Christian Zealot RETURNS to Debate Abortion

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Let's be present in certain states, visit prizepicks.com for restrictions and details. So I am the guy who debated you on abortion at UCLA a couple weeks ago. Towards the end of our debate, you used a hypothetical that involving a blind man who is going to unintentionally touch you with a pregnancy wand or alternatively stab you in a non-lethal way. And at the time, I was confused by the hypothetical. But now, I thought about it and I understand the point you were making and I'd like to ask you some follow-up questions about it. Sure thing. Cool. The blind man with a pregnancy wand is unintentionally causing harm to another person. So you're making a comparison between him and the fetus, correct? Yeah. Alright, cool. So first question. Do you agree with proportionality, the principle of proportionality, that when you are using force to defend yourself, it should be proportional to the level of threat to you? To some extent, sure. But they're going to be categories where we're going to bucket action. It doesn't have to be directly proportional. Sure. There's going to be variation. But for example, if you slap someone in the face and then they respond by hitting you with a hammer, that was not proportional. So I think generally we can agree to this principle of proportionality. Well, I would be really careful with that counter example because what you just gave was an example of, maybe you just misspoke, but I'm just going to be clear here for a line out moral principles. What you just called was like a revenge or like counter-attack thing. It would be different to say, could you do it to prevent something else? These are different forms of because when I'm talking about the abortion thing or when I'm talking about the person, the blind man coming to stab you or tap you with a pregnancy wand, we're talking about self-defense, not actions we can take in response to somebody else doing a thing, right? You're talking about preventing a harm, correct? Which is what I said. That's why it can be a little bit disproportionate. So for instance, if somebody is approaching, you're saying they're going to break your arm and the only means you have to defend yourself might be like a knife to stab this person. I don't know. Well, if it's intentional, I don't think you should ever have to suffer the broken arm because all you have is a knife. If it's unintentional, then there might be a slightly higher threshold, but it would depend on what's going on. I would think that intentionality makes a lot of difference here. It's going to change the thresholds, but I don't think it'll completely erase the role, but we're going to go through that. I got it. Sure. If someone is going to knowingly stab you, but you know it's going to be non-lethal, but they're doing it intentionally, it's still a serious injury and so then our shared intuitions would tell us that you're probably justified in using lethal force to defend yourself if you know someone's going to stab you intentionally. However, if it is purely accidental, like if someone is tripping and then you see that they're going to unintentionally stab you, the hypothetical you gave, you said it's non-lethal, so you know you're going to live and they're going to do it accidentally. Would you and a situation really shoot and kill that person to keep them from non-lethaly stabbing you? Most people, I think, would argue that I think you could have that defense, yeah. I don't think so. I think most people shared intuitions that if someone was going to accidentally hurt you, but in a non-lethal way that you should not be able to kill that person, I would disagree with you on what our shared intuitions on that situation would be. You have two possible outcomes to this scenario. In one, you have someone who gets stabbed but will live in scenario two, you now have a dead person, and in a situation where neither party is morally culpable, it seems to be pretty clear that outcome two is worse than outcome one. Would you agree with that? I don't think it's fair to treat both actors as the exact same and then you just look at the outcomes of both actors to determine which situation had the preferable outcome. I think we would weigh these outcomes a little bit differently. I don't know if I would say that a person is necessarily supposed to bear a serious injury if it could be prevented even with lethal self-defense against somebody else. I don't know if they would have a more compulsion to bear that serious injury. But would you say it's fair for the person who's, again, not morally culpable? It's an honest accident. Is it for them to be dead now when the person was going to survive? To me, it's just not a matter of it being fair. I mean, it sucks. I mean, life isn't fair. Yeah, I mean, it sucks for them, but I don't know if I would say the other person is committed like a moral error. More than sucks for them, they're just they're dead now. So I don't think I wouldn't be able to do that. Let's run that. Let's run that same thing. Like, what if there was a fat person rolling down a hill and they were going to roll right into you and kill you, but you had a bazooka to blow them up, but the fat person isn't rolling down the hill because of any fault of their own. Let's say they got pushed over by a jaguar. Is it fair to them that you could blow them up with a bazooka to stop them from crashing into you and killing you? I mean, not really. It's not their fault. It's not fair to them, but I mean, the key difference in the hypothetical you just gave is you said they will kill you. That's the key point here. Is that you know the person, you know, fat guys rolling down the hills, but whether or not they kill you or injure you doesn't change the fairness to them. In both cases, the person is not being intentional and they're harmed for the other person, right? Yeah, but no, it does matter whether not you're going to die. That matters in terms of what is justified because again, the principle of proportionality, if you know someone is going to unintentionally harm you, but in a non-lethal way, to use lethal force against them is just categorically disproportional and I think pretty clear. In a non-lethal way? I don't know if you would defend that, right? We can torture that a little. If somebody was going to cut your leg off, but there was a hospital nearby that could 100% save your life, you know you're going to survive. Do you think that you should have to suffer that injury that a person could cut your leg off, accidentally? For me, personally, it would complete depending on whether the person did it intentionally. If a person is coming up to me with the machete, and they're going to cut my leg off, and I know that even though I'm going to survive, I would usually feel forced to bend myself, but if it's someone's doing it accidentally. It has nothing to do with your personal opinion on it or it went to there. I'm just saying it's a moral principle. I can only speak for myself. No, what? No. Are we talking about personal morality here? I'm just talking about my personal relations and what I would I perceive to be our shared intuitions to be? Oh, sorry. Okay, okay. If you're talking about your personal intuitions to try, if we were taking an intuitive view of morality, sure. So backing up a little, it's hard to cry out these type of titles. These are obviously insane circumstances, but like say you're working in some warehouse and you've got a box that you're stacking or you're pushing up, I guess. And then there's a guy behind you, and he's fallen asleep in a forklift that's like slowly driving towards you. And the only way to stop him is to push a self-destruct button on the forklift. And if you don't push it, it's going to run into you and it's going to chop off your leg, but there's like a hospital right next to your work. You know you'll survive. However, like you're, you're going to be legless now or you're going to be missing at least one leg, but the alternative is to kill the person. Do you think that that person is morally compelled to suffer the amputation that he's not allowed to kill the other person because the other person just fell asleep and he's not being intentional? Or let's just say I'm instead of falling asleep because I'd imply some moral failing on his, but let's say he had like a mini-stark or something in it. Like through no fault of his own, he's just like, yeah, asleep at the will. I mean, yeah, we can, you can, you know, paint this hypothetical in, you know, 12 different ways, but basically I would agree that it's, it would say it sucks for you that you're going to lose a leg, but it's preferable over the other person dying when they're not morally culpable. So yes, I would say that that person, I think the morally optimal thing to do is to let their leg be cut, but now the other person at least gets to live. I think that's, that's obviously better. I think with that, I mean, we just have a foundational, I think, disagreement there, and then everything else, so that would be, yeah. Yeah, we can disagree on that point, but there's a couple other factors that play here. So would it also be different if you knowingly place the blind man in this predicament, such as you gave him the knife, knowing that there's a good chance that he would unwittingly stab you, would that change your intuitions in the matter? You are not culpable for this very scenario. Not necessarily. I think it would depend on give on, on, at that point, it might, I think the intentionality of you giving him the knife, I think, might vary that. So for instance, if you gave a person a knife to work in a kitchen, and that was your only expectation, and they're like a narcoleptic sleepwalker, and so they fell asleep and they started coming towards you with a knife to stab you. I don't know if you have a more responsibility there for what that person does at that point. The comparison being if you protection have sex and you still get pregnant, right? Then I mean, that would be the comment. But I mean, but so I think for the fourth, forklift example, like if you gave a guy, if you put like sleeping pills in his lunch or something, knowing there's a good chance that he would fall asleep and then would threaten you specifically. And then in that scenario where he would cut your leg off, you then kill him. I think that's, you and I disagree on the first scenario, but now when you are, you and you intentionally engage in the thing that now created this very situation, I think you let you have much less of a moral case to be able to use the force against the foreklift driver. Yeah, I don't necessarily disagree with that. If you're having a ton of protective sex and somebody gets pregnant, I don't know if the self-defense argument is necessarily a good one to use at that point, sure. Okay, so you would agree that for, so then 99% of abortions happen as a result of consensual sex. So would you agree that the bodily time we argument therefore does not work? Well, it's not consensual sex. It's whether or not you're using protection or not, was what we were talking about, right? No, but yeah, even if you use, even if you use protection, there's, I think the figure was that half of people, so there's two things here. So there's 99% of abortions come from consensual sex and then of those 99%, 50% of people who had abortions, we're using some form of contraception at the time that they got pregnant, but a minority of them were using contraception perfectly, so there was user error there, so that you could say there's moral culpability there. And even still, with perfect use, contraception has like a one to two percent failure rate. So at that point, you're kind of getting to the point where like, You have like you know the maybe baby in a shoe box where can you shoot a you know shoot up both their shoe box If you know that there's a 1% chance if there's a baby there So even if you're using contraception perfectly you still by engaging in the situation that you know has a at best at your best Level of behavior still has a 1% chance of creating a child I still think you're more morally culpable for taking care of that child and not Killing them seeing is how you created the situation knowingly I don't know I don't think I necessarily agree with that. I think that if you're taking steps to If you I think if you're taking reasonable steps to prevent an outcome from happening, but that outcome still happens I don't know if you're morally required to follow through on every single thing relating to outcome. I'm not sure if I agree with that But I mean okay, what if um because you're also like it's a weird thing to say that like Like you're accepting the outcome of a thing or recognizing the potential outcome of the thing versus like Morally consenting to the thing as well. There's like a little bit of a difference here But then that's complicated by the lack of agency obviously on the side of the I guess the fetus or whatever but I mean like for for fathers Even when they let's say they used you know Conti is the condom to even use it correctly, but there's like we said there's a 1% chance or I think condoms have a 2% failure rate and Then the the woman gets pregnant and now the father is liable for child support He never consented having a child, but we would still force him to do Provide child support in that scenario. So we were you were making a morally culpable for his action Well, I mean at that point you already have a child born that you have to talk about like what's the best like level of care I guess for the for the kid who's born at that point on the state has decided that The two parents have financial responsibility sure Right, but with bodily autonomy arguments. You're kind of side stepping personhood. So if you grant fetal personhood Then there's no moral difference between a born child and an unborn child in that instance Yeah, but I don't know if it I don't know how this plays into self-defense or whatever for father paying child support No, that was this this is regards to the principle of you engage in an action that you knowingly has Certain potential to have a certain outcome and it's that outcome manifests then you become Responsible since it is direct result of your actions. That's what the father the child father paying child support has to relate to Hank joined BJ's wholesale club the day he became a father of 30. I coach football now Coach Hank saves up to 25% off grocery store prices 30 pounds of pasta three cases of protein bars 75 sports drinks and That's just pregame. He knows teamwork and BJ's knows savings This is your home coach home of the save join for just $20 at BJ's dot com slash mesquite and save 10 cents per gallon for six months Open soon limited time offer new members only BJ's home of the save So you're you're saying that the father has to accept the outcome of child support even though he didn't intend to Have a child, but the argument I'm making is that the woman doesn't have to accept the outcome of a pregnancy even though She didn't intend for the outcome of a pregnancy or whatever is that the comparison? Yes, I think essentially if you grant field personhood and that is what happens Yeah, I just I'm not sure if I just don't know if I view like paying child support to be of the same type of weight as like suffering a severe bodily harm Okay, so you're saying that pregnancy and childbirth is a greater burden than the paying child support for 18 years Is that is that you're what you're saying essentially? Yeah, or it's at least a different harm of like a different kind That I don't think a I think a yeah, I think a person can be expected to bear like a financial thing, but I think that's a different thing of kind than like suffer a great injury Okay, I can I can pivot to ballet about autonomy in general, but I have one more point I wanted to make about the hypothetical the original hypothetical you gave okay So so the points were so far does it the proportionality was number one number two was intentionality Number three was the fact that you knowingly created the scenario and then four Would your intuitions be different if instead of a stranger was going to accidentally stab you who you gave the knife What if this is your own child would you use lethal force against him? Um, I think I think today it gets harder, but I think the answer would still be yes Even though I think that's I'm sorry, I think that's ridiculous. I don't think any any person if if you Know if a parent like I understand that I've used the same argument as a violent argument But like the the easy to feed her for this is right now in society We have zero obligations for parents to provide life saving care to their children at the expense of their own body Right, it's not required that a parent has to donate blood even to save their child or that they have to donate like a organ or something to save their child Right, so I mean like I think even though it feels bad. Obviously these situations would probably never come up outside of like an abortion context But like I think we don't actually have those expectations on on parents socially Okay, so yeah, we don't force parents to donate organs But there's we still expect a lot of parents these parents still owe positive They have positive responsibilities towards their children and we all acknowledge this There's a reason we don't force parents to donate organs, and there's good reasons for this But I would say before we get into that. I'd like to say that if if a parent could so when that is legally enforceable I was sort of with if a parent could Safely save their own child's life through donating a kidney and don't donating kidneys with modern medicine is incredibly safe procedure And for long-term outcomes, they're they're quite positive. You don't really have major issues with kidney donation If a parent could save their child's life safely through a kidney donation But instead chose not to would you at least agree that that parent is behaving immorally in that regard? I don't know I'd have to think about that a lot. I'm not sure My I like I very slightly lean towards yes, but that's a really really hard one And there's a lot of ways that you can chase that down to where it caches on to something's pretty bad I'm not sure what the expectation requirement Right, but I'm not saying I'm not saying let's make it legally mandated. I'm saying just more requirement I'm saying more requirement for it to be a moral or immoral action Yeah, I would have to think about that a lot. I think it's the tough one I think most people would say that that parent was behaving immorally When we can disagree with about that So another issue is The regards are intuitions about this women's bodies have the natural function of pregnancy You know women's uterus is their rooms Their hips their breasts everything like many things about women's bodies are specifically You know designed to carry To conceive carry nurture and give birth to a child but our kidneys are not Their natural function is not to be you know surgically cut out of our bodies and Implanted into someone else's so this is why if we're going off of intuitions as to You know the basis of morality and legality This is why one of the main reasons why our intuition's differ in this regard also with pregnant, you know, unlike Pregnancy with kidney removal now you're missing a major organ so that also affects our intuitions with pregnancy You're no longer missing it while it's still we would say it's a very serious harm pregnancy in childbirth You know, you're not missing a major bodily organ afterwards and Also, it definitely creates, you know, a clear slippery slope if you start mandating organ donations Then it's very easy to see how that can be you know Abused and taking into a very dark situation very quickly while just expecting mothers to give birth If they have sex and conceive a child the Slippery self there is not quite as apparent as it is with Organ donations, so that's why I would say that these two are are they're morally different Force organ donation versus Being you know saying that I think they even like kidney donation is probably a less arduous thing than Would be my guest and like pregnancies in terms of like outcomes and everything else Like the recovery time and how long you're a burden by having donated a kidney and everything else It's gonna be a lot it's gonna be a lot worse on the pregnancy side than it is on like the kidney donation side I mean you you can make you can make the argument for that But I was so I still see the reasons that they're different in wire intuitions are different the reason I gave everything I think still hold But there's There's another hypothetical you can give in this regard. So let's say a father is walking with his young daughter and He goes to you know a part of Town or something where he knows that there happened to be a lot of like feral and aggressive dogs there and let's say a dog Charges up and is charging at his young daughter and then he runs away and the dog, you know kills his daughter And then later when he's confronted about it. He's like, well, I'm gonna side bodily autonomy I shouldn't have to risk serious injury you know to Fighting a dog to save my daughter, but would you agree that most people would say that that's that's retarded that that's not a that is not a Justification that would fly in any situation in that situation. We would we would morally condemn that father Um I don't know I think that it's a tough one. I think the issue is I think there's a lot of intuition pumping going on here Let's instead of saying a dog because I think the expectation is that most men should probably be able to fight off a dog fairly easily depending on the type of dog, what if it was like a guy in his daughter and then there was like a black bear or something or a brown bear, which everyone is bigger, a thousand pound thing, and the father couldn't escape would both, would the expectation be that the father would stand and fight and die? Or that the father would have to run, or if the father ran and couldn't save his child, would people like, "I can't believe you left your child there to die," or whatever, and it was like. No, I think very clearly, if the father let his child to be eaten by a bear, then we would morally condemn that father. But again, this is, but this is also more extreme, because this is a clearly lethal scenario when pregnancy has a 99, a greater than 99% survival rate in America. Well, Sherry, but the only problem with pregnancy isn't the survival. It's said it's nine months of like, and then several months of like extremely physical, like physically burdened existence. Sure, I'm sure it's like a long term, whatever, other bullshit. I think there's also a bit of intuition pumping as well, because it's hard to imagine a scenario where like you're taking your child to a place, there's going to be huge amounts of expectation and moral responsibility placed on you, like taking your child to an area knowing that there's going to be significant danger. So I think that would also cause you to plant or replace a lot more moral responsibility on the person on the adult taking them there. Right, but the reason that we say that in the hypothetical is because, you know, again, like I said, 99% of abortions come from consensual sex. It has to do with like, what are the steps you're taking to prevent pregnancy? So like, let's say, for instance, that let's say you have a father and let's say there's like a forest of rotwellers. And when you walk past this forest, like it's known that rotwellers will come out or rotwellers will come out to attack, you know, people. And if you walk out, you know, you're walking past this forest and the dog comes out and you don't defend your child and you just run away and let the child die, I think most people will be like, bro, what the fuck? Like you just walked past rotwiler forest. Of course, it was going to come out and eat your child like this is fucked, bro. But like, let's say that same person had a fuck ton of like rotwiler repellent and like a stereo and it was like a, you know, it generally always like repels these dogs and they don't come out, but somehow there's like a freak mutant rotwiler that comes out of the forest one day and then the parents like, oh shit. And I, you know, the parent can't fight off the dog or if they do, it's going to be like a severe bodily injury thing. I think people would look down on the parent running. I think it would kind of be looked down on it, but I don't know if it would be seen even remotely as the same type of moral failing because it's like the parent did everything they could to reduce the risk of harm, I guess. But I mean, like sometimes, you know, shit happens, but I think it is, I think it's a lot different. Like if you get into a car accident and the kid had the seatbelt on versus not having the seatbelt on, if the kid dies and they didn't have the seatbelt on, people are going to be that it's a huge moral failing of the parent. If the kid died and they had their seatbelt on, you know, assuming you weren't like the at fault driver, like I feel like people would view it differently. Okay, let's end in the rotwiler forest when you bring repellent. Are you leaving the child to die in that scenario? Is that what you said? Yeah, I guess, so the runs because he feels like he's not going to be able to fight off the dog without a chance of dying or it's going to be like a severe bodily injury. Or, or he could, or he could let the child live and then he also has a 99% chance of living, you think he could still. All right, severe bodily harm, right? Right, but 90% chance of living. Like, but we're still comparing. You keep saying, serious body harm, which I agree with, but we'll see, we'll see, I'll turn it into his death. Right, so we would all agree that severe bodily harm is preferable over death, right? Yeah, but like, yeah, but I think that it's death is not the only thing we're measuring against. Like the severe bodily harm is a, is a pretty big, I don't, there aren't very many things in life that are comparable to like nine months of pregnancy. I mean, yeah, no, pregnancy is a very, you know, it's a, it's a unique, it's a unique life experience. Not many things are comparable to it, but, but again, it's, it's again, it has a 99% greater than 99% survival rate, which is prefer, you know, I'd rather, I'd obviously rather be pregnant than be dead. But you could also compare that with parents who are taking care of their child, you know, say for 18 years, and let's say the only jobs where they are in the area, like let's say they're in like, you know, Appalachia territory, and the only jobs around are coal mining jobs, and they have to work a coal mining job for 18 years to provide for their family, provide for their child, and you know, coal mining does, you know, permanent damage to your lungs that has all sort of all sorts of negative health effects. But we would still, if that, like, if that's the only job available to the father or to the mother, whoever the parent, then we would expect them to work the job to prevent their child from starving, would you agree with that? In that scenario, yeah, probably, but I mean, like, this is a whole society built around this where like, like, that's just the expectation for everybody and society, regardless of anything going on, right? Like, if you were working in a warehouse and it was just known that like, I mean, forklifts just roll around sometimes and chop people's legs off, like, you lose a lot more, you have almost no more authority there to kill somebody who might accidentally know that's just like part of that living in that society, it's just part of that risk of being in that society, right? Yeah, so the point I was making is that you're saying that a lot of things are comparable to pregnancy, but I'm saying 18 years of working a job that does permanent damage to your body, and we'll probably give you an early death. I don't think pregnancy is usually associated with early deaths. I have to, I have to check, but because I'm giving it to her. I understand the scenario, but I'm saying that I don't think this gives me, I don't think this would weigh it less on the women, on the women losing her right to self-defense against an attacker with no agency. I think it would give more right to the father to have some kind of self-defense claim that like, if there was a society and if you had to pay child support, the only way to do that was to necessarily engage in like incredibly risky, arduous activity or whatever. You might have a stronger argument there for why the father has a right to lethal self-defense, I guess, against the fetus or something, maybe something like that. Are you saying lethal self-defense? Are you just saying that the father doesn't want to work the coal money job so they let their child start? What are you saying here? That they, there might be like a stronger claim there maybe that like it like there would be, I think it's going to be pretty rough for people to ever accept parents abandon their children or their children and die or kill their children. But I'm saying that regardless, it's going to, people are going to look differently on if a father has to support a child and that father's job is he's a programmer for Microsoft and at some point the father is like, I really just don't want to go to work. I hate this fucking job. I don't want to talk to AI anymore and their child starves to death. People are going to view that father a lot differently than another father who it's like, I'm supposed to be my child and the way that we survive is by me going into the forest, hunting and gathering food and at some point like I just, it's just too much like I can't like the animals are too fast. I'm getting injured too much like I can't do it and my child starved. I think both might view them disfavorably, but there's going to be a lot more judgment on the first than on the second I think. Right, but if you're a hunter-gatherer, let's say you say, oh, well, hunting-gathering is really dangerous, but if you know that it has a 99% survival rate, I think we wouldn't, we wouldn't. It's like if if if your father saw his daughter, you know, drowning in a pool and he has, he could go in and save her, he has a 99% share that he will survive. We wouldn't super-judge the father if he didn't do so. Now, I guess it doesn't, we would, but I would argue that we're intuition pumping a lot there because saving a child from drowning doesn't seem to be a thing that we would ever, that doesn't seem to incur a lot of risk or bodily harm to do that, right? Yeah, I mean, yeah, there's a lot of bodily harm as perncy does, but okay, so let's say hunter-gatherer again, let's say you maybe you have to, you fight animals and maybe that's dangerous, but again, if it's a 99% survival rate, you can get injured sometimes. I think we all agree we would still expect that parent to not let their child starve and do the thing that would save the child and again, the parent has a 99% chance of surviving from. Right. Yeah, I think, I think we would probably have that expectation. I still think people view that as a little bit different than expecting to receive like an injury or just because there's so many chances to mitigate it. Like, even if it's a percent, a high percentage chance that you'll get injured, it just feels different. Like, I think people, but isn't even, you're describing pregnancy, like your hypotheticals, I think it's a difference here where you're saying you're trying to prevent a harm, but I just want to point out pregnancy, when you have an abortion, you're already pregnant, you're not preventing, you're not preventing it, you're time to prevent it was, you know, not having sex. Well, the whole thing is the nine months or whatever of the whatever physical labor you have to go through to carry the pregnancy. I guess it's, I guess the point I'm saying is the difference, there's a difference between, you see someone's about to stab you and you're going to prevent that versus, the fetus is already in you, right? The already, the fetus isn't doing anything. They're just, the fetus is just chilling. Now, it has big, it's anybody's gonna tell you, I'm saying that like, there's like, if you have an abortion, you're avoiding the majority of like, the huge harm related to pregnancy. Sure, but then you're, you're imposing the harm of death on, on your child. Sure, but I mean like, the question is like, should you have to suffer a harm that somebody else is bringing towards you that you could otherwise prevent? And it just seems like generally speaking, we don't expect people to. Hey, it's Kelly Rowland. You may not know this, but I have eczema. So I get how it can steal your time. But why let eczema take over when you can talk to your doctor about epglyce? Epglyce, lubricism app, LBKZ, a 250 milligram per two milliliter injection is a prescription medicine used to treat adults and children 12 years of age and older, who weigh at least 88 pounds or 40 kilograms with moderate to severe eczema. Also called a topic dermatitis that is not well controlled with prescription therapies used on the skin, or topicals, or who cannot use topical therapies. Epglyce can be used with or without topical corticosteroids. Don't use if you are allergic to epglyce, allergic reactions can occur that can be severe. Eye problems can occur. Tell your doctor if you have newer, worsening eye problems. You should not receive a live vaccine when treated with ebglis. Before starting ebglis, tell your doctor if you have a parasitic infection. Paid partnership with Lily. - Respect your time. Ask your doctor about ebglis and visit ebglis.com or call 1-800-LilyRX or 1-800-545-5979. - Hank joined BJ's wholesale club the day he became a father of 30. - I coach football. - Now, coach Hank saves up to 25% off gross restore prices, 30 pounds of pasta, three cases of protein bars, 75 sports drinks, and that's just pregame. - He knows teamwork and BJ's knows savings. This is your home coach, home of the save. - Well, I think if you give all the caveogs that I described where the person's doing it unintentionally, you created a scenario and it's gonna be non-lethal versus lethal force. And it's not just a stranger, but it's your own child. If you provide all those caveogs to the scenario, I think our shared intuitions was strongly favorite and that you were not morally allowed to use lethal force against your own child in that scenario, which I think that, I think if you're being honest, you'd have to agree with. - I think it can get close, but I'm not sure. I mean, like the actual hypothetical is like, you see, you know, we can say it's your own child, if we feel like that changes it. If you see your child who's for some reason blind and you're in a closet, you're hanging something up, and the child is wandering towards you without stretching his hands as the magical pregnancy one, and you know if that child touches you without wand, you're gonna be forced to commit the next nine months of your life to carrying and then delivering a child. If that child was wandering towards you and there was no way to stop it beyond shooting your kid in the head or whatever, would you have a right to defend yourself that way, especially if you've exhausted other options to prevent the child from getting to you, but none of them worked. So this could be our contraception or whatever, or do you have to allow the child to make contact, your child would make contact with you with the pregnancy one, and now you have to be pregnant for nine months and then deliver a baby. - Yes, yes, if you give your blind child a pregnancy one, knowing there's a good chance they're gonna touch you with it. - Well, good chance. - That chance is one percent. - Sure, even if the chance is one percent. - If you give them the pregnancy one, that's also, that, fuck, I guess, I could try to think of a different analogy, but the issue here is that like, why the fuck would you ever give a child a pregnancy wand? I think there's an intuition pump there. - Well, I understand, but you're using this thing of like, well of course if you give them a pregnancy wand, you have to accept that you could, but there's like, there's literally no reason to give a pregnancy wand to a child other than the fact that it might get you pregnant, whereas like, there are reasons why we have sex that isn't just to have a child. - Okay, so then, you know, people have sex because it's pleasurable, so you could say, I don't know, the hypothetical people get so weird, but you have some reason that you just, some reason that you enjoy giving them the pregnancy wand, like the risk of it is, I don't know, it's really good. - Yeah, I know this is getting really weird territory here, but you have some reason to give your child the pregnancy wand that's beneficial to you, but you know if you do so, there's a 1% chance they're gonna touch you with it. Unintentionally, absolutely, you cannot shoot them in that scenario. I think that is pretty, black and white, pretty obvious. - I don't know. I think that for, I think for, in this particular hypothetical, I think I might agree, but stepping back, it seems to be the case then that we're saying that it is unethical to engage in sexual behavior if you're not ready to have a child. It seems like that would have to be the moral rule that we're writing there. Because I feel like the. - I don't think that's necessarily the conclusion, I think the necessary conclusion is that if you're engaging in sex, then if you get pregnant, then it is a moral to have an abortion that you should give birth to the child. - Is that everyone I just said? You know, I'm sorry. - Wait, how is that different than what I just said? - I thought you said they should just not engage in sex. I'm not saying that necessarily the conclusion that they should engage in sex. - Well, I think that if you. - Yeah, that's, I'm sorry, maybe I'm a spoke. Yeah, if you're engaging with sex, you need to be ready to have a child every single time. It would be immoral to engage in sex without the expectation that somebody could get pregnant and then being ready to have all of the, we're with all to take care of the kid everything after that. - Yeah, correct, I think that is the logical conclusion that I think most of pro life people are, that's what they're arguing. - Sure, I'm not sure if most people would accept that trade-off, 'cause I think people feel like sex is pretty important to their lives such that they. - Sure. - Yeah. - People enjoy sex, but killing children versus a dead child versus the pleasure you get from sex. These are not comparable things. - If you're doing everything you can to prevent conception and everything, I'm not sure. - Well, not everything, you could just wait until you're ready to have a kid. - Well, you're saying not have sex, basically. - No, you could wait until you're ready to have a kid, not have sex forever. - Yeah, I have sex until you're ready to have a kid. - Yes, right. - Right, yeah, that's what I'm saying. - Yeah, but then if you don't want to have a kid, you're never a lot of sex. If you don't want a kid, you shouldn't have sex, but again, like yeah, if you do have sex, you don't want to have a kid. In America, adoption is a real thing. - Sure, right. - If you want to-- - We're talking about way past it there. We're way past the abortion conversation if we're talking about adoption there. - Well, no, but I'm saying that if you're not in America, if you're not ready to have a kid, yes, I don't think you should have sex, but if you do, then you are in America, you're liable for the nimbus impregnancy in childbirth or C-section, whichever, but then after that, you are not necessarily on the hook to raise a child, I think you should, but you are obviously not. - I'm just saying that the moral outcomes of the things that you're talking about are that, if you're not willing to carry a child to term, it would be a moral-to-engage sexual behavior or to have sex, and then you shouldn't be having sex, it'd be immoral to have sex until you're ready to carry a child to term and then, you know, yeah, to deliver to baby. - Yeah, I think you should wait to have sex until you're ready to have a child. I think that's fine. - Okay. All right, I hear you're, I hear you. - Okay, all right. Are you there to stop having sex? - Well, no, this isn't the argument that I use. I said, I don't believe that the fetus is a, is an agent or whatever, but the claim that I made at the debate was that I think you can make arguments for bodily autonomy. I still think you can. I don't know if all the intuitions here, everybody would follow through on, not being able to defend yourself, but I think the body of the tummy are giving us much harder. That's why I usually go with the lack of person who are lack of conscious experience. - I mean, do you wanna go back to the consciousness argument? - We could, I mean, that's my main one. I don't know what the moral value is of like a single cell or like a bundle cell creature is. - Sorry, breaking news. Poké and Lily are ending their podcast. - Uh-oh, we'll check it after this. Okay. - Okay, let me go ahead. So to go to the, back to the consciousness argument. So, okay, I can recap from what I said at UCLA. So we generally agree with the precautionary principle, but there's obvious caveats for that. And then I'm saying that we can safely, I would agree with you that we can safely say that zygotes are not conscious since they have no neurons, but at six weeks, it starts to become unclear because now there are functional neurons present. The mid-brain begins forming and there are brain waves that have been detected at this stage of gestation. And so, because consciousness is such a mysterious phenomenon, it becomes very difficult to know what the percentage chance is that it's- - So I don't know where the research is on that. I've never in my life seen something make the strong argument that at six weeks, we think there's a potential for conscious experience in the immersion of child, but if we did, then I would just say that at six weeks is the time that we should cut abortion off that. Which would effectively ban a abortion, but- - It would ban most abortions, for sure. But the- So there is a, you've referenced before the thalamacortical complex, and many of not most scientists agree that they think that that's what's necessary for consciousness, but it is not the consensus, nor is there really a consensus among scientists about when consciousness starts. There is a paper by a scientist named Bjorn Mirker, who argued that the seat of consciousness is not the thalamacortical complex, but is instead the midbrain. And he gives a lot of evidence that supports this, which I could get into if you wanted me to, but for this sake of argument there is, are scientists who argue that if the midbrain is the seat of consciousness and not the thalamacortical complex, like I said, the midbrain starts farming at six weeks, not at 20 weeks, like the cortex does. And so, that's why you have issues of, it's a question mark of one another conscious. And if you don't know what the percentage of chances that they're conscious, and then precautionary principle would state that you don't know, then you should just not have abortions after six weeks, which would effectively ban most abortions. There is another paper called reconsidering fetal pain by a scientist named Derbyshire and Bachmann, and they argued that fetal pain experience maybe as possible is. as 12 weeks gestation. Now, neither for Bjorn Murkers paper or this paper, both papers are definitely influential and have incited a lot. They haven't been universally adopted nor have they been debunked. And they basically point to that the questions of when consciousness starts, when pain starts, these are open questions that are hard to determine. And there's a natural barrier to this. Because, like I said, consciousness is one of the most mysterious aspects of human existence. It's been a mystery in science and philosophy for centuries. And you have the heart problem of consciousness where we don't have a fundamental understanding of what causes consciousness. We don't know what the neural correlates of consciousness are. That's the minimum structures necessary. These are both open questions that we don't know how to solve, specifically because consciousness has the feature of privacy. Meaning, you cannot directly observe someone else's conscious experience. We can only observe what we see are behaviors that we attribute to consciousness. But we cannot directly detect consciousness. This is what's called privacy of consciousness experience. And so because consciousness is so mysterious, and because we can't even put a range, what presents chance the fetus is consciousness after any point, after six weeks, then I think the precautionary principle stands that we shouldn't be carrying out abortion. So what would you say then? I'm sure I can find a paper where anybody defends any particular thing. But I mean, I'm sure there are papers that argue for-- I mean, there are some that argued for consciousness emerging at a later state than the 16 to 20 weeks that I cite, I don't remember who it was. But my understanding is that generally, the field is at like 16 to 20 weeks, I think, is where most scientists are like kind of at. This is obviously a difficult question to know the answer to 100%. But if we're going to say precautionary principle, we have to weigh the potential harms on both sides. On one side, we have the potential death of a thing that exists that's a life or a conscious life or whatever. But then we have to weigh that against the harms of the violation of the autonomy of the woman. And then we have to balance these two things out. We can't just say, well, to be safe, we're going to just say that we're going to assume it's a life from day one or at six weeks at the very least. And then erase all autonomy for the woman's body based on that principle of precaution, because I feel like we're only providing precaution for a single side. Right, I would generally agree with you. But I think the issue is that you need to-- in order to make these judgments-- oh, so I would agree with you. If we knew that there is a 1 in a million chance, or 1 in a billion chance, that the fetus is conscious, then I would agree with you that we should probably go with-- oh, I just want to say, this is only if you go with the consciousness argument for abortion. I don't agree with the consciousness argument. I think there's problems with that in general. But if you are going by the consciousness argument, then if you say that, OK, there's a 1 in a billion chance of the fetus is conscious, then I would agree. And then scenario, you should allow-- like you said, because of the respect of harms that the mother should not do in abortion, that instance. But the problem is, is we don't know what the percentage is. If you know it's 1 in a billion, then OK, but we literally don't know because of how mysterious consciousness is, that's the issue. Well, I mean, we have some guesses, right? It's not like it's a total mystery, right? We know it's not conscious. You would agree it's not conscious at one day, right? Well, yeah, I agree with you because there are no neurons. But at six weeks, you have neurons. You have the midbrain forming. You have brain waves. That's why it's six weeks and becomes a question mark. And to say, well, I know-- I know I would have to go and look even. I would have to be more familiar with the researcher. Wouldn't we even say brain waves? Does brain waves just mean some amount of electrical activity? Because I think your brain stem give certain types of brain waves, when we talk about that? Or I would have to look up, like even particularly, what that refers to. Sure, you could look it up, but there's these brain waves that happen different parts of the brain's brain waves that happen in the cortex as brain waves that happen in the midbrain and lower brain. But I'm signing a specific study. It was done back in the 1950s, where two scientists-- they took two fetuses. They were ectopic pregnancies, so they were not viable pregnancies. And that instance, that was a genuine medically necessary abortion. So that's fine. So they removed the fetuses one was six weeks, one was 11 weeks, and they stuck electrodes into their brains to see if they have brain waves or not. And the scientists of that study said that they observed brain waves in the six week old, similar to that of a sleeping adult. Now, take that to mean what you will. The point is, is that brain waves of some kind were detected, and that's what I'm referencing. There's a paper that I could link you that says that. Sure, yeah, I just-- again, I'm not sure what-- when we say brain waves there, I don't know what that-- if you remove-- I would have to look up everything that the-- when we say midbrain, like the parts of this. If you have a human being that has no front brain or whatever, and only like a brain stem, only a brain stem, I'm pretty sure the person is just considered essentially dead. I don't know what functions the midbrain gives you, or if we think that could even give rise to a conscious experience for, like, mid and brain stem. But-- Well, we don't consider for brain death. When people are medically determined to be brain dead, they were tested to determine whether or not the forebrain and the lower brain-- like the upper brain and the lower brain. It's like the cortex, and those associated parts are the higher brain, and then the midbrain and lower, I think are generally the lower brain. But they do test to make sure that both regions are in fact dead, and they're tested to do that. So if-- Well, but I think for-- I think for, like, a coma toast, like a perma-como toast patient, I think, like, the brain stem, I think, is still doing things. But all the other parts of the brain are gone. Well, if you're considered brain dead, if your upper, I guess, higher and lower brains are both considered dead, now there are people who are brain dead and who still have reactions, like, reflexes. But that's only because their spinal cord is still alive, so there are reflexes that are associated with that. I think-- I couldn't wrong, but I thought for those types of reflexes, that doesn't necessitate the brain stem. Have you ever wondered how movements start? I'm Ashley C. Ford, host of "Into the Mix," a Ben and Jerry's podcast about joy and justice. This season, we're talking to unexpected progressive heroes who found purpose in unexpected places. 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If you win your first $5 lineup, prize picks, run your game. - Let's be present in a certain state's visit at prisepix.com for restricted sent details. - No, there are reflexes that only depend on the spinal cord that aren't dependent on the brain stem. - Okay, my understanding is that there are some that depend on the brain stem, but the brain stem in and of itself can still like have like a heart beating and stuff. But like if you're, I don't know, the names of the brain parts are whatever, but. - Yeah, I do know that there are parts of the brain that they checked to see, are they alive or dead before pronouncing your brain dead? - Sure. - Yeah, but so yeah, so I was still maintained that we don't know when consciousness starts, we don't even know the percentage chance that at any point put with the chances of the fetus being conscious is, there's also this issue that I have to bring up where that, so you said in your debate with Lila that you put the point at 16 weeks, was the point that you think conscious experience based on what you saw might be possible. There are about 40,000 second trimester abortions a year. And for second trimester and later abortions, the most common method are DNAs, which are dilations and evacuations, which involve using, you know, four steps to grab the arms and legs of the fetus and tear apart, you know, these are the cases that pro-life people normally bring up. But for good reason, because like we said, if you take the chance that a fetus is conscious at 16 weeks, then if we are performing these kind of abortions where we're literally just grabbing them and ripping them apart, there's a real world chance there that they are conscious and they are consciously experiencing this. So not only are we doing the crime of, you know, killing a child if you give them personhood, but they are actually experiencing the thing that is happening to them. I mean, what I'm saying is true. Would you agree that if that is true, that that's something that we're doing that's really recklessly tearing up? Yeah, we shouldn't be killing in any way, right? Living human beings that have experiences that we're trying to protect, right? - Right, so I'm just saying that that is a thing that, so you agree that it shouldn't be happening, I'm telling you, it is happening, to the, to the, to the point of like 40,000. - Oh, for, well, I mean, it would depend on, I guess why the abortions are done or what the medical, if it's like a life of the mother thing, I'm not sure I would have to look into the particular thing, but I mean, most, the vast majority of abortions, okay, well, I don't know if the vast majority, but the majority of abortions after, like, late-term abortions, so this is the only thing I was bringing up was that people on the left normally say that, oh, late-term abortions are only done for medically necessary reasons, but that's not the case. I can see, oh my notes here, where is it? So there was a study done by, well, first off, there's, yeah, there's a study done by, it was called the Turnerway Study, which found that it's said that most women who sought abortion after 20 weeks were delayed because they did not realize they were pregnant. Once women are delayed, financial and logistical barriers pour some even later into pregnancy. So this is saying that most women who seek abortion, late-term abortions are not doing for medically necessary reasons, it's other reasons. So, um, it's the one point I want to make. Wait, quote that part again, read that again? Yeah. So, um, most women who sought abortion after 20 weeks were delayed because they did not realize they were pregnant. Once women are delayed, financial and logistical barriers push them even later in pregnancy. And I can link you to if you want. Sure, I'm just trying to think of that necessarily means that if that statement necessarily means that most second term abortions or second term as third abortions are done by, I don't know if that logic with follows, it might, but, but whether or not it did or didn't, I mean, I would just say that these would, I would consider these a moral, right? I don't know how this changes any other program agreement. Sure, sure. Okay, so then we agree that late-term abortions are moral. Um, so, yeah, so that's, that was my first part about the conscious argument, the first problem with the consciousness argument is that we don't know what the chance, the chance the fetus is pregnant or as a conscious at any point after six weeks. Um, there's another issue knowledge that there is like a scare though that like, if we do know so little about it that it's a huge burden that you're telling somebody else to suffer on the off chance that you might be correct about like an earlier emergence of a conscious experience, right? Right, but it's offset by the fact that it's, this is a potential murder. That's, that's the point. Yeah, I understand, but I'm saying that there's a huge cost on both sides of that. Yeah, yeah, I'm not, I'm not going to deny the pregnancies a huge cost. Okay. Um, the other issue with consciousness argument is, um, it, it leads to weird conclusions. If you say someone needs to be conscious to, uh, be a person, um, then you run to, I mean, people have brought this up to you before cases of amnesia or people with Alzheimer's. Um, what, what is your current response to these situations where people are in a coma and they wake up and they're not going to, or even even not, not even a coma, but like a person with Alzheimer's usually goes to sleep and they're going to wake up and they're not going to have memories of their past. So in that instance, well, because you say, you know, people in a coma, the distinction you make between that and the fetus is when you say, well, person in a coma was conscious before. And that's what's morally relevant and distinguishable between the coma patient and a fetus. But in instance where the memories are gone, then what becomes the, the, the morally relevant feature that previous consciousness matters? I mean, I think, I think these are really interesting cases to talk about for a lot of reasons, but I think all they're going to do is change how we understand like what a human life could be. It's not going to make us expand our definition of human life to include things that we were considered to be very, very, very like outside of the normal human experience. Like if it was the case that there were like, if we, like, we're talking about things like identity and persistent identity over time are like ontological requirements basically of being considered a human. If you had a creature that every single time they went to sleep and then woke up, it was a totally different person with different memories and everything else. I think people would have a much different evaluation of whatever that creature was than what we considered to be humans today. So it's hard to like not to say that people with Alzheimer's disease are not human anymore or are not the same person they were, but there are like a lot of interesting questions that spawn from that and the most boring way to answer those questions and the most morally unsatisfactory way to answer those questions is to say, oh no, it's just the exact same as every other human. I don't know if the article anymore, but there's an interesting article or essay right a long time ago by a philosophy, I think PhD student about whether or not it was moral to have somebody with like a severe Alzheimer's progression in jail for a crime that they committed earlier in life. But we say that it's moral to keep somebody in prison for a crime that they don't even remember doing or have like the cognition to even understand that they did or any any recollection whatsoever of it. And I think those are very interesting questions, but I think the boring question would be to say, or the boring response would be, well, they're all humans, so it's all the exact same thing and then you just stop. So all that to say that, you know, like there might be interesting questions we can ask about like, well, what if a human had this particular affliction or this particular condition? But I don't think the answer to any of those things would be, oh, well, let's just broadly extend our definition of human to include all of these things, so it's the exact same. I think you would meaningfully look at these types of experiences as being different, and I would point to a multitude of things in society that demonstrate that. To your point about, can you keep someone in prison for a crime they don't remember committing? The Supreme Court is actually ruled on this. So in Madison versus Alabama, which is in 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that you can be punished for crimes that you don't remember committing. Even in this case, it was for capital punishment. Their ruling was, if you don't remember committing the act, but you at least have the mental wherewithal to understand why you're being punished, then it's okay to punish the criminal on that instance, even if they completely forget it, even if it's capital punishment. So that's a. So I was in the facts of that case, but like, if it's a person, how could a person be expected to understand why they're being punished if they don't even remember committing any of the action? Or are you just saying they, like, and they possess grammar? Well, in this case, the criminal, he, I think he had killed a police officer, and then while he was in prison, he suffered like a couple strokes, and he forgot a lot of his past, including the crime, but he still had enough mental ability to understand when it was explained to him why he's in prison, what he had done. And that case is, yeah. But you talk about, there's a lot, there are a lot of interesting questions about the persistence of identity, and I have thoughts on that, but on the, so the question still remains, on the topic of Alzheimer's patient, if the Alzheimer's patient goes to sleep, and they're going to wake up, and they're not going to have memories of their past, would you say it's morally, morally permissible to kill the Alzheimer's patient that regard? Not necessarily. I think you might be able to say that like the identity of the person has meaningfully changed, but I don't know if that would give you, if you would just say that they could kill the thing, like if you were to have a person who slept and woke up with a new identity every time or something, I don't know if you could kill that person just because they would assume a different identity. So in that instance, it seems like you're arguing for the pro-life position there, because if the person whose identity changes every time they wake up, when they go to sleep, the person that they were before no longer exists, so all that's coming is a future person. And so if you say that we're not allowed to kill them because of the future person that's coming, well that's the pro-life position, is it not? Yeah, but it's hard to imagine when we transition from one to the next, because for the pro-life position, there is no person to speak of. We always have to hark into some future person. If we're talking about a person who goes to sleep and then assumes a new identity, are we saying there's an eight-hour time period where it's a blank slate and nothing exists? And then there's a new identity that emerges at the end of those eight hours, because in that case, I would say I guess you can delete this person in the middle of the night. If it's like they go to sleep and there's like an eight-hour blank slate period where just a body with no mind. Well, they're just asleep, they're not conscious, they'll sell a brain and everything, they sell a body, then they're still alive, they're just not conscious at that point. So you would say that we could kill that person? Well, but you're saying they wake up with a totally different personality or. Yeah, yeah, they're gonna wake up and you're saying they're different person when they wake up, but they're gonna wake up, would you say it's okay to kill them? Because before you said it, that's not okay. When you say they are gonna wake up, which they are you speaking of, or I thought I thought that in the analogy, you're saying they wake up like a totally different person. So there is a human being there. So you can make the distinction in a human being in a person, but like there's a human being there, there's a body there, there's a brain, there's a heart, there's everything, so that human being exists. They're just not currently conscious, and when they wake up, they're gonna have different memories or whatever, but there's still a human being there that's asleep. We wouldn't call sleeping people, not humans. But sleeping people aren't like. They can be woken up. There's some conscious thing there to speak of. We don't have to always. If you're looking at a sleeping person, you don't have to hark into some future person that they'll become when they awaken. They were a person. They're asleep right now. You'll wake them up and they will wake up as that person. I think it's different than a person that doesn't exist yet. Right, but a coma patient probably can't be woken up immediately so that. But we still wouldn't allow you to kill a coma patient if you know they're gonna wake up in a few months. Sure, but what if you knew they weren't gonna wake up? Yeah, if you know they're not gonna wake up, then that's not a person anymore because they don't have the potential for future human consciousness. Yeah, but the only thing you're protecting is the fact that they ever were a person in the first place. That's why we're asking the question if they're gonna wake up is because at one point they were awake, right? Right, but in the case of Alzheimer's or in amnesia, it becomes unclear why the previous conscious experience matters is the issue. Yeah, I guess maybe. I don't know. Like I said, I think these are interesting things to think about. It's dark, but I don't think these move you any closer to expanding definitions of what is alive. I think of anything that probably pushes you in the other direction, which again is dark, but I mean. No, I don't think so. I think our intuition are intuition to pretty clear that you can't kill Alzheimer's patients. You can't kill people who are in reversible comas. And then if you take that standard and you apply that to the fetus. So I wouldn't argue. It's super, super not clear because I think that especially around like end-of-stage life care for a lot of these people, like this is where some of our strongest comments start to come up about. It's made in Canada. It like assisted suicide stuff. And this is stuff that you generally hopefully wouldn't grant to people. But like if somebody wanted to. Like you wouldn't want like a 25-year-old who got a bruise on his arm to kill himself to do an assisted suicide. side. But if you had like a 75-year-old who was otherwise healthy but was experiencing like extreme forms of Alzheimer's or dementia, I think that people are pretty sympathetic in that case but why is it more acceptable there for that person to kill themselves? I think we do have a lot of questions around like when your identity and everything starts to fade and your cognition starts to fade on the types of protections or things that you would grant to these people. I think there are a lot of questions around that. Are you saying are you saying allow them to kill themselves or are you saying you decide to kill them? Well I'm saying allow them to kill themselves in terms of allow to kill them. I think we typically don't we don't typically take it that far for a lot of reasons. So like you said like assisted suicide is a really controversial stance. It's not a lot of people have issues with that and with good reason. Well it's at least murky. But it's not murky at like 25 or 30. There's nobody's like debating that or they shouldn't be. Those people are generally seen as moving attacks, yeah. But I'm just saying that when we get to end of life stuff where we get to stuff that severely threatens a person's ability to maintain some kind of cognition or some kind of conscious identity, there are a lot of questions about how we deal with these people. Like severely cognitively impaired people don't even have the same rights in society. Not to say they were allowed to kill them but they might not ever be allowed to consent to sex or sign a contract. They may permanently have a power of attorney or something else. So I mean I think we do deal with questions about this related to severe cognitive impairment. And then for severe conscious impairment if we think it's never coming back you can pull the plug on those people. Right but like you said, we can't kill them and that's the best distinction. Well for like combatose people are people that we feel like are never coming back to a conscious experience. I mean in a way we do kill them, right? We pull a plug and start with us. That's different. But yeah, the common patients if there if there's no longer the potential for future conscious experience, then yeah, that's not a person. But the fetus has the potential for future conscious experience and that's the difference. They have active potential for conscious experience. Well, they act a potential that the potential doesn't make any sense. A sperm and an egg have potential if they come together to create a conscious experience, right? Yeah, so this is so this is a distinction. So with to make the distinction between gametes sperm and egg and as I go. So for pro life and pro choice sides, we need to pick a line that's true for both sides, right? We need to pick a line. So we need to look for a transformative event where you have a change in kind. I wouldn't grant any of this. So I think all of us is super arbitrary. This is giving you way too much charity to build an argument, I think. Well, how would you not agree that pro choice of people have both have to pick a line? Yeah, but I'm justifying my line with what I think are pretty strong arguments. Your justification is holy arbitrary and trivial, I think. Like you're talking about a transformative experience. What if my transformative experiences sex? Hank joined BJ's wholesale club the day he became a father of 30. I coach football. Now coach Hank saves up to 25% off gross restore prices, 30 pounds of pasta, three cases of protein bars, 75 sports drinks, and that's just pregame. He knows teamwork and BJ's knows savings. This is your home coach home of the save. Join for just $20 at BJ's dot com slash mosquito and save 10 cents per gallon for six months. Open soon limited time offer new members only BJ's home of the save. You're listening to a quick ad. You know what else is quick? Selling your car on Carvana and just put in your vehicle information and we'll give you an offer. I'm done. No hassle, no negotiation, no guy from an online listing lowball in you, which means by the time I'm done explaining this, you could have basically done it. Still haven't started? Hey, better late than never. Sell your car today on Carvana pick up fees may apply. Okay, I'm going to make a I'm going to make a case for why conception is a transformative event and sex is not. Okay, so so we're looking so again, we're looking for a transformative event where you have a change in kind, right, where you not have a person. We're looking for a changing kind. So conception fits this criteria very well because you're going from human tissue to human being sperm egg with a zygote, all the information is necessary to create a full fully grown person is now present. And with the zygote information is present when a when a man and a woman come together to fuck as well, it's just kind of separated. There is like a DNA that's created for a zygote, but it's not it can't become a human can't do anything. It needs so much from the mother's body. It needs nutrients and an environment to sustain it for so long in order for it to become anything. Right, but it still has active potential. And I'll explain what I mean there. So unlike the sperm or the egg, again, all the information is now fused together at the moment of sex, you have a bunch of, you know, millions of different sperm that potentially may join with the egg, but haven't yet. So at that point, you have potentially different active, you know, a million different people. No, not active because so here's the difference. So active potential. Well, okay, so yes, the so that what I'm saying a person is is a human being with active potential for consciousness. You're for my understanding, your position is a person is a human being who is either currently conscious or if they were unconscious, if they're currently unconscious, then they were conscious previously and have to potentially be conscious in the future. And I'm saying that's not the case. It's if a human being has active potential for conscious, that is a person, but a sperm and egg are not human beings. There's only human tissue. And so, well, you're begging. I'm you're defining human be I if you want to define human being that way, then I guess, then of course, but that's why I'm saying I would never I wouldn't just allow you to grant all of this automatically. Like, I don't think most people would say a zygote is a human being in the same way. It's not controversial. It's not controversial to say to describe sperm and eggs as as human tissue. That's not exactly controversial. Well, I think that might be considered are organs and tissue the same thing. But regardless, I'm saying like this is not like a Mary Ann Webster victory that you can have by looking at the right terms and saying, oh, look, I found the answer to my pro choice. The one of the most difficult philosophical questions of all time is defined away in a book, right? But worse, what I'm saying, like everyone who's on pro life side argues that conception is the point. And there's a good reason for that because again, you have to pick a you have to pick a line and it's conception all the information like biologically, we are defined by our DNA. And so your all your information is now present. And that before the actual conception does not define. I mean, but the all of the I don't even know if I wouldn't necessarily agree with that. There are a lot of I mean, like I understand why they pick the point of conception. Well, actually, I don't think it was science, but I like they feel like they have to pick some point in time. That's fine. But the problem is the time that they pick is insufficient. I think to address any of my arguments, which is why that point that you pick, you now have to switch to this like active potentiality argument because you can't point to anything they're worth protecting. But if we're going to use some kind of potentiality argument, well, then I'm going to say that, well, I think that that active potential is most realized when two people are having sex with each other because that's when you're like doing the big event that's going to bring the sperm and the egg together. And you can say conception, but you can't defend as I go. You have to talk about the future potential consciousness that it might exhibit. But I could say the same of like a man and woman having sex. There's going to be future potential consciousness that'll be exhibited from that action. Right, but you don't have a human being yet. You only have human tissue. And we only apply personhood or rights to human beings. We don't apply rights to human tissue. Like we don't apply. What do you mean be human beings? I mean, like human being is not what you can't just define a way. I think the question like when we say human being, what we're really talking about is like a conscious mind, I think, generally speaking. That's what we apply rights to. That's what we think of. That's what we have conversations with, right? But not in the case of a coma patient. There is not a conscious mind there. There's only there's only a body. Correct. And if we say that the coma patient's not coming back, then we pull the plug in the coma patient and they die. But if the coma patient is going to be conscious again, then there's still a person, which is the point. The fetus will be conscious in the future just like the coma patient will. Yeah, but the coma person was already a person. There was something there to speak of in the past. So that we were protecting the fetus is there was nothing in the past even speak up. You're thinking about I think it's going to come into existence and never even existed before for the coma person. It's they're coming back. But like we said, in the case of amnesia, who's even coming back? That's the point. We're torturing the ontology of human being at that point, which again, we can do it. But there's no way that you would ever justify a total expansion of the category of human being by saying what if we had a comatose person whose mind was going to be completely swapped with another person's mind once they came back to a conscious experience. It's just stretching too far of the definition. It's not that tortured. Alzheimer's patients exist. This is a real thing. Alzheimer's patients don't go to sleep and come back with a mind of a totally different person. Remember, they can come back without their previous memories. And so the question is what makes them what makes the previous conscious experience even relevant at that point? I mean, I think if it progressed to a certain point, I think people would agree. It just kind of feels bad because they look like if a person woke up and they literally couldn't remember anything ever, and there's a laying there in bed, and they literally can't even form memories. At some point, people might say, yeah, it sucks, but you could probably pull the plug on this person. Well, not in no memories. When they wake up, they'll go throughout their day, and they'll live their life. But when they go to sleep, when they wake up, they're not going to remember the previous experience. I think that this is different. I think you've created a different creature at this point that I would have to think of assigning different morals or, like, considerations to you. I'm just describing Alzheimer's patients. This is not true. This is like the most advanced, like by the time you're getting at this advanced level of Alzheimer's, the person is dying of pneumonia because their muscles aren't working properly anymore. Even if someone's dying of pneumonia, you can't kill them. Yeah, but I'm just saying that like you're making it sound like you're describing like a typical dementia patient. This is like end and end stage life stuff. And also, even when you say if someone's dying of pneumonia, you can't kill them. Like, at this, this is probably the point where most people would have DNRs and stuff like like don't resuscitate me, like let me die. - Okay, but that's different from killing someone. Like, again, assisted suicide is controversial, but killing people who didn't give you consent to kill them is not. - Sure, but I mean, we can find like at that stage in a hospital, I think you're basically killing somebody if you have a DNR. We can argue that it's been like doing an allowing harm, but like if the doctor is potential to save you quite trivially and he chooses not to, or there's a DNR, they're basically letting you die. Like I don't think you would say they're, is there like a meaningful moral difference between pulling the plug on somebody for sustaining them with food versus like choking them and killing them that way? Like do we think there's a meaningful difference here between the way? - Most moral philosophers, I think agree that there's a difference between killing versus letting die. There's a distinction there. - Don't wait, there's a distinction. - But it depends on the allowing harm circumstance. There's a huge difference in how much we would say versus killing a person, right? Generally most moral philosophers are gonna say killing a person is worse than allowing a person to die for sure. However, like if allowing a person to die, if I was sitting in a pool and I watch right next to me a two month old Crawlin and fall in the water and I see him drowning and later let you just pick him up and just put him back on the thing and I let him die. Most people, I don't know how the law is just, most people I think would just call me a murderer or at the very least it would be the most severe thing they could call me right up to murder. Nobody would be like, oh well he allowed him to die, so it's not the same as how he killed him. - Well no, actually the law addresses this. So if you push them into the pool then yeah, you're a murderer. But if you see someone drowning that actually the law states, even if you see someone drowning and you could reasonably say them, you're not morally, you're not gonna be charged with the crime. - I'm not appealing to the law here necessarily, but I'm saying, 'cause we're in the realm of moral arguments, and I'm just talking about a random person dying. I'm saying like if you could literally just reach next to you, just lift pluck a child out of the water and you let them die. I think most people would like borderline consider you a murderer at that point. - Everyone say you're behaving immorally, but I think it's, people would consider what's worse. Not saving a child that you didn't cause a scenario versus pushing a child into a pool and killing everyone would say that pushing them in is worse. - Maybe, I mean, I think I could get different circumstances here that would change people's minds on it. I think it would be, I think people would look really bad upon a dad who was like, I'm gonna teach my child to swim by throwing them in and see if he does. Unless he the father throws them in and the child tries, and then like they, it's a real unfortunate scenario, like for 30 seconds, he starts a drown and the dad takes him out and he's like, oh shit, and the child dies. Technically, he pushed him in, he died. I think a lot of people would look really disfavorably on that dad. I think they'd look down on him and it'd be a bad thing, but I still think that somebody, if you were literally just having a smoke, you were sitting in a pool and you watched a little two month old crawl in and just drown right next to you and you're on camera and you're just sitting there watching them drown. And then the mom comes out screaming, you're like, oh, you crawled in, you know. I think people would view that second person more harshly than the first. Like even though one is like a doing worse, even if you don't agree with my take there, like when we talk about allowing harm, there's a huge gradient to what type of harm we're allowing. I think there's a huge gradient there. Not all allowing harm is treated the same as other, yeah. - I mean, yeah, I don't disagree with you that the person is behaving incredibly immorally by letting his full child drown. But I think it is a general rule that killing versus letting die is worse. That's just in general, like there's a million different factors you're gonna buy to, but killing is generally worse than letting die. - Yeah, I definitely agree with you generally. But like a DNR in a hospital is kind of weird because it's like you're literally there to be taken care of. So doctors like letting you die, we've kind of made a choice that this person is like, oh, wow, to die. Now we haven't gone as far as to say be killed unless you're talking about like a suicide stuff in which case do we consider that killing or not? But like it's a pretty significant step we've taken that we wouldn't with people who don't have like severely augmented experiences. Like I don't think we've ever let like a 22 year old healthy person sign like a DNR going into a hospital. I don't know if they're allowed to or not, I'm not sure. But I think people would look at that a lot differently. - Okay, I'm sorry, I'm kind of lost. How does this apply to the abortion argument again? I've kind of lost right now. - Well, it seems like you're trying to interrogate my ideas around do we consider a fetus a person? And I'm saying no because there's no conscious experience there to speak of. And then the example that you're trying to go to to test mine is you're trying to say, what if you have an Alzheimer's patient who wakes up every day with absolutely no memories of the past? Can you kill this person while they're sleeping? Cause now I can't rely on the past conscious experience. And then my two points against this are one. This is an incredibly rare thing that I don't think is typical even of an Alzheimer's thing. But then two, that if you were to push me at all on that example, I'm almost certainly going to be taking away rights from the person who's waking up, not remembering anything, then granting rights to things with no conscious experience at all. Wait, so you're saying, I'm sorry. So you said the Alzheimer's patient is, you think that's really rare. And then what was your second point? I'm sorry. - I think I would just bite the bowl and say, okay, fine. If you want, you can let up Alzheimer's patient who's waking up with no matter what, you could just let this person die. I would be far more likely to be a person after that. Like, not letting die, can you kill them? The problem here for the problem why this doesn't, this is a really bad analogy for pregnancy is that the Alzheimer's patient isn't necessarily like causing somebody else active harm by existing whereas in the pregnancy, the fetus is. So like, it's hard to imagine why would you kill the Alzheimer's patient? Like, that's a pretty extreme step to take. That almost just seems vexatious. Like, why would you ever do that? Whereas for a pregnancy, an early pregnancy, we can understand why we have an abortion. - Right, we're still comparing pregnancy versus death. And so we would agree that death is worse than pregnancy. I mean, the Alzheimer's patient, they're not going to be causing pregnancy under someone, but they're still taking up resources. They're still requiring care and a lot of money to take care of. So you can definitely make the argument that they are causing a harm in that sense. - We should have been allowed to. - Or if you could just let them die, that would be different than murdering them, right? - Yeah, I still think we would not allow people to just let Alzheimer's patient start to death. - Yeah, but that's generally because we have the resources to take care of them. But if you were to start to run low on resources, if you were to choose between saving one Alzheimer's patient or one other person ever, and this is a person that, in your comparison, is no longer able to have even a day-to-day experience, we still haven't been able to comb out an example. - What? - When the coma would be a little bit better than Alzheimer's patient, like a really bad vegetative state. - Well, no, because he's saying that there's a different mind basically that emerges every time. So I can't rely on the past mind to give a protection to the future person or something. - I mean, they both work. A coma patient was always with amnesia versus Alzheimer's patient. Those both work as examples. It's just Alzheimer's patients are more common than true coma patients with amnesia, which is why I'm appealing to Alzheimer's. But in your instance of running low on resources, I mean, I guess it becomes more of a serious situation, but how is that relevant to pregnancy, though? Like, the mother. - Well, I'm just saying the reason why it seems hard to kill a person with an Alzheimer's, killing any person is because we're not typically in an environment where it's like, where we need to kill this Alzheimer's person or something really bad is gonna happen. Generally, they're in environments where they can be taken care of and they're not usually like a huge, ideally, a huge resource burden or whatever. You'd give them some food. I guess they do need some care for narcissists or whatever, but they have the jobs to do it. But they're not like harming, especially actively harming other people around them. - I mean, I'm just saying they're. Yeah, they're not physically harming anyone, but I'm just saying that there is a cost, there is a harm. - Sure, there are resources. - But that harm can be distributed to a lot of different people. There are people with jobs to deal with this. There's a lot different than the single cost of a person is attached to growing inside your body. - Yeah, but again, we're still comparing death versus pregnancy. I mean, you agree that death is worse than pregnancy, correct? - Death, yeah. - Yeah, so then that's the point. I mean, you'd. - Well, when you're running back to a different part of the argument, though, I'm just saying that you're. We would be okay with letting a person choose to die if they, at Alzheimer's disease had advanced that much. I don't think we would be okay with letting an otherwise healthy 25-year-old choose to die if they ended up getting like a pneumonia or like an infectional hospital. We would expect in hope that they would be taken care of. So I think something different is happening. If the mind of the Alzheimer's patient is deteriorated so much, this person is forgetting who they are every single day, something different has happened there. So it seems to be that the mind is like an important aspect that we're appealing to in terms of whether or not we would want to keep a person alive. And then much to say when I'm looking at a fetus, that has no mind yet, does even have the cells to have a mind. It's hard to speak of like what am I protecting there? And you're trying to say, well, what about future potential? And then you're bringing up like this combatose and Alzheimer's example. And even if I were to grant every single part of these examples, the only thing you'd be pushing me towards is to say I guess maybe these people shouldn't have like the same moral consideration than a normal living person is. But typically that's just never gonna be the case because I don't think anybody views these people as having like human experiences like when they're sleeping and they're waking up as like totally new things. I just don't think we'd typically view them that way. I mean, you say I'm only pushing you towards not letting them have the same rights as other people, but I'm not pushing you towards, you wouldn't agree. You still have not agreed that I'm pushing you. Like if you granted all the arguments and would not push you to, it's okay to kill them. And that's the distinction. - Well, because you can't put me in a scenario where I mean like you could find scenarios where like let's say that the only way to keep an Alzheimer's patient alive was to have them connected to like a bypass machine on another person. And so the only way for that person to do things or to leave or whatever, like they could just disconnect themselves from the Alzheimer's patient. And then the patient would die. Like I would agree to stuff like that. But it's hard to make a compelling argument for why should you kill somebody who's not like actively harming another individual. I mean, it sounds like you're kind of going to the violin and sorry, but is that we're kind of pivoting towards right now? Not. No, not necessarily. I'm just saying that killing a person with Alzheimer's disease is like not the same as killing of like a boarding of feet. I like, I can't think of it because there's no conceptual harm. There's not really a harm that the Alzheimer's patient is causing somebody and just just general resource drain is not anywhere near a specific or dire enough harm in the same way that a pregnancy could be considered like a physical injury. Selling your car on Carvana. Just put in your vehicle information and we'll give you an offer. Done. No hassle. No negotiation. No guy from an online listing lowballing you. Which means by the time I'm done explaining this, you could have basically done it. Sell your car today on Carvana. Pick up fees may apply. And now, prize picks is available nationwide, locking for kickoff because everyone and everything is on prize picks. What you want? Download the prize picks app today and use code Spotify to get one hundred fifty dollars instantly in line-ups if you win your first five dollar line-up. Prize picks. Run your game. But the, so yes, the, what were you, you keep bringing up the premise that's a hard, but I don't agree with it. I, and I don't disagree with you, but the, the point is that the harm of pregnancy is a lot less than the harm of, of death. So we can't just keep it going. That's what I'm talking about. We're not talking about that. We're not comparing pregnancy to death. We're comparing killing an Alzheimer's patient versus aborting a fetus. And I'm saying that I don't know, like, I can think of reasons why you would have an abortion for a fetus. I can think of positives for why somebody might want to. Even if you're anti-abortion, you can understand that, like, well, the woman won't be pregnant anymore. I have to go through labor any of that. But I don't know why we just kill an Alzheimer's person, assuming they're like in a hospital and they have the resources and everything to be taken care of. So if the Alzheimer's patient was causing harm to the extent of pregnancy, do you think we could kill the Alzheimer's patient that scenarios are what you're saying? If that was the only way to reduce the harm, yes. But that's like such a, almost. But I think, I think, I think we're in intuition pumping here as well. Because with an Alzheimer's patient, we, we all agree that it's under normal circumstances, it's wrong to kill them. But we also value, we, we all value future conscious experience. So with Alzheimer's patient, we presume our intuitions are leading this to us because Alzheimer's patient is going to get to enter their life, especially when they have this kind of memory deterioration. Like you said, they're, they're getting to monitor. They're probably not going to have much life. So there's not much future, future human experience there to value for the Alzheimer's patient. Well, for the fetus, for the unborn child, they have a lifetime of conscious experiences ahead of them, which is why we would, even though killing both is wrong, we would put greater moral, we would say it's more morally despicable to kill a child than to kill a person who's on their death bed who's going to die for a week from now. I mean, would you agree with that? Yeah, but that doesn't mean that we're talking about the, it doesn't mean that we're granting the same moral consideration as a serial to the same thing, right? So like I think that you could argue that a person who suffers some kind of bad accident that destroys their ability to have children in the future can feel like they've been robbed of a future child in the life and the conscious experiences and everything that would result from that, but it doesn't mean you've murdered somebody. Right, but then in that case, not even a human being exists yet, but in the case of a fetus, you have a human being. Well, my argument is, I don't have a human being. I don't act to potentials on a real, I don't know what to mean. You have, you have a human being, you have a living human body that's just, there's a collection of cells. It is not. Yeah, we can't. Is there, is not a conscious state, all the DNA is there to create the person. All the DNA is in a corpse. Right, but the corpse doesn't have active potential for future consciousness. I don't know what, active potential is begging the question. You're using this like created, constructed phrase that's not used in any other part of anything, everywhere, to try to salvage an abortion argument. Active potential just means what you, when you say active potential, that's like shortcut for. There's nothing here that's worth protecting yet, but like in the future, there will be. So I'm trying to, I'm trying to mind from the future, some kind of normative, you know, consideration. Well, active potential, I'm referring to the same thing that Trent Horn referred to and is arguing with you. I understand, but again, it's not a real, this is just an abortion. This is like a pro life phrase, it's not used any, this is not like a real thing, active potential. Well, I mean, but I mean, we really described what I mean back to potential, but it's logically it makes sense. So active potential, something with active potential just needs time, nutrition and the proper environment, like Trent Horn said, to become, why can I say, why can I argue the same thing about conception, then, like about sex, like given the, because it's a sperm, a sperm. If you give a sperm time, nutrition and the proper environment, they're not going to become anything other than a sperm proper environment, like a vaginal canal. What do you mean? It swims to and over, that's all it does. Yeah, you put a sperm in a vaginal canal, but without the, the, the additional information of the egg, the sperm is not going to become anything but a sperm. Yeah, but why is the additional information, the thing we're granting moral consideration to? Because we're looking for a, we're looking for a transformative event, we're looking for a difference in kind. When you double the amount of information. You can have a transformative event, but like I would argue that like a zygote splitting from one cell to two is arguably a transformative event. Sometimes so much so, that's when Twitter created, but I don't know that these are things that are giving you moral consideration. Not as much as, as conception is like the, yes, a zygote going from one cell to two cell is an important step in the creation of the fully formed human, the fully formed person. But conception is what determines everything is what determines your entire DNA. Before you know, you're choosing, that's so arbitrary, you could be, you could conceive and have an abortion or you can see even have fetal alcohol syndrome start drinking a bunch of alcohol. We have metabolic syndrome and your baby gets starved to death and there's so many things that happen past the point of conception that will determine whether that child is brought to determine what the child could even look like. I understand why you're choosing conception, I just morally, there's no reason why that is like a more special thing than sex or when it's a hundred cells or whatever else. I don't like it's just, you're just choosing some random physical property that, you can choose it, I guess. I just don't know where morality of that physical property comes from. Well, because now you've made the transition kind from human tissue to a human being. You now have all of the information. You've been using definitions, though, you're not like, I don't think conceptually, from human tissues to a human being, I mean, I would argue that a bigger development is when you actually start having the brain that separates you from the rest of the entire animal kingdom, but zygotes and fetuses up to a certain point look literally like dolphins. Okay, wait, so, I mean, what the fetus looks like at the beginning doesn't really matter, but you're saying that. Well, here's the thing, let's assume, let's say that you have a thing, let's say that you get pregnant and you've got this wonderful transformative experiences that happens as a zygote or whatever the fuck else. But let's say that there is, at some point, an error in the womb and everything continues to grow, but the child has no brain. Would you think that once that child is delivered, it gets all the same things as like a human being would get? Is the child conscious? Yeah, I don't know, whatever you want to call it, it's a brain. It's just a brain stem. If the child is not conscious, then no, that's not a person. They don't have any actual potential for conscious experience. Okay, so then it seems like that is the thing that you're valuing then. It's not the DNA or the human body or whatever. It's the conscious experience. It's the active potential for conscious experience and I put the point, it would start applying. To mind from the future moral consideration. If by saying active potential, if there's no conscious experience there, you wouldn't value the life, then if there's no conscious experience that hasn't formed you, then there's nothing that are value. We could say that in the future we'll have a conscious worth defending, but at that point in time, it doesn't. But we do value potential. We do generally protect things that we value. We do value potential, but it's not the same as the thing itself, it's a different type of thing. Right, but again, the reason that we value the coma patient with amnesia is because they will be conscious in the future. That's why. because we value, we provide inherent value to the human conscious experience, which is why if potential consciousness is coming, then we put value to that. That's why we. I know. I think it's because they were already a person that came in and you're looking at like the past experiences. I don't think it's because of a future. But again, with amnesia that is not clear, I would also argue, like let's say you have a child born, who is just not conscious yet, but will be in a day or so. You could say that maybe that's not super applicable, but that has happened where a child has been born that did not show consciousness until later. We wouldn't say that a child is born, who hasn't had conscious experience, but we wouldn't say this fully formed, viable baby that's out, that you could just kill it because it's not conscious yet. That doesn't make any sense. I don't know, are we saying the brain isn't there yet or just hasn't had a wake-up moment yet? I don't think this is the same as. The brain is there. The brain is there. The brain is there. They haven't had a conscious experience yet. It hasn't been working up. I don't think that's the same as saying that you have some. I don't think they're like sleeping as the same as having no conscious experience. I think these are different types of things. There's no science. If a baby is born, that shows no science of consciousness. The brain hasn't been active or anything for its entire development. It just hasn't flipped on. Nothing is going on. Yeah. Okay. So there has been cases where babies have been born. I think there have been cases where the cord was either the cord was in front of them or the cord was on the neck or something, because of that, they were born and they didn't show science of consciousness when they were born. But I guess you could say. say that even if they were born not conscious, maybe they had a previous conscious experience well in the womb, I guess you could use that. But then the other case would be that you can have, like you say, 16 to 24, 28 weeks, there's a big window that they don't know. But viability is within that window, the viability starts around 21 weeks. So you could still have a chance, like there's been babies born at 21 weeks who is not clear if they're conscious, or wherever conscious is even in the womb, but are viable, I think 87% of Americans agree that viability, when a child is viable, you cannot kill them. So in that instance, if there's no previous conscious experience, but you have a living viable baby out, but you would still provide a tribute value to that baby, wouldn't, right? Wouldn't we? Maybe, I don't know what stage we're talking now, but, I mean, we will listen, I'll give you it. Well, I guess it depends on, I mean, if you're talking about a baby that's born and everything, I think typically, yeah, we're way past any normal abortion kind of updates. But also, okay, I'll let you make your final arguments 'cause I do have other, should I have to get through? So go for it. - Here. Okay, I mean, I was just responding to your main, the blind man hypothetical, I think I just thought, well, I took point out how consciousness, we don't know when consciousness starts, so that puts in a big question mark, it need point after six weeks. I say there's a lot of issues with consciousness argument, when it comes to Alzheimer's and coefficients, everything, I already said all that. So, yeah, just thank you for listening for the time. - Yeah, no problem. Thanks for chatting. I'll be back, everybody. - Yeah, thanks. Bye. - Bye. Okay. - I coach football. - He knows teamwork, and BJ's knows savings. - This is your home coach, home of the save. 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