426: Copyright v. The Internet

(upbeat music) Last week, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cox versus Sony, a case with huge ramifications for the future of the internet. The question at the heart of the case is, who is responsible for copyright infringement online? In this case, a group of copyright holders sued not individual infringers, but an internet service provider. That ISP did not encourage or facilitate infringement. Rather, it simply didn't do enough in the rights holders view to terminate the accounts used by the actual wrongdoers. Many of those accounts belong to entire businesses, universities, or hospitals, meaning that termination would end service for thousands of innocent users. But no matter, a jury awarded the rights holders a billion dollar verdict against the ISP. This is the tech policy podcast. I'm a slightly under the weather Corbin Barthold, so I apologize for my voice quality. It is my great privilege to be joined today by Pam Samuelson. She is the Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law and Information at the University of California, Berkeley. She's a director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. Above all, she is one of the foremost tech and copyright law experts in the known universe. Professor Samuelson, welcome to the show. - Thanks, glad to be here. - So excited to have you here. We don't do much copyright law on the podcast. So I think we should start with a primer. How does copyright law work in the context of the internet? So copyright law gives authors exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of copies of their works. Whether it's on the internet or otherwise. And so if you reproduce a copyrighted work such as recorded music and you distribute those copies to other people, that's infringement of copyright. Now the law doesn't have a contributory from infringement standard, the way that trademark law and patent law has one. But courts have used general principles of tort law to say that if you have contributed to someone else's infringement, intentionally that can be the basis of holding someone liable. And so the theory on which Sony music is proceeding in this case is a contributory infringement claim on the idea that Cox knew that certain of its subscribers had a users who infringed and they kept providing service to those customers and thereby contributed to infringement knowing that they were making that kind of contribution. - And I can think of a couple times we have touched more or less in passing on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on the show that seems like a key piece here. How does that play in? - Well, directly, not at all, because the case really calls for an interpretation of the scope of secondary liability for infringement based on common law standards. And so the Digital Millennium Copyright Act isn't directly involved in the case. And yet, both Cox and Sony are making arguments that rely in part on the DMCA. Now, the DMCA has safe harbor provisions and those safe harbor provisions, whether you're a conduit or whether you are a service provider of other kinds such as a host of content. Those are based on whether there are conditioned on whether or not you have an enforce a repeat infringer policy. And so one of the things that happened in the lower courts was that the courts decided that Cox did not qualify for the safe harbor because it didn't enforce its repeat infringer policy stringently enough to satisfy the law. So that's one way in which the DMCA has some implications for the case. But the DMCA also has a provision that says that even if you don't qualify for the safe harbor, that doesn't automatically mean that you are or a contributory infringer. It means that it's not supposed to have any bearing on the liability standard. And so from Cox's standpoint, 512L, which is the part of the safe harbor provision that says that you shouldn't make adverse inferences if they don't qualify for the repeat infringer policy limitation. And you have the argument on Sony side that the safe harbor was also intended to give internet service providers incentive to participate with copyright owners in reducing infringement. And because Cox is not doing that, and if you let Cox win in this particular case, they will have zero incentive to cooperate with copyright owners. And so that's actually a place where there's even though it's not directly involved in the case, there are arguments about the DMCA that both Cox and Sony are relying on. It is helpful and illuminating to me as a non-copyright expert to hear you say that it is only indirectly relevant, because it kept coming up in the briefs and at oral argument. And I was getting a bit turned around about how it plays in. And then at some point, I think both in the briefs and in the oral argument, the point was made. Well, the secondary liability in the copyright scheme is drawn from the common law. So nothing is to stop people from sending Cox notices about any kind of e-legality that could potentially create secondary liability if we go down this road. And I went, wait, what? So this is not a special copyright thing. If people start sending notices about any kind of illegal contents on the internet, we could be terminating internet accounts. So very, very helpful to me. As I said, we're dealing, and as you said, we are dealing with contributory liability and the discussion centered around that. And Justice Kagan at one point, I thought, summarized things well. She said that there are three principles that she drew from the case law. And one is that a defendant must seek to bring the wrong about. And two, that there must be some kind of misfeasance to be distinguished from mere non-feasance. And three, that the defendant didn't just treat the customer in question like everyone else did something special for them. Do you think that is an accurate summary? And if it is, it kind of sounds like this is an easy case. - So I think that Justice Kagan was pretty clear that from her standpoint, Sony didn't meet any of those principles, didn't satisfy those principles. So there was no evidence that Cox wanted people to infringe. There was non-feasance rather than mal or misfeasance. And Cox wasn't doing anything to help anybody in French so that it was treating them like everybody else. So I think it is the case that those principles, if adopted by all of the offices, would result in the court granting Cox's motion for judgment as a matter of law. And so that would mean not only would the billion dollar damage a war go away, but it would mean that that Sony could not go back and try the case again. And I think those were the principles she just dealt from the case law. But I'm not sure all of the justices would go in the same direction. So I especially Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson, I think both were more sympathetic to Sony and were worried about what would happen if they just granted that judgment as a matter of law. You know, would Cox have any incentive at all to cooperate with copyright owners and terminate anybody based on this? And so I think part of the question in that case is really whether copyright should have its own special contributory infringement rule, or whether it should have a rule that's consistent with common law, aiding in a betting law, or third possibility is that the copyright law would be interpreted the same as patent law, which has a codified contributory infringement standard, which frankly, Sony would not be able to meet. So there are I think a couple of different options here. I see the case as easy in terms of sort of reversal. I don't see any of the justices actually thinking that the standard that the fourth circuit court of appeals endorsed. Simply, you contributed by not cutting off enough people, and you knew that they were substantially likely to have some infringements in the future, and therefore your contributory infringer. I think I don't see any of the justices as buying that particular interpretation, but it's not clear where they're going to go. - Yes, Justice Sotomayor said emphatically at one point to Cox. You did nothing, and Justice Barrett said, "What incentives would you have to do anything if you won?" Definitely some concern there. Justice Sotomayor at one point said we're being put to two extremes, and at points, Cox was willing to embrace that framing of the case. I think it might have been Justice Kagan who said, "So it's irrelevant to the case whether Cox "was a good corporate citizen." And Josh Rosenkran said, he contested the premise, but said, "Yes, as a matter of law, "it's irrelevant to the case." - And weirdly, we actually, we can't escape the DMCA, it seems to me, because without the DMCA, it makes sense from my perspective, you don't want to go deep into the stack and start holding a Justice Barrett brought up the electrical company. Well, why can't we shut off the electricity to a house that's doing bad things? And what's the distinction between the electrical company and an ISP, and the attorney for the United States said, "Well, the DMCA, the existence of the DMCA "shows that Congress had some kind of different conception "for an internet service provider. "So it does potentially Congress think that an ISP "should be responsible for copyright infringement "of its users. What do you think of that?" - One of the things that was frustrating to me was that none of the litigants and none of the justices really noticed that the safe harbor provision of the DMCA applies to three categories of internet service providers. So if you're a host and you get a notice about somebody infringing, you have responsibility to go investigate and take it down if the infringement claim is same. There's also a provision there for cashing. Well, if you cash something and the cash has illegal content or copyright infringing content, you get noticed, you have a responsibility to take it down. And if you're in information and location tools such as a search engine and you're linking to some place that has infringing material and you get noticed about that, you have a responsibility to go and do something about it and take it down. Okay, now there's a fourth provision there for conduits. And if you look at what kind of service that Cox provides, it's really a conduit. And the conduit does not have a notice and takedown provision that's similar to the one for the other three types of internet service providers. And so you could read the DMCA to say, you don't have any responsibility at all under the statute to take something down. So what Sony has been trying to do through these lawsuits against Cox and a few others of the broadband providers is to try to, in some sense, put indirectly a notice and takedown regime for the conduits. The problem is that it's not possible for Cox to actually take anything down because it doesn't have any infringing content, right? In contrast to the other three categories, they can actually investigate and take something down. And Cox basically doesn't have that, doesn't have that kind of control. So to me, the fact that there's no notice and takedown requirement in the statute should be a strong support for Cox's position. And it just didn't come up and I don't know why. - Very interesting. That also gives me thoughts about the way that Twitter versus Tomna was discussed in the case. We recently had that Supreme Court decision involving whether Twitter could be liable for aiding and abetting ISIS because there were ISIS accounts on Twitter and Twitter didn't take them down. And a lot of the language about aiding and abetting that everybody's discussing the three principles Kagan brought up, for instance, come from that case as well as a few others. And there was attention paid to whether Cox did more than Twitter or is more culpable because did it have notice of specific wrongful acts here whereas Twitter only had notice that there were potentially bad accounts or bad material. I've never thought Thomas's description of the facts in that case was quite accurate at any rate. It sounds like maybe they should have been going the other way and talking about how this case is different because of the distinction between the two entities in the stack and no one seemed to really pay attention to that or understand it. There was some talk by some of the justices that made it sound like a social media platform and ISP are completely equivalent. - So I think the Supreme Court isn't exactly the most internet savvy group of people in the country and so they're trying to do their best. I think to make sensible interpretations of the law as applied to the internet. And I think the solicitor general was really the most influential of the participants in the oral argument in terms of sort of thinking about the implications of the Twitter versus Tom Neckase and really saying you gotta provide substantial assistance and you actually have to, there has to be some causal connection here and you have to be able to do something, right? And so what is Cox doing? It's providing a communication service the way that Twitter was providing a communication service and it's providing it without providing any kind of special assistance to infringers any more than Twitter was providing substantial assistance to the terrorists. So you know, I think it's really telling that solicitor general which usually has a pretty carefully carved out position for the solicitor general to come in and basically say no general principles of tort law should apply here. The Twitter case was about aiding and abetting and that basically articulated that there has to be purposeful culpable conduct that is the basis of the secondary liability and the solicitor general just didn't see that there was the kind of purposeful culpable conduct that was required for holding secondary liability and I think it's telling that there was nobody from the copyright office on the solicitor general's brief and in most of the court's copyright cases in the last decade or two, copyright office personnel were on the briefs and so I'm pretty sure that the solicitor general ended up taking the stance that the copyright office did not support. - Sticking with the theme of Supreme Court arguments not bringing together the greatest experts on the internet. A lot of very good lawyers arguing this, Josh Rosencrantz for Cox and Paul Clement for Sony and I believe it was Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart for the United States. It was left to Justice Alito to carry the flag of internet access. He said, quote, "I don't see how Sony's position is workable at all," said that to Paul Clement counsel for Sony and I was struck that in the course of his response, Paul Clement is challenged by Justice Alito. Okay, lots of people may be on a single account for an ISP so you're at risk of shutting down internet for the entire university or hospital or regional ISP whatever and Paul Clement said, well, a university could cut down all the students bandwidth so that they didn't have fast enough internet to engage in large amounts of copyright infringement and I found that kind of flabbergasting. These are all, again, these are all very talented attorneys in terms of standing up and arguing at the Supreme Court but that seemed to betray a real ignorance of how the internet works and what people are using the internet for. I assume there are researchers at universities who need fast internet connections, for example. And so it was a bit disappointing to see the details of an actually pretty technical field lost in the shuffle of aiding and abetting principles that are being applied to, you know, we're making analogies with sales of guns or whatever. It was the case that Clemens pretty fast on his feet. And so he had to have some sort of response to what do you do about the university problem. And I think the kind of like, from what I could tell, if there was a way to distinguish the kind of institutional versus residential accounts that sort of my or would sort of say, yeah, the hospital or the military barracks or the university, you can't cut off internet access for everybody when only a small number of people are using it in an abusive way. They would all be happy, I think, to say that there's no liability when you don't have any control over what the people are doing and you're just providing a general service to accounts. But I think the sort of the sense I got was that at least just a sort of mayor would say, with residents, cutting it off for the family would be harmful to some of the members of the family. But you could actually then, you know, make sure that junior is no longer using it for bit torn purposes, punish him and then the family can get back on. So I won't be entirely surprised if there's sort of some effort, even if only in a concurring opinion to say the institutional issues should be dealt with differently than the residential issues. So I don't know that that's going to happen and I don't think that's a particularly sound thing because if people are working from home remotely and you get in an access cut off, then people lose their jobs and people can't go to college and people can't log on to their medical portal to get the prescription that they need to prevent themselves from having some sort of heart attack or something like that. You know, it's like the consequences of the cutoffs really, I think, resonated with even Justice Alito. Now, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas, generally speaking, they're not very fond of technology companies, but both of them seemed somewhat more sympathetic to Cox's position than I would have necessarily expected. It came out in the record pretty clearly that Sony, and it's not just Sony, it's a bunch of rights holders in alliance, are engaged in a deliberate strategy, Cox is just kind of there in this lawsuit. I don't see them as good or bad, but I do have feelings, shall I say, about the way the rights holders are going about this. Justice Barrett at one point said, well, we're relying on Sony to be a good corporate citizen as well and not go after hospitals and universities and there's really no evidence that they would be restrained in that regard. Paul Clement responds, well, it's not scalable for us to go after direct infringers. How much validity do you see in that claim? I think it's absolutely true that it's just not cost effective to go against every single person who uses internet connection to use BitTorrent and get infringing songs or infringing movies. I think that's right. And the quote from one of Judge Posner's decisions in one of the peer-to-peer file sharing cases, it's a teaspoon approach to an ocean problem. So I think the court actually would be sympathetic with that. On the other hand, if there were some subscribers of Cox that in fact didn't just get three notices but got, you know, 400 a day. If somebody could go after and Sony could go after some of the bigger infringers or what were sometimes called the habitual infringers in the Sony case. So I think that actually they could go against some people and so I don't know the fact that they can't go against everybody is a reason for Cox to be alive. I should ask any other observations about the oral argument, anything that struck you that I have not done a good job of getting us into. I think one of the things that justice, several justices were concerned about is that there isn't a contributory infringement provision in 1976 act. And the DMCA safe harbors is not a contributory infringement or a bicarious infringement standard. So one of the principles that you could take away from that, now there is some language that the authors have, the exclusive right to do and quote unquote to authorize certain kinds of acts such as reproductions of works and copies. So the two authorize language means that if somebody authorize somebody else to infringe that they can be held liable. If the only scope of contributory infringement in copyright law is to authorize, then totally Cox wins, right, because Cox did not authorize any of its subscribers to engage in infringement. So the two authorize standard goes, you know, is would mean that they win. Now the question is, you know, what do you make of it, right? There are three possibilities, right? One possibility is to say, well, it's not in the statute and therefore there's no contributory infringement, Congress basically would have to revisit this and decide to enact a provision about contributory infringement. Two is, and this one came up also is to rely on the patent statute, which does have contributory infringement, has two provisions and the Supreme Court in the Sony Badamax and in the Groxter case both drew upon patent law principles in making decisions about secondary liability. And so the patent statute says that if you induce infringement, then that makes, that's a basis for liability and there's no inducement plan here. There's no sort of affirmative act to support somebody else's infringement and also a specific intent to aid infringement. So under an inducement standard, basically Sony loses the other contributory infringement standard that's in the patent statute is based on the principle that if a technology doesn't have a substantial non-imprinting use, then you can hold somebody liable for contributory infringement of a patent and if, again, if the court ends up borrowing that contributory infringement standard from the patent statute, again, Cox wins because one of the things that the solicitor general pointed out in its brief is that the service that Cox provides has substantial non-imprinting uses. So under that standard, again, Cox would win. The third possibility is, again, this kind of general principle of tort and some of the court's opinions in Sony and Groxter suggests that the court really thinks about contributory infringement and copyright law as consistent with general tort principles and that's where the aiding in a betting statute or provisions of tort law have this kind of, you have to provide substantial assistance and you have to do it in a way that intends to, you know, as a purposeful effort to make something happen. And if that's the standard, I think, again, Cox probably wins. So what Paul Clement was trying real hard to do is to say, hey, just stay within copyright law under the Gershwin standard, because the Gershwin standard says that if you contribute to, you materially contribute to someone else's infringement and you know that you're doing that, that that's enough. And I think, I think that's what the fourth circuit, the court of appeals, decided that's what the case was argued on. And so I think that again, the court is likely to say we may have said something nice about the Gershwin decision in Groxter, but we're saying now that that it doesn't, that doesn't satisfy common law standards. And I think there were some briefs that also made that kind of argument too. That is such a great overview of the paths the court might take. What I struggle with is getting a sense from the argument of which one is going to appeal to them, even Justice Gorsuch seemed to be at peace with the secondary liability being read into the statute that that ship has sailed. No one seemed, I read, to want to stick with the fourth circuit standard and say, we're knowledge and interaction is enough, but as you have pointed out, several of the justices seemed uncomfortable with any standard that in effect leaves Cox able to do nothing to just sit on its hands. So do you have any thoughts on what a workable solution might be here that doesn't necessarily give Cox everything it wants, while not incredibly disrupting the Internet? I think one possibility, and I'm not going to predict that this is the way that the court's going to go. One possibility is for them to say that if Congress really wants to revisit the safe harbor provision and say what kind of repeat infringer policy a conduit is supposed to have, that Congress can do that. So I think it's the case that the safe harbor provision doesn't exempt conduits from the requirement of having a repeat infringer policy, but there is no standard that's been set by the courts about what kind of repeat infringer policy do you have to have if you're a conduit? And that actually is not clear. Now, one of the things that is important to sort of understand is that Sony is treating every single one of the notices that was sent by this company that basically sends automatic notices of infringement of it detects sort of some infringement happening. It just sends a notice that basically says this is infringement, but there's no court determination that there has been any infringement. And it's pretty well known that some of the robot notices that get sent out are erroneous. And so there's no kind of due process built into this right now. So there's due process when you're talking about the other three categories within the safe harbor, right, the host, basically the caching and the information locating, you can actually as the service provider, you can actually do something and not clear what sort of thing that the conduits are supposed to have to do. And so clarifying that is something that maybe Congress could do or that maybe that somebody has to do something about, but the standard right now is just like whatever I think that Cox and others of the broadband providers, as well as others that are in the stack, including the electrical company, what are they supposed to do? I don't have control over those people. Well you have written eloquently about the importance for an online copyright regime to account for the interests of small and medium platforms and individual user creators. And I feel like you've you've segwayed us in well to that topic because you're already getting us to what might a better or clearer regime look like, maybe Sony somehow prevails here and Cox goes down in flames, it seems unlikely, but anything can happen that creates all kinds of knock on effects for potentially ways that network architectures have to change and all kinds of privacy problems. And on the the ashes of that result, you are advising Congress to set up the system in the way that you would like it to look, what are you telling them? But one of the primary benefits of the Internet is its universal access and it's so important to maintain universal access and that's a value that I think members of Congress even when they fight with each other about other things, we all use the Internet now and universal access means that people should be able to get on. So I think that if Congress wants to set up some sort of regime for the responsibility of conduits like Cox, that it should try to investigate what are the possibilities here and set up some sort of like standard that everybody can live with because if Sony does prevail in this particular case, there are going to be lots of Internet subscribers who are going to lose access and that's bad for everybody. And so making conduits into copyright police and one of the things that again, I think you raised earlier, which I will repeat now, is that if just not cutting off when there's some sort of notice about some malfeasance by one of the subscribers users, it's enough to basically cause institutions to lose Internet access for any kind of wrongdoing, right? So could be defamation, could be child pornography, could be privacy violations, they just can't be put in that kind of position. So I think that's important really to kind of say that copyright is important but it's not, it's not the most important thing in our society and so it's got to be a real balance. And Sony's efforts is not to get balance in copyright law. It's to basically force other entities to become its agents in enforcing copyright and I don't think that's what the court wants and I don't think that's what members of Congress will want. So Professor Samuelson, I could not possibly let you go without getting into artificial intelligence for a little bit. I'm so excited to pick your brain on some of this stuff. Let me try to segue us in a somewhat rational way from our previous discussion. There's all the AI copyright lawsuits and there are ins and outs that we could have easily spent a whole hour talking about instead of what we talked about. But specifically, how will the spread of AI generated content online potentially affect the copyright regime that we have been discussing today, contributory liability, the spread of copyright infringement being easier potentially. Do you see there as any link between increased AI content and the issues at issue in Cox versus Sony? I think most of the AI developers right now, especially the generative AI developers are going to really look very carefully to whatever the Supreme Court has to say in this particular case because there are contributory and vicarious infringement climbs in several of the 65 lawsuits that are pending against the against developers now. That's actually really important. Most of the claims and most of the attention have gone to direct infringement claims based on copying of copyright works in the course of training models and that's a direct infringement claim, not an indirect infringement claim. And the first three decisions basically on that case, two of them say that it's fair use and one of them says it isn't fair use and the one that says it isn't fair use is actually up before an appellate court right now and so we'll know something more about the direct infringement claims but sometimes the outputs of these generative AI systems either are exact or substantially similar to some of the material that the model was trained on. And then the question is, is the user of the generative AI system that produces for example images, for example, of Superman going to the moon or something like that? Is that an infringement for the generative AI company or the system basically produces what the user asks for is the user an infringer and if so is there an indirect infringement by these generative AI company and so that's actually one of the issues that has come up and has been discussed but there hasn't been really a ruling on it yet. So AI generated content that isn't substantially similar to in copyright works that were used as training data, that stuff according to the copyright office is in the public domain. So there's a lot more public domain material now than there was before because there's no copyright in that according to the copyright office. So how is everybody supposed to be able to tell what's AI generated and therefore in the public domain and what's in copyright that's going to create more confusion, and so, you know, I think that they're a whole kind of, this full of issues that will be raised in those cases, but directly, I think the gendered AI companies are going to be waiting to see whether material contribution and knowing that somebody may infringe, which is the fourth circuit standard, and what Sony is going for right now. If that standard holds, then that actually would have significant implications for the gendered AI companies. If instead, the court says, no, there has to be purposeful, culpable conduct on the part of a company before that company is held liable, I think the gendered AI companies would sort of like, oh, shoo, we're okay. And so I think that's the most direct implication of the case for the gendered AI developers. You've forgotten more about this than I've ever known. So you'll have to tell me if I'm dropping into caricature, but it seems to me as I look at the history of technological advances, be it video cassettes or music streaming or now AI, the pattern tends to be that the Sony's of the world engage in the most uncreative response possible and rush into court and don't think about the possibilities for using the new thing in a way that redounds to their benefits. And eventually some equilibrium needs to be found where, for instance, Apple gets the music right holder to understand how good the new technology could be for them if they would just get on board and make some kind of arrangement. How do you think we get to that with AI? Do they just litigate it out until one side wins or the other loses or they reach a compromise position? Do they need to get in a room and engage in some negotiation? What needs to happen? To be fair to Sony. Sony was actually the company that provided videotape recorders that are objective. So Sony has one set of interests when it's a technology provider and another set of interests when it's a copyright owner. And so I'm sure that there are some interesting conversations that take place in Sony headquarters because you know they got to have a consistent position. It's certainly the case that the lawsuits that have been brought against technology providers have, for the most part, been resulted in finding some sort of equilibrium. And one hopes that that will happen here. I think part of what's interesting about the AI space is that most of the lawsuits are actually not being brought by Disney and by, you know, there are now Disney cases, but until relatively recently there weren't really, I mean, universal music went against a couple of the sort of the AI generated recorded music group. But you know, that's actually that, those cases sell. And so I assume that actually they settle on terms that were mutually satisfactory. But you know, except for the New York Times case against Microsoft and Open AI. Most of these lawsuits are brought by, by little guy authors. And you know, that's actually pretty interesting that it wasn't has shed or McMillan that brought the lawsuits involving book authors or book sort of the training on books. It was some of the individual authors. And so that the class action lawsuits, I think, are ones that there's just a lot of money at stake in those cases and, you know, with respect to the class action cases, I don't see them settling because you can't, you just can't set up. I mean, the one case that's settled, the sort of the, the anthropic case settled for 1.5 billion dollars, that's a lot of money. But that's actually just for supposedly passed infringement, right? So the use of pirated books, they downloaded 7 million pirated books, and the parts authors were able to persuade anthropic to settle. But that's for past acts. It's not for, not for training and not for any kind of output infringement. So we're kind of in a space where I think the litigation is going to go on for somewhere between 5 and 10 years and then things will kind of shake out. I don't see one resolution here, but I think more of these cases will settle, especially with companies that are that are suing. Well, Professor Samuelson, it has been a privilege and an honor. I appreciate your time so much. Thanks so much. It's been fun talking to you. And I guess we'll see pretty soon how things shake out. I don't think the court's going to wait until the last day of its year, right? So usually the court issues its last opinions in the last week of June or the very first week of July. And I don't see this one waiting that long. I'm guessing that they'll get something out in kind of March or April. As long as they don't dismiss it as improvidently granted between the end of this recording and us getting it up online, I will be happy. This has been the Tech Policy Podcast. I am Corbin Barthold. I've been joined by the one and only Pamela Samuelson. If you enjoy conversations like this one, please go give the show a five star rating wherever you listen, subscribe, tell your friends, do all the good things. And while you go do that, I will get started on the next one. Thank you all. Thank you so much, Tom. The Tech Policy Podcast is produced and distributed by Tech Freedom, a nonpartisan non-profit think tank in Washington, DC. To learn more about our work, make a tech deductible donation or find other episodes, find us online at techfreedom.org. [ Music ]