Can Europe Solve Its U.S. Dilemma?

[music] -War and Peace, a podcast by the International Crisis Group. -Welcome back to War and Peace, a podcast of the International Crisis Group. I, one of your hosts, Olga Olokher, speaking to you from London. -I'm your other host, Olga Siddick-Carbonel, also speaking to you from London. -Today, we are talking about how European countries are responding to recent US actions in Venezuela and to US statements about its designs on Greenland. So, talking about how they're responding now and how they might navigate this complicated transatlantic relationship going forward. -When the US seized President Maduro of Venezuela in a shock military operation in early January, it's an understatement to say that the move caused considerable global disquiet. It also caused a lot of stress in Europe. So, many European leaders had criticized Maduro for his repression, for ringed elections, and so on and so forth. But that did not mean that they did not view the raid as a violation of international law and the UN charter. Most of them, however, responded cautiously. And while there might have been consensus, there also was some disagreement. So, while Spain joined left-leaning Latin American countries, and criticizing the operation openly, Hungary and Italy defended it. In a collective statement, 26 EU members, so without Hungary, noted that international law and the UN charter should be a "held" "underall circumstances". And they underlined the special responsibility of UN Security Council members, but avoided explicitly critiquing the United States. -We have been very firm on the UN charter. We have been very firm on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of countries that has to be respected. And we have been also talking to the American colleagues about these things. And then, right on the heels of the Dermennes-Wayla Special Operation, members of the Trump administration started talking again, as they had done last year, about coercively acquiring Greenland from Denmark. And several of them went asked, refused to rule out, use a force to do that. So, this, of course, also rattled European leaders, being as it was direct threat to the sovereignty of one of their own from their biggest ally. But they also kept their statements of solidarity with Copenhagen, calibrated, shall we say, trying apparently to contain blowback from Washington. So, I'm trying to use really careful language to describe their very careful language. And that's kind of, goes to the heart of this problem, right? You've got Washington's allies in Europe who remain deeply reliant at the United States for their security, including most immediately, Washington's shrinking, but still crucial, help for Ukraine. So, even when Washington starts behaving like a threat to European states, to its allies, those countries are trying themselves in pretzels, trying to forge what some have called strategic acquiescence. So, it's this idea that you keep the U.S. close, and you don't publicly confront it, and you hope that way to keep it on your side, or close it after your side, for long enough, to become less dependent. But doing that, aligning so closely with the United States that's increasingly willing to ignore and flaunt international norms, could carry its own costs. First, it might not work. And even if it works for a while, the hypocrisy of giving the U.S. a pass on principles and sovereignty and international law, that the EU otherwise seeks to defend globally, well, it's hard to miss, though it's not entirely new. But it is particularly fraught when the bloc's credibility with many countries is already weakened by, for instance, its limited response to Israel's campaign in Gaza. So, with Washington likely to continue to be at best unpredictable and worse dangerous to them, when does its allies current approach to managing the transatlantic relationship fall apart? And what could these countries do to make their reach more, rather than less secure, under the circumstances? To talk about Ohovesse, we're very happy to welcome back Natalie Tochi. Natalie is the director of the Institute to Aferii International in Rome and Professor of Practice at Jones Hopkins University. School of Advanced International Studies. She's previously served as an advisor to the Italian government and to the European Union, including to the EU's high representative Joseph Borrell. Natalie is also a frequent commentator on European foreign policy and trans-ethnic relations, including a columnist at the Guardian. Natalie, welcome back. Being back with you. So, Natalie, you've argued in a recent Guardian piece that this approach by key European governments of avoiding criticism of the United States, specifically in Venezuela, is a misguided approach. So, why do you think they're doing what they're doing and why do you think it's the wrong approach? I mean, what you would hear from them is, and I think you touched on many of these points, is, well, we need to keep the United States on side, given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, given our defense dependence on the United States, given that we want to salvage this relationship. And I'm not trying to say that these are misguided goals. Well, though I find really quite striking, well, several things. I mean, firstly is that the attempt at achieving these goals by sort of flattery slash self humiliation has really been going on for a year now, right? And so, empirically, we seem to have plenty of evidence that suggests that it's actually not working. So, the question really is, why is it that we carry on? Now, why do I say it's not working? You could say, well, you know, you look at Ukraine and ultimately we haven't seen the US's full siding with Russia by full siding with Russia what I mean is not just siding politically with Russia, but actually going as far as, for instance, preventing Europeans from acquiring US weapons to give to Ukraine. You know, you could make the argument, this has been thanks to European flattery self-humiliation diplomatic shenanigans. I actually think that that result is far more the product of the fact that Putin has consistently overstepped the mark, right? So in a sense, once again, we have to thank Vladimir Putin rather than the European flattery and self-humiliation. That would be my reading on Ukraine. So, I actually don't think it has worked. You know, the flattery has not worked on Ukraine at all. If the goals of that flattery were, for instance, the US putting more pressure on Russia, that obviously has not happened. So that's Ukraine. Then you could say, well, you know, but there is that defense dependence more broadly even beyond Ukraine on the United States and therefore, you know, we need to heat the US on site. And we need to, this is what you would commonly hear. We need to buy time. And will I find a little bit odd about that conversation is one thing is to say, well, we need to buy time. So rather than kind of poking the US in the eye, we kind of should, you know, sort of nicely smile while in the meantime, doing our things to kind of accelerate, you know, full steam on actually acquiring greater independence from the United States. Now that doesn't seem to be happening either, right? What yes seems to be happening. What is happening is that we have seen rather significant uptick in European and particular German investments in defense. But that uptick in defense spending given that it has primarily happened at national level has not actually led to a reduction of dependence on US weapons. And so that's why I'm not sure if the US has impacted many respects that doesn't even seem to be the goal, right? I mean, I was listening to a recent interview given by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and he was actually making the case very explicitly saying, you know, Europeans, yes, of course, should be investing in their own capabilities, but they should also be buying more US weapons. So that's the time that we're buying is not really being bought in order to reduce dependence, right? Maybe yes, becoming more military capable, but not more autonomous for the United States. So that argument doesn't really hold water. So then you kind of left with, and then perhaps just one third consideration coming to then what I think the main problem is third consideration is all these arguments, you know, our defense dependence on the United States, Ukraine, this and that and the other. Kind of ring the hollow, the minute in which you take a step back. And again, you know, let's make the comparison with the Vittitsuela situation and the position of other Latin American countries in the case of Latin America, we're looking at countries which are certainly much poorer than the average European country. And certainly just as dependent in different ways, not least because they're obviously geographically much closer to the United States. And yet they had demonstrated an autonomy of thought far greater than that. of European countries. You were mentioning the statement that actually Spain signed up to with several Latin American countries. So they seem to have a guts, basically, to do what many European countries can't or do not want to do. And I think it's interesting to ask ourselves why because the answer cannot be found in material conditions. Because as I said, in terms of material dependence, in many respects, it's even higher. And so I think there's a sort of psychological element to this conversation. We simply cannot accept that the world that we used to live in has gone. There's a sort of story of kind of ontological security. We are, who we are, because our relationship with the United States was what it was. And it is deeply unsettling, you know, on a really, I mean, on a psychological level, kind of acknowledging that that world has gone, because if that world has gone, it means we have also gone. And we have to reinvent ourselves really rather radically. And I think it's that mindset switch, which we really struggle to make, especially at the collective level. Yeah, I mean, I have said before that I feel like Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine doesn't pose an existential threat to the EU. It has destroyed the EU as it was, right? It's gone. And now with the United States, there's a new existential threat to what was left of that concept. But I think then the question is, what do they do instead? And do they have time to do it? Right? Because I think the idea is that they've got it, right? It's no longer a wake-up call, they're awake. But what they've realized is that they're not ready. They're not dressed. They can't find their socks, yeah? Yeah. Yeah. I mean, yes. So I think where we are in terms of the awakening is that there has been awakening at individual level, right? So if you speak to, I would say, a kind of vast majority of officials, of elected leaders, what we're saying would basically, I think, resonate with most of them. I don't think that on an individual level, we're in a state of denial. Somehow that individual level has a not kind of coalesced institutionally and connected to this, it hasn't really been given a public voice yet. You know, so probably the moment in which I was most struck about this is not going to say who this was, but I was in the Middle East, in December, early December, and I was having coffee with a very senior European leader, EU leader, and basically, you know, we were having exactly this conversation. And she was actually, when it comes to the United States, even more negative and pessimistic than IR, for instance, you know, positive indeed, the likelihood that they may stop, for instance, even selling us weapons for you, great. So far more negative than IR, right? And then, you know, up she goes on stage, and this was, you know, probably something like the day after a couple of days after the publication of the National Security Strategy, and she starts talking about our greatest ally, right? It is obviously not what she personally thinks, but somehow this cannot and has not translated yet in a public and in an institutional level. So maybe it's just a question of time, okay, that's the optimistic. You know, maybe the journey from the individual to the collective just kind of takes a little bit more time, but we're on our way. But I think there's another possible explanation, which I think requires us to then think a little bit more deeply about what the solution is. And the more kind of problematic explanation is that the institutions that we have available, for instance, the European Union and NATO are simply not made for different reasons. You know, they simply don't have it in them to make that mental leap collectively, institutionally, because they are built in and for a different era. And particularly when we think about NATO, for example, the ideological strategic operational industrial spine is US, right? So you cannot expect something to kind of radically change its DNA. It's simply not going to happen. So if that is the explanation, so the kind of tools that we have available, the institutions that we have available simply don't have it in them to make the leap. Does it therefore mean that that leap will need to take place outside those existing institutions? And this is why I think that if we are to look at snippets of kind of hope and optimism, it revolves around initiatives like the coalition of the Willie, you know, a critical mass of countries whose governments still haven't completely gone kind of off the bend, basically, in terms of the rise of the fire, rise and what have you, understand that we are facing a triangle of threats. There's the Russia threat, there's the US betrayal, and there's the what I define as the reverse JD Vance threat, the sort of threat from within i.e. the rise of the populist far right. And that in order to address that existential triangle of threats, they need to stick together because we either stick together or we are a group of small fat chicken in the jungle. So I think that the ideas around a coalition of the Willie is actually where the dynamism lies. Yeah, it's where the action lies. The question is whether back can at some point move beyond a dealing with hypotheticals like a reassurance force deployed to Ukraine and actually start thinking more deeply and broadly about how Europeans can defend Europe without the United States, for example. So at the same time, both having a format which is indeed flexible and outside EU structures, but that needs to be at some point institutionalized because otherwise it ends up meaning that we only have one meeting after the other, but nothing really happening in between meetings. You know, what happens in between meetings? That is the work cut for institutions. And if those don't exist when it comes to the coalition of the Willie, then you simply have one summit after the other, but very disillaction in the treat. Now, that's fascinating. And you know, you're talking about the psychological shift in Europe, I think until very recently, right? It was about buying time to protect itself alongside America, rather than counterbalance or protecting from America when we talk about some of the discussions on Greenland now, which I hope we'll get to in this conversation. So you talk about the coalition of the Willie, and the, you know, the problems with, for example, European rearmament plans. Obviously, go beyond money. One of the things you touched upon is the issues with common strategy, defense spending, you know, NATO says these regional defense plans, but they're guidelines and they include a vision of the US being involved that perhaps it's unclear that the Trump administration is still committed to. So do you really see, I possibly for a united European defense strategy? I mean, can we move, as you say, from that coalition, the willing to something where, you know, strategic autonomy means something more concrete, for example, in the defense sector of having this pan-European planning? So I just, although I am extremely negative about anything happening, as I said, from within existing institutions, I'm actually really quite optimistic about the fact that it can happen outside. And let me just perhaps spell out a little bit more what I mean by this. So I'm extremely negative about this happening from within that you, I'm extremely negative about the idea of a European pillar within NATO. I don't think that this is going to happen within that you for two sets of reasons. The first is, again, you know, empirically, it's not like we haven't been trying. People like myself have been champions of EU doing more on defense for well over a decade. And at some point you've got to come to the realization that if we are where we are and yes, I mean, you know, some things have been done, but frankly speaking, really marginal initiatives on defense and defense industry, then maybe the conclusion is that that is not where the solution is going to lie. And the EU was a project built in and for peace, and it simply cannot transform its DNA to become a machine for war, basically. I mean, it just doesn't have a in it. If you add onto it the problem that within that you and within NATO that matter, there are already, let's call them fifth columns, you know, Orbán and Pizzo and what have you, you know, can we really have the conversation, right? I mean, can you really completely share your intelligence? You know, can you really strategize when you have kind of people that have the direct line open to Moscow or to Washington these days, right? So I think there's a kind of problem of trust basically within existing institutions. Likewise, I'm extremely negative about ideas for a European pillar in NATO. This sounds fantastic on the surface. You have a wonderful machine that actually works and has worked. Why not use that existing machine rather than reinventing the wheel and gradually as the US nicely and politely and in a gradual and coordinated and incremental way calls out, you can fill those blanks with Europeans. I mean, in principle, it is obviously the easiest, the neatest and the most effective solution. But if we're having this conversation, it's because there is indeed the possibility, the probability, if not the certainty, that that US exit is not going to be nice and pretty and coordinated and all the rest of it, then it can really be rather abrupt because it is the scenario of a betrayal, right? And so again, just imagine the conversation within NATO. Can NATO actually have even a conversation about the US pulling out in an uncordenated, abrupt, let's say, adversarial way? No, no, of course, the answer that the US ambassador and he wouldn't be lying, yeah? But the US ambassador there, then that would basically say, of course this is not going to happen, right? But the decision would be above his pay rate. And again, I was sort of very struck recently in another meeting. I was having a kind of conversation with a sort of very senior US general in NATO. We were talking about the fact that indeed Europeans by 2029, 2030 should be ready to fill most of the blanks. And literally the next day, the news came out that the US plans a very significant withdrawal by 2027. Now, I am absolutely certain that he was not lying to me. I just think he just didn't know. (laughs) Right? And so again, can NATO prepare for the US betrayal? No, it can't. Now, the reason why I, at the same time, am positive about an alternative is that, I don't think we're suicidal. I don't think that the majority of European countries and their elected governments today, maybe at some point I will change, but today, I don't think that they are suicidal. And I think that they understand that they need to do something together about this, right? And this is why, and I think we have the resources, as I said, here we are, 30 of the richest countries in the world, right? If you have a critical mass of them, kind of joining together, frankly speaking, also considering that the military threat that we're confronting, i.e. Russia, is not exactly this extraordinary actor. I mean, you know, it has not been able to occupy more than 20% of Ukraine in sort of well over a decade of war, right? So, yes, we can. It's not that difficult. (laughs) I don't wish to sort of, you know, underestimate the complexities, but this is why I come back to the psychology, because I think that most of the problem of, oh, this is so hard, this is so hard, has to do with certain mental blogs and certain kind of knee-jerk reactions and a kind of learned helplessness that has been learned over the course of 80 years, that we basically have to start unlearning. - Now, one of the issues here, when you talk about NATO and NATO, not being able to do this, I think part of the problem is, and I think Alyssa mentioned this, right? NATO has the US-baked in, and attitudes have the US-baked in. But in fact, and when I have some conversations, I have very different conversations with different people in different countries on this, but when you raise the question of, what does a European defense look like without the United States? People agree that it does not look like a defense with the United States, right? It's not a one-for-one replacement of objects and human beings, but I think it is very difficult to somehow combine a French approach to how you do this, with a Spanish approach, with a German approach, and so on and so forth, with an Norwegian approach. But I think it's not that difficult to get an Arctic Baltic approach. And this is some of what we've seen, you talked about the coalition of the willing, but there are other subsets and coalitions, and we've written about this a little bit too, that might form the building blocks of a new order. I mean, how do you think about that as a concept that it's not one new thing? It's a constellation of things that start fitting together over time. Yeah, I actually completely agree with you. I mean, I think that what I would consider to be the core of that coalition of the willing, again, aimed at the Russia threat and the US betrayal/abandonment, necessarily revolves around a Nordic Baltic German and Polish, I would say, core. And once that is in place, and I think actually in many respects, it already is, then you automatically have the French coming in, because nothing on European defence is going to happen without the French. And if the French are in, the Italians are in, and the Spanish are in, and we kind of need to understand this as kind of concentric circles. I was probably, I think, probably one of the few, the actually thought that there was a certain, let me say, not just honesty, but perhaps even justification when Pedro Sanchez basically said, hey, I spent 2% and no more. The reason why I think that is that, I mean, inevitably, geography is going to have a role to play here, right? I mean, if you are on the other side of Europe, and there is no immediate threat to you, yes, obviously solidarity is important, and solidarity means that defence budgets are increasing, and Spain's defence budget has increased rather significantly, in fact, spending 2%, considering that it's growing at 3.8%, you know, a highest growth rate of any OECD country is actually a significant increase in defence spending. That's kind of fine, right? I mean, inevitably, you're going to have Baltic countries spending around 5%, Poland, likewise, you know, if they spend 5, if Germany spends 3.5, and if Italy and Spain spend 2, of course we can defend ourselves, right? There's no question about that. So I think that there is always going to be an element of heterogeneity in all of this, and rather than considering this as sort of insurmountable obstacle, we should actually adapt to it, and see how is it that we can make this work for what the ultimate goal is, which is the defence of Europe. It's interesting because as you were speaking earlier, I was thinking about, you know, you've described the threat as a far-right, but also, where does the leadership come from for a project like this? And what you're describing is more of a snowballing effect, where you wouldn't have one very strong leader, but several in different ways, in different regions. But perhaps that can lead us to the next question, because we can't ignore the conversation about Greenland at the moment, and European leaders have been more forceful in their language around Greenland. As we record this on January 14th, four ministers of Denmark and Greenland are landing in Washington for this very high stakes White House talks with Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and Vice President J.D. Vance. What options do EU leaders realistically have at the moment to deter, to prevent US actions, talking about money, defense, there are a lot of ideas floating out there, but what do you think? So, I mean, I think you rightly use the word deter, and I think that is the word that we should be thinking about. So deterrence rather than attempting to modify. And why do I think that modifying is not a great strategy? I don't think it, because if the US is a attempt to take over Greenland, it's an imperial policy. I mean, this is about colonization. And modification essentially not just vindicates. Yeah, I mean, it kind of really underlines that this is a strategy that's working. So paradoxically, it's that attitude of submission that makes the US want to subjugate. So in a sense, modification is achieving exactly the opposite a goal that we're presumably trying to pursue. So I think modifying is not an option here. Yes, exposing, in a sense, the sort of imperial nature of this project by basically saying, hey, you want to talk about security? Fine, let's talk about security. You want to talk about natural resources? Fine. And if these issues, if once we get into the details of them, actually reveal that this is not the point, because what you want is simply to have Greenland, then I'm exposing the imperial nature of this project, quote, unquote. So I think that diplomatic track aimed at exposing this question for what it is is important. But I think going beyond that, into indeed, the sort of modification achieves exactly the US's coercion that we're trying to avoid. So then the question is, how is it that we can keep our backstraints a little bit more? And here, you know, I mean, there are plenty of ideas. The question is whether we have the guts to pursue them. Denmark could ask for an increased presence of NATO troops, including the US's, of course, a Greenland, but including other European countries. So that would be one set that could be taken, which presumably would reduce the likelihood of those US troops actually making an aggressive move and therefore running the risk of all the problems. Although, of course, they would quote, quote, "win," were they to confront Europeans, but there would be a cost and even attempting a political certainly cost and even attempting that route. So that would be something, another sort of, you know, that there would be signaling of basically saying, "Were you to do this?" Actually, other European countries could counsel contracts with US defense companies. They could actually gently invite the US to leave bases in Europe. Now, you would then reply to me, "But not for you, this is against European interests." Well, is it? This would be acting on the recognition that the US is no longer an ally. So you only want US presence in Europe if it increases your security. If all of a sudden you realize that it's reducing your security, what's the point of having those US troops? Particularly, I'm thinking about not so much troops present in Eastern Europe because there there is obviously the whole Russia angle, but think about US bases in my own country, Italy or Spain. These are actually bases that are primarily in the interests of the United States. They would not be able to do what they have done over decades in the Middle East, for example, and what we may be about to see again soon in Iran, were it not for the military capacities which are hosted in southern European countries? So this would be a real problem for the United States. So that's a second, a kind of line of reasoning. And then of course, there's the economic instruments that in the case of trade, we chose not to use, but those instruments are there, the anti-coefficient instrument. So as I even save this, do I think that we're going to do this? I'm not sure, yeah, but it's not because we don't have these instruments, it's not because this is not materially possible, but it's because it would require, even probably amongst the three of us here having this conversation, a switch of the mindset of basically saying, "You know what, fuck it, yes we can." Right? Which we really struggle to make. So we have to shift mindsets in Europe because the United States is unreliable. We've already had to shift them because the Russians are dangerous or more dangerous than people thought. You have both the US and the Russians thinking, "Hey, smears of influence are a good way to organize the world." And also we have this lack of fitness for new purposes of the institutions that exist in Europe. So what does this do to multilateralism institutions, the OSCE, all of these things that were also built in a different time? Do we chuck them as well? And if we chuck them, do they replace them? Is Europe in the world limited to these building blocks, muddling through approaches? Or is there still space for these bigger concepts? - So I think all you have to that we need to really focus our minds on why and how this moment is different compared to the past. Because of course there have been many instances in which institutions were not particularly effective. I mean, this is in the sense the entire history of the UN Security Council with very rare exceptions. There have been plenty of instances in which international law was violated. There have been plenty of moments of hypocrisy and double standards and all the rest of it. So this has happened before. What has not happened before in the same way is not the violation of norms and the ignoring of institutions. It is the fact that the United States is unrecognizing these laws and these institutions. This I think is categorically different because it's not a story of double standards. Double standards assumes that there are standards and double standards assume that there are violations in some cases and non-violations in others. I think there's a fundamental difference between, for example, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, showing up at the UN Security Council in 2003 lying, I mean, providing false evidence on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, basically couching an intervention through the prism of democracy promotion. So of course that was all a lie. And eventually that UN Security Council resolution was not forthcoming and the US in any case attacked Iraq. But there's a fundamental difference between that, not even trying to get a UN Security Council resolution. My ignoring the institution altogether, there's a fundamental difference between not respecting judgments and opinions of, for instance, the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice and sanctioning those institutions, right? Bravo been sanctioning the perpetrators of crime, sanctioning the International Criminal Court itself, right? So there's a moment of direct attack, not just violation, direct attack on those laws, on those institutions, which I think is unprecedented. So firstly, I think it's important to really kind of recognize what is different about this moment and therefore come to the conclusion that if we are to salvage something up until when the US remains the way it is now. So having made the transition from being the at times, slightly assertive, but nonetheless, global policemen that operated within certain rules, being the global gangster that basically operates with no rules at all, right? So if we recognize that, then the question is, how do the others, quote unquote, try and operate within frameworks of institutions and laws and norms and all the rest of it? And there, I think that, you know, this is basically the whole chapter in which there is a lot more to be done and a lot more attention to be paid to what Europe and the quote unquote global South could be doing. In some respects, it is happening. I mean, I think again, if we are to look at snippets of kind of hope and optimism, we would point to the fact that if today we have an EU medical surdeal, it is precisely because the US, this is the product of the old Trump. There's no way in hell that Europeans would have accepted to move forward on Mercosuun, had it not been for Donald Trump, yeah? If there is scope for finalizing an agreement with Mexico with finalizing an agreement with India, with opening a discussion with the comprehensive and progressive trans-Pacific partnership, it is because Trump is what he is. But I think, you know, beyond trade, there is a lot more that I think we could and should be doing in terms of establishing principled partnerships with countries in the global South and countries than what we could think of as the rest of the West, right? I mean, the sort of Japan's and Canada's and Australia's ever this world. So I actually think that we're only going to be able to do this if we actually recognize just how different this particular moment is as far as the US's attempt at not as they said just violating, but tearing down the old order. What do you see as the biggest risks in that? Where are the biggest gaps, for example, you know, we focus on, you know, we're watching the Ukraine negotiations very closely in discussions around, I don't know, a US monitoring role, which I'm not even sure the US is capable of doing, but, you know, in other venues, a conflict there has been a role for the UN, for the OCE, for the African Union, for these multilateral institutions to make sure that peace sticks. Is that one of the bigger risks? Where do you see the biggest gaps now for collective action? So I think that it may be interesting to sort of look at the difference between the model that we have been focusing on Europe and, for instance, what the Gulf countries and Turkey, to an extent, have been doing in the Middle East. Now, in both regions, there is a recognition that obviously the US has been the kind of prime player yet. But it seems to me that there is greater readiness in the Middle East and in particular amongst the Gulf countries to understand that, again, you know, without poking the US and the I, but there needs to be far greater regional ownership. And, fine, you know, if you can then, you know, sort of, if you want to portray, there's a Trump win, fine, you could do that, but I don't think that Gulf countries, for example, are under any illusion whatsoever, that, you know, this is something that they can simply delegate to the United States. And coming back to sort of Europe, again, I think, you know, there's that element of acknowledging that we don't, our prime objective should not be that of keeping the US in. Our prime objective should be living with the US being out. Right? So, and I think one can make this argument for different world regions. I mean, I think, you know, sort of perhaps a final reflection on multilateralism. I think we have already been moving into a world in which it is only a more, in a sense, regionalized multilateralism. And, you know, we were talking about coalitions of the willing. I think you could make this argument at the global level as well. It's about global coalitions of the willing, both at regional level and [BLANK_AUDIO] level, again, you know, to sort of pick on an example, on an issue that we haven't touched on the tour climate, yeah. It is those coalitions between, for example, you know, European countries, which still, despite the Green Lash and a group of countries from the south, you know, then we saw this, it did failed in Bilem, but it was constituted basically in Bilem, of kind of trying to keep up the level of ambition on climate action, for example. So I think both regionally and globally, given that we're in this kind of messy moment of transition, we should probably be understanding international and multilateral cooperation more flexibly through different forms of coalitions of the willing. And as I said, ways that both reflect the uncertainty of this shift in the international system while at the same time trying to sort of salvage norms and rules to the extent possible. So thank you Natalie, we're out of time, but I actually feel marginally more optimistic ending this conversation that I felt going into it. You know, the king is dead long, long love the king, right? The older order is dead, long live the emerging order, but thank you very much for joining us. Thank you has been real pleasure. For more from Natalie, you can follow her on X and Blue Sky at Natalie Tochi and check out her work on the IA website as well as her regular column in the garden. You can find more of our own work on European security, the global response to US actions in Venezuela, US rhetoric on Greenland and so on and so forth on our website, crisisgroup.org. You can follow crisis group and Alyssa and me on social media as well. Crisis group is @crisisgroup on X and Blue Sky. Alyssa is @peeDecard of those places and I'm @bolyaholiker only on Blue Sky. Thanks to our producer Aboujard Koujini and our coordinator, Hi Koujshog. And of course our biggest thanks to you are listeners. If you have any thoughts or suggestions, email us at [email protected] and don't forget to leave us a review and subscribe to War and Peace wherever you get your podcasts. We will be back with a new episode in a few weeks but until then goodbye. Goodbye.