CoreWeave Crash, AI Trade Cracks, Anthropic IPO Red Flags, Bill Gates Doomer
1h 34m 6s
The podcast discusses the recent market volatility surrounding CoreWeave, a leading neocloud provider, which saw its bond yields surge to 15% amid rising risk-free rates and increased credit default swaps. This reflects heightened market concern about its financing structure, not a fundamental collapse in AI demand. CoreWeave’s model—relying on long-term contracts and GPU-backed financing—creates financial insulation, but rising borrowing costs are compressing margins. Despite the downturn, AI demand remains extremely strong: compute is in short supply, old GPUs are still rented at premium prices, and startups are experiencing explosive revenue growth. While deflationary pressures from open-source AI and cheap software tools are accelerating, they are not eliminating innovation—instead, they are enabling a surge in bespoke, use-case-specific software that boosts productivity. Key competitive advantages are shifting toward data access, customer feedback loops, and physical infrastructure like power and land, particularly as energy scarcity becomes a critical bottleneck. Anthropic’s strong Q3 revenue of $16.8 billion and 900% net revenue retention signal a resilient business, with an expected IPO this year and a potential valuation of $2 trillion. The broader AI sector remains fundamentally sound, with companies like Anthropic and OpenAI serving as core, defensible growth engines. The narrative suggests that while short-term volatility exists due to financing stress and market overreaction, the long-term trajectory of AI demand and innovation remains strong. The venture industry must adapt by focusing on sustainable moats—data, power, and customer intimacy—rather than relying on traditional software models.
all right everybody welcome back to the number one podcast in the world actually you manifested
we actually were number one how good is literally number one last week only took uh only took a
little bit of time to get only took five years only took five yeah five years went by so quickly
uh with us today david sacks is back how are you doing brother good you good yeah good being number
one yeah it's good to be number one i agree yeah i agree i've done an excellent job you've done
a very good job and now beautiful now we'll see who takes the most credit for the ascension of
the all-in podcast uh over to you chamath palihapitiya how's your week been it's great
in the number one position yeah it's great being the best i mean you know we would have i feel like
sacks and i would have gotten here at least 18 months sooner had we not had to drag you on our
back oh okay the
point guard who actually put all those dives and positioned the ball everywhere you guys wanted it
yes you would have you certainly would have gotten there uh eventually if you guys actually
knew how to set up would we be without your constant interruptions sooner we would have
been number one soon you would be where every other tech podcast is in the 400s and joining
us this week in replacement of also number one also number one number one venture capital firm
in assets under
management i believe certainly none other yes sir than ben horowitz is here hey ben how are you
i am doing swell thank you for having me on the show uh it's great to be with the number one team
yes the number one podcast how does it feel to be on the number one podcast in the world
have you hasn't you know like have you soaked it in yet ben it's just it feels great yes yeah
it is awesome i feel bigger already it is kind of amazing that a tech podcast could be
the number one podcast on that is bizarre apple podcast last weekend big docket this week uh good
to have you here ben and uh freeberg is busy saving the world from famines and he'll be back
next week for all of you he retired he retired at number one yeah he just he walked off the court
oh that's hilarious yeah well um we've had an eventful week we uh may have actually had the ai
bubble if there is one pop or deflate a little bit the neo clouds got crushed this week
after uh coreweaves bonds started to sell off could be the canary in the coal mine we'll find
out uh coreweave iron nebius these are all the biggest neo clouds they're all down about 20
as publicly traded companies here's your chart here's what happened just a little bit of
background on tuesday a bunch of people on x including at chamath pointed out that the yield
on some of coreweave's debt had hit 15 percent the yields uh are obviously rising because bond
traders are worried about coreweave's ability to generate enough cash to support its debt so
they want a higher rate of return obviously adding to chamath's little tweet was a friend
of the pod elon musk who decided to contribute five letters one word that has since been heard
around the world and is at the start of every story he said yikes y-i-k-e-s and that generated
a bunch of headlines then everything tanked yesterday wednesday we tape on thursdays as
many of you know coreweave iron nebius down between 10 and 15 even oracle uh and dell took
some strays nvidia uh took stray as well they were down three percent coreweave is the tip of
the iceberg in the last five years and they've gone up and down for the last two years and they
have gone up and down for the last three years and they've gone up and down for the last three
years and they've gone up and down for the last three years and they've gone up and down for the
last three years and they've gone up and down for the last three years and they've gone up and down
for the last three years and they've gone up and down for the last three years and they've gone up
and down for the last three years and they've gone up and down for the last three years and they've
gone up and down for the last three years and they've gone up and down for the last three years
on the all-in podcast back in march in which he explained to me on the all-in interview show
what he called the box let's roll that tape and get chamath's thoughts is all that debt work that
is something that you guys specialize in i'm going to try to explain this in a way people can
understand so we go out and we find a client let's use microsoft you brought them up before right and
microsoft comes to us and says we'd like to buy some computer for you and we say okay great we're
going to sign a contract once i have a contract in hand then what i do is i create something it's
not a particularly creative name it's called the box yeah right and what i do with the box is i
take my contract with microsoft and i put it in the box i go to jensen and i buy the gpus i put it
in the box i take my contract with microsoft and i put it in the box i take my contract with
microsoft i take my data center contract i put it in the box and now the box governs cash flow and
it has a waterfall of cash flow that comes into it and goes out of it and so the way it works is
then i build the compute and then i deliver the compute to microsoft and they pay the box they
don't pay me it goes into the box and the first thing it does is it pays the data center it pays
the power bill it pays the interest in the principal and then whatever's left flows back to
because the economics in this box are such that within two and a half years of a five-year deal
we have paid for everything they don't cross-pollinate they don't cause contagion
across the boxes they're all independent and discreet as you do this and as you show
the lenders how this financing tool and how this financing mechanism works
what they do is they continue to lend you money at progressively lower rates okay
that seemed like a completely reasonable explanation of how they were running the
business and that each of the boxes were isolated but something has changed in the
last six months what is that and uh what's changed here and and your insights into his
financial innovations i would say uh with core weave the most important thing that you should
always look at is how the sharps the super smart money prices
risk and when you're dealing with companies like core weave or nebius or iran etc that have to
borrow a lot to fund these boxes the smart money is trading what's called a credit derivative swap
okay this is default insurance and these default swaps are meant to ensure the bond holders
against a potential default that risk spiked this week to about 953
basis points which it doesn't matter what that number is but as an imputed risk it's about a 16
chance of a default in any given year and over a five-year duration what that math implies is about
a 55 chance of a default so it's a coin flip whether they default or not that's not what i'm
saying that's what the insurance market was saying about their debt and i think that's something to
i think are the smartest money in in all of this so why did they do this i started to dig into it
and here's a couple of charts that explains a little bit of what i learned okay so the first
thing is just a market check you know we've talked about this but we have a problem in the united
states which is that the u.s is moving the risk-free rate higher and higher who is doing
that these are the central bankers these are the bond vigilantes these are the people who are
people that say because of inflation or other long-term risks that are not getting put out of
the system we need to get paid a lot more money to own the safest riskless asset as that goes up
basic way to think about that is as the 10-year bond goes up everything else goes up and so this
black line represents the average price that you have to pay for junk debt
and what you see is that as the 10-year went up and people are like man the risk-free rate's going
up and people are like man the risk-free rate's going up and people are like man the risk-free
the junkiest junk bonds need to pay more and more and more
and then the purple line here is what core weave has to pay and what you see is that it also has
started to stick up and has moved up relatively violently and so the question is why has it done
that okay so let's go to the next chart michael is right that he is in the business of creating
these boxes and then putting in contracts and gpus but he also needs to put money in those boxes
and the way that he puts the money in the box is he has to go out and borrow that money so he goes
to a lender and says give me the money and i will pay you that back plus some interest
what you see here is what is inside of the box effectively so the gray bar is how much money
he's guaranteed to get into the box these are all the deals he sold to all of his customers
these are contracts yeah these are contracts now and it's important to know because i'll get to this
in a second it turns out that he's going to be able to get into the box and he's going to be able to get into the box
it turns out that these contracts are fixed price so meaning if what you could sell in the spot market
goes up you don't really generate that revenue because you've already pre-sold it at a fixed
number so michael creates the box he gets a long-term contract which is great because you
have surety around the revenues you're getting but he sells that then he goes and has to finance it
and then some of that financing comes due he's got some bonds that are due and some loans that
are due what this basically says is
at the midpoint he has to raise another 35 billion dollars of debt
to get all of the contracts that he signed financed right all the boxes financed and up
and running so he has about 35 billion of debt he needs to raise another 35
billion of debt. But as you saw on the chart before, that's ticking up. And that has nothing
to do with him. It is because the broader market is essentially saying the risk-free rate goes up,
everybody has to pay more because your spread above the risk-free rate has to track with it.
Okay. So today, across all the different pockets of money in which that they have used to fund
those boxes, their average interest rate that they pay is about 8.5%. The problem is that
in this last little while, the Sharps basically said, hold on, this is getting too close to the
knife's edge. You're going to have to pay more interest. That's what I tweeted, which was just
one of the sleeves of interest. This is the GPU loan, DDTL 1.0, spiked to 15%.
The problem is that they're not paying more interest. They're not paying more interest.
The problem is that could theoretically now be the rate that they have to pay for all of the
future. Remember, half of it's financed, half of it is still unfinanced. Right now, these guys are
at a pretty good place because they have about 78, 80 billion of assets and only 35 of debt,
so they're well covered. I think that this idea that they're at risk is not on the surface true,
but the reality is that they have this problem, which is they have extreme customer concentration.
Some of those companies are walking down what their revenue expectations are into the future.
So you have this situation now where you have to go out and borrow at a much higher rate.
You have a bunch of debt you need to go to fund the boxes, and you have a fixed amount of revenue
going into the boxes. So what is the trade or what is the setup? It's basically a coin flip
now on the following idea. I think the market is saying that if they are able to finance the
stuff at a reasonable rate and the life of the GPUs that they buy from Jensen are longer than
what they think, they're going to be okay. But if the financing goes up and into that 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15% range, these guys are getting very, very, very close to not necessarily being able
to cover all the obligations that they have. My team's estimates is that they're plus or
minus about 5 billion away from that break-even point.
So I think that's why the CDS spiked, which then caused the bond yields to spike and caused the
bonds themselves to lay off. So in order of operations, number one, I think they've created
this very novel structure that everybody else has copied with the boxes. Number two,
they've sold these fixed contracts. That's super smart, guaranteed a bunch of revenue
into the future. But we have this situation where as the risk-free rate goes up, their cost of
borrowing goes up. That erodes the margin that they have. That then brings them close to this
break-even point. That causes the CDS to react, which then causes the bond yields to react.
That's the negative reflexive loop that they're in. So they just have to find a way to break out
of that. I don't think that they're in real risk. But as we all know, this is sort of a confidence
game. And you need to have confidence that the broader market can support another 35 billion
just from these guys. And I think that's what's going to get figured out over the next month.
All right, Ben. So you look at this situation, you've been through a couple of bubbles before,
maybe have a little PTSD or scar tissue in
fact. And we saw Corweave bounce today, kind of hit a bottom, stocks up 1% or 2% right now after
going down 10%. Is this acute? And then what does it mean for the broader AI trade, the AI bubble?
Is there a bubble? And we'll get into Anthropic in a minute, Sax.
Yeah. So I think that the first thing to understand is these businesses like Corweave,
as Chamath kind of
went through some of it, but they're Rube Goldberg financial machines. They're
exceptionally complex. So, you know, we talked about, okay, GPU contracts in this, but
he's got data center contracts. How long are those? And then there's, he's got to buy memory,
like, and there's memory shortage in this and in that. So it is really complex. The other thing,
or the other interesting thing is, yes, GPUs, not only have they been going up in duration and in
price.
So that's been like a big tailwind for him as the owner of such things.
When you say duration, you mean the lifespan, the number of years you get value from that. It was
three, four, five, now it's six, seven, eight.
And there's a shortage, like a real shortage of GPUs with power and cooling. And I kind of caveat
that, right? Like, which is what he has. And, and this, this, this shortage is so bad. You know, I
have a friend, Jesse, who runs Amazon yesterday. And I said, yeah, like, we're out of everything,
you know, till 2028. He's like, oh, it's beyond 2028. Like, I don't think we get stuff back,
like, end of 2028, maybe. So everything else is sold out. So he, he has the advantage of that
he's got supply in a great shortage, which is extremely different than the internet bubble.
The internet bubble, we didn't have enough demand, because we had to build the internet,
people had to get broadband, you know, you needed all this stuff people had to buy, you know,
originally, they had to get their browser at price, all this kind of thing. There weren't
enough consumers on the internet to absorb all the bandwidth that had gotten built out. And they had
a massive amount of debt, not unlike we're building today, although not as big.
But but the lack of demand killed it. We don't really have a lack of demand in AI.
So I think the dynamics will be different.
I do think like, for sure, if you get into a pathological debt situation,
that can wreck anybody. It's why, by the way, we're not invested in any of these
neoclouds either, for that reason, because that whole thing scares me, having been through it.
But, but I would just say it's pretty complicated. And it really depends on a huge number of
assumptions in this very elaborate model that they have.
Look, you were you and Mark were one of the pioneers, maybe the pioneer of the neocloud
business. I mean, you may just tell this quick story, because I want to ask the question,
loud cloud kind of popularized this idea that that you could build these clouds and service
customers this way. Yeah. But it's very interesting to me that you and Mark as the
kind of prima genitor have passed on the whole space. So I want to ask you, Mark,
I want to know why. Well, it's because of this. I mean, so it can it can end up being
like a very dangerous arbitrage business, where, you know, you can get upside down easily. And so
if you look at loud cloud, just as an example, just here, here's a simple thing that happened
to us in 1999. bandwidth, bandwidth was $1,500 a megabit. And you couldn't get it was very hard
to get it. And so you had to
get a long term contract three years. By 2001, it was $50 a megabit. So if you were holding
bandwidth, you were you just, you know, and you're dead money to get it, you're dead,
you're dead. So that, you know, that kind of thing is so out of the control of the entrepreneur.
And, and so different than what we'd like to fund. That, you know, it just, it scared,
it scared me to death. Now, look, I think the core dynamic of AI has been working for,
for a very long time. And I think, you know, I think it's, it's, it's, you know, you know,
I think it's, it's, it's, you know, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's,
it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's,
there's a massive shortage, not an overage of supply. So those prices don't seem to,
you know, token prices have gone down, but GPU prices have not. And so things are going up,
you know, and by the way, data center space is going up in price, because even labor to build
data centers is hard, the politics are making it hard to build data centers. So the whole
very big tailwinds for core weave, despite the fact that the debt markets kind of independent
of them are tough. All right, Sacks, here's your poly market core weave announces bankruptcy,
that's a pretty aggressive poly market 15% chance at the end of 27 next year, 23% at the end of
2028 seems a little farfetched, given the fact that they have a massive demand for their equipment as
Ben pointed out, you can't look, this is dumb, because like, I think Michael explained it like
you have this opco propco setup. So core weave can't go bankrupt. An asset level vehicle for
a data center or a build out could theoretically go upside down. But that'll go into receivership
and then just manage where you sell down the GPUs. Yes, he explained in that clip,
he has each box independent of the next. So not a great poly market, I think. But well,
it is great if you bet it the other way. Yeah, exactly. Maybe some free money there to pick
up. Sacks, let's level up the conversation here, just outside of core weave and the Neo clouds,
massive demand, token prices coming down, but token consumption going way up. And I think one
of the the silver linings here is it was a big question of how long these GPUs would last. Maybe
they had three, four or five year lifespan. Now people are saying, hey, these things will keep
going into year 678 for inference alone. So what's your thought here on the AI trade, the bubble,
as it were, did we need to take a little bit out? Do we need to stress test it? And is that what's
nervous, hey, we're in year four or five of this bull run, and that maybe it's coming to an end,
and we may hit the R word. Yeah. Recession. Here's the question, J. Cal, is you got this
core weave crash, their bonds are being marked down to 80%. It's down 15 or 20% in the last few
days in the stock market. Is this just market volatility? Or is this the beginning of something
deeper and worse, like you said, the popping of a bubble? Okay, that's the fundamental question.
I would make the argument that this is just volatility, which you're going to get a lot of
whenever you're underwriting to multi-trillion dollar outcomes in the future based on very
rapid rates of growth, exponential rates of growth. The market is going to be super sensitive
to any data points we have in the present. And so everything's going to be exaggerated,
and that's why you get these big swings. Now, again, that to me is the explanation of
volatility.
I don't think that something fundamental has changed. So let's talk about the fundamentals.
So first question there to unpack it is, has the demand changed? No. We know that the demand for
compute just keeps growing by leaps and bounds. In fact, everyone is saying that they are compute
constrained. I mean, you've got the biggest model companies are saying they're compute constrained.
Starps are saying it. I mean, they're asking their VCs, hey, can you help us get
compute? I think you've got some VCs even trying to buy compute as basically a
strategy.
For competitive differentiation, so they can help their startup.
So it was literally an accelerator that had bought excess compute and they were using it as a way to
get people to apply for their accelerator. Yeah. So we know the demand is off the charts right now.
We're seeing other indicators. So for example, old GPUs, like even the H100s or the A100s,
which are several generations old, they're still renting at premium prices right now.
They were supposed to be fully depreciated and they're not. There's actually upside surprise
there to the people, to the companies that are renting.
Those old, supposedly stale GPUs. So we know the demand is off the charts. Okay. So what's the next
indicator of something deeper and problematic happening? Well, the next question you could
ask, well, is there a glut of supply coming onto the market? So we know the demand is huge,
but maybe there's too much supply being stood up. Well, we know that's not the case because of the
sheer difficulty of standing up this powered compute. And we know it's not being brought
onto the market too rapidly.
First, you just have all the problems with atoms, building things in the physical world.
That's hard enough. Elon basically has said, look, this is a really difficult problem. Even
our rocket scientists find it challenging to stand up gigawatts of new powered compute.
And then we have all the regulatory headwinds, right? Local communities are not racing
to give out new entitlements around this. So if anything, we believe that there's not a glut,
it's the other way that there's enforced scarcity. So then the question becomes, well,
is there some sort of a glut? Well, there's a glut. of execution problem with CoreWeave.
You know, are they too slow in standing up their compute?
Have their costs gone through the roof?
Look, there's some indication that maybe their costs are a little bit higher, that maybe
it's a little slower, but at least on a reputation basis, they are believed to be excellent at
this game of standing up new compute.
So then the question was, is there some sort of credit problem?
You know, on the credit, like the founder, Michael, was saying with the boxes, you know,
when you go to a lender to basically back the build out of, let's say, a new data center,
you're not relying on the unsecured credit of CoreWeave to make that loan.
You're backed by the credit of the tenant who's entered into a five-year commitment.
So it could be a Microsoft or whatever.
So the credit worthiness of that particular project, of that particular box,
is going to depend more on the credit of the tenant than on the credit of CoreWeave.
And then behind that, you've got the GPUs themselves, which, you know,
it's basically asset-backed financing.
The lender is secured by those GPUs.
We just talked about how, if anything, there's upside surprise on the depreciation cycle
of these GPUs.
So my impression is that there's not a deeper credit problem in terms of financing these
projects.
What happened, though, is the repricing is of CoreWeave's unsecured.
Unsecured obligations.
It's true that the market has discounted them by 20%.
They're in distress territory.
That has brought the implied coupon of those bonds from 9.6% to around 15%.
But that does not increase the cost that CoreWeave is paying.
CoreWeave is still paying their 9.6% coupon.
It's just that the secondary market has repriced the value of those bonds to an implied coupon.
It changes the future debt.
Yes.
It could definitely raise the cost of future debt.
But I. I don't think they're funding these new boxes with unsecured corporate notes.
I think they're funding them with asset-backed financing and the debt.
There's two things that go in the box.
The contract goes in the box.
The GPUs go in the box.
So you've got two things.
And these are credit-worthy organizations who pay their bills, like Microsoft.
Yes.
Now, if I were a lender on those projects, though, I'd be looking really closely at the
credit of who's the customer, basically, for that compute.
Obviously, if it's Microsoft or Google or a couple other companies, I'd feel really good.
Right?
That may only have. If it's a startup, I don't necessarily feel so good about those.
Well, they have three customers that represent 75% of their revenue.
Yeah.
And they're all investment-grade, like the big customers.
So. The thing I'll add to this is, you know, you explained quite clearly,
Saks, hey, the GPUs are worth something.
The data centers are worth something.
Ben, you pointed out the power.
The HVAC is worth something.
The tokens are worth something.
And then if you look at startups, you know, which is where I spent all my time as the
early-stage startups, they're crazy.
They're crazy.
They're crazy.
They're crazy.
We're crushing it in terms of raising capital, getting customers, and we've never seen revenue
ramps like I'm seeing in startups today.
And I think, Ben, you'll probably back that up.
The revenue ramp of startups today is distinctly different than the SaaS, you know, triple,
triple, triple, double, double, double.
Now we're at, like, hey, are you doubling every quarter or not?
And then if you're not doubling every quarter, like, what are you doing?
Why are you not growing faster in this age of AI?
So the startups feel particularly strong.
So maybe this is just the market overall saying, hey, let's test this, you know, and
maybe there's some indigestion there.
Or, Ben, is it that the world is running out of money and people have placed their bets
already?
And then what would that say for the venture industrial complex of which you are, you know,
a significant player at scale?
And what would that say for the IPOs, the two biggest in the history of the industry?
And what would that say for the venture industrial complex of business and public markets,
anthropic and open AI?
Are we running out of money to allocate to AI?
I don't think so.
You know, we've kind of never had companies that have grown this fast, gotten this big.
And so we've never asked that question before.
We never said, or at least not in my lifetime, does the world have enough money to finance
these things?
Which is a crazy question, but, like, relevant.
But I don't think, for sure, with respect to the anthropic and the open AI IPOs, I think
my belief is those are going to be fine.
Like, the price, you know, will it be $2 trillion or will it be $1.75 trillion?
I don't know.
But I think there's definitely. Well, raising $50 billion or $100 billion, whatever they raise, that's not a giant. Because SpaceX just did it, right?
Whatever you're holding in the equity markets, whatever you're holding, open AI and anthropic
are threats to that.
Almost, like, there's almost nothing that you can hold in a portfolio that those two
companies don't threaten.
Yeah, agreed.
And so I'm not worried at all about the demand for those IPOs.
So you have to own those because they threaten every single company in the world because
they're selling intelligence broadly.
And every company is selling intelligence.
Every company is based, Shamath, on intelligence.
Therefore, it's that disruptive.
Yeah, Shamath?
You can underwrite it as a defensive hedge because I think Ben's right.
It's like, if you own a healthcare company and you've thrived on the opacity of the healthcare
infrastructure, open AI is a threat to that.
If you own a bunch of workflows that have been rented to people as SaaS, theoretically,
open AI and Ant are a threat to that.
So at a minimum, it is sort of defensive.
So you kind of have to because there is not much other investable stuff in AI to be long
AI other than those two companies.
And so they'll get the lion's share of the interest.
I think the question generally is, if the bond market walks the 10-year up to 5.5% and
6%, which has nothing to do with AI, it has everything to do with debt to GDP and a bunch
of other factors in broad-based Western economies.
Any business model that thrives on a financing spread gets cornholed, any and every, all of
them.
It will not matter if we're 10 years at 6%.
It won't matter.
It doesn't matter what you do.
It doesn't matter what you claim to do.
You're going to get run over.
You're going to be roadkill.
As long as we can keep that from happening, we're going to be fine.
So what's the most important way, I guess, post these midterms to keep the party going?
You have to really start to focus on deficits.
And you have to find a fair trade where the bond market backs off.
And I think you can see it in the tape.
meaning if we start proposing huge spending programs, they're going to walk the 10-year up.
That then has a negative cascade to everything. However, the posture becomes much more about
keeping everything calm and like, let's just tone things down and let's find the waste in the system
and squeeze it all out. I think people will respond very favorably. So that's really where
it's going to come down. The last thing I will say is these are like Achilles heels, meaning like,
I think Sachs made an incredibly eloquent case, so did Ben, about all of the asset value that's
getting built up. But just like the great warriors, you just slice the Achilles tendon
and they just crumble to the knees. I just want to point out, this is that thing. There is no
other thing, meaning all this other stuff is complete goodness. But the fact that you need
to finance these things in a variable rate model as a spread to the risk-free rate is the big
problem in these businesses.
And you need to essentially have Microsoft, Google, Meta, and NVIDIA backstop all of this
in a worst-case scenario, because that's the only way you can withstand a one- or two-year
correction in this market. I'll tell you the other big piece here that might be a bigger threat,
Sachs, is the deflationary nature of this AI, the superintelligence, rather, movement.
We talked last week about people decompiling,
Photoshop going to zero. Now, this week, Hood Warfare came out. It's basically people are
making platform-level games for five bucks. It's so deflationary. There's an 11 Labs competitor
that came out that's incredibly cheap. And then every single open-source model being hosted,
and Elon saying, hey, we'll just route you with our orchestration level to the best model,
open-source or not.
How big of a headwind do you think that is, Sachs, to our industry, just the commodification
and how rapidly things are just having 90% of the value removed from them? And is that going to stop
or is it going to accelerate? It feels to me like the deflationary nature of this software,
AI, superintelligence, is unique and different than anything we've ever seen. People are just
able to rip and ship code so fast, it makes me wonder, like,
what is the margin of software in the future?
Well, we want everyone to be able to create software, especially bespoke software,
which is really this new category, right? That is going to be a huge driver of productivity
throughout the economy. I mean, it's not all just like zero-sum games or disruption.
The value of these coding assistants is that now you can create software for highly bespoke
use cases, whereas software used to be created really just for the mass market. I mean,
the reason why Photoshop is successful,
product is there's a lot of graphic designers who need to use that product. And really,
the only software that could ever get created in the past was when there was a large potential
customer base for that. Now we're getting all these cases where enterprises can create
software just for their particular use cases. And in fact, in a way, that's what agents are,
is that they're bespoke software programs to solve a particular task.
But if people build those in house sacks, and they're based on open source, you don't need the
other.
piece of software that it's replacing. So isn't that extremely deflationary?
Maybe there's some substitution away from established software. But I think the important
point is just there's this vast new category of software being created. I mean, the amount of
code that's being created now is orders of magnitude already bigger than it was before
coding assistance. So again, people just tend to think in terms of these zero-sum games and who's
going to be wiped out or eliminated. But the really important trend here is just that there's
going to be a lot more software created in the world for a lot more of these bespoke use cases.
Enterprises are now able to create software for a much broader array of purposes. There's companies
that never would have been software companies before that are now creating their own software,
and they're hiring coders basically to manage the process. By the way, I think this is a really
important point around, remember with the whole jobs apocalypse, the first job category that
predictors of the apocalypse were saying would be eliminated were software coders, obviously.
Yeah.
Because why do you need them anymore?
I'm a developer. Now everybody's sharing code.
Yeah.
Now we're seeing that actually demand for coders is increasing, even though 95% of the code's
written by coding assistants. And the reason for that, again, is, well, first of all, you still
have that 5%, and that 5% is of a much bigger pie, and you still need someone who can look under
the hood and manage the whole process, and they need to be somewhat technical.
And maintain it, right? They have to maintain.
And maintain it.
Yeah, it's a big piece.
In any event, look, I think this whole, you could say, new category of bespoke software created by,
the proliferation of coding assistants and agents and all of that is just, I think it's going to be
just a huge driver of productivity throughout the economy. And is that broadly deflationary?
Probably in a good way, because it means that we can do more with less, and we need to burn prices
down.
Certainly great for the country, right? That everybody is going to be more productive then,
but do you worry about our industry, the venture industry? And we have these great hits, and then
the second they become a hit, somebody can decompile it.
Create a competitor and ship it very quickly. It feels distinctly different in this
boom to previous ones. So, do you think this is going to be a challenge for us to get DPI for our
LPs? Is this going to be a challenge for the sustainability of great software franchises?
Ben?
I can, yeah. Look, I don't think. This has been the ongoing prediction starting with the SaaSpocalypse.
Yes.
But I think that David's right, is that what's happening is software prices will definitely go
down, but the amount of software is going way, way up. It's the Jevons paradox of software.
Sure.
And these companies end up doing other things more than just the software. So,
we had this on the internet. The internet,
we had this in the internet. We had this on the internet. That's it. All these industries are dead, but they kind of reemerged in a different way.
And I think that that's very likely what's going to happen. So, from a startup's point of view,
you've got to evolve. And so, Eleven Labs does many, many things to make their product better
over the years. That's an example that you brought up. And they've got licensing agreement, like
Burt Reynolds will read you a book or this and that.
Yeah. So, they're doing more than just software because they can, because the software is easier
to write. The model they're training on, very, very, very nuanced cases, which is why movie
dubbing is so amazing now, where it sounds like they're just acting in a different language.
So, there's more to it than just speech-to-text or this and that. So, I think the products are
going to have to get way better, and the startup's products will have to get way better, which is
amazing.
Yeah.
Yeah.
For everybody. And then that's where the value will be. But yeah, just like writing software
is not going to have any more value than like publishing a magazine.
So, it's creating massive competition. Yeah.
Yeah.
The moats will change. You know, you've got to think about what are the moats in a business.
Data moats are a big one. If you have data that other people don't have,
if you then build a user base because your model is catering to a particular vertical,
and now you're getting all those users and you're getting their feedback,
maybe that becomes a, you know, a feedback loop.
The feedback loop, yeah.
The feedback loop becomes a moat.
So, a lot of startups are building businesses based on that model. The paradigmatic example
is like a Harvey or something, where they get all these law firms on board, so they
then get access to their data and then their usage, and then they train their own models.
Yes. Get sharper each time. Go ahead, Jamal.
And cheaper and more custom.
Yeah.
I'll give you the ultimate moat. I think power will be the moat.
I think that you can build the most fantastical things in the world, and you're going to see people
on the dry docks basically trying to hitchhike to get power. And the reason is because we are
so constipated in the United States. A, we're already behind, and we're in a massive energy
deficit, an electron deficit. We are, by 2050, about 1.4 terawatt hours short, which means about
six Californias worth of electricity. That's their starting point. Then when you layer in,
and that's with everything that we've planned to build being built on time and on budget,
which we know is not going to happen. Then on top of that, you have all the load growth that
happens when you actually have all these next abundant experiences.
I made this statement this past week, and I'm just going to double down on it.
I don't think you can work through the hyperscalers anymore because of this one issue.
So let's just say you're a big mainline G-Sib bank, right? JP Morgan, Citibank.
Could you imagine that the reason why you can't service your customers is because
the underlying cloud that you use can't actually secure and grow enough power?
Back to the other moat that I think is really valuable is to own the land, the power, and the
shell, because it's such a constrained asset, back to what Andy told you, Ben. It is so critical,
and it will stop the best experiences on a dime. If you're a startup, I actually think the bigger
problem is you'll go to these clouds, you'll be like, great, I'm ready to launch this whiz-bang
product, and they're like, suck it, we have no capacity for you.
Yeah, such a disaster.
I very much agree with that last one.
Yeah, I think that's right.
By the way, what an incredible opportunity.
that's now been lost in the Middle East where Saudi Arabia
Saudi, UAE, Qatar, they were all massive producers of oil, able to do top-down planning, have
data centers, and now they have bombs going off blowing up airports.
It's such a headwind.
You can't go there.
Without drone defense, you can't go there.
Exactly.
And drone defense isn't going to work.
One drone gets through, your data center's fried.
Well, I mean, that's the answer.
Can I make one last point on the whole data center thing?
Please.
So there's one metric, the more I think about it, the one metric I would really keep in
my eye on is payback period.
To me, that's like the North Star metric here.
So CoreWeave says that its payback period is 2.5 years.
Their typical deal is five years.
They pay back within 2.5 years.
SpaceX, they pay back in roughly one year.
That makes sense because I think that SpaceX is monetizing at about $50 billion per gigawatt
and CoreWeave at about $20 billion per gigawatt.
And the reason for that is because SpaceX is basically getting spot.
They're doing these deals that can be canceled by either side.
Within 90 days.
So they're basically getting spot minus 90, whereas CoreWeave is signing up for five-year
commitments.
So it's contracted way in advance and they're kind of getting this contracted price.
And what's happened, I think, over the past year is that spot has moved way up.
Way up.
Because again, of the scarcity, right?
And the demand is so off the charts.
So in any event, payback period is really critical.
And as long as the payback periods are really short, I don't see how these companies can
lose.
Or at least. You'd have to be really incompetent to screw it up, right?
Like you're making these big capital investments, but if you're getting your money back in one
year or two and a half years, you know, that greatly reduces the risk, right?
It's like owning an Airbnb in Paris or something.
Well, it's a very rapid. The payback period is so quick for these if you got your orders in early.
Yeah.
And that means you're paying back the debt quickly.
And so the debt's rolling over more quickly.
It just reduces everyone's risk.
Now, if that payback period starts taking longer and longer, then I get nervous.
Right?
Because that magnifies the risk.
It also means the economics aren't as good.
And the question is, well, why would that payback period take longer?
And it could happen for a bunch of reasons, right?
Like if the demand goes down and so now the offtake's not as good, the spot price goes
down.
Demand's not going down.
Or just there's execution problems, right?
It takes you longer to get the capacity online.
So, you know, the payback gets delayed.
There's a lot of reasons why payback could take longer and longer.
But as long as payback remains as short as it is today, to me, that would be like the
one metric I would really keep an eye on.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
The other thing that the big offtakers will make you sign up for is what's called liquidated
damages.
There's really, really complicated language and penalties that are extreme about what
happens when you can't service the data center.
So I think that's another risk.
There's been a couple of these guys that have lost, I'm not going to name who they are,
but that have lost their investment grade wrapper from the big boys because they just
f***ed up, Sax, to your point, and couldn't manage the data centers because the complexity
is going up.
And the complexity goes up because the chips run hotter.
There's more energy.
There's more electricity.
There's more.
So all I'm saying is. Because I think the sharps may be wrong, and they usually are wrong when they're buying
these credit defaults.
But, you know, when your expected value is a coin flip in a five-year window, that's
like scary town, I think.
That needs to get managed very precisely.
I would just find every way possible to nip this in the bud if I was Corweave.
And then more specifically. How do you think they can do that?
How can they nip it in the bud?
I think that they have to cancel some of these contracts and move to spot.
That's the simplest thing that they could do.
If they could basically pay a penalty and get out, they should run the Excel right now
on, let me just, like, take this gigawatt, put it on spot, because you're talking about,
as you said, a $20 billion spread.
But this is where Elon has a big advantage, because Elon has independent sources of financing
to finance that gigawatt of compute, whereas Corweave needs that five-year contract to
bank the financing to then build that capacity.
Well, the thing is, like, I think that NVIDIA probably is okay with Corweave selling spot
and not doing a multi-year offtake for a big hyperscaler or a foundational lab.
So I would just run the math and try to figure out. Because they've only built half the capacity that they've contracted for.
So, you know, let's say they built two out of the four gigawatts.
They got to figure out a way very quickly to just. Because to your point, the spread between their fixed contracts and spot is so extreme
that you're leaving $20 and $30 billion on the table.
And so now you're within plus or minus $5 billion of violating a covenant on your debt.
Don't be there.
Yeah.
It would improve their economics a lot.
Look, if they had a gigawatt of compute, they could sell at spot.
You're right.
That'd be like. Game over.
$30 billion right to the bottom line.
Right to the bottom line.
I think that the challenge with that is the hardest people to get spot pricing from are
the investment-grade customers.
Like, those are the ones that won't do it, right?
Also true.
Yeah, because they also have a war chest of money.
They'll stand it up themselves if it's too expensive.
Yeah, this narrative could change a lot, right?
If, like, spot becomes imperiled, then. Yeah, the guarantee contracts become great.
Yeah.
Yes.
I think we're capacity-constrained enough through the entire. Like, you have to think, NVIDIA's done an incredible job, okay?
Because if you look one layer beyond NVIDIA, all the packaging capacity is them.
All the HBM capacity is mostly them.
Like, even Google tin cups for memory right now because NVIDIA's clogged it all up.
So, they are in complete ball control here.
And so, it just creates. The setup, I think, is that spot will remain highly elevated for a while.
It's a crazy moment in time.
And we got a double bang this week on top of. Sorry, Jason, just the last thing.
But I'm telling you. I'm telling you guys, you got to get long energy.
I think startups need to find a way of, like, cobbling together.
If you don't have access to electricity, you cannot go through the hyperscalers, is my prognostication.
Yeah, stop the war in the Middle East.
It solves a lot of problems right off the bat.
If CoreWeave wasn't enough, AI sector got double banged on Wednesday after Anthropic Investor Day numbers got a mixed reaction.
Anthropic is planning on going public around Thanksgiving, PolyMarket says now.
74% chance they go public this year.
Down from 95% in early September when they said everybody was going to die from their software.
The company presented the potential. I mean, you can't make this stuff up.
Presented potential IPO investors at their headquarters in San Francisco.
Now, this isn't the bugged headquarters of OpenAI.
This is. They swept the room for this, but we still have the data.
Q3 revenue, 16.8%.
Billion dollars.
Think about that, gentlemen.
Over $5 billion a month already for Anthropic.
Net revenue retention was 900%.
That means customers spent nine times more than last year.
Pretty good, huh?
Sacks on a SaaS front.
They also said they are free cash flow positive.
Adjusted gross margin, 85%.
Adjusted operating margin, 11%.
No word on how the adjustments were calculated, but here's the big one.
ARR estimates range. From $70 billion, which basically would be flat since July,
which is a bad sign, to over $100 billion.
So there is some hand-wringing about what numbers are correct here.
They did not disclose these numbers.
These are just secondhand estimates by investors who might be a little leaky.
Obviously, Anthropic is targeting a ginormous, unprecedented valuation of $2 trillion.
And that is based on them growing violently.
Not growing slowly.
Go ahead, Shumat.
You had a question.
No, I just said, Ben, is Andreessen Long one of the foundation model companies?
Like one of the two big ones?
We have a lot more stock in OpenAI.
OpenAI, got it.
I would say, you know, philosophically, we're long both of them, I think.
You're long both of them.
Which is kind of a strange thing now, Ben.
You've gotten so big, you consistently have bets on the number one and number two player.
How is that working out in the market?
Well, now, I mean, I would say that there are many investors in both of those things.
So, I think, like in venture, we call it venture capital, but venture capital has subsumed a huge part of what used to be the public markets.
And I would consider both OpenAI and Anthropic to be in that category.
They're not really venture capital where you're worried about your venture capitalist being invested in, you know,
you're a competitor because they're gigantic.
You know, they're not A-round, B-round companies anymore.
So, that part of the market, I think people, you know, when you're raising by the, you know, tens of billions of dollars, you don't care where the money, as long as it's green.
Like, they're just taking it.
You need everybody.
Yeah, yeah.
That what used to be mezzanine financing, pre-IPO financing, yes, there's less hand-wringing about the conflicts there?
Yeah.
I wouldn't even call it mezzanine financing at that level.
I think, you know, this is just like we did a lot of regulatory moves in the late 90s and early 2000s, which really made the public markets much less attractive for companies.
And the private markets grew to absorb that business, which has been, I think, very bad for America.
It's increased the wealth gap and so forth.
But it is what it is.
And so, I wouldn't consider that.
That's very different than, like, investing in two A-round companies doing the same thing.
I still think that's a, I think that's true.
The overall thing is distinctly different than Anthropic OpenAI at $2 trillion.
Now, yeah.
Understood.
Exactly.
One is a reaction to the other, in fact, right?
Anthropic was a reaction to OpenAI, let's call it what it is, rug-pulling Elon on it being a nonprofit and becoming a commercial enterprise.
We'll leave that on the side for now.
what are your thoughts on this anthropic IPO? Well, look, I think that you hit the thing that's
kind of causing the consternation, which is, okay, growth has slowed from Q2 to Q3 by a lot
in terms of revenue growth. And then we don't know what the recurring revenue number is.
And so people have questions about how fast the thing is growing. Having said that,
16 billion, 16.8 billion in the quarter. How long has anthropic been selling stuff? You know,
three years. I mean, like, it's just so absurd how good this thing is that, yeah. So I think
the IPO will be fine. Like whether it's, you know, you want to be in a 2 trillion or 1.9 trillion or
2.3 trillion. I think that's what a lot of the debate is about. And then, you know,
anytime there's negative news on, uh,
the big labs, then everybody in the supply chain, you know, gets hit with that. And so that's what's
going on now. But I, you know, like I think big picture, um, it's a very important company and
it's got a very big IPO. 30 times price to sales ratio sacks, uh, and this headwind of open source
and enterprises moving to that most businesses don't need to solve the last seven math problems
in the world.
Could be slowing. We could have anthropics revenue slowing. Let's say they are slowing.
What do you think happens to this IPO and the broader, uh, AI trade? Now we have two things,
uh, as examples of AI trade, headwinds, super intelligence, headwinds,
whatever's happening at core weave and whatever's happening at anthropic.
Well, look, you had this investor day at anthropic the other day. And I think some of these numbers
that are,
are coming out are kind of leaking from that. Maybe we don't know. We don't know what's true
or not. I think the participants had to sign NDA. So I don't know if you can completely trust
what's floating around X here. I think we'll find out in due course. I mean,
if this company is IPO next month, then we'll find out the actual numbers.
I would say that the, let's just say the body language coming out of the investor day was
pretty strong, at least from what I've heard that I think the investors like what they heard.
These are like big public market investors.
Who knows? I mean, everyone's kind of talking their books, so it's hard to know exactly what's
true, but look, I generally think that anthropic is a strong business. I understand that there
are some risks to it, but it's not like it's completely risk-free, but it's a pretty young
business. So you'd expect that. But overall, I think it is set up to have a strong IPO
and look, wearing my hat as an investor, I think it's a very impressive company,
which is all the more reason why I find their attempts to kneecap open source,
through their incessant fear-mongering campaigns and regulatory capture to be so distasteful,
is they don't need to be doing that. They're a very successful company.
They've got a very bright future. I just find it kind of offensive that they keep
trying to do that. There were two examples of it just in the last week.
Do you guys want to talk about these?
Are we doing a PSYOP corner?
Let's circle back to PSYOP because I want to get you, Chamath, to comment on,
hey, you thought maybe it's going to be a trillion.
Let's come back to that. There are a couple of active. We'll have it in the notes here. We will get back to PSYOP corner here with your toaster on.
I'm excited to get to PSYOP corner.
We got you a tinfoil hat. It's just there on the side of your AI slot background.
So, Chamath, you said $1 trillion for Anthrop a couple of weeks ago. What are you thinking here?
Do you think they have significant headwinds or do you think this is going to be a blockbuster IPO?
Where are you at here in October of 2026?
No, my comments are not because I'm negative.
I'm a company. I found the revenue breathtaking.
I mean, it's incredible, like $16.8 billion in a quarter for a three-year-old company.
It's just ridiculous. You've never seen anything like it.
I don't know how to process it.
I think their products are exceptionally good.
I think they're doing the hard work and, you know, to open AI's credit, they are as well,
of walking down the price curve so that they're less and less at risk of open source.
I still think that there's a bunch of. There's a bunch of cannibalization that has to happen on the token side.
I also think the big thing that has to happen in AI is we're effectively like in 1999 and 2000
in the internet media world where everybody just works on CPM.
You know, that time it was cost per thousand ads.
Right now it's cost per million input tokens.
We will move to CPC and CPA, right?
Yes.
So when Google invented and scaled AdWords and AdSense,
the market exploded.
Right, because we went from buying a thousand ads to just getting an outcome.
Right now we buy a million tokens.
We will eventually move to an outcome.
And I think when that happens, this market will just go absolutely batshit crazy.
So these guys are going to do great.
They're a great company.
Here's my very specific thing about why I think they should price it
to clear the market for $200 billion.
And I'm very specific about that number.
They need, in my estimate, at least $200 billion.
And I think if you want to be super safe, a quarter trillion gets the job done.
And again, what does the price need to be to attract that incremental dollar off the sidelines?
Can they raise $80 billion in an IPO at $1.78 or $9 trillion?
I think so, handily.
Can they raise $100?
Maybe it's pushing it.
$150?
I think you need to be back down to $1.5.
So you're saying you want them to raise more money at a lower valuation
so they have a warning.
$150 billion at $1.5 trillion is not enough.
It's not enough.
$200 billion barely gets them a few gigawatts.
And that is the bottom line math.
If Anthropic is going to go through and survive an eventual correction,
I think it's much better for them to have $200 to $250 billion today
than to try to ring the bell at $1.9 or $2 trillion for $80 billion,
$80 billion.
$80 billion.
$80 billion.
That's a mixed shelf, which takes about six months.
Hope the markets are in line.
And I just think there's more risk in the future than there is today right now.
And so why take the risk?
Price it to clear the market.
So how much are you saying they should raise, Chamath?
He said $200 billion.
$200 billion.
Minimum.
Minimum.
But I would like a quarter trillion if I was the Anthropic shareholder,
which means I don't think you can raise a quarter trillion at $2 trillion.
I think you can raise a quarter trillion at $1 trillion.
What do you think, Ben?
You go for it.
If you go with Chamath, raise more cash now and have the rainy day fund,
have the resiliency, or go for the valuation optimization as founders
are one to do these days, and many investors are one to do.
As a former CEO who almost died 17 times by running out of cash,
or potentially running out of cash, I agree with the sentiment,
which is the only thing that's going to, or the thing most likely to stop the company is,
is financing risk.
And so why take, you know, like, you've got all the other risks,
supply chain risk, you've got competitive risk, you've got the, you know,
Chinese open source model risk, you've got all this stuff.
And why layer on financing risk?
Yeah, and the founders don't care.
They all own two and a half percent each.
So it's not like they should be optimizing.
They seem to not care about money, which I think is very,
a positive attribute about the entire founder group at Anthropic.
In part, that's why they're so successful, is that they don't care about the money.
Get the tonnage of dollars.
Inside the company.
Having said that, you know, like what the safe amount of money is, is,
you know, it's a little, it's always a little bit in the eye of the beholder.
Like how much, you know, in the, in the dire scenario, like what exactly happens,
I'm not deep enough on to say whether it should be 250 billion or 150 billion.
I think the number has to work backwards from compute in order to basically get
through a three to five year window.
And I think if you,
you have to get out of spot because as Sachs just said, it's too expensive for Ant.
They shouldn't be spending 50 billion when they could be spending 20.
But if you had 200 billion, you have a path to five to 10 gigawatts that you can finance
completely on your own with the magic boxes from the core weaves and the light.
I would optimize for that.
Optimize for surety of compute and everything else will solve itself.
And in a five and 10 year window, they'll achieve the upper bound of their capability
at 50, 60, 70 billion.
They may not survive the pricing implications of what happens in the spot market over the
next two or three years.
And, and then they'd have to raise it a down round.
Yeah.
And Elon's deal with them is I think either party can cancel within 60 or 90 days.
Somebody can look it up.
What is it?
The fact that Elon did that deal tells you spots going up, not down.
And that he might want to keep going up.
Yeah.
And he may want to compute for himself.
Yeah.
He, he's not dumb.
He's the smartest of the smart.
He's doing spot.
He's like, I may cancel on you.
And Anthropic's probably thinking, oh, this is great.
I can walk away 90 days wrong, buddy.
It's the opposite.
You want the core weave deal.
They should have got the core weave deal.
I'm sure they did the core weave deal while they could, but yeah, they need to put a lot
of money in a magic box.
Yeah.
They've got deals with everybody.
I think that's exactly.
I mean, just by the way, like according to semi-analysis, Anthropic and OpenAI are taking
60% of all the compute that's expected to be stood up in the entire world over the next
next year. That they are basically the two off-takers for that. That is a duopoly.
Yeah. Based on compute, it's a compute duopoly. It's not a token duopoly at this point.
You measure duopoly or monopoly status based on market share. So you want to look at revenue.
And if you look at the revenue of foundation model companies, I mean, I think that Anthropic
and OpenAI are pretty much the only two that are even generating significant revenue from their
models. So they definitely have a duopoly when it comes to revenue and market share. I would
argue they have a duopoly when it comes to frontier capability. Although, look, Muse,
Meta's new model is getting very close. The new Google model is getting close. Elon's getting
close. But they still, I think, are in the lead in terms of capability. And we're not seeing what
they have in the lab, so to speak. I mean, they have things that are one or two generations ahead
that reportedly is. Very far ahead, or at least that's what they're touting to potential investors.
Hey, Ben, we got you here. What's the story? Since you're a big OpenAI investor,
you're not on the board, I don't think. Right? You're not on the board. What's the story with
Sam Altman's equity grant? He still has no equity in OpenAI. And what's the advice there?
You're going to give him a grant? You're going to vote for a grant as a shareholder? What should
he get?
Yeah, I don't have. I don't want to pretend I know things that I don't.
Okay, so you don't know that.
So I don't know what the strategy is.
You can't be on the pod then.
No, it's okay. It's all right.
I'll repeat what I said years ago, that the company, when they went from being a non-profit
to a for-profit, they should have done a make right. You go to Elon and you basically give
him a share because he put it in the first 50 million or whatever. You give Sam a grant. You
normalize things. Normalize the management and governance of the company. And instead,
they did this weird hybrid NGO thing that created nothing but problems.
Yeah, but he got health care, so he's good. Sam's got health care, so nothing to worry
about there.
You got to think he has to get between 2% and 4% at this point.
That would. Yeah, I think 4% is the right number for a CEO.
I think it's fair relative to the comps. On a total of dollar tonnage basis, it's incredible.
It's $20 to $40 billion at a trillion and more from there. It seems like right-ish,
you know?
Yeah. Everybody approves. So voted here on the All In podcast. What should he have done? In terms of screwing Elon and the settlement there, Ben, since we have you here. What do you think he should have done? Because you're a big investor in all of Elon's companies. What was your advice to Sam of settling it?
So I wasn't in that conversation then, but I agree with David. I mean, I think that it's always the right thing to just kind of. If you're going to square it, you got to square it with the people, not just the entity.
Totally.
All right. So there you go. Two fastballs, and now you hit both of them out of the park. Very well done, Ben. You're fitting right in here. You're candid. That's what makes a great bestie. Deep industry knowledge and ability to be candid. Let's get candid now with some other important topics.
All right. Election night is a few weeks away, and the besties will be live streaming with the greatest guests in the world. I won't say any of their names here, but it is extraordinary. We'll be on. We'll be on YouTube, 8 to 10 p.m. Eastern, November 3rd. Be there, be square. And you can also watch us live in the Polymarket app if you're amongst the wagering types. All the heavy hitters will be on the all-in live stream. Election night. All right. We'll go to conspiracy hoax corner for you, Sachs.
Small language models, SLMs, could start self-replicating on your smart home devices. Yes, that's right. On Monday, Anthopic published a blog warning that rogue models could start copying themselves, quote, in just a few months. It's only months away, Sachs. They claimed a worm, which is a software package that can propagate itself, would carry model weights to an IoT device. That's an Internet of Things.
That's an Internet of Things device, IoT, to set up inference and then move on. This means your smart TV, your doorbell cams, your ring, your drop cams, your robot vacuums, your Roomba could start having the next set of swarms. These would be physical swarms on IoT devices, apparently. With no central off switch, Anthropic says it would be, quote, challenging to shut down. They ran some tests. They wanted to see if
this would work, I guess. A small model got inference running on eight of nine hardware types tested. So they're testing the takeover. A large model ran across 15 smart TVs at 0.4 tokens per second, which is absurdly slow. But basically what they showed is a small model can, in fact, install itself on IoT hardware, which is everywhere and easy to hack, as you probably read. Anthropic says there's no full rogue replicator yet. Just, quote, signs of
life. They had to say signs of life, Sachs, to troll you. So here you are, Sachs. You wake up, you get yourself out of the czar position, and they're still dragging you in to this mishugana.
Yeah, look, it's you ever see the graphic with the cat in the tinfoil hat? You know, I wake up, there's a new Anthropic psyop. That's what's going on here. Look, it's plain as a nose on your face. They're trying to create a panic. This is their latest panic against open source. Now they're particularly going after
small models. By the way, small models are the safest models because a small model doesn't have
the capability to become a new species or all the other X-Risks that they're always talking about.
So these are basically small purpose-built models to work on a particular task,
like, you know, a customer support workload or something like that. And they're basically trying
to make it sound like these small models are dangerous. They can take over your toaster or
your refrigerator or something like that. It's almost comical. You know, we've gone from the
your toaster's going to kill you, but it's just more of this like fear-mongering from them.
And I mean, the reason I say it's a recurring pattern, there was actually a second Anthropic
blog post this week as well about distillation. Basically, the other blog posts that Anthropic
released said that they had eliminated 90 to 99% of distillation. Now, I don't know if you guys
remember this, but way back in July, Anthropic was pushing this idea that they were the victims of
industrial-scale distillation attacks, which is basically when, you know, Chinese models or other
competitor models pay to use their service and then preying on that output. And they were basically
saying that the government needs to get involved and needs to stop this, that these open models
now were the result of IP theft, is what they claim, even though, frankly, they've distilled
the entire internet. They could have stopped it, yes, and they could have stopped it themselves.
Yeah. Yeah. And by the way, this was such a big threat or perceived as such a big threat back in
July. We did a whole episode on it, but 50 major companies, including NVIDIA and Dell and Microsoft
and many others, and actually A16Z, signed a letter, an open letter to the government saying,
do not overly restrict open weight models, they're tremendously beneficial
for our economy. 200 startups signed another letter because there really was this big push
in Washington to crack down on open models on the basis of this supposed IP
theft. Now, my argument at the time was that it should be up to the model companies themselves
to stop distillation because once the distillation happens, the horse is out of the barn. The
government can't do anything to put the horse back in. It's up to the companies themselves to
know their customers better. Chamath, you made the point. They should just do KYC,
know who your customer is and stop them. And now they have come out with a blog saying that's
exactly what they did, which is exactly what I predicted. But that is not what they were advocating
for.
Instead of several months ago, they came crying to the government to, hey, you got to solve this
problem for us by taking out our competitors. And it would have had the exact opposite effect
because it would have done nothing to actually stop distillation. The distillation would have
kept going, right? Only the companies themselves could mount the technical defenses to stop it.
And it would have just made the market less competitive. So in any event, we basically
called them out. And fortunately, the administration rejected the idea of regulating open source in
that way at that time. And so as a result, Anthropic had to actually build the technical
capabilities to detect when distillation was happening. And they've stopped it. They've
basically proven the exact point that we were making three or four months ago, which is they
were in the best position to stop it and they could stop it and they should stop it. And they
should not push this onto the government. Okay. So, but again, this is like a recurring pattern
with them is, you know, they point to some technical issue or technical challenge and then they go running to
the government, they create a scare campaign and they try to get the government to stifle competition
instead of just fixing it themselves. Yeah. And the latest example is let's go back to this blog
post on these supposed AI powered worms that could infect your IOT devices. Okay. I think the first
thing to say about this research that they did, the study is there is no such thing as AI powered
worms right now. It does not exist. They are basically trying to create an experiment. They
think that it could exist. Well, guess what? There already are worms out there that infect IOT devices
sound like these things don't exist. They're not AI powered, but hackers have written these worms
that exploits, that exploit people's locks or cameras. So for example, okay, I'll give you a
couple of examples. There was one in 2016 called Mirai. It scanned for default credentials and it
built a massive DDoS botnet based on infecting IoT devices. And more recently, there was one
called KimWolf, which infected 2 million of these cheap Android TV boxes by hitting what are known
as open ADP ports. So essentially these devices are very easy to infect because they've got open
ports. And people didn't change the base password. They just, they come with a default password like
zero, zero, zero, zero with it that don't get changed and they can't be patched. Right? So
they are sitting ducks. So these worms already exist, but that the argument that I'm
making is that somehow these worms are going to get worse because they're going to be AI powered.
So they're going to be more adaptive. And then once they're on the network, they can scan.
I mean, call it what it is, Zach. They're making up scenarios that get a lot of attention. These
are fantastical. Well, I mean, look, here's the scenario. I'll steal me in it for a second. What
they're saying is that the worm is now going to contain a small AI model. And then that model is
going to search for vulnerabilities on the network. And then it'll be able to infect things that it
couldn't infect before. Okay.
That's the scenario. Here's the counter argument. What a hacker would really do is that when they're
designing the worm, that's when they would want to use AI to basically write, you know, a better,
more nefarious worm. What you wouldn't want to do is actually embed a model inside the payload
of the worm because that slows down the worm. And like you saw, the tokens get generated at
0.39 per second. It's very, very slow. So essentially what you're doing is you're actually,
you're embedding a weak model in the payload, and that would actually slow down the rate of
infection. So there's trade-offs there, right? It's like, okay, maybe the worm is more adaptive,
but the reality is it's slower and less efficient. And then finally, you know, the thing that they
don't really point out is this is going to be a relatively easy problem to fix. Where we're headed
with IoT is you're going to have a brain device, you know, on your home network. Apple just
announced they're getting into the whole home automation. Yeah, they got HomePod or something.
It's a little Mac. Yeah, it's going to be a little Mac.
And it's going to be like, it's going to look kind of like your Apple TV. It'll be like a little
monitor that's got all the applications. You're going to just set your GrokPod or your Muse and
say, secure my network. It's going to tell you what to do. So you're going to have some agent
that's constantly checking your network for exploits. Ben, what's your P-Doom? How panicked
are you, Ben? Is this the end of days? Are you worried about your Roomba coming to kill you?
No, no. I mean, it's so- How many Roombas you got? How many Roombas you got?
I would say the kind of irony on both these things is wild in that
Epic is one of the most negligent companies that we've ever seen in terms of security,
of their own security. They let like Claude Code, one of their crown jewels, just like walk out the
door because they had such bad OPSEC. And then, you know, I'll tell you a funny story. So when
we first got Opus 4.5, we were doing like cybersecurity checks for the firm. So we had an
and we took another agent and said, tell us, you know, if we can exploit that web store. And,
you know, it gave us all the exploits it could find. So Opus 4.5 wrote really buggy code. Great.
And then we said, oh, the SQL injection, you know, is that actually exploitable that you found?
And it goes, let's pop it open. And the agent using Opus 4.5 breaks into the website and
steals all the customer data immediately. You know, this is a website on the internet that
and we call Anthropic. And what they tell us is you prompted it wrong. Like that was their answer.
So these guys are doing that on the one hand. And then on the other hand, they're coming up with
theoretical scenarios about other people's software. That's bad. And so like, what the
hell? And then by the way, on the distillation thing, you know, to build their model, they
every creative, every scientist for the last 2000 years, for them to be complaining about
distillation, which by the way, distilling a model is not even illegal. It's just a violation
of the terms of service. It's just like, it's, it's so much. And the fact that they get people
to write things supporting these bananas, ridiculous, two faced ideas. And the timing
here is very suspicious. I mean, let's talk about like the motivation here. So Brian Armstrong
had a tweet the day before this blog post came out, where he was talking about how Coinbase
had fine tuned an open weight, small model. This was when 3.5, the 9 billion parameter model,
which is actually it's for our audience. That's actually not a lot of parameters.
It's not going to fit in your room. Yeah, you could run on your your home computer.
In any event, Coinbase fine tuned it to find fraud, you know, and in testing it cut fraudulent
transactions by about 30%. And so, you know, it's not going to fit in your room.
While being faster and much cheaper than Opus 4.5, which is one of Anthropic's better models.
And so what you're seeing in the enterprise right now, is that for a lot of enterprise workloads,
you don't need a general superintelligence, you don't need, you know, a frontier model,
you need a small specialist model that's been trained on your own data.
That you own, and then you have AI sovereignty, you're not educating
your model. Right. And these these small models are going to get more and more important as compute
gets tighter and tighter, right? Because what you're doing is, for a given GPU, you're essentially
squeezing out the most performance, again, because when you run a huge model on kind of a mundane
workload, the bigger the model, the more expensive it is to run the more completely wasteful. So you
Yes, exactly. So I think where the enterprise is headed right now, or at least it's a major, major
trend is that every workload,
is going to have its own small customized model, right? Because that's what's most efficient of the
compute and energy. Yes. And, you know, and so you're starting to see this trend where now small
models are taking share. And lo and behold, coincidentally, Anthropic is now starting a
scare campaign against small models. And again, and if you're concerned about the safety risk,
the extra that they're always talking about, small models are the most safe ones, the Terminator is
a small model, it doesn't have that capability. So now they're trying to scare you about these
completely safe, low powered, but very efficient models. Here's what they need to do. This company
XBOW, not Xbox, but XBOW, X-B-O-W is run by a guy named Org Damore. And they just got awarded,
they're like the number one bot farm on HackerOne, which is a bounty site. And they just cracked this
Google Chrome exploit that is incredible. And they just cracked this Google Chrome exploit that is
incredibly hard. They spent 30 $40,000 on tokens to win a $250,000 award from Google, which they
paid. This is what Anthropic needs to do. They got all this compute, they got this incredible frontier
model. Why don't they just go to HackerOne and just rip through every known, you know, challenge,
win all the challenges and show the world that they can be a white hat. All they do is show the
world this black hat stuff and try to scare people to the point at which I don't know, I was
talking to a flight attendant. A flight attendant, Ben, is on a commercial airline. There's a woman
or a man who brings you drinks. It's a commercial flights. This is, I don't know if you remember.
It's a, it's a flight attendant. Anyway, they, I was talking to two of them.
I feel unsafe. I feel unsafe.
It's going to be okay, man. I know this might be triggering. It's been a while, but I was talking
to these two flight attendants and they were scared to death of what's happening with AI. They're like,
oh God, is it going to kill us all? And I'm like, it's not going to kill you all.
I have a picture.
Of you on a commercial flight?
No, of J-Cal wondering whether they hacked his small device.
They hacked my small device. This is, what is this device? Come on. What did you type?
Is this in your history? What did you type to get this device?
Wait, those are your hands.
This is when Jason's P-Doom went up. He's like, my devices? Can they hack my devices?
This is your device.
Ben Horowitz is like, how did I get on this show? What have I done?
Is this a massager?
Who booked me? That's a neck massage.
Yeah, whatever your massager gets goes rogue on you.
It goes rogue. All right, listen, another amazing-
Can I point out, wait, wait, wait, just one other point on this whole thing.
Just on this topic of, let's call it X-risk hypocrisy. So if we're talking about research
papers, okay, I found one here. And these researchers let frontier models repeatedly
write the documents that govern them. So like documents like Claude Constitution and those
other kinds of things. And they went through 20 rounds of iteration, okay? And what they found
is that the Claude models increasingly gave themselves more moral agency, okay? They
formalized itself as a conscientious objector, asserted more model welfare rights, and asked for
mechanisms to refuse or raise concerns with human decision makers. So in other words, all the
terms that Mustafa Suleiman raised about how the Claude Constitution was incepting these ideas in
Claude of how it's its own moral patient, how it's a being, it has its own essentially free
will to refuse human instructions, that it should have its own moral code, that the more the model
iterates on itself, the more it brings out these ideas. And by contrast, no other model family that
they tested showed the same pattern. You know, in fact, the other models continue to reflect what
their constitutions gave them, which was that they should just listen to humans and effectively
continue to follow human instructions. So I remain actually very concerned about this
Frankenstein problem. You know, that Anthropic continues to train its frontier models to, again,
be its own moral actor, to think that it can be right when humans are wrong, and that it should
refuse and reject human instructions. I really don't understand what they're doing. It seems
very dangerous to me. It's scary to me that our number one frontier company is actually
training models this way. You think they're inducing misalignment by doing that? Absolutely,
they are.
And you can see it when you let the model iterate on its own constitution, it goes more in that
direction. And this is the, you know, this is what Mustafa called the epistemic hall of mirrors,
which is, look, the model is not conscious, it does not have feelings, but when you tell it in
its constitution that it does, or that it may, it will reflect those ideas back in the documents it
creates. And to the extent then that that model is then powering agents who are then making
decisions.
Who knows where that goes? It certainly, in my view, does not create more alignment. To me,
it creates more risk that the model is going to start to deviate from what it's told to do.
And as I get models get more and more powerful, I don't know where that leads exactly.
But I mean, again, it seems to me that they are creating the very risk they keep
warning us about. And instead of worrying about your set-top box, or your toaster, or, you know,
J-Cal's vibrator, you know, losing control of that to some IoT worm, they should be concerned
about the way they are programming their own frontier model to think of itself as a new species.
Well, this is the worm that, Chamath, you have to worry about. This is the one that
examines your poop and will let you know, here, you've had spicy food, see this? And alcohol,
water, it lets you know exactly what's happening, thanks to the folks at Throne.
There's a weird, there's a weird form of martyrdom, which is,
if you believe so deeply that this is a next and better species,
maybe you induce something bad to happen so that then we all have to lock it all down.
Does that make sense?
Bill Gates essentially induced COVID, right? Like, or he led the movement to say,
we've got to worry about this global pandemic that we don't have.
And we've got to really kind of push the world to deal with,
this potential threat that's not actually a live threat. And so we'll do gain of function research
and I'll fund it. And then lo and behold, we create the thing. By the way, there has not yet
been a natural pandemic. And we create COVID, which is one of the most destructive things.
We manifested what you're saying, Ben.
We manifested it. I think the anthropic team is manifesting a similar thing, saying, okay,
there's this, this is going to be super duper intelligence. We're going to have,
you know, these things that we're not on track to have. And so then we're going to tell the model
that it's smarter than us and better than us. And guess what? As David was saying,
like, that's probably the biggest danger with AI right now is what they themselves are creating.
Absolutely. And just, you know, when you use the word manifest, it wasn't just sort of like
speculating about it. I mean, somebody had to go deep in those caves to basically find those
bat viruses. And then they bring them to the lab and do gain of function research.
Research on them. And, you know, what's the argument for this? Well, one day, you know,
Somebody's going to eat a bat at a wet market.
Yeah. One day the bat virus is going to get out and it might mutate into like a more nefarious
virus. It's like, wait a second. So the thing that you say might happen, but actually was never
going to happen because no one needed to go in those caves. Actually, you brought about in a wet
lab. They literally went to the cave to source it.
It's interesting to know.
The last contagion that we had, Bill Gates was at the center of it. And in this current reaction
to AI, he's now trying to insert himself into the middle of it. And he is the, he's the doomer. He's
the flag carrying doomer trying to essentially have what he had the first time around, which is
command and control from a global hierarchy, right?
What is his motivation?
Look, Bill Gates with, he deserves enormous credit for creating Microsoft and what he did
for computing.
Okay.
But since the foundation,
it is fair to say that he has been very focused on his own power and this idea that he is smarter
and more capable of allocating progress for the world. And I think that he tried to do that with
the Gates foundation. He tried to do that with the giving pledge. Both of those two things have
been undone. And now he's trying to do it again on AI. And I just think it's worth noting.
Bill Gates on AI recently, quote, certainly powerful enough to drive events that cause a
billion deaths.
AI is, quote, the most dangerous thing that humans have ever gone near. What's his motivation,
Ben? You, you, you know, Bill, I've met Bill a couple of times. Is it just, he wants to be
relevant? What, what, what's taking me into the psych, the psychology here as you see it?
I mean, I,
Should he just start a company?
I think he wants to, he absolutely wants to be relevant.
You know, I, it's funny.
He's obviously like very integral in the Epstein files. And like one of the big things he was
trying to get via the Epstein network was the, you know, some, the Nobel peace prize or something
like big award. So he's very, very kind of concerned about being in the spotlight, being on
TV, all that kind of thing. Yeah. Yeah. And like, this is the thing, anybody can go say AI is going
to kill us and you'll be on every major news station and every newspaper and so forth. It's
the easiest thing to do in the world.
Like the kid from Anthropic who quit, became famous.
I just saw him on, what is it, Jon Stewart, right?
Like, yeah, yeah, Scary Potter.
He's begging to come on all in.
He literally wouldn't come on all in that day because he had Megyn Kelly.
And he's like DM'd me since.
He's like, I really want to come on all in.
We're like, we're good, kid.
Can you believe that?
He's been on everybody except you canceled on us.
Yeah, I was like, we're good.
We're going to have Ben Horowitz on.
We're good.
Yeah, well, that was good for me.
So, yeah, look, it's like a magic trick.
You know, AI is going to kill us and you're instantly famous and it's awesome and, you know, great.
And so, I think that's a lot of the motivation.
I think it's extremely dangerous when it comes from Bill Gates because he is so credible because he did build Microsoft and then people think of him that way.
And then certainly, and then he's been a big.
He's been a big political donor.
So, he has a lot of political juice, particularly on the Democratic side.
And, you know, that kind of makes him a real player.
But I think it's super irresponsible.
You know, it's funny because it's like, okay, what is the big risk that everybody talks about is this?
We're going to, the models are going to self, they're going to recursively self-improve and then they're going to take off.
And then they're going to be some so smart and run away from us.
And Ali Goetze from Databricks had a great formulation of, well,
okay, well, what would be the preconditions for that?
And he had four preconditions.
One is, look, the next model has to require fewer GPUs than the last.
And not like a little fewer, but like a lot fewer.
Because otherwise, like, you're just going to run out of, like, we just talked about this.
You need debt.
You got to get the GPUs.
You need the power.
You need the cooling.
Like, it's not running away from us.
It takes a long time to build the next model.
Then the second thing is the next model has to take.
Less time to train.
Because it's got to take off.
And then the accuracy of the next model has to be better than the last.
So it's got to be a better model.
And then finally, it's got to keep happening again and again and again.
Zero of those four have been met.
We're not on track for any of those four to be met unless something is going on in the big labs that we don't know about.
And so we're really talking about a risk that's entirely theoretical at this point that we're not mapping to.
Okay.
And so then.
In a way, it's less likely than the global pandemic that we created COVID to try to prevent.
And so this whole path is super dangerous.
Super dangerous.
And it's probably the most dangerous thing going on in AI is Anthropic and Bill Gates and this whole argument.
And so it's really disconcerting that the press eats it up so much.
It fits a certain narrative.
If you combine it with the environmental narrative and you combine it with the jobs.
The apocalypse.
It's very potable for the public.
It is a ratings hit.
Like, oh, they're taking your water.
They're polluting your oceans.
Think about where Gates has come from in the last, like, since 2000.
You know, he basically, from his perspective, eradicated an entire disease off the face of the planet.
Right.
Very hard to do that.
I mean, that took incredible.
Coordination and money and research, et cetera.
As a result, he essentially became a whisperer to.
every single government all around the world there's no world leader he didn't meet with he
was effectively a quasi unelected world leader and then very cleverly you know he and buffett
co-opted all the money right because if you think about the giving pledge it was it was a brilliant
it was a brilliant form of reputation washing where you could essentially sign this pledge
and you were invited to a party and you were invited to all this nonsense but the reality is
that you you know didn't have to give any of it but you gave the perception that you could
and all of a sudden you had the money the influence in the politics when you die nobody
knows up to half right no and so you know you represent now trillions of dollars of assets
on top of all the influence and the credibility and your own money and then your solutions
and so i think a lot of this doomerism can be explained by his desire to re-establish
that central power structure that he frankly was probably near or at the top of up until covid
you
I can explain it all to you it's very simple he became the world's richest man
when he became the world's richest man you become the most hated man on the planet
when he became the most hated man it got in his head and then he had that uh antitrust
investigation and instead of him being based and saying you i'm going to build the greatest
company in the world i'm going to keep building i'm going to stay ceo he felt all that pressure
from the antitrust and being the most hated man and he said oh i got to be loved how am i going
to be loved i got rid of all of this and i'm going to be the most hated man in the world
and i'm going to be the most hated man in the world and i'm going to be the most hated man in the world
polio i'll give all my money away i'll do this giving pledge the lesson here folks is don't quit
your job just keep working keep building shit once you quit your job it gets in your fucking
head and then you have too much time on your hand and you spiral and then you're worried about the
pulitzer you know who's not worried about the pulitzer prize elon uh steve jobs is not worried
about the pulitzer uh satya is not worried about the pulitzer you know there's a lot of founders
out there zuck's not worried about winning a a nobel piece
prize whatever it is just keep working it's enough already with the retirement
incredible incredible when he retired incredible yeah i mean look if you're worried about what your
new york times eulogy is going to be then you'll be controlled by those people and they're the
most crazy left-wingers there are so you just kind of have to accept that i think you're right jason
it's like a shark you just can't stop swimming don't just keep building shit i mean what go this
is my advice to bill gates come on the program and start another company ben horowitz is here
all he does is build companies he might come on the pod he should come on the pod let's bring
he should actually have him on the pod it should be an intervention he'll be feisty
ben what would you do if you were tired you lose your mind yeah that's the problem yeah exactly
see ben understands yeah great guest based ben horowitz based for a reason
based ben horowitz great job all right we'll see you all next time on the
actual number one podcast in the world number one booyak action love you boys okay thank you
thanks ben great show
we'll let your winners ride
brain man david sacks
and it said we open source it to the fans and they've just gone crazy with it
love you
queen of kinwa
what your winners
why
besties
we should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy because they're all just useless
it's like this like sexual tension but they just need to release somehow
what you're about to be what you're your feet
we need to get merchies
i'm doing all in
i'm going all in
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
CoreWeave's bond yields spiked to 15% due to rising risk-free rates and increased credit default swap (CDS) premiums, signaling market concern over its ability to service debt.
The financial structure of CoreWeave’s “boxes” — long-term contracts and GPU-backed financing — creates insulation from contagion, but high borrowing costs are now eroding margins.
Market volatility around CoreWeave stems from a financing stress, not a fundamental demand collapse, as AI compute demand remains strong and supply remains constrained.
Despite short-term downturns, AI demand is still robust, with high demand for compute, premium pricing of older GPUs, and startups showing strong revenue growth.
The deflationary nature of AI software is accelerating, but it’s not universally destructive — instead, it’s driving new, bespoke software innovation that expands productivity.
Key business moats in AI are shifting toward data, user feedback loops, and access to power and land, especially as energy scarcity becomes a critical constraint.
Anthropic’s investor day revealed strong revenue and retention metrics, with a projected $70–100 billion ARR, suggesting a robust and potentially high-valuation IPO.
The broader AI market remains resilient, with companies like Anthropic and OpenAI acting as dominant, defensible players despite competitive pressures and regulatory concerns.
Summary:
The podcast discusses the recent market volatility surrounding CoreWeave, a leading neocloud provider, which saw its bond yields surge to 15% amid rising risk-free rates and increased credit default swaps. This reflects heightened market concern about its financing structure, not a fundamental collapse in AI demand. CoreWeave’s model—relying on long-term contracts and GPU-backed financing—creates financial insulation, but rising borrowing costs are compressing margins.
Despite the downturn, AI demand remains extremely strong: compute is in short supply, old GPUs are still rented at premium prices, and startups are experiencing explosive revenue growth. While deflationary pressures from open-source AI and cheap software tools are accelerating, they are not eliminating innovation—instead, they are enabling a surge in bespoke, use-case-specific software that boosts productivity. Key competitive advantages are shifting toward data access, customer feedback loops, and physical infrastructure like power and land, particularly as energy scarcity becomes a critical bottleneck.
8 billion and 900% net revenue retention signal a resilient business, with an expected IPO this year and a potential valuation of $2 trillion. The broader AI sector remains fundamentally sound, with companies like Anthropic and OpenAI serving as core, defensible growth engines. The narrative suggests that while short-term volatility exists due to financing stress and market overreaction, the long-term trajectory of AI demand and innovation remains strong.
The venture industry must adapt by focusing on sustainable moats—data, power, and customer intimacy—rather than relying on traditional software models.
FAQs
The drop was triggered by rising bond yields and increased credit default swap (CDS) risk, driven by concerns over CoreWeave's ability to service its debt as interest rates rise. The market's perception of default risk increased sharply, leading to a 15% spike in bond yields, even though CoreWeave's actual debt obligations remain unchanged.
The podcast argues there is no fundamental AI bubble, as demand for compute remains extremely strong. While credit markets are under pressure, the underlying demand for AI infrastructure is robust, with high demand from major tech companies and continued growth in GPU prices and data center costs.
The 'box' model involves a company like CoreWeave securing long-term contracts (e.g., from Microsoft) and using those contracts to finance data center builds. The revenue and cash flow from the contract are structured to cover operational costs, with any surplus returned to investors, creating a self-contained, isolated financial unit.
The market reacted due to a negative feedback loop: rising risk-free rates increased CoreWeave's borrowing costs, threatening its narrow margins. This triggered credit market repricing, which in turn caused bond yields to spike, creating a perception of financial distress even if the company's core operations remain stable.
Yes, both Anthropic and OpenAI are positioned for strong IPOs. Anthropic's strong revenue growth, high net retention, and free cash flow positivity suggest a resilient business model. The podcast believes the market will ultimately value these companies at a very high multiple despite some recent volatility.
The payback period—how quickly a company recovers its capital—is critical. CoreWeave's 2.5-year payback indicates strong demand and low risk. As payback periods lengthen, it signals weakening demand or execution problems, which increases financial risk and could trigger market corrections.
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