Corporate Athletes: Durable Competitive Advantages and Long-Term Investing
from Value Investing with Legends
58m 54s
Jim Engel, president of John W. Bristol & Company, shares his value investing framework centered on identifying "corporate athletes"—businesses with durable competitive advantages and sustainable growth potential. His approach combines deep qualitative analysis of competitive dynamics, such as scale, network effects, and switching costs, with a rigorous five-year earnings projection and valuation model. The firm emphasizes long investment horizons, strict position limits, and ongoing risk monitoring through comprehensive documentation and periodic review. Unlike traditional models, Bristol integrates AI tools to enhance research efficiency but maintains a human-driven process focused on writing, discussion, and peer feedback. The investment team operates under a "harmonious tension of opposites," where overlapping research responsibilities ensure diverse perspectives and robust analysis. While the firm holds significant exposure to technology leaders like Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon, it actively seeks undervalued opportunities in areas like enterprise software, where operational necessity and data security create resilient demand. Jim acknowledges the growing dominance of the "Magnificent Seven" but remains cautious, emphasizing that true long-term outperformance comes from disciplined, fundamental analysis rather than market trends. He stresses the importance of understanding macro shifts—especially in technology—through close observation of emerging trends, leaders, and user behavior. Ultimately, the firm’s strategy prioritizes risk-adjusted returns, resilience, and long-term sustainability, guided by principles from Warren Buffett and Michael Porter, and reinforced by continuous learning from both history and current developments.
Welcome to a new edition of the Value Investing with Legends podcast.
My name is Michael Mobison and I'm an adjunct professor at Columbia Business School
and a faculty member at the Halbrun Center for Gramm and Dot Investing.
I'm here with my co-host, Tano Santos,
the Robert Halbrun professor of asset management and finance at Columbia Business School
and the faculty director at the Halbrun Center.
Hi Tano, how are you? How's the semester off?
The semester is good, I taught my modern value block week
and the students are off to the applied value investing,
the great superhighway taking the elective so a good start to the Halbrun year.
That's fantastic.
A great business is not automatically a great investment.
Price matters, of course, but so do the durability of the company's competitive advantage,
the opportunities to reinvest and an investor's ability to distinguish between
a temporary setback and a permanent change.
Patience is valuable only when it is backed by good analysis.
Our guest today has spent more than four decades investing and leading investment teams.
His firm looks for what it calls corporate athletes,
businesses with durable advantages and the ability to compound earnings over time.
It applies that thinking not only to stocks,
but also to the challenge of managing capital for institutions with long investment horizons
as well as annual spending needs.
Today we will explore how that approach works, where it can go wrong,
and whether a relatively simple, liquid portfolio can be an alternative
to a much more complicated strategy.
We are delighted to welcome Jim Engel, president of John W. Bristol & Company,
an employee-owned investment management firm founded in 1937,
originally to advise the endowments of Princeton University and Swarthmore College.
Jim joined Bristol in 2000, after spending 17 years at DLJ Asset Management,
the last dozen of those as chief investment officer.
At Bristol, he coordinates the research effort as responsible for portfolio strategy,
banks and financial services, and fixed income.
He remains a research analyst as well as the leader of the firm.
Jim is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Arizona.
He received his MBA with distinction from the Warden School and is a CFA charter holder.
Bristol combines fundamental research with a collective decision-making process.
Its analysts have overlapping research responsibilities, and its average investment holding period exceeds five years.
The firm manages equity, fixed income, and balanced portfolios for endowments, foundations, families, and other investors.
Welcome Jim, thank you very much for joining us today, there are lots of topics we're keen to discuss.
Thank you, it's great to be here.
So let's start at the beginning with your path. Can you tell us a little bit about your background,
where you grew up, your family, what led you to the University of Arizona, and what first drew you to the world of investing?
I grew up in Phoenix, Arizona. My family was an agricultural family, and my father still worked in the industry.
University of Arizona was an easy choice for me to offer three of the great peas. The place was 125 miles from home, so just far enough to be outside of my parents' backyard,
but close enough to be near my family. The price was right, that's the second P, it was $125 a semester, if you can believe it.
I think Columbia is more expensive than that today, and also the imprimatur of the university for somebody who had no plans to leave the state.
So even Barry Goldwater went to the University of Arizona, and it seemed like the place to go.
So can I ask you a little bit about that? So you graduated from the University of Arizona, and was DLGA your first job, or was there anything between what attracted you to the world of investing?
I intended to be an attorney, but my girlfriend at the time's mother said that I should apply to the Wharton Business School.
So I took the GMATs, and was accepted before any of the law schools that I applied to responded, and so I went straight to the University of Pennsylvania in pursuit of my MBA.
Now I was a very studious student at Wharton, and I got very high marks, but I missed the whole section about I should network,
so I wasn't a very good networker, and I was an even worse interviewer, which is going to come out in this interview.
Between the first and second years, I didn't have an internship, which almost every MBA candidate had one.
So I went back to Phoenix, placed an ad in the classified section of the Arizona Republic.
A guy who was running a land and cattle company answered it almost immediately. He had two projects in mind, one which was to decide whether or not they should relocate their beef packing plant from Phoenix to just south in Nogales, Mexico.
The other project was to help out with the small hedge fund they had on premise.
The first project was overseen by a Harvard MBA, and he really did not want to be stationed in Mexico, so I got from the very beginning that he didn't want me to come up with a successful conclusion that we should relocate the plant.
The second operation was run by a guy who had graduated from Northern Arizona University, and was a CPA, and was a very enthusiastic about bin-gram approach to buying companies.
He wanted me to do in-depth research on two companies, one which was a gasoline dispenser company called Tokai, and the other one was a company called CCI that made the cabs ago on garbage trucks.
So it was the cab and compactor on garbage trucks. Both of them were trading for less than seven times earnings and less than 70% of net cash on the blocks, so it was a different era back then.
I spent a lot of time calling up folks to find out how the selection process worked for selecting your garbage truck and also for selecting your gasoline pump.
We ended up buying those, and both of them worked out. He had a connection to DLJ, and that's how I got my on-track to DLJ, and that was my first real introduction to investing, although when I was in middle school, I'd bought some shares of Disney at over a hundred times earnings, and I learned you can pay too much for a great company.
From there, I graduated, I started almost immediately afterward at DLJ. The first project that was on was a special project, which is investing in local banks, because the advent of regional and nationwide banking was coming up, and the laws were going to change, and these local regional banks were very, very cheap.
60 and even 50% of hard book value, they were tiny. I visited one company called Penn Bank Corp, which was based in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which is the home of the very first oil and gas well in the country.
It had also portfolio of cheap bank stocks, so it was doubly attractive. Before my interview with the president of Penn Bank Corp, I had breakfast in McDonald's, and the president of the bank came up to me and said, "You must be gem-angle," and I said, "How do you know that?" He said, "You're the only one in McDonald's, I don't know, and you're the only one in a suit and tie."
So these were tiny banks. Fortunately, the premise worked out, and we delivered a 33% annualized rate of return to the limited partners that joined the fund, and that lasted for about three years.
One of the quirks, and I think I have to thank George Soros for this, because he was about half of the fund, was that as soon as we had a realization, the money had to be distributed. So this wasn't a permanent vehicle.
So then I was absorbed into the rest of the DLJ unit, which at the time was called Woodstar Throws in Winthrop.
I became a general analyst, and the only one who knew how to use a computer and spreadsheet.
The industry had basically not hired many people for the decade of the 70s, so this is in the early 80s.
So my ability to run a spreadsheet was almost magical to many of the portfolio managers who were in their 40s, and it probably prematurely elevated my status in terms of great thinker,
as I could calculate PE ratios with the best of them, but I didn't know really much about how a business worked.
Nonetheless, I was able to fake it until I made it. I went from research to the head of research to the chief investment officer in pretty quick order.
This is a wonderful story, because they won in the banking, because it's a wonderful example of how a regulatory intervention was a mid-90s, if I remember correctly, in 1994 or 1995, right, when banks can open something like that, right, Kim?
Actually, the regional one took place in 1985.
1985, that's right. All of a sudden, you think a particular barrier to entry is being removed.
If you understand the economics of banking, you realize that those local advantages remain, because they are. based on those informational advantages local banks have over the pool of risks they can
underwrite and the opportunities were phenomenally. Is that one early lesson that you took out of
that case? Yes. In fact, there was a density of the network business. So this is branch banking
and in order to do your banking in this part of the country, they didn't even have ATMs. People
would go to their branch. They would do their banking on Friday. Small businesses would do their
banking. So having that density of a branch banking network was everything and that was not going
to change until the advent of the iPhone. It was a great advantage and also I will say I had a
tailwind at the time because interest rates started to decline pretty precipitously. The bond
portfolios that were under water started to lift. So not only did we buy them cheaply on a hard book
basis, but it was even cheaper than I had anticipated because the bonds now were getting revalued
upwards. So Jim, you joined Bristol in 2000. Can you just explain what attracted you to the firm
and what was different about the investment decision making process there versus DLJ asset management?
The thing that attracted me to the firm was really the culture and the focus of the firm.
When I was at DLJ, by the time I left, I was running a large cap flagship portfolio,
a small cap flagship portfolio with a co-manager and I was overseeing alternative investments
in the DLJ unit. And also when you're part of a very large organization, you have calls on your time
and I spent a fair amount of time consulting with both investment banking about what would be
attractive to an institutional investor and also marketing for other arms of the firm. So I was
feeling very overstretched and felt that I would do my best work at a focused firm like Bristol.
That's really what attracted me to it. It also had a collection of great people who had
intellect after the highest order and understood businesses in a deeper way than I did
was my estimation and that I would learn a lot from them. And so I always wanted to keep advancing
in my knowledge. It turned out to be a good decision to join them. So let's turn a little bit to
investment philosophy and there's something that Michael mentioned in his introduction,
this issue of corporate athletes being something that you guys look for. So why don't you walk us
through what you mean by corporate athletes and how do you find them? At a very high level what we're
thinking of is we want companies that have durable competitive advantages and we think of in terms
of five and ten year outlooks and we want companies that have the prospect for above average
growth rates. They don't have to be super high growth rates but above what corporate average
growth rate is. Now durable competitive advantages can come from a number of sources and I think
probably Hamilton, Helmer described them very well. Scale, network effects, switching costs,
whether they have a proprietary or captured resource or if there's anything outside of those
that may give them a long-term advantage, we really are focused on that. So we try to drill down
as to what is the source of the competitive advantage and how durable is it or is it a combination
of all of them? We're going to talk about risk a little bit later but I cannot resist the
temptation of asking you now Jim about the resilience of the factors that make for corporate athletes.
So think about Nike. My students are going to laugh when they hear me ask this question because I've
been thinking about this company for a long time and you see a company that was clearly and
industrially that in very hard times because some of the decisions they took over the last few years.
How do you think about that resilience? How do you evaluate it? How do you protect yourself?
This is something that I think about a lot and you've seen this with many consumer products
companies and if you go back 20, 30 years ago when you think of all the great consumer products
companies, what did they have? They had dominant scale and broadcast media and now we've moved to
social media where all these ankle biters can get a share of voice. Maybe they're still the best
but they don't have the monopoly they once had. They had probably a monopoly on shelf space and
this is one of the things that Nike lost in terms of monopoly on shelf space. They had better
distribution and they also had technological advantages in terms of their manufacturing processes.
They still have technological advantages. They still have a brand but they no longer have
that control of distribution they once had in the control of share of voice. So you've seen a lot
of ankle biters come in and take share from the big behemoths within the consumer packaged space
and in many consumer goods. So that's something where it slowly got away from them and they made
some miskeys too. They tried to go mainly direct and they fired a lot of their wholesale channel
and that opened up a lot of shelf space for companies like On Cloud and others to suck into the vacuum
and that was a strategic blunder. Let me just circle back around and just you mentioned Hamilton Helmer
and the book there for our listeners just to make sure it's a book called Seven Powers. So if you
want to follow up on that strategy framework, Hamilton Helmer book Seven Powers. Your framework puts
deliberate capital allocation alongside competitive advantage. How do you all judge the returns on the
next dollar company invests rather than just as historical returns and I think we're obviously living
through this in a very big way today with what's going on with the accelerated spending for the
hyperscalers. So how do you guys think about the marginal return on investment? We do that on a qualitative
basis for the most part. So in our process and I'm sure we'll get into it is with each industry,
we look at an industry, we try to identify the athletes. Those are the companies that we talked
about with the above average growth and durable competitors advantages. The attackers, those are
the ones that can change the game and the also rants and they play the needed role of shared donor
because the athletes have to get share gains from somewhere and it's usually the also rants
that are not so happy to provide it but they do provide those share gains. So we're thinking about
things on a qualitative basis whether or not the additional spending companies do make sense or not.
Sometimes it's straightforward as in the case with a long time holding that we sold
not too long ago progressive where it was really about advertising spending that was feeding
a fixed cost manufacturing machine and other times it's a company like meta where they have
a history of success by spending a lot of money but they are spending nearly $8 a share pre-tax
on this thing called reality labs where we hope they will have a success but it looks cheap even
despite the fact that they seem to be burning all this money all at once on reality labs.
So you're talking about close to $16 to $20 billion every year spent on new initiatives.
Our assessment there is that they get an adequate return but probably not the kind of returns
they've had in the past but betting against Mark Zuckerberg has not been the way to go in the past.
Any company that serves on a daily basis 40% of all the people on the globe he has a special talent.
Definitely so you have a fascinating exhibit in the report you were kind of to send us
on the sources of growth and you kind of have a little list with all the companies and basically
assigning to each of them a characteristic of growth market growth share of the market whether
they have internal growth and so on and so forth. What kind of analysis do you guys do to understand
these different sources of growth and in your view particularly interested in this question Jim
what is the source of growth that you think is the one that is most misunderstood by investor that
gives you the opportunity. So I think that market share growth is probably the easiest to understand
as you can usually see where companies positioned relative to its peer competitors and who will do
well over time relative to its peers. The hardest one is the new markets one. I'm going to be
completely humble as I looked at Apple before the iPhone was introduced and came up with some very
aggressive assumptions on their music and their PC business and built in something like a billion
or two dollars in out-year revenues that's five years from now for a new product initiatives.
Has it turned out my aggressive assumptions for their PC business and their music business
and the iPods all were pretty close but I missed one thing that sort of mattered which was the
iPhone. The iPhone dominated everything so new initiatives and this is something that I tried
to emphasize
with all of the team, it's not what you can see
that sometimes is the most important thing.
It's what you can't, and you have to imagine
whether or not they're gonna be successful
and how much you're paying for that success.
So if you're paying very little to have a company
like Meta currently spending $18 billion a year,
you might get lucky, but it's very hard to know
what market they're gonna develop with that.
So Jim, can you walk us through your evaluation process?
You project normalize earnings over 10 years,
but you calculate a five-year target price
using a market multiple and some relative price earnings
multiple.
100 years, six through 10 and form that multiple.
How do you guys come up with this?
And what kind of conversations are you having
when you're sitting around the conference room table
trying to decide what you should pay for something?
- In the process, it's really a two-step process.
It's this qualitative assessment,
which we talked about with the athletes,
the attackers, and the also ran.
From there, with the athletes and the attackers
that we think have some legs,
we do a qualitative profile and arrive at a basis
for investment where we have to believe to own these shares
and then the key buy-ins, which underpin that belief.
Those are things that we can track
to make sure that the company is still on track.
Once we've gone through that work,
we then model out the company five years out explicitly
and we project out five years beyond that.
So what we're looking for is what is normalized earnings power
that we can see on a per share basis five years out.
And then what would we pay for that?
It's based off of our assessment of the length
of the competitive advantage period
and also the growth in the secular period,
which is the subsequent five years.
So a company that has great growth
over this five-year forecast horizon,
but little growth to go after that,
maybe it's a market share game
and we think they'll have all the market share
that matters at the end of five years
would get a low multiple.
But if they still have rapid growth to go,
then it'll get a higher multiple.
- Can I just ask a very quick follow-up on these?
This is very interesting
that somehow you have to distinguish between the growth
in the market share versus the growth of the overall market
and how long can that go on
for that total addressable market question.
How do you guys go about estimating that?
- In the year 2000, this was actually my maiden voyage
has a discussion leader at John W. Bristol,
but it was a company that was known to me at DLJ.
I introduced progressive insurance to the group.
And progressive had a number of advantages,
but it only had a 3% market share.
And a big advantage was,
and this is probably the least appreciated,
was one of the best claims processing organizations
in all of the industry.
Their main focus was on non-standard auto.
So they had claims people that would be on the scene
of an accident within half a day,
and they would assess the cause of the accident
and the damage, and they would write checks very quickly.
This prevented from claims inflation
that would oftentimes happen with risk-laden drivers
because they tend to be the least trustworthy.
So they had this machine of feeding data into
a data processing center that was also probably the best.
At the same time in the '90s,
they were investing through the P&L
to build a direct insurance business.
Their non-standard business was being sold
through independent agents,
but usually the independent agents
wouldn't lead with progressive.
They would only sell it if your son or daughter
or wife or heaven forbid you turned out to have a very poor
driving record or some blemishes in their past
so that it was very difficult to get insurance.
So they were able to build a standard insurance business
on a direct basis without messing up
the distribution channel of independent agents.
That was unique in the industry,
and there are only three large direct writers at the time.
Geico was the king and was a pure play,
and USAAA was an underappreciated asset.
Geico was a little bit bigger than progressive,
probably close to a 4% market share.
And USAAA was hardly on the radar.
All of these companies, it was easy to do a triage
and say, these are the long-term winners.
It was easy to pick out.
State Farm has probably a share donor,
but it was really the smaller companies
that were going to be share donors to this model.
It was a low-cost model that could deliver a better result
to their policy holders.
But once you got up to 17% of the market
and with Geico, not quite that large,
the share game was pretty much done.
- So let me ask you then a little bit
about an issue of process.
And of course, it's the question
that we ask many of our guests,
which is how you are integrating AI
in your investment process today.
You just hire Dimitri Cavaykin,
who was my best student in his class.
So I'm very happy that he ended up with you guys.
And how is it going to affect the demand
for equity analysts going forward in your estimation?
- First question is, did Dimitri pay you to say that?
I'm very fond of Dimitri.
He was wonderful presence in the classroom.
Both in Michael's class and in mine, we miss him.
Dimitri's a great guy.
He didn't pay me, but he's welcome to do so.
- A couple of answers here.
And one of the things that I like about the firm
is we have a ladder of maturity
of the people that work on the investment team.
Sadly, I'm now the most mature on the team.
We ladder this and we give them equal voice.
They bring the skills, the modern day skills
or the skills of their generation into the process.
And so Dimitri has been a leader in terms of thinking
about how to integrate AI
and has probably been instrumental
in this adopting quarter for an easy way
to put together all of the public research
and the public filings of the companies.
We've also contracted with Claude
because we are a firm that believes in writing
and that in order to truly understand something,
you must write down what it is you think you understand
and then get the gift to feedback from your partners
as to whether or not you truly understand it.
So we've been writing for a very long period of time.
So we got a Claude enterprise license
that we can put that in as well as public documents,
sales side research and we can use an amalgam
to come up with conclusions as we go through it.
This year has been the first time
we put our own writing into an AI process
because we've been worried about our work
escaping into the wild
because we think about things
a little bit differently than most.
One of the things that I came to really appreciate
from the firm is they like companies
that invest through the P and L
and maybe are suppressing current earnings
but it'll lead to future growth.
In fact, when I was a DLJ, I liked companies
when that period had ended,
they were letting their earnings show
and oftentimes that's how the market reacts.
But the real economic power is being built
while the companies are suppressing current earnings
and investing through their P and L.
So that's a long-winded answer
as we have two approaches to AI
and then each of us probably have a paid version
of chat GPT for their personal accounts.
Jim, there's been a lot of talk about rising concentration
and specifically the rise of the so-called magnificent seven.
You own all the stocks of the companies of the Mag seven.
How did that come about?
Was that just a bottom up analysis
to let you there, they're all corporate athletes?
How do you feel about that concentration today?
- You're right to point this out.
They didn't come in as a group.
Microsoft was purchased in 2002.
We actually owned it up until 1999
and felt that all the good things
about Microsoft have been priced in.
I was the discussion leader on Microsoft too
and felt that it in the mid teens times earnings
that it was very attractive
and it was still growing in the high single low double digit
range on the operating basis
and they were generating a lot of free cash flow
that they were investing on options
that didn't has a turnout pan out.
They tried buying cell phone companies,
they tried doing mobile.
We owned it for about eight years
where it was kind of stuck at $20 a share.
We got a few special dividends
but we continued doing it
because the economic machine was still working.
The next one was alphabet or at the time Google.
There we knew that online advertising was taking share
from the traditional advertising world
and Google was the best positioned outside of Facebook
in terms of online advertising
and Facebook was not public.
Later, Amazon is an interesting one
because I was certainly not an early
understander of the model. But we bought Amazon in 2010.
But that was a substitute when we decided that the attacker had usurped the athlete which
was Walmart that we had in the portfolio.
I can come back to Amazon down the road, but we felt that its assortment has well-as its
Amazon Prime Program because we own Costco and we knew how powerful these membership models
could be that eventually they would show profitability.
It was a company that was suppressing all of their earnings through new initiatives
some of which would pan out like AWS and some of which would not pan out at all such
as their fire TV.
But they were smart in the way they addressed the market.
Then lo and behold Facebook came public, we were in on the offering, we added to it when
it got cut in half after the offering which is pretty typical for us.
By the way, Progressive was one we bought at six and a half and five dollars.
The five dollar purchase was less comfortable for me because we're down over 30% and we
ended up selling it at about 205-208 dollars.
Averaging down is not been something we've been afraid of in the past.
We also bought Apple in 2011 once the boneheaded discussion leader kind of realized that the
iPhone was going to be bigger than what he had originally thought.
And that was me.
And then Tesla and Nvidia, actually are the only two where you could say they came in pretty
close together.
Tesla came in in early 2024 when it was under pressure.
Our belief is that Costco's favorite EVs, in fact when we bought Tesla the model Y was
a significant premium Toyota Corolla and today it's trading almost on top of it in terms
of price and they're more profitable on an operating basis.
And then Nvidia is one that we came to a little bit late.
We had looked at it a couple of times thinking that they would be well positioned in an accelerated
computing environment, but we did not fully understand the lock-in that they had with
CUDA software system.
And we finally came to the belief that that was a powerful thing.
We're underweight the Mag 7, but we're overweight a few of the names like meta, we have a very
large weighting in.
The Mag 7 are 7 out of the top 10 holdings in the S&P 500.
The top 10 holdings in the S&P 500 now are all technology companies and they represent
over 40% of the S&P 500's market cap.
So this is an unusually concentrated market.
So this is an interesting discussion, it leads to the next one that I have which is you
added service now which is a question in my final was the analysis on service now.
And I want to ask you a little bit how you guys approach this sector software in general
that has been so severely disrupted by these hyperscalers and the threat of AI substituting
for all the services they provide.
So tell us a little bit how you think about that risk.
If you can tell us a little bit how you see service now as a play in this space.
Then now I would take issue with the enterprise software companies being so severely disrupted.
Service now is revenue growth is still in the high teens.
What we believe is there will be software that is disrupted, but if you're a system of
record, you have regulatory things that you touch and you have very private information,
you're going to need a control plane.
And today there's a lot of discussion about vibe coding software with AI and also writing
agents that will do all of this.
Well agents as we have learned act a lot like human beings and they need to be supervised.
Service now's great strength is that they're connected deeply into this business processes
and the data of the firm.
And they're also deterministic in their outcomes.
You get the same outcome every time, whereas AI is a probabilistic based system where you
get the outcome you expect some of the time, most of the time, maybe nearly all the time,
nearly all won't cut it with very sensitive data.
This is not informed just from the top up down trying to logic out this as we spend a
lot of time with user groups and even the ones that are experimenting with AI and AI plug-ins
into the service now or into their work day installations.
They do not want to maintain these systems on a long-term basis.
They want a trusted partner who will control them because in the case of work day, they don't
want to release your birth date and your social security number and your compensation out
to the wild unexpectedly and get sued.
These companies occupy a very important role and we think that role is not changing, but
their method of getting paid may change.
Right now many of these companies are getting paid on a per seat basis, which is the number
of employees that use it and they get paid so much per user.
They'll probably get increasingly paid on a value added basis for the plug-ins that they
use because they will enable companies to do the same number of tasks with fewer employees.
We think they will share in the value because they will be offering a proprietary solution.
So I couldn't agree more and this is one of the reasons why you would get an A+ in
my class by the way, Jim, clearly.
This is a little bit what inspired giving this as a final case to my students.
And in particular, these things that are particular services in this space and where you cannot
afford to have mistakes or a screw up because the consequences can be quite dramatic for
the clients of this company.
So the demand is going to remain there for a while.
The more these AI agents look like us, I think the higher the demand for these services
will be.
Thank you.
I will tell your former student Demetri that I got an A+.
Demetri actually is returning from a workday user group meeting today.
So I'm looking forward to getting his notes.
Your personal coverage includes banks and financial services, which can be analytically distinct
from industrial companies, you've held over time, JP Morgan, Moody's and S&P Global.
In your mind, what makes a financial company a corporate athlete rather than simply a
beneficiary a favorable credit conditions or interest rate?
Can you walk us through how you would judge a company's durable earnings power using one
of those companies potentially as an example?
Let me start with Moody's because it's probably one of those things where I had an aha moment.
Back in 2006, I was looking at Moody's, which was a spinoff of Dun and Bradstreet.
My partners were very skeptical about Moody's because they felt that their credit analysis
was nothing special.
They used standard filings.
They were backward looking and they were often slow to change.
They weren't sure that they brought anything to the table.
And what I understood over time was that there are many parties in the debt markets that
rely on Moody's and S&P's credit ratings.
They each have roughly 40% of the market.
And it's not only the buyers and sellers of bonds, in fact, they may be the least important,
but it's the regulators and the auditors that care deeply about what the credit rating
is of a portfolio because they have to, has an outsider evaluate whether or not they're
going to put their stamp of approval on current bond portfolios.
One of the great benefits of this is all of these four parties, the buyers, the sellers,
and actually the underwriters too, the auditors, the regulators, all depend deeply on this,
but they don't pay the freight, it's the corporate issuer.
So I have found over time that something that is highly valued where somebody doesn't have
to pay for it, that's something that has real stain power.
The companies themselves get a benefit in terms of lower borrowing costs if they get a
credit rating of triple A or triple B or better.
The cost of the credit rating and the cost of the surveillance is actually low relative
to the benefits that the corporate issues get.
And once data is issued, it doesn't go away, which is one of the great discoveries is
it just gets refinanced.
It's not like personal debts where families go through cycles where they borrow, they pay
it down, then they borrow again, corporations basically just refinance.
That all had the earmarks of an irreplaceable asset.
There are really only two companies that carry the weight for regulators, Moody's and S&P
global.
There are a lot of small ankle biters, but they've never been able to gain much in the
way share because the regulators and the auditors like the heft of having 100 years of ratings
for Moody's and almost that long from S&P.
They have a very privileged position, it's an asset-like model.
It's got 50% operating margins.
And one of the things that I learned at the advent of the financial crisis is even when
they get it wrong.
in the case of Moody's and S&P Global, you could say that there are high ratings of CDOs and CDOs
squared may have led to the financial crisis. I went back and looked at my model subsequent to
the crisis back in 2012 and Moody's and S&P Global basically the ratings business generated
about the same amount of revenues and profitability as if the credit crisis never existed.
It just came from different sources. It was much more corporate credit rather than derivatives
which is what I had originally thought in 2006. Two companies that can bring the Western
rural to its knees and they can't figure out how to get rid of them, they occupy a really durable
position. And that continues on today. Moody's has another good business which is their analytical
services which is a great consulting business. S&P Global has two other businesses that are
almost as good as the credit rating agency business. One is their commodities pricing business.
All the parties need to have a standard for where the commodities will settle at and Plats pricing
provides that standard. And then they have this little thing called the S&P index where all the
index funds pay a royalty to S&P for that. So that's only 70% of the total business those three
entities but it's 70% of the best businesses in America. So it's not like most financial services
businesses. They're not balance sheet oriented. This is clearly a standards business. Their role
is very, very difficult to displace and they have pricing power. JP Morgan is a different one
where it's completely management, management, management. Banks are leveraged. At the time we bought
JP Morgan it was leveraged maybe 12 to 1. Now it's leveraged a little bit less than that. But
really good management can make a huge difference. They occupy it a great position. It has a money
center bank and also has a large credit market participant. But I think their management is
head and shoulders above all. We have owned it because of management has much as anything else.
Can we switch to Jim a little bit to the issue of portfolio construction and risk and let me ask
you like a question first about how you guys keep track of the risks in your portfolio and in
particularly whether your thesis is working out or not and whether you're making money for the
right reasons or not. How do you actually make sure that you guys have a good understanding of
their risks that you take and whether you're making money for the right reasons? The first and
foremost way we reduce risk is really understand our companies. So we try to understand exactly
what they do, what role they occupy within their industry and how they're likely to make money.
We write this comprehensive documentation with the basis for investment, the buy-ins. We model out
five years and ten years hence and we go back and we check ourselves. So once something goes into
the system it has a projected rate of return based off of its normalized earnings power and its
PE target. When stocks do very well the price makes it so that the distance to the next five years
out is much lower and they get up for review because they have too low a projected return.
When stocks do very poorly they're either an ad or it's time to say goodbye and there it's
very important to have well why did we buy this thing in the first place? Did the key buy-ins hold up
or is there some sort of temporary factor that's obscuring the goodness of this company that the
current market participants have latched on to but will go away with time. So issues of the moment
can give us good entry points to add to our portfolio. So it's really understanding companies well
and not misunderstanding companies because as Mark Twain said it's not what you don't know
that kills you. It's what you do know that ain't so. Then we look at concentration. We limit the
size of positions. Six percent is our maximum position size. In the case of some now technology
companies maximum position size would be lower than where they are in the S&P 500. We're comfortable
with that. Amazon and Microsoft have been two actually over the years where we've trimmed them
back when they've gotten over six percent and we've always gotten the opportunity to add to them
when some new issue comes up and the market starts to get worried. So in the past that hasn't
been a problem. Clearly today when you have NVIDIA at over eight percent of the S&P 500
it becomes a little bit of an eyesore. Let me ask you then the question. You support an
interesting study by Christian to you. I'm familiar with some of his work. A very good scholar
and I wanted to understand a little bit how you have this interesting thing at the end of your
report on trying to understand where does the phenomenal performance of Bristol come from whether
from security selection, asset allocation and so on and so forth. Can you tell us a little bit how
you think about your own strategy of portfolio construction relative to say an alternative like the
Yale model or something like that. We do everything in a very simple but not easy basis is we think
these endowments and foundations that have long lives have a simple purpose is they have to
support the operations that they're dedicated to which is usually pay out somewhere between four
and six percent every year. They want to preserve their earnings power in a real basis and hopefully
grow beyond that and they have to be prepared for contingencies when something bad happens.
The Yale model and it's interesting because I would say that DLJ may have been ground zero for
the Yale model because Charlie Ellis I think is really the father of the Yale model and he was at
DLJ before my time and then he took it to David Swanson and they were very successful in implementing it
but it ignores liquidity risk and for some institutions liquidity is not a factor. For others it's
a big factor so we've seen it with a number of our endowments and foundations especially during
COVID and other crises where they had large cash needs and they needed to be paid out.
So we've been pleased that the simple model has delivered above top 40% rates of return over time
on a risk adjusted basis we've delivered alpha. The alpha although according to Dr. 2 and this
is rough about half the alpha has come from stock selection about 30% of the alpha has come from
asset allocation changes. That is simply looking at what is the 10 year treasury bonds projected
return over a five and 10 year basis and how does that stack up relative to our estimate for the
S&P and for our own portfolio and when that starts to tighten within under 600 basis points per year
it's time to reduce equities and add to fixed income and vice versa when equities are under pressure
the projected rates of return go up and the fixed income looks less attractive. We've been bumping
along the very top end of our allocation range to equities from much of the post crisis period
because in an age of interest rates suppression equities look far more attractive than fixed income.
Today it changes every day but we did reduce equities at the end of the quarter
when the US treasury 10 year got up above 5.2%. So we moved back to neutral at the end of the
quarter just recently and that's really a function on long term returns. That's where most people
get confused because they tend to think of things in terms of this is a prediction of the future
and now we're not predicting future returns especially not near term returns what we're trying to do
is get the best risk-adjusted long term result. So Jim you all do something quite unusual as an
investment team you use this phrase harmonious tension of opposites to describe overlapping
research responsibilities. So how do you make that tension productive rather than simply repetitive
in other words wouldn't sure is it a second analyst bring something independent to the party versus
just being another advocate for the same thesis. Two things one is we interlace coverage so even
though we follow industries for many years some of us have been following the same industry for
over 20 years we also interlace coverage with other areas if you're in financials you may have
a slice of technology you may have a slice of consumer products. We do this so that when a
discussion later comes to the table with a fully developed platform we have people who are working
on adjacencies and they're knowledgeable about the area they're just not willing pupils and they'll
have their own points of view and we try to keep the work very much focused on the issues at hand
not personal so we're trying to develop a robust profile and we have a discussion starter
who are
raise the thorny questions to begin with in terms of the process, but they're not devil's
advocates.
The devil will get his own advocate.
We believe that what they want to do is raise the hard issues up front, but they don't
have to push them if they don't believe them.
It's that process.
The other aspect about it is that we're all involved in the process.
We all have money at stake.
We have over a hundred million dollars of our own money invested alongside our clients.
We try to hire people that have different points of view, not only different age cohorts,
but they'll have different life experiences.
They will have different ways of looking at an issue.
But the one true goal is to get the very best portfolio we can, and we replicate that
equity portfolio for all over clients, the same is true in fixed income, and in balanced
accounts, that's a blend of the equity in the fixed income account.
It's really focused on the work, bringing all the talents to bear on each issue, and
our partners are not shy about giving the gift of feedback if they think that the discussion
leader is wrong.
So we're getting to the end of this wonderful interview, Jim.
We always close with the same questions, Michael and I, and this is a very broad question
take it where you will, which is what worries you most about the future of investing the future
financial markets, what excites you the most, what keeps you awake at night, Jim.
The thing that worries me the most, the thing that excites me the most, the thing that
keeps me awake at night is actually the same thing.
We are entering a new age of technology revolutions.
My career began with the PC revolution.
I've seen the internet revolution, I've seen cell phones revolution.
And I think the age of artificial intelligence and agents is wonderful.
It is going to lead to greater productivity and greater growth than we've ever seen.
But it is also going to provide challenges to existing competitive advantages in a way
that we've never seen before.
Trying to understand things from not only a ground view basis, but from the user's point
of view in terms of technology trends is very exciting.
It's a wonderful time to be alive and it's also very unsettling because as in the case
of these little tiny banks that I first studied, it's one thing in a physical world to have
a branch network.
It's another thing when you have a branch in your pocket.
What was a great competitive advantage can be a competitive load stone if you don't understand
the shift.
That is the main thing.
So for somebody who is not completely focused on technology, I think it's very important
to pick out some people like Brad Gersner or Lex Friedman or even the all in guys or
Dark Esch and follow them religiously to figure out what they're thinking about in terms
of technology.
If you get this right and in our new purchases, we've had basically three buckets, companies
that we think have nothing to do with AI like a Sherwin Williams where we've made purchase
there.
We think it's a sickle-coly depressed stock, which was going to do very well over time.
Companies that further on AI, such as Marvell Systems, which has optics in its chip business
and we think that's going to be the next phase as we move into the next phase.
And then companies that are misperceived as victims and you pointed out service now and
I brought up workday, we think those are misperceived as victims and that's a great opportunity.
So Jim, you've tipped your hand a little bit on this but love to know what you're reading
or listening to or watching these days and what book or books would you recommend to
listeners who want to become better investors?
Every couple of years, I reread the Warren Buffett chapter in the original Money Masters
by John Train.
That was one of the great gifts of the guy who was running the hedge fund for the land
and cattle company.
As I think he actually made me pay for it because he was a value investor through and through
but he alerted me to it.
The chapter on Ben Graham was my early start but the chapter on Warren Buffett has been
something that I've tried to live by for most of my life in terms of the things to look
for.
The other things is read the CEO's letter of the companies that you like, trust and admire.
Jamie Dimon tells you what's going on in the banking industry in excruciating detail
and you are going to learn a lot about the banking industry from reading his annual letters
each year after year and comparing what he says today versus what he said in the past.
That was true with Warren Buffett.
I think it's true with Andy Jassy as well.
Elon Musk is somebody to pay attention to as a mover and shaker.
Reading those things on a current basis are important.
Almost everybody interested in the business is going to stay abreast of current happening
so I'm not going to mention that.
I think also the Helmer book is very good about understanding what makes up competitive
advantages.
He gives you seven examples.
There may be more but the seven powers book gives you a pretty good understanding and
reading Michael Porter's competitive advantage framework is the standard part of our research
platform.
And finally, read some stuff from outside of the investing world.
I just finished Ulysses's grants memoirs.
I'm a little behind in my reading.
He gives you a real understanding that some things are very hard to do but they're worth
doing and we keep a folk Churchill quote up on the wall in our conference room.
Success is not final, failure is not fatal.
It's the courage to continue that counts and I think that's the most important thing
and investing is if you continue on with a time tested process, you will succeed even
if you're not succeeding in the moment.
What a great way to end our discussion today.
Jim Engle, thank you for joining the Value Investing with Legends podcast and to all
of you, thank you for tuning in and we will see you in our next episode.
Quit.
Thank you.
Thank you for listening to this episode of the Value Investing with Legends podcast.
To subscribe to the show or learn more about the Helbrun Center for Graham and Dot Investing
at Columbia Business School, please visit GrahamandDodd.com.
Thank you.
This episode was produced by Columbia Business School with the participation of John W. Bristol
and Company Incorporated, JWB, an SEC registered investment advisor.
Registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training.
The views expressed by James Engle, JWB's president, are his own as of October 16th,
2026 and are subject to change without notice.
The hosts and interviewees views are their own.
The topics discussed were selected by the hosts.
Mr. Engle referred to the other companies as examples.
As of October 16th, 2026, JWB client accounts and/or JWB personnel held positions in Microsoft,
Alphabet, Meta, Apple, Tesla, Nvidia, ServiceNow, Workday, Sherwin Williams, Marvel Technology,
JP Morgan Chase, Moody's, S&P Global, Costco.
Positions may change at any time without notice.
The research paper by Dr. Christiane TU that was referenced used JWB provided historical
performance data, JWB compensated Dr. TU while the study was completed.
This episode is general information about JWB's investment approach and is not investment
advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle, and no view or approach
discussed assures a profit.
JWB did not compensate Columbia Business School or the hosts for this episode.
But JWB employee, a recent Columbia MBA graduate, suggested JWB's participation.
JWB no longer holds progressive and Nike.
Mr. Angles comments about his career before joining JWB, including investment results at
prior firms, describe experiences at other firms and are not JWB's performance or indicative
of JWB's results.
Comments about performance, rankings, and attribution are Mr. Angles' characterization
of a study JWB funded related to the periods and methods described in the study, and are
not a complete presentation of JWB's performance.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Jim Engel’s investment philosophy centers on identifying "corporate athletes" — companies with durable competitive advantages and the potential for above-average, long-term growth.
The firm uses a qualitative framework to assess competitive advantages such as scale, network effects, switching costs, and proprietary resources, while also evaluating the resilience of these advantages over time.
Portfolio construction emphasizes long holding periods, strict position limits (six percent maximum), and a focus on risk management through deep company understanding and periodic reviews.
A two-step process combines qualitative analysis of business models and competitive dynamics with quantitative modeling of normalized earnings and five-year target prices based on valuation multiples.
The firm integrates AI tools to streamline research and enhance writing-based analysis, but maintains a human-centered approach rooted in deep due diligence and collaborative decision-making.
Despite heavy exposure to technology, the firm identifies undervalued sectors like enterprise software (e.g., ServiceNow and Workday) where operational reliability and data security create enduring demand.
While the "Magnificent Seven" dominate the market, the firm is deliberately underweight in them and overweights companies like Meta and others with overlooked, sustainable growth drivers.
Key to success is a disciplined, long-term approach that prioritizes risk-adjusted returns, transparency in investment rationale, and continuous learning from both market shifts and technological disruptions.
Summary:
Jim Engel, president of John W. Bristol & Company, shares his value investing framework centered on identifying "corporate athletes"—businesses with durable competitive advantages and sustainable growth potential. His approach combines deep qualitative analysis of competitive dynamics, such as scale, network effects, and switching costs, with a rigorous five-year earnings projection and valuation model.
The firm emphasizes long investment horizons, strict position limits, and ongoing risk monitoring through comprehensive documentation and periodic review. Unlike traditional models, Bristol integrates AI tools to enhance research efficiency but maintains a human-driven process focused on writing, discussion, and peer feedback. The investment team operates under a "harmonious tension of opposites," where overlapping research responsibilities ensure diverse perspectives and robust analysis.
While the firm holds significant exposure to technology leaders like Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon, it actively seeks undervalued opportunities in areas like enterprise software, where operational necessity and data security create resilient demand. Jim acknowledges the growing dominance of the "Magnificent Seven" but remains cautious, emphasizing that true long-term outperformance comes from disciplined, fundamental analysis rather than market trends. He stresses the importance of understanding macro shifts—especially in technology—through close observation of emerging trends, leaders, and user behavior.
Ultimately, the firm’s strategy prioritizes risk-adjusted returns, resilience, and long-term sustainability, guided by principles from Warren Buffett and Michael Porter, and reinforced by continuous learning from both history and current developments.
FAQs
Corporate athletes are businesses with durable competitive advantages and the potential for above-average long-term growth. Jim Engel looks for companies that have sustainable sources of strength, such as scale, network effects, or proprietary resources, and can compound earnings over time.
He assesses resilience by examining how well a company maintains its core strengths in changing markets. For example, Nike lost its monopoly on shelf space to new entrants, and its shift to direct sales created opportunities for competitors, showing that even strong brands can lose edge over time.
Deliberate capital allocation is central to his approach. He evaluates whether a company’s spending on new initiatives—like Meta’s Reality Labs—makes sense qualitatively, not just based on historical returns, to ensure long-term growth potential.
The firm uses AI tools like Claude to analyze public filings and research, but emphasizes writing and peer feedback as essential to understanding a company. AI supports the process, but human judgment and analysis remain at the core of decision-making.
The firm limits position size to 6%, with lower thresholds for high-growth tech companies. This limits concentration and ensures risk is managed across the portfolio, even as certain stocks grow in market value.
While the Yale model focuses on asset allocation and risk, Jim Engel's approach emphasizes both security selection and asset allocation. His strategy is simpler and more focused on long-term returns, with about half the alpha from stock selection and 30% from asset allocation shifts.
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