Can Lebanon Ever Be Free of Hezbollah?

Hello dear listeners, Thomas Small here with another episode of conflicted and look who's here. Amen Dean, you're finally here. Amen. I haven't spoken to you since last Friday. Dear listeners, this is Thursday afternoon, Thursday, the 26th of March. I haven't spoken to you, amen, for like what? Five days? You can't leave a guy hanging for that long when there's a war going on, a war like this, which is driving everyone crazy. Oh yes, driving everyone nuts, especially like if these nuts are Iranian nuts. But anyway, I've been busy, man. I've been absolutely busy. I know you've been busy. Our friend, Nedwa Dosseri, sat in for you for Tuesday's episode. I had such a great time talking to her. Absolutely, and I'm so grateful to her. I'm so grateful. You have no idea. I mean, I wrote my gratitude to her on X. I mean, and so, yeah, I'm absolutely grateful. I told the dear listeners at the top of that episode that you told me you had to go somewhere undisclosed to meet someone undisclosed that you to meet, you know, to learn all sorts of interesting stuff, some of which I hope you'll be able to share with us. So you come back prepared to give us, you know, the goods. But, amen, you come back to a Middle East. Absolutely drowning. I mean, not just in war, but in water. In water, absolutely. I mean, as soon as I arrived, we arrived back in just home. I mean, I was on the flight and I was switching on. By mistake, I was switching on the front camera of the airplane. You know, MRZ Line have these beautiful features. And I was seeing all the thunder storm, like, you know, I mean, like, you know, and the lightening's like, and I mean, going on. And I was like, oh my god, like, anyone going back into? Is this normal for this time of year, amen? No, although like, I mean, two years ago, April, 2024, we had what we call the storm of the century in which Dubai was flooded completely. Oh, okay. Again, it feels like it. I'm, you know, and now this afternoon, I come back home to find it flooded. Yeah, well, I know we were supposed to record this earlier today. But you said Thomas, my flat is flooded. Honestly, amen. When it rains at pores in the Middle East, you know, so if there was a storm like this two years ago, then I suppose this storm isn't divine intervention. But for those of us watching from afar, it does seem like God has interesting plants for the Middle East. How should we interpret this freak typhoon tornado that is suddenly descended upon the vast area that Iran has been attacking? Well, it's the respite because we need to replenish our interceptors, especially in Bahrainin Kuwait. Furthermore, that was enough time for some interesting deployment by the US military, especially when it comes to the 82nd Airborne and, you know, the submarine corps coming with the US striply and other marine amphibious assault ships, which are now very much on their way in order to execute so many things. We're going to talk all about that, dear listeners. This episode is mainly going to focus on the Lebanon front of the Iran War, but Aiman is going to bring us up to date with things more generally. But before we go to the main deal, you know, before the the free title music finishes, I just want to say, Aiman, this rainstorm in the Middle East has made me think eschatological dreams, especially when I heard that today there was an earthquake on Mount Athos, the place with the monasteries where I spent a few years in my youth. So I'm thinking the end of times have arrived. I'm having eschatological visions, Aiman. We'll talk about not just mine, but other people's eschatological visions in this episode of conflicted. We're going to talk about Hezbollah. We're going to talk about the Lebanese government. Is there even a Lebanese state at this point? We're going to talk about Iran, Donald Trump, confusing signals from both sides. 15 point plans, five point plans. The whole Shabang, let's get right into it. Okay, Aiman. First of all, what the flying duck is up with Donald Trump's absolutely batshit crazy, confusing messaging of late. I mean, were Steve Whitkov and Jared Kushner in talks with the Iranians? Was JD Vance sent to Pakistan to have some talks with the Iranians there? The threat last weekend to destroy Iranian power stations if they didn't open the straight of Hormuz in two days. And then that being postponed by five days because the Iranians were playing, you know, like they were going to make a deal, but then they said they're not going to make a deal. But then Trump said, no, we have our eye on someone to take over. And that guy said, no, I'm not going to take over. And then, you know, was it market manipulation? Was it what the hell is going on? I know that for an outsider or someone who is not steeped into modern warfare, all of this look like a crazy chit-chit. Yeah, it seems chaotic. Like there's no plan. That's what people are saying. Trump and the Americans have no plan. They're making it up as they go along. Look, can we always forget about Trump? Trump is the chairman of the board, but the real CEO that is executing the conflict are the combined might of the Israeli-American military. That's it. So these are the people that we care about. Whatever Trump says, he is the equivalent of the McDonald's mascot. Wait a second. Amen. But he still has the power right now, if you wanted to put it into this war, he could say, I put a stop to it. I am the commander in chief. It's over. Theoretically yes. Practically he cannot. He just cannot. It's like, look, theoretically he could point a gun to his head and says, well, I could easily pull the trigger. But his self-preservation will not allow him to do that. Okay, so you're saying that we shouldn't pay attention to Trump's messaging at all, or is Trump's messaging some part of the 4D chess that the real Trump be in? The ones who think that he's the greatest genius that ever lived are saying that this is all 4D chess. He does this on purpose in a very accalculated and strategic way to confuse the enemy. Is that at all possible? Or is it like there's a whole other thing going on, a kind of carnival show where Trump on his own just does what he likes while behind the scenes, the real decision makers are calmly and carefully doing what they can. I mean, obviously in an environment where nobody knows all the factors that play, nobody knew how the Iranians would respond. So the Americans and the Israelis are having to react to that. But is that what you're saying that that that Trump is really just a carnival barker on the side and shouldn't be listened to at all? I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is this is all madness, but there is a logical method to this madness. And once you crack the code, then suddenly everything becomes clearer. So what Trump is doing is that he is relying so much on the advice of his military and intelligence advisors. Of course, they don't tell him how to say it, how colorful he should look in the make the languages. But they give him the guidelines that Mr. President, this is exactly what we are going to do. One, two, three, four, five, we need to mislead the enemy. We need to string them along for a day or two or three. There are always discussions. He will bring in his economic advisors, including Scott Besent who is the Treasury Secretary. He will bring him in. He will bring Marco Rubio, Pete Hexeth and everyone else. Secretary of State, Secretary of War. Exactly. And everyone else. Like I mean, guys, look, how do we come the energy markets? So his energy secretary will say, well, Mr. President, how about, I mean, we just tell the market what they want to hear. Because it's all about perception. And then Hexeth will say, ah, perfect. We really need two, three, four days in order to replenish our interceptors in Bahrain and Kuwait. And we are four or five days away from being ready for them, Phoebe as a soul tone, one of the islands or two. And then you have Scott Besent, you know, saying, oh, yeah, and why we are at it to come our own stock markets. And if you think like, we should say, one, two, three, four, five. And then Rubio comes in and say, ah, and we need to confuse the enemy. So this is how you should frame your argument. So suddenly, you have all of this, you know, crazy stuff that Trump writes is the emalgamation of a lot of the advice that he's been given in order, like, to put it together and put it out there in a language that is, you know, provocative insulting, confusing, you know, sometimes incoherent. And I understand people, I understand, you know, that, you know, sometimes it makes no sense. But also don't forget that in front of the international audience, you between now and then after you have exhausted your enemies and you toyed with them so much, you come to them and you say, look, you know what, I'm having some mercy on you. Is the equivalence of an orca, a killer well in the ocean, toying with the seal that they just they are playing like in a literally like in a, if you see in an Orca, pot before playing like in a, I mean, you know, football really like in a basically with a seal, they play with their prey, unfortunately. So I'm the same with the cat playing with the mouse. It's simple as that. So, so what, what, what they do is that look, look, I'm having mercy on you. I'm going to give you again, my terms. These are my terms. 15 point plan, you know, including no more, you know, a highly rich uranium, you give it to us, no more center of futures, you give them to us. You know, and we want you to stop supplying weapons and funding to your proxies. You should never be hostile towards Israel. You should de escalate in the region. Blah blah blah. And all of these 15 points. And then you invent the story that the Pakistanis are doing it. Oh, on by the way, JD Vance is on his way to Pakistan in order to talk. Why? Because that would, you know, really signal to the markets, especially the oil markets that he desperately need to come down. That there is a serious consideration for an end to the conflict. And you make it really sound so credible and so believable that and you get the Pakistanis to play along. For real. And so you in the penituation were, okay, the Pakistanis pass on the message. Then of course, by end of the week, which is now we are approaching end of the week, after the markets have come down a little bit, because why? If you don't have this cyclical coming of the market right now, the Brent is about $101. It went to 94, it went to 90, near 90, like I mean, just on Monday, and Tuesday, with all of this plan of, oh, we have a plan, we have a peace plan. Because why? If Donald Trump did not engage in this cyclical deception operations, you know, so what happened is, we will now see the Brent around 135, 140. So what happened is he depressed the price. So when it rises again upon escalation, it rises from a lower base rather than from the higher base that it was at the previous week. That's why it is much needed. It's always much needed, you know, calming of the market. It's like, you know, when you, when your kids in the car are telling you, are we there yet? Five minutes. And then 10 minutes later, are we there yet? Five minutes. But surely they marked these oil market traders are sophisticated enough to see through this, I mean, how many times can you do this? No, no, trust me, trust me. I've been, I've been with market traders before and trust me, like, and basically they are, you know, they are really dumb. I mean, basically geopolitically dumb. And I'm being generous here, seriously, like, I mean, I know some of them are conflicted fans. I'm sorry. Yeah, I'm sorry, dear listeners. This is Amon's words, not mine. Don't, you know, don't blame me. Exactly. Like, I'm sorry, but guys, you're dumb. Oh, okay. So, you know, they don't know how to factor risk because many of them were texting me on 27 February, telling me, we don't see the market pricing your alarmist forecast. I, we all think like, and basically, you're wrong. Myself, my colleagues, whatever, from what, from reputable, big, like some of the biggest oil companies in the world, their trading desks are telling me this. Well, my friend, I have friends and finance and things and they're texting me like crazy over the last three days, especially, you know, really kind of getting angry with me. We listened to the conflict and Amon said this, Amon said that. And now it's not true. It's not going to happen. He's going to taco. There's going to be a deal, et cetera. And I was thinking, Oh, I don't know. I still trust Amon, but maybe I don't know. Exactly. And so at the end of the day, just like you did, just like you received all of these texts, I was receiving all of these texts and messages. You know, my partner, Paul, basically, like my business partner, like in the base, and other, you know, a few colleagues of mine were receiving this. It's like telling us not shut it. You know, just shut the F up. Like, I mean, you really don't know what you're talking about. And we keep telling them, listen, pals, like, I mean, we know what we're talking about. You don't, but they keep telling us the market did not, you know, price your predictions. And then Saturday morning, you know, myself, my business partners, we were sending, you know, the alerts to them specifically, we put them in a WhatsApp group together just to send them basically like in the tongue in cheek, like in a basically emoji and just to tell them, like in a basically who got it right. So at the end of the day, the problem is, yes, Thomas, I have to repeat this, you know, market analysts, especially energy market analysts and traders are dumb, dumb to believe what, you know, Trump is saying. And trust me, they fell for it for the third week. They fell for it for the third time. And they will keep falling for it time and time and time again. Okay, let's talk about this amphibious assault plan. So last Friday, it was announced at least it was reported that thousands of US Marines and sailors were being redeployed to the Middle East. And it seems that they have arrived, or at least some of them have arrived, including the 82nd Airborne Unit, a very formidable force. Do you think this is true? I mean, are we talking thousands of America's top Marines, Navy Commandos, Delta Force Squad, all that sort of thing being put into place? Yes, absolutely. So if that's the case, then, Amen, what from what you understand is going to happen in terms of any kind of American ground troop invasion of Iran? That isn't going to be an invasion of Iran, mainland. Let me, me, me, absolutely clear. There will be an invasion of the islands. There will be several islands, Abumusa, Harg, etc., all those islands. Koshim, Siri. And I think there will be a lot of confusion when American paratroopers and the Marines land on Siri because basically like, I mean, hey, we are on Siri. And then all of their phones are light up, saying like, basically what's happening? Okay, so this is more or less what you told us like 10 days ago. That is going to happen. You're still pretty positive about that. Oh, yes. What about this thing that I hear about the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, MBS, Prince Muhammad bin Salman calling Trump urging him to see the war to the end? I mean, this has been all across the media that Crown Prince is saying, Trump, you've got to see it to the end. We cannot have this regime in place at all at the end of these hostilities. Do you think that's true? Yes, he's not the only one though. The president of the UAE, Sheikh Muhammad bin Salman, hold the same view. You know, the Emir of Kuwait, the King of Bahrain, and most importantly, his majesty, the King of Jordan, who's always been viewed as the most smiled and easygoing. But he is also saying, look, regardless of whatever reservations we might have had before the war, now that the war has started, we cannot coexist with the current leadership in Iran, post this conflict. They need to go. And the problem here, Thomas, is the fact that the American psyche don't understand or still traumatized by a phrase like regime change. No one wants a regime change. The invagions of the islands are not to execute regime change. The objective is regime destruction, not a regime change. Let us be honest and clear about it. Well, that sounds more dramatic than change, destruction. No, no, a static at all. I mean, at the end of the day, regime change, it means basically that you have to own the place, you have to invade it, you have to administer it, you have to do, you know, lots of things. You know, regime destruction is you destroy the regime and then you walk away and whoever is in there, let them pick up the pieces, which is the Iranian people. You know, I understand many people would be like skeptical, but the problem is, why is it a regime destruction? Because there can be no change in the regime behavior. Again, you know, go back to and listen to all the back, you know, episodes of this podcast from early 2019. And you will understand why this isn't a regime that is normal, that pursuing normative politics. Well, speaking of non-normal regimes, I need to talk about the Houthis. Everyone wonders if they're going to join the war on the side of Iran or when they will. Today, Aiman, this very day, the 26th of March, is the 11th anniversary of the launch of decisive storm, the Saudi-led air campaign that was trying to counter the Houthis and push them back up into Sadda out of Sanaa where they'd taken over the government. Now, we know 11 years later, they're still there sitting pretty. And today, Abdul-Malikal Houthi, the leader of the Houthis, gave a big speech, officially commemorating the 11th anniversary of decisive storm, commemorating the survival of his government. But everyone knew or expected that he might say something about his intentions of joining the war or not, what happened? Well, he said that we are going to join the war when it is militarily necessary for us to join it. And so he is keeping his cards close to his chest. He's still, of course, blamed Sadr Abia for all the ills of the Middle East. Every bad thing happened in the Middle East since sliced bread is the fault of the Saudis, that was the gist of his argument. So he's preparing his audience who are mostly like a basically brain adult, you know, illiterate people. You know that there could be a conflict with the Saudis forthcoming, but he did not yet declare anything decisive in that regard and the reason is because the Iranians are still keeping the Houthis as the last intact front of resistance as far as they are concerned. They will bring them in as a reserve. So you think then Abdul-Milacle Houthis speech where he said, "We'll enter the war when it's militarily beneficial to us" is a talking point that the IRGC gave him. The IRGC want the Houthis to stand back for a little bit longer or is Abdul-Milacle Houthi maybe forging his own strategy now? No, he's not bright enough to forge his own strategy or his decision-makers than his the team around him. Exactly, which is mostly IRGC. I see. Yeah, exactly. I tell you why because at the end of the day, without IRGC operating the ballistic missiles on the drones that he is possessing, basically he's in nobody and his entire army is nothing. So if he betrays the IRGC, if he betrays Iran and decide to go independent, who will operate the vast arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones and cruise missiles that he possess? Right. These are all Iranian made and Iranian operated and so he desperately need them. That's one thing. The second thing is the IRGC already said that should, should any square inch of Iranian territory be invaded by land, what they mean, the islands, of course, then there will be an intervention by the Houthis. Right. That makes sense. So that's why they're holding the Houthis back. It's one of their, remember the old Mexicans stand off so they try to resurrect their dead Mexicans. Put a couple of guns back in their hands. Yeah, I can picture now Abdul-Milika Houthi in the next speech wearing a umbrella. Some rare. And I also suppose that, you know, behind closed doors, the Abdul-Milika Houthi and the Houthis in general are trying to extort probably the Saudis for as much money as they can in the meantime. That's their normal MO. Okay, Aiman, at the end of this episode, I'm going to ask you a couple more questions about the war in general. But we've got to talk now about what this episode is supposed to be about the Lebanon Front and not just the Lebanon Front in this war, but really Lebanon as a state and as the slow, inexorable crumbling of its sovereignty really for decades and decades. And so first, if you allow me, I just want to remind the listener or inform the listener about that long story. And I want to start that story. And this may surprise some people in 1969 when the Lebanese army signed an agreement in Cairo. So it was obviously brokered by a friend of the show, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt. So the Lebanese army signed an agreement in Cairo with Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO, head of Fata, which allowed the PLO to function as an armed guerrilla movement inside the Palestinian camps in the south of Lebanon. So that was 1969. Nasser somehow managed to convince the Lebanese army and through the army, the Lebanese government to allow the PLO to be an armed guerrilla movement in the south of the country. That's really where this story starts because from that point onwards, Lebanese sovereignty traditionally understood as possessing a monopoly of violence in a territory began to be undermined. Because from the PLO to Hezbollah, the south of Lebanon, especially, but Lebanon as a whole has been sadly struck by the virus of non-state actors. Hezbollah most powerfully. And the Cairo agreement, this arrangement led inexorably to the Lebanese civil war, which was so horrible and lasted 17 years. It was a war that led to outside intervention. First from Syria, Syrian troops forced the PLO and other armed groups into the south. And from there, the PLO launched attacks into Israel, prompting Israeli invasion, first in 1978, and then permanently in 1982. So again, that decision to allow an armed group to operate freely in the country led to the same kind of dynamics that we're seeing right now, because Israel has invaded Lebanon again. Eventually, the Cairo agreement was annulled by the Lebanese government in 1987, but the damage had been done. The PLO had left Lebanon a few years before. That was part of the outcome of Israel's invasion in 1982. But in the meantime, Hezbollah had emerged as a major militant non-state actor in Lebanon. It was founded in secret by the IRGC in 1982, and then formally came out of the shadows in 1985 as Hezbollah, the party of God. Now, amen your half Lebanese. Just this part of the story, from 1969 to, let's say, the Ta'if agreement in 1990. Your country, your mother's country, went through hell, and those foundations were laid for the hell that it's going through now. Well, of course, I mean at the end of the day, I think in 1990, the Iranians lobbied hard. All the parties involved in mediating the Ata'if agreement in order to end the civil war for Hezbollah to retain their weapons as part of the resistance against Israel. And at that time, Hezbollah was a pygmy in comparison to today. They were looked at as a just a Mirgrilla, you know, army, and they posed no threat whatsoever to the Lebanese army proper. And so they were allowed to keep their weapons as part of a resistance, a token resistance. Everyone was deceived. No one expected the amount of investment, training, funding, equipment, and the over militarization that was done by Iran and the IRGC in favor of Hezbollah. When the Ta'if agreement was signed, of course, Israel was occupying southern Lebanon. And so in Hezbollah's mind, it had a reason to continue the resistance. And, you know, that reason, that rationale, at least, was sort of seen as legitimate enough by the signatories to the Ta'if agreement to allow Hezbollah, I think uniquely of all the militant groups to retain its weapons after the civil war ended. But it wasn't just Israel that was occupying Lebanon. And this is often overlooked because we all, you know, the sort of Hezbollah story, the Lebanon story is often framed in the context of Israeli intervention in Lebanon. But as I said before, Syria was the first country to invade and occupy Lebanon. And it stayed there longer than Israel. Israel withdrew in 2000. Syria, not until 2005. And a few months after Syria first invaded Lebanon in 1976, the Arab League, you know, who often, amen, honestly, I'm not sure how useful the Arab League has been to the Middle East really. But the Arab League agreed to send an Arab peacekeeping force to Lebanon. So this is a few months after Syria invaded. The idea was that this force would help end the fighting there. But effectively, this Arab League force became permanently Syrian commanded and was like a way in which Syria to remain sort of in Lebanon. -Legally, yeah. -Legally. So a really stupid system. But because this story is not just about Israel's interventions in Lebanon or Hezbollah's fighting Israel, but also about the slow degradation decomposition of the Lebanese state. That long period between 1976 and 2005, when Hafezal Assad and then Bashar al-Assad was occupying Lebanon influencing Lebanese politics, getting in the way of other Arab countries in the Gulf, of America, of France, of all these countries trying to solve the problem, getting in the way of a real solution for Lebanon. That legacy, the Syrian, bathist intervention in Lebanon, I would say arguably is as important as the Israeli Hezbollah dynamic in Lebanon for the undermining of the Lebanese state. -Exactly. I mean, I visited Lebanon many times during that period, 94, 96, 98, 99, 2000. All the way to the run-up of the assassination of Prime Minister Lafaykh al-Hari'i in 2005, from Valentine's Day. -Carried out by Hezbollah working with Bashar al-Assad. -Exactly. So it's like how many times I lost count of how many dollars I have to pay at Syrian checkpoints, Syrian army checkpoints all across Lebanon. Wherever I went, wherever I went, from Saidun in the south, this is how far south they were allowed to exist as a Syrian army. All the way to the northern Tripoli, Tripoli in particular, like when I used to visit friends there, because it's a tsunami, it's like, I mean, kind of have a tsunami, half orthodox. It's like us. Exactly. We should go on holiday to Tripoli when everything is peacefully. Exactly, exactly, my dear, exactly. So that's the whole idea. It's a fact that every time I wanted to go to Tripoli, I have to pay exuberant amounts at checkpoints, manned by the Syrian military and Syrian intelligence, in order to avoid being pulled aside and questioned. And so he will tell me, look, what do you want? You want like, I mean, the rough treatment. You want, however, like, basically the easy treatment, or do you want the VIP treatment? And I say, how much would the VIP treatment cost me? He said, well, give me 20. You know, so $20 was enough, but then, like, basically, that's one check point. And then two and three and four and five. And then, you know, so you have to, in order to have a free movement in Lebanon, you can, if you are staying there for a week, you should just get $300 in 20s, you know, for the purpose of me carrying a foreign passport in Lebanon, not to be harassed and pulled aside and asked, you know, who am I? What am I doing there? In who am I visiting? You know, this is a notebook. Write the names of your friends, your aunties, your uncles, and your, you know, basically entire school classmates, you know, going back 17 years. Seriously, I mean, they can do that to you in order to pressure you to pay. Well, amen. That was the experience of one guy, half Lebanese visiting the country, but, you know, at a structural level, and at the highest sort of ranks of Lebanese politics, Syrian involvement was real and totally suffocating. Not just the political economy, but the economy of the country, Lebanon, which in the 60s had been a sort of jewel in the crown of the Levant, was slowly, slowly being suffocated. It's, the capacity of the state was being drained out of it. Corruption was on the rise. And as a sign of all of this, after Syria withdrew in 2005, which was part of the fallout from the assassination of Rafika Hariri and their cedar revolution, and all of this thing going on. And in the midst of which there was a huge war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, but from 2006 onward after the war, regular rounds of tripartite meetings between Israel, Lebanon, and Unifil, the United Nations into reinforce in Lebanon, you know, working obviously with the US, working with France, working with Gulf partners. So many rounds of tripartite meetings were held. And yet, despite all that diplomacy, despite all the agreement sign, all the plans, et cetera, because Hezbollah remained there, a state within a state, the Lebanese state and armed forces continued to be compromised, weakened, corrupted, and, you know, and the thing is, throughout all of this time, the US was playing an active diplomatic and military role, trying to solve the problem of Lebanon, militarily, of course, you know, until 1983, following Hezbollah's notorious Marines, barracks bombing, but diplomatically, ever since then, America is often perceived to be the bad guy in the story of the Middle East. And maybe on balance, it is, I don't know. The new US Embassy in Beirut is huge. And people who think that America and Israel are the main problems in the Middle East, they look at this big embassy and they see it as a symbol of America's evil imperial designs for the region. But I think when you look at the record, the State Department working with other partners tried for years and years to solve a problem. But the Lebanese state simply did not possess the capacity to do anything because Hezbollah was there. Yes. Hezbollah, in the end, on the back of their war with the Israelis in the south of the country from 1990 until they were 2000. And then after that in the war of the 2006, the 33 days war, after that, Hezbollah ballooned into a state within a state. I want to say ballooned. I'm using this term precisely because lack of cancer, it's ballooned because it became a cancer within the state. When people tell me why the Lebanese state looks so tired and feeble and incapable and incapacitated, then I say because it's a cancer patient, there is a huge tumor inside that body, it's called Hezbollah. When people tell me, and I know like in many people we'll be shouting among some listeners saying, "Oh, I remember you hate the resistance." These are the people of the resistance and I keep telling them, "Look, basically, just please, just wake up and smell the Arabic coffee." Resistance against what exactly? The Israeli occupation left the country entirely. And they were only like in a square kilometer here or a square 500 meters there, that's it. You know, minor, minor, minor, minor issues that did not necessitate. The existence of an army outside of the authority of the state bigger than the army itself. Okay, let's say for argument sake, it is an army outside because it needs to resist the Israelis, which was there was no war, there was no intention of war at that time. Why does this army needs a separate banking system, a separate financial system, a separate telecommunication system, a separate security system to run policing in of their neighborhoods and areas? Why do they need their own intelligence service? Why do they need, in fact, their own hospitals, their own clinics, their own entire private network of electricity generators? I mean, they became a state within a state in a way that was sucking the economic life out of the state. Well, we know why, frankly, Aiman, I mean, despite what partisans of the hashtag Resistance think about things, the truth is more complicated. And the reason why that happened, why his Bola grew in that way was because it became the biggest and most important clank and pillar in Iran's proxy network across the region and as a force to project Iranian power and to hold up one of those Mexicans with his gun pointing at Israel. And we saw this happen in real time in a big way during the Syrian Civil War when his Bola operating extremely closely with Khosam Soleimani and the Kud's force entered that war on behalf of Iran to prop up the Assad regime and were extremely brutal in Syria. And really terrible, there's no love lost, I think, at all between Syrians, generally, certainly Sunni Syrians, but Syrians generally, and the Hezbollah. It's leading probably to a generation's worth of tensions between Syria and Lebanon, just the memory of Hezbollah's intervention in the Syrian Civil War. But anyone, I don't know anyone who thinks, who doubts that Hezbollah is anything but an Iranian proxy, not really because it has anything like noble aims, but simply because Iran's own geostrategic kind of position requires them to have a force there. Those people are just smoking dope. But since the 7th of October onwards, we saw peace by peace Hezbollah being degraded by Israel, especially that amazing month across August and September of 2024 when Hezbollah's long-time leader Hassan Nasrullah was assassinated when the incredible, you know, pager bombs went off in the pockets of lots and lots of assets. That was my birthday, 17 September 2024. It was a good birthday present for you, Aiman. Exactly, from BB Nasaniahu. Thank you so much. So Israel did achieve in degrading Hezbollah in a big way during that phase of this now three years running kind of anti-Iranian war in the fall out of October 7th. But when we get back from this break, we will first talk Aiman. You will explain to us the degree to which Hezbollah in the meantime has managed to put itself back together, create a new command, structure, working with Iran, working with the Quds Force, replace some weapons stocks that were destroyed by Israel, et cetera. And then we'll talk about what's going on on the ground in Lebanon right now. We'll be right back. Hello, we're back. We're talking about Hezbollah. We're talking about Israel's new invasion of Lebanon. We're talking about all things Lebanese, Aiman. Since the campaign against Hezbollah that Israel waged, decapitating its leader Hassan Nasrullah and so on, ended in November 2024, Hezbollah has, it seems quite clear, slowly rebuilt at least some of its command structure, at least 100 IRGC agents, perhaps on the ground, have been helping that effort. Weapons have restocked perhaps by pilfering Syrian weaponry when the Assad regime fell during those. 72 hours when Assad left and before the new government could stamp its authority, as Israel was destroying everything, it was kind of crazy few days there in Syria. It seems like Hezbollah was able to grab some of that weaponry and take it back to Lebanon. I don't know, this is what I've read. I bet you know, what was it Hezbollah's strength, let's say, on the 28th of February of this year when the Iran War started and how did it get there? I think they went from being at 30% of their strength when they lost 70% of their strength by November of 2024, by the end of it, they were absolutely down on their knees. However, I can say that they are now back to 70% of how they were. Well, that's pretty good. That's a pretty fast rebuilding. How did that happen? Well, first of all, you mentioned it already, there were 100 IRGC officers who were dispatched to Lebanon to restart a training campaign and a purging of the ranks of suspected collaborators with the Israelis. But most importantly, a recruitment of a new generation who were not tainted by the old structure that was infiltrated by the Israelis. So they recruited roughly about 17,000 new young people, which is a disaster. Some of the people being recruited as young as 15, even. So, and the idea is that these people are going to be not tainted by the old structure that was infiltrated by the Israelis. For example, this is why today, for example, today, on Iranian official news outlets in Saudi Iran, the Basige now has announced that they are lowering the age of volunteering to the Basige to 12. Wow. So if you are 12, you are allowed to join the Basige in Iran to defend the nation. Now someone will say, oh my God, child recruitment. And I say, yes, of course, child recruitment. But there is also a sinister reason for this because they are recruiting people who are not yet being tainted by infiltrations by the Mossad or the Americans or other nefarious powers as far as the Iranian structure is concerned. So the same thing has been flooded. Another thing is because of Hasbullah's control of the airport and also control also of the port in Beirut, they were able to continue to receive shipments of weapons through that means until the Israelis threatened to bomb the airport in the port if the Lebanese state do not take full authority of that. They did. And also there was something called the retrieval of weapons from semi-destroyed depots that the Israelis bombed, but they did not get the entirety of the ammunition. So they will go and salvage. You know, they were salvaging what could be retrieved from all the depots that the Israelis bombed because the Israelis are not going to bomb a depot twice. That was a genius way of doing it. So they retrieved considerable amount of ammunition from there and it was a successful operation. So by the end of it, like, I mean, they rebuilt themselves into 70% strength of what they were prior to engaging the Israelis in August of 2024. I have another question because in the meantime, so again, last 18 months or so, big efforts were undertaken led by America and other powers to strengthen the resolve of the Lebanese state to really do something about Hezbollah. And you know, it seemed last year like maybe something was going to be done. It seemed like the Lebanese government had found a backbone, had felt that they could move. Hezbollah had been weakened. And yet once again, nothing was done. What happened? Well, simple because the Americans don't understand this technology. They don't understand the ideology. They don't understand how powerful and, you know, an invasive and intrusive, you know, the Shi'a 12-er fanaticism that runs within Lebanese Shi'a across the board with the exception of maybe 20% of the Shi'a population there, 40% belong to Hezbollah, 40% belong to Nebeh Berri, you know, the speaker of the parliament and his movement, Amel, which was founded by Musa Sada'r. And we talked about Musa Sada'r before in one of the episodes in season, I think, three. Disappeared in Libya, probably killed by Colonel Gaddafi. Most likely, he's done the world a favor anyway. So, so in my opinion here, like, I mean, the Lebanese army. And I have to reveal something here. I have a cousin who is in the Lebanese army itself in a certain function and position which I'm not going to reveal. But senior enough. And he educated me enough about this. He said, look, Ayman, it's not as simple as he might think. The Lebanese army is 30% Shi'a. And that's what we're talking about, like, in Amel and Lebanese army of 100,000, so 30,000 Lebanese soldiers are Shi'a. And 15,000 of them are belonging to Amel, the Bihbarri's party, which is allied with hisbullah anyway. And then you have, of course, 15,000 who are core hisbullah militants, but they are actually in the army. Right, gosh. Yes. As, you know, basically, a reward for a good service with hisbullah itself and being hisbullah's people inside the army. Goodness gracious. They moonlight as army soldiers. So if the Lebanese army were to move decisively against hisbullah, you will have a mutiny by 30% of the army straightaway. 30,000 soldiers are going to mutiny straightaway and to break the army and then to start a civil war straightaway. That's is going to happen. It's inevitable. So when the Lebanese president Joseph Aoun and his prime minister Nawaf Salam, and, of course, the leader of the army, Rodolf Hekel, but the way Rodolf Hekel, I will say it out loud here. In a, basically, I don't care if he's assuming. You know, I, I've heard, you know, some credible, you know, rumors about him and said the army that every month he is receiving $60,000 in appreciation money from hisbullah. Wow. This is the head of the Lebanese armed forces. Yes. The head of the Lebanese armed forces. You know, so, so at the end of the day, you know, he himself, he's going to be a himself in the pay of hisbullah. I'm not saying it's a certainty, but there is no smoke without fire in Lebanon, especially. And I suppose it's not, it's not an unbelievable thing, you know, it's perfectly believable because that's kind of how politics are done. Exactly. And so he himself went to the US in order to, because the US, you know, government invited him three months ago for the purpose of discussing, equipping the Lebanese army because the Lebanese army was supposed to use the year 2025 as the year for which they disarmed hisbullah. And they were doing some what later transpired to be just show operations. Oh, really? It was just purely for display. Because why as soon as the war with between hisbullah and Israel erupted again after the killing of Aytullah Khamanai, late last month, 28 February, you know, just a few days later in early March, hisbullah entered the conflict. They were firing from positions that were supposed to have been cleared, you know, by the Lebanese military in a month ago. That's very telling, gosh. As his army commander, General Rodolf Hekel, he went to meet with officials in DC. And one of them was, unfortunately, for the, for Rodolf Hekel was Senator Lindsey Graham. Who? As you know, we all know, like, and basically he doesn't mince his words. I mean, basically, like, and I mean, the man is, so he was telling him that, look, you know, you came here seeking, like, basically, our help, you know, because, you know, this arm in hisbullah is a priority for the United States because hisbullah is a terrorist organization. However, the Lebanese army had General Rodolf Hekel was a little bit, you know, kind of, like, you know, basically, Abruptan, his rebuttal of Senator Lindsey Graham, telling him, no, you know, hisbullah is not a terrorist organization. At least within the Lebanese context, wow. That was not wise, my dear friend, Rodolf Hekel, you know, basically, like, and that was not wise. I mean, and so Lindsey Graham, kind of, like, and I mean, ask him, he said, what do you mean? Like, I mean, it's not a terrorist organization. It is a terrorist organization. You are tasked, you know, and we are giving you our own tax, you know, pay our dollars for the purpose of this arm in hisbullah because it is a terrorist organization. And he repeated his stance. I can't describe hisbullah as a terrorist organization. It is a national Lebanese force. And that's when Lindsey Graham stood up abruptly and said, meeting his offer. So it's like, what's the point? What is there to talk about? If you, you know, are refusing to call hisbullah a terrorist organization. And then he left. When he returned, has Balawa. waiting for him at the airport to share him and to say what a true national hero this general is because he is defending the resistance against the enemies of Lebanon and the Israelis. Well, I guess we understand why it is that on the 28th of February when the Americans and the Israelis launched the new Iran war, that Hezbollah was fighting fit on the 2nd of March, so only two three days later, Hezbollah launched an attack on Israel. In retaliation, they said for the killing of Ali Hamanay, the old supreme leader. They launched 60 rockets and drones, Israel launched air strikes, including on Beirut's Hezbollah-dominated southern suburbs. Now, the next day, there was another barrage from Hezbollah. And on the next day, yet another, but twice in strength. Israel responded with intense strikes, even more intense. Reports emerged that Israeli troops had crossed the border and were moving north. Israel issues a wide evacuation order, and all residents, Israel says, are to move north of the Latani river. Then on the 5th and 6th March, about 300,000 citizens did so. They were displaced and they fled north of the river. On the 8th March, Israel strikes central Beirut, a targeted assassination is carried out of a senior Kudz force commander. Then back and forth, back and forth, day after day. On the 11th March, for the first time ever, a missile barrage from Hezbollah was timed in conjunction with the missile barrage from Iran. That's a pretty interesting moment when really their mask is off, and it's just clear, we are coordinating our attacks. By the 16th of March, a major Israeli ground operation was underway. Israel has declared its intention to occupy the country as before, in order to create a security zone up to the Latani river and perhaps even beyond. As of today, over 1,000 people have been killed in Lebanon. Not a huge amount, frankly, but a million have been displaced. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled. And from what I've seen, Amin, the city of Tyre on the coast, the ancient city of Tyre, has basically been emptied out. Civilian infrastructure, such as bridges, have been destroyed. People, Lebanese people, understandably wonder if those civilians will ever return to the south, or if southern Lebanon will become another Gaza, and in fact, Israel itself dropped leaflets on Beirut threatening, quote, "Gaza scale devastation." At the same time, the Lebanese government, Amin, has now announced that Hezbollah's military activities are banned and said that IRGC agents would be arrested and deported, and just two days ago on the 24th of March, Lebanon declared Iran's ambassador, persona non-grata. So that's just the blow-by-blow. That's what happened the last three weeks, right? What's your insider view? Very precise timeline here, Thomas. Thank you so much. You set the stage in a very well. Now, you said here that the Lebanese government declared the activities of Hezbollah, illegal and banned. Yeah, good luck. Who will enforce it? Because the Lebanese army had again, we come back to the man who I suspect is in the pay of Hezbollah to the tune of $60,000 as I was told, among, said he is not going to do anything about it. He is not going to confront Hezbollah, or to stop Hezbollah militants or activities or anything. They arrested several Hezbollah militants who were transporting missiles between civilian areas in Beirut, and guess what? As soon as they took them into the military court, the military court released them on bail, each one for $20 bail. That's it. Go, leave, do whatever you want. It's clearly the state cannot exercise its authority. And as soon as the foreign minister backed up by the prime minister announced that the Iranian ambassador, who is himself a former IRGC commander, who's really a real IRGC commander, is just like in a masquerading as a diplomat, is a person who is on grotto, no longer welcome them to Lebanon. He must pack up and leave within 48 hours. He issued a statement from the embassy, from the Comfort of his embassy, in Beirut saying, we will treat this decision as it never happened. You know, in other words, luckily, we will pretend that the Lebanese government doesn't exist. Because basically, Aiman, it doesn't exist. The Lebanese state is a failed state. Is this what you're saying? Exactly. That's why I'm saying, you know what, stuff all of Lebanon, all of it, in a basically, from top to bottom, including the army, including the government, including their airport important, everything. If you can't bloody defend your own sovereignty, you know, against a parasitic ambassador and a parasitic militia, then don't blame the Israelis when they blow up your airport and blow up every single civilian plane on that tarmac. Don't blame them when they blow up the civilian infrastructure in order to make sure that Hassanullah doesn't have a free movement, you know, from any place in the country, to any other place in the country, to target Israel and Israeli civilian infrastructure, especially with ballistic missiles, you know, launching from Balbek, landing in Ash-Kalon, that's 400 kilometers, that's a ballistic missile. And who gave that bloody ballistic missile to them, except Iran? Basically, Iran turned Lebanon into a forward military base. And I swear to God, if anyone comes to me and says, "Hazballah has legitimate, you know, reason to exist," you know, I will tell him how many relatives have you lost to Hasballah's adventures, you know, and if none, I will tell him to get out of my face straight away and out of my sight, because at the end of the day, you do not hijack a country, a nation, and turn it into, basically, a forward military command post on behalf of an eschatologically mad Ayatollah's regime. Well, Aiman, you know, from what I understand, and I'm no expert on really anything, but certainly not international law, from what I understand, it is the responsibility of every state on earth to prevent terrorist groups from existing and certainly from attacking other states. So some people say that Israel has no right to invade Lebanon to do any of this that it's doing right now. And I understand that that is in fact not the case. And that because the Lebanese state has simply failed to prevent a massively funded and armed terrorist group on its border with Israel, attack its neighbor Israel, Israel actually does have the right militarily to do something about it. Yes, because actually there is a similar situation where yesterday, just yesterday, the nations of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Six countries came together to declare that if Iraq cannot control the militias that are funded and established, just like has the Allah in Lebanon, by Iran funded and directed by Iran from launching drones, cruise missiles, ambelistic missiles from Iraq territory into these six countries which has been well documented. And with all the ample radar signatures and evidence and electronic evidence that we need, then these six states reserve the right for self-defense under international law and even they named the exact articles of the United Nations Charter when it comes to self-defense. This of course puts the whole Iran war, I think, in perspective because Iran, the Iranian regime, the IRGC and its Quds Force has been propping up terrorist groups everywhere. So if Israel has the right to intervene in Lebanon because Hasbullah is attacking it and the Lebanese states not doing anything about it. And if these states in the GCC and Jordan are saying we have the right to intervene militarily in Iraq, if those militias are fire upon us and if the Iraqi state fails to do anything about it, then in a wider regional context, surely all of these states and preeminently the United States, the great Hegemon of the world, has the right to intervene militarily in Iran because Iran is the one creating funding, arming, training and supporting these terrorist groups. It just seems basic and this is why I don't understand. People call this war illegal, maybe technically it could be argued to be so in certain courts of law and yet I just don't get it. Iran, the regime's influence has been so malign in so many places that surely eventually you can just say, well, you know, get stuff to work out, we've got to do something about it. But to stick with Lebanon, Aiman, what's going to happen? You say forget it all, the state, the army, the airports, whatever, forget it. But literally what do you think's going to happen? We can't have a Gaza situation in Lebanon. That would be, I mean, we can't take another heartbreak like that. The world would be in serious trauma if that were to happen in Israel, my goodness. It's reputation is on a knife said already and it just wouldn't be good for anyone surely. Do you remember Thomas that in the episode we did UNI many years ago. It feels like an age ago after October 7, after Hamas did with the did on October 7 in 2023. That episode we say, what was Hamas thinking? And I said, and I keep saying it always to many friends and to many colleagues and to many detractors even, I say the first rule of going on a Suis admission. Just don't take your god damn family with you in a go alone. And that's exactly the problem is the fact that as well as just like Hamas is determined to take the family with them. Their wider Lebanese family, just like Hamas took the wider big family in Gaza to a Suis admission, drag them into it unwillingly, as well as dragging the entire country of Lebanon unwillingly into a Suis admission. And for as far as Israel is concerned, they don't want to keep fighting war after war after war. And this is where naive people in Europe, a particular like Macaron of France, where he keeps saying ceasefire, ceasefire, ceasefire, no. No, even I will say no. Lebanon needs a chemotherapy. And if it means Israel going into a beast mode in Lebanon to achieve it because many of my relatives in Lebanon are praying, God please make it the last war. And I asked them, what do you mean by the last war? They say that Israel annihilates Hasbullah and it's based completely so we don't have to really live this, really live this nightmare ever again. - Well, Aiman, you are half Lebanese. And in fact, I'm feeling sad. I'm getting teary because I really love that country. I love the Levant. I love the Middle East. I am so sad. I am really weighed down by all of this wickedness around, all of this death and all of this war and all of this foolishness. It's really weighing me down. There are lots of things that I wanted to ask you about, Aiman, I wanted to ask you about Iranian sleeper cells and terrorist networks in Europe and in America and other places. I have a whole list here of attacks since the beginning of the war on the 28th of February that I wanted to ask you about. I wanted to ask you about Russia. The EU has accused Russia of providing intelligence to Iran. There are reports of Russia shipping drones to Iran. I wanted to ask you about that. - Through the Caspian, yes indeed. - Well, either do a special episode on that question or we'll save it for a Q and A and therefore dear listeners, you might have to take out a paid subscription and join the conflicted community to hear Aiman's answers to those questions. So I'll leave this episode with this topic 'cause I do wanna talk about it. Now I sent you this video yesterday over WhatsApp and you didn't reply to it 'cause I imagine it pissed you off but I wanna ask you about it. So Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, speaking to the economist the other day, said, quote, "Iran has the upper hand." And he stated, "With pain in his heart," he says, "I do not like the Iranian regime, "God knows I do not like the IRGC." So he's not one of these like knee jerk, hashtag resistance, anti-Americans far from it, the head of MI6. He states that the US Israeli strategy is fundamentally flawed and that Iran, which is definitely playing a weaker hand, is playing that hand masterfully and will win this war in the end. Now Aiman, he is just one of thousands and thousands of voices, not all of them just armchair strategists, some of them very elite people, saying that the US is going to lose this war. And I think a lot of our listeners are also wondering if that could be the case because conflicted in general presents a more full-throated defense, let's say, of America's overall strategy and of the war aim of destroying the Iranian regime. But Aiman, honestly, might the US lose this war? - God forbid, they might. At the end of the day, not because it lacks the military power or might or the foresight or the ability to strategize. We will lose this war because of voices like this. Because of defeatist mentality, who tells you basically that, you can't confront evil, you have to coexist with it. The problem is, what if evil doesn't want to coexist with you? I mean, sometimes I feel myself like, basically, as this lonely, automated train operator in the operation room of this lovely train network, and I can see the glitch there, I can see the Iranian train, basically, I mean, getting that glitch and basically, I mean, moving in fast speed towards other trains in the network, and I'm gonna, I can basically cause a massive collision and the eraylement of several trains. And yet, when you tell people, "Accident about to happen," and they say, "Oh, no, don't worry, the system will correct itself." No, no, no, you don't understand, there is a glitch. No, no, no, the system is perfect, there will be no glitch. That's exactly the argument I used to have with many of my former MI6 bosses. Is the fact that they have grown accustomed to believing that containment with Iran, because Iran is somehow a nation state, and therefore, no matter what containment worked with Syria, in a four decades, it will work with Iran for decades to come. But there is a problem here. Iran recruited 700,000 young men in Iraq and Syria, and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Lebanon and Gaza and Yemen, 700,000 men to be under arms, to rise up against their own nation states, to become states within the states. So when you have these voices, come out and keep telling you, you can't win. This is a shrewd evil, calculated evil. But actually, when you say that, you are arguing against yourself, you are proving the point that it must be confronted. When you tell me that, "Oh, they prepared for this war for a very long time." They know what they're doing. Well, thank you. You just prove my point that we must confront them. Because if we keep picking the can down the road, it will be our children who will fight a stronger, more vicious and more capable Iran. -Amen, you're reminding me of Gandalf in the Lord of the Rings. He talks to Frodo, saying, these are the dark times, but sometimes in a generation, it's your call upon to fight the enemy. I can't remember the exact quote. Fans of the Lord of the Rings will be shouting at me for getting it wrong. And of course, as we all know, and as post-colonialist literary critics like to tell us, J.R.R. Tolkien's Middle Earth is a kind of facsimile of our own world, and Mordor is definitely, I mean, if you look at the ring of mountains that makes Mordor, it is sort of like. -Zagros. -The Zagros Mountains and Persia, and Tolkien was working in this kind of, inherited European worldview, in which the great enemy is the Eastern Persian forces. -The Haradram, yes, exactly. Modeled on Pardjan's, yeah. -Exactly. -You're reminding me of the Lord of the Rings in what you're saying. And yeah, I agree with you. I see that case. It seems sensible to me. In one sort of voice that I find increasingly frustrating on the internet, on ex and things, is the economists, kind of. Not the economists, the magazine. I mean, economists, the people. People who see the world solely through the prism of economics, of trade, they seem to think that because this war is causing an increase in the oil price, the war shouldn't happen. As if there could ever be a war in the Middle East that didn't affect the oil price. I mean, I want to ask these economists, are you serious? -And they don't you know that your markets, your precious markets depend on political and therefore military activities that underlie them. You can't just have these markets that are sacrosanct, and that, you know, I mean, really the market, quote unquote, leading these leading war efforts, leading politics, gets it completely backwards. But there are a lot of loud voices saying, "Oh, oh, clearly the American war is not going well because the price of oil is going up." And you think, are you serious? Don't you think the price of commodities went up during the first world war, during the second world war, during every goddamn war since the beginning of mankind? -In fact, in fact, there is so much hypocrisy, so much hypocrisy. Look, I know I supported Ukraine's right to self-defense. I still do. I believe, like in the basically Russia's invasion of Ukraine is no different to Russia's, you know, bullying, you know, or invasion of Afghanistan or bullying of the Caucasus. You know, and I do believe basically, like in the Ukraine had the right to defend itself. I'm for the first one to say that. Many of the people who are criticizing the, intervention against Iran are the same people who actually want to continue to see the war between Ukraine and Russia continue without any possibility of a ceasefire whatsoever. Just for the sake of their fetishized love for seeing Russian soldiers die in a basically a Ukrainian's die. But Aiman, these people see America as the Russia in the situation. They see America as invading "attacking Iran" unprovoked in the same way that Russia invaded and attacked Ukraine. That's how they see the world. Except I tell them my dear friends, my dear naive friends, I just said that Iran over the course of three decades recruited, recruited 700,000 men into terror organizations and non-state actors for the sake of expansionism. They took over countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen. So, and cause two civil wars in Syria and Yemen, two million dead, you know, 25 million people displaced. I know, we can't, we don't need to litigate it again. It's just like there are people in the world who don't see that. They just don't see it. They can't see it somehow. What seems so obvious to you and me, especially to you, Aiman, you know it. You lived it. But they just cannot see it. And partly it's because I guess they've absorbed a certain worldview, anti-American, whatever you want to call that pro-resistance. I don't know. I mean, these people often are quite wealthy. They're kind of often members of the beautiful people. They have properties and, you know, they'll have a flat in Istanbul and a flat here and you know, they kind of go to galleries and they're the smart set. They're just sitting around and they just seem to think that Iran, because maybe in certain neighborhoods of Tehran, there are some pretty swanky galleries and some nice cafes that therefore, you know, it's perfectly fine. I don't get it. I don't get it. But they're just living in a different universe for me. Well, well, there is a bullsh*t theater in Moscow, like I know basically what's wrong with this. You know, I'm just saying that look at the end of the day, if Iran was a normative country with normative politics, I would say like you might have a case here. But it is a terror-sponsoring nation where half of its armed forces, which is the IRGC, is designated terrorist organization by no less than 35 countries around the world. Yeah. Well, I don't get it. Anyway, we should bring this to a close. Thank you, Aiman. I hope that the flood of Noah does not return to the Gulf. We talked about how maybe the Gulf is the site of Noah's flood. And right on cue, five days later, Noah's flood returned. And I hope, you know, your poor flat dries out. Indeed. Dear listeners, thank you for listening to this episode of Conflicted. We will be back with you as ever soon, soon, soon. Join the Conflicted Community. Otherwise, stay well. See everyone. Conflicted is a message-heard production. Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.