mean, one of the standard cases of that kind of gap, and again, this is a related but different gap, I would say. But one of the standard cases maybe would be cases of prioritizing. So you could say that a patient comes to you and you can explain to them that they have condition X and you can explain to them that there is pill Y that will either cure or improve or at least make condition X sustainable. So anyway, you can explain the causal link between condition X and pill Y. And that causal link might be curative or might not be, right? And now I think, you know, way you're absolutely right, that is a scientific, not just an explanation, but it's a scientific justification. You're saying, you know, actually what you're saying is basically the pill works for your condition. But now, not every pill that will work will be worth it. So in my side effects, there are no work worth for these particular patients, right? Maybe because of this patient's lifestyle, maybe because of this patient's age, maybe because of this patient's comorbidity, right? Or it could be, so this is one sense of prioritizing. It's like, well, the pill isn't that expensive and you could prescribe it, but it's just, and it does work against this condition, but just not for this patient because of this other reason, right? Now, but then you can also imagine another case, which is, well, the pill would work against this condition and the patient has the right clinical profile to get it, but it's just a very expensive pill and the patient's condition is not serious enough for that patient to prioritize. And you're gonna keep it for the next patient who's, you know, who has the same condition, but at the, you know, at a later stage, or who is younger, or who is more comorbidities, or in fact, fewer comorbidities, right? Again, here, it's only about doing the analysis, right? We're not saying, you know, prioritize patients with more comorbidities over patients with fewer or we're not saying prioritize older as opposed to younger patients. I think, I think in that respect, that is one good way of bringing the normativity into this, but I think it's important, and I mean, again, I'm sorry, but we're gonna have to do even more complexity now. I think it's important to distinguish between two senses of normativity, only one which is ethical. Because as we said, actually, you know, both of those things are justifications. So you explain into the patient how the pill would work and why it would work, and then on top of that, then you making the argument for why the patient should or should not get it, right? And then on top of that comes what we discussed in previous episodes comes the whole issue of, you know, whether or not the patient consents, right? But that's actually here, we're kind of like, at a prior stage, then consent, you know? We're not quite gotten to, first of all, we need to find out, you know, what treatment works, if at all, then we have to find out. And you're the doctor, you correct me here, but I'm just thinking in very general and theoretical terms. So it seems to me, first thing you identify the condition, second thing you identify, a possible treatment, third thing you identify, whether the treatment works with the more general profile of the patient, and not just that particular condition, then fourth, you identify whether that treatment is worth, given, I don't know how expensive it is, how time consuming and given resources and stuff like that, and fifth, and only fifth comes basically like, suggesting it to the patient and getting the patient's consent. Does that sound like the way that it works? I think it's a fair way to present it. I would just maybe make it much more concrete. Please do, please do. And referring back to where we started today, without smoking, because, you know, there is an explanation why smoking works on lungs. For example, right? You can provide all these technical explanation of how it ruins the lungs, fair enough. And then you have the justification of stop smoking when it comes to exactly a more technical term saying, well, if your lung capacity is reduced because of smoking, then sooner or later, you will reach a level where you have difficulties breathing if you continue smoking. I would say that is the rather technical justification of it. And then you have the more normative moral example of it, justification of it saying, you should stop smoking because it ruins your lungs. And I think, but just, I think it's, I mean, we can discuss whether it's correct from an ethical, philosophical point of view. There's this distinguishment, but I think still it's very relevant for doctors to distinguish between those, because often I would claim they are, mixed, or people are unreflected about it because once you remember, of course, just because it's true from an explanatory point of view and justified from a technical point of view, you know, maybe the patient doesn't give a shit about it and have many other things in life, but often we have, we are using those explanatory or technical justifications to do actions in health care to give advice and interventions. I think to the normative aspect of it and sometimes it's really difficult for doctors to notice, again, I would claim, to distinguish between those things and while the patient might really don't have a care about their lung capacity, especially if they already sick for other things, or if they simply have, you know, more existential things. Let me say a couple of things here. First of all, I think we fundamentally agree on this, right? And in fact, I would go so far as say, you know, I'm not sure that medical doctors should be in the business of telling people to stop smoking. I think medical doctors should be in the business of explaining to people what smoking does to them, you know, both in terms of the general effect or the probability of lung cancer, you know, life expectancy, you know, other effects and stuff like that, but also specifically to, you know, the life situation of a particular patient. So, and I think those are the kind of two first levels that you've identified. The sort of the more general one and the more particular one. So the general effects of smoking and then the particular effects of smoking on a certain patient. But I think the very reason when you're absolutely right to bring it back to this, the very reason we're doing these exercises of making this complex distinctions, for example, the distinction between ontology and epistemology through the evidence, explanation and justification, empirical and normative. It's exactly to give doctors tools for decision-making, but also for self-refraction. So, for example, now, after I've been talked for half an hour about these distinctions, we can say like you did, well, look, then there is a third step. And the third step, once you've explained, you know, the medicine of smoking, and once you've applied the medicine of smoking to a certain patient, a certain clinical profile, then the third step is because of one and two, you should stop smoking. So it's almost like a sort of ancient Greek silogeism in which, you know, you've got your premises, and then the doctor concludes, therefore, you, etsyl, ought to stop smoking now, right? And I think we've now done enough to, and again, it's not our business to make that call, but we've given the listeners and our medical students enough tools to maybe understand why, you know, maybe a doctor should stop before joining that conclusion, before providing that advice. Maybe all that even GPs, or I would say, are on the front line, even GPs maybe should stop before and not say you should stop smoking, because that's not their business, right? That's the business of the patient, that's the old point about autonomy and consent, right? Life is tough, you know, people get up really early in the morning and work crazy hours and in shit jobs. And if you, they need a few cigarettes to deal with that, you know, how can a privileged GP judge that? They should just then back, explain the situation, explain the consequences, give them the tools for designing, and then the actual decision about quitting smoking should be something else. I must say, so this was just my, sort of, long-winded way of agreeing with you, Kristoffer. But having said that, obviously, there is the complexity of the fact that smoking is addictive, there is the complexity of the social determinants of health, there is the complexity that we started from which we started, again, today, about the fact that, you know, obviously, you know, young teens might not be fully autonomous, so that my, you know, different rules might apply to non-fully autonomous agents. So, I think smoking is complicated. Even if the medicine of smoking is really simple, it's a really good place actually, smoking or, in fact, drinking or other things to sort of show how, you know, the medical story just isn't the old story. And for that reason, I think we can maybe conclude today's podcast and say, we promise to the listeners, we're going to do a dedicated episode on smoking. But before we conclude, just want to, because you brought it up yourself with a more structural level or, like, for example, prioritizing and so on in society. And I also think that is, it's also relevant for the doctors or the medical students or anyone else listening to, you know, health experts or politicians or economics stating facts and data and numbers. For example, when it comes to smoking, you know, providing the explanation of how much it caused society to smoke or the justification that society can save certain amount of fund resources by, you know, stop people smoking is not in itself a justification of that it should be banned smoking. And I'm providing this because very often you would see examples of experts, you know, making it subtle, the actual normative argument that we should stop smoking by trying to provide a lot of numbers, data, explanation of why it's bad. And you think that it should be out in the open. It should be out of the open or at least it's important for those listeners who are going to, you know, either agree or disagree to be aware of of these subtle arguments or these subtle normative assumptions that lays in it because again, smoking is in that case a sensitive topic, but it's no different when we're now discussing again, people being overweight or people eating food or we have to physical active. The principle is exactly the same. And we have to have an episode on that as well. So let's start to take notes on all the episodes we have to have. No, but I, I mean, I completely agree with that. Maybe I'll just, I'll just, you know, since we're, since we're at the end, I'll just use your comment to link it back to something that that we did early on. So we discussed, I think in one of the previous episodes, the way that maybe justifying paternalism in public health is easier than justifying paternalism in health care, like at the hospital and whatever, right? And I think this may be, this may be another case of that, like where it's very uncomfortable to imagine that your GP tells you stop smoking now, right? I think that's going too far. Again, and then the listeners now have the tools to think, oh, is it going to far because it's paternalistic? Is it wrong? Is it whatever? Is it normative? And stuff like that, that, you know, we've given the tools, they make the judgment. So that's, that's, that's harsher. I think your GP telling you in the GP practice stops smoking, then maybe a public health campaign. And then I don't know, like, you know, I, you know, when I go running in the morning, I always go past one of these things from the city council, you know, that is, that is trying to get people to, you know, eat more green or stuff like that. And I think, and sometimes it's about quitting smoking and things like that. I think sort of, you know, a billboard might be more acceptable than your GP telling you, whether or not, independently of which one is more effective. That's another important distinction that we'll deal with maybe another time, right? So the acceptability of an intervention does not only depend on its effectiveness. And maybe the GP telling you is more effective, but that doesn't make it more acceptable. And the billboard is maybe less effective, but more acceptable. And again, let's leave the listeners to then reflect on, you know, how to apply paternalism to this kind of case. And we promised them an episode on small. So this was the episode about the difference between explanation and justification. And hopefully we'll know that. But we did know all sorts of other stuff in between. But yeah, hopefully that, hopefully that has come through as well. Yes, thank you. Thank you, good stuff.