Dialectics

[Music] Hello, thank you for joining us on another episode of Why Theory. I am, as always, Ryan Engley, one of your hosts, Todd. The other host, how are you, bud? Hi, Ryan, I'm very good. Excellent. So today is an episode that is precedent-making. We are fulfilling two listener requests in one with this episode. We are going to talk about dialectics and both the development of the concept, sort of like historically philosophically, and before coming in more specifically to Hagle, and then the influence on Lecon, and how Lecon is a dialectical thinker. So shout-outs to Ken from Birmingham, who wanted a flyover of certain philosophical concepts, and Sean and Dublin, who wanted us to talk about Lecon and his relation to dialectics. So with that little introduction, Todd, where did dialectics start? How do we get here? So, well, maybe we should first define sort of what we think dialectics is, right? Yeah, sure. So I think dialectics would be either that contradiction is the driving force of thought and maybe of being itself, or that identity is always involved in what negates it. So the way in which the negation, you can't get around negation. And I want to also put out two definitions by 20th century Marxist. So, Giorg Luchot in history in class consciousness says dialectics means the dialect, or he says something like the dialectical method means grasping everything by through the whole. And then Adorno, Teodor Adorno in negative dialectics says, the name dialectics says nothing more to begin with than objects don't go into their concepts without leaving a remainder. So those are two, I think those are two sort of interesting, I think Luchot's probably a little more right than Adorno, and maybe we can unpack Adorno's statement a little later. But then for sure. Let's start just at the beginning. So it seems like Plato is the originator of dialectics. But for him, and I think this separates Plato from then Kant would be the first modern iteration of it. And what separates Plato is that he, for him dialectics is a form of argument, which is opposed to sophist, like the sophist will have recourse to anything to win the argument. And dialectics is tied to there is an idea of truth, and we get to it through identifying contradiction. And you said to me earlier, you said to me that there's a relationship, I think this is a good point between Aristotle's principle of contradiction and Plato's dialectical method, even though Aristotle would never have said, I don't think, oh, I've got the principle of non-contradiction from Plato's dialectical method. Sure, sure. But that's kind of interesting, yeah. Yeah, no, it is interesting. And it's interesting to think about that influence on law, like I think, I mean, in the, we've said this in a number of different ways in a number of different podcasts, but one of the central problems with the current political situation right now is this idea that truth is my truth. It's your truth. It's just infinitely reproducible in many, many different forms and that there's no big T-truth, there's just little ones. And I think that, I don't know, it's complicated, but I think that there's been in some ways like a victory of sophistry, like if you think about the way that like you think about the way that a court trial plays out, this is not interested in truth. It's who's going to win the argument and who's going to pull out the best stops to win on a like a technicality, right? And I think like, you know, just a little example on the the problem with producing little T-truths all the time is like, me too, I think is like, you know, one of the great truth movements, but even the people who are on the side of it, they don't talk about it the right way. Like I think about the Oscars and I forget who was introducing all of the silence breakers, but what he said was that these women spoke their truth. No, they didn't. They didn't speak their truth. They spoke the truth. That's, you know, and like it blows my mind. So when you say that, what you've done is you constructed your argument in such a way that like, well, so now what's Harvey Weinstein going to say? Well, my truth is I didn't do that. Right. And so, yeah, it's just two competing truths. How do you know? How do we decide which truth is the one that we're going to be invested in? I totally agree with this. Like my truth, that idea is I think, like it's, it's, it's, it's interesting that the moment in which women start to speak up about abuse, then all of a sudden it's like, oh, they're not saying the truth. They're just saying they're true. They're like, it's like, it's like, it's a way of like completely undermining the like the assault on patriarchy that is possible in the Me Too movement. Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. It's a really good point by you. So, so I think that's, so it's fascinating that Plato links contradiction to truth and that will, that will be true later on in, in, in both Kant and Plato, although I think, you know, their take is going to be radically different. So, yeah, but we just want to do a brief little thing on, absolutely, on Plato and what he, because it's for him, it's not, it's not so much a way, they're like, I don't think for him dialectic has any, it's purely an argumentative strategy that helps to get to a historical, you might even say. It's almost rhetorical, I think that's right. Yeah. And it gets right. And then, but for someone like Kant, so Kant in the latter half of the, I said, half, I guess it's half of, of, of, of, of, critique of pure reason, lays out what he calls the transcendental dialectic. And that really is the moment at which dialectic has a, has a rebirth in, in philosophy and, and his idea is that we can know the limits of reason at the points at which we run into contradiction. So, him dialectic is, is nothing but the identification of contradictions, which tell us we can't think past that. Right. So, like the, the famous, I think we've talked about them before on the podcast, like the, the famous example, like does the world have a beginning and space and time or does it not and, or has, or has it been going on infinitely? Is there a simple substance or is there just complexity all the way down? Is there freedom or is there just natural law and is there a, is there a necessary being or God or is there not? And so, I think all those for what he calls the antennas of pure reason, it's dialectic that identifies them as contradictions that we can't get beyond. Right. Right. And then this is, that's the exact point of Hagle's intervention. Right. I think that's really a key thing that, that, that in some way, Hagle takes his, Kant's transcendental dialectic, this identification of stumbling blocks, fundamental stumbling blocks and thought that, that Kant thinks, well, because we have these stumbling blocks and thought, we can't know anything about what's really beyond our field of representation, because we try to go beyond it, we try to get, we try to think of that field of representation as a totality. Like, what's the first, what's the beginning? We, we fail. We can't reason runs into contradictions. And he, he sort of, he gives the arguments for pro and con and says, look, they both, they both fail. And so, Hagle's point is, well, why does that failure of knowledge necessarily correspond to, we don't know anything about, yeah, being is, you know. And so he thinks that the failure of knowledge actually indicates something on the level of being. That's interesting. So, it's, it's, it has this an ontological valence that dialectics didn't have before. Right. So, it's, so, right. So, I think that's right to say that, I mean, it does have an ontological valence in consensus in so far as it says, we can't know anything about ontology. Yeah, yeah, yeah, right. Right. So, so that's, that's sort of interesting. But, but you're right, Hagle's the first thinker for whom dialectics, all of a sudden, becomes itself almost an ontology. I mean, I think, or, I think it's fair to say it's an ontology that logic is has ontological weight in Hagle's way of thinking. And because it's dialectical, because, because we, his idea is that the contradictions that we come to in thought, if we are trying to think these absolute things like the beginning of the world in space and time, right. If that, if we run into contradiction there, then that there must be something in being that makes that contradiction possible. Yeah. So, that's his idea. And so, that's how he kind of translates dialectics from just an epistemological or, or something operative or rhetorical, right. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. To something that has an ontological, ontological, valence or ontological weight to it. So, that's the real, and, and, and then he, he starts to, he thinks his whole movement of his thought then becomes focused on dialectics and on what I think is interesting is that he doesn't reject the principle of non-continue. contradiction, which would be, I mean, some people, it's funny, because some people think, oh, Hague overjects the principle of non-contradiction. There's other people who think he never does it all, he just completely follows it. And then there's, my position would be, he follows it up into the point at which contradiction becomes irreducible, and then he says, we can really have contradiction. Because there's something, don't you think there's something kind of radical about the identification of the contradiction? Right? Like, I think-- Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. Do you want to talk? I mean, I think that this is one of the examples we were kicking around earlier. I think it makes sense to do a, like, a dialectical sort of analysis of a situation, the political situation. And I think it's one of my favorite examples, and this is even something that Trump said while he was on the campaign trail, about immigration, is that the immigrant situation in America is such that we have these, we have these Mexicans coming in to the country, and these are the two things that they do. They just bring their whole families in, and they drive down, I don't know, property values, they'd set up shop, and they ruin communities with-- Well, they get welfare. They're lazy. They're public assistance. They soak all that stuff up, right? And the other thing that they do, presumably the same people, is they take all the jobs. And so what you have is this-- Because they're so hard working. Yeah, you have this utter incoherence between the lazy Mexican. You have what you have, I don't know, I think that this is probably what the conservatives imagine is that you've got both speedy Gonzalez taking all the jobs, and regular Gonzalez, like not doing any jobs. I don't know. Well, I think that's a key thing, Ryan. I think it's a nice example that you have to separate those two figures, right? You have to have a-- So let's just call it the conservative mind. It's not maybe nice, but-- So the conservative mind has to be dualistic, right? It has to say, on the one hand, you have these certain immigrants that are lazy on public assistance taking all our money. And then you have to, on the other hand, you have these other immigrants that are stealing all our jobs because they're willing to do jobs. We won't. They work hours that we won't. They're just more industrious than we are. So as long as you have a dualism, it's perfectly easy to sustain that, right? Certain ones are this, certain ones are that, and never the train shall meet. Except in my dream. Right, like my dream is your truth. Right, like if there's no. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And they say, no, no, no, no, no. Those two people are the same, right? Those two people are the same. Like the figure of the immigrant is, at the same time, like coming to lazy, not coming to work hard, and hyper-industry is extra hardworking, et cetera. So that-- I mean, I think that's the-- Well, that's the-- Genius of dialectics. But yeah, go. Yeah, well, no, it's that-- so what you need to see at that is that idea that is in-- like that idea is in, like, is, of course, in contradiction with itself, and that nonetheless shows you the truth of the conservative position. Right, right, right. And I think that that's-- Or-- But, okay, now, that was it. So that's-- so it's interesting, because what you just-- that was a kind of Kantian analysis of the contradiction. Right, so you said, like, okay, it reveals something about the thinker, her or himself, right? The conservative thinker, her or himself, right? And that's what Kant would say about what contradiction reveals. What Hegel would say is, no, actually, that's true about the immigrant. The immigrant is at once lazy and industrious, just like all of us are. Just like all of us, right? Yeah, yeah, that's the lesson. I'm going to sit around for three hours and watch a football game. Yeah. And I'm like, I think pretty hard, like, I'm going to-- afterwards, I'm going to read four hours of Hegel. Sure. So, like, you know, so I think it nicely captures the way on both this opposite-- like, so there's some truth to Kant's position, right? Like it does reveal something about the thinker. But at the same time, it's also, I think, you have to recognize that the-- that one thing dialectics suggests is that the subject itself is contradictory, right? Like, it's at odds with itself. It's, you know-- Right, and then that goes-- and then doesn't that also clarify the political situation as well, which is that it shows you that for the-- in the Republican imagination, they are only ever one thing, right? They're only ever the pure hardworking subject. But also, there's the thing that, like, allows them to get out of it, which is that, like, I think I said at the end of-- I can't remember this the last episode of the other one, which is that, like, if you bathed yourself in, in sort of, like, religious morality and then you-- like, pretty much anything that you do, that contradicts that or conflicts with it, it's fine because you really believe, and you're, like, a believer, right? Like, which is why, you know, you can have people defend-- like, you can have ministers defend Trump and attack Hillary Clinton at the same time because they-- evangelicals believe that they're going to get something out of Trump as president that they wouldn't get out of Hillary Clinton because she, while also being a believer, is committed more to the-- and it's a secular morality. Right. Yeah, right. Right. So-- I think she's more of a believer than Trump. I think, of course, right? But, yeah. But she would not overturn Rovers'-- wait, right? Right. Like, that's the-- Right. Although, I don't know that it's-- I think you're right, and that's true, but I don't know that the support for him among evangelicals is transactional. I know that's everyone reads it. It's something that he's giving. Yeah. I almost think it's his very obscenity. And I think you said this at some point that-- that religious morality today is much more a license to really enjoy yourself. Where a secular morality is. It's not restrictive. It's restrictive. It's true. I had this fascinating exchange in my glasses. I'm like, can you say, do you feel super-egoic of restriction to act in a politically correct manner? And no one said anything. And then one person said-- which I thought was absurd because I feel it, you know, and it's true. But then one person said, no, I'm just worried that my-- what I say is going to be interpreted as politically correct, even though it's not motivated by that. And I thought, well, OK, I'm sure that that is genuine. But to me, that's even a more of a sign of power-- I was just going to say-- Super-ego. Yeah, right. Isn't that-- doesn't that prove the point? Yeah, that's super-adjusted. So I think your point about the way in which secular morality is so super-egoically strong, and the religious morality is like a license to-- you know, and I think Trump is the embodiment of that. Like, he's the way the evangelical conservative enjoys. Like, that's-- Yeah, you know. Yeah. And so that's-- and that is-- that's Hagel's dialectical position. Absolutely. Right. And I think-- let me just-- I love this example of-- I think that the great-- I think the figures of Hagelian-- what I would call like Hagelian politics-- are these-- are 70s feminists who totally took up this idea of-- you know, what patriarchy does is it doesn't allow women to be contradictory. So it says like-- look, the patriarchal image of women-- virginal or horror, right? But absolutely dualist in its conception. Right. Absolutely like-- there are virgins here, there are horrors here. And then I think the claim of 70s feminism, like, "Dermain, Greer, Shulmeth, Firestone," these people, was-- no. No. Virgin Mary was a slut. Like, that's the-- that's the-- you know, like, you have to think of the virgin and the slut together. And that contradiction is what it means to be a woman. And I think one of the things patriarchy says is men are allowed to be contradictory, but women aren't. Right. Like, that's the basic-- women have to be dualist. Men can be contradictory. And so one of the-- I think that's a great victory of feminism is to say, you know, women can be contradictory as well. I think that's-- Yeah, no. I think that's a-- that's a fabulous example. That is just quick-- I know you would never do this, but I'm going to do this. That's a quick plug for your book, because you talk about this in your book coming out, right? Which is-- My book on Hegel. Yeah, that's one of the whole examples, yeah. Yeah. And the title is-- And I played your eyes myself. You played your eyes yourself. That's right. You should have cited. I'm trying to keep you out of trouble here. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What is the title? I forget the emancipation after Hegel. That's the title. All right. Awesome. So we-- let's see. One of the things that we want to talk about, I think that this makes sense to get into here, is you brought up the Lukach and Adorno at the beginning. Yeah. We've gone enough into the conversation that we can bring those two ideas. Yeah, let's bring it back. So let's re-site what they are. So Adorno's notion is-- Sorry, Lukach is-- ideas that the dialectical method means relating everything to the whole. So it's always having reference to the whole. And for a doerno, the ideas, objects don't go into their concepts without leaving a remainder. So there's a kind of mismatch between concepts and objects. So on the one hand, Lukacch, I think it's funny because Adorno sounds nicer. It sounds better. But I think Lukacch's idea is better. It's depending on how you understand whole, right? Right. Well, it needs to be, I mean, does whole need to be thought of, I think, with like a like parenthesis around the W, right? Or around the H. I mean, like either, you know, so that it indicates that there is a, like, because what Adorno gets right, and you said this earlier, is that what, if what Hagel does is to follow non-contradiction, you know, until contradiction is irreducible, then that's Adorno thinking he's reading Hagel, like totally faithfully, which is that like it's this irreducible kernel. I gave you this example before the show is like Adorno's understanding of dialectics or understanding of Hagel is that what a dialectical method is is using, like using a leaf blower to find a needle in a haystack. So like you, you get rid of all of the hay and you're just left with the needle, which is like the irreducible kernel of contradiction. And that's the object that doesn't, that doesn't, that doesn't leave the remainder, that doesn't go into its concept without leaving the remainder. Yeah, that's the object. Right. Right. And then so that part, I think, can you describe Hagel himself through the same leaf blower? Well, I could, I think I could do, hey, a blue cautious definition, which is like it's, it's to find out that the haystack is made of needles. Yeah. Yeah. You know, it's good. And, and I think that like that's, you do need to think, I mean, to perform a dialectical, you know, thinking about it is you do need to think both of those ideas, I think at the same time. But for Luke Hutch, there's a needle everywhere. Right. Right. Exactly. You can't, and I think what Hagel would say, and I think that's closer to what Hagel would say, right? Like I think he would say, you can't separate the needle from the haste, like you can't just, that like the, the haystack is implicated in the needle, and the needle is implicated in the haystack. But the other thing I think he would say is, are there's, we discover contradiction through our leaf blower itself. Right. Like, like, it's the, like, and I think this is a problem with Adorno's idea that for, for, for Hagel, it's the very, it's the very unfolding of the concept that ends up being contradictory to itself. And that's what he means by dialectics. So, for instance, if we trace out, so the first section of phenomenology, which is the easiest to talk about, I think, called sense certainty. Right. Like, sense certainty means all I can trust are my senses. Right. Like that's all like, that's the, that's the only knowledge that I have. And he, which, which, which, can I, can I put in a thing here? Yeah. That, that, I think, I saw this, this article on medium that I really, really didn't like about, like someone was saying that we were in a post enlightenment era. And I think that there's this, like, you know, what's like post truth, post enlightenment, probably, like, and I think, excuse me, in general, people are, because technology advances, people think that, like, you know, we have to always be moving forward, like with everything. So, you know, post modernism has to be completely different from modernism, because it's later, right? Like, you know, and we, right now, because we're so far from the enlightenment era, we have to be after it. But I mean, is this not, I mean, is that not flat earthers? Like, what a Hagle is talking about? Like, sense certainty? Like, you can only be certain about like, what it is that you have direct experience with. Like, like, this is the, so anyway, what you're going to talk about, I just wanted to put this in, is like, we're not, if you want to, to, to diagnose some of the, like, contemporary, like, condition and thought, where we're, we're not moved to post truth, we've moved to pre-enlightenment in, and that's, that's what's happened. And so, Hagle's idea on sense certainty, I think is like, you know, it's good that you're talking about it. I think it's one of the most relevant things right now that he talked about. So, anyway, I wanted to put that sort of, like, statement. Yeah, no, I think that's, absolutely, absolutely crucial. And so his idea is that, if you think all you can trust are your senses, you can't even say that all I can trust are my senses. Right? Like, like, like, so, so that's one, I mean, he doesn't, he doesn't work it out quite in this way, but that's the upshot of what he says, that, that you can't even, that sense certainty can't even articulate itself as a mode of truth. Like, when it tries to articulate itself as a mode of truth, it always, it ends up going beyond the, it's what it, it itself acknowledges as the, the only kind of cruise claims that it can make. So, so there's a way in which it has to, it's set, it always is saying too much, you know? So, because like, just to, to kind of nail that down, like, like, for me, like, because like, in explaining sense certainty, you are all, you are going outside of yourself and outside of your own experiences, your own senses, right? Yeah, your own senses to explain something that you have experienced. Right. Like, once I even say, I'm just going to employ the concept of, he, this is the ones he uses, like, this here now, like, already, like, those concepts refer to a whole larger structure that makes them make sense is like, this only makes sense as this, as opposed to all these other things, right? Right. And now only makes sense as opposed to all the other possible times. So, so, this is a, it's a nice way of understanding what Hegel means by dialectics because it means like, the thing that you're identifying is involved in all these things that it's not. And so, that's how, that's how for him, dialectics works and how contradiction is discovered and how, why Adorno is wrong because every position, if you, if you play it out, you can see the way in which it undermines itself. Like, like, that's what you did with the anti-immigration position, right? Like, you just played it out. Like, just play it out. And you, if you play, and that's why I think, she's like, the best way to undermine in ideologies, to take the ideology at its word, that's a very Hegelian idea. That's a, this idea that you just play out the, the structure itself, and then you, you see how it, it's at odds with itself. And I think that's what Adorno doesn't get. But it does, what's interesting is this is reconcilable with Lukacchist definition because, just playing it out means seeing the whole, right? Like grasping it out of the whole. Yeah, exactly. That's really, really great. And I think like, like, to go back to the source of our favorite examples, which is World War II, and Nazism, like, I forget where G-Jick talks about this. It could be, for the know-not what they do, or maybe he's mentioned this in a number of different places. But like, the way that Nazi propaganda about the figure of the Jew worked was that, like, at the same time, it's a lot, it's, they're different stereotypes, but it's the same thing as Mexicans in America today. Yeah. Where you, you had, listen, fathers, look out for the, the swav charming Jew because he will take your daughters and, and you know, you, they'll, and, and, and appreciate himself and your family and impregnate your daughter, blah, blah. But, and then also the Jew is slimy. That's how you can know the Jew. Like, it's a dirty, they don't wash. And so that you have this, like, incredibly charming, like, rat pack, you know, 1950s, the Frank Sinatra Jew, and then also, like, like, a slum dweller, you know, like, like, rat, raggedy clothes, like, Charlie Chaplin's tramp, right? Like, so, and that, in coherence, is the thing that coheres that ideological field. And that's, you know, so you don't say, like, well, these, these ideas are, are, are, are contradictory, like, they don't make sense. It's like, no, like, this is how you make sense of Nazism, how you make sense of that time. Right. Right. And, and, you know, again, and it goes back to the other thing that you said, like, that, like, yes, people, people, of course, like, I mean, there are times where, like, I don't shower for three days and whatever. And then there were times where I like to think I'm quite charming. You know, so like, everybody, everybody is, is like that. You're this charming man, right? That's pretty good. I like the sort of ambiguous sexuality that that implies as well. But, um, but yeah, anyway, just like, uh, you wanted to say anything about that example. Yeah, no, I think it's a great, I mean, I think the, I, what, what struck me when I just, when you were saying that was that, so Plato and Kant, I think, would say a similar thing to the Nazi, right? They, they would both say, well, can't you see that you shouldn't be anti-Semitic because your anti-Semitism is relying on a contradiction. So for them, dialectics would mean I identify the contradiction and then I, I get rid of it. I get rid of it. Or I say, I can't think that anymore because that's a contradiction. For, Heygall, interestingly, I think would say, yeah, you kind of, you got it right. The Jew is both those things, right? Like he would say, because everybody's like, you are, just like you are. So, so your anti-Semitic picture of the Jew, if you bring together the two contradictory things, then you, you correctly apprehend the contradictory nature of subjectivity. Right? So I think that's the, that's the, to me, That's it. That's the great, you know, step forward, or the great leap forward in Hagle. But it needs to be radical, I think. It continues to be radical. Because like what you were saying about like the platonic or the Kantian position on that, you know, on the Nazism, right? Like this contradictory, so now we get rid of it. It's kind of the CNN response to Trump. Yeah, it's like, it's, I mean, it's even in something as banal as like, I think I've probably used this example before. It's in something as banal as baseball, like like analytics, right? Like there's no clutch hitting because we can't come up with numbers for it because it doesn't make sense that someone would get better than they normally are. So clutch doesn't exist. It's a contradiction. So we just get rid of it. Like that, I mean, like I think this is like a, you know, it, it's, I mean, I think that you could probably, isn't there? Let me give you, can I do a little dialectical analysis of clutch hitting? Like what if it's this? Yeah. And it's that the clutch hitter or the clutch quarterback clutch performer in sports just doesn't get worse. Yeah. Right. Well, and this would be, I think a nice kind of Lukachi in a way of understanding dialectics as thinking the whole, right? Like everyone around that player gets worse in the time, in the clutch time because they're nervous, they're part rate, accelerate, et cetera, et cetera. But the clutch player just acts like, you know, there's this great example of Joe Montana in the Super Bowl, unfortunately, was against the Bengals and so it's crushed. But he, like, he comes to the huddle, they're down by, I don't know, whatever, five points may be. I think it was five, yeah. Yeah. And he, he, and they have to drive the length of the field in a minute and a half and he looks to the players and the other like this, you know what? There's John Candys up there in the, in the stands. Right. And the players were like, what is he doing? They're like, they, somebody, I heard a player say we immediately knew we, we had the game one. That's all he did was just say, there's John Candys. And you believe that he's here in the stands because he was like, look, it's to me. It's like most players, even if it was early in the game, wouldn't be calm enough to say to say that, you know? Well, you know, you'd be like, they're too distracted. They're not in the game. Your head's not in the game. You got to get in this. You don't understand the situation. Bob, Bob, Montana understood it perfectly, which is like, we're just going to do what, we're just going to go play football and be dead chilled out about it. And we're going to be better than them because they're, they're going to get tight and they're going to make mistakes. That's what happened, Bengals and Fence Abak dropped in interception in the end zone. So, you know, yeah, yeah. Because it was too big, right? Because he didn't see John Candy in the crowd. He didn't see John Candy. Yeah. No, I think that's, I think that's great. So that means, I mean, to me, that's dialectics, right? Like that's so the analytic positions, nice that it's the analytics. And it's the analytic position. So the analytic positions looks at the player, her himself, right? And tries to think what's different, what's different, what's different. Yeah. The dialectical position says, well, you can't think about the player in isolation because there's a relationship between the rest, you know, the player and the subject and the whole objective field around, right? Mm-hmm. So you just use the word that I think is going to mark our point of departure from Hegel, if you think this is the time to do it. Yeah, let's, let's have a departure. So you mentioned the subject. And I think that this, how do we understand Lacan as a dialectician, if you like, of psychoanalysis? And I think that it comes here in the subject and with contradiction. And also with Adorno's sort of like irreducible kernel being the object, that nonetheless makes sense of the whole that Lou Koch is talking about, right? Like the-- Yeah, I think that's a nice way to bring it all together. Yeah. Like, isn't-- so I think what separates Lacan from, say, other psychoanalytic thinkers is that he rejects this notion of a divide between subject and object or between internal and external, right? Like that. And I think it's interesting because a lot of people identify in Lacan himself. Melanie Klein has an influence on him. But for Klein, there's-- it's clear-- like the object can be interjected. It's clear that the object is first external in order to be interjected. You know, so there's this kind of-- and I think for most psychoanalytic thinkers, there's this Freud, I think, is more of a question. But I think there's this kind of divide between internal and external. And what's great about the concept of obje-ah or object cause of desire is that it-- and this is why Lacan calls it "extimate," right? Like, so it's not-- which isn't a word. Like, it's intimate, but it's exterior. So-- So I think that that-- so it's both in the external field and it's my-- it's the point at which I am out there shaping the external world or I'm affecting the external world. No, that's fantastic. Well, I mean, and film serves like some of the great examples of this. Yeah, why is that? Why is film get this-- it gets to be the privileged example for everything. I'm a little-- Yeah, right. Well, because one, I mean, I think, is you and I are doing it, but for two, it's true. And it's the spot of the viewer in the image, the subject in the object, I guess, is probably what it's-- Right, so it's interesting. Well, I think it's maybe worth talking about the difference between the painting and the film, right? Because I think Lacan's example-- or never filmic-- He does an under single filmic example. He has two primary painting examples. And I feel like the painting example doesn't quite do it as well. So Hans Holbane's The Ambassadors is the famous one in Seminar 11. And then he does this amazing thing where he invites Michelle Foucault's Seminar 13, so it's called the L'Objée de L'Obs. He can't leave the object of psychoanalysis, is Seminar 13. And he invites-- so it's two years after Seminar 11. Obviously. He invites Foucault, and then he talks-- he's going to give an analysis of Las Meninas, the Velasquez, painting that Foucault famously analyzes in his preface to order of things. Order of things, yep. And fascinatingly, Foucault doesn't come up with it. Lacan's like, OK, next time I'm going to give my analysis, I can't wait to have you-- then Foucault says he's like, I don't understand. Foucault's not here at the audience. It's kind of funny. Either it was-- I prefer to think it's like this great passive-aggressive move on Foucault. Yeah. Which makes me like him more. Like this. Yeah, yeah. You know, fuck him. He's going to do an analysis that I made famous. I'm going to just not come. I'm going to tell him I'm going to come. And then I'm not going to come. Because I think it really was Prickish on Lacan's part, right? Like it's-- Yeah. I mean, he just-- yeah. He's sort of not a very nice guy. But so we did-- he was Lacan's attitude, was it like that-- you didn't quit. I fired you. Like was that that his-- I think it was-- Well, you know what's fascinating, too. And this is what I think is even worse. Is that he constantly praises Foucault's analysis and says, I'm just going to add one little thing to it. And then he's totally undermines it. So it's like he doesn't even eval that he's really-- that it's kind of a full frontal attack, you know? It's pretty good. So anyway, so the whole thing is that most people probably know it is the famous painting of the-- these world travelers. And then in the bottom of the painting is a skull that's that's anamorphically inserted in the painting. So only if you're on the top-- I think it's the top right-- top right side. You can look down. I wouldn't spend-- that painting was on the wall. I taught at Loyola Marymount University. I wouldn't spend 20 minutes trying to get the person in the hallway. We're like, she had her head against the wall. She's like, I still don't see it. So it could be hard to see. Yeah. Anyway, so there-- so-- and that skull is, of course, the spectators is the point at which the spectators in the image because you have to move to see it. So it says-- Yeah. --it sort of takes your positioning into account. And it's saying to you, like, in the end we're all dead. It's this momenta mori, in the Edwaraal dead, and all the riches of these travel. Like, you're enjoying looking at that in the end. That's all you are. I had a student ask me about that. I wanted to tell you what I said. But she said to me that-- because the point that I made, I was talking about the picture, is like, like, Lacan-- one of the things he says is that, like, this is the point at which your mastery over the image fails because this sees you before you see it. Yes. Like, like, like, the painting knows. You're going to be drawn here. Like, you're going to be looking. And I had a student come up to me after it. She said, well, what about when you've already seen it? And you know. She said, because I've seen that painting before. So I know, like, I don't look there immediately. And my response to her was, I said, like, that actually shows the gaze that actually shows that point even stronger. Because after you know it's there, you have adjusted the way that you're looking. So even though that spot, like you're claiming, like, doesn't have the power over you as a viewer anymore, it's exerting even more force because you're looking elsewhere. Because you're thinking you're choosing not to pay attention to it when that has actually completely articulated the way that you experience the visual field. Did she give you a tip? That's an amazing-- like, you went beyond what a professor would say. You deserve the tip for that. That goes a great point. Yeah, well, thank you. Yeah, well, you know what I'll tell I'll tell Clark maybe the little yeah, maybe I'll get it Yeah, I think it's a little bit of a bum for that. Yeah Or they may be I mean given what our view of Earning money. Maybe you should get a pay cut pay cut. Yeah, you did a good job cut your pay. Yeah, that's it Less money. Yeah, okay But I think so so then his other let's More quickly his other example so the example of of Las Maninas is that so what was Foucault thinks he knows what's being painted on the we can only see the back of the painting the big Pain in it's being painted Foucault thinks we know it's the royal couple and so this is the epic of Perfect representation he thinks like cons point is we have no idea What's being painted all we have is this blank space and so and we're we're forced to like we're drawn to the blank space and yet We don't when we're sort of spending all our time speculating on what could be painted on the black on the blank space and so for him That's that's the point of gaze right so okay? So those are good and I think they do a nice example of showing the dialectical They show the icon is a dialectical thinker right like he he doesn't he doesn't respect maybe dialectics means this like not respecting the dualism of subject and object At least for Lecon I think that's yeah dialectics would mean I think that's what it would mean for him like you cannot that dualism does not exist like you cannot have a dualistic conception of subject and object that's really interesting well I mean I don't I don't want to jump to it like to talk about another field But I mean like that I suppose that would be like the primary Error if you're thinking this way in like a object oriented ontology right like that's Absolutely, yeah, yeah, it's assuming that the vision the Lecadian position would be that you know what you take out of the object is You put in it already like right or you're involved in the objective field like your desires are already Object they're involved in that field in a way that Graham Harmon like the main representative of that position wouldn't Of out like he like his whole point is let's think about that without our contamination But look on screen is like you're sorry It's already contaminated like you're contaminating the whole thing like the objective field is all Contaminated with subjectivity. There's no way to withdraw that Contamination yeah, my my example the example that I like a lot is mishearing a song lyric and then singing that Miss heard song lyric to yourself all the time What is the fine? Yeah, go ahead. Yeah until until you find out that you were wrong. What were you gonna say though? What is the locus classicus of that of that phenomenon? Have you seen the movie the way way back? No, I haven't seen it. It's a phenomenal film just for if anyone's Listing that's it's a great film to see but so What's her name? Emma no, it's not Emma. I forget I was forget her name, but She was in 2012 anyway, I'm not gonna say it doesn't matter So the one character is she's she's like dancing around singing around and the song by mr. Mr. Curie Laison Okay is playing on her and she sings the song Curie Laison, she says Curie Laison, you know, and so yeah everyone starts to laugh at her there like it's not and she goes of course it is what's it She doesn't know the Latin and it doesn't make sense to her, you know, so yeah, but I thought that's to me is the great example of a of the way The mishearing becomes like shape totally shaping what the objective experiences, right? Yeah, yeah, no It's that's a great example. I mean there's like I was in a bookstore and they had There's there's a bookstore in Cranston, Rhode Island that sells records and they They have these coasters with misherds song lyrics on them and You know like they're like a couple The one made famous by friends like hold me closer Tony Danza, right like a you know Which I'm not actually sure as a misherd or if that was like that intentional There's one in there's one in long kiss good night. Yeah, that movie with Gina Davis and Samuel of Jackson I do yeah, I don't think I remember this the song is at England Dan and John Ford coley song like I really love to see it tonight and he goes I'm not talking about John Lennon and The lyric is I'm not talking about moving in oh That's really funny. So it's another one where they have the pretty it's funny how I Wonder how often it's a name that gets inserted Where it's just you know lyrics, which is I think that's you know that would be it worth that kind of I mean This is a great Freudian phenomenon. Oh sure. Yeah. Yeah, the misheard as a the mishearing as a kind of para praxis Yeah, right. Yeah, yeah, and that and I think that the what the kind of power of it is like there's there There are a lot of bands that like like beach houses a band that I like and I mean I if I have I've listened to everything that they've done and I could probably tell you like six words Like it added anything that they like cuz it's interesting I was gonna say the band that does it the most is REM like they that's pretty good to yeah I think what are the words and and what's fascinating is that off on all some of their albums like Michael Stipe will be it'll say instrument voice Like as if the voice is just an ob it's like a kind of a game thing like as if the voice is just an object and the words that he says are just meant to fit within the What the song demands and that's really great? That's have you ever heard of Mondagreen or Mondagran. I'm not sure I'm saying it right. It's it's like a poet It's like a poetic form of like of composition where like the words are meant to be misheard. Oh and Yeah, and I think that like that's that that's the the intent anyway the whole point like I mean get back to to dialectics is like that this this is the when If you're listening to something that is meant to be misheard like and you attempt to or even the difficult here Your attempt to make sense of it like to hear it like you're it's coming from your own subject position like in that thing and so like if you're you're taking if the way that you think about you're hearing this Song that's occupying objective reality and all you're doing is is is trying to To say for it. Yeah, yeah, right like objectively like that. No, no, no Like there's something before you heard the song that like you're putting into it already and that I mean that would be I mean desire would be Sort of like the obvious right answer just a the alien twist would be that the song that they had to make the song in a way That was that was ambiguous enough for you to be able to do that right like that would be the so so for Hagle would would and I think this is why The question is whether psychoanalysis has an ontology right because I don't think LeCon would say what Hagle just said right like I think for him It's just that dialectics just is the subjects You know, it's the subjects distortion of what it sees and I mean I guess it is the distortion of the objective field in this sense Like that when he says the big other doesn't exist right like that is that's a way of saying the field is Is never it's itself contradictory right? It's never it's never fully complete unto itself Yeah, right. This is the I mean in a previous podcast we I Talked about a Lombard Jews definition of the the real and LeCon and one of his his examples is the the number quote number Infinity which is what completes the field of numbers, but it is impossible, you know, and then this is what Joan Copczek famously says about Sex contra Judith Butler and read my desire is that like, you know, it is Sex is is a sort of a structural incompleteness that completes the field it is not You know Hopelessly incomplete and that's why you know, we we have this a proliferation of Of gender this is you know Joan's argument. It's that like you know It's incomplete and that's what completes it and so I yeah, I think that's really Yeah, I think that I think you could even make the argument that the origin of dialectics lies in the fact that we require An incompletion a structural incompletion to complete the field right? That's really really great that it in completion is inserted to provide the whole or a completion and That's the origin of dialectics and that's why Lou Koch's definition works as a definition of dialectics because if you think the whole then you have to think The H.O. Ellie not just the W.H.O. You think and that whole is precisely an incompletion that gets inserted To finish it off and I think that's also the relationship for Lecon between big other and object day right like object so big other is in is is lacking and then the space in the lacking big other is filled with object day or the Extimate part of the subject right but it never it's always it's itself. It's a part that doesn't fit so it it does fit But it's itself incomplete and so it's never It's never creating a perfect you know complementarity or perfect closure all or perfect harmony all these things that Lecon will constantly invade against Right so that's so I think that's an interesting way to think of him as a dialectical thinker just just dialectical Relationship only of the object field like only of relationship between lacking big other and object day right their relationship is Dialectical but I love the way you formulated that that it's this incompletion that's inserted to complete the field Yeah, I think you know you said something earlier that I want to sort of go go back to like there's just a couple minutes ago about a second analysis and ontology and One of the things that I think I said this at the end of our previous episode on Drive and Desire, that I think it's in, imagine there's no woman, John Copcheck writes that I think the quote, she said that we're obliged to see that death drive substitutes as an ontology and Freud. And you and I talked about that on phone a little bit. Do you want to speak to that at all? Like as you said, like, where is the sort of fault line between it being ambiguous if there's an ontology in psychoanalysis or unless I was quoting you? No, I think that, I mean, I guess I would claim there's an ontology, but I do think it's like, like, is, like, the question is I think, is what can one extrapolate from death drive, right? Like if we, if we discover the existence of death drive and we accept that, then what can, what ontological, like, what ontological ramifications does that have? Like so for Hagle, for Hagle the existence of, like, logical contradiction leads him back to ontological contradiction. And I think, and I think, I don't know what John's position on this would be, but I do think that you can do the same thing with death drive that you can say, like, there must be some ontological structure that makes the emergence of this self-destroying entity possible, right? Like, there has to be something that makes that possible to emerge. Now, we, like, so we know that there is something rather than nothing. So it can't be just that everything, like, there's only this drive to negate, right? Because then there would be nothing, whatever had been formed. So I think that what we can say, though, is that there's, that ontologically, there can't be, like, everything can't be driven by its own, like, just pure, straight movement forward, right? Like, I think there's, I think, there, like, death drive does seem to me to put into question just the universality of a evolutionary model of the universe, like a completely evolutionary progression. As, like, an upward trajectory, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. In other words, like, like, you know, like, if it's moving forward, it's moving forward backwards, like, it's, you know, like, the crab's movement. I think that something like that would be the ontological implication. I don't know where you think of something. Oh, no, no. I think that's great. Well, what you were saying was it's almost like, you said that, that, that, that, it made me think that, like, Freud does what Hagel does, but in reverse, like, Freud found an ontological contradiction and that led him to, like, formulate like an epistemological and, like, like, a theoretical contradiction, you know? And, and for, for Hagel is the reverse, that the logical, logical contradiction leads him to discover, like, like, ontological, logical. Yeah. I mean, if people object to Hagel, I think that's the objection, right? Like, they would say, you can't go from logic to ontology. Like, they're just no. Because, and it is true, isn't it, that there are some things that happen in the mind that aren't, have no correlate to, to the world, right? Like, you can, like, I can, I can dream of having sex with George Clooney and I'd ever have sex with George. You know what I mean? Right, right. There's no, or, hot take, maybe you did. [LAUGHTER] I've tried to, you know, yeah, I know. Yeah. That's interesting. No, but I, I think I probably have had a dream about that. But, but, but I do, I do think, like, so, but, but I think Hagel's point is different from that is that, OK, that's true. Like, clearly, you can have dreams and fancies that don't have any objective correlate. Sure, sure. But, even they have to be made possible in some way. And the main point he makes is that the difference between that kind of thing and the contradictions that Kant uncovers is Kant is trying to think things to their to their absolute end point. Whereas, like, some little fancy about George Clooney, that's not a, yeah, that's not thinking things to its end. So it's different. Sure. Sure. It's not the same. So, so, thought that comes into contradiction when it's trying to think about the beginning of the universe, or the beginning of the world, then that's different than this kind of, a mindless, mindless fancy, you know, that someone has. Yeah. And the to equivocate both would be like, I mean, would that be like the, would that be like a Kantian mistake? I think it would be. I think it would be. Yeah. Because I think what, and I think that's the common rejection of, you know, you can't go from logic to ontology is, I think that's a Kantian. I think that's fair to say that's a Kantian position. Yeah. Interesting. Why don't we move on? Because we sort of said, paintings aren't the best representation for dialectics and psychoanalysis. And then-- Sorry. It's sort of left it. So, I thought we should-- no, it's not-- it's equally my fault. But let's talk to what the seventh and greatest art has to say about that. Well, yeah. So film, of course, like the-- you know, Slavoy has some great examples of the gaze and the moving image, like one being psycho when Norman Beatt who, at this point in the film, is covering up the murder of his mother, puts Janet Lee in the trunk of her car and pushes it into a marsh. And then there's that moment where he's was he smoking a cigarette and watching it sink. I don't think he's-- Norman's not smoking. I can't. Maybe I didn't. Maybe I made that up. So he's-- I just thought like nervously-- like, is he nervously watching? I think I associate-- I think he's chewing gum, maybe. Chewing gum, maybe. And he's watching it sink. And then for a moment, it doesn't. It stops. It's probably 15 seconds. It's fairly long time that it stops. And you're like, it's not going to go down. And you're caught-- you're wrapped in that with Norman. You're like, oh my god, no, it's not going to go down. And you finish the implication of that. Well, obviously, you wanted to go down, right? Like, that's the thing. And Slavoy thinks this is the-- he doesn't say this, but I think it is maybe the best example of the gaze in the history of cinema. Like, I feel like-- because you're-- you've just seen Norman cover up a murder, like, wash the bathroom, clean it out, and then try to sink the body in order to get away with it. And you want the body to sink. And we've been aligned with Janet Lee-- The whole time. The whole time in the film. And she's decided to give back the money. So any kind of moral qualms we had about her or her out. So it's like you're rooting for the first of that we're aligned with to be-- to her murder to be covered up. And so the fact that film has the ability to twist your-- let me put it this way-- to twist your conscious wish. So that it comes very proximate to your unconscious desire is pretty amazing. You are consciously wishing for that car to go down. And the way Hitchcock makes you aware of that is that he stops the car from going down. Right. Right. Yeah. Amazing. Amazing. Yeah. My other example I really like-- I don't think Slavoy talks about this-- is the end of science of the lamps the first one. Right. Just stunning. So Lector and Clarisse are on the phone. He's called her at her FBI graduation. Yes. Yeah. Yeah, he has. And then he says to her, they have a little chat. And he's like, I'll never come after you. I wish you would do the same and not come after me. And she goes, I can't promise you that. And then he says, I'm having an old friend for dinner. And that's the-- and then she just-- I think that's the last line. She might say, Dr. Lector, Dr. Lector, but he's putting the phone. But it's a great last line because on the one-- so he's seeing his old-- the guy that tormented him while he was in prison. And a guy that made moves on Clarisse and his-- Dr. Chilton is his name. Oh, he's just been an ass throughout the whole cell. He's just a horrible guy. And so-- but I don't think he deserves the death penalty. I mean, if you asked us, we were on a court trying him. We'd say, maybe a fine-- Maybe a fine-- It's kind of a jerk. He should rehabilitate his personality a bit. Yeah. He doesn't deserve to be eaten by another human being. No, he does not. And not only that, but I think most of us would say, if we're going to deliver a capital punishment, like cannibalism probably isn't the way that we would deliver it, right? That's tough. It's tough. It's a little harsh. Yeah. So-- And yet, when we hear him say, I'm having an old friend for dinner and turn to follow Dr. Chilton, every spectator is like, go eat him. Eat him. Oh, go eat that guy. That guy's a jerk. I can't wait for that to happen. Yeah. So that's pretty-- I think that's a pretty great example of the way our desire is implicated in the image that we-- I mean, this is what I think is great about film. I think in works of art, a lot of people say I can really see myself in there. I can really-- Yeah. Whereas I think with the film, you really feel on the one hand. you feel this total separation, right? But in other hand, you have this process of identifying with figures or maybe, I mean, I'm not sure if that whole discourse of identification is right, but you certainly feel invested in what's going on in the frame. - I think that it's both, I mean, it's both. I mean, I think if that's the lesson of this podcast, is that it has to be both to some extent, like it cannot, it has to be a, there has to be distance because you, everyone under, like even, like I've talked about this with, like one of my classes, like, where students were saying that, like they, when they were trying to make the argument that they identify, like identification with the film. Now, identification with the film coming from, like, Mulvey means there was no distance between the viewer and the screen image. There's no distance at all. And when my students were trying to make the point to agree with it, it was so interesting what they're saying was that, well, they identify when the character is relatable. And that it's already a bit of distance from the image. You're understanding them as characters. They're not like real people in front of your eyes that, like, you got to know for two hours. - Right, if there was no distance, you'd be like, have you ever seen a clip from Wells's Don Quixote, where it's a very short clip, where he sees someone in danger on the screen. He gets up and starts nifing the screen. - Oh, that's great. - The movie screen, he's at the movies, he starts to stab and he ends up shredding the screen. And it's amazing scene. And I think that there was no distance. Everyone would be doing that all the time. - All the time, yeah. - Well, what is it, that great line, and naked gun Frank Drabben, when you hear about his disciplinary record, is when he killed someone and shakes her in the park. And he said, like, well, listen, when I see three weirdos and togas stabbing someone, I shoot the bastard is what I do. You know, like, because it didn't understand, it was really a Caesar, right? - Like it's so, like, that's the thing, right? Like, everybody should be like, you know, saving the, they should be trying to, they should be trying to save the world going with the Marvel superheroes in every film. But because that's what, that is the end, that is the end of, like, understanding of identification. That's like, carrying that concept at the end. - But I think it doesn't hold. - It doesn't hold, but I think this selector thing is interesting because on the one hand in the film, you're, he's not the character, you're sort of, you're not inserted with him in the film, right? Like, that's what I think is so great about the end, because you're much more aligned with Clarice and her investigation and you feel bad for the woman, that's kid. So, so, and selector is a kind of scary figure. I mean, you, you, you suppose him to know, I think he functions a lot like a psychoanalyst, I'm not the first person to say that. But, but, but, but, relative to Clarice. But, but you don't, you're not really identified with him. So, that's what I think is so great about the end, is that you're forced to see that like, this foreign intruder in the field that I feel comfortable with, that I'm sort of, I'm aligned with, it's actually the intruder in that where I'm located, right? Like, that's the, see to me, that's the real, that's when you can really show the gaze in the cinema, that's the, or the object, and the dialectical relation of subject to the external world, it's not that you're identified with what is most like you in that, you know what I mean, right, right, right. That's, I think, the key, like, yeah. And that's what's, you know, wrong about the moldy way of thinking, like, you don't, you're not identified with what's most like you, the real radical point of cinema comes when you actually find yourself identified with the point that, that sort of undermines your symbolic identity. And again, that's the dialectics of subjectivity for La Conde, right? Like that, that you're, on the one hand, you are this subjectivity, but more than that, you are this thing in you, more than you, that undermines every symbolic identity that you have, which, you know, ties back to the idea of death drive as well. - Mm, no, that's, that's fabulous. - Right, right. - That's, no, totally, totally. - I think that's, absolutely right. I, like, I have, I have another point to add onto that, but I think that that's a really, really nice point to, to end on. I don't want to, I don't want to kill the, I don't want to kill the quilting. - Kill the vibe, okay. - Yeah. - That's the quilting point. - Okay. - Yeah. - All right. That sounds good, Ryan. Over and out. - Over and out, Todd. Thanks so much. - Yeah. [Music] [Music]