China rising, America in decline? The Trump-Xi summit

Hello, and welcome back to Independent Thinking, the weekly podcast from Chatham House. I'm Bronwyn Maddox. This week, Xi Jinping is in Washington to meet Donald Trump. It's been four months since Trump's state visit to Beijing. Even in that short time, the dynamic between the two countries has continued to shift. Gone are the days when the United States was the unchallenged superpower and China the supplicant. Today, President Xi and Trump meet as equals, or at least I'm going to suggest that to our guests. China is the rising power industrially, militarily, economically, while President Trump's struggles in Iran, the war he chose to fight, and his possible looming rebuffs in the midterm elections indicate the setbacks of his administration and the weaknesses that America is showing, some would argue, have been going on for many decades, but that he possibly has accelerated. There are many immediate issues between the two leaders. Trump's tariffs, two different approaches to artificial intelligence, warnings about the risks of that frontier technology, and then how to handle Russia and, of course, Taiwan. But over all of them looms one big question. Who will come to dominate? Who will come to dominate the 21st century? So we're going to talk about that, and we're going to talk about what each wants from the discussions between them at the moment, what they're going to try and get, and then what the longer-term picture might look like. To discuss all this, I've got a trio of esteemed experts from our Asia-Pacific program here at Chatham House. First, we've got Program Director Ben Bland. Great to have you here, Ben. Thanks, Romain. Also with us is Senior Research Fellow on China, Dr. Yu Jia. Good to see you again. Lovely to see you again. Completing the panel, it's Associate Fellow, Dr. Bill Hayden. Hi, Bill. Hi, Barbara. Let's start with where they are now. And I was saying in the introduction, look, this is a point when they seem to be equal. We had that moment last year when they met and President Trump was all full of tariffs he might put on China, and President Xi said, no, you've forgotten how much of the world's critical minerals that China controls. How about rethinking those tariffs? And that is what happened. How would you see their relative influence? Ben? The analyst's answer would be, it depends on what you're looking to measure, right? So you can look at a whole different range of factors. If you're thinking about finance, the dollar, that's clearly America out on top. If you're thinking about manufacturing, China's clearly winning that game. Technology, I guess, the jury's out. Our colleague James King would say China has won already or is winning. I guess some in the US frontier tech companies would argue about that. But what's interesting to me is if you take a step back and look at the mood music of how Trump has handled Xi Jinping, he's wanted to make himself look great and America look great. But in the process, I think he's given a kind of equivalence to China, which I think will go down very well for Xi Jinping back at home. I can see exactly the points you're making, but isn't that equivalence there in reality? Well, surely it's equivalent in reality in Beijing as well. We've been talking about mood music. I mean, I was just reading the Chinese state media this morning. It seems to be the entire state media just want to have branded this as if it's something he's doing. I mean, Xi Jinping achieved the equal status with a US president ever since the founding of the country. So that's the tones and mood was in Beijing. And also the fact that since 1962, Donald Trump broke tradition and picked up a Chinese president at the airport. I mean, for the Chinese, a country that concerns so much about protocol and procedure and is something of vital importance. That's a big deal. But are you agreeing with Ben that there are big, okay, not the dollar, that's a really important point, but big areas of industrial technological proficiency where China is equal or ahead? Industrial capacity, yes. But I think on technology, it's a debatable and also business surface. A bigger question is who determine the next round of the world order? And what China's trying to do is trying to give a very clear answer. At the end of the day, United States is not the only one that is able to determine world order. And China is now drawing that, giving either unhelpful hands. This is the essential point I wanted to get onto about who is shaping the world order. Bill, how would you answer this question? Well, I think we're now in the collective narcissism stage, in a kind of which audiences are these leaders trying to appeal to? And for Donald Trump, it just seems like he's appealing to a domestic audience. He's almost sort of, it seems, given up on trying to appeal to a global audience. Well, it's clear that she is reaching out as the voice of, say, the global South, being an alternative party. Well, I think that she's reaching out as the voice of the whole in the world at a time when the US is busy destroying its own brand in Iran and other places. And then here you have, you know, a confidence he taking to the stage, presenting, you know, his global initiatives of various kinds. And, you know, Trump, you know, looking like he's a supplicant going to the airport. So, you know, in terms of image and self portrayal, you know, China's winning. And what about the actual influence? China spent a long time trying to get, if not friends, but partners and trading partners and trading relationships across the world. It does have a degree of influence. It's helping Russia considerably in Russia's war on Ukraine by buying its oil and by giving it all kinds of technology. Would you say that China's influence around the world is rising at this point? For sure. Before he arrived at D.C. at this moment, he made a flurry of foreign travels in September, Bishkek, Cairo and New Delhi, places that U.S. President Biden and probably really does not really pay attention to. And what China is trying to do is trying to go to those places and try to tell the rest of the world that it's not just the United States, but it's actually China are willing and also have the power to decide how the world should be organized. And that world, in Xi Jinping's eyes, is run by multipolarity, not by unipolarity. Ben? I think there's also a question about what kind of power China wields and what kind of power it wants to and is willing to wield. And I think the world that China is building, it's much more about economic power first. So it's something quite different from the U.S. world order we've seen, which was, yes, partly about rules and principles, institutions, but backstopped by a global military with bases and operational capabilities and the willingness to intervene repeatedly, as we've seen this year all around the world. And China, I think, for now wants to build something else. So it's economics first. I think the other point is there's quite a lot of risk-averse, a lot of coercion from China's perspective. So, yes, you can say compared to 10, 20, 30 years ago, Xi Jinping is more assertive on the international stage, but he still doesn't really want to get dragged into foreign conflicts. He's not willing to put China's diplomatic reputation on the line to try and resolve even conflicts like the Iran one, which has direct impacts on the Chinese economy. There's a sense of sort of passivity in the world, but there's a lot of chaos. China doesn't actually have the capabilities or the desire to solve these problems. So, yes, we want to boost the economy. We want to boost our influence, but we don't want to get sucked into these problems. So I think you can see the power rising, but it's really primarily in the economic domain. And while there's a lot of talk about reshaping the global order, a greater voice for the global south, China's not really willing to put much risk capital behind that. I think in addition, apart from economic power, it's also here is coming in as the technology power, Beijing using technology as a source of power and influence, that attracting the non-Western world using Chinese technology. I think there's a sense of power and influence, perhaps more long lasting than, say, for example, structured and static military alliances. What about diplomatic power? Someone deep in the UN system lifelong was telling me, as all these people gather at the United Nations General Assembly at the moment, that China spent years getting its officials, its diplomats at all kinds of levels of the UN system. And it's going to see the fruits of this in the coming years. And we should be braced for China to start. You're saying, look, how about moving some of these UN agencies to China? Is that your view of what's happening? Well, I think we're going to see the first one. There's a vote coming up on the maritime areas beyond the national jurisdiction, which looks like it's going to go to Xiamen. So maybe that'll be the first one to come up in the near future. But yes, I think broadly, I mean, just look across the whole range of institutions and the Chinese advance has been paralleled by the American withdrawal. Yeah, I think it'll less be about the UN because I think that the challenges with the UN and the international system are kind of irreparable. I think once you start talking and start to unwind these things, it's very hard to prop them up. And I think that's why we've seen China also launching its own initiatives, global development initiative, global civilizations initiative, the global security initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, there's the BRICS and the Shanghai Corporation Organization. So I think China is in a phase of experimentation. But if you look at all these things, they require quite low levels of financial and political commitment from China. So what worries me actually is not that China comes in and rebalances everything in its own way, but actually that China won't really be willing to fill a lot of the vacuums left by the US vacating the global system. And its vision of a global order is much more about protecting a narrower set of what it views as core interests for China. You just talked about the US vacating the international system and Bill's touched on this a couple of times. Bill, I wanted to ask you how long you think this has been going on, if you like, a decrease in American influence relative to China and whether Donald Trump has accelerated that? Well, I suppose you would have to start with China. I think it's been going on for dart it with the global financial crisis and everything that flowed from that but i mean if you look at things might start before with iraq and afghanistan you know you could say the destruction of the saddam regime was the high point and everything has been downhill since there but i think it was the financial crisis and i think up until that point you know chinese officials you know had looked at the us as being a sort of model to emulate not not politically but in terms of you know unleashing the forces of the economy and at that point i think they began to think the model had you know feet of clay so we actually even before trump you know was elected the first time you know things started to change i think in terms of the promotion of global goods and the end of that unipolar moment when everything appeared to be going in a sort of you know a liberal with a small l direction what do the two of you think about whether donald trump has taken steps and his administration and his assorted senior people that have if you like surrendered american influence because you know his slogan is make america great again and yet we've seen various things like retreat from clean technology the iran a conflict from which he cannot extricate himself offending all kinds of allies with tariffs and so on we've seen various ways in which he asserts that he's improving america's position but others would not always agree i would see him as an accelerant but not the cause of what's happening and i think we have to look to the u.s public that's voted him in twice but you could even see look back to barack obama and even george w bush before 9-11 and i think that's a big part of what's happening and i think that's a big part of what's happening and i think we have to look to the u.s public that's voted him in twice but you could even see look back to barack obama and even george w bush before 9-11 who'd sort of envisaged a smaller role for the u.s in the world so i think there's something deeper happening there but of course the fact that the trump administration in its second term is explicitly opposed to the idea of international rules-based order has made things really difficult for allies in particular i think for non-aligned countries in asia they would look at this and say well what's changed right america always did whatever it want and put some nice fancy words and institutions around it so i think in a sense it's less shocking for independent countries that aren't allies of the u.s but what i would say is it will mean that if future administrations come back in and say now we're going to take our partners seriously and we want to work together to challenge china or challenge russia it'll be very very hard to convince anyone that it's worth putting more eggs in the u.s basket so i think the damage has been quite serious when it comes to china policy one of the interesting things is the kind of core tenets of u.s deterrence in asia they haven't really shifted there's been a lot of questioning of the u.s commitments to taiwan to japan and south korea to a lesser extent but you know the u.s military is still forward deployed in the places it has been but i do think the rhetoric matters right and especially the fact that trump has talked down china as a threat that even within the united states it's opened up a bigger debate about actually is china a big challenge is it really worth multi-generational investments of trillions of dollars to compete with china and both on the left and the right of u.s politics you now see voices of emerging saying actually china isn't really our problem we're far away we have these two oceans protecting us we have mexico and canada yes there's some economic competitiveness issues but beyond that protecting asia is not our problem the first island chain as it's called the second island chain that's ultimately irrelevant for america and i think one of the things that trump has done he's given license to those voices where in the past i think it would almost be unsayable in washington to come out and say china isn't actually that serious a challenge so i think what do you think then do you think they're going to be able to do that i think they're going to be able to do that right or not from america's point of view if i take a step back i think some of the critics are probably right i think china doesn't represent the kind of challenge to the u.s that the soviet union did for a number of reasons right if you think about the soviet union they had communist party and communist agitators active within the u.s so this kind of internal threat they had you know missiles deployed to cuba on america's border and there was actually like a clear ideological contest between capitalism and communism that the soviet union and its allies were pushing and the u.s was opposing china is not really promoting its ideology in any clear sense of course there's meddling in the u.s but they don't have sort of a hard core of you know chinese advocates within the u.s and china doesn't have its military deployed you know on the borders of the u.s so i think it is quite a different threat but on the economics of course and the technology as uj was saying the threat is much more significant but that doesn't lend itself necessarily to such a zero-sum game because the interconnection economically and technologically are so deep all right that's quite a challenge to what actually what a lot of european countries would say is look first china is actually fueling this war on our eastern border ukraine's costs by keeping its fingerprints off the actual weapons if you like but also is about to annihilate our industries make us dependent and those who do things i'm thinking of the japanese prime minister takeichi saying japan would stand by taiwan and promptly getting all kinds of weaponized supply chains of critical minerals turned off so there is a lot of countries not feeling quite as relaxed as you sketched it from what might be the american point of view what do you think of what ben's just said and then i want to get into this question of what china wants because that is absolutely essential to judging how countries should react to it i mean partially what ben said was right and really on this sense of how much united states should care about asia security how much united states should care about asia allies and for me judging from current trump's policy i found very confused as a policy analyst so secondly what china really wants i think that's exactly what china want have united states that less attached to asia and leave china a bit more space within the closest neighborhood and that china would be able to extend this influence and also to some extent curb its long-term archi-rival japan and less so south korea and philippine so the u.s allies so that's one thing now secondly i think what china wants is to be able to extend this influence and also to some extent curb its long-term allies given the retreat of united states and china now began to introduce this so-called new vocabulary of world order a new vocabulary of international relations how it should be organized you know on the notion of sovereignty on the notion of development on the notion of human rights and so on and so forth and none of these vocabularies has been represented through the so-called liberal international order but instead it is something that china by using its own domestic development argument that even without western values even without enshrining what the west has advocated there's a path to modernity and china has proved itself managed that so i think that's perhaps the most powerful narrative that beijing is presenting right now you know that pathway to modernity without having all this western so-called liberal internationalism but you know china is making the world safer autocracy that's what's going on quietly and we can say maybe donald trump is you know helping in that bit but the communist party of china has an agenda and it is not liberalism it's not freedom of speech it's not autonomy you know and in asia i mean the us you know might be able to think well we're safe between you know two giant oceans but i mean countries in asia do not think this is a great idea hence you know all this attention on taiwan because taiwan you know it may just be 25 million people the same as the population of shanghai but it's the totem i guess and also i think for the us a military establishment for whom the whole purpose in asia has been to keep control of what's called the first island chain that ben mentioned you know which is japan taiwan the philippines all the way down to around singapore are they going to overturn you know 70 years of practice you know and sort of say ah yeah we're kind of relaxed about asia now we can retreat as far as hawaii i think this will cause a huge fight within american policy making circle but i think it's important to say look it's one thing i agree that china is a challenge i don't disagree then it's what all i'm saying is are people in the us in competition with china and so far the answer has been no right on on the economic i'm not sure that's right uh in the us probably but in europe no you're seeing europe waking up um slowly but to this really existential threat to dozens of industries and saying we've really got to try and get our act together and china is saying all any possible measures are protectionism but europe saying some of this is justified these are chinese companies running at a big loss selling into our markets uh we're going to lose our entire industry if we allow all this to happen and i think they're waking up to the military threat which is not as distant as talk of asia pacific islands might make it seem and then when you get to other countries i mean this is not just about the us and europe japan and many other countries near china so this is really getting very uncomfortable we don't have freedom of passage in the seas that is challenged we've got china intruding on our airspace and maritime space and if i'm going back to the u.s we've got china intruding on our airspace and maritime space and maritime space and maritime space they say anything they don't like there is retaliation using the now very formidable control of critical minerals and supply chains so um that's part of what i was thinking when i was sitting listening to you bill well yeah and the knock-on effects i mean if the u.s withdraws from asia and then japan and south korea you know start thinking well we're on our own where do they go do they then think well we've got to have nuclear weapons do we then sort of see a whole kind of proliferation breaking out uh in asia and then spilling from asia to other countries parts of the globe as well so you know we've all spent a long time bashing the americans but we're going to miss them when they're gone is there anything countries can do about getting rid of the chokehold that china has on critical minerals well yes there is but it's just going to take a very long time to do it so there are already initiatives japan australia the u.s and other countries talking to each other but it's simply the question of scale and having the manufacturing and processing capability to do something about it so china's chokehold on this is going to going to last for maybe a decade, regardless of what anybody else does. contracts and minerals. It's also the refining ability. And it's also to do with the environmental standards. If United States and Europe has a very stringent environmental standards, and this will not fit into the facility that is able to process in those critical minerals. Let's pick up two of the more difficult topics we've touched on already. One is AI, one is Taiwan. Let's start with AI. Where do you think they are in this race? Interesting enough, I mean, American companies and also the US administration have been talking successfully about setting guardrails on this AI competition. And so far responses from Beijing is quite muted, basically by saying, we want to do our own thing, and you can do your own thing. So at the end of the day, I think I remember what she's been talking about so-called constructive strategic stability. If there's only one takeaway I want to take by the end of a Friday, and what they're going to talk about, are we going to seriously have a guardrail on AI? If they have a tiny little bit, you know, a little bit of a guardrail on AI, I think that's going to be a big deal. Co-management on AI, and I would actually consider this visit as a very limited success. But I think for now, Beijing's interest on having this co-management and joint guardrail on AI is not there. But I think the relative discussions about AI and the risks and the opportunities in China and the US actually gets to the heart of this wider debate we've been having about, you know, how the US and we in the Western general approach things and how China does. And we like these big conversations about, are we all going to be wiped out? What are the deep systemic risks to the world? Is it going to cure all cancers within three years? These very hypothetical arguments, while at a practical level, many of us as individuals and companies are struggling with how to use these tools. China has taken the complete opposite approach. There's almost no debate about, you know, the world being wiped out. They're talking about how can we use AI practically to increase the efficiency of our companies, our applications, our manufacturing industry, whatever is right. I think that tells us something about the two systems that we're really interested in systemic big risks that we don't actually have to address. And spend money on. And China is much more focused on the sort of day-to-day quotidian work of making improvements to its economy and its society. The old cliche of crossing the river by feeling the stones could be rolled out here, I think. So do we think there's any chance of an agreement between the two or really that the competition between the countries and the competition between the companies, that that is really going to triumph? Well, I think, I mean, if you take the view that this is actually about, technological supremacy, why should either side be interested in guardrails? You know, I mean, they may say one thing in public, but at the end of the day, I mean, there are plenty of incentives. I mean, these companies take on staggering amounts of debt. They want to make sure that their models win out. And for the US at a national level, they have the same incentive. I mean, so I can't see why either state would seriously think about guardrails at this point. And if you talk to thinkers in China, whether it's AI or nuclear weapons or it's trade issues, you know, they will often say, well, look, guardrails are what the more powerful country uses to keep the weaker partner down. But I do think eventually, if China gets to parity on certain technologies or defense platforms, I think there probably will be more interest at a later date in some sort of managed competition. But I think coming back to the earlier question about how has China caught up with the US, I think in China, there isn't enough of a sense that they have yet. But I think once they feel much more parity, hopefully there will be a more sensible conversation across sort of systemic risks about how these two countries can work together. But for now, I think China feels that's just a framework that the US might use to keep their progress down. I tend to agree that the competition is going to win out over cooperation at this point. Bill, Taiwan, if the US won't defend it, can it be defended? I mean, it's a difficult place to invade. I mean, there aren't that many beaches and it's quite mountainous in that sense. But it's a fairly easy place to blockade and to prevent ships and planes getting into. It's a place where China can amass huge amounts of not just military ships, but civilian ships and all the rest of it. It could, for example, demand that countries recognize that Taiwan is a part of China. They won't let their ships go through the sea. There's all kinds of things it could do to sort of put pressure on other countries, which fall well short of invasion. And I'm pretty sure that Xi Jinping would like this to be in his legacy before he steps down. Whether that means an actual, you know, shooting war, I don't think at this point, but. A shooting war would depend on America wanting to shoot back. Absolutely. And we don't know whether that is the case. And, you know, in discussions with Japanese analysts, they were sort of basically saying that, you know, for them, if the US becomes involved, then Japan gets involved. But if the US doesn't get involved, then why would Japan take the risk at that point? So I think it must be quite lonely to be a Taiwanese politician right now in this sense. But I don't get the sense that the debate in Taiwan is going to be about, you know, the US and the US and the US and the US and the Taiwan has caught up with this. There's a sort of sense in Taiwan that everybody wants the same thing, i.e. the status quo. But they are sort of aware that China has a kind of ratchet approach, that everything goes forward. It, you know, might stay the same for a bit, but it never goes backwards. And that's attempting ultimately to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC. Ben, we were hearing at this dinner discussion last night, the musing that if China blocked the Strait of Taiwan, the effect of economic disruption would be far, far greater. than the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz. Yeah, if there was some sort of uncontrolled situation, a spiral to military conflict, or a military blockade, which I think is technically considered an act of war in international law, yeah, the consequences would be devastating, given how much trade flows through. I think the challenge for China, as Bill was talking about, is what can it do to increase pressure on Taiwan that doesn't lead to those sorts of devastating economic consequences? Which would also hit China, given that so much of the trade that's going through the waters around Taiwan is coming to or from China. It's, you know, raw materials coming into China, and the goods that they're selling around the world fueling their economy. So I think they would have interests in using, as Bill said, this kind of ratchet approach, trying to make sure that they can squeeze Taiwan without those sorts of effects. But I do think there's a lot that we in Europe and in the rest of the world can do to support Taiwan. Perhaps less so in the in the case of a D-Day style invasion, if that's what were to happen. But given that China is using these kinds of gray zone pressures, I think there's a lot the governments in Europe can do to talk to our companies to prepare them for the sorts of pressures they might face from the People's Republic of China, and to do what we can to encourage our companies to keep doing business with Taiwan to maintain those linkages, to resist some of the pressures that they'll inevitably face from Beijing to cut those ties with Taiwan. This is not something that we've done in the past. So when, for example, airlines, hotel companies have been told, you know, change the menu of countries, countries on your website to say, you know, Taiwan brackets, China, companies have just done that. And I don't think governments in Europe have ever even spoken to them and said, maybe don't do that. I mean, one thing, it's very confusing, if you're a tourist trying to find Taiwan in the PRC, because it doesn't exist. It's a separately governed country with its own passport control and everything else. So I do think at the margins, there's things we can do so that the sense of Taiwan separateness, and their voice in the world is a bit better known. I think at the margins, that would push back on some of China's efforts to erase the sense that Taiwan is in fact, de facto independent. Interesting enough, I mean, before Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States, I mean, one of the preconditions, and Beijing laid very clearly is that is to say, Trump administration could not go through these massive arms sales towards Taiwan. One of the watching point for this state visit would be firstly, is Taiwan going to be raised? I'm sure they were going to be raised and whether this will be appear on the joint statement. And also, secondly, how much delay that Trump administration will manage on arms sales towards Taiwan, and then that would actually show the real attitudes on what President Trump himself, but also demonstration on the attitudes towards Taiwan and also what you want to do about it. So I think the arms sale for now, is one of the key watch point on this. If you were presidency, would you wait until Donald Trump has left the White House, given how unpredictable he is? Well, judging from the comments Xi Jinping made in May, basically by saying, he hoped that in the next three years or so, that's going to be a very stable bilateral relationship between Beijing and Washington. So I think that implies. I just want to add something quite important about Taiwan's agency here, which is often overlooked in any conversation about Taiwan. And to me is the most important point, firstly, because I care about the 25 million people of Taiwan. And secondly, because we live in a world where if you want to protect yourself, you have to look after yourself. We're not living in a world anymore where you can rely on others to protect you. You can try, you can have that hope that the US might defend you. Or Europe might help you in some ways, but ultimately Taiwan's position largely is going to be determined by what Beijing's willing to do and what the Taiwanese people and government are willing to do in response. And over the last few years, they have made steps to increase their defense spending, to increase public awareness about the risks of various threats from invasion to information campaigns from China. So if anything, what Ukraine and other recent conflicts are, even Iran, actually a lot of it will come down to the willingness of a people. And we have seen various examples of just how vigorous that defense can be. Let's just, as we come towards the end of this, look at how this might play out in the longer term. Both countries have, as well as enormous strengths, have weaknesses. The US has debt rising very steeply at the moment and attracting more attention from the world's lenders. China has not only a declining population, but more and more people are being affected by the running many of its companies at a loss propped up by state. banks. So questions about both of their models. When I was asked the other day for a note of optimism, I said, well, in all the backdrop, we've been talking about all kinds of problems in the world. I said, broadly, we don't think that the US and China are going to go for a hot war. But then I wondered whether my guests think that is right. The American analyst Robert Kaplan wrote in the New York Times very recently that the US is blundering towards war with China, and he was not of that optimistic cast of mind. Bill, where do you stand on this? Well, I guess you'd have to think about where it might break out. And I suppose Taiwan, South China Sea, Asia Pacific is the place that it's most likely to happen. But you're right, the pressures on China's economy, you know, at one level, it's taking over the world. And on the other level, it's collapsing. You know, it's one of the four countries in the world that have over 300% of GDP in total debt. But does that really matter if you have a state-controlled economy? But back to the question of whether I think. Our economists would say yes. Right. So how long do you wait? I mean, and are there some sort of people in the US who are really sitting back and thinking that, you know, China will just implode under its own domestic debt levels? I think that's a very optimistic way forward. I think there are plenty of things that will happen before that comes to pass. So I suppose I'm probably a hostage to the current path and just assuming that everybody would agree that war is a completely irrational outcome. It would be catastrophic for the world. Yes, yeah. And so therefore, hoping that the good nature of everybody, involved, will lead us against that. But we're now at a stage where both sides, you know, might see the struggle for dominance as existential. And so therefore, the calculations would change. Well, I disagree with you. I think at the end of the day, it's not really about the leaders and what leaders want to do. And ultimately, if you're asking American people, and if you're asking Chinese people, are they really willing to fight on this war for the sake of world order and for the sake of dominance? And perhaps the clear answer is no. So I think at the end of the day, what can really hinder or prevent Xi Jinping to do something crazy? And it's not the elites around him, but it's actually the population already enjoy the benefit of economic prosperity in the past decades or so. And then that is something that they do not want to repeat in the past, what we have seen back to a cultural revolution before 1949. So you're saying the Americans would have to start it? I would not say the Americans would have to start it. But basically, I'm saying I think most of the both Americans and the Chinese are largely precipitous. There's no reason of that two countries and fighting something that is absolutely unnecessary. Ben? I think if you look at it rationally, like you were saying, yes, it doesn't seem to make sense. And there doesn't seem to be the stomach for it in the US. I mean, obviously, the Chinese people don't get a vote. And I would worry more, perhaps in China about these feedback loops between very heightened nationalist rhetoric from the government heightened public expectations and no channels for some independent feedback. But if you look at the rational, yes, it wouldn't seem to make sense. But so many wars have been started, you know, by accidental cycles of escalation, mistrust, etc. And we know there's not much trust between these two countries at all. So that worries me, I would say. And also that we're moving into a world where war is being normalized as a continuation of politics by other means. And that's not just about the US, but we see that in other places, too. So I think it's kind of scary, right? But yeah, the rational calculation. Economically and politically would would say not. But yeah, I would still have that concern. So long as especially around Taiwan, I would say more than the South China Sea, China refuses publicly to renounce the use of force to take back Taiwan and the US still has some kind of defense guarantees to Taiwan unclear exactly if they'll be upheld. I think it is still quite concerning. So really important that we still continue to have these conversations. We talk to all sides and try and think about what could happen in the worst possible situation, because it would be devastating. I can feel our economics team sort of hovering over this conversation saying, no, you haven't given up way too the way that debt might determine all this. But I think we have rightly anchored this in, you know, what these leaders with all the potential for miscalculations may do with the very highly charged situation that they are now in. I'm going to take that as a kind of optimism at the end of this conversation. But cautiously, heavily qualified, but draw it to a close there. So a huge thank you to my guest, Ben Bland. Thanks, Bronwyn. You too. Thank you so much. Bill Hayden. We've cheered everybody up. Doesn't always happen on the podcast, but we do try. Thank you all for joining us for today's podcast. And we're out every Friday. So don't forget to follow us on your favorite app and do look at the show notes for links to some of our latest work. There is a lot of it. You can always find us on our website, www.youtube.com.au. So don't forget to follow us on your favorite app. Our work at ChathamHouse.org. I'm Bronwyn Maddox. We'll be back next week. Goodbye till then.