Caught in the Middle of the Iran War: A Conversation With Anwar Gargash

I'm Dan Kurtz-Phalen, and this is the Foreign Affairs Interview. From what we know, Iran's neighbors, even those long at odds with the Islamic Republic, were opposed to the war that started last February. Yet it is those Middle Eastern states that have paid some of the highest costs. As their governments grapple with the consequences of a war that is still far from settled, they are also struggling to understand and to shape a new Middle Eastern order. But there is little consensus about what that order should be, or what it should mean for relationships with the United States and China, for future economic models, and for the future of the United States. Or for the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Anwar Gargash is one of the region's most experienced diplomats and foreign policymakers. He long served as the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Arab Emirates, and is now diplomatic advisor to the UAE's president. Gargash joined me on Monday, September 21st, to discuss the war in Iran and where it may end, his country's rift with Saudi Arabia and its approach to Israel, Gaza, Sudan, and more, and what a new, better Middle Eastern order might look like. Anwar, thanks for doing this. Thank you. Thank you very much. Such a pleasure. I want to start with what may seem like a simple-mindedly straightforward question, but one that I think reflects just how hard it's become to understand the most basic dynamics of the war in Iran and the situation in the Middle East right now. How do you characterize the current state of the conflict? And who, as we sit here today, has the most basic dynamics of the war in Iran and the situation in the Middle East right now? Who has the advantage, if we can say? Well, I think it's no war, no peace right now. It's better than war, and definitely not good as a permanent peace. I don't think anybody has the advantage right now. I mean, each party is basically in what you would characterize as this no war, no peace situation. So there are areas of And then there are areas where basically each party sees that it has certain cards to play along the way. But we definitely see a situation that can actually be protracted unless we have a breakthrough somewhere down the road. There's a view that you hear both with regard to the Trump administration and to the leadership of Tehran, that continuation of this no war, no peace situation, if we can call it that, is the best option for both parties, that this is sustainable. I disagree. I mean, I disagree. I think it's not sustainable for both parties, and it's not sustainable for the region. We do need peace, but I think also we need peace that will last. We don't need sort of a patch-up job where suddenly within three months, four months, five months, we have another outbreak. I think we need something with more permanency. And for that to happen, you really have to have substantive discussions, and you have to have them at different levels. I mean, the American-Iranian level is one important level. But I think also from our vantage point in the Gulf, these discussions at the Gulf or individual Gulf countries or the Gulf as a group with Iran is extremely important. And that actually leads also to, let's say, more understandings in several key issues around us. You know, I mean, issues that surround Lebanon, issues that surround Israel and Gaza. It's connected, but I see that the crux of the matter is more in the Gulf, more centered there, and then the others are also important. So substantive discussion is extremely important. And substantive discussion means it should really address many of, let's say, the transactional issues about funds and about ships and about straits and stuff like that. But I think ultimately, it should also address issues that are about confidence building or the beginning, let's say, of confidence building, non-belligerence, issues of how can we actually, out of this wreckage of the moment, create something a little bit more permanent. I think that's extremely important. I want to pick up that question of what a permanent settlement or new regional order might look like, but just to linger on your interactions or your view of the new Iranian leadership. Yeah. I'm very interested in your assessment of how this leadership differs from the leadership as you experienced before. The UAE has gone through cycles of engagement and tension with Iran over the last many years. How is this leadership different? And what, as you assess their their theory of victory, their view of how they want to proceed from here, what does that look like from where you sit? Well, I think there is a sense of continuity, but then there is also a sense of discontinuity. Let me start with the discontinuity. I think for 37 years from 1989 until the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, you had a central figure, an arbiter for a system. And Ali Khamenei was, you know, the person who would decide who will be the final decision maker in all matters in Iran, whether it was social direction, whether it was issues of war and peace, whether it was economic issues and so on and so forth. I think whatever we say, there is a discontinuity here, because after 37 years of this all-powerful cleric, we do have now a gap. And that gap actually is now in transition. So you have different groups, like always, I think this is what has characterized the Iranian political system, revolutionary system since 1979. So clearly, this is crystallizing right now. And I think it'll take time for that. It's extremely difficult to imagine, you know, that sort of order and centrality of the last 37 years to be sort of recreated within months. So that would be my view. So definitely a sense of discontinuity, but also there is a certain continuity. And with a more fractured leadership that is arguing about basic questions of direction. I don't know about fracture, but I know that this is more a leadership that is trying, to sort of fill, you know, let's say, a big shoe that was left, a vacuum and so on and so forth. So I think we're still in that process. And as usual, I mean, the players are more or less the same factions here. You know, people who want Iran to open up within the system and people who see that the issue of an Iran that is more, let's say, anti-American and more, revolutionary, etc., are also part of it. I think the other important distinction is that the change, you know, that has been discussed by various, various Iran observers of a more emphasis on the Revolutionary Guard or the military at the expense of the theological part of the regime. I think this is already taking place. This is something that a lot of Iran watchers have expected to happen in the next decade. I think because of the war, because of also of the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, we can see that this is accelerated. Is that Revolutionary Guard and military leadership with its newfound influence as the Iran watcher view is that it's more intent on, it's more comfortable with a sustained no war, no peace scenario, that it's less likely to compromise, that it's more intent on maintaining control? Is that Revolutionary Guard and military leadership with its newfound influence as the Iran watcher view is that it's more intent on maintaining control? All the reporting suggests that you did not want this war. You were not especially consulted, did not recommend it to either the U.S. or to Israel. But there's been also an interesting range of responses from different call factors, many of whom have slightly different interests, but have also seen a different path out of the situation. As you go back to February and look at the arc of this conflict, what has driven the UAE response? And why is that different from the Saudi response or Qatari or some of the others around you? Well, I'll take you back a little bit earlier. With the fall of Saddam Hussein, 2003-2004, I think for us, this is a sort of vital point here. Because again, what we saw is a whole change of geostrategic shifts in the region as a result of the fall of the Baathist regime in Iraq. So one of the things I consider very important is that usually you have, a huge event like the current war, it takes years for you to really understand the full, let's say, impact of such an event. Taking that into account, from the fall of Saddam to the rise of ISIS, which was also very much related to the fall of Saddam, you had the gap of around close to 10 years. So again, the effect of a major conflict you will see for many, many years. I thought that, with the Hamas attack on Israeli settlements and the ensuing war, that the region will actually go through major geostrategic changes, and we will have to deal with a lot of these changes. Fall of Assad, Hezbollah being diminished, and so on and so forth. But I think we, the region did not have time enough to sort of chew on the effects of that war and, suddenly, we're in a second war. So we have, I think, a double impact there of a continuous war that started from the 7th of October. I think from that perspective, the UAE was genuinely concerned, and our messaging to all our friends in Washington and other places was against this war, because we understood from our previous experiences that this is going to take a long time. This will be very complicated, and the after effects will have to be dealt with for many, many years. And I think this is what has transpired. Now, we did not have, what I would say, early warning that there will be a war. I mean, but our political readout was very clear. I mean, once we found that there was a huge gap in the nuclear discussions between Iran and the United States, these gaps were not going to be bridged. And, of course, we had our expectation that there will be a conflict. When this conflict started, I think we expected that there will be an Iranian attack on us and on other Gulf countries, but we did not really expect an attack of this sort of breadth and this sort of tenacity. And I think we were lucky in the sense that we were ready. We've been ready for a long time. We have a battle-hardened military that has, you know, seen action in Afghanistan and Yemen and Kosovo as a peacekeeping force and in many, many other areas. And we had actually started building our missile and drone defense capacity. So I think for the UAE, and then I'll talk perhaps about other countries, but for the UAE, I think establishing deterrence was extremely important. I mean, establishing deterrence is not a goal in of itself. I think establishing deterrence is an important element that now today is leading us to greater, let's say, opportunities with diplomacy. And I think this has been very, very important. Now. Can I just go going back to your surprise at the breadth and intensity of the Iranian response? What do you think you missed in your assessments before the war? And how did that change the way you responded? Did you respond more aggressively against the Iranians because of that response that had surprised you? No, I think. I think, you know, the idea of being succumbed to 3,300 missiles and drones, this was a huge, huge attack on us in many ways. But I think this was a plan. I mean, the plan was, if Iran is facing an American and Israeli attack, what is the plan? The plan was to see the Gulf, perhaps, as the weakest link and to sort of pressure the Gulf and pressure, let's say, global supplies. And the result will be more pressure then on Washington and the Israelis to stop the war. I think this was part of a calculated strategy. I think in the U.S. case, we were able to address this attack. 95% of these missiles and drones were at civilian infrastructure. But our rate at intercepting these was also in the upper 90s. So we did very well. But again, it disrupts a country that's. Never really faced this sort of attack. Now, for us, I think the deterrence factor is important to the diplomacy factor. It's not an independent goal. And I think today, for example, as we are opening channels with the Iranians, I think the deterrence factor helps us achieve the diplomacy that we want. And you feel good about where deterrence is at this point? I think we are getting better at it. But as I said, this is a region that can't stay in an over no peace zone. We do need to move forward. Other than that, a comment perhaps on the other Gulf countries. Each Gulf country has its own calculations. A country as big and wide as Saudi Arabia, which is the size of Western Europe, has a different threat perception. Countries that have no, let's say, venue to the Indian Ocean closed within the Gulf, such as the Gulf of India, are not going to be able to move forward. Qatar or Bahrain or Kuwait or Iraq, they have a different also perception there. I think what was missing and we failed miserably within the GCC was what I would call a collective political security response. There was a lot of support within the GCC on the logistic side, the economic side. But I think the failure is the GCC was unable to collectively fashion, a response at the political or the military level. It was more or less more of bilateral cooperation, national positions of trying to sort of thwart the sort of threat that we have seen. You talk about the channels that are opening with the Iranians. They were supposed to be at last week, a meeting, an Oman-brokered meeting about the future of the strait that the UAE was going to be part of. That didn't happen for reasons that have been speculated about. I'm not sure what that channel is. And then also how you see an acceptable outcome for the strait. There seem to be a lot of signs that many other Gulf actors and certainly the Iranians are comfortable with some kind of, you know, new status quo that does involve something like management and some fees in the strait. Is that an acceptable outcome and a plausible outcome from UAE's perspective? I think the UAE's perspective is more tied to international law. So we have a strait that's been governed by international law for hundreds of years. And for hundreds of years, it's been governed by international law for hundreds of years. You've seen during, you know, the Portuguese being in the Gulf or the British being in the Gulf or the Dutch being in the Gulf, or let's say more modern times of British and American influence, Iran being a central power, less central power prior to that, the strait has been functioning mainly as an open waterway for energy and trade, et cetera. I think that's where it should be. And in many ways, I think the Iranians are using the strait more as a negotiating position. And I think we have collectively to come and understand that the strait has an impact on the global economy, as much as it affects, let's say, Iran and the Arab Gulf states. It also affects, you know, European countries, Asian countries, the Far East, et cetera. I think collectively, it'll be a precedent if straits are basically controlled by countries. That want to change this sort of status quo. And I think this is also indicative right now of the international system actually unable to basically protect, you know, sets of rules that have governed this system for many, many years. So clearly, if you have this issue where a state or two think they can control the strait, then what about Bab el-Mandeb and what about the other states? So clearly, if you have this issue where a state or two think they can control this system for many, many years. So clearly, if you have this issue where a state or two think they can control the strait, then what about the other states? No, the straits have to go back to the status quo ante. I would argue that the Iranians are using the strait more as a negotiating position for when these negotiations take place with the United States. That would be my argument on it. I understand the principled position there. It's just striking when you hear other Gulf leaders talk, and even some leaders from powers outside the Gulf, you hear a lot of attempts to kind of break the pact. bargain around this, that there's a kind of slippage in that position. That does seem like it's, like I said, a new president. But I think also it's sort of self-explanation for countries not basically standing up for what they should stand up on in terms of the international law, etc. Because again, I mean, these straits, like other straits in the world, are critical really for international trade as we know it. If they become tomorrow a political bargaining chip, our region, our world is full of crisis. And you never know when the next time these straits or other straits will be used as a bargaining chip. You said very clearly here, and you've said before, that the UAE was opposed to the war before it started. And I think this was the right timing for this war. From a U.S. perspective, I think it's pretty hard to see where we are now, at least as anything but a failure. As you say, the long-term repercussions are hard to predict, but certainly in the short term, it does seem to be in a better position than it was at some point. How do you understand the U.S. endgame now? And as you talk to your American counterparts and think about further U.S. action, what should the U.S. position be? What are U.S. options? I think the first thing I want to say is this war actually makes the U.S. position in the Gulf more important, not less important. Even countries that are basically at the receiving end of Iranian, let's say, missiles and drones, understand that they need America more today, not less. So I think this is also- There's a certain irony in that. Definitely there's an irony. But I think that, you know, I mean, you need the United States. I think the argument that has been mentioned, well, America is not going to be there to defend you. I think this has already been taken care of in the last decade or so. We understand that ultimately American boots and American power is not going to defend the region. American boots and American power. We'll look after American interests. But we understand that the starting point, and I think this is for a country the size of the UAE, starting point is to build your own threshold, which is your own capacity to defend yourself. And I think the UAE has proven that even a country our size can do that. But then again, to do that, you need also to work out your diplomacy, because you can't just take a posture that is- You have to actually talk to the Iranians, talk to others, et cetera. I think the third layer is basically these contacts. It is really American equipment, American training. And if you don't get the American equipment, what sort of layer can you get from an East Asian country like Korea, for example, or what can you get from another country? I mean, again, you saw during this war, the Israelis, for example, introduced the Iron Dome. They introduced the Iron Dome to help and support us. And we didn't request it. But the Israelis also understood that this is a very important relationship for them. And for that, also very grateful. To linger on the U.S. for a moment, the centrality is about air defense systems and weapons and intelligence less than it is about the U.S. presence. That's the change from what you might have thought 15 years ago? Not necessarily, because if I view the trajectory of UAE-U.S. relationships, for example, today, in the 1970s, 80s, that relationship was really about energy and oil. Today, that relationship is much wider. We've got in the UAE 60,000 Americans living in the UAE. This is a huge community that is actually part of a very multi-nationality population within the UAE. We've got trade at about $30 billion with the United States. We've got investments in the United States at about $1.6 trillion. That's only the UAE that I'm talking about here. So the American interest in the region, I think, should not be viewed with the prism of the 70s and 80s, which was a very much sort of energy and security defense prism. Today, this is an important relationship. And I think one of the ironies, really, of this war is how central it is. How central the Gulf is. The sort of interconnectedness of the international economy that many people thought that the Gulf was more important 40 years ago. But then again, people now are discovering that this part of the world is very much interconnected with everything else. It has an effect on inflation. It has an effect on energy. It has an effect on food prices, et cetera. So I think it's not the issue of just us depending on, let's say, American equipment and American political clout and so on and so forth. I think at the same time, America has vital interests in the region today. And many of these vital interests affect how the American economy is performing. I'm sure like other regions in the world too, but definitely this region is also part of that. I think a large part of it has to do also with the globalization that we have seen in the international system over so many years. And I think this interconnectedness is very much part of the scene. Are you reassessing the value of having U.S. military bases in the UAE? No. I think this is essential. I think not only us, but to many Gulf officials that I've spoken to, they understand some of the challenges. They understand the importance of having U.S. military base in their country. But I think the war and the Iranian attack has made that more important, not less important. And this is one of the ironies, or what I would say, one of the failures really of the Iranian strategy, to think that basically by targeting the bases, they are able to make these bases redundant in terms of our strategic thinking. But it's not the case. It doesn't seem crazy to say that the bases neither deterred the Iranians from attacking them. It became more of a target than they did a deterrent. But what does that miss? Not really. I mean, to a certain extent, the bases are a target. But if you look at the size of the Iranian attack, only 5% of that attack was really targeted at military installations. And I think that's one of the reasons why they didn't attack economic infrastructure. Because the whole idea was to try and hit the economic infrastructure and create that sort of pressure that will ricochet on Washington, and Washington will look at that. Using the bases as a pretext, but not a target. Using the bases as a pretext. I mean, the numbers speak louder than words. And this is not only the case in the UAE, but this is the case also in other Gulf countries like Kuwait and other. You talked about the reasons why in the no war, no peace scenario is not a good or stable one. If you're being optimistic, what's a plausible outcome that would end this war in the near term? If we're being optimistic here, what does that look like? Well, I think to start with, I think we are in a sort of protracted crisis. So I will not say that this is going to be a short term crisis. It'll take some time for us before we disentangle what are the key positions here. So I think the first thing is we've got to look at this crisis as a protracted one. And usually to resolve protracted crisis, you do really need to deescalate and work more on diplomacy. But I don't think there are quick answers. For the reasons that you mentioned also with regards to the transition in Iran, I think also we will see an Iranian system that will not be very stable for a while. Not necessarily a change within it, but I think this is quite usual in a sense where you have 37 years of the stability of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Don't expect that that same stability is going to sort of continue straight away. So I think we have to also deal with that. I think these are important points because if we take these into account, saying that Iran is in transition and at the same time, this crisis is going to be a short term crisis, this is a crisis that will actually take some time. I think once we see these, once we sort of digest these items, it becomes clear that the pace of dealing with the issue differs. So the idea basically is let's not concede very quickly. Let us discuss and open more channels and so on and so forth. I think at this stage right now, we still have maximalist demands. And for us to sort of break up these maximalist demands will take some time. So that is the sort of framework that I'm thinking through. Is the Iranian nuclear program a front of mind threat to you right now? Or is it a point where- Definitely. Definitely. It definitely is. I mean, the Iranian nuclear program, I think, is the important part here of everything that takes place. I think currently, for example, Yeah. And then lead me to the nuclear program, looking at missiles, looking at drones, etc. I think every country has to think twice before choosing a military path because everybody is vulnerable today. Even if you're winning a war, your civilian infrastructures are very much targeted at any chance, even with a party that is losing the war. I would say today that the nuclear program remains at the heart of these negotiations. And in my opinion, that is where the negotiations ultimately will lead to, back to. So the Strait of Hormuz issue, I think the Iranians are using it as a negotiating position, but ultimately they will have to come to the bigger negotiations. I mean, that is, in my opinion, inevitable. We'll return to my conversation with Anwar. We'll return to my conversation with Anwar Gargosh after a short break. New York's most iconic spaces, September 24th to 27th. To learn more, visit IndependentHQ.com. Did you know that Foreign Affairs has an app? Enjoy professionally narrated audio, playlists, and adjustable playback speeds for a personalized listening experience. Save your favorite pieces for later or listen on the go. Search for Foreign Affairs in the App Store or visit ForeignAffairs.com slash app. You mentioned the assistance that you've gotten from Israel since the war started. This was another irony of this war is that one of the other central parties in this war, the fighting with the U.S., the Israelis, you've said, and this is, I think, diverges from what some of the other Gulf leaders have said, that Israel will become more central and a bigger player and a more important relationship for the UAE going forward. Why is that and how do you envision, what do you want out of that relationship? How do you envision that relationship developing? Well, I feel part of the sort of failure of the Iranian strategy, let's say, there are several failures here. I think number one, and perhaps some of them were already worked out earlier, but it was a risk-reward sort of calculation. I feel number one is the issue of trust between Iran and the Gulf countries was broken, clearly. And I've. I've identified in several talks that there is a difference between trust and relations. I think relations with Iran will come back, but it'll be more functional. You have to rebuild trust, et cetera. And this is very important because you've never really seen a direct Iranian confrontation with its southern neighbors. This is a new phenomenon where a lot of red lines were crossed. So I think this is part of it. The second thing, as I mentioned, the U.S. actually becomes more central. More important. And this is a clear product of this. But I think on the Israeli side, I would say that many countries in the region are going to hedge their bets. I think this is very, very natural that countries will hedge their bets. Contacts that were clogged for a while with Israel will be opened again, whether it is political contacts or whether it is contacts that have a sort of military. Acquisition type of thing. Does that include the Saudis? Do you think normalization will be that country? I don't want to name any single country, but I think that this will be the general feeling. The hedging will be very important. But I think for us, we have a formal relationship with Israel. And as we see that this is an important relationship, because we see it's an important part of a different Middle East, to be honest. And we've paid a heavy price for it. It hasn't been an easy relationship for us. And so. In terms of our public opinion and in terms of how this relationship has been characterized. But we've been pragmatic. And we said, you know, I mean, we really have to see a different region. And in order for us to see a different region, the Palestinians are talking to the Israelis, the Egyptians and Jordanians and others have formal agreements. Why not us? So I think we've been very practical. Is it a relationship of trust at this point? Have you crossed that threshold? Well, I think it's a very important relationship. I mean, the issue of is it trust or no, it depends because Israel also is a political system that is evolving. We have our areas of contention over how they've conducted their war in Gaza. We have our areas of contention also and disagreements on their plans, for example, in the West Bank, etc. But I think on the other hand, we have to see a different Middle East. And I think we have stuck now six years with this relationship. But I think we have stuck now six years with this relationship. During this war, as I said, there were actually two wars, the way that we see it. There's an American-Israeli war against Iran. And then there is a war of Iran against the Gulf countries. So there have been two wars. And we've been trying to sort of separate the two from each other, at least conceptually, if not practically. So again, we. The implication being the message of the Iranians, don't blame us for a war that others have started. Exactly. And I think not only that, I think a lot of the sympathy that the Iranians would have gained in confronting the first war did not translate because they took on the Gulf countries, which were not part of it. And in fact, many of them were mediators and many of them, you know, like Oman and Qatar were trying to mediate, trying to sort of find ways out, etc. And I think this was a problem. The formal relationship between the UAE and Israel started. Six years ago. And that was very much about preventing formal annexation of the West Bank by the Israeli government. That was a priority of your government at the time. There has been a lot happening in the West Bank that suggests something approaching de facto annexation, even if that's not formal. As you've watched those events, do you worry that it's going to approach a point where you would have to reevaluate that relationship? Or to put it differently, is there anything short of formal annexation that would cause you to downgrade those ties? I think it gives us. I mean, Israel is going through an election. We have to wait and see what transpires. But I think we have a lot of. Well, maybe clout is a big word, but I think our voice matters when it comes to many of the Israeli parties today because they consider this also as an important relationship to them. I think we've leveraged that relationship successfully in many areas. One of the areas that we've leveraged it. And. And the sort of humanitarian support that we have been pushing through Gaza. We are now close to $4 billion of aid that the UAE has sent to Gaza. $4 billion is a big amount. And I think we would have not been able to do that size of aid except by leveraging the relationship with Israel. Today, we are also emerging as one of the major players in terms of pushing the President Trump's plan also for Gaza. And at the same time. And at the same time, I think our voice is important when it comes to issues in the West Bank, etc. I have to come and say here, we are, of course, constrained. Where are we constrained? We're constrained, number one, by who rules Israel and what he thinks is essential policy, national policy for Israel. This is an area where, you know, your ability to influence that stops there, for example. I think we're also constrained in a sense that. We're also constrained in a sense that, you know, your ability to influence that stops there, for example. We're very much part of the Arab consensus on an independent Palestinian state and a two-state solution. Perhaps we're a little bit more vocal on the issue of the reform of the Palestinian Authority, because we feel that the Palestinian Authority, with its historical legitimacy within the Palestinian people, has to reform itself in order for it to be the player that it should ultimately be in many ways. Including with Newt. Including with Newt. Including with Newt. Including with Newt's new leadership of the. Yes, yes. And so what really transpires is a complicated picture. It's not a picture where the UAE really will come and say, well, I'm going to reassess. I'm going to do this and that. I think we have been playing a major, important role in various developments. And, I mean, this time last year, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, our foreign minister, is meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He was critical in Israel accepting the 20-point plan. And, you know, I mean, he really took, and the UAE took a big gamble at the time where Netanyahu was basically barraged by all the criticism from everywhere. But we took that gamble, and that was one of the key meetings that basically supported the Israelis accepting the plan and ultimately ending the war in Gaza and recovering all the hostages that were with Hamas. Notwithstanding the vision reflected in the 20-point plan. 20-point plan and the continuing rhetorical support for the two-state solution in Arab capitals and in Washington, in European capitals and elsewhere, it does seem hard to imagine how we're going to see any progress towards an independent Palestinian state in the near term, given Israeli politics, given the divided Palestinian politics, given what's happening on the ground in West Bank and Gaza. Is there a reason to be less pessimistic than that? No, it's very difficult to imagine it, but I think it is extremely poignant also when you hear, well, what is the alternative? What is the alternative really to that sort of vision? There is no alternative to that sort of vision. So I think we need to keep working on this. I think the fact that we have the Abrahamic Accords is interesting because you hear also a lot of Israelis hearing openly an Arab voice of reason. Arab voice of compromise from the UAE. Not only that, but you also see a lot of Arabs, Arabs of pre-1948, that actually we talk to, they talk to our ambassador and very much welcome how the UAE is actually engaging because they feel that they're somehow left out of whatever is going on. You mentioned the divisions within the GCC, within the Gulf countries. At the center of that has been your tensions with Saudi Arabia. Over the last few years, that has clearly hobbled the Gulf's common response and the kind of collective response that you noted would have been useful in the early days of this war and perhaps can still come together. Maybe just to go back to the fundamentals of this, how do you explain the rift between UAE and Saudi? I mean, you can talk about it as a regional hegemon that sees its place being threatened. You can talk about the UAE's economic model being kind of eaten away at a bit by the Saudi competition. I'm curious for your explanation of where that comes from and then what that's meant as you've tried to forge this common response against the Arabs. Well, I would rather concentrate on our view of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I think we see that our security is very much interconnected. I can't see really a UAE that is stable without a Saudi Arabia that's stable. We have a land border. We have this sort of. We have this sort of connectedness that our security is one in the same. So I look at it from that perspective. I think our economies are very much also interconnected. There is, of course, a big degree of competition between the UAE, which has been an open economy for a very long time, and the Saudis also through their vision 2030 to try also and change that economy. So our view is to try and emphasize. That this is not a zero-sum game. We can both do well. And in fact, if Saudi Arabia does well, we will do better and vice versa, and including other Gulf countries. So I think our relationship today is not in its best form. But I think both countries are working very hard in order to maintain, you know, the sort of areas of disagreement and to limit these areas of disagreement, because I think soon we will be able to. Understand that complementarity between us and cooperation is more important than, let's say, competition. Competition is important, but competition within bounds. So the UAE's view today is really about managing, let's say, the state of relations with Saudi Arabia, making sure that this state of relation is within the certain confines of cooperation, et cetera, because we know that. At some stage, we will be able to address this rift, because it's not in the interest of Saudi Arabia, and it's definitely not in our interest, and it's not in the interest of the region. The Saudis are the main reason why Emirati forces are no longer backing the efforts in Yemen the way you long were. As you watch the escalation of hostilities from the Houthis in Saudi over the last several days, it seems to be continuing as we speak. What do you worry about in terms of regional repercussions of that, and do you see any formula not involved? A major use of U.S. force or a major regional response that will get the Houthi threat back to at least where it was a few months ago? Well, we came into Yemen basically to support Saudi Arabia, and we came into Yemen to support Saudi Arabia out of understanding that our security is interconnected. And I think our forces in Yemen performed with valor and performed very well during that period and stayed there for a long time. And then. We had this rift, and we decided that when the Saudis wanted us to leave, we decided to leave, because we were not going to be in a position where we will be confronting our allies for many years and our neighbor. And I think this was the right decision to take. It wasn't an easy decision, but it was the right decision. Today, I think nothing changes. We are concerned whenever we hear that the Houthis. Have targeted Saudi Arabia. We are very much concerned, and our sympathy is with the security of Saudi Arabia. But where are the areas here that we are definitely concerned? I think one area is definitely if Bab al-Mandab is being used again as a lever of pressure, the same way that the Strait of Hormuz is being used. Which appears to be the case today. Which might be at some stage. I mean, the Houthis now are talking about just targeting. Saudi shipping, but again, you don't know how the crisis will develop, and will they really stick to that position or not. But I think at this stage right now, this is a war that's taken, I don't know, 10, 11 years now. And there has to be a political outcome here. A political outcome that has to be Yemeni-driven, and has to take into account also, of course, Saudi Arabia's security interests, because of the border and so on. So I think this is where we need to move, really. The understanding that this can go on for a long time, and that this is the time really to address the core questions that had to be addressed 10 years ago. Some of them are to do with Yemen itself. What sort of country do the Yemenis want? Is it a federal entity, et cetera, et cetera? And how whatever happens in Yemen will also not affect Saudi Arabia, and how can Yemen also be. Is it an independent party, not really an appendage to Iranian policy? Another place where these regional tensions have played out is, of course, Sudan. You and your colleagues have strenuously denied the accusations from the Sudanese armed forces and various U.N. experts about Emirati arms and money going to the RSF, the Rapid Security Forces in Iran. Let me just read a line written in an essay by Tony Lake, former American National Security Advisor, just to give people a sense of. What the charges are. He wrote, "The outside actor that bears the most responsibility for the starvation and ethnic cleansing, however, is the United Arab Emirates. As the RSF perpetrates genocidal attacks on civilians in Darfur and other regions, Abu Dhabi is delivering arms to the militia." Without getting into the full, you've made the case elsewhere. But I'm curious, as you look at Sudan, and it's less in the headlines, but the humanitarian stakes and costs of that are immense, as are the regional security implications, what can the U.S. be doing to put pressure on the RSF, especially to try to bring that war to the end? What's the path there? Well, let me take you back a little bit. I think Sudan has had historically a problem with military rule, and there's always been a recurrence of the military ruling. And then there is a popular uprising. The last uprising basically ended the Bashir dictatorship. I think the first mistake was when the two generals, who are the warring generals today, overthrew the civilian government. I mean, I look back at that specific instance, and I say it was a big failure of the international community, including the UAE and others, of not really calling a coup a coup at the time. And I think this created an unstable situation where the two generals had to fight it out. I think until that moment. The UAE had good relations with both parties and with many of the civilian parties. And we used our offices also to try and get them together to try and get a solution, etc. Today, in my opinion, there are, I don't know what's the number, but there are about 12 countries that are sending weapons to Sudan today. But I think that usually the sort of military propaganda focuses more on the UAE. So sometimes we feel that there. There are 12 countries you can name, but somehow you're just naming one country. But in reality, the UAE position has also evolved, as we saw that this is a never-ending war, as we saw that this is a war that will not end in a term of a victorious party and a vanquished party. As we look at the history of Sudan, of continuous civil wars and, you know, mismanaged military dictatorships, etc. I think we. We've moved really, and our position is more articulated within the quartet, which includes the United States, us, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Definitely, the European Union is very close and the African Union to that position. The position here is important. Number one is ceasefire right now. I think you have to end the war right now. Now, the party who is against ending the war right now is General Burhan, the SAF, because for two reasons. I think number one is he believes that he can win and because I think he wants also to be president. And for him, perhaps this is the sort of price that you have to accept that I'll end the war if you make me a president. And I think this is something that is a problem. The second part is open, unfettered humanitarian support. I mean, the UAE already has commitments that are close to seven, eight hundred million dollars for humanitarian Sudan. And we have a problem pumping all of this humanitarian aid there. But I think the third thing is very important. The third thing is Sudan has to see a civilian transition because clearly the two generals have lost really the legitimacy to rule Sudan. We have to go back to the civilian transition. After the Berlin conference a few months ago, the civilian track is becoming much more prominent. And I think it is gaining ground in many ways. So again, this is really the UAE position. It has evolved from a position where we try to reconcile the two generals to a position where we were closer perhaps to the RSF, but with the sort of tragedies that we saw Darfur and post Darfur, it has shifted really to a position of seeing civilian transition as the only way out in Sudan. Do you have unique leverage or is there something you can uniquely bring to this, especially with the RSF that can contribute to that transition? I think many countries have leverage. We have leverage. Many of the other regional powers have leverage today. But ultimately, the decision to stop the war is with General Burhan. I think he has to take that first step and say, you know what? I'm going to stop the war right now. But I think he has political ambitions that are basically undermining it. And the RSF would respond to that favorably in your view? Well, the RSF has already said that many times. But again, I think ultimately. If today at the end of a war in Sudan, you have a reinstatement of a military dictatorship, you're really putting the seeds for another populist uprising against them. So why should you go through two stages when you can already work out a transition that the civilians will actually have to lead that transition? Because they were leading it and they were thwarted by the military coup that was led by the two generals. To close, I want to get back to your vision of the future of the region and the future regional order. One effort to try to shape this has come from, has been really Saudi-led, the Mecca Pact, which involves Saudi, Turkey, and Pakistan, a kind of collective defense arrangement. How do you see that? Do you see it as a kind of constructive step? I think the future of the region is, in my opinion, after the Yemen war, I've always described, our policy from the Yemen war to the start of the Iranian attack on us and on the rest of the Gulf. I said our policy is geo-economic and I think the future of the region is basically in prioritizing geo-economic policies. So really, what did we do between 19, I don't know, 17, 18 to 2026? We emphasized, really, our economy. We emphasized. We signed 38 free trade agreements, for example. We opened up and liberalized a lot of our laws within the UAE. We changed a lot of the economic restrictions that you had on any economy in the UAE, had very little, and made the UAE more competitive. We've invested heavily, for example, in technology and artificial intelligence. And at the end of the Biden administration, we had a huge break. We had a big breakthrough with the United States that has also put a lot of our investments in AI as part of our, let's say, insurance for the future. We've used that also to work with the French on AI cluster. We're using that to discuss with the Germans and others. So the first thing I would say is the future of the region is basically in prioritizing the economy. In prioritizing technology. And is that model under threat, just given the security risks right now? No. I don't think it is under threat. I think, in fact, this is what the UAE's calling card is. And this is why the UAE is influential in the region, because people can see that the UAE is successful by emphasizing that. And although we've discussed during this podcast all the challenges we have, what we're really trying to do is deal with these challenges. But our. Basically. Our leadership instructions to all our ministries and sectors, et cetera, is to emphasize the economy. Emphasize opportunity. Emphasize technology. I mean, why would two million plus Arabs come and live in the UAE, Palestinians and Syrians and Egyptians and others? Because you create opportunity. You create a successful Arab state and Arab model. So I think beyond all that, that's how the future should look like. A future that is very much different from the past. I mean, again, we spoke about Israel and our relations with Israel. People only look at the sort of political security side. A large part of it also has to do with technology. A large part of it has to do with IT. I think this is where we see the future. The future we see is less politics, less war, less confrontation, and more geo-economics, where we come and say, "It's not in the past. It's not a zero-sum game." If we do well, we will all do better. That's really our message. I'm interested in how you see the role of China in that scenario. There's been a lot of reporting that China has given some assistance to Iran during this war. You were, I believe, in China, or at least your president was in China recently for a visit. How do you see the Chinese role? And what are your discussions with the Chinese about moving towards that order, especially when it comes to Chinese information? I think the Chinese are still less political in our region. And I think the Chinese are more, let's say, economic and commercial in our region. So China has, in my opinion, two sets of relationships. It has old relationships and new relationships. Old relationships are with state-centric economies, and new relationships are with countries like the UAE. Where, I don't know, the figure is about $100 billion of trade with China, for example. So China is, in a way, understands that the future of Chinese relationship in the area is its new relationship. But again, I mean, China also looks at the crisis from a prism of China-US relationship in many ways. So there are different considerations right now. But I still don't see a very political China in our region. In many ways. So we're pressing ahead with a lot of commercial relationships with China. China is our largest trading partner as it is with many, many other countries in the world. I think this also leads you to basic issues within the view that we have in the UAE. One thing is our president believes, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed clearly believes in what I would call strategic autonomy, the idea that this is a changing international system. Our relationship with the United States is a cornerstone of how we do things. Our relations in the region have to be managed. But we also have to have an Asia policy with China and Korea and others. So he's very much there. And if you look at, for example, what we have done with Africa, today we have about $150 billion invested in Africa, dollars. And we have a trade of over $100 million with Africa. Again, we saw an opportunity. We took a risk. But the whole idea is this is a world that you want to sort of keep your core relationships, make sure that these core relationships are for areas where you need to develop them, for example, technology and AI and others, and secure them. But at the same time, you have to also open towards other opportunities as you move forward. Would you like to see China playing a more forceful political role in managing some of the security threats so it can get to that future you're talking about? Well, definitely. I mean, if China can really help on the issue of the maritime security of the Strait of Hormuz and lean on that matter, it doesn't have to be a military presence. But I think it's very welcome because China benefits from Bab al-Mandeb. It benefits from the Strait of Hormuz. So definitely any sort of Chinese, let's say, influence towards securing what I would call international law. And in our case, this is very important if China can also impress on Iran on a political also solution. It's very, very welcome. Can you say anything about the conversations that have taken place between your government and the Chinese government? I would rather not, but I think the Chinese know our view and they respect our view. And definitely, as I said, China has an interest really in upholding, let's say, the sort of freedom of navigation within these straits, not only on the principle of international law, but practically also for its own benefit. Well, Anwar, thank you so much for doing this today, both laying out very clearly your analysis of a very complicated situation now, but also holding to that vision of what a future order might look like. I hope we can pick up that conversation once we're through this current crisis, whenever that is. But for now, thank you so much for doing this. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview was produced by Rachel Powell, Adelaide Parker, and Kanishk Darur, with audio engineering by Todd Yeager, and original music by Robin Hilton. Special thanks as well to Irina Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. And if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in. We hope you enjoyed this episode of the Foreign Affairs Interview. Don't forget to visit foreignaffairs.com slash spotlight to sign up for Dan Kurtz-Valen's free weekly newsletter, featuring more of the clear-headed analysis that you enjoy here on the podcast. 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