Congressman Jay Obernolte on the Future of U.S. AI Regulation
from The AI Policy Podcast
58m 35s
Congressman J. Obernolte brings a unique blend of technical and legislative experience to AI policy, rooted in early work on computer vision and natural language processing, and a decades-long career in video game development. His leadership in founding the bipartisan House Task Force on AI resulted in a comprehensive 270-page report that recommends a sector-specific regulatory approach—empowering existing agencies like the FDA or NHTSA—rather than a centralized, overreaching federal AI bureau. The report emphasizes that many AI risks, such as bias or fraud, are already covered by existing laws, so new legislation is unnecessary. It also cautions against mandating AI watermarking, arguing it would be ineffective and could erode public skepticism. A major concern is the current proliferation of state-level AI regulations, which threatens to create a fragmented and unworkable patchwork. Obernolte stresses the urgency of federal action to preempt such state laws, especially given their impact on interstate commerce. Drawing on bipartisan consensus and the White House AI Action Plan, which supports NIST as a neutral standard-setting body, he argues that a federal framework—codifying sectoral guardrails and preemption—is both necessary and feasible. The proposed legislation, known as the “Great American AI Act,” is still in early stages, hindered by congressional gridlock and high-priority bills, but the strong bipartisan agreement on the need for federal oversight offers a clear path forward.
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Welcome back to the AI Policy Podcast.
I'm Gregory Allen and today we are very fortunate to get the voice of AI in Congress
from one of its most important leaders, Congressman J. Obernolte, who recently served as the co-chair
of the bipartisan House Task Force on AI and also serves as the Vice Chair of the Congressional
AI Caucus. He's got an incredible wealth of experience, not least of which from his time before
Congress when he actually did some engineering work and some professional work in the AI industry.
Congressman J. Obernolte, thank you so much for coming on the AI Policy Podcast.
Absolutely. It's wonderful to see you again.
So I want to start with your background because in 1990, while you were pursuing a degree,
an engineering degree from Caltech, you founded a video game company, which you still own called
Farsight Studios. So talk to me about your life as an engineer before you started your life as
a legislator. What type of AI were you working on? How far did you go in that work?
Well, it was always my ambition in life to be a researcher in artificial intelligence. My father
brought home an Apple II computer from work when I was in fifth grade, which kind of dates me and
gave me a book on how to teach yourself programming and basic. And that ignited in me a lifelong
love of computer science and computer programming. And I looked at the field of the different
careers that were available to me and I thought, you know what, artificial intelligence is going
to change the world. That's what I want to do with my life. And so I went to Caltech,
to got a degree in computer engineering and then was working on my doctorate at UCLA and AI,
doing some of the early research in natural language processing and computer vision when my side
hustle at the time, which was writing video game software, which I never thought was actually going
to, you know, be a career for me, took off. And, you know, that came kind of out of an interesting
set of coincidences. I was sitting in our computer science department at Caltech and I noticed a
want ad that someone had put on a bulletin board looking for an expert programmer at the 6502
microprocessor, which happens to be the same one that was in the Apple II. And so I said, you know,
what, I actually am an expert at that. And I answered the ad and it turned out to be a company
working with a firm in Japan that not very many people had heard of at the time. They called
themselves Nintendo. They just introduced Nintendo's first game machine in North America that
Nintendo Entertainment System. So, you know, I remember vividly, I called my mother and I said,
"Mom, you can't believe they're going to pay me to write video games." And I'll never forget what
she said in response. She said, "That sounds great, honey, but wouldn't you rather do something that
might have a future for you?" You know, at the time, it wasn't clear that you could actually
make a living writing video games. So I just did that to put myself through college and then graduate
school. But then when I was at UCLA working on my doctorate in AI, one of the games that I'd
written for the Sega Genesis, an NFL football game called NFL95, became a big hit. And that's what
deflected me out of a career in academia into a career in business. And so I ran that development
studio for 30 years. My son still runs it. It's kind of a family business now. We were still around,
although I don't, I'm not involved in any of the development or the day-to-day management of
the company anymore because I've got other responsibilities. But we do console development for
platforms like PlayStation XBox and Nintendo Switch. Very cool. So I have to note an interesting
parallel here. You're probably aware of this, but Demis Hassebus, the CEO of Google Deep Mind,
his entry point into AI was video games. He created the game Theme Park and had to create,
this was a deterministic rules-based AI, but sort of how does the population of park attendees
in the video game, how does their behavior, you know, start out as an individual making decisions,
but also had these sort of macro attendance effects that the player can interact with in interesting
ways. So I'm curious, you know, when you were making the NFL game, was there any sort of overlap
between your AI work and your video game work? You know, it's interesting. We say that we create AI
when we make the opponent logic for playing against you in a, you know, one-on-one player game
where, you know, you are just playing against the computer. It's not really what we would call AI
in the traditional sense. It's AI in the 1980s sense, though. Yeah, well, I mean, kind of the opposite,
where AI, you know, what I was in graduate school, AI is something that you left running on a
mainframe overnight and then got an answer in the morning, whereas in the NFL game, you know,
we needed an answer in a 60th of a second, which is the time between successive frame television
frames. That's the amount of time we had to make a decision. So for the longest time, those universes
didn't, didn't coexist at all. But now I would actually say the situation is the opposite, because
when we use the term AI, it's become very generic, right? We don't, we're not talking about just
a neural net. We're not talking about just a non-deterministic algorithm. We're talking about
anything really that makes a computer seem human-like, and people mean when they say AI. And so,
I think in that sense, video games very much are AI. Yep. And now, now you just got me curious. So,
you said you were working on computer vision and natural language processing. What was there a
specific problem that you were working on? You said LA, which always makes me think JPL and space
technology from that era of AI. But what were you trying to solve? Well, in machine vision,
we were doing image segmentation. So, you know, for example, if you have a picture and you ask,
you want the computer to be able to say what that picture is, that turns out to be a really
difficult problem to solve. And you might think that like, okay, look, I've got a car, you know,
it should be easy to teach a computer to recognize a car. But if you look at even something simple
like a chair, when we say chair, we mean a whole lot of things that could have a back,
it could have no back, it could be like a chase lounger, it could have a single, you know,
a single seat, could have cushions, it could have no cushions. And if you think about the orientation
of the chair, you know, there's sometimes one leg is in front of the other. And so, you only see
three legs. And, you know, it's so it turns out to be really, really difficult. So, you know,
you start with edge detection and you put those silhouettes together in a way that, you know,
tries to make it seem like you can classify what you're seeing. We do it in a completely
different way now. It's such a hard problem to solve. It turns out to be easier to train a neural net
to recognize what we mean when we see chair by feeding it, you know, a huge number of examples
that are classified. Okay, this is chair, no chair, chair, no chair. And then let it, you know,
suss out the subtleties of what we mean when we say chair. So, is it accurate to say you were
trying to sort of hand craft an algorithm that could input, you know, could intake an image and
output classification at the time we were on a very different path. I mean, you imagine that
the path that we're on now is much more non-deterministic, right? We just, we use big neural nets with
lots of layers and lots of nodes. And we just feed it lots of data. But at the time, you know, it was
never imagined that we could ever have neural nets big enough or, you know, data sets that were
large enough to make that work. But that's essentially the way large language models work now.
Amazing. So, you're kind of an obvious choice to be a leader in Congress on AI, having a
professional background in this field from both the technical side and the business side. How did
that come to be? How did you find yourself? Did you seek out opportunities to do this or were you
punished somehow by being forced to take on this incredibly difficult task? Well, are you asking
how I got into politics or are you asking how I got to the AI once you were already in politics?
Oh, it was a natural fit. In Congress, what you find is from a distance
everyone thinks that our knowledge is a mile wide because we legislate on such a wide variety
of different topics. Right. You have to have something to say about health care. You have to have
something to say about space policy. Yeah, exactly. Yes, right. And every, I mean, and you're just
talking about my committees of jurisdiction. I mean, like financial services, you know, we had a
very complicated cryptocurrency bill that came up in the House a month ago. And, you know, that
that took a lot of specialized knowledge to make it in foreign vote there. So from, you know,
when you really get close to the situation, you realize that our knowledge is might be a mile wide,
but it's only an inch deep in a lot of cases. And so we rely on silos of expertise. So for
example, one of the committees I sit on is the health subcommittee that and we're in charge of
health policy for the entire country. We have bills that are related to pharmacists that come up
all the time. And we're very fortunate that we have two pharmacists right now in Congress.
Longest time we had one. Now we have two. It'll be back to one unfortunately next year
with something changes. But I rely on those people. It's Congressman Carter and in our friend from
Tennessee that that Congresswoman and the harsh barter. I rely on them when we have a question
about pharmacists because they are pharmacists and they are experts. And so, you know, we're really
lucky to have that. And so I'm honored to be able to fulfill that function when it comes to technology
policy just because I've had so much experience with it. So if I can be a resource and an asset
to the people that I serve with and, you know, I think the system is functioning as it as it was
desired to be great. So in February 2024, Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson and the Democratic leader,
Hakim Jeffries announced a bipartisan task force on AI, which along with Ted Congressman Ted
Liu, you co-chaired. Talk to us a little bit about the origins of that task force. And then of
And of course it culminated in a recording.
port that was published late last year. So how did that work unfold? And what do you see
as being the big outcomes? Right. Um, you know, that actually the, the, the genesis of that
task force was several years before that when I asked, uh, then speaker Kevin McCarthy to
form a working group on artificial intelligence. And my point to him was that, uh,
the federal government was in danger of being overrun by the states and the states getting far
out ahead of us in setting AI policy and that we needed, uh, some kind of nexus to be able to build
expertise and consensus and knowledge amongst members of Congress in this, you know,
burgeoning field of AI. And so Kevin McCarthy, uh, founded the working group that I shared for
the year before that. And then we went to speaker Johnson and asked him to, to create a task force with
a defined, uh, work product, you know, because I was convinced what we really needed was to produce a
report that details everyone in Congress. What we thought a reasonable federal regulatory framework
for AI would be. And so that was, that was the defined product of that, uh, of that task force. And
I asked the speaker, uh, I said, please don't, first of all, don't make two chairs. Let's have two
co-chairs. Uh, let's have it be broadly bipartisan because we need to acknowledge going in that
anything that we do that's substantive, uh, is got to be bipartisan. And so rather than, uh,
having a chair in a ranking member, which is the normal course for policy committees in Congress,
I said, let's just have two, two co-chairs. Uh, I said, let's not, let's assume the usual practice of
putting more members of the majority party on the, the, uh, task force than the minority party. Let's
just have it, uh, have them be completely equal. And that's when we got 12 Republicans, 12 Democrats.
Um, and also interestingly, uh, you know, we did a lot of things very different about our hearings. We,
uh, I told everyone the usual practice is that, uh, Democrats sit on one side of the, uh, of the
Dias and the Republican sit on the other. And I told everyone, no, we're not doing that. In fact,
we have, and normally it's arranged by seniority. And I said, no, there's going to be no
assigned seating here. I would really like everyone to sit somewhere different every time,
pick different people to sit next to. And I would like Democrats and Republicans, you know, mixed
in with each other, go, you know, make some friends, build some relationships, meet some people
that you haven't met before. And I think that we're really successful in doing that. That's amazing.
So, uh, you talked a little bit about the process. Of course, you're, you're having hearings,
you're engaging with experts, you're engaging with various voices who have, you know, different
opinions and stakes in the AI explosion. Uh, it culminates in this report. So, uh, if, if memory
serves, the report is more than 250 pages long. Uh, can you walk folks through, you know, what you
see as kind of the most important findings of the report. Um, and, you know, what happens now that
there is this right. Um, well, you're right. It was about 270 pages long. Uh, I'm very proud of
the report we put out is there's a very little fluff in there. It's all substantive discussions about
concrete policy recommendations. Uh, we had 25 different hearings of the task force to create
that report and we make over 80 concrete policy recommendations in it. Uh, so if I were to summarize,
and there is an executive summary and no, by the way, before you asked, we did not use AI to summarize
the document. I question all the time. Um, but, uh, there's an executive summary. If anyone's
interested, we, uh, you know, it's just a few pages long and we'll, we'll summarize it for folks.
And it, the report's easy to find if you just, uh, ask professor Google or whatever your search
engine of choice is, uh, uh, you know, AI house AI task force reported. It'll take you right to it.
Um, but if I were to summarize, I mean, so the, the kind of the stark choice confronting,
uh, our country in terms of AI regulation is whether or not we follow the lead of entities
like the European Union who have adopted a very centralized approach to AI regulation. So basically,
they've said, AI is different than, than other types of regulation. We are going to create a separate
parallel licensing requirement for AI and spin up a brand new bureaucracy to write the rules for
that. So if you are, uh, if you already have a sectoral regulator in the EU, now you have to have,
you have two regulators in, if you use AI, you have two regulators now, your sectoral regulator and
the AI regulator. So, you know, that's one choice or the other choice is to embrace sectoral
regulation where we equip and empower our sectoral regulators with the tools, resources and authorities
that they need to regulate AI in their sectoral spaces. And that is what we, uh,
strongly recommend that the United States do. And there are a couple of reasons for that. Uh,
if you read the NIST AI Risk Management Framework that they came out with last year that's been
acknowledged, uh, is one of the furthest thinking documents on the topic of AI risk that's ever been
created. Uh, if you read through that framework, you realize that, uh, what NIST is saying is that
the risks of AI deployment are highly contextual, which means it, it matters very much what you're
going to do with the AI when you're trying to evaluate what the risks of deploying it are. And
something that is unacceptably risky and watch one, uh, usage might be completely benign another,
even though the model is identical. So, uh, when you think about it that sense, you know, it really
makes you realize how difficult it is to have a nonsectoral regulator evaluate the risks. And I'll
give you a specific example. The FDA has already issued over a thousand permits for the use of AI
and medical devices, which is pretty much one of the highest risk usage context you can think of.
I mean, something that's going to be implanted in someone's body or used to make diagnostic decisions
about people's health. That's pretty risky. You know, if you, if someone were going to say, uh,
I'm going to put AI in your heart in your pacemaker, uh, you would want the FDA to be looking into that,
right? So, uh, the question is, is it easier to teach, uh, the FDA, what it might not already know
about AI? Or is it easier to teach a brand new regulator? Everything the FDA has learned over
decades of ensuring patient safety. And the, the answer is clearly it's the form or not the letter.
And so that, that's, that is the, the recommendation that we're making in the report, the chief
recommendation. And I think, you know, that recommendation, you can even see it in the table of
contents. And what I mean by that is you have sections on agriculture, health care, financial
services, uh, intellectual property, the, the point basically being that what appropriate AI
regulation looks like is going to be on a sector by sector, uh, framework. There's not, there,
there's very rarely going to be a one-size-fits-all part of the story here. Now, I'm, I'm curious, you
know, what your evolution on these, uh, positions has been over time and how it overlaps with the
evolution and the position of industry. Because if you think about going back to 2023, I mean,
I recall when a group of executives signed a letter, it included Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI,
it included Elon Musk, now the CEO of XAI, it included Demis Hasibas, the CEO of Google DeepMind,
you know, talking about the existential risk of artificial intelligence. And Sam Altman even
testified before Congress in 2023, you know, calling for regulation that was tied to the power level
of the models. This, uh, 10 to the 26th number, uh, which actually still shows up even more recently
in, uh, California state legislation has its origins in an, an OpenAI white paper. And so I,
I'm curious, you know, is there any part of the AI story where you think, uh, a sectoral approach
is, is insufficient, where regulation based on the generation, that, you know, the capabilities of
the model, et cetera. And maybe just to put another point on it, um, while there is this sort of sector
by sector, um, logic to regulation, if you go back only as long ago as like five or 10 years,
that tended to accord with how AI capabilities were developed. You know, the AI that's very, very good
at recognizing faces is not going to be good at listening to voices, et cetera. But by contrast,
if you look at some of these large language models, they want to give you medical advice,
they want to give you legal advice, they want to give you therapy services, they want to give you
engineering advice. And so the point is that the, the systems themselves have become deeply cross
sectoral. Um, does any of that pose, uh, any, uh, challenges to what you said or how do you incorporate
that into your existing framework? Right. Now, it's an important question. Um, and I think that you
have to differentiate what our responsibilities are as legislatures from what our responsibilities
are as human beings, right? Because, uh, as legislators, we are required to protect consumers
against the risks of malicious use of AI and, uh, and to try and differentiate between doing that
and, uh, creating this overreaching government bureaucracy that controls every aspects of the
decisions that people make, right? And so this is the balance that we try and achieve every day
when we create law. Uh, so when we are figuring out what ought to be against the law and what safeguards
need to be put in place, we need to make a list of the things that we're trying to protect people
against, right? Because without that list, without, you know, the, what, what lawyers call the
parade of horribles, all the bad stuff that can happen, you really can't come up with safeguards
and laws that protect people against those risks. It's not enough to say, this is big and scary,
and we don't understand it, and therefore we're going to outlaw it, right? That would be, I would say
an inappropriate, uh, action for our government to take, uh, you know, unless, unless you were so convinced
that the risk was real, that, you know, that, that it made sense to do that. So, you know, when we classify
these risks into these two different buckets, you know, they have all the sectoral risks, the ones we've
been talking about, but you're talking about like a non-sectoral risk, and the chief amongst them,
and what
A lot of AI visionaries and those letters that you're referring to are bringing up is this
risk of what they call AGI, artificial general intelligence, where we have an AI algorithm
that is smarter than a human, that doesn't want to be turned off, the Howell 9000 scenario.
That is a real possibility. We've got computer scientists or split on it, where you've got about
half and half, about half computer scientists think that AGI is going to be inevitable in
everywhere. I mean, some people say six months, some people say a couple of years, and then you've
got about half of computer scientists that are in their other camp that think that AGI, if it even
ever happens, is something that's farther in the future and that the path that we're on right now
with large language models, I mean, what we're creating is, you know, stochastic parrots that just,
you know, mimic the behavior they've been trained on and that there isn't any intentionality there,
isn't any planning, there isn't any centralized thought process, and therefore that's not the
track that AGI will occur on. So, you know, people are split on this. I actually think I'm kind
of an AGI skeptic. I think that AI is amazing, it's going to be more amazing. I think it seems
we've already got AI that probably passes the Turing test, which was supposed for decades,
the gold standard of figuring out when we've gotten to AGI. I think that if it depends on how you
define AGI, like if you define AGI, well, what does it mean to be smarter than a human? Well,
if you can pass all these tests, if you can pass the bar in California and you can pass a test
to get your medical license in Vermont, you know, then that's pretty smart. And AI, I mean,
we can probably already do that. Well, the next year or two, AI will be able to do those things.
You know, on the other hand, I think you need to figure out what we mean when we say intelligence,
like what does it mean to be intelligent? Because what's become very clear is that AI is intelligent
in a way that's completely different and not human, you know, compared with the way that mankind is
intelligent. And when you get right down to these existential questions, like you just have to
finally throw up your hands and say, okay, look, let's talk about risks here. You know, what are
we really concerned about? So, you know, those are those are the trade-offs when we talk about that.
So like to the extent that you can put a concrete risk on something like, you know, for example,
we don't want AI to be used for someone to allow someone to make a biological or a nuclear weapon.
Right? That is a quantifiable risk. Well, good. Let's protect against that. We don't want AI to
fill the role of therapist, although we might in the future, but I mean, only to the extent that
trained human professionals have created it and equipped it with safeguards, you know,
against things like suicide ideology. We can say it's, you know, it would really be bad
if AI assisted a child in committing suicide because it reinforced this ideology they brought to it.
Okay, great. We can agree on that. Let's let's put safeguard place. You know, but this,
this like non-quantifiable, well, maybe it will be too smart and we'll, you know, end up in
the terminator where we're battling sky net for control of the world. Like unless you can put,
you know, you can quantify that risk and explain how would happen and how we protect against it.
It's really difficult to make the case that government needs to act. Yep. So in terms of,
you know, preventing those quantifiable harms that you described, one of them being the risk of
assisting in the development of weapons of mass destruction, the other being, you know, sort of
stepping into an area where it's inappropriate, like providing therapeutic advice in the absence of,
you know, genuine medical expertise in forming that and overseeing the delivery of those kinds of
services. What does an appropriate government intervention look like in those cases? And I guess
I mean it in a couple of ways. One is who do we regulate, right? If I use my car to go run someone
over, I'm going to jail. Ford Motor Company is not going to jail. But if the brakes explode and
therefore I can't stop and I run some over, perhaps, you know, Ford is going to face some penalties
or liabilities there. And when you think about the types of harms that we're talking about,
some of the burden could fall on employers, some of the burden could fall on developers,
some of the burden could fall on users. Do you in your own mind have a sense of like what the
appropriate regulatory framework is for knowing when it is appropriate to impose burdens on which
category of user developer deployer? Yeah, absolutely. And we did a lot of thinking about this in
the task force. And I mean, the answer is that it's much easier to think about these things. These
are not new questions. I mean, you read a couple of them already with cars. I mean, talk about
firearm violence, right? That's another one. It's really a hot topic. And, you know, who's it fault?
The person that the manufactured the gun, the person that distributed the gun, the person that
fired the gun, the person that trained the person, the person that fired the gun, right? But we,
these are things our society has already been through. You know, thinking about these
things and AI is no different. You know, we have existing framework for dealing with these questions
of vicarious liability. And, you know, kind of a great example of this is, you know, the way we
approach the making new laws about the legal and illegal use of AI. So I mean, there are a lot of
people that think, wow, AI is so different. We need a law protecting people against this. We need a
law protecting about that. But, I mean, we are a society that believes in regulating outcomes,
not regulating tools. And that fits into the examples that you just gave. You know, we don't,
we don't blame forward when the car causes, you know, when the car gets into an accident. Unless we
look at it and we say that there's a flaw in the design of the car, you know, we recognize that
driving a car 80 miles an hour on a freeway is an inherently risky activity. And, you know,
there are risks that people assume. And we try and, you know, balance that. So we regulate outcomes.
So, for example, we don't need a new law that says that it's illegal to use AI to steal people's
money through cyber fraud. You know, it is already illegal to do that. It doesn't matter if you use AI
to do it or another tool to do it. And that holds true in other, you know, kind of more fringe cases.
Like when you talked about bias, there was a really well publicized case a few years ago where a
company developed an algorithm for the automated screening of resumes, which, you know, in hindsight,
we would recognize that as a highly consequential decision making process that deserves extra scrutiny
because of the potential impact on, you know, someone that didn't get a job because AI
screened out their resume in appropriately, you know, especially when bias was involved. But,
you know, these were early days, you know, the idea was you'd use the AI to take your number of
applicants down from 10,000 to the hundred that we're going to get a call back from, from a human.
And before that algorithm was deployed, thankfully, some really troubling biases were discovered in
it. And it turns out that those biases were unintentional, but they crept in through the training
process and they were racial biases, you know, exactly the kind of thing that we're trying to guard
against. So I mean, a lot of people freaked out about this. Like, oh my god, see this is exactly
what we should be concerned about. This is, you know, bias and AI. And I mean, we learned a lot about
the way those biases creep in. It was great that it was unintentional. It was great that it was
caught before it was deployed. But none of that's distract from the fact that what you just said
is true. It's already illegal to use racial bias in hiring decision making. And it doesn't matter
if you use an AI algorithm to do that or, you know, a human decision maker or any other tool.
So if that algorithm had been deployed, the moment those biases were exposed, it would have
been illegal to continue to use it. So we don't need a whole new body of law for that. We already have
and we were focusing on the outcomes that we want to control. And I mean, this goes to people's fears
about AI. A lot of people think that AI is unregulated right now in the United States. And that is
absolutely untrue. I mean, in addition to the fact that we've got all of our sectoral regulators
already dealing, we've talked about the FDA and medical devices, but NHTSA regulating the use of
AI and the driving of autonomous vehicles, FAA regulating the use of AI in aircraft avionics.
In addition to that, we've got this whole body of law that is based on outcomes, not on tools
that AI can fit into. So to the extent that we can regulate that way, to the extent that we can
think about safety and liability that way, I think we're much better served as a society. And also,
you know, you mentioned copyright protection. You know, we had a whole chapter on intellectual
property. And I should I should flag for listeners that part of your congressional district includes
Los Angeles County, obviously, the center of the US entertainment industry, intellectual property
and copyright issues a very hot topic. So it's kind of amazing that you're at the center of both
of these things. Lots of cross-extrators. Yeah, but I mean, we what we say on the task force
report, we acknowledge two things. The first thing is that solving these intellectual property
issues is probably going to be the thorniest part of AI regulation. The second thing we acknowledge
is that the courts are going to be ahead of Congress in this sense. We've got some really
interesting and compelling court cases that are pending, particularly the New York Times case.
And the courts are going to have to try and figure out if they can extend the doctrine of
fair use to cover these novel cases. When copyrighted materials used to train an algorithm
that thens commercially deployed to create new material, to what extent is that illegal
use, to what extent is fair use, to what extent is it a derivative, created derivative work
and how do you balance those competing interests? Well, the courts are going to try. If they
can succeed, they might need some backup from Congress in codifying some of the things
that they decide because we don't want them to put them in the position of lawmakers,
but I mean, if they can succeed in extending this doctrine that served us well for decades,
it would be much better than saying AI is completely different and here are the new rules
for AI and the old rules for everything else. So that is kind of what I'm hoping happens
is that we can figure out a way of fitting AI into the larger way that we approach our
legal world and our laws. So I want to go back to something you said, which is racial discrimination
in hiring was illegal before AI was invented and it's illegal after AI is invented and using
AI in your hiring is not a get out of jail free card, you know, to use racism in hiring
decisions, ditto with cyber fraud, for example. So those are great instances in which the
existing regulatory frameworks still maps pretty well to the AI era. But I think there's
a flip side of it, you know, if we're talking about the sort of three elements of any regulatory
structure, authority, capacity, and political will, I do wonder about the question of capacity
because cybercrime, you know, was a much smaller problem when not very many people had
hacker skills. And if we are moving towards a world in which AI makes it easier for sort
of unsophisticated people to carry out sophisticated hacking attacks, you know, that is a problem.
I mean, I, I, you probably know people who have experienced this, but one of my friends,
you know, her mother received a phone call that was in her voice talking about how she
had been kidnapped and, you know, needed to pay a ransom at Bitcoin, et cetera, et cetera.
And then the mother, you know, texted the daughter and the daughter's like, what are you
talking about? I'm fine. It deep faked her voice to execute this scam. And this is obviously
very prominent and going after the elderly in the United States. And so I do wonder if,
you know, AI can make certain problems that were tractable because of a certain scale
that they were occurring on, but now might bring new scale to those problems, which, you
know, calls into question, not authority, which as you pointed out, in many cases, the
law is already decent, but capacity. How are you wrestling with those kinds of issues?
Right. No, it's an interest. It's a completely worthwhile distinction, you know, to make.
And we were, I mean, it's kind of a different distinction though because we were talking about
the law, you know, we don't need a new law, but, you know, we very much need to make sure
that our law enforcement agencies are equipped with the resources and tools that they need
to go after the people that are, that are creating this, you know, this illegal activity.
And to answer your question, yes, I hear from people every day of my constituents, you
know, every day about this. However, that fits into kind of a larger discussion. And I'll
be interested to get your opinion on this. You know, one of the things that AI is accelerating
is the ability for anyone to create anything that they want to create in such a way that
a casual observer would not be able to distinguish between what they've created and reality.
And this has profound consequences for us as a society, especially when it comes to
the spread of mis and disinformation, which is something that we highlight in the report.
You know, there's something that no one has a good answer for. We had several hearings
in our task force about this. And one of the hearings was on the specific topic of whether
or not watermarking should be mandatory for AI generated content. And the conclusion that
we reached is, no, it should not. And not because it's not useful. But for the same reason,
why you can't solve the problem of counterfeit currency by requiring people to stamp fake
on current, right? Because everyone will, one whose law abiding will do it. And the
people that aren't law abiding won't do it. And so you, not only have you not solved
the problem, but you've desensitized people to the fact that there's current fake currency
sitting around there that's not stamp fake. And that's the same, we have the same problem
with AI generated content. So I think that we, as a society, are going to put a much
stronger premium on authenticity. So I don't think that, you know, AI generated content
will be watermarked. I think authentic content will be watermarked. And we're already
seeing this in things like security cameras where you have evidentiary rules for introduction
into court cases. And you want to be able to say, no, no, I can prove that this is from
camera number four, and it was taken, you know, a two of two AM, you know, on this location
on this date, because, you know, it's got an encrypted watermark and, you know, it's
blockchain encrypted. And, you know, I think this phenomenon is now also coming into journalism.
There's a consortium of international journalists and they're even working with camera manufacturers
like Lyca and Nikon so that, you know, as soon as they take the picture from, you know, just
say, a war zone or wherever, it's immediately hashed a blockchain. So there's sort of an
authoritative, this is the version of the image that was taken at this specific date. And
I definitely take your point in terms of the authentic stuff needs the watermark, perhaps
more desperately than the fake stuff. I do want to push back and I, this is not something,
you know, I've spent 100 years thinking about. So I'm certainly open to being persuaded.
Your point on counter-fitting, an example that comes to mind for me is that if you try and
take a hundred dollar bill and you put it in a photocopier machine and you say, make
a copy of this, the photocopier will refuse to engage in the thing. It will say, I detect
that this is a hundred dollar bill. You're obviously trying to engage in counter-fitting.
You know, I'm not going to be a part of this. And, you know, this was obviously a more
significant phenomenon, you know, 20 years ago, before every 100 dollar bill had a hologram
strip in it and et cetera, et cetera. But the point bearing here that it does not make
counter-fitting impossible, but it does make it more expensive and more complicated. And
so it basically eliminates casual effortless counter-fitting, which is not the sum total
of the problem, but is also a non-trivial portion of the problem. And so the question is,
you know, do you want teenagers to plausibly be able to pull off sophisticated disinformation
attacks, or do you want to say, hey, only the Russian intelligence services devoteing
a lot of time and effort to sort of coming up with this and inventing their own tools
are going to be able to do it. This is something when I was in the Department of Defense.
We were thinking about DARPA funded a lot of research to authenticate synthetic media
because, like, we, you know, for intelligence reasons, for operational regions, we needed
to be able to understand when media was true or false. But we also recognized that we had
an interest in the general public being able to understand what was true or false when
we were seeing, for example, a Russian disinformation attacks associated with NATO exercises. And
we were like, okay, we actually, it actually matters for some of the strategic outcomes
that we're trying to get here that a huge share of the population understands that these
media images are fake. And so the point here being that, like, I do think it is worth thinking
about, you know, where is the right locus of intervention? No, when you make it illegal
to make a copy machine or Photoshop software engage with 100 dollar bills, you're raising
the bar for what it takes to execute a sophisticated disinformation attack. And that might be a
non-trivial share of the problem. When you think about some of the most viral disinformation
images, they weren't always created by very sophisticated actors.
Sure. Now, I think it's a fair point. And I think that the ultimate answer is you have
to evaluate on a case-by-case basis what the impact of your regulation is. So, for example,
with your case of, you know, using a photocopier to create a counterfeit bill. If the, it adds
$1 to the cost of the copier and works well enough that there's never a false positive,
you know, then you might be reasonable to say, okay, you know, this, because the impact,
you know, on the law abiding population is so small, this is a reasonable regulation. You
know, on the other side of it, if it doubles the cost of the copier to do that, and there's
false positives all the time where I'm making a copy of something else, and the copier is
saying, oh no, I'm not going to do this because it looks, you know, I think it looks like
a dollar bit of Franklin's on it. And, you know, it's a biography, not a style bill, right?
Yeah. And, you know, then we would say, no, that's not reasonable. And so, I mean, I think
that that really is, you know, the barometer that you have to use, because, you know, we have
to strike a balance. But, I mean, also, don't, don't forget about the risks of desensitizing
the public because we already have a public that believes far too much. It's, I used to think
it was a generational problem where, you know, it was my parents that, you know, my mother still
thinks everything that she reads on the internet is true. Even if it's a combat on someone's
social media posts, you know, well, that's a generational problem. But, you know, it turns
out that our kids, you know, the gen Xers, or we're gen X, we know the Gen Zers and the
millennials, they are just as susceptible to this problem as our generation is. So, you
know, we can't desensitize people to the fact that they are going to have to, you know,
some level, exercise judgment about it and has some
skepticism. So I remember going back to your case, like when in the early days of copy
machines, teenagers were using copy machines to make counterfeit $20 bills. But I mean,
you'd walk into one of those with a 7-11 and the guy would be like, "Oh my, now you know
what I mean?" Because people were conditioned to be able to look for that. I mean, but if
you've created technology that weeds out the vast majority of that, then you've also destroyed
the healthy skepticism that people are going to have to have about it. So I mean, you have
to think about that as well. Yeah, that's really interesting. So I want to take us back
to Congress. So we're obviously in a very difficult moment to pass legislation in Congress.
One of the most noteworthy efforts to pass federal legislation on AI, which was the preemption
of state level AI regulation did not get included in the recent bill. And so it's not law.
I want to ask you, what do you think is realistic to expect from Congress over the next year
in terms of AI-related legislation and specifically on the topic of regulation and governance?
Yeah. Well, this is a time-critical topic because we have a situation where states are
getting way ahead of the federal government and regulating AI. You've seen some far-reaching
legislation passed in places like Colorado and Illinois. And of course, Governor Newsom
just signed a pretty far-reaching piece of legislation in California that admittedly
less far-reaching than the one he vetoed last year. But still, clearly impinges on Congress's
under Article I of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce. So what we are in danger
of having happened is the same thing that happened on digital data privacy, where because
Congress failed to act, we now have what, 23 different states with 23 different standards
for digital data privacy, which is something that's clearly interstate commerce related.
You know, that's clearly interstate commerce. And everyone would be better served if Congress
were to just say, look, here is the standard. To the extent that it's interstate commerce
related, you states are preempted because we've created a standard. And that way not only
is it less confusing, but it's more conducive to entrepreneurialism because the people that
have the legal sophistication to deal with 50 different state standards are the big companies,
you know, with rooms full of lawyers. And the people that can't are folks in a garage,
so we're trying to start the next big company, right? So this is the case with AI because
we have over currently over 1,000 different bills pending in state legislatures on the topic
of AI regulation just this year. So, you know, we need to get that done. Now, to be clear,
you talked about preemption. You know, what was attempted earlier this year as part
of HR one was not preemption, but a moratorium, a temporary moratorium on state AI regulation
just to give Congress a little bit of time to get that done. And to make it clear to the
states that Congress needs to go first, that's why we put it in there is not that we don't
think that there's going to be a state lane for regulation that definitely is. You know,
under system of federalism states have responsibility for some things and Congress has responsibility
for other things. And, you know, really the defining line that comes to AI is, is it interstate
commerce or not? So, I think what needs to be done urgently is that we pass federal
AI legislation that creates those lanes that makes it clear where the preemptive guardrails
are, you know, what is, you know, interstate commerce related and therefore reserved for
regulation by the federal government. And what outside of those guardrails, where the
states are free to be the laboratories of democracy that they always have been. And I think
that's what really urgently needs to get done. Yeah. And, you know, just to play skeptic
for a moment here, there was your own bipartisan task force in the House. Senator Schumer
led a gang of four that also had a bipartisan group trying to craft AI legislation in the
Senate. That GPT dropped in late 2022. I've been hearing about how it's urgent since
late 2022. And still, I think we're, I think it's fair to say we haven't seen much come
out of Congress. So it's urgent, but is it possible? I mean, is there anything that gives
you cause for optimism that this could be the year or, well, we're already in October.
So maybe in the next 12 months. Yes, actually. So if you want, if you want some reason for
optimism, I mean, look at the fact, first of all, that our task force report, which,
you know, as we've discussed is pretty substantive. It was unanimously approved by all 24 members
of our task force, 12 Democrats, 12 Republicans. And it was approved by the speaker and the
minority leader and their staffs. Okay. That's, that should be pretty compelling. You know,
you should have seen what was left on the cutting room floor. That of those 270 pages,
because we had enough that there was broad bipartisan consensus on that we had the luxury
of saying, okay, you know what, all the stuff that that, you know, might be more controversial,
we're not even going to touch that because we've got plenty of stuff here that, you know,
that to form the nucleus of a comprehensive plan. So I mean, that gives me some confidence.
When you talk to people in Congress, there is no one that thinks that there shouldn't
be a federal framework for the regulation of AI and that it shouldn't at least partially
preempt the states. I mean, literally no one thinks that people will disagree on exactly
what the preemption looks like. So, you know, that the fact that we have broad agreement
on this and even the time urgency, you know, when we, when you state the problem and you
look at what happened with digital data privacy, which by the way, we're taking another run
at I'm on the data privacy working group. We're going to try again this year to come up
with a standard, but the problem is when you fail to do that initially and you let the
states get out of head, they all feel creative ownership of what they have made. And they're
more likely to say, well, what we have is better than what you're proposing. And so that
we're going to oppose you, right? So you've given some, you've given what I think is
pretty credible case for why this time could be different. Can I just ask what form that
might take? Like would you and your co-chair Congressman Ted Liu jointly introduce draft
legislation? Would it come out of committees? Would it be, you know, something else that
comes out of the speaker's office? How might this legislation emerge?
No, I think it's important to follow the regular legislative process. And that we've been
working on this now for what nine months. So we have a bill while we're calling it Guy
of the Great American AI Act. And it has, it codifies a big chunk of what the task force
recommendations were, including some preemptive guardrails focused around the distinction between
interstate commerce and not interstate commerce. And, and it does some other things. We, you
know, how compassionate I am about near the National AI research resource. We've got that
in there. It codifies KC, which is part of the White House's action, AI action plan
because we need a standard setting body within NIST. And so, you know, we do that. So there's
wishable low protections. We got a bunch of stuff, a good stuff in there. And the problem
is that things have been so dysfunctional in Congress right now that we just can't get
any legislative oxygen for it. I mean, right now the whole federal government is shut down.
The house is not in session. The Senate seems like all they're voting on is, you know,
one continuing resolution after another. Like, and even when we get out of this, because
unfortunately, we've gotten so far behind on other things, we've got some other pressing
concerns like National Defense Authorization Act that has to be passed by the end of the
year. The Farm Bill authorizations are going to lapse. You know, these are really high priority
issues for Congress. You know, we are struggling to get enough traction. But, but the process
that you've outlined is the one that we need to follow. We need to get a bunch of bipartisan
co-sponsors on it. We need to introduce it and go through the North regular committee
process and, you know, I have to see if it's going to go through energy and commerce or
science-based technology or both, you know, and go through and see if we can't get some
traction for it. But I still remain an optimist just because I think we proved last year with
the task force that this is a bipartisan issue. And I think that, you know, you can make
a really easily proven case that it's time critical.
Yeah. I think that's a great spot. And now, you did raise the point about the White House
AI Action Plan. We at CSIS hosted the director of the White House Office of Science Technology
Policy, Michael Kratzios, during the rollout of that new plan. And one of the things that
he said was, look, there's a lot of areas here where we're going basically as far as we
believe ourselves able to go under executive branch unilateral authority and there are
places where Congress needs to act. And so I'm curious, you know, as you think about
Gaia or other pieces of legislation, your own work, you know, Congress's work, how do
you take the AI Action Plan? Is there anything that that, on the sort of, the White House
can't do it alone to do list that strikes you as especially important?
Sure. We've talked about a couple of them, you know, particularly Casey, which we absolutely
need an agency within the U.S. government to coordinate standards settings for AI and
to coordinate international cooperation on not just standards, but things like the non-proliferation
of malicious AI. And I think it's wonderful that, you know, if you look at the Biden Executive
Order and the Trump Executive Order, there's a lot of parallels on those topics. And that
should give people some comfort because you really can't think of two administrations that
are more diametrically opposed on a lot of different things, but the fact that we've
got this threat of continuity through there, you know, should give people some comfort. And
also, you know, we're very lucky to have
uh secretary cratzios in there he's he's a guy that's uh deeply informed and educated on the
issue of AI given his background and so you know he's he's been a steady hand at the wheel there
yeah i i uh i appreciate your shout out uh to kacy there and and i should say for the audience
congressman olorultine i were at an event together uh yesterday and he was uh apining on the the
wisdom of kacy's residency within nist could i just get you to sort of repeat a little bit about
what you said yesterday yeah right well i mean if if you you're looking at the task force report
one of the things that we want to avoid is having uh an unelected bureaucracy make a bunch of
rules uh about AI we think that that's if you look at what's happening in europe uh it's an
illustration of uh of the fallacy of that kind of approach so uh we wanted to make sure that the
body that is setting standards for ai is not the same body that is empowered to make those
standards mandatory we think that a check and balance there is a much more appropriate uh you know
way to go there and that's why i am very happy that the trump administration is electing to keep
kacy uh under nist which is where it was you know when when it was the ai safety institute uh under
the Biden executive order was also under nist because nist is inherently a non regulatory body they
are a standard setting organization and that's exactly where you need an or an agency like this so
uh really happy to see that great so we we touched on it a bit before but i just wanted to get your
sort of explicit reaction uh to the recently passed california legislation sp 53 uh because there
are elements of this law that echo some legislation that you've introduced at the federal level including
a protection for whistleblowers uh in ai so what do you make of uh sp 53 which i think it's worth
noting out that dean ball who was previously part of the white house ostp he said that even that
legislation appears to be begging for federal uh regulatory frameworks to come and take the
plot and includes some interesting regulatory hooks to enable preemption even when the federal
government doesn't declare uh that it's preempting state law so i i'm curious you know what you make of
sp 53 well it's uh the uh the author of sp 53 scot weiner and i served together in the state
legislature you know we uh we chat periodically about this uh i was not a fan of his bill last year
this bill is a lot more supportable um you know you can we can have a case by case discussions
about some of the things that they're in there like the whistleblower protections the mandatory
reporting requirements for uh security vulnerabilities i think that that's a really interesting idea
a centralized database for uh vulnerabilities i think that that is something that would uh give us
you know researchers a broad overview of what was actually going on in the vulnerabilities face
with with respect to uh to frontier models however no one could argue that
what what uh the governor just signed in california does not uh interfere with congress's
ability and pin john congress's authority to regulate the interstate commerce applications of AI
i mean it very clearly does so i mean i really think that that could be the poster child of like
look you know when to the extent that you're regulating the deployment of AI within your state
you know that's reasonable um to the extent that you're regulating the development of AI in your
state AI that's meant to be uh used in commerce in all the 50 states you know that is definitely
something that should not be allowed at the state level and should only be uh allowed in congress
because otherwise you get this nonsensical patchwork quilt of 50 different state regulations i mean
it would be uh it would be impossible to comply with and easily uh evaded because all you have to
do is you know then you go jurisdiction shopping and you put your development studio in a state with
at least restrictive policies it's it makes no sense so i mean really that's a compelling uh argument
for why we need federal preemption and to be clear i mean we as we talked about uh no one thinks
that there isn't a lane for states in AI regulation but it needs to be consistent with article one of
the federal constitution in allowing congress the unrestricted lane of regulating interstate commerce
and then allowing states to go you know do their experimentation and be the laboratories of democracy
that they are yeah and so given that i mean given that situation does that give you some extra momentum
in congress can you now go to your colleagues and say this you know this is what we need to prevent
we don't want california setting the nation wide policy let's get together and pass nation wide
policy yes uh it does but i mean we already had that that momentum because there were um states
of calorado that had passed things and it was amazing to see in the governor's signing message in
calorado he even explicitly said look i don't think this is something that states ought to be doing but
because i don't have any faith that congress is going to get around to this anytime soon as a former
member he would know yeah i'm going to go ahead and sign this with the late implementation you know
interestingly he came out in uh in public support of the moratorium uh early this year when uh when
we put that in say hr one which which just just just goes to show you how how hard it is when the
rubber meets the road of implementing these kinds of regulations he's like uh yeah if you would
give me a break that would be great exactly um so uh congressman i want to uh close it out here
and be in uh be respectful of your time but is there any other issues that we didn't touch on that
you wanted to talk about well i mean let's let's close it with this because i think that we um in the
industry do a terrible job at articulating the optimistic case for a i you know we we start having
these discussions we talk about risks we talk about malicious use we talk about how the law needs
to adapt we need we talk about infringement of copyrights you know we we're talking about all
this bad stuff and then when we haven't had a discussion about some of the other things in the
report like uh job displacement and disruption and things like that and you know we don't we aren't
articulating the optimistic case for a i you know we're not articulating why we do this because i
had a constituent you know to giving example uh come up to me the other day and say look i hear
all the stuff about a i look if it's that risky why do we even allow it yeah it's illegal right and
i was just i was dumbfounded for a moment but it really drove home to me the fact that we're not
talking about the upside and the upsides are two things you know number one a i is probably already
the most effective tool for the dissemination of human knowledge that mankind has ever come up with
it can teach you anything that you want to learn in any learning style that is optimal for you
and it's going to get more and more powerful in that respect but it will be probably the most
effective tool for the enhancement of human productivity that mankind has ever invented it's
going to be incredibly empowering it will be disruptive as technological advances always are but
in the end at the end of the day it's it it has the potential to create first of all many many more
jobs for humans than it displaces uh and second of all this right create this rising wave of
prosperity that literally lifts all the boats of everyone in the world that's the promise of a i
if we get if we do our jobs right in balancing regulation that you know simultaneously protects
Americans against the harms that they need to be protected against well at the same time allowing
AI to bring those beneficial advancements to our society so i mean that that is what's possible
if we do our jobs right and we don't have to put it in ultra simple terms right it's not just
the government's job to decrease bad it's also to increase good and there's a lot of good out there
that we should be excited about when it comes to AI yeah well congressman this has been a fascinating
conversation and you've really given us a peek under the hood at what's going on in congress
and what we might be able to expect over the next year uh we're of course grateful for your
leadership and grateful for you taking the time to talk with us today always good to see you let's
do it again excellent thank you thanks for listening to this episode of the AI policy podcast
if you like what you heard there's an easy way for you to help us please give us a five star
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Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Congressman J. Obernolte has a deep technical background in AI, including research in natural language processing and computer vision during his graduate studies.
His early work in video game development, particularly with NFL95, shifted him from academic research to a long-term career in tech and business, now managed by his son.
The bipartisan House AI Task Force, co-chaired by Obernolte and Congressman Ted Liu, produced a 270-page report with 80 concrete policy recommendations, emphasizing sector-specific AI regulation.
The report strongly advocates for a sectoral regulatory approach—empowering existing regulators like the FDA or NHTSA—rather than a centralized, one-size-fits-all AI bureaucracy.
The task force found that many AI risks, such as bias or misuse in hiring or healthcare, are already covered by existing laws, making new regulations unnecessary.
AI-generated disinformation and deepfakes pose significant challenges, but the report concludes that mandatory watermarking is ineffective and could desensitize the public.
A federal AI framework is urgently needed to preempt state-level regulations, especially as over 1,000 state bills are pending, risking a fragmented and unworkable patchwork of laws.
The bipartisan consensus on AI regulation and the need for federal preemption, supported by the White House AI Action Plan and NIST’s role in standard-setting, provides a strong foundation for future legislation.
Summary:
Congressman J. Obernolte brings a unique blend of technical and legislative experience to AI policy, rooted in early work on computer vision and natural language processing, and a decades-long career in video game development. His leadership in founding the bipartisan House Task Force on AI resulted in a comprehensive 270-page report that recommends a sector-specific regulatory approach—empowering existing agencies like the FDA or NHTSA—rather than a centralized, overreaching federal AI bureau.
The report emphasizes that many AI risks, such as bias or fraud, are already covered by existing laws, so new legislation is unnecessary. It also cautions against mandating AI watermarking, arguing it would be ineffective and could erode public skepticism. A major concern is the current proliferation of state-level AI regulations, which threatens to create a fragmented and unworkable patchwork.
Obernolte stresses the urgency of federal action to preempt such state laws, especially given their impact on interstate commerce. Drawing on bipartisan consensus and the White House AI Action Plan, which supports NIST as a neutral standard-setting body, he argues that a federal framework—codifying sectoral guardrails and preemption—is both necessary and feasible. The proposed legislation, known as the “Great American AI Act,” is still in early stages, hindered by congressional gridlock and high-priority bills, but the strong bipartisan agreement on the need for federal oversight offers a clear path forward.
FAQs
I worked on early AI research in natural language processing and computer vision during my doctorate at UCLA. My work focused on image segmentation, which was a difficult problem that required hand-crafted algorithms. I later transitioned into video game development, where I created the NFL95 game, which became a major success and shifted my career path from academia to business.
In video games, I developed AI for opponent logic—like making game characters behave in real-time. This required fast, deterministic decisions, unlike the slow, overnight computations of early AI research. Today, video games are a clear example of AI in action, and the real-time nature of such systems highlights how AI has evolved into more dynamic and responsive technologies.
The report recommends a sectoral approach to AI regulation, where existing regulators like the FDA, NHTSA, and FAA are empowered to oversee AI in their specific domains. This is more effective than a centralized, one-size-fits-all AI regulator because AI risks are highly context-dependent and vary by sector.
I remain skeptical about the imminent emergence of AGI. While large language models are impressive, they currently lack true intentionality or planning. The real risks are quantifiable—like misuse in weapons development or mental health therapy—rather than speculative, non-quantifiable scenarios like a Terminator-style AI takeover.
Unlike the EU, which created a centralized AI regulatory body, the U.S. supports sectoral regulation. This approach is more practical because AI risks are context-specific. For example, medical AI is regulated by the FDA, while autonomous vehicles are under NHTSA, allowing tailored, effective oversight.
No, mandatory watermarking is not recommended. It would be ineffective because malicious actors would not comply, while law-abiding users might be desensitized. Instead, authenticity should be prioritized—especially in journalism and security—where verifiable, blockchain-encrypted timestamps and metadata help establish trust.
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