e.l.f. Cosmetics: Joey Shamah. The Dollar Store Formula That Built a Cosmetics Giant
74m 49s
Joey Shama and Scott Borba founded Elf Cosmetics in 2004 with the revolutionary idea of offering high-quality cosmetics at a $1 price point, challenging the market’s belief that low cost meant low quality. Initially facing skepticism from retailers who feared customer loss, the brand gained traction through strategic media placements in major publications like Glamour and Good Housekeeping. A viral rumor in 2006 that Elf was being acquired by Bloomingdale’s triggered a massive surge in demand, forcing the company to rapidly scale operations and build supply chain capacity. Elf successfully penetrated key retailers like Target and Hudson’s Bay, where it demonstrated strong sales performance and incremental value, without undermining higher-priced brands. The business combined direct-to-consumer sales with retail distribution, achieving profitability by 2010 with $30 million in annual sales and a $70 million valuation. Joey sold a minority stake to private equity firm T.S.G. Consumer Partners to secure financial stability and reduce personal risk, though he remained deeply involved. Over time, Elf expanded its product line with premium offerings like Elf Studio, maintaining its core value proposition. Despite early financial strain and uncertainty, the brand evolved into a billion-dollar company, proving that affordable, accessible beauty products could achieve massive market success through innovation, strategic marketing, and resilience in the face of industry challenges.
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(upbeat music)
Okay, so $5.99 wherever flat rate
and you're gonna sell it through the website
and it's complicated and,
but the other question to have is,
how are you gonna handle the logistics?
I mean, you have it sitting in a warehouse,
but who's gonna package the stuff up and send it out?
- So honestly, we didn't even think about logistics.
We were just following Glamour Magazine's lead.
They wanted us to make a website
so we could get in the magazine.
We didn't think we were gonna get an order.
(upbeat music)
Welcome to How I Built This,
a show about innovators, entrepreneurs,
idealists and the stories behind the movements they built.
I'm Guy Ross and on the show today,
how Joey Shama started a dollar cosmetics brand
that turned into a billion dollar business.
(upbeat music)
Among the 33 cars that lined up to race the Indy 500 this year,
one was particularly notable.
It was painted in shades of pink
and it's driver, the only female competing this year,
Catherine Legg.
But perhaps as notable as the driver was the car's main sponsor,
not Penzoil or Firestone or Coors Light,
but rather Elf Cosmetics, the first time ever
that a beauty brand sponsored an Indy car.
And if you know something about Elf,
that's not entirely surprising
because Elf was essentially built
as a disruptor brand back in 2004.
At that time, people either bought cosmetics
at the drugstore where they were cheap
or at the department store where they cost a lot more.
And the assumption was that price equaled quality.
Drugstore makeup just wasn't as good as the high end stuff.
But when Elf launched, it upended that model.
At the time, discount makeup cost about five or six bucks
for a lipstick or blush.
But Elf products, all of them, cost a dollar.
And the thing is, they didn't look or feel cheap.
And it meant that customers could take a risk
of trying out more of their products,
which made the brand particularly popular
with teens and tweens.
When Joey Shama and his original partner,
Scott Vincent Borba, started Elf,
they ran into a lot of roadblocks.
For starters, the big box retailers weren't interested.
They didn't think there was a market for their products.
But within a few years, the brand started to gain traction.
Joey sold most of the company back in 2014,
but he managed to scale it to a pretty successful brand
in 10 years.
And today, Elf is publicly traded with a market cap
of around $4 billion.
Not surprisingly, the $1 price point has gone away,
but the products are still relatively inexpensive
between $5 and $15.
As for Joey, he grew up in Brooklyn in the 1980s and '90s.
His dad had an apparel business
and most of the people in the community,
including Joey's family, were of Syrian Jewish origin.
We are very tight-knit community.
We do a lot of things together.
We have a very strong network.
And we are very entrepreneurial in spirit.
I came from a community of merchants.
We buy product, we sell product.
We know how to do that.
And that's something I always aspire to.
I wanted to do it differently.
So I had a passion for making money.
I had a passion for making a name for myself.
And I had a passion for making an impact.
Whatever it was going to happen, it was going to happen.
I remember when I was in high school,
I was president of a teen division of our community center.
And the woman who was running it at the time said,
I don't know how, but I know you're going to be successful.
And I really go back to that meeting
that really stuck with me of saying,
I'm going to be successful.
I don't know how.
If it was beauty, it was beauty.
If it was yoga mats, it was yoga mats,
it was apparel, it was apparel.
It was going to happen.
OK, so you grow up in a home of your dad's an entrepreneur.
And did you always, you know,
were you kind of encouraged from a young age
to join the business?
Was that your sort of groomed to do?
I mean, I think my parents and they really
afforded me the flexibility to follow what I wanted to do.
I think it was a possibility.
But my personal fear in life was joining my father's company
and not being a productive member of it
and just being the boss's son and not really proving my worth
and being successful on my own.
And that was my biggest fear.
Yeah, but I think you did wind up working with your dad
for a while, right?
I mean, I know that for college, you went to NYU
and you studied business.
But I think you also worked with your dad during that time,
right?
Yeah, so I worked with my dad and his apparel company
as I was in college.
So I was learning the basics.
I was learning what a purchase order was.
I was learning what a system was to track orders,
what delivery dates meant, how to sell.
I did a little bit of sales for some of the close outs
or the leftover inventory that they had.
So that's how I really got my feet wet.
OK, I want to go to how this begins.
Because what I've heard is it's 2002
and you're at a party in Los Angeles
and you meet this guy, Scott Vincent Borba.
First of all, what were you doing in Los Angeles?
What was this party?
You're a senior in college at that time?
Yeah, so that's a story that's out there,
but that's not the real deal.
OK, good.
So actually, I was introduced to Scott Vincent Borba
through a mutual friend.
And the concept was that Scott was a beauty maven.
He really understood the beauty industry.
He worked at a lot of different beauty companies.
He was one of the first employees at a brand
called Hard Candy.
He was at Neutrogena running the Neutrogena Color Cosmetics brand.
And he had this idea that he wanted
to create a line of cosmetics.
And we were at my father was looking maybe with me
to invest in a business and to help.
And that's kind of where it came from.
So basically, you and your dad were kind of looking around
for some ideas and somehow somebody got to Scott
and said, oh, I know these guys in New York
who are looking to start something.
It was basically that.
Basically that.
OK, he was living in LA, right?
Or was he living in New York?
It was funny because he was living in Manhattan Beach, California.
And I was living in Manhattan Beach, New York.
So that was just the funny coincidence.
But he was in California.
What was Scott's concept?
Scott's concept was a line of cosmetics.
Similar to that of Hard Candy, it was a value line of cosmetics.
When we looked at the landscape of the retail market,
there were still a lot of big box retailers.
Two of the biggest ones in the early 2000s
that were growing exponentially were the dollar chains.
So it was family dollar, dollar general.
They were growing to five, six, 7,000 doors.
And the problem they had is they
didn't have quality and consistency on their shelves.
So basically, they either had an unbranded no focus
on quality brand, where it was two items on a blister card
for a dollar, a lipstick, and a nail polish or whatever.
Or they had access to some branded merchandise
that was leftover from a drug store or was a return or was extra.
So you had to cover girl colors that you didn't want.
Maybe you could find the one you wanted.
It was at a discount, but it wasn't planagrammed
and it wasn't consistent.
So the idea is, hey, let's actually, instead
of a plane wrap lipstick or a $78 cover girl or Revlon,
whatever costs, let's make something that is branded
as cheap as the plane wrap.
Exactly.
But you're trying to figure out this kind of wormhole, right?
Can we get something good enough?
That is really cheap to manufacture
that we can sell for a dollar, right?
'Cause it's a dollar store.
Is that what you're thinking?
Yeah, basically what we learned really early on
is when you break down the cosmetics to formulations
and componentry, formulations, yes.
You can hit that price point.
The real artistry, if you may, is in the componentry
where we couldn't afford metal.
We had to go plastic or we couldn't afford things
that were multi parts and it need to be one part
or one mold extrusion.
So we needed to really figure that part out.
But the actual cosmetics, we were able
to hit that dollar price point.
Okay, so you guys are on board with Scott.
You can form this business.
And you guys had relationships in Asia
with apparel businesses.
So tell me a little bit about how you started to see
whether you could actually do this.
What did you start to talk to to see
if you could actually make this stuff for cheap?
So I headed over to Asia.
It was the summer of 2003.
We had one of my father's long time office managers
was a very entrepreneurial guy.
And he introduced us to the first factory
that we worked with.
And I remember. trying on the mascara in the factory, seeing if it was waterproof, had no idea what I was doing.
So this was in August 2003 and it took the better part of 10 months. It was June 2004 when we
first had product to sell. So let's kind of dig into this. I'm just thinking about lipstick, for
example, right? It's like whatever goes into the actual lipstick and then you put it in the lipstick
container, which is plastic and it's got a cap on it and then it's going to go into what's
called a blister pack, right? You can put on a shelf or something like that. How do you actually
make that for a dollar? I mean less than a dollar. Sorry, much less than you got to sell it for a dollar.
So there were products out there. We weren't the first person to sell lipstick for a dollar.
We weren't the cheapest guy selling lipstick for a dollar. We were just creating a brand around it.
We were creating an emotional affinity. We were making sure it looked good and it felt good.
But still, help me understand like blush or a powder, mascara. How does that just the container
and the brush and then the actual cosmetics? It's got to be like 50, 60 cents at most so you can
mark it up and make some margin. So it's about, it was about half of that because our target
could cost was about 35 cents. I think back to the simplicity angle, everything we sold,
we sold it for 59 cents so they could retail it for a dollar. Right, of course. How do you make it for,
how do you make something like that for 35 cents? Well, that's what it, is what I'm trying to say.
That's what it costs. Wow. Like that's how much it costs everybody. Now, yes, you can put active
ingredients in yes. This was 25 years ago. And yes, there are more expensive componentry and finishes
and all that. But you're also paying for the corporate overhead. You're paying for the infrastructure.
You're paying for the spokespeople. You're paying for the marketing campaigns. You're paying for
the shelf space. You're paying for the returns. You're paying for the warehousing. And all of that,
if not done efficiently, you won't work. But when you look at a pure cost of good sold across the
market, for what we wanted to bring to market, it was not that challenging. How were you guys? I mean,
you had Scott involved. He was in LA. You're in New York. Were you working out of the offices of
the apparel company? You know, you're working with contractors. Scott was in full disclosure,
still working for other cosmetic companies, but working for us on the nights and weekends. He was
doing the product development. So yes, we did use my father's apparel office. My father's apparel
company had a warehouse in Edison, New Jersey. So we were definitely leveraging anything we could
across my father's supply chain. And we were working nights and weekends when we needed to.
So you have, you identify a manufacturer in China. And how many, how many skews are going to,
how many different products you're going to make? So 13 categories we started with and 67 skews.
So we had eyeliner with a sharpener. We had a press powder that had salicylic acid in it. We had
a few lip glosses. One of them was a plumper. One of them was inspired by Stella, which was a high
and brand at the time. An eye shadow that had four colors in it. So a quad of eyeshadows.
That was, you know, it was across eyes, lip and face. Eyes, lips and face, which is how you came to call
it. Elf, eyes, lips, face, right? Exactly. And who, who were you thinking were your competitors?
Did you think that that Maybelline and Revlon and L'Oreal or your competitors are not really,
because they were, they were charging four or five times the amount that you guys would be charging.
In terms of the space we were trying to get to, yes, very much Maybelline cover girl.
There was some smaller brands, NYC and Wet and Wild. Those are more of our core core
competitors, because they were the value brands, even Rimmelundin. But both Rimmelundin and NYC
were owned by Cody. Wet and Wild was a standalone. But that was the problem in the early days
that you had a few incumbents that owned a bunch of brands and controlled all the space
to retail. Yeah. So you had L'Oreal, which was L'Oreal and Maybelline, you had PNG,
which owned Cover Girl at the time. So there was no room to you to like box your way in two
feet of space, because it was all controlled by four or five companies, even if it was 12 brands
on shelf. And so here's a question for you. We know from, from all the work we've done on this
show over the last 10 years that the margins on cosmetics can be incredible. It's like it's
like vitamins. It can be an amazing business if you do it, right? So the raw materials,
even high-end materials are not that expensive. And essentially a huge chunk of their costs
were marketing, right? Like if it's Revlon, it was Cindy Crawford, right? Yeah, Cindy Crawford,
Halle Berry, yes. And so that but that gives them a lot of reach and a lot of publicity,
you're saying that that is a big reason why even the sort of the value brands like Cover Girl
or Revlon were comparatively expensive. Yes, I used to have a slide in one of my earlier sales
decks that had, you know, if you look at the cost of the lipstick, how much is actually in the
lipstick versus going everywhere else? And that's, you know, we took that apparel mentality
from my father's business of you buy something, you market up, you sell something. As opposed to
you buy something, you pay to market it, you pay to get shelf space, you pay to promote it,
and then you sell it. And we took out all that middle and we were just delivering value to the
customer. I mean, it's interesting because we have done brands on the show, not just cosmetics,
but let's talk about cosmetics for a moment, that have very deliberately priced their products
at a higher price point to signal quality, to signal luxury. So there is that strategy too.
A thousand percent. I mean, so much so that one of our biggest obstacles in the early years
was retailers afraid to put our product on shelves because they didn't want to trade the
customer down. If they're selling a six dollar lip gloss, and I'm selling a dollar lip gloss,
and they customer buys mine over theirs, then they just lost five dollars of sales.
And by the way, the first order, how much did the first order cost? Roughly. Did it cost you guys?
To bring in the goods? Yeah. It was a hundred and fifty thousand dollar order.
And this was basically an investment that you guys put into it. You guys put this money into it.
Yes. We bought the goods. It was one container. It was about six hundred thousand pieces.
And the strategy was while we're manufacturing this, we're going to start to pitch dollar stores,
dollar general. Is that what you thought you would do? Yes. We had a sales rep agency for dollar general.
I remember being at that meeting, we put the whole line, we went to dollar general and family dollar,
and we said we've got the answer for you, quality over quantity. And they politely said,
we like what you're doing, but we are committed to quantity over quality.
But that was just a few of the dollar store locations. Did you, did you try to approach others?
So we went, there's a trade show called ECRM. Yeah. You meet a lot of retailers. You're kind of
guaranteed a meeting, a 20 minute or 10 minute meeting with each retailer. And it's kind of like
around Robin. And that's where we met 99 cent only and dollar tree. But you know, as we were trying
to get out there, we just kept hearing. We're committed to the quantity. This doesn't make sense.
I don't want to trade my customer down. I don't have room for it. Like it was no, no, no, no.
Yeah. Up until this point, I mean, you're trying to get this into dollar and dollar general,
which was the whole point of this product. You're thinking that's where we go. That's where our
market is. That's where it's going to crush it. And you have zero validation. Every,
every meeting you have with the 99 cent store dollar store people is like, no, no, no, no, no, no.
Did you think maybe it was wrong? Yes. Oh, yes. Very much. Very worried. Yes. When you're,
this is my first foray into business. I'm newly married. I have, you know, I'm trying to build
my career. You know, you have to live like, how are we going to make this a business? I mean,
we knew we thought we had something, but it was, it didn't feel like it at the time. And I remember,
I think it was in about February or January, early 2004. I was driving to the city. And it was just
as Alex Rodriguez was signed by the Yankees. And there was an underwear brand called To Exist.
And To Exist had sent a package of underwear to the, to his hotel or apartment. And they were
talking about it on the radio. And I was like, wait, how did, like, how did this happen? And
actually knew one of the people involved with the company. And I said, how did that happen?
He's like, oh, we have a PR firm. Interesting. And I was like, oh, PR. That sounds cheaper than
marketing. All right. So you hear the story about Averod and the underwear. And you find out,
you figure out which PR
firm was behind that plan?
Yep.
I reach out to the PR firm.
I tell them about the concept, and I don't know if they loved it or wanted another client,
but they scheduled what they called desk side editor appointments.
So it was me and it was one of the members of the PR firm who went away, who was the rep
on our account.
Her name was Amanda.
Yeah.
Okay.
Now, so here's the thing.
You bring it to these editors, right?
And you're showing them product and you have a brand like you, I'm assuming you hired
like an agency to come up with a logo for Elf and in a look.
Yes.
We had an agency in Costa, Mexico, California called Juno Design.
They created the logo, some of the look books, some of the brand catalog.
And then we also had a digital agency that built the website.
Well, and was it, I mean, was it really expensive to do, I mean, and now you make a logo
in AI, and I'm not saying good, but was it really expensive to do that, it must not have
been cheap.
It wasn't cheap, but it wasn't real, I mean, we were bootstrapping it.
We didn't have any revenue coming in.
My father was funding everything we needed and it was, we did everything as cost effectively
as possible.
Okay.
So now you've got a, you know, this, this concept and, and you've got a design firm and
you bring it around to these editors, right?
Yes.
We went around to all the beauty editors in the city, New York City, from glamour, to lucky,
to good housekeeping, to Oprah, to 17, vote, glam everything.
And we pitched them about this line of color cosmetics that we wanted to bring to the
market.
We walked them through the whole line, how it went from eyes, lips face, how it was inspired
by prestige, how it was, the quality was great product.
And then at the end, we said, oh, and by the way, everything's a dollar.
And then they were blown away.
So you're kind of keeping it a secret until the very end of the price.
I think there was the wow factor that like, okay, here's another guy showing me another
line of cosmetics like it looks good, but why isn't any different than the other $12
lip gloss I saw yesterday or I'll see it four o'clock today.
But then when we told them the price, then it was like, that was the, like the winning factor.
And then I remember it was late April.
I was walking in the city.
I got a call from the PR firm.
Late news, glamour magazine wants to put you in the magazine for the next month's issue.
Well, it was actually glamour magazine called me up and said, we want to put you in the magazine.
Okay.
But we have a problem because our readers need to be able to get you.
Right.
We need to buy you.
So they gave us an ultimatum.
Yeah.
They said either you're in all Walgreens by next month, highly unlikely or open a website
so that the customer can get you.
But nobody's shopped on a web.
I mean, not nobody, but people really didn't know nobody's shopped on a website.
We didn't even know what he commerce was.
It was like us and Amazon at the time.
And you couldn't get into Walgreens because you couldn't get in anywhere.
No, not even.
And even if we could, you'd need to set up ship, get in shells off planagram.
It was not even an option.
When we come back in just a moment, Joey gets a much coveted meeting with a buyer from
Target, but then she asks a question that he simply cannot answer.
Stay with us.
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from VisaUSA Inc. Hey welcome back to how I built this, I'm Guy Roz.
So it's April of 2004 and Glamour Magazine wants to feature elf cosmetics in an upcoming
issue.
But first, Joey has to make sure they have a working website.
So we called my web developer and I said can you make us an e-commerce part of our website
and we have 30 days to do it.
He says yes we can do it, I say and how much is it going to cost?
And he said $5,000.
I said $5,000?
I don't know, that's a lot.
I can't really afford it, we're not selling the product.
I go how about I give you some equity in my company?
He said I don't think so, I think we really need the $5,000.
So we gave him $5,000.
We built an e-commerce site.
If you saw the e-commerce site today, you would cringe.
It was the clunkyest e-commerce site, not to his fault, that was just the time.
And basically we launched the e-commerce website on June 14th, 2004.
Okay, so this was us and I'm sure there was like multiple steps and because it wasn't
striped, it was just hard to get a credit card in.
I mean it was hard.
We did a credit card processor, authorised.net, yeah.
And then once you got the order, you would still have to ship it out.
I'm assuming you charge for shipping too at that time.
So basically we decided early on, we're selling dollar cosmetics.
How do we charge for shipping?
Yeah.
I pretty sure the post office had like a flat rate, like if it's a certain size.
So we did a flat rate of $5.95 and we did not accept returns.
So it's hard.
You're going to buy cosmetics on this internet thing that you've never purchased
on before and you're really going to hope you like it because you're early in it for
at least $67 and you can't send it back.
Yeah.
And this is probably not UPS, so it's not traceable.
It's probably like what priority mail or something.
It was priority mail, yes.
Which means it could get lost and all this stuff.
So okay, so $5.99 wherever flat rate and you're going to sell it through the website and
it's complicated.
But the other question has is how are you going to handle the logistics?
I mean, you have it in a warehouse sitting in a warehouse.
But I mean, who's going to package this stuff up and send it out?
So honestly, we didn't even think about logistics.
We didn't think we were going to get an order.
So we didn't think it all the way through.
We did have a credit card processor in the warehouse.
There was an office.
So we had some workers and people in the warehouse that could help out.
If we got two orders, three orders, who knew?
We had no idea that e-commerce would ever become something.
And now it's just you go, you shop a fire, whatever, and it's all automated.
But then if somebody put their credit card in, you would get some kind of email or some
kind of communication, which you then had to take that information and manually put it
into a processor, right, like a credit card machine.
Maybe it was so cumbersome.
We needed to print it out and then go into the portal, put the credit card number.
Some of the credit cards would bounce back.
Then we'd have to email the customer.
Your credit card's not working.
Then we would come back and then we'd print the label and then weigh the package and then
drop it at the post office.
Okay.
You've got 150 grand worth of inventory plus the shipping cost plus all the ancillary
costs.
I mean, who knows how much you're in now.
How much cash is gone into this business?
You know, a lot of people may not even know this, but if you don't, there was a time where
Glamour magazine or Vogue like that moved product, it was a big deal.
The early 2000s and the late 90s were like the heyday of big magazines.
And even if a tiny mention could have a huge impact, yes.
But this issue comes out from what I understand on June 16th, 2004.
And it's not a huge article about, it's like a couple of lines about your cosmetics,
right?
It's one blurb and a picture of our concealer.
Okay.
And does anything happen?
Do you notice any movement right away or?
Yes.
So I remember walking into the office and we had to screen like a back end to the website
where if someone placed an order, you'd see the order, the date and the value.
So all of a sudden we walked in day one and we had 400 orders.
Wow.
And, you know, all the products, the $150,000 of inventory came in the Assortment Packs.
And I remember my father, CFO, who was helping out.
We were opening boxes.
This one had purples and this one had pinks.
You know, we had pallets of inventory that only had this color.
out because that was the hottest seller, so there was stuff all over the place.
So you'd be like opening one by side? I got the purple here, somebody else is like,
"Oh, I've got the candy apple red lip gloss in this one," or whatever, like that's literally what you're
doing. Yeah, I mean, after the first six orders, things just start like, "What do we do now?"
So then we took them out of those absorbent packs, we built 67 boxes, each box had the unique item,
everybody. I remember my brother, who's now a doctor, he came in, he picked a few orders,
that was not for him, he never came back, went to med school, we never saw him again in the
business, but we were finding anyone that could help us pick and pack orders. Joey, I'm curious,
I mean, did you get tons of orders from that glamour magazine or just, you know, even if it was
50 orders a day, it was exciting, or was it more than that? I think it was more than the dollars,
it was the validation, it was like, yes, we believed that we had something here. So over the next
year and a half, we had a lot of these glamour placements, which were honestly great placements,
and we wouldn't be here without them, and then we had even better placements, we had like,
we had not brand features, but there was one feature that we had in Good Housekeeping magazine.
Now, if you remember Good Housekeeping, there was nothing better than a Good Housekeeping
seal of approval, and Good Housekeeping gave a feature of our lip gloss at a dollar versus the
lip gloss that was sold in Sephora for 24 dollars of still a cosmetics, and they said,
whichever one you buy, you will love it. I had that blown up in the office, that was a huge
win for us. Oprah Magazine did a backstory cover where they laid out all our makeup, and then
they made like a piece of art of our makeup around a dollar sign, and they did a whole article,
and every time one of those bigger ones happened, we felt the spike.
And by the way, in that in that first year 2004, did you try and pitch Sephora?
No, that wasn't. You knew that they weren't going to carry your products.
I don't think we could afford to be in there. In that first year of business,
because you really first sawers come in in June of 2004, do you remember how much you guys
didn't sales that year? I want to say about 400,000. Okay, so pretty good. I mean, means you sold out
your initial inventory, which means you had to bring in more inventory, right? Yes.
All right. So exciting. What was it? Was it stressful to you? Did you feel like I am still
worried that this might not work? Every day, every night nights were worse than days, because days
are busy. But yes, I remember maybe in the next year, we had like a budget of like $125,000
a month of sales. Like how am I going to hit that? You had to hit that number. We had to hit
125,000 dollars of sales a month. Why was it your target? I don't remember why it was. I just
remember that number. And I remember we had our web business. We had very, very small regional
business where you had like a chain with four stores or six stores or eight stores that carried
our product. And then we had a few international inquiries. I remember one from Australia and one
from the UK actually in Wales. And they started like, can we copy what you're doing and kind of
take it to our market and buy the product from you? Yeah. And I said, sure, at this point,
why not? Like you're an account like any other. And I don't have to worry about all the
international complexities. Wow. So I'm saying, even you put all those together, I think we were
able to hit maybe $125,000 a month. But I think it was barely to cover costs. There was no growth.
Any new inventory had to be funded by my father's capital. Like it was, you worried that he might
be just flushing money down the toilet. Yes. It was stressful. I mean, every sales meeting was maybe
this was the unlock. In the early days, I remember I was newly married. I was living in an apartment
over my parents' house. I just had my first son in January 2004. And I had to, you know, we live
in a community that has high expectations and we needed to figure it out. Did it cause any tension
between you and your dad? No. He didn't have very, very deep pockets, but he believed in it. And he
was happy, I think, from what I saw to not stress about it. He was felt good about it and
was managing it and wasn't afraid of it. And I guess you could have, if everything was just
disastrous, liquidated, like try and sell it for, you know, a cut rate price and maybe recover
some of your investment. It's not that easy on a dollar product because you're already at 59 cents
selling price. So I'm going to sell it to you for what? 30, 20? I mean, it's hard. Yeah. Okay.
So 2004, you're, you know, you're kind of incrementally growing. And I read that you also managed
to get a pitch to target that year that you managed to make a pitch to them. What was the reaction?
So the first time I met the target buyer was one of that ECRM trade shows where you are scheduled
to meet all the buyers in a 10 minute. And I tell her this whole pitch about the quality,
cosmetics, color, everything. And her response was elf. Why would I want to put something called
the elf on my face? And that was like, I didn't know what to say. I don't even recall my response,
but that was a challenge. And it ended up actually, we stayed in touch with the buying team. I believe
she went off the desk. And I don't know somehow we got a call two months or some time later where
they had an opening and they had not in the cosmetic section, but in what they call the trial and
travel section. So we were able to put two or three different items there, the same item different
colors. And we had a bin. And that really was ended up being a game changer for us.
But that didn't happen in the first year that happened. No, it happened later in 2006,
May 2005. So, right. Because I read that the first real retailer, like significant retail that
you managed to get into was HB, the supermarket chain, based in San Antonio. Yeah, so the HB,
that was one of our aha moments as a company. Because through all of our nose that we got
in the early days, one of the biggest know that we got was we like the product, but we don't want
to trade our customer down. Like, if I'm a retailer, if I'm a Walgreens, and I'm selling a cover girl
lip gloss for six dollars, and I'm going to sell an L flip gloss for a dollar. Now there's five
dollars that the company, the retailer's not getting. And it was actually HB, which is a high volume
supermarket chain in Texas, that said, we're going to try it. And at that point, we had developed for
the local markets, this four-sided spinner rack. It held about 954 pieces, something like that.
And HB was open to putting these racks in each of their stores. So, this is like a six-foot-high
rack, something like that? Yes, exactly. So, you could spin that rack, and it had, you know, 954
products, depending on the size of the product. So, basically, we sell it, we sold this into her,
and the thing sold out in minutes. And at HB. At HB. And did it go into all the HB stores,
or just a few? I wouldn't go into 30, but the best thing that happened with HB is we get an email
from the buyer the next morning saying, I was wrong. This brand is incremental and impulsive.
Because they saw that because of the price, I wasn't buying one or the other. I wasn't not buying
Cover Girl for five or six dollars and just buying Elf, but I was buying Cover Girl and
Buying Elf, or I still have five dollars to spend, but I'm going to buy five products because
there's such an array of product and really, you know, maximize my dollar. So, essentially,
it wasn't actually eating into the sales of Cover Girl or other more expensive products. It was
just people were buying more product in that department. Yeah, it was adding more to their top line,
not taking away from their sales volume. And that changed our wholesale's pitch and the whole
everything going forward. And then we went in all HBs, and then there were some HBs that put four racks
into the store, each store, and it became, it was our first viral sensation, I guess.
So, how did that use to change our approach? How did it change your approach in how you
sold this, try to pitch this product? Because as we're meeting retailers and their responses,
I don't want to trade my customer down. We're saying, look, HB is doing it and it's not,
it's adding incrementality. They're selling more. It was a combination of impulsive,
meaning I didn't want something, but I'm going to go get, I'm going to get it anyway because
it's so cheap. Maybe I was going to buy a candy bar and said I'm going to buy a lip gloss.
So, there was no barrier to entry. And you had data to back it up. And we had data.
Okay, but HB, you're still having a hard time getting into these other retailers from,
you know, HB is great, but from what I understand, it's still going to take some work,
and HB alone doesn't make your company proud.
profitable yet right? No. No, okay. And what were you just aside from just product? What were your other huge expenses?
Because you're not doing any marketing. So what were your expenses? So at this point, we now had our own office.
We were building somewhat of a staff. I was still very involved in every element, but I was leveraging
some people now that my father's the power of business was changing a little bit. We brought on two or three people from that business,
and then we brought on someone right out of college, but she was great to help with some of the marketing and product stuff.
Probably some of the more experienced people are expensive. Very expensive.
And did you guys ever think about like, you know, let's offer people equity for lower pay because it'll save us money?
No. I mean, people needed to make money. They needed to pay their rent and their equity really really wasn't worth much,
because we didn't even know if we were going to have a business. It wasn't the currency people we're looking for at the time.
Right. Right. Didn't make sense to them. I mean, of course, I'm sure they were kicking themselves later, but that's okay.
So, so you're an HB and still, and do you remember by that point, by the time you're an HB and you see, you see this phenomenon there,
starting to feel like, okay, we're cooking now, we're still sleepless nights. Still sleepless nights, there's a large hill to climb,
A to be profitable and then B to be successful. So, like, how are we really going to get to the top of the mountain, so to speak?
What kept you up at night? Failing. Not being able to, you know, my father was still helping fund this.
We were closed narrowing the gap, baby, but like, how big can big be? I'm selling dollar cosmetics.
Where do we go from here? Where's Target? Where's Walmart? Where's Walgreens? Where's the big guys?
Like, how do I, I'm competing with Covergirl and Revlon and Lori L? Like, these guys control the space.
And when you're selling something for a dollar, you have to sell a lot of it for it to be a successful business, right?
You can't just rely on one regional chain of grocery stores.
Yeah, you have to be anywhere and everywhere and, and you have to constantly be shipping it in,
because even if you set like our foresighted spinner rack held 954 pieces,
but once you sell 954 pieces, you have to send in another 954 pieces, so there was a lot.
Like, if, if a $10 item was needed to do $1,000 in sales, they were only to sell 100 items.
We need to sell 900. Yeah. I mean, it's like a, it's like a slim gym at the gas station.
I mean, the price, the price difference wasn't that high anyway. Yeah, sell a lot of slim gyms.
Exactly. And there's only four flavors of slim gyms, right? We have 67 items.
I remember in the early years, we were making money and I told my, like, maybe a little later,
but I said, okay, the company made money. Where's my share? And my father turned to me, he goes,
he left. He's like, no, no, no, you got to invest that back in. You have to do it again.
And then eventually you'll get there. But that's kind of, that was my naivete.
Okay. So I read about this story that happens in 2006. And I wonder if it was,
if it was sort of strategically manufactured, but it was a rumor that came out about Elf that
actually really ended up being an amazing boon for the company. Tell me about this rumor
and when were you involved with it? Did you manufacture it?
So I always tell everyone, if I manufactured it, I would have done it over and over and over again.
So I definitely can't take credit for it. All right. But it was September 2006.
And we had just come back from another industry, Checho. And I remember we were in a recap meeting
with, we had a sales rep at the time who was there. And we were all of a sudden the phone rank
and outside of being the CEO of the company, I was also the receptionist and the customer service
carer. So I answered the phone and she says, the woman says, is this Elf cosmetics? And I said,
yes. And she says, is it true? I said, is what true? She said, I just got an email that you're
being bought by Bloomingdale's and that all your cosmetics are going up in price. I said, I don't,
I'm news to me. And then I checked the website and all of a sudden, we see orders coming in
by the tens and hundreds. And it was, I think at one point through this viral viral spike,
we were like the 80th most visited site on the internet. Wait, where was this rumor coming from?
Where was it? Where were people hearing it or seeing it? It was just an email. It was one of these
like, we have no idea where it started till today. And everybody got it. My target buyer got it.
My aunt in California got it. My cousin, my, everyone you spoke to till today, when I say Elf
cosmetics, they say, Oh, I got an email that you were being bought by Bloomingdale's in 2006.
So this rumor comes out and it turns out the people panic and they're like, wow, the price
are going to go up. We better buy, buy it while we can. Yeah. I mean, over it. So we were getting
about 300 orders a week at the time, depending on the virality. We went from getting 300 orders
a week to 18,000 orders a day for the next six weeks. Okay, that's exciting. But were you also
a little bit worried that, Oh, what if people actually think this is true? The orders are going to
drop off pretty soon. So that our excitement was great. This is, I mean, the orders were coming in
rapid fire. But we didn't have the inventory to support those orders. We didn't have the process
to reorder, to pick, to pack, to do anything. So we didn't know where it was going to stabilize
or what it was going to mean in the long term. But right then we were just drinking from a fire hose.
And we were just trying to figure out, how do we get these orders to our customers? How do we
continue to build off this virality and find ways to take this to the next level? So how did you
fulfill those orders? I mean, you know, could your, what did you do? So I got on a plane and I went
to our factories in China. I went with our agent and we had to figure it out. I remember when my
first got to China, our first or second night there, I called my father and I'm like, I don't know
what to do. Like, this is too much. I can't do this. And I remember I was on my blackberry
in the elevator and he tells me, this is it. You either figure this out or we pack up and go
home. Like, this is what you built. This is what you wanted to do. This is your opportunity.
When we come back in just a moment of financial deal that finally lets Joey sleep at night
and an ill-fated sale that wakes him right back up, stay with us. I'm Guy Ross and you're listening
to how I built this. Hey, welcome back to how I built this. I'm Guy Ross. So it's the fall of 2006
and Joey is in China scrambling to fulfill an unexpected surge in orders. We had to
find a warehouse. We had to make the goods. We had to create a system to pick and pack
the goods and all this was done on the fly as the order velocity was continuing and it took about
six to eight weeks and we shipped 192,000 orders from China, direct to customers in the U.S.
and that year we were projected to do two million dollars for the year. After this spike we did
about eight million dollars. We were profitable. Wow. And we never look back. Wow. I mean, talk about
trial by fire. Okay, so you get through this but now you've got real sales, right? And I guess
it's around this time where you manage to finally convince Target to let you in. So actually,
in 2008, I get a call from Target. Now we had a very small relationship with Target. We were in
the trial and travel section and the target buyer said, what if Elf made us a holiday end cap
program for our stores and cap at the end of an aisle, probably facing the registers, right?
Yeah. I mean, this is, you know, when you're walking to Target to have what they call the race
track, this is on the end like every cart is passing this thing. This is the primo spot. This is
like the park avenue of Target. This was like pinch me. Am I dreaming? Yeah. It was like the
premier retailer. First of all, Target was always like the retailer growing up because my father
was doing business with them. It was in line with our values. It was perfect. Now this was November
2008 for holiday 2009. So still 11 months away. You don't ship till October for that. But we were
like, we are in. Okay. You're in Target. But from what I understand, they actually want you to
raise the price. They don't want you to sell it for a dollar, which is interesting because most of
the time when retailers, CPG retailers go to Target, they're, they're, they're
They're urging them to lower the price, or to offer coupons, and especially around food,
right?
A lot of times retailers are saying, "Hey, you got to cut off a dollar here.
They're urging you to increase the price, and you guys were reluctant to do this?"
So they wanted us to increase the price, but not of our everyday merchandise.
They appreciated the incrementality and impulsivity claims that we were making, but they still
felt that we needed to continue to grow the price point.
So at the time, we're launching a small line called Elf Studio.
And basically, if we had a four-foot section in target, half of the section was a dollar,
and half of the section was now three dollars.
Okay, was it the same product inside?
So yes and no.
The same quality of product was offered on both the Elf and Elf Studio.
However, often, the Elf Studio was dual-ended.
It also was bigger.
So if this was one ounce, this was one and a half for two ounces.
It had a little bit more pearlescence, but for the most part, we stood behind the quality
of both the Elf and the Elf Studio line.
But it really doesn't sound like it wasn't that different in terms of what you were offering,
but I mean, why would a customer think that, like, that's a question I would ask you
at the time.
If I was on your team, I'd say, "Jo, I don't know if people are going to buy this.
They're used to us being a dollar."
One of my buyers told me a long time ago something that really stuck with me, "Prices
what you pay and value is what you get."
And as long as we're committed to continuing to offer our customer extreme value, she doesn't
want us to be stuck to the $1 price point because if we could take a $35 item that they
get at a prestigious retail and bring it down for $3, she wants that.
If it's a $12 lip gloss that we can bring for a dollar, she wants that.
But it just needs to continue to convey value.
Okay.
So you up until this point, your sales and target were for trial products.
Like, you're going on vacation and you just buy a bunch of things.
How much of a game changer was it when Target says, "Okay, we want you to have the second
tier in addition.
Was it a small bumper?
Was it a significant bump?"
The biggest win was our ability to compete on everything you do in the food and drug
mass arena is sales per linear foot.
So if you're in a four foot section, they want to know how much value, how many sales
you're going to do per foot on that four foot basis.
So when L first launched in Target, they were forecasted to do $60 per linear foot per
store per week.
Out of the gate, we were at $100 per store per week.
So we were already performing on par or better than a lot of the expectations and a lot
of the competitors.
And you were already D2C for six years at this point.
So now you're coming.
This is the beginning of the D2C craze, right, 2010s.
Before we get into this, here's a question for you.
You not only do you weather the financial crisis of 2000, let's say, seven to nine and it
continues really to 2012 when the market only fully recovers.
There's always this story about financial crises or recessions and its lipstick is always
used as an inelastic.
People will still spend money on lipstick because it's something people are comfortable spending
money on and it's kind of recession proof and people still want to look nice.
Is that, was that true?
Did you see that happening in real time?
Not only did we see it happen in real time, it's what propelled our success because like
you said, in 2007 and 2008, during the financial crisis, it happened to be at the same time
that Revlon launched a brand called Vital Radiance and I probably don't remember, ever heard
of it.
And Loria launched a brand called HIP to compete with Mac.
And the major premise of both those brands was we are going to sell more expensive cosmetics
in the drug store arena.
We are going to compete with Sephora at Dwayne Reed at CVS.
Wow.
And that was an utter failure.
That failed miserably quickly and that is really what opened the door for elf cosmetics
to get shelf space to target and really continue to become a brand that's thriving in the
retail space.
So even though so many businesses were struggling at that time, it was a combination of price
point and the product.
People still bought cosmetics, people still want to look good.
Yes, because if you're not going to go to the salon, you might as well find the next
best thing.
I'm so interesting.
Yeah.
All right.
I mean, you're, you guys are growing and you're finally, you started this business really
launched in 2004, six years in, you got to be feeling like, okay, this is now we are
cooking with gas here.
Do you remember roughly by the end of 2009, what, what you guys were doing in sales a
year?
I remember at the end of 2010, we were doing about 30 million dollars in sales.
Wow.
And we were able to do it a lot because of the, the mix of business between web and retail
was a great mix for a growing business.
Because when you're operating on retail, on web business, you have a high margin business.
Sure.
You have a media see of cash.
So I'm not going to have to wait when I sell to target or if I sell to retailers, I buy
the goods, shipped the goods, then get paid 60 or 90 days later.
As opposed to the internet business, I'm able to get paid right away.
So we're really able to grow from 10 to 20 to 30 million with very little additional
debt or leverage.
Joey, how many hours were you working on this a week?
Like now we're getting into 2010, were you, was it all consuming?
Yes.
I mean, again, I'm a Sabbath observer.
So we work 24/6.
You stop working on a sundown on Friday until sundown Saturday.
You don't answer your phone.
You don't know calls with China.
You just stop.
Yes, we take a day off.
It's a great rest day and it really, it gives time for family.
But other than that, if you're not sleeping, you're working.
Okay, so you get to a point where things are looking pretty good, 30 million a year.
And I guess in around 2010, at some point you get an unsolicited call from an investment
banker saying, "Hey, we have a client interested in maybe making an offer."
I got a call.
It was January 2010.
And this woman calls me as a cold call and she's like, "I see what you're doing and we'd
love to kind of represent you and seek a sale process."
And who would she?
Her name is Vanette Ho.
She was at a small boutique investment banking firm called Fananco and she said, "You know,
this is what we do.
We'll take you to potential investors, then we'll narrow the field.
We'll ask for indications of interest and then we'll get some final offers and we'll
see what we want to do."
And we'll start with the $25,000 retainer.
I said, "This all sounds nice, but I don't know you and I'm not giving you $25,000 on
a hope that this is actually going to work out."
So she came back and she said, "Okay, we're going to waive the retainer, but we want to
do this process with you.
We really like the company you're building."
And I remember we got a lot of private equity interest.
Okay, 30 million a year in sales, so let's just say the valuation was 5, 6x.
Sounds about right?
More or less, at that time.
It was closer to 8 to 10x.
Okay, great.
So there's a number out there.
Are you comfortable saying what the valuation was in 2010 at that time?
The valuation of the company was probably, it was about $70 million.
Okay.
$70 million.
So here's a question for you.
It's $70 million valuation, why were you open to selling some or all of the business at
that point?
The first reason was we had an opportunity to do something for the family, which was perhaps
not generational wealth, but wealth from definitely more money than I've made in my life.
I was 29 years old, I was able to put money away, and if everything else fell apart,
I would still have financial flexibility, and the second reason was I didn't know what
I didn't know.
Maybe Lori L and Revlon were working on the next thing to take me out in 30 seconds.
I had no idea.
And then the third thing was really just like, it's not what you know it's who you know.
So I think being connected with these guys who are in this private equity world that are
selling companies every day, they know the steps, they know the game plan to make you
sale ready for the future.
Got it.
Okay.
So you get a bids and you end up accepting an offer from a private equity firm, T.S.G consumer
partners, right?
Yes.
And they're going to take a minority share.
So 49%, you guys are still going to own a majority of the company, and you're going to
get a check.
You know, probably I'm assuming anywhere from $7 to $15 million in the bank.
Correct.
More than that, but correct.
And explain how it works.
They basically buy a minority share.
You get a check and then do they also put more money into the business to grow it?
so there are situations like that, but because Elf. didn't need their additional capital.
So all the money, you know, a few things change,
that you have things you can't do.
So I can't sell the company without them.
I can't hire some crazy salary.
Like there's a few guardrails,
but for the most part, there was very little difference
from the day before we closed to the day
after we closed, except on the ownership structure,
we now had a partner.
- And now you had some money.
- Yes, that's when we started sleeping at night.
- I understand that.
I mean, I think there are entrepreneurs who would say,
I could see where this is going,
and I just turned this thing down, right?
But you're saying, hey, this can go the other way
at any moment.
Like you had healthy paranoia.
- Yeah, look, and I would have done a lot better
if I did that in the long run.
- If you didn't sell.
- If I didn't sell, but I don't regret
what I did one minute of one day.
And I always say, Elf has had subsequent liquidation events
over the last 10 years since then.
This was the smallest by far the smallest,
but it was the most impactful.
You know, the stress of your life is now,
it's much less.
You're not stressed on, are you going to make it?
You're excited about what the future is going to bring.
- Yeah, now I know that a little,
so not too long after that, maybe years or after that,
Scott, who was involved in the beginning, he leaves.
And from what I've read, I mean, first of all,
do you keep in touch with him?
Do you have any connection with Scott anymore?
- So Scott left a little before that.
Scott left, in 2008, Scott came to us,
my father and I, and we started another business called Borba,
which was a nutraceutical beverage.
And the concept of the beverage was its skin care
through nutrition.
So basically, you drank two of these a day
and your skin was clearer.
And Scott found a partner for Borba,
and he took the Borba business,
they bought our steak out and they took it,
that business, and then we stuck with the health business.
So it was a very amicable split.
Since then, Scott and I have lost touch.
I think the Borba business never really took off.
I believe Scott became a pastor at some point.
I don't know.
- Yeah, he became, I already became a priest,
which is an amazing story.
Okay, so that was that.
And now you've got a private equity partner
and turns out that L'Oreal in 2013
approached you, you and your minority owner,
to buy you out.
And you guys went deep in this negotiation.
Tell me about that offer, that conversation.
So it was actually Revlon, they reached out first.
And after I got a call from Revlon,
I called my good friend, Venet.
And I said, "Venet, what do I do?"
So she goes, "Okay, you guys are still,
you guys, it's a little early,
normally these take a few more years,
but you guys are killing it,
you're really doing so well,
so quickly like let's run another process."
So we met now with more strategics who are interested.
And actually, L'Oreal came through with the best offer.
They offered us about $225 million for the whole company.
And we were very excited at that point.
And we were ready to sign.
And now this is lock stock and barrel.
We're selling the whole company.
We are done, we did it 12 years ago, we started.
We're getting our checks, we're leaving.
And all of a sudden, Venet calls,
and she said, "L'Oreal's passing, it wasn't happening."
You were gonna get over $100 million even your dad
from that deal because you had 51%.
And was there any clause in the negotiation
that if it fell apart and you get some money or no?
- No, zero.
- So you were just assuming that everything is,
and you get a call that they're pulling out why?
- So at the same time that they pulled out of the Elf deal,
they also bought a different company called Urban Decay.
- Sure.
- So I think they were trying to just play both sides,
or see what got them to the finish line.
They blamed it on the fact that they couldn't get comfortable
with our supply chain, and that we were so low cost,
and they had some, they weren't comfortable with it.
But I think that it was really because
that they were focused on the Urban Decay deal.
- Wow.
So they were really, we did Urban Decay on the show.
Found a fascinating story.
Founded by Sandy Lerner, also co-founded Cisco Systems.
It's a fascinating story.
So you must be, you must be crushed.
- It was crushing in the moment, but in hindsight,
it's such a blip on the radar of what it's become,
and how much money we subsequently have made through this,
that it was a blessing in disguise.
And in 2013, we regrouped, and then we did a process,
and that's how we got TPG.
- TPG comes in as a different company,
a different private equity, and they come in
to buy a majority stake from you and your dad,
and they value the company at $265 million.
So they're gonna buy a majority stake,
which means that you guys are gonna hold on
to a sliver of the company.
- So that was, when we were selling to Lori L,
we were selling 100% of the company.
When we met TPG, they're like, no,
we really like we bring to the table.
We want you guys to roll equity with us,
and we want you to stay involved,
and stay as equity holders.
And I remember when they finally gave us a firm offer,
and the offer was we're gonna buy a majority stake
in the company, and we're gonna bring in a CEO
to lead the company.
It was like a wait, was lifted off of me,
and I'm like, wait, it's not gonna be my problem anymore,
but I'm still gonna have equity and upside.
It was just, it was like a freeing experience,
and they brought in a CEO, Tarangamine.
- He's still the CEO.
He's delivered a lot of value for shareholders.
He took the company public in 2016.
- It's amazing.
I mean, so you guys stayed on for about a year and a half, right?
During the transition, but really it was,
you were kind of winding out, you were winding down your time.
You were, and I'm assuming by the time you finally,
you actually left, you were done, you were out, out, out.
- Yes, we worked with Tarang and team
for about a year and a half, a little bit more,
but it was probably the most impactful two years
of my career, because I call it my master's program,
because I was able to learn how it's done
on the other side, how Chlorox execs and PNG execs,
and how they look at the business, how they structure teams.
It's a mixture, it's a blend of the entrepreneurial spirit,
and the best in class work ethic that they do,
and I put it together.
- Okay, so you are out of the picture,
but you now really have created a wealth,
a significant wealth for yourself,
and in a way that you can kind of just,
I don't do whatever you want.
You can invest money, you can do nothing for a while,
and I guess for a while, you actually did not much.
But tell me about that period,
'cause it sounds like you actually were not happy.
- Yeah, so my father and I officially left Elf in December 2015,
and I vividly recall one morning
when my kids got up to go to school,
and I sat down on the couch,
and I started watching House of Cards,
and then a few hours later, my kids came home from school,
and I was still watching House of Cards,
and I'm like, I can't do this anymore.
And at that point, we were working on something else,
but it was taking a long time,
but I knew that retirement life
at 35 years old was not for me.
- Yeah, and probably not particularly,
not a great example for your kids, right, to be.
- Yes, that's for sure.
- And I think within a year, maybe less,
you started a new company that you called Fit for Life,
and I guess I should explain it,
'cause it's kind of a cool concept,
because I guess you basically partner with big brands,
like Reebok or Gaia, which does yoga products and Fila,
and I basically get the licensing rights
to sell products with their branding on them.
- Yes, the way we look at Fit for Life
is anything that you see in a gym that's not a machine.
So any of the mats of the small weights, of jump ropes,
weight invests, all that, those are the things that we do.
- And you manage the whole process
of manufacturing distribution sales?
- Exactly, so yes, we have relationships with retailers,
we sell to Target and Walmart and Amazon.
We are making the product, but they maintain the brand.
That's their job, and our job is to operate the company,
and together with them create great products.
- What a fascinating business.
- I mean, and is it a good business?
- It's a good business.
The fitness business is a good business,
but it's not nearly as exciting as the beauty business.
- Yeah, right.
- Beauty business is trendy, it's quick.
There's virality, there's a lot of excitement,
there's a lot of M&A deal, like there's a lot going on.
The fitness business is, I'm sure you own a myogamat,
when's the next time you buy a next yoga mat.
So the velocity's a lot slower and it's less exciting.
So which brings me to your next business which makes sense,
'cause you get back into the cosmetics business,
the beauty industry,
business, you start another company as beauty, but this time you guys are acquiring brands
and tell me a little bit about this business, this is an interesting business.
So in late 2018, I got a call from my good friend, Venet, she's telling us about a portfolio
of beauty brands that was owned by private equity to compete with some of the big guys.
It was not doing very well and they asked us to look at the business at the possibly
by the business.
Two months later, they were getting in worse situation and they were going to file for
bankruptcy.
At that point, we looked at it again and the benefits to bankruptcy is that it kind of
hits a reset.
So any bad contracts, any old money's owed and things like that all go away and you're
able to start on a new slate and go forward from there.
And we now run a company called AS Beauty, which owns the assets and the company of
Laura Geller Beauty, Julie, and we closed on that deal in February 2019.
And it still has a following because people remember those brands.
Yes.
So when we bought the business, it was a downtrending business, but it was still a business.
And now we are growing the business very nicely, both online and on Amazon.
It's interesting because you think about like big brands, the '80s, like guest jeans
or a Massimo and Fila's huge in Southeast Asia, I know which was huge when I was a kid
in the '80s and '90s.
But a lot of these brands, people in their 40s, 50s, 60s will know, it's like owned by
somebody else.
Maybe it has been sold multiple times, but still using the brand.
It's just an interesting business to me.
Yeah, I think when you look at the retail environment, there's so much clutter out there.
So any point of differentiation is valuable.
So when you have a brand like guests or Fila that you've grown up with, like Reebok,
you remember those pump up shoes from the edges, right?
Of course, I have.
So that's something that cuts through the clutter and allows you to stand out as well as
gives the customer confidence that this is a brand and that there's something behind it.
So this is what you focus on.
Going back to Elf, it's amazing.
You could have sold it, walked away, and we've done beauty counter, we've done some
other brands that once they sold it, it went downhill.
The opposite happened with Elf.
It grew and grew and grew.
I think I would just check their market cap, it's like $3.8 billion.
It's a big company, it's doing really, really well.
I mean, do you think that how you started this brand in 2002, really launched in 2004,
you could recreate the playbook today?
I think when we created the brand in 2002 and 2004, our biggest obstacle was how are we
going to get space in a retail environment controlled by four guys.
I think today, now, it's how are you going to own the most amount of attention from the
consumer on Instagram, Snapchat, and Meta?
So could I have done it today?
Probably.
Would it look different?
Definitely.
Do I have the tenacity and goal to do it again?
Probably not.
I wouldn't start a business.
At this point in my career, I think buying a business is a much easier entry, but I think
if I was a young entrepreneur and I needed to cut through the clutter, a thousand percent
if you're creative and committed, you can find the way to do it.
Yeah.
Joey, when you think about this journey that you took, of course, you had a lot of, I mean,
you did have help from your dad, there's nothing wrong with that, but it's still, it could
have failed, right?
It could have gone nowhere when, certainly when the dollar store didn't validate this idea.
And then you think about where you got to.
How much of that do you think had to do with just the grind you put in and how much do you
think had to do with getting lucky at times?
So I think when you get lucky and when you have the desire to be successful, that's when
you will be successful.
So I go back to that elevator story I gave you a little earlier that when my father said
like, this is it, you either figure it out or you pack up and go home.
I didn't manufacture that blooming dials email, but I could have tried to, but I doesn't
mean I would have been successful.
You can't wait for luck and you can't manufacture opportunity, but when that luck is there,
you got to take advantage of it, come hell or high water.
That's Joey Shama, co-founder of Elf Cosmetics.
By the way, you know, we mentioned that Joey's former partner, Scott Vincent Borba, left
the beauty business to join the priesthood.
Well, just a few weeks after Joey and I did this interview, Scott was in fact ordained
as a Roman Catholic priest in the diocese of Fresno, California.
When he left the world of business, Scott also left the trappings of his former life behind.
He said that he gave up his fancy house and car, his Gucci suits, and his 401k.
And as for his new life, Scott told the New York Times that he's looking forward to
serving God and working with his parishioners.
Hey, thanks so much for listening to the show this week.
Please make sure to click the follow button on your podcast app so you never miss a new
episode of the show, and as always, it's free.
And if you're interested in insights, ideas, and lessons from some of the world's greatest
entrepreneurs, please sign up for my newsletter at gyros.com or via substack.
This episode was produced by Carla Estevez with music composed by Rum Teenero Bluey.
It was edited by Niva Grant with research by Olivia Rockman.
Our audio engineer was Patrick Murray.
The production staff also includes Carrie Thompson, Alex Chung, Sam Paulson, Casey Herman,
Jayce Howard, Chris Macidie, Catherine Cipher, John Isabella, and Elaine Coats.
I'm Guy Ross, and you've been listening to How I Built This.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Joey Shama and Scott Vincent Borba founded Elf Cosmetics in 2004 to offer high-quality, affordable cosmetics at a $1 price point, challenging the traditional assumption that cheap products were low quality.
The brand faced initial resistance from retailers who feared losing customers by offering lower-priced alternatives, but gained traction through strategic placements in magazines like Glamour and Good Housekeeping.
A viral rumor in 2006 that Elf was being acquired by Bloomingdale’s triggered a massive surge in demand, forcing the company to rapidly scale operations and fulfill orders directly from China.
Elf successfully entered major retail chains like Target and Hudson’s Bay, where it demonstrated strong sales performance and incremental value without cannibalizing higher-priced brands.
The company leveraged a mix of direct-to-consumer (D2C) sales and retail distribution to achieve profitability, with sales reaching $30 million by 2010 and a valuation of approximately $70 million.
Joey Shama sold a minority stake to private equity firm T.S.G. Consumer Partners in 2010 to secure financial stability and reduce personal risk, though he remained deeply involved in the business.
The brand evolved from a $1 product line to include premium lines like Elf Studio, maintaining value-based pricing while expanding product variety and appeal.
Despite early challenges and financial uncertainty, Elf grew into a billion-dollar publicly traded company, driven by product innovation, pricing strategy, and adaptability to market shifts.
Summary:
Joey Shama and Scott Borba founded Elf Cosmetics in 2004 with the revolutionary idea of offering high-quality cosmetics at a $1 price point, challenging the market’s belief that low cost meant low quality. Initially facing skepticism from retailers who feared customer loss, the brand gained traction through strategic media placements in major publications like Glamour and Good Housekeeping. A viral rumor in 2006 that Elf was being acquired by Bloomingdale’s triggered a massive surge in demand, forcing the company to rapidly scale operations and build supply chain capacity.
Elf successfully penetrated key retailers like Target and Hudson’s Bay, where it demonstrated strong sales performance and incremental value, without undermining higher-priced brands. The business combined direct-to-consumer sales with retail distribution, achieving profitability by 2010 with $30 million in annual sales and a $70 million valuation. G.
Consumer Partners to secure financial stability and reduce personal risk, though he remained deeply involved. Over time, Elf expanded its product line with premium offerings like Elf Studio, maintaining its core value proposition. Despite early financial strain and uncertainty, the brand evolved into a billion-dollar company, proving that affordable, accessible beauty products could achieve massive market success through innovation, strategic marketing, and resilience in the face of industry challenges.
FAQs
Elf Cosmetics launched with a $1 price point for all its products, aiming to offer high-quality cosmetics at a fraction of the cost of traditional brands.
Elf gained traction by demonstrating product quality and value, and by leveraging media coverage like features in Glamour and Good Housekeeping, which built consumer trust and demand.
The first significant retail win was with HB (Harris Teeter), a supermarket chain in Texas, which allowed Elf to sell through a spinner rack and showed that the brand added incremental sales without cannibalizing more expensive products.
The rumor caused a massive surge in demand, with orders increasing from 300 per week to 18,000 per day for six weeks, forcing the company to quickly scale production and logistics to meet demand.
No, while the $1 price point was central to the original brand strategy, Elf later introduced higher-priced products like Elf Studio, which maintained quality but offered larger sizes and better value at a slightly higher price point.
In the early days, they had no formal logistics plan and relied on warehouse staff and manual processes, including printing labels, manually entering orders, and using priority mail, which often led to delays and losses.
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