Breaking Down the US-Iran MOU (feat. Robert Greenway)

(upbeat music) - Welcome back to The Ron Breakdown. I'm your host, Mark Dubewitz. It's sure been an interesting week in terms of a Ron policy with the signing of the Memorand and Understanding between the United States and Ron. I'm going to introduce you to Rob Greenway, who's an American National Security expert. He's a former US Army Special Forces Officer and intelligence professional in diplomat. Best known for his role in shaping Middle East policy during the President Trump's first administration. He's going to help us understand the MOU. He's going to understand the arc of President Trump's or Ron policy. What could come next if there is a final agreement if there's not a final agreement? Rob is former deputy assistant of the president and senior director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council from 2018 to 2021, where he was the senior White House official, responsible for coordinating US policy across the Middle East and North Africa. Part of that he was a senior intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency before joining the NSE. He's a combat veteran of the US Army Special Forces with more than three decades of military intelligence and nationalist security experience. Rob is widely regarded as one of the principal architects of the Abraham Accords, which normalizes relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. He played a leading role in developing and implementing the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign against Ron, including major economic sanctions and broader regional strategy. He previously served at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, Think Tank, and is now the senior vice president of American global strategies. This is the Iran breakdown, so let's break it down. Rob Greenway, thank you for joining me. My great pleasure, always good to be with you more. So Rob, I mentioned to this before we started recording, I am so pleased to see you because I feel like an emotional and psychological level, I needed Rob Greenway in my presence. For the reason that I have been surrounded since the MOU was announced by people with their hair on fire. And I think it's coming from people who obviously are horrified by what they see in the MOU. But also I think it's coming from people on the other side who are horrified that anybody would criticize what was in the MOU. So having you here, always thoughtful, always analytically serious to help not only peel away the MOU, but also take a step back from the actual agreement and maybe talk a little bit about the arc that got us there. So why don't we start there? Let's step back. I mean, you were in the first Trump administration. You were in charge of Middle East policy. You've been working on the Iran issue in the White House. You've been the military. I've served our country with honor and distinction for decades. Tell us a little bit about the arc of President Trump's Iran strategy where we've been, where we are today and we'll talk about where we're going. Sure, I'm happy to do it and it's a pleasure to do it. You know, it's probably the first time I've heard anybody say, really, I'm glad I'm talking to you today so that you can help us wage my concerns normally. It's the opposite usually when I show up, something terrible has happened. So I'm glad to perform a service. I hope at the end of this, it'll be a worthwhile to you. I think it is important to step back almost always. Like the benefit that you and I have having studied at this problem in particular and the roller coaster ride is perspective. And I think it's important to keep things in perspective. And I think it helps get to sound judgment-siled. Thanks, give you a better ability to project what's going to happen in the future without being surprised. So I think it's unlikely that the person that did what we, I think, all have rightly celebrated this past six months, really, the last two years and the first administration. I think it's radically unlikely that we're somehow going to find him pulling a complete 180 and occupying a different position that's going to compromise what we all believe to be his landmark achievements and successes, which he louts at every opportunity and rightly so. So I think it's highly unlikely that we're going to see a reversal in position in a compromise of US principles or a sacrifice of US or Israeli security or regional stability as a result of all of this. I think it's highly unlikely to happen. And it's not my read on events. Although I understand the interpretation of the MOU in the last couple days explanations of it, I understand where you could land objectively at criticisms of the text, of the agreement, and even the way that it's been described, I totally understand it. However, I judge that, again, that president has been and continues to be remarkably consistent, and has always landed on a place that advances US interests in ways that other US presidents have been reluctant to do. Well, let's talk about that. Yeah, because specifically on Iran, I mean, you served in the first term on doing Iran policy. I mean, the first term was obviously President Trump withdrawing from the JCPO in 2018, re-imposing a or imposing, I would argue, for the first time really a policy of maximum pressure. So serious sanctions, killing custom solo money. No president was willing to do that. And I think we should drink to that. Well, I think we should drink to that. Given how many Americans he killed and named, I think obviously President Trump did, did America and the world of service by getting rid of solo money. And by the way, I think it is worth noting that if solo money was still alive, I question whether we would have had many of the successes we've had against Iran because as much as he was a terrorist and a murderer, I think it was also Iran's most competent and perhaps even brilliant battlefield commander and having eliminated him in Trump's first term, I think laid the predicate for everything that has come since. You would agree with that. Oh, no question. I'd also say too that his position was unique because of the time that he spent the credibility he built up, his competence was certainly part of it. He occupied a unique position and could circumvent the system such as it was and no longer is in the way that Iran makes his decisions. And so the chief of the armed forces general staff arguably now occupies a position, commensurate with the position as intended, but the solo money had the ability to cut through that and go directly to the supreme leader and did. And independently so without coordination and that had lots of impacts on how Iran responded to and in many cases escalated or provoked situations and absent all of that in him, it's a different system altogether. So you would agree, I think you would agree that on October 7th, 2023, the Islamic Republic was perhaps at the zenith of its power that in fact it had built up deadly capabilities, missile nuclear proxy capabilities. I mean, it had benefited through the Biden administration that really reversed the maximum pressure campaign that you guys had imposed. And then most of Iran's actual nuclear expansion, if you actually look at the details and we have an FDD occurred after the election of President Biden 'cause I think the Islamic Republic I think rightly assessed that Biden wasn't prepared to use all instruments of American power and in fact, Rahm Ali, the Iran envoy was trying to persuade the president to go back into the JCPOA and providing huge sanctions relief. So President Trump inherits this situation for four years of Biden. Assess from October 7th to 2023 to today and the release of the MOU, what the president has gotten right and also maybe what he's gotten wrong. I think you're right. I would agree with the premise that Iran in many respects was at its apogee. I would also say it's a stark contrast to where I would judge their ethnicity or now from an economic, from a military perspective from a nuclear enrichment standpoint. Although a moving target, they have not, as you've identified, been at a place where they have not had an enrichment capacity since 2006. So they have up to this point been able to and no longer do. So I think that's important. I also think it's important because in my estimation, President Trump has been remarkably consistent on Iran in the first and the second administration. And I think that's important. The guidance to us and to me has always been from him the too pronged approach to Iran into the Middle East as a whole. And that is one, we will confront our adversaries and two, we'll support our partners in all aspects. As a practical matter, what that meant to us is the destruction of the ISIS Caliphate, which was an issue in 2017 and '18, addressed satisfactorily and Baghdaddi was the culmination of the destruction of the physical Caliphate. But then beyond that was confronting Iran, which resulted in, among other things, maximum pressure in the withdrawal from our participation in the JCPOA. And that was the consistent destructive component of it, dealing with ISIS and dealing with Iran. His priorities always. The second part of it was building up our partners and allies, which was also sort of two pronged effort. One is to increase their capability capacity and two is integrate Israel more effectively in the region, which among other things became the Abraham Accords. But it also included a lesser, I think, known and should be resurrected concept of creating a new enduring regional security architecture in the region, which would ultimately include Israel. Those two things we're going to intersect. So those two prongs were consistent and his approach to Iran in my judgment has always been remarkably consistent. And I say that because those that are struggling with the current MOU and the approach and diplomatic perspective and the actions taken over the last two years and in fact, the first term, what I would point out to you is I don't judge the president as somehow now reversing his position. In fact, I don't judge that he's going to be in any way inconsistent on it. And I at least at any rate, don't expect that to be the case. Okay. But let's deal with the criticism. Yeah. I mean, let's start with the criticism of the president's decision to use military force against Iran. Right? Obviously he didn't use military force against the regime in the first term Trump with the exception of killing Soleimani as we noted, which was a significant achievement. but he made the decision with both Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury. for the first time in US history to use military force against the regime. And the criticism is, I think, less, it's more muted about midnight hammer. It was 12-day war, came on the heels of a successful Israeli attack, B2 bombers, mass awards, penetrators, significant damage, obviously, to Fordot and Tisfahan, to Natanz. And it was a short war. Iranians seem to have limited capabilities in terms of response. And I think even some Democrats would gradually admit that it was a pretty good success for the president. Obviously the criticism is about the 38-day war in 2026. And many on the left, and some on the right as well, thought that was a war of choice unnecessary. Plan badly communicated worse and is resulted in a strategic victory for the Islamic Republic. You want to address the decision to go to war? What do you think the predicate was to go to war? Go to legitimate predicate? And also acknowledge if you think there are any mistakes made in going to war. Sure. First, in my judgment, it's not a war. It's a punitive expedition. And the distinction matters, in my view, in the sense that Iran really, we can't go to war with the country that can't fight back. Iran didn't fight back, you can't fight back. It was also cards to begin with the president exposed it, but with Israeli cooperation. And I'll also give, again, credit where credit is due. President Trump's the one that made the decision to integrate Israel into the U.S. Central Command, which allowed for far greater and more efficient integrated air defense, but also coordinated defensive operation. The culmination of which was the defensive attacks under the Biden administration, enabled by their participation in Senkhan. But now, offensively, in what we've seen in the last two years. And I think that matters. And again, a consistent reflection of the president's decisions and thinking on this. And again, I don't judge it to be a war because Iran didn't have the capacity to fight back. I'm certainly not against us. And so the decision, I think, also incidentally, was probably the last conversation I had with the president of the First Administration was on the subject, basically walking through what happened in Min Nite, Amber, and what has happened since. And determining, you know, what is the core, what course did he want to take in the waning days of his first administration? What I would say is that ultimately the judgment, then and now is, you know, the degree to which the threat is advanced from the first administration where he left it, had gotten to the point where, as you know, and have well documented better than anyone, along with David Albright in his team, that the degree to which Iran has made progress towards a testable device. And I think the right judgment was that there was no diplomatic or economic solution left available to us. And that day, I've gotten so far advanced and close to the breakout period of having a testable device, perhaps even a deployable device. And I think we need to recognize that the United States is track record on anticipating a partner ally or adversary obtaining a nuclear weapon is a 100% and is 100% wrong. And being humble about that and recognizing that they are so far close to it and that a record is just imperfect that the, an economic and diplomatic solution was no longer viable and military force became necessary. And so I think it's completely defendable. I'm not going to argue the communication side of it, that's somebody else's business. I'm not going to argue perceptions because they're not mine. All I'll say is the decision in my mind is completely defendable and completely logical. In addition, you know, we heard that the argument was made that there was an attempt planned for Iran to preempt and to launch an offensive strike. And in many ways, the initial response was decided to deter that. My knowledge of the Iranian problem in confidence is such that I have no question that that was true. And that again, that judgment is also sound. But again, I'll leave that to be debated by others. In my mind, in my judgment, in 2020, we had really lost an economic and diplomatic ability to resolve this issue. That only the military option was viable. And again, I think under the circumstances, the only verifiable inspections that work with Iran are explosive. All right. So Iran is not capable of taking on the United States and Israel and certainly the combined forces or defending themselves or defending themselves. But to give credit where credit is due, they played the one card they had. They played it at a point where they were weak and desperate. But they seem to have been quite successful in playing this card. And that's the Hormuz card. Now, Rob, I know you've had lots of experience in the years in the US military and the US government. I'm sure you weren't surprised that Iran played the Hormuz card. And I'm sure you would tell those who say that the US military had no plan to deal with Hormuz, that they don't know what they're talking about. This is something that the US military and Sencom in particular has been working on for years. What's your assessment of that decision by Iran? I think I want to then sort of segue into the choice that was before the president in recent weeks and his decision to choose diplomacy over fighting the battle of Hormuz militarily. Yeah. To offer that the military didn't have a plan for any given eventuality is a little bit misguided. It's one thing the organization does exhaustively and comprehensively. We've been dealing with the potential closure of the straights Hormuz really since the Carter doctrine 79. But I would say you can go back probably to Suez when we started to look at strategic choke points and create formal plans for this. But certainly after praying, Manus and ever since there's been a formal recognition of that capacity. I'll say though that the prioritization of a closure and a US response to it has ebbed and float over time and has probably waned in the last 10 to 15 years. And so is our capability capacity to deal with it in the one way that Iran physically could in fact close and that's by mining it. They didn't they could have but they were denied the ability to do it and didn't. And so they never really had the ability to close the straights and they certainly didn't in this evolution physically in military. Right. They did in fact convince insurance markets that it wasn't worth their while and then shippers of course make a decision that it wasn't worth the cost associated with it. But they never physically close the straight. The only method available to them wasn't taken because it was denied them and that was the mining had they done it. It would have been a much more difficult problem to solve. In the end they have the ability to sporadically target targets with Chinese variant and as you cruise missiles as the who these do in the Bobo Mende. That's not a closure. That's a disruption and that still exists to a certain extent. That's the battle that remains and then the choices to pursue this diplomatically or to militarily or to military options. I would have you know counsel and advocated as I'm sure the department did that those options existed and were available to the president. There may have been a calculation as to whether the time and the costs associated would be worth the outcome. In my judgment, this is a problem for which there is a military solution. I think at the president continued the campaign. I think this problem would have been eliminated. They would no longer have the capacity to do it. And I think still that option is available to the president and I would judge something in the four to six week range would eliminate the viable threat. But again calculations may differ. I think the choice to do to pursue a diplomatic option is something I think the president will be sensitive to if he thinks it's viable. The president of course will always talk about his proclivity and his ability to make deals. And I think it's been proven to be correct. And I've witnessed it and it is formidable. And I could understand why the president would want to pursue a diplomatic solution if it's available. And now I think the question remains whether or not pursuing a diplomatic option is going to prove viable long term. Now in my own judgment, I don't think it's possible to pursue a diplomatic arrangement with Iran for any number of reasons. One they have no, this won't be the first time they ever comply or attempt to comply with a negotiated settlement. And I don't think their interests will allow them to. I also think the fractured nature of the command and control and the regime as it is now prevents enforcement even if that was a decision that decided to make. So I think for a lot of reasons, I think we'll find that the diplomatic solution perhaps worthy of the intent is going to fall far short. And I think in the end they're not going to comply. I don't expect will have to comply with our portion of the diplomatic agreement. So that's very interesting. I want to get back to the MOU because I get a sense from you that you think ultimately the MOU will be overtaken by events and may already be overtaken by events. And this is the actual provisions are less material than many people are suggesting. But I want to go back to the battle for her moves because I think one of the un, some respects unwritten stories or at least unheralded stories is the job that Amor Bradley Cooper did, Commander Sancom and the US military, and very quietly without a lot of fanfare. Moving tankers through Hormuz, particularly hugging the coastline of Oman, getting on average. I mean, again, the numbers are kind of all over the place, but maybe it's five, six million barrels a day. Through the strait, the five to six million barrels a day, maybe even more maybe eight million barrels a day that the Saudis and the Emirates were moving through pipelines. Obviously that helped with a collapse in Chinese demand, about six million barrels a day. But about 50% was moving through. And if you can include the Chinese barrels, maybe close to 80% was moving through. So, why do you think the president decided not to give the green light for Amel Cooper to really expand and intensify that operation? Can you speculate or is there anything that you've seen that would suggest to a higher price would take too long and maybe would push up against other political and diplomatic timelines? My sense is, and it's speculative because I don't have insight into this decision in particular. My sense is that the uncertainty on the one hand, unpredictable outcome, which is always the case in any conflict, this would be no exception. I think the other is the cost in terms of munitions already significant inventory issues heading into epic fury. Now they've been depleted even further. That obviously places constraints on us and the defense and industrial base, which has to expand. At a time, we're seeking to expand our inventory and production capacity. We're also depleting critical inventories of precision munitions. I think that was also contributing to the concern. Then I honestly, I believe in contrast to that, and the other side of the scale is the president judge that there was, in fact, a short, if not a long-term, potential to achieve a dip-max solution because of the position he had put around it. Because I think weighing all those facts, I think the judgment was it's worth a shot at doing. It's worth an attempt. I think in the overall calculations are not near-term. I think he's also looking at this in a little bit of a longer term perspective. I think his mind is well beyond 60 days, and I think he's looking to the end of at least his term, and the damage that he has imposed on him. I think in his calculation, he has more time to deal with this problem. He has the luxury of dealing with a completely decimated opponent who is desperate and rightly so. I think he views that leverage as being worth pursuing a diplomatic option because the cost and the unpredictability associated with it is not insignificant. I want to get to that because I want to look over the horizon beyond the MOU. I think it's very important to do that, but I want to look at the MOU. What is your overall assessment of the 14 provisions? We certainly don't need to go provision by provision. I was on the Arama claims wonderful podcast, School of War a couple days ago, and we literally went provision by provision. I have a feeling that we got to provisions seven and half the audience that already dropped off because it can get a little bit mind numbing. But without going provision by provision, what's your overall assessment of that agreement? Well, I'd encourage everybody. I listened to it this morning. I encourage everybody to do the same and find myself sympathetic to your arguments in there. My sense of the MOU is it was designed to achieve a very specific purpose. It was designed to get an agreement to relieve the economic pressure associated with the closure of the straight and to open the door for subsequent negotiations and give Iran the theoretical chance despite the insane odds against it that there is, in fact, a diplomatic path that's available given the position he's put them in knowing that they are in an incredibly decimated position and there is time. It's not 2015 where we're dealing with a program that's accelerating. We're dealing with a military that's ascended and growing and capacity and capability and a network of circus and proxies administered by a far more capable hands. That's not the case today. So I think the president's calculation was the MOU was designed to get to that point. And that like all frameworks, the frameworks are subject to both interpretation and a great deal of compliance. As the vice president talked about today and the president did from France and from Switzerland, it's contingent upon compliance. And again, if you look at what the president has done and you look at past behaviors indicating of what we're likely to see in the future, I don't think we're likely to see President Trump giving the Iranians a tremendous amount of latitude on non-compliance and getting rewards for it. Right. But if you look at the provisions and I think this is what people are getting really hung out by, I mean, if the assumption is that this will never be implemented, that Iran will not comply with it. It's almost a diplomatic faint in order to buy time, come energy markets, get the price of oil down, get the price of gasoline down, put the president in a strong position or stronger position ahead of midterms so the Republicans can keep Congress and that the president is going to deal with this after the midterms. So effectively he needs four months, four or five months to get him there. And so you negotiate an MOU, you backload most of the issues, you frontload the ones that involve opening up or moves. And that kind of is the idea that this really is never going to be amount to much. And I guess each of the 14 provisions matters less. The flip side of that argument is, but Mark that might be true, but not every provision in there is backloaded. Some of them are frontloaded. And the frontloaded provisions are the ones that everybody's getting really concerned about. And I guess specifically those are in no particular order. The sanctions relief, allowing Iran to sell its oil, the access to the $100 billion in frozen assets that Iran can get some kind of access to and we can talk about what that actually means. The Lebanon provision, which seems to at least on paper, maybe not in practice, grants Iran a veto right over Israel's ability to deal with his bala. And the president's rhetoric around this over the past few days has supported an interpretation of that provision that I think a lot of Americans and I think particularly Israelis would find troubling. If you look at the provisions and Rob, you know the provisions as well as anybody, are there any there that concern you more and are there others that really concern you less? Sure. Yeah. And I think we share these, right? So those you've mentioned and others, including the time provision on the potential for exposing or imposing costs on transit through the streets and cooperation with Oman. But setting that aside, the most concerning are the liberation of assets that are blocked and frozen within US and broader jurisdiction with which we have control and influence. The second would be relief from primary and secondary sanctions associated with the sale of not just oil, petrochemicals, metals, right? There's all their major exports, four out of five, accepting agricultural. It's serious money that's required to resurrect a military and nuclear program that have been completely decimated by this president. Again, unlikely that he's going to allow them to rebuild what he spent a fair bit of resources and time of political capital to destroy. I don't see it. And so I can understand the interpretation where that could be at risk. And I think in the hands of someone else, I would be more concerned. I'm not because I think in each case, I don't judge the president is inclined to do it. I also don't think the Iranians are inclined to comply long enough to allow satisfaction of any of those provisions. And there's enough room for interpretation. Lebanon's a good example of that. Where on the one hand, you'd say it's a success as you argued, I think, rightly with Aaron on the podcast that Iran managed to get it in there at all, where it was not really in the JCPOA at all. I would argue too, though, that that's probably an area where noncompliance is going to prevent compliance on the US side of it. Because an action taken against Israel is going to result in a requisite action, whether anyone likes it or proves it really a material, the reality is it will happen. And that the result is you're going to get a non-compliant environment, which allows the United States to say, I'm sorry, you're not compliant. And we had a ceasefire in New Island. Yeah, I mean, I remind folks that even the Biden administration's ceasefire actually gave Israel quite a lot of leeway to respond to attacks by his bala, by to imminent threats from his bala. And in fact, the IDF was quite successful, even during the ceasefire and its implementation at continuing to severely degrade his bala's capabilities. I would guess the president of the United States doesn't want to go to the left of Biden on the his bala issue. And he hasn't. Right. I mean, we obviously look at circumstances alone and we don't have to speculate. We can judge what the president has done consistently in. And despite what he says only occasionally, Israel has had absolutely no limitations on the spillage respond whatsoever. And I expect they will not. And instead of hampering or impeding their ability, which the United States says the ability to do Biden demonstrated this so did Obama, you'll see the opposite. You'll see rapid repositioning of assets and resources made available to Israel to continue what they're doing. Now, you know the president, you worked for the president, you briefed the president. The rhetoric in recent days around Israel and around his bala and Lebanon, what do you make of that? I think that's what's really concerning people. They look at the text, they're concerned that Lebanon is already in there. Yeah. Then they hear the president and he's blasting Prime Minister Nanyah who he's blasting the IDF. And he seems to be at least rhetorically. I'm not going to say siding with because I think that's an overstatement, but I think he seems to be a little less hostile to the regime in Iran's position on the his bala issue. That's fair. Sure. Well, the way I would interpret it is this is, this is language targeted for purpose. It's not intended for an Israeli audience. It's not even really intended to so much for an American audience. It's intended for a variety of audience because what he's attempting to get is compliance and agreement with the proposition. And that's the goal and objective. And I think to that end, you could argue that that language could help support. the goal and the objective. Again, our private conversations reflective of that, despite, again, reports to the contrary, in my experience, the president has been more than supportive of Israel's actions taken to defense itself. So I don't put. I think that is undeniable. I mean, I think I'm trying to remind people here and abroad that yes, there are rhetorical flights of fancy that are concerning, but that if you look at the president's support for Israel, first term and second term, it is undeniable that he has been most supportive of Israel, of any president, at least in my memory and perhaps in modern American history. So one has to keep that perspective, though, of course, pro-Trump's rhetoric can sometimes get people highly concerned. Sure. And others too, I'd have to say, some of the responses you get from different quarters in response to his rhetoric also are probably almost certainly unhelpful in many instances. But we are in silly season right now. I always remind people, selection season in Israel, selection season in America. Why don't we know how to do it in the same season as well? Yeah, but you're absolutely right. And then I think that perspective is completely right. And I also have the benefit of experiencing this. And I've seen, in the first administration, comments made that will ruffle feathers in one hand and then take an action in his direction that are more consistent with what we've seen in reality. And I suspect that's exactly what's happening now. Israel is going to be rearmed and re-equipped at record pace and they're going to be enabled in substantive ways and supported by the United States to take all action necessary. And while he may comment about taking out an apartment building in response, you know, Israel's taken over 2,500 missiles and drones during the current ceasefire. There's no sympathy. Nor is there, I think, any genuine intent for them to stop doing it. I think there's probably more healthy respect for that than anything else. Yeah. And I'm sure appreciation by President Trump and many, including the military, for the fact that Israel has been eliminating his ball of tariffs who've killed and maimed and tortured and kidnapped Americans. Duk-duk, you know, just the latest in the litany of this they should get, you know, we should be sending them, you know, we support them tremendously. But that alone, I think, deserves special mention just because the American blood, the five killed in Carbola in particular executed as a result of Duk-duk in his training of Kitab is well special, but times it deserves special notice. They've done tremendous work and in support of the United States with American blood on their hands. No question. The president knows that. Well, let's dig a little bit into the money because the benefit of having you here, an expert on military issues, on nuclear issues, on missile, on sanctions, you really are the complete package on this. And I think when people look at the provisions, I think the worst case interpretation of it is, Iranians can sell their oil and let's say it's two million barrels a day, which was with their average before the war started at $75 per barrel. And it's about $5 billion a month. So that's about $10 billion worth of oil over 60 days. If they got market value and they never do. Right. Okay. So I want to sort of just lay out the worst case. So again, market value. And it's $5 million a month, $10 billion over two months. Let's say this runs five months to just after midterms as $25 billion. So the worst case interpretation of this is Iran is getting $25 billion. No discounts for the buyers. And Iran is getting access to all $25 billion in repatriated funds or in money that they can use for trade. And we are effectively paying Iran a $25 billion toll to open or moves for five months in order to get oil flowing. That would, I'd say, would be the worst interpretation. If you add it to that, again, the worst interpretation, they're getting access to $100 billion in frozen assets. And all of that might need is going to be freely available, accessible and repatriated back to the Iranians. That would mean they'd have $125 billion of sanctions relief over the course of a few months, which is a huge financial windfall for this regime. And would be stripping the president of the very leverage he needs to actually negotiate a final agreement that meets his minimum demands on the nuclear side. And if he doesn't negotiate that final agreement, he would have given them $125 billion gift that he can take back. Okay, so that would be the worst case interpretation of those provisions. What's your interpretation? Yeah, well, for context, right, to put the numbers in some sense of perspective, the Iranian defense budget, near its apogee and consistent probably the last 10, 15 years defense budget is about $50 billion a year. There are fluctuations to that. There are some specific provisions that go to the IRGC in an indirect way, but that's a ballpark number that largely became inflated because of the GACB way. The larger the degree to which, as you know, the access they have to resources just indicates the degree to which they're going to spend that all the things that we don't want. It never goes to the places where you think they'd spend it or we would think they should spend it. It always goes to the places that harm our interests. Yeah, by the way, the first year after the GACB, the IRGC's budget, as I recall, increased by 90%. Yeah, exactly right. Good indication of what you're saying. 100% right. You can count on it like death in taxes. The degree to which they have access to resources will only go to the places that threaten our interest. It's just a certainty. And so to put it perspective, $50 billion dollars is your annual defense budget. You can imagine then what they could do with money like that, which in American context doesn't sound like a lot these days based on what we spend for lots of things. But for the Iranians, it's a tremendous windfall that is a grave threat to us. Now, having said that, the way I look at this is, and from a policy perspective, I always tend to view this as concentric circles and concentric circles in the sense that the first outer ring of this is compliance. And so my interpretation of circumstances, inclusive of the MOU is that without compliance, you get nothing. And that's been stated a couple of times, but you can quibble and debate, I think rightly with the language as its phrase. But in my view, that's the first concentric circle. And so if you don't pass that, you don't have access to anything. Now, if that's true, then the next concentric circle is, you don't have direct access to the funds themselves. So even if you sell, right, as has has occasionally been the case in the past, you might get your goods to China, but you can't repatriate the cash because we would penalize China, let alone Iran. And so without carveouts and in piracy, let's just say that China loved this deal because then it meant they were dealing in barter goods. It was goods and services that would go back the other way, China loved it. And the fact, I think they'd prefer that in perpetuity. And so no dollars and no euros, importantly, not even Ren Minbi would get back to Tehran. But that's the second concentric circle is no direct access to actual liquid cash that could be used. So you deal with assets in barter. You can't misuse that too much. The next concentric circle was, okay, you can have access to it, but it has restrictions. This includes, but not limited to escrow accounts and other mechanisms that have been established, that prevent them to have direct access or uncontrolled access. The next concentric circle, you know, after that, again, assuming we get this far is then, you know, some sort of oversight over the degree to which they have access to the resources. But I don't think we're going to get past the first concentric circle. Like, I don't think we ever get to the point in which they're complying. So I think we're going to have plenty of justification to never give them anything, really, other than probably export. But I think the next concentric circle will hold in that we won't allow them access to cash. Now, if that turns out to not be the case, then everyone who's been critical of it, then has justifiable has cost to do so. Now, it's also important to note that even if they have access to the dollar amounts you've mentioned, they're not going to be able to do a whole hell of a lot between now and the end of the year, in which case the president potentially has greater flexibility to deal with the Iranian threat. And certainly, even within the second two years, the last of his second administration, he will have the ability to prevent them from really resurrecting anything of note. And they will still be completely defenseless in the process of doing it and we'll rebuild capacity between now and then. So in my judgment, there are too many concentric circles that I don't expect Iran is going to allow that are going to provide the justification for them to have access to that kind of money. Yeah, that makes sense. I mean, if I were steelman, the administration's case here, I would say that we're going to allow them to sell their oil, but not monetize it. Correct. The sale of the oil with whatever discounts are applied, the money will collect in accounts. The Iranians will not be able to access for either repatriation or for buying barter goods. The money in China, which will be both this oil, that new oil, that is sold and the bulk of the $100 billion in frozen assets. Again, the Iranians will have limited ability to use that money to buy Chinese goods. By the way, I do worry about Chinese goods, Rob, like precursor chemicals for rebuilding solid fuel, missiles, and manpads and Chinese air defense systems. You can imagine the things that none of which helped them with the exception of those things that supported solid propellants in particular, supported the offensive missile program, the air defense side of it, nothing helped. There's nothing I think in the Chinese Russian inventory that are going to help or that they're willing to provide at the advance end of it. And I think it's an important point to note in all of this, broader context is one of the most important things about the conversation with Iran and Venezuela I would add is the president's thinking on this is these things are in an isolation. The message really is control of global markets, US control global markets with our partners in in order to restrict the revenue that Moscow can generate from oil sales and second to restrict China's ambitions being completely dependent upon them. Those at a strategic level are probably the most important in the competition with Iran and with Venezuela and both explained and I think provide greater ration offered actions taking against both. Okay, here's I think what gives me some heartburn is when I see administration officials coming out and speaking in ways that are echoes of Barack Obama and John Kerry and Wendy Sherman with 2015 and what I mean specifically by that is not a technical argument about cutting off all pathways to nuclear weapons when indeed the Obama administration didn't do that and Sanctuary's leaf will be limited and reversible, which of course it wasn't. But this whole sort of I think American conceit, which I think to be fair, many presidents have had it, not just about Iran, that we can kind of seduce the hard men of Tehran and Moscow and Beijing and Pyongyang by flooding them with cash and turn them into responsible global stakeholders where they will abandon their ambitions and in the case of Iran will no longer be a geodess theocratic state. But by making them rich, you will make them pragmatic. Now when I hear administration officials talk like that, I worry because I think there's just just view that we're all material boys and girls and Americans, shift money, prosperity, a good life, you'll abandon your ideology. By the way, Americans, we have an abandon our ideology. Thank God we haven't because I think we have a great ideology as a free people defending this great republic. And I do think spreading our ideas of freedom and human rights in the rule of law around the world. But these men in Tehran and Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang, their ideologies are incredibly dangerous and destructive. And the notion that we can somehow get them to step back from those ambitions by flooding them with cash seems to me delusional. Well, I'm in complete agreement with you, right? And one of the benefits of course of having you know, significant experience as opposed to significant education. And there's a difference between the two is you you don't harbor delusions. The premise that that appeasement is based upon, which is the provision upfront of benefits, then buys you a probability of improved behavior, is not supported by any facts known to man. It's not supported by historical pattern. I can think of no instance that reinforces this conclusion. And nonetheless, it exists like a lot of delusions because people find a need to reconcile their actions and desired course of action with some sort of reason. No one in the past or no one in the present that's arguing in that way is going to be looked upon favorably. Right? For the same reason that everyone advancing those arguments during the JCP away, we're all proven to wear a millstone around their neck. These comments will live forever. Just like Jake will always have, you know, the Middle East is more peaceful, you know, now than it's ever been. This is Jake Sullivan for the last two advisor in the days before October the 7th. Nor John Kerry, so saying, you know, there's never going to be a diplomatic agreement to an Israel and South Arab neighbors never, never, never, never, never in 2016, I believe. Like these statements will will never go away. We'll always be resurrected and rightly so. And again, the premise is is not supported by any facts. And the evidence with Iran, of course, is exactly the opposite. In fact, the greater degree they have access to resources as we just talked about with the defense budget, it is only going to be used to attack our interests because that's their ideology, and that's those are their objectives and their goals and they're committed to them. Now, what I will say is, you know, the rationale and arguments are perhaps less important in compelling than what's actually done. At the end of the day, right, all policies are have only one arbiter, and that's the result. So I will judge the MOU and the President's policies and goals and directions more broadly by the end result. And right now I'm looking at a decimated Iran for the first time since 1979. I think that's pretty good. And I don't see a path in which they're likely to restore the capabilities that the President has destroyed. And I certainly don't think he's going to, again, reverse himself and allow them to do it. Since again, he's the one that just destroyed it. So again, I think it's highly unlikely. But to your point, anyone arguing that appeasement and benefits are some going to result in behavior change, again, there's no support of argument for it. Yeah. And I think when I look at provisions in the MOU, for example, like we are going to set up a $300 billion reconstruction fund. And we are going to lift American primary and secondary sanctions and UN sanctions. And I think by implication, EU sanctions and IAEA resolutions, and we're going to flood you with cash. If you meet again to be fair, first ring is compliance. Yes. If you meet our demands on the nuclear side and I want to ask you about that as well, Rob, I think I can understand why diplomatically and from a strategic communications perspective, you hold out the $300 billion reconstruction fund as something that the regime has the incentive to try to get through compliance. And you also hold it out so that when the regime doesn't comply, they're going to have to explain to their own people why they just went through two wars, decades of sanctions, trillions of dollars of economic damage, why the people who are living in poverty and who are being brutally repressed by their own, why this regime turned down a $300 billion reconstruction fund, which would have involved the lifting of all of the sanctions that would have flowed even more money, hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars to help rebuild Iran and give these people obviously the prosperity, I mean the Iranian people, the prosperity they deserve. Do you think it's designed for that reason? I certainly think the president's perspective would include that. I think he views the entire approach to be, I'm going to place an objective in front of you. What would I view to be acceptable behavior? And if you get there, great. I'm going to do as little as possible to get you there, but I'm certainly going to help clarify for what that is. If you don't, I will help you by course of means if necessary. And I think that alone explains the president's actions, and if not much of his statements relative to Iran. And I don't think that he's changed his position on this. And I'd say too, the 300 billion is a great point. I can remember during the confrontation with the ISIS caliphate, we did a conference in Kuwait on raising international funds with reconstruction of the territory repatriated, including Mosul. A whole bunch of countries commit to a lot of funds. I don't think any of it actually materialized. I can remember doing the same thing after his Bulless fertilizer cash aid destroyed the damn the port of Lebanon, the Port of Beirut. None of that, I think money really materialized either despite President Macron's repeated visits and pledges to the contrary. And I can remember just recently with Gaza reconstruction, and we'll see what happens there. So do I think there's ever going to be a 300 billion dollar fund for Tehran's reconstruction? Absolutely not. Nor should there be because if anything, we ought to start with the reconstruction of the Gulf States as a result of them launching ballistic missiles and drones at them. In that may or may not happen, they're obviously able to do it, but I don't think that's ever going to happen. Okay. So let's talk about if the MOU works and if the MOU doesn't. If the MOU works, meaning that it in the next 60 days or if it obviously renewed for another 30 or another 30, the president is able to secure a final agreement with Iran. I'm sure you're deeply skeptical that that's going to happen. I am as well. But let's assume for the sake of argument that he can. I know you can't read the president's mind, but certainly based on his statements, are you confident that that agreement will meet the nuclear because we started taking missiles and everything else off the table? Is it going to meet at least the nuclear standards that the president has laid out in terms of zero enrichment, full dismantlement, no underground, nuclear sites, anywhere anytime inspections, clearly no weaponization program, and clearly getting rid of the thousands of pounds have been rich to uranium. And maybe with respect to the enriched uranium, since we seem to have already conceded that it won't be shipped out of the country and only downblended, are you worried that that pretends more nuclear concessions to come? Or do you think that was just a easy give me, we're easier give me to the Iranians as we begin the negotiations because the president is going to be very firm on those other nuclear demands. I don't expect there's going to be a successful conclusion negotiated settlement here. I don't think we're going to see an agreement. And if we were to see an agreement to your premise, I don't believe the president would concede Iran to nuclear program that he has taken great pains with Israel to dismantle and to destroy, and nor should he. More importantly, again, I don't see him allowing access to the resources to resurrect the program or the unrestricted nature of it because I think he fully understands the threat. It's why he took the action he did. Again, you can't look at the current circumstance absent what he has already done. The reason he took the decision that he did, and again, it's debated, but he did. He took it. He took it because he was convinced himself that he had to use force and force alone. order to prevent it. I don't see him reversing that position or negotiate a position, but I don't see Iran complying with it at the same time either. And again, it's important to remember too that this is a country that is over a hundred years of oil and gas reserves to spot its own domestic needs. If anyone had an argument not to have a nuclear weapons or a nuclear peaceful nuclear power program, it's Iran. Absolutely no need to do it. Beyond of course the need for enrichment as you pointed out repeatedly. Okay. So there's no final agreement, President, if he thinks work out well for him, he keeps the Senate and maybe the House gets to November. Well prices are down, gasoline prices are down, economy is doing well, stock market is still high. It seems at least politically this was a good strategy for the President. He's sort of kicked the ball to November but got himself in a position where he can now deal with the Iran issue. What does he do? Because I'm sure you'd make the argument that he'll use the next two years to sort of clean up the problem because he does not want to hand this off to his successor. I think he's probably skeptical that successor will address the Iran problem with the same level of intensity and strength that he has. But he's back in that situation in November, military option, economic pressure, perhaps maybe continued diplomacy but that's so far as failing covert action and possibly maybe some openness to some kind of support campaign for the Iranian people for when they come back to the streets. Yeah, I think Iran is going to give them every excuse imaginable to finish the job. And I think a couple of things. The energy market will be in a different place. I think the efforts to reduce the dependency on the straight physically will start to diminish rapidly over the planned construction projects. I think their capacity to deal with it also will have will be in a much better position deal with more effectively. That will be the priority. We won't have to deal with the nuclear program as such anymore. It remains buried. And so I think the President will be in a better position. And I also think you're right. My judgment is he will not want to leave the problem to a successor. But from an economic and military perspective, I think he views and I would agree he'll be in a stronger position in six to 12 months. And I think I think my expectation is that he'll finish what he started. And I think he'll have the latitude to do it. And I think that's what this is about. And Rob, when you say he'll finish what he started, what do you see? What would you anticipate? I mean, return to major military operations, a green light to Amar Cooper to really punch through. And when the battle of war moves militarily, what do you sort of have in mind in terms of those options? Yeah, I think it'll be a combined US and Israeli military action to eliminate the remaining threat and to ensure that from an economic standpoint, we are resilient and no longer susceptible to that disruption. I don't think it'll go so far as to as you and I would advocate for support for the Iranian people to to select and overthrow what's left of the government. But I think it'll be elimination of the remaining capacity. Should you think I'm not even in thinking that the President might be prepared to at least instruct intelligence community to prepare a plan for what support for the people would look like. I mean, I would say that I would do that. I'm not President Trump and I'm not the President of the States, but like the Pentagon, which prepares, as you said, plans for everything, including that. Okay. So plans should be built for that. Plans have been and I would be shocked if they're not up to date on doing that. How full, scoop and scale of which I don't know, but there's no question that that would be an eventuality so that you can make the policy option available. And that's the department's ethos, right, is to make sure that the options are available. And thinking through it is what the building does better than anything else. So I would be shocked if those plans created in the past haven't been updated in order to reflect that and make that policy option to the President, but I don't think he'll take it. Yeah. I mean, I share your skepticism, though, I mean, it's been a longstanding theme of this podcast and certainly at F2D for many years that the end of the day, you, we need to support the Iranians because they're coming back to the streets. They've been on the streets since 1999, repeatedly at great risk and they've shown tremendous courage. And I think it's a moral failing on our part, but more importantly, from a national security perspective, it seems to me wise that you would want to support millions of Iranians who are dedicated to crippling the regime and might might be less expensive and have less consequences than dropping more Tomahawks and precious munitions on remaining Iranian facilities. Again, I'm not opposed to that for sure because I think there's still some deadly capabilities that need to be eliminated. But when the Iranians come back to the streets and I think they will again, I think the United States of America and our allies should be prepared to actually support them, not for regime change, not because we believe we're going to usher democracy into Iran, not whether it's this opposition leader or that opposition leader. I think we tend to get stuck in that too often, but that if you actually want to weaken your enemy and cripple this regime, we have a rotteny and boots on the ground that are prepared to do it and we should be really thinking softly and in a more comprehensive way about what that support should look like. Yeah, I've had those discussions in terms of what the right policy goals and objectives are. Everything is predicated upon your goal and you have to reverse engineer it. I also am conscious of the arguments opposed to it. I likewise would advocate for it and perhaps time for another podcast, but I would say that there's a middle ground. There's a middle ground where support assistance can be provided and at the same time your policy goal and objective doesn't have to change the point in which you're supporting the overthrow of the current regime. So I think there's a middle ground in which it can be done. I think it is a complicated path, but I do agree with you that it's worth pursuing because it does serve two purposes. One, it's demonstrably providing support with inevitably I think will happen. I think it will be under new management at some point in the future. They were the first to introduce a constitution of the region in 1906 and I think that's the base, you know, that's the basis upon which they'll return to formation of a new government at some point and I think our assistance to it I think would be an R in their interests, but I also understand the complications associated with it. And the president, like the markets, appores one thing more than anything else and that's uncertainty and I think that's one of the main arguments against that particular track and the different permutations of the uncertainty and introduces into an already complex question. In my mind, it's worth the pursuit, but I understand the history and I understand the concerns associated with it that it prevented us from doing that so far. Well, Rob, I'm going to take you up on your kind offer to come back and discuss that in a lot more detail, but I want to thank you very much. It really fascinating conversation as I promised at the beginning of this podcast, it was going to be analytically serious, analytically fair and then we were going to cover the Iran trajectory and the MOU without our hair on fire. So thank you, Rob Greenway, for your service and look forward to having you back. My pleasure. Always good to talk with you, Mark. So that's it for today's episode of the Iran Breakdown. If you want to better understand what's really happening with the Islamic Republic, please subscribe, rate us five stars and show this to people who need to hear it. But it's your first time here. Go back to episode one. That's where we began laying the groundwork and then episode with Crown Prince Reza Pallavi. You can find me on X, an Instagram at M.E. Dubuets or M.D.U.B.O.W.I.T.N.C. I'm Mark Dubuets. Thanks for listening and look forward to breaking it down again with you next time.