Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Deduction

[Music] Hello, Ian. Thank you for joining us on another episode of Why Theory. As always, I am your host, Ryan Angley joined as always by Coach Tom McHall and Todd. How are you doing, buddy? Ryan, I'm doing great. How are you doing today? I am doing well and that is objectively true. There's really no way for you or anyone else to de-verify that, Todd. I'm pretty sure, I think. And I think the way that we know that we can know that is explaining the pages that we're going to cover today from Manuel Conz could take up your reason. Which we are, what is this? I think this is known as the Transadental Deduction section, even though that's not the title that kicks it off. This is the-- Yeah, right. We're going to talk about a little bit about what comes before the Transadental Deduction, just because, but our primary focus is going to be on the deduction. But it's actually known popularly as the popularly, the people on the street, scholars, and talking about. They call that the metaphysical deduction and then what comes after the big, the longer parts are the two versions, which we'll talk about, of the Transadental Deduction. Yeah. Right. Yes. That's good. That's excellent. So this is what we're going to cover today. And again, just the same as it ever was. Same as last week. I mean, this has just been an absolute joy and a blast to read through. What we're going to try to do in this section is something that we kind of have been doing the whole time, but I just put this out at the start to explain where this is going and what we're going to do. People may have noticed, if you listen to-- I don't know. You listen to our show or you read different people in our orbit or listen to other podcasts, also in the orbit that boy is it easy to come up with film, TV, internet, meme examples of Hagle, Freud, LeCon. I mean, maybe even SART, actually, I think we had a really easy time coming up with examples when we did being in nothingness and critique of dialectical reason all those years ago. But this same impulse, if you like, or maybe not-- that's not it. It's not the impulse. There's just-- there's not a lot of like what's the-- what's like the Kantian film in the same way that-- What would you say? I don't-- It's hard to say. It's hard to say, yeah, because it's an idea that is not out there, which isn't say there's not one. It's something that we're going to be working to talk about. I think section by section, but I wrote an essay on the bottle episode in Hagle, so I think, oh, my media example-- oh, yeah, the bottle episode stages Hagellian contradiction. That's the necessity for the structure of the episode to become unbottle. That's like sort of my take in a sentence about that. You wrote the book on Nolan and Hagle, and there's, of course, there's ways of talking about Hagle and Lynch, like we've done that. And all-- And of course, my god, Freud and Hitchcock, LeCon and Hitchcock. It's very-- The same thing for Kant does not really exist. I don't think it's for the Kant of theory, not for the Kant of practical reason, because I think if you wanted to say, oh, there's some ethical examples of Kantian ethics, I think then you'd say, yeah, there's a lot of them. But your point of place-- For example. Yeah, right. Good place, or just off the top of my head, Michael Clayton's a great example. Yeah. Somebody that really tries to follow a Kantian ethic, at least at the end. But here, and thinking of-- We spent a lot of time actually trying to think about, oh, what would you exemplify Kantian theory? It's harder. And I think you're right that you can find examples of particular sections, but finding a holistic example is much harder. For instance, I think when we finally get to the end, to the transcendental, the dialectic toward the end, then I think it's easier because maybe because he's what he means by dialectic and what he means is different. But nonetheless, because he's concerned with dialectic, maybe that translates a little easier to film, I don't know, but I think I can-- I can-- off the top of my head, I can probably think of a couple examples. So that's-- I think you're putting your point about the way that this, at least, the first part of the book works and doesn't lend itself to examples is really good. And maybe that explains why Kant himself doesn't use any examples much to the distinction of Hegel, right? Hegel-- Yeah. There's plenty of examples-- Maybe too many examples in Hegel. But there's none. In Kant's work, there's-- at least in the-- there are examples in the critique of practical reason. But there are basically none in the critique of purism. When he goes to use an example in the transcendental deduction, he says, "Let's think about causality." Well, okay, you give us a couple of events that are-- No, he doesn't do that. So yeah, I think it's a really good point. It's-- yeah, I mean, it's-- and again, this is-- I am pleased hearing me in the narrowness of this because-- I mean, there is, like, Sarah Cardwell is pretty well known in television studies, and she's a Kantian on the analytic side of things. So, like, that's-- like, there are certainly things in the media studies world, I think, especially, as you said, people coming to Kant for the moral philosophy, or for the analytic tradition to find-- Right. --find the things in media examples. But, you know, again, like, it's-- it doesn't-- like, you know, everything you always want to know about the combo we're afraid to ask, Hitchcock, like, there's just-- there isn't this kind of-- I don't think anyone would ever think of writing a book like that. We're Kant. Yeah. Hitch-- where LeCon is replaced with Kant, right? Yeah. Because he wouldn't think of it. Yeah. It's-- so we're-- not that there's-- not that-- so perhaps there is wisdom that no one would think to do it, but we're gonna go against that green anyway, so that's what we're gonna do. Once more on the bridge-- Once more on the bridge, dear friends. I think also it makes it-- I mean, as always, I think that that kind of makes it for better radio and more accessible listening. So it may lead us down some alleys that are-- alleys that Kant himself doesn't go down because he doesn't write through example, but whatever. We'll see. I think it'll make-- I think it'll make this for more understandable and approachable thing. And again, just as always, when we do these kinds of things, we want you to try to take a stab at reading it. It's not as scary as it may seem. And also being confused is a very important step in learning, I think, and trying to push through. This is very important. So with all of that preamble out of the way. So I think this is-- we've, of course, covered this in the-- in the first that there's-- there are A and B sections to this entire text when you read it today. So you get the big copy where-- I think-- I know you're reading in German, but the English translation, you're doing the Cambridge, correct? Right. Same as me. Okay. I think that's the one people should read. I think the old Norman Kemp's Smith, and then it was-- it was reached-- Hackett had a translation come out about the same time as the Cambridge one. And it was fine, but I think the Cambridge one is the best one. Yeah. So this is-- this one we're reading from, I think this-- I've been encourage other people to read from it too. Really good. I mean, it's the really good introductory material. All kinds of stuff. It's good. And so you have both of the authoritative versions of what can't work through with critique of pure reason. But this is the thing. Is that when you read it in this form, it does rather give the appearance that the B sections are a-- and a dendum, a clarification, this added-- Supplement. Supplement, this thing, yeah. And that's not how that played out in actual-- in history, in history, what Kant did was effectively overwrite the A for two. I think we want to get into this. I think the two main reasons are to correct misunderstandings, but then also to clarify. Because this always happens when you-- if you write something, something will occur to you later that like, oh, you know what? I wish I had said that, or I could have tightened this, or this or that. So those are the two reasons why anyone would do this. And I think it's also true for why Kant did this. But this is pretty-- I think this is our first section where there is such a gulf between the A and the B that I want to start there. So what happens in the A and the versus the B, just in terms of difference? And why is that important and what does this kick off in philosophy? Yeah, yeah, good, good. So what he's trying to do is deduce the positive-- it's the odd thing because you think, okay, so before this section, opening-- of the transcendental analytic. So the transcendental deduction is basically the first major section of the transcendental analytic where he's setting up the structure of subjectivity. But it's before this section that he lays out first the table of judgments, 12 different forms of judgment, and then deduces from that the 12 categories that then in the deduction hill say, "This is why we have to believe in these 12 categories." But at no point, and this is a really controversial thing, in fact it is what inspired Fickda almost immediately after Kant. So within, I love, 15 years of Kant writing this book, the first edition, so the first edition 1781, Signature 1787, so A is 1781, B is 1787. Fickda already said, "I'm going to rewrite this not exactly, but to say, 'I'm going to try to deduce where all our categories or concepts, pure concepts of the understanding come from.'" So that's what was the major problem that Kant just basically assumes these catatological from the history of formal logic. He takes these categories over, basically from Aristotle. So Aristotle has 10 categories Kant adds to, but it's basically from Aristotle. And then, so part of the dissatisfaction with the a version of the deduction came from the fact that Kant didn't really deduce the categories at all. So it's the transcendental deduction of the categories. He doesn't, you're like, "Wait a minute, you're not deducing the categories at all, so what are you doing?" Because the title of the section is, and this is the first, this is what he begins, this is the transcendental deduction, the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding. So wouldn't you, if you look at that, and you would assume, and I think Kant or Sreaders did assume that he's going to deduce how all of these 12 categories emerge, but he just doesn't do that. He does that 0%. Right? So I think that is one of the things that generated the discontent, but not on conspart because he doesn't, that's not what he corrects in the B version. I think what the A version, what is it? It does, it's a couple of things that are different. So first of all the 12 categories, the main one that he does talk about in the deduction is causality. And I think that, that'll, in a way, that stands in for all the categories for Kant, because if you lose causality, you lose everything. And he has this great line where he says, "If we don't have the categories, our experience would be," he doesn't say like a dream, he says, "something less than a dream." Yeah. That's the answer. Why would that be? Because he thinks even in a dream, let's say, causality is still operative. Right? So that's why if you didn't have the categories, if you weren't able, you would not even, even the logic of the dream, which is crazy, but nonetheless, you still, when you're dreaming, you still think, "Well, I'm existing or I'm witnessing how are you doing in a causal world." And that's for him. So the, the, the, the deduction is the attempt to say, "We have to have these categories or else we're, we can't even have what we call or believe to be an experience." Right? So that's the key thing. And then in the A version, his depiction of how that works is much more complex, which we'll try to unfold as we go along. In the B version, it comes radically simplified, which is caused, this other thing we'll talk about a little bit after we do the introduction, a radical divide in how the A and B are received. So they're received totally differently in different conceptual universes by people following and cons' wake. Even if there's a general discontent, and I think this is fair to say, fictitious discontent with, wait a minute, deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, you're not really doing that. So pure concepts of the understanding are what Kant calls the categories. His ideas, there's 12 categories that come from the understanding that shape how space and time are organized. And that's the idea. That space and time come from, we talked about this last time, come from the sensibility, there are intuitions, and then space-yotemporality has to be organized in some way, like through causality or whatever. And that's what Kant is going to do. He's going to say, we have to do that in this section. Absolutely. And the, I mean, another thing that we're tracking in this, which I'm going to get us to in a second, is the influence that this had on Freud and LeCon, who we talk about, obviously, all the time. And some of that influence has been talked about by you, actually, pretty recently, for LeCon, on the LeCon side of things. The Freud thing is a little more dispersed. My, you know, just a huge influence on me, Joan Copcich, who believed that Freud, her content was that Freud believed he was the inheritor of the German philosophical tradition from Kant. That's what, that's her claim. I heard her say that a million times. Wow. Yes. Yeah. And, and certainly wasn't Hegel, right? He didn't, he never read him. It's very clear. No, no, it's very clear. Yeah. And this is, how do we know that like we have Freud's library and Hegel's not in it. So it's like at where, but there's a lot of Kant in Freud's library. So, so that's another thing that we're, that we're tracking in this. Just, we're gonna, we're not gonna get to it now, because this is too much of a jump, but it is on this, on the level of causality, which is so important for Kant, where I, I'm gonna try to bring us into the Freudian territory that like Freud tries to, I, I, think, now that I'm reading this and, and thinking about what Joan said, that what he believes is his understanding of trauma, upsets Kant's understanding of causality. So I'm gonna, yeah. So I'm gonna, yeah. Yes, I'm gonna put that, I'm just gonna put that here and we'll come back to it, but that's just like a little thing, keep that in your mind. So, um, the, yeah, just what, the, so we're gonna move through this like A and B, but I wanted to, I wanted to set up the, there is this, this big difference. And of course this, how it inspired, you know, people like Fickta and, um, and Shelling and, um, and Hagle and also, um, and how it upset, uh, people like Heidegger, right, who, who believe that there was this, this betrayal, uh, between the, between the two, the two sections. So, um, and it is interesting, right, the last thing that he established, that the way I think is very important, right, that, um, that, and this is, um, you know, I'm reading, uh, Dyer and, and Paul Gyer and, um, Henry Allison, like commentaries on this and they're, they, they read Kant very differently. So I'm trying to get like a spectrum of, of opinion on this, but what they've, both pretty, pretty agreed on is that, um, of course, space and time are pure intuitions. He does lapse a little bit and call, um, I think it's toward the end of the A, like he calls them both concepts, but that's like, um, I think something that he, um, wants to, I know, one thing that he will clarify in the, in the B, what, what is, uh, so this last time, one of the things that is funky and intimidating with reading Kant is that he has his own vocabulary. And so like intuition works kind of like how you would think and concept works kind of like how you would think, but it is, uh, it's, it's, it's a little different though, right, because intuition has nothing to do with. Oh, that was a little intuition I had about something. Sure. But it is, but it's sensory, right? Like it's, it's true. Yeah, that's true. So there I get, yeah, I see. Yeah, that's the, like the recognition of a sensation, I think is, is really, is very important for him with intuition. And then with a concept is that like the concept, you know, he, Guy or his Keen to mention this, uh, the, the idea of like a mark or sort of like a detour by which something becomes sensible. That's how it's a concept and not an intuition. So, um, and anyway, what does he say? Like a bunch of different times in the section that, um, he clarifies that space is the, is a pure, uh, primary intuition and time is a pure, uh, posteriori intuition that like is something which is a little bit of a, I don't want to make a big deal about this right now, but that is a really interesting little edge, like little, little, um, little, uh, gap that you, that, that I think gets kind of crowbar, um, by, it different ways by Hegel and Freud about, um, the possibility of retroactivity. You know what I'm saying? Like, like time, perhaps even in Kant's system has this, I don't think time is a posteriori. He says, he says it directly. He says it directly. Yeah, time is a, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, posteriori intuition. I'll find it, but we can kind of like, I mean, what is the idea? No, but I mean, he does, so the difference, as I take it is that time is, is, is governs our internal experience, our internal perceptions and space our external ones. But we can't have any experience without those, right? Like that's how I think we know that we have it. I mean, I mean, right. So the question is, so Heidegger wants to try to, he thinks that we can from our our temporality, which makes sense because this is his, that's his thing. And being in what? Being in time, right? Right, right, right. Exactly. And then time will become even more important as his career goes on. Maybe not during the Nazi'site. But I think so, so one of the things that, and this is why Heidegger thinks that the first that a deduction is so much better is that he, that he divides into that he that for Kant, there are three kind, he's kind of even used the term a threefold synthesis. And so first you have the apprehension of our representations in the sensibility. Then you have their reproduction in the imagination. And finally, their recognition in the concept or in the understanding. And so, so Kant really sees in the first, in the A deduction, a threefold movement going on that ends with the possibility of experience. So he's trying to, what is he trying to do? He's trying to set up a path to get us from intuitions in the sensibility to cons, the categories, the pure concepts of the understanding and their employment in the possibility of experience. And it's a three pronged approach with a crucial role being played by the imagination, which has the if it reproduces our intuitions and then allows them, that reproduction allows them to be ordered by the categories. So I think that's a pretty, I understand why he changes and I even like this B deduction better. But I, I think it's interesting the really decisive role, and this is what Heidegger loved, that he gives to the imagination in the A deduction. And then in the B deduction, the imagination is just basically part of the understanding. And Heidegger has a coronary when he first has to read the B deduction. And he did both of his, so he wrote a series of lectures called phenomenological interpretation of Kant's critique of pure reason, which is great. And then he wrote a book, I mentioned both last time I think, called Kant and the problem of metaphysics. In both cases, it's stress on the A deduction and critique of the way the B deduction. It works out because of this retreat from imagination, which for Heidegger is tied to temporality. And I just want to, before I forget this, I'll put this out here. I think a little bit related to what you're, you're getting to, there's this, this line is on 205 of the, I know it's not how you're supposed to cite Kant, but if people have this, since no representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it, which you're talking about Heidegger and influence. That to me sounds an awful lot. Like Lacan's aphorism that we've covered before, that the signifier represents the subject to another signifier. So just like something in the, and that's kind of interesting that that's something in the A section that, not before the A. Right, right, right, right, before the A, yeah, yeah, yeah, right, right, that I think is a pretty clear, a pretty clear influence for, for, for, for Lacan. So it's a, this, like, in, I think to, too often, I just kind of want to go like a little, a little global on this, like, too often this, this gets like, Hegel is the, Hegel's the guy for, for this kind of thinking, and then Kant is just, he's important because he is the one who inspired the correction. So I speak, you know, and, and I think that, that, that is just, it's, it's cleaving out like just in, in, in, in, in, entire, and just, and then for one, a enormous body of, of work, obviously, but it also requires a, a reduction of, of, of Kant to like, trying to work out, I don't know, fussy problems that, that are sort of, just covered by Hegel, by, by contradiction, which is, I think, reduces both Hegel and Kant in that kind of, in that sort of gesture, which I think happens. I don't know, maybe, maybe too, too often in, in our realm of, of, of, of, of thinking about things, but it's just something that, that, that, that have been, has been constant for me in reading this, like, he's paying, it is, so it's, and it's so funny too, that, like, with the, you know, you brought this up about the categories and, and obviously, like, Heidegger having a, uh, coronary because in the B, that they just, like, the, the way that they drop out, um, and, and, and don't, and become, really, just, like, even more, it's causality is the, is the, uh, it rules the day and then the, this combination comes in, and this idea of, I think comes in, that was not, right, clear, which also, Heidegger is not a fan of, not a fan of it. Yeah, yeah, and, and, but it was so, I don't know, and, in a way, I don't, I guess this is my, my question for you. Is there a way? Is there a way in which that, this, um, this, um, like, the reduction of, of, of, of, of content that happens in continental theory is, like, I don't want to make too big a deal about this, just because this happens to be the thing that we're covering, is it, yeah, perhaps because of this movement in this section from, from A to B, that's maybe something I want to, I want to, well, I think that, I think that's a really good point, actually, because, uh, it does, so I'd said that Heidegger loves the A deduction, which is almost an understatement. The, the, the people, and part of his, the reason he gets so upset about the B deduction is because the way that it was taken up by neo-continism before him, and, and what neo-continism did was it performed what we call a, a reduction of Kant to being a, a logistist, like someone who just gives us the logical, which ended up, people did write, titled something like this, the logical structure of the world, something like that. So, is that what Kant is doing? No, but if you take the, by, by making the understanding more important in the B deduction, he does open the door, I think, to that kind of reading that says, oh, all that's important here is this, once we understand the structure of the understanding, empirical experience doesn't matter, the intuitions don't really matter, time doesn't matter, space doesn't matter, what matters is this logical structure that we can establish through the categories. And I think that is what, I think that's what, I know that's what Heidegger is responding to. And I wonder if that's the reason for what you're talking about. This sense that Kant is this thinker of, of, uh, what do you say, like rigidity and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and reify, and reification, I think, like, reification of the categories. And I think that that's right. And I even, and when I was in graduate school, that was the, the dismissal of Kant was almost total for that, it's interesting that he's dismissed now for other reasons, but it was almost total for that reason, that he was thought of it. And, and, you know, it's, it's a system that's probably more than anyone else. It's Luke, because, in a way, Hegel is the hero of history in class consciousness. And Kant is the villain. Kant is the, is, in, in history in class consciousness, Kant is the acme of bourgeois philosophy for Luke, Kutch. And because he's stuck in this reified world and cannot think time. So it's, and, which, which, is, is, is the whole way that the commodity, the logic of the commodity functions, right? Like, it functions temporally. So there's this really interesting, so Lucien Goldman wrote a book called Luke Kutch and Heidegger, in which he said, Oh, okay, Heidegger fine, except he took everything from Luke Kutch. And I don't think it's totally right, but it is there's something to that because Luke Kutch was on to this, this problem with the, the, what happens in the B critique. And so I think, I almost think it's, it's for sure Heidegger is more invested in Kant than Luke Kutch's, but, I think it's Heidegger a little bit, but I think it's Luke Kutch primarily who leads the, what you're talking about, this sense that, okay, real, the kind of philosophy we want to do starts with Heigel, it doesn't start with Kant. And it's because there's this, there's this reified structure that Kant's giving us. We just, there's, right, there's 12 categories, we just know there's 12 categories. And Heigel would say, no, these categories evolve historically, that's at least in a certain reading of the angle, right? These categories evolve historically, you can't set them once and for all, but Kant doesn't think that. Come thinks, these categories determine the possibility of the experience in the Garden of Eden and in the dystopian future toward which we're rushing very quickly. So I think that's, that's sorry. I think that's the, I think that, I think you're real, it's a really periscopacious point because I think that there is this, and I do think Lukacch is to blame. There is this sense that-- - Interesting. - I think history in classical consciousness is a great book, so don't get me wrong, but I think there is this sense that Kant is the, in that book, Lukacch identifies the, the philosophical villain, the person that turns philosophy into basically caught up in the problems that capitalism creates. - Interesting. - In a way that Heyagall breaks out of and then makes allows Marx to totally break out of. - Interesting, interesting. Just a quick note, there's a note that Gire includes at the bottom, or well, it's not just him, it's a Gire in Alan Wood, who the translators and editors of this. There's a note that I, it's about appearances that made me think that Kant was saying that time was Op. History, which is not true, which is-- - That's right, right. - So, it's not, it's just not true. You're right, there's something about appearances, and anyway, I magiced it into being some division. So yeah, don't get me wrong about that. This is, you know-- - Because the whole thing is about the a priori, it's about what can we synthetic a priori, right? Like what can we know a priori about how experience has to be structured? - Yeah. - And that's the whole, so he doesn't really care, which would drive him, "Pierre says crazy, he doesn't care what happens in experience." He just wants to know what is in that experience that makes it possible. - Yeah, there's something, I think what I was trying to get at is, I do think that there, I mean, why does, I've, there's something in the way that he thinks about time, that is, there's an unopening that, as I said, I think Freud tries to disrupt, and I was trying to find the warrant for it in the text itself, and rather than just Freud coming at it, like, well-- - Yeah, I think it just, I think it's just him. Yeah, it's just, and the reason, and I'll just, I'll say it now, to not have this-- - Hang it over our heads. - Hang it over our heads and this kind of confusing thing is that, like for Freud, trauma disrupts time and cause. And the, it's not something that happens to you in the, something traumatic happens to you. Of course, it happens in a linear, like the linear progress of your life, but the, recognition or the registration of it is not something that occurs at the same time that the trauma happened. And that's something that becomes very clear to Freud through clinical practice. - Really on. - It's the 1895 Project for Scientific Psychology, where you-- - That's right. - Yeah, that's right. - It describes this. - Yeah, it's really early. - It's very, very, yeah, which means it's one of the, I mean, like, 1895 that's studies in hysteria, that's the, the psychomy analytic method being announced to the world. - Yeah, yeah. - And developed. So, this is like a very, very early insight. And I think it's, it's, it occurs right at this. I think it is aimed at how Kant imagines time and our understanding, not his, the understanding, but our understanding of really how things like work in time because for causality for Kant has to be prior to effect. And what Freud, and then that, what's controversial about that? That seems like perfectly, Newtonian and maybe even-- - Rua, it's really important. - Yes, yes. - Yes, perfectly Newtonian, which for all intents and purposes, very, also very correct, even in a lot of different ways of thinking about how cause and effect work, of course effect is after cause. How could it be otherwise? - Right. - What Freud is uncovering with in the science of the mind is that like, effect can almost has to arrive before cause because cause is too much. It's actually, it's too much to be apprehended. It's too much to have, like you can't even have this, like it's a sensation so large that it is not sensible in the time that it occurred. And the size of it doesn't have to be, you know, like look, like there's, oh God. Like I always use myself as the example because like having the traumatic brain injury in the car accident is like, it's something happened to my body, but it didn't happen to the me that says I think, which is pretty, like I don't remember it. It's not really possible for me to do that. But there are other things that like I, I realized, you know, kids are so cruel when you're very young. When I was a kid, like so my family, we lived in an apartment and everyone else, I went to school with, they lived in some house and some suburb development. And I did, and when I said I lived in this like apartment complex, there was some kid, I don't know, I was like eight years old, they were like, are you poor? And I didn't remember, and my, this is separate, this is another time, also in school, I was very young, like single digit age, like I don't know, like between nine and 11. My parents were younger than most other people's parents that I went to school with. And some kid asked me, were you an accident? Like straight, and I didn't really remember that this happened until just years later. I know I reacted at the time, I'd just say no or whatever, just divert the conversational way, but it wasn't until years later, I don't know what happened actually, I don't even remember the inciting incident for the retroactive recognition, but this thing came back and I was like, oh my God, yeah, that happened when I was in middle school, yeah, middle school, I guess, or grade school, grade school, it doesn't matter, in both of those, in that period. And of course that happened to me linear, in a linear perspective, but again, the question is about registration, which is also a cons question, and that's where I think the two projects and why Joan would say something like this, is like, when does the registration of the trauma occur? And when is the registration of the sensible experience like a curve? I do think that they're coming at the experiences of the world with a similar mindset only, what is Freud have that, you know, Kant is not a deficit in his thinking, but like there's no, of course there's no one conscious. - No one conscious. - For Kant, and there's also, there's no, there's no trauma, there's no thing that would interrupt and quarterly sense of the world, yeah. So that, which is interesting, so I think that the, I guess this is one of the challenge that we don't have to talk about this 'cause I'm just like genuinely in the process of thinking this, I don't have things very sedimented in my head on this, but like the, can you have the, like they're both trying to think like how do we know things, right? There's this, I know you don't, you didn't watch Bojack Horseman, but there's this like framing that people really like from the second season of the show. There's this character who becomes, it comes out of a coma, she was in a coma for like 20 years and she suddenly becomes like writing, it's a nice like, jab at Hollywood. She just starts like writing all these like, game show formats and TV shows that Hollywood loves and they're not really that clever, but it's a beautifully voiced by Lisa Kudrow and she comes up with this game show, it's called Hollywood Stars. What do they know? Do they know things? Let's find out, like that's the structure of the game show. And I keep thinking about that as I read this. There's like people on earth, what do we know? Do we know things? How do we do it? Like let's find out, Kant's really taking that very, very seriously. And my, I guess my question is that, I think the structure that he comes up with is really valuable. Like I have sympathy for Heidegger on that, like with especially with the categories and all that. And of course, obviously I am invested in what Freud uncovers and his thing and I, so is there a way to have both, I guess, as a question? Can you have that structure that. But I mean, Kant actually doesn't even have both in the A and the B, but can you have that structure of what he's trying to uncover with also this idea of that which blows out any possible structure? And I think that's why Freud and also LeCon are trying to come up with, I think this is what Kant teaches them is like, well, what you have to do is you have to figure out what's a prior. We have a primary and a prior massacism. That's what we have. And then at different points, priority, I think changes at different times for LeCon, but the LeCon of Seminar 10, anxiety is priority, anything. So like, again, I think that this is what I think Kant teaches them. Yeah, yeah, no, I think that's right. I think that's right. I think, right. So the notion of, here's what's interesting, right, that for Kant, causality has to, so causality is the category that he cares most about. I think because when David Hume refutes rationalism, he refutes causality. He basically says, we don't know why does A follow from B? Maybe that's the best example. If I drop the bill, if I hit a ball into another billier ball, why does the next one then move? Well, it's because it's because one causes the movement of the other. And Hume says, we don't know that. We just, we're just habituated into believing that the one thing will cause the movement of the other, but it might not. And because all we, you can never, and this is his reputation of induction, we can never induce a law from experience. We have to deduce the law. So Kant says, okay, I accept that, but that means that we have to then say, but at the same time, Kant says, but we know causality is true. We can't even imagine experience without it. And that's how Kant will argue. Basically, that's what he's arguing in both of the forms of the deduction. What is it? What is the sine qua non of our experience? He wants to say, it's these 12 categories that I've come up with, with causality at the head and the B deduction. He mentions causality or stresses it in a way that he doesn't in the A deduction. But I think that that's, I think what he's, his point is that, yeah, you had, that those concepts are tied to, that their material is what come, is what comes from the sensible intuitions and they are allowing us to order it. And then, like your example from Freud, it's great because Freud's point is, no, causality doesn't necessarily follow the ordering of the intuition, so that it can go against. So he's still, he's saying, how can we still understand causality? But without being, I guess, in Freud, you could say the divorce between the concept and the intuition is interesting. It's much more complete than it is in Kant, which is, which is fascinating because that's what Kant's great revolution we mentioned this last time is, is that he splits up sensibility to understanding or intuition and concept in a way that no one had prior to him. So that's splitting up, and then, and because he's flipped them up, he has to write the deduction about how they're married together, right? That's what this is. This is just like, how are they married together? And I think Freud, you could maybe even argue, takes this split even further because of this notion, and I think Hegel's the first to come up with it, of retroactive causality. That's yeah. And event can happen that then changes the past. And I wonder, I wonder if you think that because obviously, so when Kant wrote the first critique, the French Revolution hadn't happened, and even when he wrote the B version, the French Revolution hadn't happened. And Hegel wrote the phenomenology 20 years, 18 years after the French Revolution, and it's the, it is the determinant of event of his, his youth, he was at the tubing in seminary when it happened. Yeah. So I wonder if that's the event. So for Freud, it's a patient, right? But I wonder if for Hegel, the event is the French Revolution, which then does he see that, after that happens, it doesn't so much change the future, but it changes how we think about what came up to it. So right? It like, and even Marx follows this, I think, that once capitalism emerges, everything in the past, we see it, we see it different, that history is the history of class, the history is history of class struggle. Why do we see that only because of capitalism where it's evident? And I think Hegel would say, after the French Revolution, we can retroactively see history as this struggle for freedom to emerge. But it wasn't evident to anyone 50 years before that. So I wonder if that, there's all, that's, I wonder if that event allows Hegel to move away from this, the Kantian emphasis on causality as tied necessarily to forward movement. Yeah. And you could also lash World War I in there for Freud as not, it doesn't change, actually, it doesn't change anything. Well, that's not true. But like, it hardens, I think, his initial ideas on the ideology of trauma and then it enlarges it. That's why I say, it doesn't change his mind. I think he already had this idea of trauma working retroactively, but maybe what World War I does and the war trauma, war neuroses, shell shock, etc. It pushes him to move that to being prior to experience and not just the result of a kind, a certain kind of experience. Right, right, exactly. But then, so what happened, I think the patient's name is Emma, I can't remember. Emma, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So what happens to Emma then becomes universalized almost. And so, and not, it's interesting, it's kind of like the abandonment of the seduction theory, right? Like the suction theory gets abandoned because it becomes universalized and here, nocturacide or retroactivity, but I think in the, I think you're right to say in the later Freud, it becomes universalized through the idea of death drive. And I wonder if that's the same kind of thing that's happening. Yeah. I think it's probably true. Yeah, it's very interesting. Like the, I mean, I don't think that, I think that there's, with, with, with, you know, it's not like, and not as though the, the French Revolution, like, this, like, I think was trying to get at earlier, it's like, it's not as though thinking after the French Revolution mean, means makes this irrelevant. You know, I know that you're not saying that, but like, the, I think what is interesting, though, is like, should someone who makes a system like this also have a system in mind for what would break it? Because that, I guess, is, like, that's sort of Hagel's idea and then Freud's idea, is that, right? These things, so like, this, it would take seriously the system, but what about these things that break it? What does that cause us to have to do then? You know, like, the, it does the, does the Kantian, the sensible, and I mean that in his terms, does the sensible path that can't lays out is that valid, like, without, like, without trauma, like, so this is, this is, this is valid for, like, a trauma-less world. Is this, is it, is this the way that we think and not in times of revolution? And maybe not that we have to throw another person in this, but it's like, does, does Kant have the theory of the situation? And then these are ideas of the event, you know, like, is that right? Right. Right. You can, you can see this, just like, this, this push and pull, like, we're trying to find the, the edges. And I mean, that's why, like, you know, we've been doing this podcast for seven years, maybe we should have done Kant a little earlier, but to, to kind of have this, this framework for, for everything, but because I just, I don't know, I just, as I'm reading it, I'm finding it like, the, it's, it's, it's, it's interesting to have read the consequence, like so much. Yeah. So, of Kant and Kant's revolution and to know that so well, and I just had this like, yeah, he's, you know, trying to figure out like, you know, the appearance is apparent. And this is, this was important too. I did know this before I went back to it, but like, even though for Kant, we can only know appearance, that for him is fine. That doesn't mean we can't know. Totally fine. That's fine. More, more than fine. That doesn't mean we can't know anything. And I think that, that's the basis of the way we know reality. Right. If we only could know things in themselves, we wouldn't know reality. So it's a weird, you have to, you have to understand that or you're not going to understand Kant's project. I think it's a great point by you. I think it's really definitely true. And I also think just to come, to come to the B deduction, which both of us think is superior, because it doesn't have this tripartite structure. Okay, the imagination doesn't play quite the role. But what it does stress. Although, wait, hold on. Sorry, I'm sorry. Although the - Try partied structure, I think I said this to you. Get very much like, why is it it ego, super ego? Why is it symbolic, imaginary, real? Like why not a fourth thing? And I don't know, I think I feel like there's something to this. - Right, but I would just say, isn't it? I don't think, actually it's interesting, 'cause I don't think there's a role. I think it's definitely true that the sensibility and the understanding are part of LaCons, even in Freud's. I think you're right about that, divide. But then I would just say the third thing, it's interesting what the third, because I think what you're saying is the third thing would be the imagination, which is kind of in the middle, which would correspond interestingly not to the imaginary, but to the real. - Yes. - But I think, I think I would say, I have always thought that the real is actually reason for Kant, because that's how we encounter contradictions that can't be reduced, right? That can't be a escape. So I don't know, it's an interesting question. Where do you locate the tripartite division? Like is it between, has it, and I think Heidi would say, yeah, he's got it here, he abandons it in the introduction. I know he would say that. - But before we move on on this, just on this point, there's this note, I want to make sure to mention this, toward the, it's on 239, no psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is so partly because this faculty has been limited to reproduction and partly because it has been believed that the senses do not merely afford us impressions, but also put them together and produce images of objects for which, without a doubt, something more than the receptivity of impressions is required, namely a function of the synthesis of them. Anyway, I'm just thinking about this, imagining. I mean, what he means by psychologist is very different from what Freud would understand as psychologists to be by time he gets to that, but I think that that's kind of, I kind of think that's interesting. - Yeah, and I think that's a great note because he's saying, you don't get that act of putting the things together is crucial and that's the imagination, and that's again, that's the faculty that Heidegger really loves because it's tied to time, but I think you're also right to that note nicely points out that it's not, Kant wants to free imagination from just being the reproduction of senses that it has this other function, which is really important. - And it anticipates the combination, I think. - Right, exactly, yeah. - That comes up in the B. - Exactly, exactly. - That's right. And so then in the B, he, the imagination is still mentioned a lot less, but it's basically under this way of the understanding. So that's a controversial, I think, move that Kant makes, but a couple of things he does in the B that are, to me really important and I think to other people, maybe problematic, that he sees the way in which the word that Ryan, he mentioned, he sees the way in which he only talks about this in the B, and I think it really helps to make it clear why the categories work and that is, our intuitions have to be combined, there has to be a combination of them. And so how do you combine them? Well, one of the ways is through causality, right? And because if you didn't have causality operating, and we wouldn't be able to combine one instant from the next, to the next, with the next instant, they just wouldn't, they would seem disparate. So I would reach for something and then the act of getting it would not be disconnected to that. And so it would just seem like all the world was made up of just constant disparate things happening all the time. And we would just say that isn't even experienced, that's not even a dream. Come back to what he says before, right? Like even our dreams have a certain coherence, his idea is why do they have this coherence because of these categories? And so it's the combination that makes it possible. And then he gets to this thing in the be deduction of what has to accompany all my perceptions or all my experiences is this I think. And it's of course an illusion to daycart, but it's also a cons way of saying each perception, each experience has to be mine. If it's not mine, and I have to hold them together. If I don't, then again, we have this problem of everything is disparate, everything is disconnected. Nothing makes sense. And so this is what he calls the transcendental unity of that perception, which he gets to in both deductions. And that's the point, that's the point, that all my experiences have to be unified around my own subjectivity. And that's why I think is there. And that's what Heidegger doesn't like, because he thinks, oh no, there is this disjunction in time that we should pay more attention to, and you're forgetting. But I think I like this. I think this is maybe, this is why I like the be deduction better, because I think it's more an affirmation of the role that subjectivity plays in constituting our experience. And I think that's really the greatest, that one of the great gestures of Kant. - Yeah, and to be clear to listeners who maybe haven't read this or aren't as familiar with this as other things, when this came out, the B took the place of pretty much everything that we have been talking about. - Right, right, right. So it's nuts. It's when you take a, when you have it together, it's like, oh, this is great, of course, you can see him working through something. He's clarifying this, maybe he's changing his mind and one or two things. This or that, but it's to have been, it's hard, it'd be like, you and watch, we're trying to come up with a media example. - Yeah, there's not great examples. - There's really not, but just like imagine, like if the, you know, if the, like if the shot for shot remake of Psycho, like just replaced Psycho, it wasn't, you know, like it just, like it replaced it. - Who was that Gus fansan? - It was Gus fansan, yeah. So I'm just trying to think, you know, like this is, I think this is-- - Would that be terrible? That would just-- - It would, yeah, but because, yeah, yeah, it would be, it would really, really would be. It's like, why would you, why are you doing that? Just so well-- - Well, I wondered that when I was sitting in the theater watching that film. With my brother, I remember where, I remember the exact theater I was in when I watched it. - It's also, you could have mad at that. - Because I was so traumatized, I think. 'Cause it was traumatic. - On an era when it's not available. - Which is, like, is it-- - Right, then okay, I get it, right. Like that movie, what's that movie? Is it called yesterday? Where the guy, - Oh yeah. - is a universe where there's no Beatles songs and the guy makes all, okay, you can re-record, I don't know, you let it be or something. There's no Beatles songs in the universe, but since we have recordings of them, just don't do that. - Yeah, right. - Yeah, I would agree. I mean, it's the only thing that I can think of is, I told you this, that like, video games are remade every year if there's remakes, like, prestige remakes, and one of the things, and this isn't the-- Now, this is the difference in intention. They're not made to replace the original. They're made to make money, of course, but on a thing that is less available, but not unavailable through any means than the previous thing. And this is one of the things that preservationists and other folks like worry about is that, like, oh, okay, so-- - If we have a new one out. - We have a new one out, and now, yeah, Silent Hill 2, the remake takes the place of the previous one. Resident Evil 3 cuts out a lot of material, remake from the originals, so now all of that is lost, like, forever, just on the basis of availability, and accessibility. So that's kind of like a separate question or a separate conversation. It's really the only thing I can find that's similar, but because it's that-- - I think the psycho example's great, though, right? - Yeah. - Because it's precisely because it doesn't do what Kant does. - Yeah. - Right, but that it doesn't, and no one would think that it should. And I think that's how, I think if we can make ourselves into Heidegger reading the critique of pure reason, I think that's how he felt when you've read the B-Deption. Oh my God. Really, I'm watching Gus fans dance psycho instead of Hitchcock's, and this is all people are gonna pay attention to. That's terrible. So I think that's a really, that's a great example you picked. It's definitely not gonna be our film recommendation. - No, it's not gonna be our recommendation. - Speaking of, I do wanna talk about a couple of films because we were thinking about films that would show what Kant was getting at by, you know, seeming to challenge it, right? Seeming to challenge it in front of us. So the first film we're gonna talk about is last year at Mary and Bad, which is, both you and I agree. One of the five greatest films ever made. You may be say it's the best film ever made. - Yeah, but I'm prone to saying that when I see some of the-- - You just saw it, yeah. - I just saw it. - So yeah, so I take that with-- - With how I say things, yeah. - I understand. My son's nickname, my little name, you know how you put a nickname in the middle of their first and last name? - Oh yeah. - My little nickname is "Recency Bias" 'cause I also-- - Yeah, yeah. - So I really appreciate that in you. (laughing) But I think, so last year at Mary and Bad, what does it do? It interrupts what seemingly interrupts the normal flow of causality. Right? So we have events that occur in the present that seem that then Renee cuts, LM Renee is the director cuts back to the past and it doesn't it seem like So the woman's in the bar there they have no names the characters there in the scholarship They're referred to x, y and z which is really Really helpful as a way to designate them, but the woman is a woman and two men basically So she in the bar she backs up and she hears a scream and then it cuts back To her dropping or she drops the glass in the present and then it seems to create this event in the past where she's screaming so that That That causality what's interesting is that it's like what you're saying about Freud. It's a retroactive causality so that's that's fine But When we watch it as a film, I think this is the key conti and point right? We still experience as it as causality we think even though in the film in the diagetic world it takes place out of time Yes, for us as spectators we cannot experience that and I think it isn't it true Even of the opening shot of a memta which goes backwards We still are thinking about that experience in terms of Causality like something is causing this other thing to happen. Well, this is why the this isn't this why the coolish of effect works Right, right exactly exactly. So that's a perfectly That's a great point. It's perfectly conti and effect Maybe all editing is really operative in this in this really causality is a category for us and we can't think outside of it So if you cut from one thing to another you're going to think That in terms of cause because it occurs in a temporal order Yeah, so it does so there is a totally conti and explanation of even though it's within the filmic Diagetic world It's happening out of time It for us as spectators the causality is not it's following the temporal order And that's that's what makes it I mean that's that's really it's it's kind of like this I don't know this is this too simplistic right but as when you're a spectator watching the movie for the first time you are A conti and when you are thinking about it later you're a gillian. I mean and that's simplistic beautiful But I think that okay. Thank you. Yeah, but that's that's I think the a nice little Divide the that stages what's at stake. I mean you could you could say for it in two like I mean I think that might even be yeah, it may be closer but but I just wanted to you know because it's obviously content Hagle closer and Actually temporality um, but but that that's this that's the uh that's the idea that like you know whenever you I mean This is it's funny the cool-ish effect works for for the two reasons it worked So the the experiment of famous film experiment of a of a man with a blank emotionless experience Facial expression it like you see that and then cut to You know a bowl of soup and so you're like oh that guy's got to be hungry if you cut to um like What is this this is child in a coffin? I think is the classic child. Yeah, right. Oh my god He's so sad, you know, and you could do other things too like I think um Hitchcock has a funny one. What is it? What is it so he he cuts? Um the first time he cuts is to a mother and a baby mother with her baby And he's smiling and then he cuts to a woman in a bathing suit and he says so the first time I'm a compassionate guy And in the second one I'm a dirty old man. Yeah, yeah, it's it's a really great. You can look that up It's fun to watch but it's it's it's even better than the classic cool-ish of example because It makes the point really really clear. I think I think chaplain does this in Something similar in is it is in city lights where he's looking at the shop windows and then he's trying to Yeah, he's trying to get away with like you know, he's just like you know, and you know He's looking at you have sympathy for him because you know, it's the train. I can't afford anything But then he becomes Aroused by the mannequin or you know with the window or whatever it is Right. Yeah, it's yeah, don't think sorry to interrupt but don't you think the great ending of city lights actually plays on that? Yes, you're expecting this final Reverse shot to let us know what is What is the woman look like is she look like she's happy or does she look like she's she can't stand him Or making fun of him and then we know that'll let us know how to read his facial expression But we never get it so all we have is his facial expression Which we have we're left with this ultimate horrible dialectical connection between Total humiliation and total love right? Yes They're maybe you're supposed to think it's both at the same time. I don't know But it's that's what makes the greatness of the ending is that it's this precisely this indecisive herbility by the missing Final shot in the cool show sequence. Yeah, which yeah, and again, it's so and and the cool show of the whole idea It works for Kantian and and for Freudian reasons because like again you you can only You cannot help but experience it in the linear way unless you reverse the film You know and then you watch it backwards or something like that, but You can't help but experience it in the linear way, but then it's because film makes sense retroactively That's like it's it's because it's the second shot that tells you what the first shot meant And that that's why that's why it has the the meaning that it does which right which Kant doesn't try to theorize right? He doesn't there is no notion of that because he thinks the intuition brings our Or sorry the sensibility brings our intuitions to us and we have to order them Chrono Acquiring to chronologically Otherwise The experience would make sense and I think what's nice about what you're saying is that is true In our experience, but yes our our experience doesn't There's something else informing and as it happens that we're not aware of as we're experiencing right right But it's still operative and I think retroactively we recognized it was operative So that trauma was operative for me. I just didn't recognize it right that that I was aware of that whatever it was I just didn't recognize it and I think that's the real Inside of retroactivity that Kant has no space for but I think he's right to say We can't think otherwise and I'm just thinking of that that's why I think the film the other film that really shows this is wings of desire Which is in German Heaven over Berlin their Himal Uber Berlin Which I don't know why they didn't translate I don't know why they turned into wings of desire anyway Yeah, I don't know Berlin I know we talked about before but it's not a bad title for American audiences Right right right Anyway, I think that that That film is trying to show vendors is trying to show the perspective of the angels Obviously, that's why it's all shot in black and white except when we when he goes has his moments of Feeling of love with the woman on the trapeze and then it cuts this really quickly to colors very jolting But that doesn't really get that job done because we're still the Part of what the angels are they're supposed to be able to perceive outside of chronological time So and it doesn't impact their actions so they can't they can't have any causal effect in the world But I think they should be Seeing the world not in a way that's governed by causality, but it nonetheless is Right it for them that and so I think what that film is showing us is that We are going to experience The world as governed by causality because that that that that category Conditions our experience and we can't even when we know Better yeah, we can't we can't get out of it I think right like wouldn't for say that about his own experience. I know There's a trauma that's really shaping me, but I can't I can't see it as an in I can't I can't see that causality in my normal everyday life Well, you know I mean it was I did have half a mind to tell you not because I find it embarrassing But like to cut out when I told you that time was a past or a worry because just yeah just because it's like I don't want this to be confusing for For listeners. I might tell you to cut it out, but it's a nice Since our conversation is here It's a it's a nice example of this obviously as I read it I didn't think that because how could I because he doesn't say that but as I've thought about this in the episode And I wanted to make sure to talk about Freud and trauma and retroactivity of course I would over the unconscious would oh interesting. Yeah, I would come to play and overwrite what I Linearly and in my notes Clearly understood, but obviously I wanted to talk about this the retroactivity thing in that like time gets interrupted and well that and has this this post You know sense right to it. So anyway, that's well right and it also gives I think that's great because it gives you But by thinking about time as opposite to your area it makes it not so determinative Yes, so that it's as if Kant opens the door To the Freudian to the notion of to the or let's say Higelian idea of retroactivity That he really wasn't open to he's not open to that he can't he can't be open to that But I do think I do even though I think that he's not really to do to do the concepts at all I do think there's something convincing about this. that certain categories have to govern our experience, otherwise it's not possible. And that they have to all, all our experiences have to be unified to make sense to us. I think that's a pretty incredible gesture on cons part. And I think he's just right about that. Like that has to be operative. Well, that would be, I mean, isn't that the way the two can not just co-exist as a group? Don't just co-exist as in, like, you co-exist with your neighbor next door, but they actually exist in tension. They do. Which is what we're right. Yeah. And actively and against each other, you cannot help but have the world of causality as it operates for Kant. But there are experiences that don't conform neatly to that and really, like, yes, okay, there was the, and I don't want to use the word empirical because again, it's like, that's not that. Or maybe it would be close to how he would use it. But like, no, I'm just going to say, no, I'm going to leave that out. But like, obviously, the car accident for me, of course, it happened in February 21st, not the longer ago, actually, as an anniversary of February 21st, 2007, that's a definable thing. But like, I don't become aware of it until six days later. You know, when people tell me about it, when I'm finally awake out of the coma. And so for me, and that's not the same kind of trauma we've been talking about, but like, that's when the accident happened, because I don't know what's going on. Like, you know, and like, but so of course it happened earlier. But so imagine that kind of structure for, again, for other things. Like, you know, you saw a movie, like sometimes it must have happened. I'm sure it's happened to you. It's happened to me where you saw a movie that you've thought you really liked, or you thought you really didn't like. And then later you have the, you have like a, not because you watched it again, but because you thought about it in a certain way. And so then it's like, oh, no, that was actually really good. Like that, that, that, and I, I, there was some kind of uncomfortability at the time that I was too keyed up on, but actually I, I did like it. And then it, it's in negotiation. And I think that's, that's what's in Hagle. And I think that's what's in, in Freud. And I, I do think, because history happens in a certain, before their projects, I super out of earlier. I think that that's, that's a huge part of it. But like, I think there's, there's not, I think what Kant is doing is, the negotiation of how these things make sense. And so because that's what he's doing, that idea of negotiation is not in the project that he was on. Yeah. I, I, I, I was so great, I think what you're saying, because it just made me think that, that this is why, isn't this why, heightager and phenomenologists like Kant and don't like Hagle? Because precisely because, this is, I mean, they wouldn't say this, but I think this has to be it. Precisely because Kant is so invested in chronological time. Right? That, that he doesn't believe, causality can interrupt, chronological time. And in fact, heightager goes so far as to say, what Kant should have been doing, is really deducing the concepts from temporality. Yeah. From the temporal structure of our experience. So I think that that, it makes sense, because phenomenology is all about our insertion into our, our temporal being, and the, the way that that defines our experience. So I just think that's really interesting that, that, that's, he wasn't a, what he's not able to think. You almost could say the difference between phenomenology and dialectics is the difference between Kant and Hagle. And I think that that's, that seems, that seems right to me, because precisely because of, of Kant's absolute investment in chronology as, and how do we, how do we conceptualize that, that chronology? That's his question. And I think that's not Hagle's question, because he wants to say, he wants to think about how that's, that, that, just in the way that you've been saying, how it's, it's retroactively determined. That in ways that we're not aware of when it happens. That we, that we couldn't be aware of when it happens. And so I like, I like what you said, that they, they both, they're both are, with each other, and then against each other, the two, the theoretical approaches, that's, that's true. Yeah, they, they have to, they have to sit uneasily, but next to each other, or else, it's, or else, you know, I mean, this is the, then it's, then it's the thing that I don't, and I know you, you have poor this, then all the philosophy becomes, they're just, they're just dishes you can pick at a buffet, and it's all fine. Right, right. You know, but you can't, because they're, they're just opposed. Yes, that's a real thing. I mean, don't you think that's the thing at the end of the day, you just have to decide. Yeah. And so, either I'm going to think, there is this temporality that's definitive for us, and I'm going to try to see how close I can get to grasping that, or you're going to say, no, there's this retroactivity function that's, that is, that is, that is, that's the, that's the real question. And that's what, I mean, that's, that's the question of Mary and bad, last year at Mary and bad, but I think it's also the question of, of, of, of, of, of Kant, I mean, of, of, of Kant's relation to heical, I should say. Would, I'm trying not, I'm trying not to say this next thing in a, in a, in a cheap way, or even in a, like, like, this would just be the armchair for it intake, but, but there, I don't know how to do it, but I want to stop elaborating this. Um, would, would a, it's not clear that Kant ever had sex, right? We're pretty clear. That is true. Okay. Would, if sex being such a question for, this is not, this is very important. Sex is a question for Freud. It's not that answered everything. But like, as far as like, like, like experiences that make sense, you know, after the fact, rather than, uh, in the chronology of them happening. Yeah. I, I, I just think that would have, I'm, I'm not, as this kind of cheap shot at Kant or whatever, but I just think that there's, um, that has to be a dimension, like, that of Freud's thought that has to be brought to bear on, like, on Kant's that would also separate the, the two of them, because of course, like sex is not in the, in the world that is written about philosophically for, for Kant. And I, and to, of course, why should, it's not a, it's not a, it's not a lack that, that needs to be there. There's no, there's no, uh, uh, it's not a problem or deficit in the text or like you shouldn't pay attention to it because there's no, there's no sex in it. Um, you know, like, don't, don't watch anything except for an R rated movie, right? Because you know, but, but I, but I, I, but I, you see, you see what I'm saying. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And I think it's pretty tame as possible. Yeah. Yeah. No, I think it's pretty good, actually. I like the dollarbook, Freud. All right. And I think, no, I think I'm, I shouldn't have used that. That's a, well, as you've got to describe Rosebud and Citizen Kane. And I think, actually, it's better than dollarbook for it's pretty great. So, yeah. Uh, I don't think that was, no, I thought it's, I thought it was really a good point. And I think the, the, the, the, but precisely because sex has the, just like you're saying, it's a problem or a gap. And, and, and, and even when you retroactively make sense of it doesn't really make sense, but it's certainly a confrontation with senselessness. Yeah. And, Heygall had, he had a child out of wedlock. So he definitely had sex in his, he had children too. But, um, I mean, other children within wedlock. But I, yeah, I think it's a really interesting, uh, yeah, way to think of it that he was, he, that he was missing that one experience of which would be about the traumatic rewriting of the past. Sure. Yeah. We're, yeah. Go ahead. No, no, and I, because I was just, because we get to, had to historical, right? Like, world, obviously, world were one. Why should he know about the French Revolution? He, there's no reason for no about it, you know, but like, is there something that would have been common to, uh, to Heygall and, um, and Freuders, but I mean, that's of course at the center of Freud's project is that like, you know, even and especially like, uh, what, what is the line? The great line. The exclusive sexual interest of submen for women is a phenomenon and is a problem in need of explanation, right? Like, he doesn't even take heterosexuality at face value, you know, absolutely not right. Yeah. And, and, and, like, Kant could not be further away from that. So, Kant, he can't define marriage in the metaphysics of morals as the mutual renting of each other's sexual organs. Like, really, and that drove Heygall crazy. He thought that's just because he thought love was so important and he thought this is just a, we're gonna reduce it to this contractual relationship really. Yeah. But it just shows somebody who never had sex, right? That's my guess. Think about it. I don't want to make, I don't want to make Kant seem not cool. I don't, may hope. Yeah, I think he was cool. Actually, I know that's a really, no, it's really, really, really cool. really good point is really important because I think often gets under right this idea that people could set their watches by when he took his constitutional which was not true by the way. But I think he was pretty cool. He had a lot of friends. He had dinner parties all the time. He even had times, I was just reading this as Marcus Velašek's book which I've talked about before. He had times when he almost got married so he's not. He didn't have sex probably but he certainly wasn't allergic to sexuality. That friends has to have a certain kind of sexual encounter. Yeah, of course. Yeah, definitely. Again, it's like especially for you. Let's raise that to the dignity of a critique of pure reason. That's important to keep in mind. It's an interesting separation. Which makes it even more, I think maybe the, again, I'm sorry to do this in manual but I think the closest that he came to sex was John Copcek bringing him into the formulas of sexualization. Oh, right. I think that's probably true. That's probably true. That's a good, first of all, I want to say, the lesson is watch wings of desire, which I think it's actually we've totally done that before. And we haven't. We've actually done last year at Mary and bad but we've just talked about it before many times. But now it is the official lesson. And then I want to end with a joke about the transcendental deduction. So I shouldn't have said it's a joke because I've already set up you up to be disappointed. But so I'll hit the left track button. Yeah, get the lap track ready. So 1781, publishes as a critique of pure reason but he doesn't pay any tax to, to pressure and the pressure tax authorities come to him and they're like, what's the deal? We know, this is the philosophical best seller. We know you made money in 1781. You made money the year before but all of the sudden you don't make any money. He's like, yeah, yeah, it's true. It's true. The first the critique of pure reason, I did make quite a bit of money on that. But I also discovered the transcendental deduction. So it wiped out all my earnings. So that's my joke. It's all I told I came up with that joke just for this podcast. So there we go. It has no other application because really there's like no one would understand it, no one would think it was funny. So I appreciate you for hitting the left track. Yes, that's right. My internal left track. Yeah, why use the, why use the standard deduction when you can use the transcendental. Right. Right. Right. Pretty good, man. Yeah. All right. Over. All right. (upbeat music) (upbeat music)