The podcast features Danil from the Come Back Alive Foundation's Drone Fold project, which coordinates military-civilian cooperation to counter Russian drone attacks. Come Back Alive, a Ukrainian charity founded in 2014, has raised over 1 billion euros and is uniquely authorized to import military goods, working closely with Ukraine's defense and anti-corruption agencies. Danil, a former soldier wounded near Bakhmut, explains that war evolves rapidly, exemplified by Russia increasing Shahed drone launches from 10 to 100 per night over two years. The Drone Fold project intercepts these drones using a system of interceptor drones, radar, vehicles, and ground stations. Each unit requires three personnel: a pilot, a navigator, and a technician. Interceptor drones cost about $2,000, compared to Shaheds at $100,000, achieving a 16-fold cost advantage. In a good month, Ukrainian forces intercept over 3,000 Russian drones, with rates reaching near 100% in clear weather but dropping in clouds. Involving civilians is difficult due to security and legal issues, so the focus is on easing military service locally. Ukrainian interceptors have become faster and more autonomous to counter Russian drone evolution, with AI development combining Ukrainian data and foreign engineering talent. This cooperation highlights the adaptive nature of modern warfare and the critical role of civilian-led initiatives in supporting national defense.
[Music] Hello and welcome back to War Tech Talk. Eastern Circle's podcast on military technology innovation is battlefield application in Ukraine and geopolitical impact. I'm Anastasia Shabachkinna, Director of Eastern Circle's Think Tank in Paris. Today I am joined by the Nilo Shunhezhki, who coordinates military civilian cooperation in the counter-drawn project Dronefold by Come Back Alive Foundation. Come Back Alive is Ukrainian Charity Foundation, which has become a strategic partner to Ukraine's defense forces, delivering military equipment to the front lines and providing training. Dengio has raised 1 billion euros through crowdfunding since its founding in May 2014 and has built trust with its numerous supporters through a system of auditing and procurement tracking. It was the first Ukrainian charity allowed to import military and dual use goods. It has cooperation agreements with the ministries of defense, veterans affairs, health, the National Guard of Ukraine, as well as National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialist Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office. Thank you for joining us today. We are joined by the Nilo Shunhezhki from Droneapod, which is an initiative by Ukrainian NGO Come Back Alive. Please can you introduce yourself? My name is Danil, and I served on the Ukrainian Army from 2021 to 20th century. During the time I took part in the Herzongkontro-Fansi operation and was wounded near Bakhmut. The main thing, which I learned in the army, is that war changes very fast. When the food chain invasion began, we were facing Russian armored columns with a stance of tank. But when I was wounded, we fought with Wagner-Human wave assaults, two completely different wars, within the same year. They showed me how important it is to adapt quickly and stay ahead of new realities on the battlefields. That is what brought me to the Come Back Alive Foundation, where now I work as a military manager for a drone fall project. And in general, my job is to understand what happening on the ground in Ukrainian war and find the most effective ways to support our military. Two years ago, Russia was firing ten Shahedrons a night. And now it's firing hundred drones, Shahed-type drones a night. And that has changed in influence how the counter drone systems have developed. Can you please elaborate on that point? Yeah, first of all, we have much more pilots who just can intercept Russian drones. So, first of all, we have to develop people who can work with drones and who can take this drone, do some modification with this drone usually. And after that, you have to have a pilot who can fly with the drone and discharge Russian Shahedrons. So, first of all, we have to have a lot of people who can work with this type of weapons, like interceptor drone. Second thing, we have to have different radar systems, because the main point is to know where Russian drones is in the fire, because it's very hard to just find some small drone in the air, and it's the second step, because without that, you can't get the Russian one. After all, you have to have different type of vehicles. Just people need to go to position and they have to have some different ground station and the battery. So, in general, the main point is the people, but we need to prepare infrastructure from the vehicle to the drones. And only after that, people can intercept Russian drone. To make sure that we understand exactly, that can imagine this infrastructure. Can you please walk us through the pieces of equipment? You named the interceptor drone itself, you named the radar, you named the pickup truck, and there is also, we understand, a generator potentially needed to charge the equipment on the ground, a ground station, a radial, what else? But if compared with the winder, you have to have some heat in your track. So usually we buy it some like, a warm guns, and people just for normal situation in your vehicle. So, in general, it's the main park park. And if some pilots only started working with the interceptor, we bought the vehicle, we bought different ground stations, battery for charging the drones and like drones. Usually a radar system is common thing. So everybody who have a radar system in this region, they share information for this radar, for everybody who working with interceptors. So you don't need to have this radar by yourself, because somebody another have this radar and share information from that. But except that, we, every time we buy some different things for the drones or for ground station to modify it there, because now we're changing very fast. And like, drone, you have to change, changing some parts into drone after just after two months in the, in the tools. So it could be, I don't know, another radio connection system into drone or another, I don't know, cameras on the drone. And how many people do you need to operate this system? Very expensive, because you have truck is expensive, drones is expensive. So first part is my colleagues, they try to fundraise money. After that, I am working with the military usually and I asked them and I talked to them about what they, so I don't know, first of all they need truck or first of all they need some new drone or something like that. And after that, we go to our procurement department and they make some deals with the manufacturer who created this drone or ground station. So we general it's very, it's not so easy and it all on process from the pound raise money to buy something. Now, this is from the organizational perspective, from the perspective of comeback alive and the drone full initiative. If we look at it from the very tactical perspective, the actual group who would manage and operate this small ground system for one counter US, how many people would need to operate this system in real time in an evening around cave. So in general, if talk about the defense of cave, usually it's like thousands of people who involved in our defense system because somebody have to working with radar system somebody works with us a pilot. And if talking about some like military units who just intercept Russian security drones, usually it's like one I think 100 different military units around the cave they try to intercept as many as they can Russian security drones. So it's like very big amount of people who involved to this action. Yes, and for example for one pickup truck, how many people would surround the truck. I'm trying to really zero down to the unit to understand really what I'm driving at. How many people do you need to operate an FPV so called like this because we, it's just I want to make sure that people understand a it is not one person per FPV. And second, how many people is it and what do they do? Usually it's three people. First of all is the pilot who who fly in this FPV drone. Second point is the second people second man is usually the man who help pilot to help pilot. Understand where he is because drones without any GPS system. So usually you don't understand where properly where your drone is in the fly in the air. So the second person help in this way. And the third person usually is like the man who works with the drone. He prepared drawn to the fly. He working with explosive to make this drone like ready to the interception. And when we are thinking about the human aspect since you're saying three people per unit basically per FPV we can say. How does it work when the war goes on for years? We now have heard about initiatives of training civilians. And so we wonder whether drone fall is involved in such initiatives of training not just the military because you mentioned of course military units are engaged into defense of cities. But with the demographic crisis in Ukraine, which has been a lot of the time.
is a similar demography and dynamics as many European countries, in fact, with the duration of the war, is there a need to train civilians for air defense? And if yes, how does your organization approach this training? Because civilians by default are not military. It is something that can be difficult from regulatory point of view when you explain this here, for example, in Europe, and also from the training point of view. Because in theory, it's the military who can handle explosives. By law, it's the military who can handle explosives and weapons parts of the system. However, the system, as we have described, it doesn't consist only of weapons parts. So are there ways to engage civilians? Do you, does drone-fold train and combat-life train civilians for these missions? And how do the roles then get distributed? From perspective of people who are military, who are defense very hard, because these people usually can, like, they sleep only per day in the night. They are only working. So it's very hard to just to people just working like they, like that, months, because in the winter, every day we have some shahead drone attacks. So these people just didn't sleep during the all-winter, and they sleep only per day. So it's very hard. But about the involvement of civilian people to this area, it's very hard to question. It's very hard to organize it right, like, in right way, because these people, they don't have rights to working with some explosive, for example, or with some military system, who give you information from the radar system, because if you know where it's radar, it's, like, very security information, so you can't give this information for everybody. So I don't believe in the massive involvement of civilian people to this area. I think the best way is to make military service maybe easier to people, and the people will be joined this, like, regiment, like, easier, and if we will have, like, much more people in this regiment, they will have, like, better shifts, because they have enough people. Basically mobilizing more people locally to stay in the local military units in order to protect, so they'll be trained and protect in air defense. They're cities. Yeah, you're absolutely right. For example, my father working with the air defense in military unit, and he working, like, maybe an hour from the home. So, like, he, he go to the shifts, but it's not so hard to people to join this military unit who, I know, very close to your home, for example, and if you will know what will be in your future in this military unit. So I think it's the only one way to involve people to this military thing, because it's not so easy to involve civilian to this air defense, because even in air defense, somebody can die. And what do you will do after that? It's from the low perspective, it's very hard to organize or organize. Because then they will not evict a civilian death, even if it's during air defense operation, they are not going to be counted as military deceased in action, basically. While if it's a military person, then they accounted as military deceased in action, and then the family can basically ask for compensation, etc. from the state. That's what you mean. Yep, you're right, but except that you, you, like, our government, they can't give access to the radar system, to the information from our partners about the shahedron's attack, because it's very security, like, it's, you can't. Confidential information. And that's another important problem of involving civilians. Then the same time you see, that's the next question I want to drive at. At the same time, the organization that come back alive, it's an NGO, it's a civilian organization, and the drone-fold initiative is inscribed within an NGO that come back alive. So how does then your organization cooperate with the military and with the government to deliver all types of military systems? I understand not just small military systems, but also very big units. You have a authorization from the government to do that, and that is very difficult to grasp here in Europe, because of course that brings the question, the monopoly on weapons, monopoly on violence of the state. And I would like you to just please explain to us, how is it possible for come back alive and how this works in Ukraine today? First of all, in Ukraine, it's very active civil society in general, and it was very active before the war, before the full-scale invasion, before the war in general. So we have people who would try to help a Ukrainian country in general. And after that, Ukrainian government, they give to our organization to another NGO to work in this military, and they don't fight against that, they just understand we can help in some situation. We didn't, and we don't replace government or Ukrainian country. We just help in some situation when Ukrainian government don't have enough capabilities to working with them. And how does the government then solve this trust problem and confidentiality problem with the security of information and access to secure information like you have illustrated with the radar systems with partners like come back alive, who are not just military nature. I think in this question, the main point is our relationship is very long, and we, our government, no. Don't hesitate to tell us a few words about the history of your organization, please. Yeah, yeah. Like our come back alive, working since 2014. So it's like more than 10 years working with the militaries and Ukrainian government, Ukrainian military forces, they understand how we can help in general Ukraine and military forces. Okay, I'm asking these questions because of course here in the West, it is highly unusual to have an NGO, a supply equipment, and work with the military on a daily basis, being engaged in such operations, and it is important the understanding of the Ukrainian ecosystem. I want to just come drive you before we dive into a few technical issues. Can you cover a little bit this issue of cost? You write on the website of drone poll that the cost relationship between one counter drone system you're used, and the Russian systems that the Russians, the head type drones that Russians use is basically allowed you to down this, this 24,000 Russian drones at a cost which is 16 times lower than what the Russians have spent on these drones. How much does it cost one system like this? Now that we know that it's a complex system, it's not just an FPV, and how does it compare to the cost of a Shahed, for example? Generally, much more cheaper and especially now, because now a lot of units have enough like vehicles, they have drone station, they have batteries, so we just buying some drones and one drone interceptor is usually $2,000 and we can compare with like Shahed drones, it's $100, at least $100,000, so it's just this calculation. And we even don't include the damage from Russian Shahed drones if they destroyed something in Ukraine. So in general, it's very good project, because we spend much more cheaper money, we don't make very big results because we intercept as many as we can. What is the interception rate now? And how has it evolved in the two years since you started? Yeah, like first when Project Drone Fold was started, the target was to intercept 1,000 Russian drones. Now targets is 50,000 Russian drones, so it's. For how much? For a week? For miles per year? For like in general, so I can like example of last month, Ukrainian forces in our
project intercept more than 3000 different Russian drones. In one month. Yep. And it's tonight, it can be like 100 head drones or much more like leader if it depends on how many shahed drones to be honest go through the Ukrainian aerospace because even one time, one military unit intercept three one like it's one one pilot and one two two people in general in the intercept 20 shahed drones per five hour. Well 3000 a month is if we look at the daily or nightly rate those nights when Russians launch intense attacks, it can be compared to one week of very intense bombing which brings us to estimate that since not every night is very intense, the most intense bombing, then it means that the country US systems we can estimate can intercept between every second or every fourth Russian drone fired at Ukraine. Am I right? It very depends on whether or another condition because if in Ukraine we have good weather usually Ukraine and military units now intercept like 100% of Russian shahed drones who came to Ukraine are feds because weather have very big influence to this point. In winter usually it's versus radio because of like clouds and if Russian shahed drones in the clouds you can intercept that. So it very depends on whether or another condition. But now we have like a lot of people who working with interceptors. So even in some some nice we can intercept all shahed drones who came to Ukraine in our our space. That's a big progress. However, we follow that shahed have also been progressing in their technical features. Can you explain how the counter drone systems have evolved in response to the evolution in shahed and Russian equivalence technology including speed, altitude change, navigation trajectory change and all and radio electronic warfare. Yeah we really compare our like our war like race because we just first of all Russian drones started to be they became faster and you have to have your interceptor have to be much more faster to intercept Russian shahed drones. It's first of all. But second point they use different strategy like they use different time per day so they can use day or night or morning or something like that so they tried to test our forces and they tried to understand when the best time to target Ukrainian cities for example. And other point they tried to use weather. They often usually use the clouds as a shield for the shahedrons because they understand in what altitude clouds in Ukraine and this and they use this altitude for shahedrons and you can't intercept that. So Russians as we they tried to make this shahed better and like destroyed more and more Ukrainian something Ukrainian I know of power station or something like that. And the Ukrainians we tried to first of all develop our interceptors and now interceptors much more faster if compare with one year ago and we try to develop more autonomic system because we understand our problem we don't have enough pilot who can working with the very fast drones so at the best way from our perspective it's made this and interceptor drones very easy to do everybody and like after that we can use less guided personnel to use this interceptor drone and if we will have more military units with the interceptors we will intercept much more because like in one region in Ukraine clouds in one altitude in another region clouds in another altitude speed we can work with them. And on that actually the artificial intelligence systems which are being developed and integrated for that purpose are they mainly Ukrainian developed foreign if yes and from which country or both. In general I think it's cooperation because for every artificial intelligence you need some data and this artificial intelligence need to understand how this shahedrons for example looks like. So usually it's from Ukraine we have we have a lot of different like videos from the interceptors with the intercepted shahedrons but problem of Ukraine we don't have people who have experience in artificial intelligence and in the technical things in general we don't have enough engineer, radian engineer and like that. So in general engineers from another country abroad. This raises many questions. I don't know if you'll be comfortable answering it so please let me know if not. We have noticed we have seen the news from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense after the new minister came to his position this winter about the new artificial intelligence strategy and the opening to cooperation with precisely as you say with foreign partners who have developed AI systems in exchange for access to Ukrainian data volunteer contract was one of the most media ties but then the system was open to cooperation with other partners as well. Could you comment on that what is Ukraine looking for most in from this cooperation is it looking for AI models which it cannot develop in house is it looking as you say for AI engineers that it doesn't have enough of or anything else and the return side of this cooperation what Ukraine has to offer yes it's data but is there anything else outside of the world. If you speak about the like using artificial intelligence in the war and in defense sector in general so the main point Ukraine can give you like you can test this artificial intelligence Ukrainian units so we have and it's only only in Ukraine you can use that normally. So from this way I think it's and data. And so we have a lot of time Ukrainian like institute who working with weapons and with some radio connection they was destroyed by the Russians because before the full-scale invasion and before the war in general were usually Russian businessmen they buy by Ukrainian factory and just take the technology and destroy this factory in Ukraine. For example this is a very important thing that we have to do is destroy this factory in Ukraine for example this Ukrainian this Russian comat a system. Like it's anti spoofing thing for the Shahedron's this system was developed in Ukraine but Russians before the occupation for many they like just buy this factory they take technology and destroy it factory so I think you have Ukraine in technology and the engineers. Isn't there a risk for Ukraine that it gives the data of course their priorities and the priorities are understandable is to win the war and for that we do what you need to. It's not a judgment call it's just a question about more industrial strategy is there risk that Ukraine will give the data use the tools which had already been developed by others but will wind up just like a lot of other countries have dependent on the AI tools on which it doesn't possess and it actually probably writes. Instead of developing its own AI tool which will be an essential to its own defense. I think we have to like working with our partners and develop our partnership because for example in Ukraine for example in Europe every country have some depends on from another Europe country and even like I robust they develop different parts in different countries so you Ukraine as a country need to work with our partners from Europe for example and develop our relationship we can't make I know the best artificial intelligence in the world by ourselves we understand that so we need to develop our partnership and I don't trust to some European country and without trust we can't work with them. So yep we have some risks in this area so but we just have another way to develop Ukraine. Thank you. I come back to come back to the country US. You have so far, we have to.
talked about the defense of Kiev, but end of cities in general in Ukraine. But also, there is the counter-US use in the front lines. And come back alive, participates in supply equipment to both. Can you draw the differences for us? What, how does the counter-drone strategy, tactics, operations, how do they differ in the front line versus the rear? So in general, it's much more important to intercept Russian drone by the frontline. Because if Russian, usually it's intelligence drones, and if they understand where our troops, they will use some ballistic missile or like the just of delivery shells or something else. So it's very important to just Ukrainian defense intercept everything around the frontline. But it's much more harder because you Russians can find your like military unit who try to intercept Russian drones. So this unit is usually they hiding in the some underground shelters. They use different strategy to camouflage your antennas or your like trucks or something like that. Harder because Russians much more closer to you and they try to find Ukrainian anti-air units because they understand how it's important to Russians to like see what going on on the battlefield. Okay. Can you draw for us then the counter defense units systems apart of what Ukraine describes as a multi-layer defense, which it has developed over these last years. And this system of multi-layer defense air defense is radically different from let's say what NATO had developed, which is described often as a solar system so called of air defense. Can you can you guide us through the key features of the Ukrainian multi-layer defense system. So the main point we understand we can't build the target our defense around the Ukrainian power station or Ukrainian factory or Ukrainian city because we have a lot of Ukrainian power station and like factory in Ukraine and we can cover everything. So from our perspective, we build a salon of anti-air defense around the Russian border and is the key of Ukrainian air defense. We enter the intercept everything which can come from the Russia to Ukrainian airspace and it's different if compare with Europe because they usually use conventional air system. And usually they like cover some radios of strategic cities or strategic, I don't know factory. So it's the the key point we developed this echelons of anti-air and it's the reason why we intercept so much. And the examples of the layers could you give us a few examples and how when because I understand that the activating of one or the other or the next layer in certain sequence depends on the nature of the attack and on the nature of what's flying basically at that time. Could you please walk us through how this is activated what are the decisions behind. In general, first of all, she had tried to came to Ukrainian airspace from the battlefield and the infant Ukrainian infantry brigade they have anti-air pilots and they can intercept from the 100 Russian and the intercept then after that like another she had drones team to Ukraine after that Ukrainian another. We have higher defense units they intercept I don't know can it can be like half of another she had drones after that we have Ukrainian as best is like Ukrainian. And in the end of the month, like system in general they intercept another part and the in deep in Ukraine we have Ukrainian helicopters which intercept the I know one she had drones who can came to this echelons of Ukrainian anti-air system. So is the is the common work somebody intercept one she had run another person intercept 10 and is only only in this way we can intercept so many. Thank you, this is very very clear now so the helicopters aren't going to be outdated right away because that's something that the debate that's raging about the modern technology and modern warfare will tanks and helicopters be retired. And so you're saying not so vast you still the helicopters where you can fly them so deep in the air that can still be useful and that is used by Ukraine for air defense. I want to just get us to the Middle East now. Since the bombing of Iran and Iran's response across the region we understand that the demand for Ukrainian air defense expertise experts and weapons has risen. How do you assess this development and what are the features of Iran's attacks on the Middle East which are similar and which are different from Russia's attacks on Ukraine. What are the lessons that the Middle East can borrow from Ukraine. First of all, I think we can compare this attack from Iran to Middle East country with the Russia but two years ago when Russia had not they don't have enough shahedrons they and they use smaller amount per night so we can compare two years ago in Ukraine and now in Middle East because it's like a little bit close. And the other point this Middle East country they even if they have money and they want to develop system us in Ukraine they need time and they need to people who will working with that because Ukraine have this two years and we two years working with interceptors we develop Ukrainian people who work in like pilots we develop ecosystem we develop different tools in the computer from the because we have well like one computer and the use see everything from the every radar system in your region so they need to take Ukrainian experience but it's not so easy they I think they they have to go to Ukraine to see how it works in Ukraine and maybe after that try to develop this system like that in the middle. Are they coming are they going now do you think I don't know no haven't seen groups of Arab allies and going through key yet okay how about NATO can we say the same about NATO countries which do not have experience with this type of multi layer defense doesn't do not have enough a lot of experience with counter drone system. With counter drone systems nor large production facilities in Europe will they be facing the same hurdles as the countries in the Middle East are facing now if one day they are bombed with the Russian slash Iranians ahead. I think the next country they don't prepare to the new war first of all because they usually don't believe in interceptor they said is the weapons for the poor country and they use interceptor because they poor and they don't have enough money for the missiles but it's it's now it's not the right so you say what to this because I don't agree with that because interceptor drones. It's only one way to intercept so many targets in your aerospace you can't intercept so many or Shahid runs by the petroid or by the Nassam's or another defense unit because you this unit usually have like patrols usually have four missiles in one track by Ukrainian like three Ukrainians people can intercept. 10th 10th Shahid per night it could be 30 or ship Shahid per night is so big amount and you even you have enough money and you have enough missile you don't have time to like recharge your petroid or recharge your another defense unit so from this way it's the you can use this missiles but from another perspective missiles very expensive and even you have if you have money you just now you can't buy. I don't know to the end of storage and buy give me 100 patrol missiles you can do it like that so NATO country must understand now war it's absolutely different if compare.
20 years ago and they have to prepare to the new battlefield. And how can they prepare best in terms of what should they do now? If you were now in NATO, you were advising them. What should they be doing in the next month or half a year? And what should they be doing to prepare themselves but also to help Ukraine keep defending NATO? What has been doing for the last four years? I think the best way is how Baltic countries working with Ukrainian military units. For example, Ukrainian military units need some time to the rest and to develop some different capabilities like a leadership or another. And Ukrainian units usually go to the Baltic countries or another NATO countries for training. So during this training, NATO and soldier, they need to take Ukrainian experience to understand, to try to understand how it looks in Ukraine. And they need to, our relationship have to be like equality. NATO is not better now. They don't better as we use. So we share some experience from our perspective, how new war looks like. Some NATO country can share some, like, I don't know, leadership things or how you can plan it, like, long and the hard mission because NATO have experience with that. So I think they need to take Ukrainian experience. And in the future, when NATO will be ready, they need to, some, I don't know, in structure, need to be in Ukraine to see how it works with the, in the reality. Thank you. Thank you, Danilo. Danilo Shunhilski with us today from the Dronful Initiative by Come Back Alive. Thank you very much for your time.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The Come Back Alive Foundation, a Ukrainian NGO founded in 2014, has raised over 1 billion euros through crowdfunding and is authorized to import military and dual-use goods, cooperating with Ukraine's defense and anti-corruption bodies.
The Drone Fold project focuses on countering Russian Shahed drones using interceptor drones, radar systems, and mobile units, with a current interception rate of up to 3,000 Russian drones per month.
Each counter-drone unit typically consists of three people
The cost of an interceptor drone is about $2,000, compared to a Shahed drone costing at least $100,000, making the operation 16 times cheaper per interception.
Weather conditions heavily affect interception rates, with clear skies allowing near 100% interception, while clouds can hinder operations.
Involving civilians in air defense is challenging due to security concerns (radar data confidentiality) and legal issues (explosives handling and casualty compensation).
Ukrainian interceptors have evolved to be faster and more autonomous to counter Russian advancements in Shahed speed, altitude, and tactics, with AI development relying on Ukrainian data and foreign engineering expertise.
Summary:
The podcast features Danil from the Come Back Alive Foundation's Drone Fold project, which coordinates military-civilian cooperation to counter Russian drone attacks. Come Back Alive, a Ukrainian charity founded in 2014, has raised over 1 billion euros and is uniquely authorized to import military goods, working closely with Ukraine's defense and anti-corruption agencies. Danil, a former soldier wounded near Bakhmut, explains that war evolves rapidly, exemplified by Russia increasing Shahed drone launches from 10 to 100 per night over two years.
The Drone Fold project intercepts these drones using a system of interceptor drones, radar, vehicles, and ground stations. Each unit requires three personnel: a pilot, a navigator, and a technician. Interceptor drones cost about $2,000, compared to Shaheds at $100,000, achieving a 16-fold cost advantage.
In a good month, Ukrainian forces intercept over 3,000 Russian drones, with rates reaching near 100% in clear weather but dropping in clouds. Involving civilians is difficult due to security and legal issues, so the focus is on easing military service locally. Ukrainian interceptors have become faster and more autonomous to counter Russian drone evolution, with AI development combining Ukrainian data and foreign engineering talent.
This cooperation highlights the adaptive nature of modern warfare and the critical role of civilian-led initiatives in supporting national defense.
FAQs
Come Back Alive is a Ukrainian charity foundation that has raised 1 billion euros since 2014 to deliver military equipment and training to Ukraine's defense forces. The Dronefold project, part of this foundation, focuses on countering Russian drones by providing interceptor drones, radar systems, and support infrastructure to military units.
Typically, three people are needed: a pilot to fly the drone, a second person to help the pilot navigate without GPS, and a third to prepare the drone and handle explosives.
The main components are an interceptor drone, a ground station, a pickup truck, batteries for charging, and often a heater for the vehicle. Radar systems are usually shared across units rather than owned individually.
A Dronefold interceptor drone costs about $2,000, while a Russian Shahed drone costs at least $100,000, making the interceptor up to 50 times cheaper.
In good weather, Ukrainian forces can intercept nearly 100% of Shahed drones. In winter, clouds can reduce interception. In a recent month, over 3,000 Russian drones were intercepted.
Russian drones have become faster and use strategies like changing attack times and using clouds as shields. Ukrainian interceptors have also become faster, and efforts focus on making them more autonomous to reduce the need for skilled pilots.
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