Benchmark Part I

All right, let's try and do it as one. And we're going to hustle. Okay, let's try and do it as just one. But I don't think we should hustle. Because especially those early days, that's what people don't know. All right, no trade-offs. And we'll let the chips fall where they do. It's a very anti-benchmark approach we're taking to this episode. Trade-off nothing. Go full depth into Gen 1 and Gen 2. Fine. Yeah. All right. We'll see how this goes. Welcome to Season 11, Episode 4 of Acquired. The podcast about great technology companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert, and I'm the co-founder and managing director of Seattle-based Pioneer Square Labs and our venture fund, PSL Ventures. And I'm David Rosenthal, and I am an angel investor based in San Francisco. And we are your hosts. The hardest thing to do in venture capital is create those massive outsized returns that only come from investing in one of the five or so truly important companies each decade. Then, once you've done that, the next hardest thing is to keep doing it with an entirely different generation of partners. Today, we are going to talk about our venture fund, PSL Ventures. And we're going to talk about our venture fund, PSL Ventures. and firm who built one of the top franchises in venture capital, Benchmark, that has incredibly managed to do both. Our Sequoia and Andreessen episode were about the empires that those firms chose to build. And this episode is about the empire they chose not to. Or maybe. Well, there was a flirtation with an empire in there, as we'll get into. There was. Benchmark famously believes that venture capital doesn't scale. They have zigged when others have zagged. They have not grown their fund size. They haven't tried junior partners. They don't have a platform team. They are not multi-stage. And I've heard they don't even have a CRM. And yet, they are the big early backer of so many of the world's most important companies. There were early e-commerce companies in the 90s like eBay, eShop, 1-800-Flowers, or Ariba. Semiconductor and networking companies like Synopsys and Juniper Networks. And of course, in the next generation, OpenTable. Zillow, Twitter, Instagram, Uber, WeWork, Snap, Riot Games, Asana, Discord, New Relic, and our friends of the show at Modern Treasury. We are at the moment of the changing of the guard. Bill Gurley is not a general partner in the next Benchmark fund, and the majority of the current partners joined in the last five years. They clearly transitioned from the eBay generation to the Uber generation. And the question is, can they do it again? Will this third generation of Benchmark continue to set the, the benchmark for all-time greatest venture capital funds in history? I like what you did there. You did. That was good. That was good. Ben teed this up before we started recording of like, I really like my intro on this one. If you don't like it, stop me. But I like that. That was good. Well done. Thank you. Well, listeners, we did a very different thing in preparing for this episode. We're trying to embrace raising the bar in different ways as the show grows. So for this episode, we talked to several current partners at the firm. Several former partners, some of the original founders of the firm, portfolio CEOs, and even public company CEOs who used to be portfolio CEOs to get a whole bunch of different perspectives on Benchmark. All right, listeners, now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year on audit or a static PDF, then everyone would nod and you're done. But in an AI first world, that doesn't hold up anymore. Yep. Your risk surface changes every week. 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I feel like every episode now I'm constantly thinking, like, are there going to be any quotes from this episode that should make it into the merch store? I know, on the Sequoia one, I was thinking about Doug talking about burning cigarettes in his arms and he wouldn't flinch. Market size unconstrained from Bezos. Absolutely. All right, David, take us in. And listeners, please know this show is not investment advice. David and I may hold investments in the companies discussed, and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. Oh, man, I'm so excited for this one. God, there's so much. There's so much Silicon Valley history, and I feel like we covered Sequoia, we covered Andreessen, and there's this missing gap in between the two of them. And this is Benchmark. We're going to talk about it today. Man, I hope we can do it justice. I'm so pumped. Okay, to understand Benchmark, we start in the 1990s in Silicon Valley, but I don't think you can actually start with Benchmark. You have to start with another firm. I'm sure you know what that firm is. Are you going TVI? Are you going? Meryl Pickard? Are you going somewhere completely different? Somewhere completely different, but I bet you can guess it. The 800-pound gorilla, Kleiner Perkins. Indeed. Indeed. Not just Kleiner Perkins, but specifically John Doerr's Kleiner Perkins. After a very successful generational transfer of their own from Kleiner and Perkins to John Doerr. Here in the 1990s, I mean, John Doerr, we've talked about him this season on the Amazon episode. I mean, he was. He was alone, the 800-pound gorilla in the VC ecosystem in the early 1990s, and specifically leading up to and during the internet era. You know, you think today of the top VCs, the top VC firms, you think Sequoia, you think Benchmark, you think Andreessen, Founders Fund. He was all of that, all in one. He was just absolutely at the top of his game. He had joined. Kleiner. He did not start his own firm. He started his career at Intel, working for Andy Grove. And from that, sort of just like Don Valentine, when he got into the business and Don, in his very Don way, said he had an advantage. He knew the future. John also knew the future. He saw the PC wave coming. He did Compaq. He did Intuit. He did Sun, which wasn't the PC wave, but it was in that era. And that, of course, led to Vinod Khosla then joining Kleiner and this dominant franchise. And then when the internet started, man, he did Netscape. He did Amazon, as we talked about. He did Google. If you were an ambitious young venture capitalist in the 1990s in Silicon Valley, and that was a big if. You could do very well as a venture capitalist in that era without being ambitious. But if you were ambitious, boy, you needed a damn good answer about how you were going to beat John Doerr. Oh, yeah. To set a little context for how you could. Well, even if you weren't ambitious, there are 100 times as many venture capitalists now as there were then. Those businesses didn't have the economics, either in terms of gross margin or addressable market size or zero distribution costs. All the things that make big tech big tech now didn't exist then. So for a while, the capital base and the number of venture capitalists actually made sense with the much smaller technology ecosystem. But there were always those few years of basically arbitrage. Where innovations happened that made these much more interesting investable categories, but there were still only a few venture capitalists looking around at each other like, oh, my God. And valuations were so low. I mean, it was crazy when John and Mike Moritz did Google at $100 million valuation in the Series A. That was earth changing. So to understand, John, we've painted the picture of how dominant he and Kleiner were. There were two very specific aspects to his style and Kleiner's style. One was he was unquestionably the guy. The guy is a good way to put it. He was the CEO of the firm. He was the leader. He was also the best player on the field. It's like if he was Michael Jordan and Phil Jackson and the front office, he did everything. So that led to plenty of situations like we talked about on the amazon.com episode of he called Tom Allberg's wife. He aggressively came in to try and court the deal, win the deal. And then he would try and pass off the board seat to a junior partner. And Jeff, of course, didn't let that happen, but many entrepreneurs did. Yep. The other very particular aspect to the Kleiner-Perkins model at this time was. Was they had adopted this idea of a modern kiretsu within a venture capital firm. And this is sort of funny to think back on now, but it made sense at the time. You have to put yourself in the context of the 1990s, a proto-internet ecosystem, really. This was the AOL days leading into the Netscape days. Biz dev deals and distribution was a lot, more important and different than it is now. It wasn't like you could just have an idea for a company, spin something up on AWS, put it on the internet, get distribution for free on social. It didn't work that way. You needed deals in place. Product market fit was a lot less organic and quite frankly, a lot less real because you didn't get this immediate signal of users finding your product and paying for it in this sort of high fidelity organic way. You had few. Products available to you and they were whatever products got done in these deals. And so true product market fit ended up being like an equal peer to your biz dev prowess, unlike today. A core part of this kiretsu model at Kleiner was we help facilitate, and some would argue they would do more than help facilitate, they would force these partnerships, biz dev relationships upon their portfolio companies. And when your portfolio companies include, Netscape and Amazon and Excite, these would be quite valuable deals both for Excite and for the young startups. Which of course sounds great. If you are funded by Kleiner, you're sort of joining this cabal where Kleiner will sort of pull some strings behind the scenes and orchestrate what deals make sense for them as a shareholder across all of these companies. And theoretically, everyone will benefit from it by being a part of the cabal. So of course, KP was unquestioned the best venture firm at the time. But they weren't the only top tier firm in the sort of bulge bracket, quote unquote, of proto VC firms at that point in time. There was of course Sequoia, and Don had done Cisco. They were about to do Yahoo. It was up and coming. But they weren't yet the dominant Sequoia that we think of today. It's amazing. They were almost a 20 year old firm, but they weren't Sequoia as we know them. There was Greylock based out of Boston. There was an IVP, one of the early institutional firms. Oh, David, we have to quick history on Venrock because listeners are going to care about this. What is the rock in Venrock? It would be Rockefeller. Yes. It's pretty loose connection at this point, but was at one point the sort of venture arm of the Rockefeller family office or one of the Rockefeller family offices spinning off to do a venture fund. Indeed. So there were all of those folks. There were the summits and the TAs kind of at the growth stage. And then there were a couple other venture firms that you've probably never heard of. You've probably never heard of them because they don't exist anymore. And among those were two, one called Technology Venture Investors or TVI, which had one very notable investment, one very, very notable investment that we'll talk about in one sec. And another one, Merrill, Pickard, Anderson, and Ayer. And the two of those firms, just so happened to share the same office building on Sand Hill Road. Amazing. They shared 2480 Sand Hill Road, part of the Quadris office park complex right there in Menlo Park. And there was a reason, or at least I'm assuming that there's a reason why they were in this building because that office park was the original office of a little company called Forethought, talked about many, many years ago on Acquired. No, really? Yes. Oh, I had no idea. And Forethought were the makers of a little Mac application that then became a Windows application called PowerPoint. Yes. Forethought, of course, got acquired by Microsoft, absorbed into the office juggernaut, and that their campus there in the Quadris, Office Complex, became Microsoft's original Silicon Valley campus on Sand Hill Road, renamed the Graphical Business Unit. Amazing. Now, why am I saying that it was appropriate that these two venture firms were based there at this point in that building, or at least for one of them appropriate? Well, it's appropriate that TVI, anyway, is based there. Yes. Who wouldn't want to be right in the thick of Microsoft Silicon? partners in for pieces of the carry and future funds, but you wouldn't let them into the management company. So that meant they had no governance, they had no control, they had no right over anything, and they didn't have contractual right to any of the fees. They were just employees. They were kind of at the largest, whatever the managers of the management company decided that they should get in terms of salary and allocations in carry. And typically, this would be high numbers. I mean, ideally, as a venture capitalist, you're getting paid more on the carry than the fees, a lot more. But it has always been a well-compensated profession. So it's not like the owners of the management company were back there saying, we're not going to pay any cash out. No, they would pay a high salary, but then they would get to keep everything remaining in the management company at the end of the year and sweep it into their own bank accounts. There's this amazing New York Times article from 1995, why the New York Times was covering politics of Silicon Valley venture firms, I don't really know. But. This is deep and like full-on Real Housewives, this article. So in this article, New York Times quotes an anonymous source, if Merrill Pickard had divided the rewards more equitably, they wouldn't have split up. And then there's another quote in the article from one Robert Cagle, partner at Technology Venture Investors, as we're talking about. And he says, today, the power is much more distributed, says the young Robert Cagle. Nobody can claim that they are making all the money for the firm. Resentment is in the air among the younger partners of venerated Silicon Valley venture firms at this time. And when they say today, it is much more split up. You know, you can imagine Bob Cagle is sort of saying this a little wistfully. I envision a future where this is the case, but it seems like at TVI and Merrill Pickard, this wasn't the case at the moment. Well, now just who is this Bob Cagle character? Well, his story is actually pretty freaking unbelievable and kind of explains why he might harbor some resentment for this privilege that you might say of the older generation. He grew up in Flint, Michigan. Yes, listeners, that Flint, Michigan. His mother was a single mom. His whole family worked on the production lines for General Motors. They were falling on hard times. It was rough. You think about Flint, Michigan, even today, that is a hard scrabble background. So Bob was a great student in high school, but there was not a lot of opportunity there. In fact, the only opportunity he had to go to college, of which he was the first member of his family to go to college, was to go to an institution called General Motors University. It's fascinating that this existed. Which was a training school for members of General Motors employees' families. And the idea was it was kind of like a quasi-vocational school to get the ready to work in the industry. So I believe he works in the company for a little while, and then he ends up getting a chance to go to the prestigious Stanford Business School. And while he's at GSB, he gets a chance to meet and intersect with someone a few years his senior, who had graduated a few years before, Dave Marquardt, who he had talked about earlier from TVI. This is right as the Microsoft deal is going down. Quite fortuitous. After GSB, Bob goes into consulting at Boston Consulting Group, and then Dave invites him to come back and join TVI. And he does really well there. He does Synopsys, the big EDA company, it's still around today, Avant, Viasoft, a bunch of other companies that do well, the firm makes good money on. And so after 10 years, he's kind of like, all right, I've done well here. I've risen up from nothing. But you guys are still holding on to the keys to the firm and all the economics. Speaking about Bob and their impression of him at the time, he had an almost religious fervor that anything other than an equal partnership was just morally wrong for a venture capital firm. And I totally understand where he's coming from here. I don't think Bob had any idea of the incredible amount of knock-on effects that would come from that absolute steadfastness of an equal partnership. And we're going to spend the next however many hours of this story really diving into what are all the trickle-out effects and different emotional states that that puts a person in at various points in a company's lifetime. This is the beginning. We didn't talk to Bob, but I don't think he foresaw just how powerful this was going to be. I think it was motivated, first and foremost, especially given his background by a sense of fairness and morally what is the right thing to do and fair and proper rewards for proper work. And then almost certainly, too, economics was a core motivation here, too. He was like, hey, related to the fairness, I'm doing the work. You guys are making the money. You know, you're taking my money here. For sure. And we did unearth something that I've always been a little bit curious about, because people always say benchmark is an equal partnership. It both means that each of the partners in a given fund have equal carry, but also all of the current GPs own the management company without paying for it. The management company is always, just given to whoever the equal current GPs are. If we do a deep dive on it someday, I would be very curious to know how the Kleiner management company transitioned from Kleiner and Perkins and Caulfield and Byers to John Doerr. But it is not common that it is just given. Yep. So here's Bob. This is the milieu we're in. And Bob, in particular, you know, he's quoted in the New York Times talking about this. He feels more strongly than anybody about this idea of giving. Yeah, I think it's a good point. I think it's a good point. And as you can imagine, these discussions within TVI, they're not able to get to a resolution, shall we say, within the firm. And so they decide, you know, everybody's made a lot of money, especially the senior guys. They decide to, quote unquote, and this is the term they use, declare victory and say, you know what? We won. We won. They won. They did. They did Microsoft. They won. Like, what more did they need to prove? What a spin. Hey, the firm's kind of blowing up. The people we've trained don't really believe the economics are fair. They don't think there's a way to fix it within the current culture. And so therefore, victory, victory. We are declaring victory and calling it a day. So that's the end of TVI. They manage out the current funds. Everybody remains on their board seats. You know, it doesn't just disappear. This is a thing with venture capital firms. There's a long tail. Because all these existing firms and board seats existed. Everybody's got to manage them out. I think Microsoft had gone public. So at least they were able to distribute that at this point. Yes, of course. It's worth noting that Dave does, after TVI, go on to found August Capital. Yes. So Bob and Future Benchmark aren't the only ones that come out of this. Also August Capital, also in 2480 Sand Hill Road. Like, it's in one building, you know. Man, it's so funny. Even in the 90s, you know, we joke about the original, Silicon Valley history of there were like 10 people and everybody knew each other. This is all going down in one office building. Yeah, for how concentrated tech was, venture was much more concentrated. Much more concentrated. Before we actually get into the formation of Benchmark here, it is worth lingering on Dave and TVI and the Microsoft investment for one more moment. When I was looking up what the terms of the deal were for the Microsoft investment, there's some interesting color shared by Dave about his style of investing. And you can see that the seeds of Benchmark really were present in TVI's demeanor toward what they believed about venture investing. So here's an excerpt from Dave Marquardt. The venture business is an intensely personal relationship business, and it's not an industry that scales well. He says he would never consider adding a value-added service. Companies should do that themselves. Bill Gates wouldn't let me bring in outside PR people and marketing talent. That's what founders do. And I think that's what he's doing. And I think that's what founders do. My view is that the CEO ultimately is responsible and accountable for everything. They are the ones who make the decisions. The VCs are there to support and be steady. Oh, I love that. I love that you found that. That could have been a Benchmark partner's quote, but it was Dave Marquardt when he was at TVI. Totally. You could copy-paste those exact words. Yep. So back to Bob here. I think he really would have preferred to keep going at TVI and convert it to an equal partnership. This is what he was agitating for. But obviously, that wasn't going to happen. So he's got to go figure out something else. Yep. He believed this so deeply in his soul that it is worth not continuing at this firm, or perhaps even not continuing this firm period in order to realize this dream. So what does he do? We're now in probably early 1994-ish. He calls up his good buddy, Bruce Dunleavy. He trots up the stairwell, maybe takes the back stairs to go see his buddy Bruce up at Merrill Pickard. Now, Bruce had gone to GSB a few years after Bob. And when Bob was at BCG after GSB, Bruce had interned for him there. Now, Bruce comes from quite a different background than Bob, shall we say. Bruce grew up in Texas and was a high school football quarterback in Texas, which is a big deal. He goes to Rice University, where he's very erudite. He studies English literature. I don't know any other young VCs who studied European literature. literature in college and somehow managed to weasel their way into the industry. I don't know how you did it, David. I don't know how I did it either. Definitely would not work today. You were destined to become a podcaster. Yeah, right. It all works out in the end. So Bruce had gone on to work in the PC industry and then importantly at Goldman Sachs and then joined Merrill Pickard. And in his venture career, he was the one who did Palm Pilot. He was on the rise. He was one of the young Turks within Merrill Pickard. But remember, he's a few years younger than Bob. And so Bob goes up to see him and he's like, hey, TVI is breaking up. I really believe in this equal partnership thing. The internet, I think, is coming. Like Netscape, you know, it's happening here. We're positioned to do this. And this is like early 94. Early 94. You and me. This is the same time Bezos is driving across the country and starting Amazon. What do you think about busting loose out of this place and you and me start a firm together? And Bruce is like, well, Bob, I'm honored, but I don't have the Microsoft money here. I'm a few years younger than you. I don't have the same kind of safety net. So it doesn't happen at that point in time. A few months go by and Merrill Pickard starts to have internal discussions about what their next fund is going to look like. And lo and behold, surprise. Surprise, surprise. The bug of equal partnership seems to have made its way around the building a little bit and infected the waters of discussion elsewhere. It's like a virus that's like infecting a very specific building in Silicon Valley. So Bruce and his fellow sort of young partner at Merrill Pickard, Andy Ratcliffe, the two of them are like, hey, guys, there's this equal economics idea. What do you think? And it turns out that conversation, I think, probably goes about the same that it went at TVI. They probably get a little pats on the head. Yeah. By the way, can we just recognize Bruce was Bob's intern. And think about the incredible vote of confidence and how counter to human nature it is for Bob to approach Bruce and say, would you like to be my equal partner? Humans have this, it's kind of a flaw. We remember people the way they were when we met them. And so as they grow, we tend to underestimate them. And it shows an incredible amount of confidence in them. And it really illustrates this obsessive sense of fairness that Bob had that the very first person he asked used to be a subordinate of his. And he asked, will you be my equal? Totally. It reflects two things, certainly in Bob and I think in all the early folks at Benchmark and Benchmark as a firm, this religious devotion to equality, fairness. It also reflects just like an absurd amount of self-confidence. Yes. Bob's like, hey, you and me, let's together go take on this whole industry, just the two of us, which, you know, you kind of need both to go do something crazy. So Bruce is a little bit more the voice of reason. You know, he and Andy within Merrill Pickard have had these conversations. He's amenable to the idea of leaving and starting a new firm. But he's like, Bob, just the two of us, for what we do, we're not going to have enough capacity to be able to create a, like, a new firm. an actual portfolio that makes sense if it's just the two of us doing deals. We need to have some more investment capacity here. We need enough diversification. And they were thinking sort of about round sizes at the time. They might invest a million, they might invest two million, but they're just not going to have enough companies in the portfolio with them doing venture the way that they believe they need to do venture, you know, eight to 10 board seats a person, no investments without board seats, that sort of thing. The TVI style. If they're on 16 to 20 boards and, and that's all the companies in a portfolio, that's not enough. Right. And there's also just like a credibility aspect talking to LPs about this, too. Like, they're going to start poking holes right away. Yep. So Bruce says, all right, I'm down, but we got to recruit some more partners here. So they start going around the valley. They go outside of the office building, trying to recruit folks. And the prevailing reaction, you know, I think maybe they thought that the religious meme, of the equal partnership and fairness. And there's a new generation dawning in Silicon Valley, maybe being within 2480 Sand Hill, they thought it was more pervasive than it was. Because the pretty universal reception they get around the Valley as they approach other young GPs is, you guys are freaking nuts. Right. We're in an amazing club here. Don't screw up a good thing that you got going. Didn't they try to recruit a well-known GP from Greylock who was like, no, I'm at Greylock. What are you thinking? And that was right. That was the smart thing to do was not to go do something crazy. It was to do the John Doerr path. Like if people had ambition, if young folks had ambition, it was like, hey, I'll put my time in and like, look at John. It worked for him. He was still quite young at this point in time. And he had the keys to Kleiner Perkins. You know, there was no real reason to believe for a lot of these folks that they had to go leave their farms and do it on their own. So we got a chance to talk to Bruce and we sort of asked him, what do you think? And he said, I don't know. I don't know. I don't asked him about this time, this sort of interregnum period. And we're like, you know, how are you feeling during this time? Like, were you a true believer? Did you think it was all going to work out? And he's like, no, I started thinking maybe we were a little nuts too. Yes. But he made a good point, which is their back was against the wall. They burned the boats. They were gone. At this point in time, they had no other option. They had to go make this work or they were out of the industry. This is like Michael Ovitz when his application for credit to start CAA had been discovered by the upper level management of his old firm. He was out. He was done. There was no way to go back and undo. So you had to build the business. Yes. There is no other path forward. So they need some more folks. Now, there's an obvious recruit to bring in to join them who also is in the same position. And of course, who they do bring in, which is. Bruce's partner, Andy from Merrill Pickard. He's in the same building, so easy to get him. So now you got three. Now you got three. You got three pretty good folks. And Bruce, I believe it was Bruce says, you know, hey, look, we're having a tough time convincing other venture guys to come join us, other GPs. But we might actually want to look somewhere else. And it might actually be a good thing for us if we bring in some entrepreneurial DNA into the firm. You know, we've got all these other people. We've got all these other people. We've got all these problems with the way traditional venture works. And all these other folks out there are reluctant to join us. Maybe it would be good for us to actually bring in some different perspectives. And he says, I think I know just the guy, a former entrepreneur who I worked with, sat on his board. We actually went to Rice together, Kevin Harvey. So Kevin, after Rice, he had started two companies. The first one, Apple had acquired. And then a second company, Approach Software. Bruce had invested. At Merrill Pickard. It was on the board. They just sold it to Lotus. Had a decent outcome. Bruce thought, hey, Kevin might make a pretty good VC. So they approach him and he's like, great. This sounds way easier than starting another company. So there you go. You've got Bob, you've got Bruce, you've got Andy, you've got Kevin, the four well-known founders of Benchmark. But four wasn't actually the number they were going for. They thought they needed at least five people to have a viable firm. And so they go out and they do actually recruit a fifth founding member, the fifth co-founder of Benchmark, a guy named Val Vaden. Val had also gone to GSB and worked in venture, but he had moved on from true early stage venture. He was doing buyouts, software company buyouts. I'm thinking of Toma Bravo and Vista, the precursor to that at a much smaller scale. And so they bring Val on. As the fifth partner. All right, listeners, now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team and deploying them is no longer the hard part. Yeah. The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making. AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern. The risks are real. Exactly. 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So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates. And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company. But the question is, who's managing them all? trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely at scale, go check out servicenow.com slash acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you. So here we are now at the end of 1994. We got the five members of the band, the drummer, the guitarist, the bassist, the lead singer, rhythm guitarist, Bob, Bruce, Andy, Kevin, and Val. They put together a prospectus to go out and raise their first fund. And the first thing they need to put on the prospectus is a name. It's quite an audacious name that they come up with, of course. Benchmark Capital. Yeah, they went all in on signaling something to the market. And I think what you're about to get into is how they signal that in the form of the economics that they were asking for, but they certainly signaled it in the name. It was, you haven't heard of us, but we're already important. Yes. Our aspiration is to set a new benchmark for performance in this industry and how venture capital is done. This is featured prominently, supposedly in the benchmark fund one prospectus. It says, quote, there is always room at the top. Oh boy. So then what you're talking about, Ben, typical economic terms of venture funds, especially in those days, was a standard management fee and carry, management fee of 2%, standard carry performance element of the fund of 20% of the net profits of the fund. And for those who don't know, just a quick crash course, 2%, that's an annual fee. So if you raise a $100 million fund, that's $2 million every year that goes to the management company that gets used to pay the budget and the salaries and all that sort of thing. And then the 20%, it's not just 20% of all the profits, it's typically 20% of the profits after 1X. So you give everybody the money back. 100 million goes back to the LPs, and then you get 20% participation and all of the profits after that. Yep. So that's standard in the industry. Now, I think at this point, some firms, maybe just Kleiner, had charged more than 20% carry. I believe Kleiner did at this point because they were such a marquee. They were so proven. If you wanted to invest with Kleiner, you had to pay a premium to get him. Yeah. They felt they had pricing power. Yeah. Pricing power. Benchmark comes out, the new benchmark capital swinging right out of the gate with 30% carry. Premium carry, we're going to price and position this like the premium product that it is. Which of course, from one perspective and the perspective of several prominent LPs is quite laughable. There's nothing here. And LPs at the time are looking at this like, hey, we think that fees in this industry are going down, not up. Yes. A good allegory is actually the thing that Andy Ratcliffe went on to do after Benchmark, which was found Wealthfront. He's like, oh, investment management fees, those are way too high. And these strategies are only available to a small group of people. What if we democratize it and we bring down not a 1% management fee for private asset management, but like a quarter percent or whatever Wealthfront is? It's like kind of amazing that when he was going out to Benchmark, he was saying 20% profit will take 30% of the profits. Yes. Yes. Oh, so great. Now this, as you can imagine, one reaction that this does not engender from the LP community is indifference. So this was a brilliant strategy. Now, some LPs absolutely love this. And very notably and famously, Horsley Bridge, the big investment advisor, makes a huge bet on this motley crew of. Benchmark Capital founders in fund one. And I think they've been in every single fund ever that Benchmark has raised and were in before any other institutions. Yes. And I think they are still one of the very largest Benchmark LPs to this day. And so they're a big investor in that fund one, which ends up being an $85 million fund, which fast forward a little bit, but becomes one of, if not the best performing venture fund in history, returning, billions of dollars to LPs. I think it's the best cash on cash of a large venture fund in history, period. Yes. Still to this day, I think. There have been some small funds, I think lowercase fund one, Chris Saka's fund, but nothing of this size, 85, which with inflation today is probably like 150, 160. But with venture inflation of how much these funds have grown, think about it like the way you would think about how newsworthy a $500 million fund is in today's environment. Yeah. This is probably like the equivalent of a $300,000, $400,000, $500 million fund. Yes. It is the best returning fund of that caliber of venture fund in history. So Horsley loves it. A bunch of other LPs love it. Some LPs absolutely hate what is happening here. And in fact. They hate it on every dimension. They try to go viral with their hate. Yes. And they hate a few things. Obviously, they hate the premium carry for the reason of what you said. And they're like, there's more capital coming into this space. It's getting more competitive. We want fees to go down, not up. You got to remember, we've painted the picture a little bit here, but this was a different world in venture where you could do pretty well by being pretty lazy. In the LP world, it was even more extreme. There was nowhere near the same level of competition for institutional dollars going into private partnership alternative asset funds. So if you were. If you were one of the large university endowments, A, you had it pretty easy, but your team was pretty small. And so you felt like you had privileged access to this small set of money managers. And now you've got people coming in within these established firms and relationships who you like. You feel like you can deploy capital with them and get great returns, year after year, decade after decade. And those firms are blowing up. And now there's new firms entering the industry that you have to evaluate. And these new firms, premium carry. They're pissed. And it's hard to underwrite because any LP that you talk to will tell you, it's not just the track records that we're looking at. And it's not just the meetings we're having. And it's not just the relationship we have with these individuals. It's our belief that those individuals will create magic together. Will they be the Chicago Bulls, or will they be the LeBron Miami Heat? You don't know that they're going to have that trust and that process. And so it's hard to underwrite. And it's hard to underwrite. And it's hard to and that demeanor. And the number one fear is everything looks great on paper. So we wrote a big check, but it turns out these guys can't work with each other. And when you have a new firm with a new brand and a new set of people, that's the key risk. And hey, the Heat brought home a championship. And I think actually the analogy holds here of a fund might bring home a championship, but if you're a large endowment, you don't care about one fund. Right. You want to back an enduring franchise. You want 10 funds. Yes. So Stanford. Your alma mater. Your esteemed alma mater. The alma mater of almost all of these folks. Literally almost all of these folks who are starting Benchmark, they get so angry that not only do they not invest in the fund, they start organizing against this young Benchmark capital. They call up all of their peers, the other university endowments across the country. Including ones who have already committed. Including ones who have already committed to the fund. And say, we don't think this is a good idea. We want you out. Literally Stanford blackballs Benchmark. Insane. Totally insane. Now, it's easy for us to pick on them now because famously, they have a complete 100% turnover in the management team of the Stanford endowment a few years later, a decade plus later. They end up being a large Benchmark LP. And they do end up coming back to Benchmark and the new team. Very happily for them, for Stanford, for my alma mater, gets back into Benchmark or gets into Benchmark for the first time and atones for that sin. But man, this was a rocky birth of Benchmark fund one, shall we say. These guys were going way against the grain. And actually, this is a funny story. So Bob, I think he probably would have had the religious fervor about the equal partnership anyway. But right around the corner, he was like, I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't this time is when Jim Collins' first big book, Built to Last, comes out. Bob reads it, loves it, as he's thinking about what's going on at TVI and what he wants his future fund and what Benchmark would become to be, totally aligns with Jim's principles in the book. They actually hand a copy of the book to every LP as they're pitching them going around for fund one, which is really funny because, A, I think they did believe in the values espoused therein, but it's also brilliant marketing. If LPs care about backing firms and funds that are going to have multiple funds and last for decades, and you're literally handing them a bestseller called Built to Last. And the number one risk with you is that you're new and unproven. It's just, it all aligns so well. So they do actually, I think, slightly oversubscribe it. So I think they had 87 million of commitments. They cut someone back. So they're off to the races. It's 85 million. It's these five partners, and they start investing. They overcome. come the blackballing of Stanford, of the LP and VC establishment. So they just survived coming through the fire here. And what happens next is interesting. So, you know, it's towards the end of the second half of 1995. They've raised the fund. They've just been through this journey. Frankly, there's kind of a letdown, I think. You know, maybe that's too strong, but a few things happened here. They didn't expect that this was going to instantly be an obvious success right out at the gate. It wasn't all 100% sunshine and roses, you know, within Benchmark itself as a partnership either. Right. It's not just that, hey, we're starting to make some investments, but like nothing's really popping in this sort of 95, 96 era. To your point, it was, we're not gelling as a team the way that I was sort of hoping we were. And it's not, all of us. It's one of us. Yeah. And there were deals to be done during 95 and 96 that would have put the firm on a very different trajectory during those early years. Those were the years when Amazon, as we talked about, got done. That was the time when Yahoo got done. And like, would Benchmark have beaten John Doerr to do Amazon? Probably not. You know, maybe. But they weren't even really in the picture. You know, and certainly Yahoo, I mean, Mike Moritz is great. Like, he's wonderful. But a big part of what started to make Mike Moritz, Mike Moritz was Yahoo. He wasn't Mike Moritz before he did Yahoo. And Benchmark wasn't in the picture then. So there were some notable misses during those years. Yeah. And then the team, Val came from this very different perspective. He was coming from the buyout industry, the proto-software buyout industry. And Benchmark was all about doing technology and internet companies. There just kind of wasn't a fit in investment styles. Yeah. I think that is probably the right thing to chalk it up to. David and I stumbled upon this and we were like, Val Vaden? How have we never heard this guy's name? Like, I remember thinking like, wait, there was a fifth founder of Benchmark? They had people coming from a venture capital background. They had someone coming from an operational background. They would have someone who we haven't talked about yet coming from an executive recruiting background who would be a slam. Fit. But this person coming from more of a buyout background turned out not to have the same fit with the rest of the firm. So at the end of 1996, Val ends up leaving the firm, leaving the equal partnership, which certainly was, I'm sure, not what any of them planned or were hoping for. They've invested about 16 million in companies by the end of 96, which is like fine deployment, but maybe a little slow. They're having a partnership transition. The firm is not winning. I'm sure it must not have felt great. I mean, like, I've been there. I've had friends who've been there. Like, it can get depressing. Like, if you're a new firm, if you don't come out the gate strong, you kind of end up fading away a lot of folks. Right. Lots of fund ones don't raise fund twos and certainly don't raise fund threes because then you have fund ones performance to look back on that should have sort of been popping already. Yep. So I imagine there's a lot of concern at this point in time and maybe some of the sort of swashbuckling this of the founding has maybe been replaced by a little bit of depression. They had to call all the LPs and tell them, hey, we came to you with talking this big talk and one of us is out. I will say after talking to a lot of different people around the firm, the number one characteristic that just kept coming up over and over and over again, they do what they say they're going to do. They carry themselves with incredible decorum. They have tremendous discretion when speaking publicly. And this just comes through anytime you hear any of that. And I think that's a really good point. I think that's a really good point. And from what we can tell, there was a very generous separation with Val from the firm, so much so that when you go to the Wayback Machine, which is just an incredible resource that this exists. Oh, you found some great stuff. You were tweeting the last couple of weeks, like just screenshots from old Benchmark websites. They're amazing. It's been so fun. Val is still on the website in 1997, January 97. So there's the five general partners and it says early stage focus, Val Evaden concentrates on technology special situations. And when you click on his bio, he's there, he's got a picture. It says, Val will be establishing a new fund to focus on technology special situations investing. The new funds focus builds on Val's experience investing in technology companies undergoing significant transitions, which can benefit from the capital and investing skills of a venture capitalist. These include fallen angel public companies, companies contemplating major acquisitions or divestiture programs, corporate spinouts, management buyouts, and in rare instances, turnarounds and financial restructurings. So they're basically saying, yep, we're going to keep using our brand to help you raise this thing that is the thing you're good at. Which becomes Vector Capital that he goes on to found. And then he's part of a few other venture firms over the years. So anyway, all this to say, heading into 1997. It was dark. If you were handicapping the future, if Vegas were betting on the odds of the young benchmark capital heading into 1997, the line would be, long on outsized success here. Certainly nobody would think that this current fund that they are investing out of and this current basket of companies, inclusive of the ones they would do over the next 12 months, would be a 92X in just a few years. On the fund. On the fund. On the fund. Wow. So 1997, the Annis Mirabelis for benchmark. Can you explain that for those of us that didn't study literature? I thought that was a prerequisite. You know, getting into this industry. Sorry, I did computer programming. I don't know if that's relevant. It's Latin for a miracle year, I think. And literally, it is a year of miracles. But they put themselves in a position to win. You know, I think we're going to talk about this more in a minute. But a key, key element to benchmark and to them getting it off the ground was both doing something different, but also having, this swagger to them. And obviously they had the swagger. And I think they kind of might have lost it in those early years. And so I don't know how intentional this was. I am imagining it was pretty intentional that the four of them remaining sort of gut check and say, like, okay, where are we headed here? Like, how do we get the swagger back? How do we get back to winning? How do we get back to being aggressive? So they go out, they decide they need to replace Val. It's the best way to do it. Bring in a new, fifth partner and they go recruit the most aggressive, the most hyper-competitive, the most swagger full person that they know the tallest. We're not yet talking about Bill Gurley, although that will be a story coming up very, very soon here. They recruit the number one executive recruiter in all of Silicon Valley and technology. David Byrne from Ramsey Byrne and Associates. It's a lot of chutzpah to go and recruit someone away from the firm that has their name on it. Yes. And to go recruit somebody whose job it is to recruit. You can say many, many, many things about Dave, but you could never say that he doesn't have swagger and that he's not a hustler. So kind of like Bob, Dave also grew up pretty hardscrabble. His family was also a General Motors family. He grows up pretty working class. I believe in New York. He ends up getting into the recruiting business and essentially by like pure force of nature and force of will just wills his way to the top. It's kind of like a Jerry Maguire type story. He ends up starting his recruiting firm, Ramsey Byrne. They're based in Westchester County, New York, and they're not working in technology to start. They start cold calling prospective clients. In tech and in Silicon Valley from Westchester, New York, Dave starts cold calling them and saying, we're Ramsey Byrne, the leading executive search firm in high technology. They haven't done a single retained executive search in high technology when he starts doing this, but they're not claiming anything literal or specific. So leading. Sure. It's like how the new iPhone, it's like a two X better camera, but they don't tell you any sort of units or what vector that is better on. Yeah. Two X better than one. But they're leading and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when in the, I think it's probably late eighties, early nineties, Dave gets his big break and he gets through to John Doran. John makes him his preferred executive recruiter for CEO searches for his portfolio companies. And remember back in these days, that's part of the standard VC playbook. You come in, you back the company, you start a search for, uh, professional CEO. Yeah. Congratulations on finding product market fit. Surely you don't know how to do the job after this. So, and we spent a lot of time talking about that in a part one of our Andreessen Horowitz episode involving none other than benchmark capital. So David ends up doing the CEO searches for Netscape. He brings in Jim Barksdale, which of course is a Kleiner company and a John Dorr company. He does the same for Excite. He's working all over the Valley. it becomes a genuine self-fulfilling prophecy. He becomes the number one retained executive search CEO recruiter in Silicon Valley from his outpost in Westchester County, New York. He projects an aura of success and eventually it becomes success. So Benchmark comes out. I think Bruce flies out to Westchester and convinces Dave to leave all this behind. He's making millions of dollars a year in cash running his search firm. Yeah. None of this speculative startup equity. He's literally getting paid. Yes. And the Benchmark partners convince him to come out and try his hand being an actual VC and to join Benchmark. And I'm sure they're thinking, and this is what plays out, they need a shot in the arm here for this firm. And boy, is Dave that. So I couldn't 100% prove this, but I believe Dave's first deal is Webvan. Oh, is it? I don't know if he did others before, but if Webvan wasn't his first, it was certainly a. Among the first, like right after he arrived. So I'm just going to open up eBoys here. And for those who don't know, who have not heard of the book eBoys, it is the authorized history of Benchmark up until 2000, where the author actually sat with the partners for the better part of two years, fully sanctioned to observe conversations in partner meetings. And when it comes out, it's not the book that they thought it was. It is a little bit more gossipy and interpersonal and definitely characterizes each person to be a little bit more tropey than they would be in real life. So it is both looked on as a lot of the facts are right, but also there's a lot of drama. It's a period piece. And we're going to talk more about eBoys in a second here, but I'm just reading here from page 30. So David Byrne arrived at Benchmark with ambitions to contribute to the partnership fast in any way he could. And he had some ideas, for which he hoped he could find entrepreneurs. One of the concepts that kept nagging him was an e-commerce business that he called MyStore, which would sell online everything for everyday needs. Start with groceries and move toward an online Walmart. We've got some less family-friendly language here, but I'm quoting from the book. So fast forward if you have little ones listening. Well, shit, Bruce Dunleavy said when Dave told him his idea as the two sat in Dunleavy's office. Have I got the plan for you? Dunleavy reached into a stack of papers and pulled out a business plan called Oasis. He tossed it to Byrne, explaining that he and the other partners lacked the balls to do it. Would Byrne be willing to be the guy? And Oasis, of course, is Webvan, which I remember Webvan as a creator, a cautionary tale of what could go wrong in the dot-com excesses. But going back and doing the this is actually a great bet to make. Oh, this is exactly the type of bet you should be making in venture capital. Totally. This is the exact kind of swagger bet with the right aligned asymmetric upside and downside that if you want to be taking the right kind of risk to establish yourself as one of the premier early stage venture capital firms, you should be doing. All right. So what was Webvan? What was the company or what was the deal? What was the company and why was it so swagger filled to do it? Have we talked about Webvan on every season episode so far in season 11, I think? That might be true. Yeah, I feel like everybody knows. The theme of season 11 is Webvan. There we go. There we go. That's so true. We probably hit it on Walmart and Amazon. So, of course, as we've talked about, it was Louis Borders, the founder of Borders Books, which had then gotten absorbed by Kmart and then spun out. And he had, left as part of all that. And he felt like Borders didn't realize his vision. He wanted another big swing, bite at the apple. He knew about Kmart, Walmart. He wanted to build Amazon, what Amazon is today. He wanted to build Amazon.com, the modern Amazon.com. He was just a couple of decades too early. And so that's what Webvan was. It was anything you want, starting with groceries. That was their wedge. But it was anything you want from the web on a van delivered to your doorstep. And importantly, now, Webvan did have the sort of last mile component as the initial founding wedge. Whereas Amazon, they're like, yeah, we'll get it to you. And it might take two weeks. And of course, then they get to prime and they get to prime now. And now they're trying to do one day prime. And all sorts of things can happen the same day if you're spoiled like me and live in Seattle. And Webvan had that from the start. And it was equally ambitious. Louis Borders did want to do food and everything. It was the everything store at the edge, sort of close to your house whenever you want it. And it was so ambitious that even the benchmark partners, after they invested, kept trying to talk him into, could we just do food? Do we have to compete with everything Amazon is doing right away? And the benchmark partnership as a whole, but I think especially the original four benchmark partners were the ones really pushing David to push Louis. Hey, can we just do food? Can we scale down? David totally falls in love with Louis. This is what he's there to do from his perspective. And it did feel like this was the sell to Dave. Hey, leave your lucrative, successful executive search firm, because if you come here, you can make big bets. And so I think that was the thing that was always on his mind is, well, if there's a bet that everyone else at the firm is too scared to make, maybe I'll make it. Yep. He was that guy. Which benchmark totally needed. Yes. They needed to re-inject that DNA. And this deal is a great deal to make, as I alluded to. So here's how the deal goes down. And this is great, because this is not how people remember it. Everyone goes, web van, ball of flames, terrible venture investment, more money on fire than I can ever remember. Emblematic of dot-com insanity and incorrectness of everybody lost their mind. This is A, a great risk-adjusted bet to make by benchmark, but B, not actually that big of a smoking crater relative to today. So it's a $7 million round. Benchmark splits the deal with Mike Moritz at Sequoia. Sequoia does $3.5 million. Benchmark does $3.5 million. Moritz and Byrne join the board. I think they each get 10% of the company. And then web van does do a late stage, one or two. I can't remember if it was one or two, at least one, quote unquote, later stage, but mezzanine rounds from completely other investors. Sequoia and Benchmark don't put more money. into the company before they go public. And then web van goes public. During the go-go eras, it trades up to an $8 billion market cap. So at the high point for this web van bet that Benchmark and Sequoia each put $3.5 million into. That's what Lyft is today. They go from, let's assume it was 10% that they each got. Maybe there's a little dilution in there, but let's keep it easy. $3.5 million to $800 million in public stock within three years. So man, fantastic. I don't think they got liquid on a lot of it. I think they were still locked up before the dot-com crash happened and it cratered. So whether they got any money out or not, I don't know. But man, what a great bet to make. I stand up and applaud for web van. And the thing that I really want to underscore here is for the asset class of actual venture capital, early stage, high risk, high returns, stuff, you want to back someone who's got a missionary focused dream. Like Louis Borders was ready for his next act and he wanted it to be really, really big. And it was probably the right bet maybe at the wrong time. It's probably a decade, maybe two decades early, but the vision was right. And so you're betting on someone that kind of has to be bigger than their previous win. So they have an incentive to make it really, really big. And as a venture investor, you want to be buying all that. You don't really want to be making these sort of risk mitigated bets and have a port. No, that is why you have a portfolio of 30 companies. Go get all the risk you can. And especially for three and a half million dollars. So that's less than 5% of the fund. Like for sure. Of course, do that all day long. So that starts to bring some swagger back to benchmark. And then you alluded to e-boys. It takes a couple of years for e-boys to get written and come out. But what a ballsy move. These guys are like, yeah, let's bring in an established author. So Randall Strauss had written at that point, Steve Jobs and the next big thing about next and the tagline on the book, which I think was part of, you know, the actual book ended up being different than I think what everybody thought, but was the first inside account of venture capitalists at work. And it's like the benchmark guys, they got nothing to lose again at this point. So like, why not? Let's be the first inside account of venture capitalists at work. And Randall gets access to everything. Like he sits in partner meetings. He's the author in residence. He's there at 20%. He's in the portfolio companies. I think he even visited the web van facility. Yep. Which was off limits to all press, you know, all outsiders. Super private. Yep. Even at their launch, they didn't let any press inside to see it because they were afraid of giving up trade secrets. He embeds with eBay. It was crazy to do this. And at the beginning of e-boys, Randall writes in the introduction here, there was no precedent within the venture business for providing an outsider such access. I suspect that the benchmark partners thought that something ballsy like this, which was sure to make the gray beards of the guild squirm must ipso facto be a good thing you know which is funny and of course it's more complicated than that but i think it's emblematic of they got the swagger back they're like you know what you got to play like there's nothing to lose here yep so that leads us to the big one the one that actually changes everything you know certainly then and still right up among their best venture investments of all time and this one required all the pieces of the puzzle it required the executive recruiter it required the knowledge of consumer which at the time consumer investing was not a thing that overlapped with technology it was not a thing that if you were betting on technology companies you're usually investing in semiconductors you're investing in networking equipment you're investing in enterprise software and so you needed this marriage of we need to find a killer executive for a consumer company that's building a consumer brand that has unbelievably disruptive brand new cutting edge always falling over technology it required a focus on and core belief in the future of the internet and it required teamwork of the whole partnership working together so june of 1997 actually well before june pierre omidyar who we talked about on the amazon.com episode had been working a few years prior at a little pen computing company called ink and they were a pen computing company and bruce dunleavy from meryl pickard anderson and air was an investor in the company and ink had an interesting journey pretty much the whole pen computing space except arguably palm pilot didn't really pan out this is like the go corporation of which jerry kaplan wrote the great book startup about and ink certainly fell into that category but the vcs and the management team refused to kind of give up on the company and they pivot into very very early e-commerce sort of software enablement enterprise software for early e-commerce and the company ends up getting sold to microsoft in a good outcome so everybody's happy they kind of all went through the trenches together and pierre had been working there as an engineer during the time he has fond memories he got to know bruce through that and after ink do you know where pierre goes after ink right before he starts ebay or auction web oh i do not oh you know oh i thought for sure you would know this he goes to the epicenter of pretty much all innovation that has ever come out of silicon valley general magic oh that's right that's right that's right i remember yes when watching the documentary a few years ago yeah ah we should do an episode on general magic and maybe find some of the original people uh that'd be we should do that at um the computer history museum in silicon valley that would be super awesome i assume they have the device there they invented the concept of cloud they invented the concept of mobile in retrospect it actually makes sense that pierre would go to general magic given his background in pen computing totally it all makes sense so while he's working at general magic famously in his free time pierre starts tinkering around on the early internet and starts a collection of internet services that he calls ebay for electronic bay area although there would be lots of retrospective justifications of that name and there was like a lot of crap on this website it's like a courier font website that has like a bunch of stuff on it all under this like umbrella of ebay but it's just like a bunch of different content and like some programmatic stuff and to your point there was one link one of the five or so main things you could do on the site was do this thing called auction web which surprise surprise became the thing that became ebay so we're telling all this history because hey it's awesome to tell ebay history especially having done amazon earlier this season but kind of painting the picture here of like pierre's this like engineer this is a side project you know it's really unclear what's going on here that's right he was full-time he was still a full-time employee at general magic when creating ebay you know he's been at companies right but on the engineering side he's not like a what any vc at the time would consider like you know ceo material as stupid as that was but it's very different than jeff bezos coming from d shaw with a full-fledged business plan and building everything out and then you know john dore from kleiner perkins cold calling him like that's not what happened at ebay by any stretch of the imagination but what does happen is it starts working and at first pierre is like just hosting these auctions for free there's no business model he gets so much traffic that like his server costs kind of go through the roof and so he reluctantly had in hand shamefully asked his users to pay a small listing fee just to keep the lights on and famously it's like the way he does it is they send checks to his apartment he gets deluged with checks he can't open the mail fast enough this is product market fit that our friends is product market fit he brings on jeff's goal who is a newly minted mba from stanford business school to come in and be the quote-unquote business guy meaning literally like open the checks and cash them it is funny that like if pierre hadn't needed to pay for the server costs there's a really good chance this could have gone the way of the linux foundation or craigslist and i know craigslist is a real business now but like it could have been wikipedia could have been this like unbelievable resource for humanity that generated no profit but instead that became the it company for a generation think about the way we think about fangs today in the early 2000s and late 90s that's how people thought about ebay totally and we chronicled so much of this on the amazon.com episode but for our purposes here you know again painting the picture this deal had some hair on it so pierre after he brings on jeff's like actually you know okay i'm open to building this as a business and like obviously we've got good revenue like we have cash flow i don't need the money but having experience from ink and then also from general magic he knows that vcs and a professional board can really help the company and he remembers bruce from the ink days but p and jeff they go around sandhill they pitch this to everybody and just about everybody else actually literally everybody else turns them down benchmark though is interested and bruce is interested and he's like you know as you were saying ben my partner bob is actually really interested in consumer stuff and consumer marketing and consumer psychology you should meet my partner bob bring bob in then they bring david in and david's like i can bring in the management team i can find the right person for this you know kevin and andy love it it's really the whole team working together they give pierre and jeff a term sheet to invest 6.7 million dollars total in the company in a series a financing at a 20 million dollar pre-money valuation pierre and jeff have one other term sheet a competing term sheet shall we say but the terms they offer are a little different the other term sheet is from knight ritter the large newspaper conglomerate it was basically an acquisition right it was an acquisition at which jeff's goal had worked very briefly after graduating from stanford gsb for a few months before pierre recruited him to come help open the mail at ebay which kind of makes sense right this is a classified thing on the internet we do classified things for newspapers we can do this too oh how the world would have been different if one of the nation's leading newspaper companies had acquired the leading online classified business and an interesting thing to note is at this point ebay is growing 10 a month so check fast growth company it's profitable all these checks that are getting mailed in like it is generating cash and growing so why would you get acquired why would you not keep running this thing well it was actually a pretty compelling offer the reason you would get acquired is they offer pierre and jeff 50 million dollars five zero million dollars and that's a thing you would think about taking that is a thing you would think about taking especially at this moment in time i mean that's like a lot of money right you know exits quote unquote didn't often happen for that size let alone exits of like a two-person company that like was barely a company right so there's some debate about what happens here and there's debate among people who were there this is a truly unknown truth but we will give you everything we know yeah it's like the aws episode and like multiple origins of aws there is a version of the story where none of the money that benchmark invested in ebay was actually used by the company that actually is probably true they probably didn't actually burn any of the money because they were profitable they were always profitable they were never not profitable i think of the portion of the 6.7 million dollar benchmark investment that went to the company's balance sheet i don't think any of it ever left the balance sheet yes i think that is correct perhaps not all of this $6.7 million went to the company's balance sheet. Perhaps. What we do know is that Benchmark got 20% or more of the equity in eBay for their equity investment in eBay. What was reported was that they own 22.1% at IPO. It was also reported by the Washington Post after the IPO of eBay that Benchmark had also structured equity-backed loans to Pierre and Jeff in the amount of $750,000 each as a way to prevent them essentially, give them an incentive not to take the acquisition offer from Knight Ritter because they're sitting there, they're like, oh my God, this is life-changing money. Right. So it's effectively a secondary. It's structured as this equity-backed loan, but basically what you could sort of take away from if this Washington Post article is true is a total of 1.5%. $5 million was paid to Pierre and Jeff to say, hey, make yourselves comfortable. You know, this is a secondary effectively. I have also heard from a podcast where another Benchmark partner at the time said that three of the six was used as a secondary, 50% of the investment round. And of course, we have also heard that there was no secondary and that doesn't exist at all. I think there was at least something, and there's enough sort of smoke here around the equity-backed loans that was reported. Not only by Benchmark. The Washington Post, but then it was in SEC filings that in addition to the equity investment that Benchmark made, there was also some kind of equity-backed loans to give them the ability to whatever they made on the appreciation of the shares that they got as a part of the direct investment, they also had a nice, nice, nice return from the founders deciding to take some money off the table. So all of this is highly untraditional, highly non-consensus. They're the only term sheet. They're willing to probably do at least some sort of this, what would come to be known as secondary transaction that then later everybody would wake up and realize like, oh, this is a great use case for this. Allow the entrepreneurs to take some money off the table so they don't sell the company for $50 million and instead let everybody make $50 billion. But nobody else was willing to do it at this time. They were the only VC term sheet and the only ones willing to structure a deal like this. I also love how everyone was making hay during the clubhouse deal, that this was some kind of like new phenomenon. Like, oh my gosh, $10 million to the company's balance sheet and $2 million to the clubhouse founders when it's only a few months old. What is Andreessen Horowitz thinking? This is crazy town. And it's like, the benchmark eBay deal, that may have been 50% of the round or at least 25%. So the deal gets done in the summer of 1997. And you don't have to wait long for the fruits of that deal to ripen. Unbelievable. September 1998, just a little over a year later, by which point in time, the company, and with Benchmark and David Byrne highly involved, has recruited Meg Whitman, superstar Meg Whitman from Hasbro and previously of Disney Strat Planning fame. And that's right. She was part of the Strat Planning group. Yep. And I think previously to that, Bain, I believe it was Bain, one of the big three consulting firms to come in, take over as CEO and lead this. And God does Wall Street love this story. At the IPO in September, 1998, Benchmark's stake of the 6.7 million they invested is worth 400 million. Fortunately for them, though, they're still locked up for another six months. They can't distribute. By the time the lockup expires the next spring in 1989, that stake is worth over $4 billion. On an $85 million. A $6.7 million investment turned into $4 billion. In a little over 18 months, less than two years. The IRR on that is unreal. This alone, 47Xs their fund. Yes. Now, if something did or didn't happen with a secondary in these loans, and if those were incremental to the actual equity investment, which we don't know for sure if they were or weren't, but if they were, if what is recorded in the Washington Post in that old article, which is linked to in our sources, is true, that's another $1 billion kicker on top of the $4 billion. Which is an additional 12X on a fund that would have already, whatever, 47Xed. Unreal. So whether you're talking about $4 billion, $5 billion, whatever, and Benchmark distributes that. They lock that in. That is real returns to the fund's limited partners, to the GPs. And we do know for sure, that they distributed $4 billion. Yes. I just want to pause real quick and say, FundOne did go through the dot-com run-up and burst. And so in 2000, after that, a lot of the investments, actually not eBay, but a lot of the investments looked much worse very quickly. eBay had obviously a drop, but not like a drop to zero or anything. So depending on when they got out of certain things, at the point that eBoys was published, the mark on this fund was 92X. But even if it went down, we know it was at least like a 50X, because we know for a fact that $4 billion was actually distributed to LPs. So now remember back to the premium carry. Oh boy, 30%. Remember how I was painstakingly explaining that the first 1X goes back to the LPs. So then only after that, the GPs participate. That's a rounding error at this point. Even if they didn't give the first 1X back, if you 50X a fund. So even by the most, the most conservative analysis, you know, assuming no secondary kicker, everything, just what we like are pretty sure we actually know. That's one and a half billion dollars of carry dollars to be distributed amongst the equal partnership after the eBay investment. And they had, you know, slices of carry, you know, I'm sure Val retained some carry after he left. And famously, I think Bob pushed for this. They gave pieces of carry to their assistants, you know, so that you could, you know, the stories about like benchmark assistance becoming multimillionaires. Like that was it. This is how this was how I had. So I think before the IPO, but after eBay is clearly working and Meg Whitman is there, benchmark had been doing for a while and would really embrace bringing in entrepreneurs and residents and doing the EIR strategy of company formation. Bring somebody who wants to start a company in house them at the firm, help them get started, you know, bring the whole partnership together to help them. Incubate the company. They did this with an EIR named Danny Shader. And Danny comes up with the idea for a company he calls accept.com. He notices eBay is becoming so big. It's now this viable platform on its own, but actually doing payments for auctions that are completed is pretty hard. And so he says, you know, I think there's actually an opportunity to build a separate independent company to do payments on the internet. And specifically to start with accepting payments for sellers on eBay. Benchmark partnership gets super excited about this. They bring in eBay. They bring in Meg. Meg's talking about like, we like this. We need this. Maybe eBay will invest in the deal itself, too. So they put the deal together. They fund the company. Benchmark does. The IPO roadshow starts, you know, Meg gets distracted. eBay ends up not investing. Then after the IPO is done. Then eBay gets cold feet. They don't do the deal. They're thinking about, oh, should we build this ourselves? Should we look at other companies of acquiring? PayPal doesn't exist at this point. Why are we partnering at all? Shouldn't we own just like 100% of this thing if we're bringing all the customers to it? So this company is kind of stillborn at this point in time. You know, what are they going to do? The whole business plan was payments on eBay auctions listings. You'd think this would be a zero. They call up Amazon. And we talked about this. I saw the Amazon.com episode. But fortuitously for them and for Benchmark, Amazon was starting to think about competing directly with eBay and launching Amazon auctions. They swoop in and they buy Accept.com for $175 million of Amazon stock. So Benchmark, get some Amazon stock. And would become close with Jeff Bezos. There was a sort of longstanding relationship between Jeff and Benchmark. You know, eBay then they do buy another company, but one that does not have good technology. It doesn't work out. And that's what leaves the window open for PayPal. A couple of years later, there were so many points in time where like the window should have closed for PayPal to be started. There's no reason that that company should have been successful or existed yet. But unforced errors just kept happening in front of them. And they just kept having that open window. Ah, so fun. Such a fun sidebar. And fun to tell it now from the eBay. And benchmark side of things as we told it from the Amazon side a little bit ago. So why is it that in less than two years, Benchmark's stake grew 100,000%? Why did eBay appreciate so quickly? And to put a finer point on that, they invested at a $20 million pre-money valuation. And by the next spring, the company was worth $21 billion. I think there are a few things. The simple answer to that is, is the world and the financial markets woke up to the power of the internet? And what here, too, was a secret hiding in plain sight right in front of everybody's faces that like, hey, the internet is this incredible enabling technology and you can build real businesses that make real money on the internet was not something that most people believed until then. Now, other people in Silicon Valley did, of course, believe that Kleiner Perkins being chief among them. But there was another non-consensus from a Silicon Valley perspective aspect to the eBay deal that Benchmark was willing to see and exploit that nobody else did, which was that the external facing aspects of this company did not look anything like the kind of companies that Silicon Valley backed. But if you just looked at the numbers, it was working. This was already working. The outward factors made it look like there was a ton of risk. Investing in this business, but it was already de-risked. It was already working. Yeah. From the outside, it looked like this UI sucks. No one will ever use this. And also, it's not a real business of people selling Beanie Babies like they were getting laughed at. So it was super non-consensus from that perspective. Sidebar, the first business enterprise that I ever did in my entire life was selling Beanie Babies on eBay. No way. You were a merchant. Yeah, totally. I sold three Beanie Babies. Two of them for $100 each, and one of them, a Jerry Garcia bear for $350. It's weird that I remember all this. Oh, I remember that Jerry Garcia bear. That was the real hot commodity, right? Yep. So it's interesting. To answer the question of the growth, there was intrinsic value growth, certainly, of this company growing 10% per month. And then it had some fits and starts, and there were times where it was growing even faster than that. And then there were times where it wasn't growing at all because the servers were down, and they had to work directly with, I feel like, it was like, I don't know if it was DEC or Sun, but someone to come help us fix whatever we're breaking on your hardware by scaling so fast and using this for purposes that you never intended it to be used for because this was pre-good web servers existing. But also, the multiple growth was just nuts. People were willing to project way farther in the future because they thought, okay, retail's a big market. If the internet's actually a thing, and people are willing to transact on the internet, then my god, this business is going to enable online peer-to-peer commerce with no holding of inventory. This is an asset-light, high-growth, pure technology business in a gigantic consumer market. Let's go. And so, of course, bubbles happen. And of course, that would never happen again. No, of course not. It's funny. I looked up eBay's market cap today, and if you look. If you look at eBay's market cap, when they went public, it was a couple billion dollars, then of course ran up real fast, as we talked about, to $25 billion, stayed there through the dot-com crash. The bottom of the trough, I think, was something around $7 billion. And then it would have another run-up in 2004, up to $77 billion. But after going up and down and buying PayPal and divesting PayPal, after all this. Do you know where it is today, David? I believe it's about $25 billion, right? $23 billion. Right about the market cap, however many years later this is, 22 years later, right around the market cap where Benchmark got liquid. Wow. Wow. That's so crazy. Isn't that wild? And right about, what is that, like 1 50th of Amazon's market cap? Something like that. It's still astonishing to me that, in the long run, Amazon, ended up beating eBay. It makes sense. It's that Bezos quote about, in the long run, there is zero misalignment between customer experience and shareholder value, and customers get a much better experience from Amazon holding inventory, and Amazon doing all this really hard, low-margin, thread-the-needle stuff in order to create this great user experience. But that stuff compounds. Well, that is the perfect transition to come back to. I want to talk, talk about the Benchmark architecture itself and analyze why the equal partnership and the teamwork and everything worked here. All right, listeners, now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Legora, the agentic operating system for legal work. Yes. Most of you have dropped a contract into a chatbot by now, but as a lawyer, how far can that really take you? It's never seen your firm's precedence. It doesn't respect confidentiality, and you can't check where its answer came from. So Legora's founders approached this the way that great founders do. Early on, the team moved into the office of a big law firm in Stockholm and learned, for months, how the work actually gets done. A couple of thousands of enterprise customers and 100,000 users later, they still work that way. They employ 100 legal engineers on staff. These are lawyers sitting inside of firms and legal departments to deploy Legora onto live situations like the deal closing this week or the review due Friday. The product has gotten very powerful in a short period of time. A year ago, the goal was a good answer from a chatbot. With the Legora agent, you hand it the work, and it comes back with a plan. Tasks like running diligence on a data room or reviewing a new vendor contract get completed inside the tool you use every day, like Microsoft Word, and against your own precedents and playbooks. Every finding is sourced, the lawyer directs the work and signs off before the system executes any steps. Every legal team can get access to the same AI models, so the models themselves do not give you an edge. What you can do with your own data, people, playbooks, that's the whole game. Today, over 100,000 legal professionals at more than 1,800 law firms and in-house legal teams in over 50 markets use Legora. And when Legora goes head-to-head with its top competitor in a pilot, it wins 70% of the time. A demo is one thing, but what matters most is an agent who reaches for it at 2 in the morning during a closing, or whether a general counsel trusts what it says before the board meeting. So if your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're at a firm or in-house, go to legora.com slash acquired, and be sure to tell them that Ben and David sent you. All right, so we've told now the story of Benchmark Fund One, from pre-founding up through Fund One, raising it, the marketing, the founding religious fervor around equal partnership, the rocky start, and then the hiring of David Byrne, the getting the swagger back, it all working. I think maybe before we continue on the rest of the very much more to come of Benchmark history, I think we should take a step back and talk about okay, this equal partnership thing itself that they marketed so much around the beginning of the firm that really was like the founding ethos. How did this actually play out in practice? Yes. So part of it obviously was economics. Part of it was what they thought was right. Part of it was LP marketing. Part of it was counter-positioning against John Doerr, obviously, for sure. How do we be different? Do something that they will never, ever do, which would have been giving up an enormous amount of their personal economics. Right. John wasn't going to make the other partners at Kleiner Perkins equal partners to him. It was downstream impacts of that to portfolio companies, to winning deals, but also to then working with portfolio companies. John and Kleiner almost lost the Amazon deal when he tried to hand off the board seat. Not only did that not happen at Benchmark because there were no junior partners to hand the board seat off to, it was like in the case of eBay, it was the opposite of that. Like, hey, we'll all come help you. We're going to bring the whole talents of the whole firm and all of our varied skill sets to help you. Yep. You are and what you're doing. Designed not to scale. Yes. So now let's talk about some of the second order benefits or effects. Everything is about trade offs. So it's the benefit that comes with the problem. It creates a culture of unbelievable trust. I think this was some of the surprise upside of the model. When nobody has any incentive to claim credit for anything, because everyone already has the best job at the the best firm, then it forces even the most competitive people, of which they all were unbelievably competitive people, to have a sense of teamwork that just wouldn't have happened otherwise. Because as we know from Buffett and everyone else who has said it over the years, incentives drive behavior. And if you truly create the incentive for this group of people to be this team oriented, then all you're left with is this culture of teamwork and this culture of trust, where you're all in bed with each other. I mean, you have signed up to be, for better or for worse, a part of this person's success or failure. And let's unpack those incentives because I think there are several layers to this. There's the obvious economic incentive. David Byrne made as much money on eBay as Bob Cagle made on eBay, as Bruce Dunleavy, as Kevin Harvey, as Andy Ratcliffe made on eBay. They all made the same. So if one of them could help give a boost that would add an incremental couple billion to that market cap, it was well worth it to all of them. Yep. That's the most baseline obvious one. But I actually think that's the less salient one on a day-to-day basis. Having lived myself as part of firms, we all have to. Obviously, the money is the scoreboard and your job is to provide outsized returns for your limited partners and it matters to you. But on a day-to-day basis, that is not part of your mind every day. What is much more salient, I think, to most people who are working as investors within a venture capital firm is the impact of what they are doing on their own career trajectories. And in any other structure, that is either the foremost thing on your mind or the foremost thing on the back of your mind. And you may profess otherwise, but it is there. It is there every day in what you're doing. And just as one small example that the older generation and some of the current generation benchmark partners like to talk about, the older folks thinking back to their previous firms, say another partner, maybe say a senior partner, has a portfolio company that they're on the board of, that they're responsible for that investment. And there's an executive hire that would really help. And you know a candidate who could be like the perfect candidate for that firm. Is it in your best interest to send that candidate to that firm or to wait until one of your portfolio companies has a spot open for that candidate? There's the economics, but even more than that, making that senior partner's track record better, not only does you no good, it does you like net negative good because it widens the gap between them and you. Once you introduce a secondary incentive, which you have when there is anything junior-senior, and the incentive is become senior, then there's a misalignment. And whether someone chooses to act on that, they're not good for not doing it. They're not evil for doing it. It's just worth acknowledging that new incentive exists, so it will change the behavior. And this isn't to say every fund should all be equal. The only way this works is if everyone truly brings the same amount of value to the partnership. Because otherwise, over time, you will have a situation where even if you're equal economically, you become unequal in everybody realizing, hey, that person's not bringing it the way that we're bringing it. And that creates just as big of a problem. You've brought up, I think, the absolute crux of this that I've, you know, we've now read and watched and listened to probably just about, maybe not, I won't say 100%, but probably 95% of all the content out there about benchmarking. And I don't think this is talked about anywhere else. And I think this is hopefully the biggest piece of context we can bring to the understanding of benchmark and venture capital in our industry with this episode. There is a very obvious question when you look at benchmark and you look at their success and you look at their success over generations, which is if this obviously works so well, why doesn't everybody do it? Why doesn't it work everywhere else? And the benchmark, firm model is very, very much in the minority. There may not even really be any other firms that are structured the same way as them. And I think what you just brought up to me is the crux of the answer. There's two ways that this partnership model in the benchmark style can play out depending on the personalities involved. For most groups of people, I think it actually trends towards mediocrity. And this was some of the criticism of, LPs and some of the other GPs in the early days thinking they were crazy. They called it communist capital. This looks like communism, right? Like if everybody's responsible, nobody's responsible. And so you trend towards the squishy middle. And I think for a lot of groups of people, that's what the natural outcome of this would be. Not to mention you have people that are overcompensated and some that are undercompensated if you're not all sort of bringing the same amount of value. And so the incentive there is messed up too, because I think this is a different way of saying the same thing you already said, but. If you're the person that brings the most value, but you're not being compensated for it, well then. Why are you giving 80% of your economics to these other deadbeats? You start showing up in a mediocre way. Yep. You're going to leave. For this model to work, you need every active general partner, every owner of the firm, everybody who is in that equal slot to be bringing it at an equal level, both in terms of effort and in terms of output. To bringing it at an equal level, and to literally the utmost of their capabilities. Because I think it does trend towards equilibrium and equal level of effort and bringing it that everybody brings. But you need a cultural norm of we're all bringing it like 100% every day. And that's, I think, a big part about what that sort of the initial swagger that Benchmark had. And then that reset afterwards, I think really set that as the tone. And that's what I think makes it very. It's hard for other groups to replicate. Yeah. And I also think that's why they have to retire once they sort of age too far out of their 40s. Because it is an implicit thing among the group of you gotta be bringing it all day, every day. And at some point, if you want to notch down to 90%, it's time for you to not be a GP in the fund. And I think a lot of these things, especially after talking with folks who are and have been partners, I think a lot of this is implicit. I don't think this is codified in rules anywhere. And I don't think a lot of it is explicitly said in conversation because they have an awareness of how unbelievably delicate the trust is, and how you need to create an unbelievable support system for your partners to be able to succeed. You have to be super supportive of them to make the riskiest possible decision. And I think that's a big part of it. And I think a lot of this is implicit. I don't think a lot of it is explicitly said in conversation because they have an awareness of how unbelievably because that is the business that we're in. You have to find the outliers. You have to go find these weird marginal edge cases. And if somebody feels like they don't have the trust and support and safety in their partner group, they're not going to do that. And so a lot of conversations, well, I think it's a very sort of like familial group. And like there's sort of lore about these 10 hour Monday meetings where, you know, it's meandering and it's jovial and it's friendly. I think the hard conversation is, you know, it's not going to be a good conversation. It's going to be a good conversation. And I think a lot of these conversations have to be just so delicately handled in order to maintain this like very delicate state. It's constantly balanced on a knife point, I think. Yes. And here's what's even harder about maintaining that sort of knife point equilibrium and the nature of our business and particularly the nature of early stage. Even the very best investors and the most engaged, the people who are bringing it on the effort, and who have produced and are likely to produce extraordinary outcomes going forward. We all hit dry spots, right? I mean, I was just recently the other week listening to Ruloff from Sequoia did a great interview on Tim Ferriss's show. Awesome conversation. And you know, he's freaking Ruloff. He's running Sequoia now. He took over for Leone, right? And one of his very first investments was YouTube. So right out the gate, he's crushing it. But then he hit a dry spell. And it was really hard on him. It was hard on the partnership. And he talks about it. So like now imagine you're within the benchmark partnership. And one of the partners or multiple of the partners hit one of these dry spells. How do you disambiguate as a member of that group? Do I think that my partner, this person can pull themselves out? Can we as a partnership together pull them out of this dry spell? Will they get back to performing at the top of their game or not? Right. You have to keep their head game strong. You can't add to the pile of reasons of self-doubt. So I think this is the trade-off, implicit, architecting a firm like Benchmark the way that they have if you're going to maintain world-class performance. It will not scale, but you do get this next level of trust that you can't get any other way, which should lead to outcomes and which actually this is a good time. I was debating if I was going to actually mention this on the episode or not, but I want to. So in preparing for this, I was talking with Rich Barton. Rich famously started Expedia by spinning that out of Microsoft and then started Zillow, where Benchmark was an investor. And Rich for a long time was a venture partner with Benchmark. And I think it was only when he jumped back in the seat as CEO of Zillow that he stopped being an active venture partner there. And his point to me was, it's way harder to cooperate your way to success. There are other ways to do this. Obviously, there are other models of very successful venture firms. We've told several of them on this podcast. Yeah, but this cooperating your way to success is the benchmark secret sauce. And because of that, and because the relationship with a benchmark board member who is almost like a co-founder and the entrepreneur is so tight and the communication is so frequent. I mean, we talked to founders who said, I'd speak to my board member every week. And we talked to other people who said, we're texting or calling every single day. I mean, this is really a tight knit relationship in how they sort of think about the board role. Rich's point was this culture of cooperation and trust ends up being a model for entrepreneurs to bring into their company. And it's amazing having that kind of example to follow. And I don't think he meant that it was like super direct or overt, but I think he meant that you sort of naturally end up learning from that and following it and implementing it in your company. Yes, this absolutely spills over. into the portfolio company relationship, both between the kind of lead, you know, the board member within benchmark, but, you know, even more so. And I think this is what one of the things that makes benchmark very different from other firms, the whole firm of benchmark, the whole partnership, the firm is the partnership, there is no difference between the firm and the partnership, there's nothing else, that relationship with the entrepreneur and the portfolio company. If I'm a founder, and I am choosing a board member, it's crazy how most people don't think about this, because you're, you're most. trying to figure out, can I get a deal done? Can I get a deal done at good terms, that sort of thing. But really, what you want is a board member who feels psychological safety in their partnership, to do the things that they think are right without conflicting incentives. It is crazy how rare that is for someone to actually have that psychological safety. So bringing it back for a minute to the psychological makeup of the individual partners within the partnership, and why it's so critical. flexible and delicate. You know, a big theme of this first part of the benchmark story we just told was having to have the swagger. If you don't have the swagger, if you don't have the, uh, one of the folks we talked to called it swashbuckling this, if you don't have that, the magic disappears. It's like, you know, for anybody who's played sports, the minute you start thinking when you're out there on the field, it's game over. You're not going to win. You're not going to perform. You got to be out there feeling yourself believing I'm going to hit that shot. I'm going to make that play. Give me the ball. I want the ball. We're going to win. If you don't have that mindset, you're going to crumble. And that's why I think these things are so intricately tied together in a partnership structure like this. Okay. So now that we've laid this groundwork of how delicate it is and how essential it is and how at the core of benchmarks, every fiber of their being it is. Now let's talk about the first time that they recruited someone new into the partnership. That's got to be pretty hard to be the first person coming in to kind of be the next generation of the firm. After the big success, right? Because David Byrne sort of was this, but like, it was sort of part of almost a reset. Yes. They hadn't had that success yet. So we're now post eBay, late 98, early 99. The IPO has happened. Distributions are being planned. Underway. And you've got a pretty interesting set of circumstances here. The model worked. You had the highest performing venture fund of all time in terms of returns to LPs of a meaningful size fund. Yes. It worked bigger and better and faster despite the false start than I think any of them really imagined. And you also have this element that we just talked about of like, you got to all be all in for this to continue to work. But everybody just made hundreds of millions of dollars. Yeah. Like, what now? Why are we raising from LPs again? Why aren't we just turning this into a family office? Of all the times to declare victory. Like, they could actually declare victory now. Right. Why are any of us going to work anymore at all, even if it's to invest our own capital? Right. And, you know, even I think they all do sort of recommit. And then eBoys talks about this a little bit. It's hard to know what the actual psychology was of any of the folks at the time. But as painted in eBoys and as borne out in practice, they all do. You know, nobody raises their hand and says, you know what? I can't go 100% anymore. I'm going to do other things. They do later, but they don't now. Even despite all that, the game just got way harder for them because they went from the people painting the targets on the back of John Doerr and other people to now they're the ones with the targets on their backs. And, you know, that's sort of the lesser problem. The bigger problem is the target of people who want to work with them. So they're now overwhelmed. With opportunity. The easy opportunities are the deals, you know, the investments, the entrepreneurs, the new companies. Even as the tech bubble starts to burst, Benchmark is now one of the top tier firms. They get all the calls. They get to see whatever they want to see, basically. Oh, and there's a bunch of things we didn't even talk about, like all the Fortune 500s that are calling them to say, start a joint venture with me to create a dot com. You don't even have to put any money in, but help me recruit the management team and understand how to do a startup. This is the big problem. Nordstrom and Toys R Us. This is the bigger problem, the distractions. So literally Goldman Sachs calls them up and is like, we want to benchmark Goldman Sachs joint venture. And not like you become Goldman Sachs. It's more like help us create the Goldman Sachs dot com. Yep. And you could imagine, you know, that could lead to all sorts of things. The car companies call them up GM, General Motors, you know, the original, like the DNA of two of the partners, you know, they want to do the same thing. You know, General Electric wants to do this. There is so much. And then we're going to talk about LPs and international and all of that in a minute here. There's an opportunity to raise a lot more money. Should we do that? 85 million was kind of a small fund. So for the five partners, there's a lot of debate about what to do now. Like, it's not clear what to do. I mean, A, they don't have to do anything as we talked about, but they are all committed. They want to do something. Some of them. Say like, Hey, are we actually cutting off our nose to spite our face by not hiring associates and junior partners here and scaling up, scaling our capacity? You know, we started as associates. We learned the trade and look at us now. Why can't we do the same for other people? Some of them say we should be doing all of these JVs. Like we should be moving towards a, you know, more next iteration, modern version of this Kleiner, Koretsu concept. Like if we have a relationship with Goldman Sachs, if we have a relationship with Goldman, Sachs, if we have a relationship with General Motors, if we have a relationship with Toys R Us and Nordstrom, isn't that helpful to all of our other entrepreneurs? Oh, they started something. If you look at their website from 2002, God, I'm so glad the Wayback Machine exists. They have a page called Our Corporate Network, and they've got like 30 different companies on there that the text says the benchmark corporate network is made up of key industry executives who accelerate the growth of our portfolio companies by facilitating strategic partnerships, sitting on boards, sitting on boards. And offering advice where appropriate. Companies active in the benchmark corporate network include and it's like, of course, tech companies, TSMC, Toshiba, Intel. But it's also companies that are sort of bridging the old world and the new. So you've got Charles Schwab and E-Trade. And of course, there's companies that were never in their portfolio, but are other big successful tech companies like Cisco. So you've got some partners saying we should do that. And then you've got other partners saying like, guys, don't mess with us. We don't mess with success. The model ain't broken. Don't fix it. We should stay focused and stay doing the exact same thing. Right. Because you could paint a picture either way. I mean, there's definitely a picture to be painted of like, the eBay thing really worked out. And this set of principles we had was a really good way to get started. But it's the world's going to change and it's going to pass us by. So we need to adapt. And if the new wave is the dot comification of America's greatest companies, we're in an amazing place to either seize that or let it pass us by. And let it slip through our fingers. And there was a very compelling argument to be like, let's be the future. And you look at like an Andreessen Horowitz, what they decided with Web3, they made that choice. Let's, at the risk of destroying everything, bet on this brand new big wave that we think could be the thing. Well, and Sequoia too, you know, Sequoia expanded internationally. Sequoia added a growth fund. Sequoia raised bigger funds. There are very clear examples of success in pursuing any of these paths. And listener, where you might expect us to go here is, but Benchmark didn't do any of that. They stuck to their guns. They knew what made them special. And they chose to ignore all the temptation. But, despite where they are today, that is not at all what happened. They tried everything. They threw the kitchen sink at corporate partnerships. They expended to multiple continents at the same time. They were like, "Oh, bigger funds. Let's raise a billion dollar fund." And they tried it all. Two thoughts. One, the one thing that they didn't do, the one thing they stayed true to on, was they didn't bring on junior partners. That's a hard decision to undo once you do that. You can undo all this other stuff. Hard, but you can, and they did. The other thing I was going to say on that, you know, the other firms we talked about that were successful with different strategies were architected in a way that they could pursue those strategies. Sequoia was a CEO firm. Don Valentine was the CEO, and then Mike Moritz was CEO, and Leonie was COO. The steward, anyway. Yeah, steward. Whatever you want to call it, you know. Ruloff is the CEO now. There was someone who could make a call. Yes, there was someone who could make a call who could say, I'm taking time as Doug talked about on our episode with him. Mike and I are taking time. We are going to travel to China and we are going to go find the right partners for us in China. And you all here are going to keep doing what you do here, making investments in Menlo Park. Tending to the chickens. Yes, tending to the chickens. What a great episode that was. That was so fun. You know, in Andreessen, they are an organization. They have hundreds of people. So all the things that they're pursuing, the corporate partnerships, the Web3, you know, there's hundreds of people working there in all different roles and levels. That's not benchmark. So the one thing, though, as you teed it up here, that they all pretty much right away are in agreement on after eBay is, let's bring in a sixth partner, a new equal general partner. Let's continue the model. And maybe we'll pursue some of these other things, too. But at a minimum, it's time to bring in a new general partner. So when you do this, and they've done this before, of course, with David Byrne, but it was different. Now it's benchmark. Back then it was benchmark capital. I haven't heard you guys like now it's benchmark. It is. I mean, honestly, listeners, I'll put the link in the show notes. You go to the 97 website and the 2002 website is comical to see like the word benchmark in this. Like they're selling so hard and they don't sell at all. Now, at least in a public facing way. And it's almost like someone made a cartoon about benchmark. When you're looking at this, you tweeted about this, that they had directions from the airport. There's a literal map from both San Jose and San Francisco. And it's like, here's San Francisco, here's San Jose, here's Stanford, and here's benchmark. It's amazing. So now when you're bringing in a partner with the benchmark equal partnership model, there's no try before you buy. You can't bring them in as a junior partner and see what happens and be like, oh, you know, you'll get a sliver of economics in this. We'll see if the partnership gels, you know, we'll see if you perform here, you know, and then no, you can't do that. You got to go all in from the beginning. And so when you accept that that's the set of constraints you operate in, there's actually a sort of very narrow path that it makes sense. And they're very narrow pool to fish in for future benchmark partners, which is if you want to be reasonably confident that somebody is going to be a good venture capitalist, you probably want to find people who are all in. You are already good venture capitalists. Yes, that's a great point. You could develop the talent internally or. Well, but you can't at benchmark. Right. It's like we could develop it internally, but the way we're set up prohibits that. And so we must look elsewhere. And what should we do? We should look for someone who has been in the industry long enough that they've burned through all the capital being a bad VC because there's a lot of tropes about it takes seven years or it takes $50 million to make a VC, which I think are all quite reasonable because your first several investments here. You're like, it's like you're getting the crap out. You may hit some winners, but it's probably going to be luck, not skill. Exactly. And you don't really have the right networks yet. And you haven't sat on boards with other VCs, even seen how people at other firms operate. And there's just lots of reasons why it takes a lot of money and a lot of time to form you into a great venture investor. But you don't want someone who's been doing it so long such that they're already the most senior person at their firm or they're toward the end of their career. If you're going to recruit them in and make an equal partner, you want to have. You want to have like 20 years of running room left in that person's career. And so that scopes you in super narrowly to like you need someone who's probably like 30 and like the best 30 year old venture investor. Yes, currently on the field. And back to the original founding impetus of Benchmark, somebody who's operating within a firm context where they are not an equal partner with full economics. And it's going to be very attractive for them to transition to. A place where they are. And on a personality trait characteristic, just to keep narrowing further and further, it's like, well, they need to be fiercely competitive, but also under the right set of conditions, an unbelievable teammate. Yes. The box gets small. It gets very small. And at this moment in time, late 90, early 99, there is one very obvious, very large person who fits in that very small box. Oh, and you need them to be over 6'5". 6'5 and a white man. Yes, right. They all did fit that characteristic early on, but are fortunately more diverse now. Yeah, which is funny now. Peter's the only white man left, as he's fond of pointing out, which is, you know, great. That is progress. Yep. Bill Gurley, of course, we're talking about. Yes. He sees above the crowd. I can't imagine that anybody listening now, you know, what are we, two, three hours into this podcast that's still listening does not already know a Bill Gurley. But, you know, his history. His history is basically perfect for this. He's also from Texas. He's from Houston. His, you know, his dad worked for NASA, I think. And then he goes to Florida. He plays basketball. He started his career as an engineer at Compaq, a John Doerr company. Goes to Wall Street, starts writing above the crowd. There was, I think this was on, there's a great interview he did years ago with Kara Swisher. I think this was where he tells the story. When he started above the crowd, he went to a tech conference that stored. Also up was putting on, they were selling this new device, you know, Palm pilots at the tech conference. You know, it's like a, uh, you know, like a new next wave of technology. And obviously Bruce was on the board. He didn't, you know, wasn't focused on that at the time, but these Palm pilots at the conference had the contact information for all the attendees of the conference, including like Bill Gates and like, you know, Steve Jobs. Oh, wow. People. So Bill bought the Palm pilot and then just started spamming everybody with their fax numbers. With his above the crowd post. I do know Michael Movison shared this story with us that the way that Bill originally started above the crowd was there was someone else who sent out a fax that was like a weekly sort of like equities analyst, effectively like blog posts, like newsletter. And they would send it out by fax at a certain time. And when that person retired, Bill started above the crowd to start sending the faxes at the same time and sort of fill the slot that this other person had, which was of course genius. And then he added to the contact list from the Palm pilot with fax numbers. So genius. And did you know, David, he eventually also started writing for Fortune. Oh, yeah. I've forgotten about that. He had a regular column in Fortune. He would always leave at the bottom, like if you have feedback, email, I think it was like ATC at Benchmark.com. I think it was like the above the crowd. That's awesome. That's awesome. He's a good growth hacker, Bill. He's underrated on that. Very good at distribution. And it turns out. And it turns out, venture capital investing. And it turns out venture capital. Well, we'll get into that. So, you know, we've told the story elsewhere. He'd been on Wall Street. He'd been to work for Frank Crotrone in Silicon Valley. Did the Amazon IPO with Frank. Frank promised to get him into venture. If he came out, he did. Bill joins Hummer Wimblad. Spends about 18 months there as a venture capitalist. But he's a well-known commodity. One of the rare female-led venture firms. That's right. Especially at that era. Very, very, very few. You know, Bill's just great. What can we say about Bill? That hasn't been said. One of my favorite things when we were talking to folks is so perfect. Bill has a Calvinist work ethic. And that is absolutely true. Absolutely true. I haven't worked with him on some stuff. I actually pulled all my quotes from research from things people said about partners into one place. And I definitely have this one. Having someone like Bill Gurley on your board is really like bringing in a new co-founder. He is always working on behalf of your company intellectually and executionally. Sounds like the Bill I know. So he's funny. So. All of this is chronicled in E-Boys. The whole recruitment process. All the internal discussions about Bill. Of course, it's E-Boys. So you got to take it with a grain of salt. It's dramatized. But what's interesting, you know, when I read it, there's this discussion about Bill that like just screamed off the page to me. Where the existing partners are concerned about whether Bill's too intellectual. And too analytical. Like he'll overthink the decisions. There's. There's this quote in there from one of the partners saying, I don't think it's attributed to whom. You know, we all know that this is more a balls than brains business. And when I read that, I just wanted to like yell at the book. I was like, this is a balls and brains business. And nobody personifies that more than Bill. And like, I can't believe how wrong this is. And like, God, this is so E-Boys. But talking to a bunch of folks and thinking about this, I actually see what they're getting at. At that. Era. And all of what had gone into making Benchmark Benchmark at that point in time. It was more a balls than brains business. Because you had to be willing to take risks that others weren't willing to take. They were certainly open to doing that. And you were with the exception of eBay, with the exception of the one that was the one. You were backing companies at that era that hadn't yet put the products in market. You had to raise venture capital for most companies. Yes. To. Get the infrastructure to build the product. There was no AWS yet. And you had to make that bet. You had to make those people bets at the stage that Benchmark was investing. You weren't investing on product traction. Which is really interesting because Benchmark mostly markets themselves at this point as a series A firm. That is not how they marketed themselves then. They said we do seed and startup investments. Seed being pre-business plan and startup being. post-business plan. Right, but not. customer traction. Exactly. And when I was really trying to figure out how did they shift from seed to series A and why, I think there's shades of gray. I think what they actually did was they shifted to series A for consumer, and they're still willing to do seeds in B2B. And in fact, there's a great girly quote where he says, backing a repeat entrepreneur in the enterprise sector is near risk-free. And so I think basically what happened is as more and more consumer startups started happening in the early and mid-2000s, you basically had angel investors that were starting to come in and fill the randomness risk, the pre-launch, no traction, who knows? The product building risk. Right. Because it was consumer so hits-driven that Benchmark basically said, okay, we'll let you guys take that risk, and we'll invest at the point of traction or the point of product market fit. Because these consumer products are such freaking crapshoots that we don't want to be playing in that seed stuff anymore for consumer. I have so much to say here. So one of the most obvious things to me here that's so funny is eBay is like the exception that proves the rule, but is the rule here. Like eBay had traction when they invested, and that's what made it non-consensus. But actually, that was like the smart thing to do because it had traction. And that's where they made the lion's share of their returns. So Bill joins from Hummer Wimblad. And do you know what Bill's first deal at Benchmark was? Ooh. No, I don't. Got some real fun Silicon Valley history trivia here. Nope. E-pinions. E-pinions. Do you know who the CEO was of E-pinions at the time? No. Naval. Really? Naval Rabican. Yep. That was his debut in Silicon Valley. Wow. And that did not end well for Naval. He did venture hacks? And then he went and did venture hacks. He ended up leaving the company. He was replaced as CEO. Then I think that was probably a big part of why he went and then did venture hacks and was kind of anti-VC in Silicon Valley. That led to AngelList. And now, how funny, how full circle it all comes. Bill also talks a lot about this on that Kara Swisher episode. It's so good. So Bill joins. And we got to tell this too from eBoys. There's this really funny vignette. The partnership can't get comfortable with like the one thing they're having trouble with with Bill. It's like, is he going to overthink things? Is he too analytical? Is he too intellectual? Does he have enough balls? And Kevin Harvey invites him on a hunting trip. He has a sort of hunting property. And on the hunting trip, Bill apparently greatly impresses Kevin by jumping over a cliff to go chase down either a deer or a boar that they're hunting and go like, you know. In the rain. Hunt the boar. Yeah. And Kevin's like, whoa, I wouldn't do that. Like, okay, this guy's got balls. I'm not worried about that anymore. Oh, so funny. So just everything. So eBoys. So two things to talk about here. First, we got to talk about the imperial era. But first, let's flash forward a little bit. I want to talk about Bill and his investing and how it ends up transforming the firm over time. He's a great investor in enterprise and consumer, but he becomes known for marketplaces. He's very analytical. He does well. He does some of these early marketplaces. He does OpenTable. He does Zillow. He does Grubhub. He does what? He does what? He comes to Odesk, you know, dog vacay that merges with Rover, you know, et cetera, et cetera. Hacker One. Yep. In the earlier era than that, sort of the Grubhub, OpenTable era and all that. Those were great wins. And Bill worked tirelessly, I think, to help make those companies successes. They weren't eBay-sized wins. They were far from eBay-sized wins. Well, Benchmark did not have an eBay-sized win until Bill's big marketplace. Exactly. Exactly. But I think it's very. Very retrospectively, and there's so much randomness tied into all this, but I do think that inside of the Series A style investing, I think Bill and Benchmark in the sort of next generation recognized that shift of like, oh, there's a mispricing here. Benchmark used to invest in seed and formation stage, taking the product risk. You can now invest at the Series A post-product risk where there's data and you can see if something's working or not. And you can make crazy-seeming bets like Uber at a $60 million valuation that are actually like deeply in the money, cannot lose money. And that was the era when Benchmark really shined. And that's the thing that Bill really brought from being an analyst and from writing regularly and from writing. We've referenced probably 10 times on this show, A Rake Too Far, Bill's post where he sort of compares all the different take rates and what goes into a take rate. And there's so much tying that into. Motes and pricing power. And he just understands all this stuff at such a deep level. And I think we shouldn't disparage the other founding partners. It just wasn't their skill set. It wasn't their strength. They didn't look at financial statements and develop emotions around what this business was good at and bad at and what the future could look like. They sat in a room with entrepreneurs and thought, does this guy have it? And I think it's a very different skill set. Very, very different skill set. And to bring it back now to this moment in time when they're bringing Bill on and also facing all of these other decisions and opportunities now that Benchmark is Benchmark, it's interesting that that decision, the bringing Bill on, the evolving the partnership, that was the right decision. All the rest of it were the wrong decisions. So let's get into that. And to dive in on your right decision, I just want to add a little more color. The Series A, was the place to run to for that period of time because of the mispricing you identified. If they had said, eh, we want to stay a gut-based business and we want to stay at formation stage investing. I mean, the rise of seed firms and accelerators and angel funds meant that that got so competitive so fast that they probably would have needed to go multi-stage and raise huge funds in order to compete rather than being lost in the base, lines and lowercase. And there's just no way. I mean, let's take Y Combinator, which is the big institutionalized winner out of all that. Benchmark couldn't have built Y Combinator. They weren't architected to build Y Combinator. But now the interesting, there is this interregnum period. It wasn't until after AWS that all this became possible, which wasn't until the mid-2000s. So from when Bill joins and all these decisions are on the table in 99-2000, you've got another five, six years before the world. Shifts. Okay. So what are all the other decisions they made? Well, like we said, the only thing they don't do is bring in junior partners, but they do everything else. They raise a billion dollar fourth fund. And before that, the first fund was 85. I think the second, I want to say was 150. And the third, I think was 175. I think those were the core funds. And then there were parallel entrepreneurs funds on top of those. So you know, if you think about it, if you think about it, you know, the first fund was a billion dollars. They raised a billion dollars for the fourth, you know, Menlo Park-based, Sand Hill-based fund. They expand internationally, first to Europe, and then to Israel. Bruce essentially moves to London. He's commuting back and forth, but spending a lot of his time in London for the first year, setting all that up. Which again, for all these things, the thesis makes sense. They looked and thought, eBay, well, that could have been started anywhere. Right. I mean, there's no reason that needed to be here in the Bay Area. It actually, at the beginning at least, didn't require that many employees, and it was matching people who were shipping stuff all around the world. So we've got a brand, and we have a unique ability to raise capital from LPs. We should be leveraging that for the next eBay that starts anywhere. Yep. They recruit seven partners, new partners, to come in and run the international funds, both a separate Europe fund, and a separate Israel fund, both structured the same way, but separate partnerships. Right. That's the interesting thing, is that it wasn't like, now we're all equal partners in one big pool. It was, you guys are a fund, and you have your own equal partnership, and we will come to an economic agreement where you get to rent the brand from us. But the reality was, especially in those early days, there was a lot of work involved from Benchmark. It was Benchmark. Benchmark LPs that were investing. It was the Benchmark brand. And then they had to go recruit the partners and put everything together, and then instill the Benchmark way in them, or try to. Right. Deal with answering the question, so how do you guys handle it when there's XYZ in the partnership? There's suddenly real administration in a group that's allergic to administration. We didn't mention this earlier, but there was one last tidbit I wanted to say on the upside benefit of the trade-off of running a Benchmark. You get to spend all your time on the field when you're a small, equal partnership. You're not spending your time managing the firm, or worrying about managing the firm, or worrying about where your career is going, or worrying about this, that, or the other thing. Literally 90, 95% of your time is spent playing the game on the field, which is making investment decisions, helping portfolio companies. There's nothing else. Right. Imagine, David, you and I spend all of our acquired time on research, recording, final tweaks on the edit, and then how do we want to message the release of an episode? And imagine if I had a recurring meeting for three hours on your calendar on Monday mornings about how should we hire the next 15 hosts to come up with and acquire all the listeners for all the new shows we're going to make. Yeah. you are the exact wrong person to do that job. And that is sort of the allegory. I mean, that is a big reason why Acquired is what it is today. But we talked about that years ago. Should we have more shows? Right. Should this be a company? And we were both like, absolutely not. That is not what we want to do. So yeah, it's very similar here. But Benchmark, to take the personal analogy, they wanted to run Acquired, but they instead decided to go build the New York Times. Right. But you can't go halfway. I mean, that's the thing. You need to go all the way if you're going to cross that chasm. Pretty quickly, the cracks start showing in this model. Well, here's what they do. They raise the billion-dollar US fund. They raise a $750 million Europe fund. They raise a $220 million Israel fund. The Europe fund, they end up cutting back to $500 million after the bubble bursts because they're like, we just can't invest $750 million. We can't deploy at all. Yep. But even still, you're now talking about a firm that the previous fund structure was on the order of $200 million, mostly in Silicon Valley, but all in the US, to now on the order of $2 billion around the world. It's a big task that they bite off. The cracks start showing almost immediately. There are three examples, all of which are sins of omission, which are the biggest sins in venture capital. None of the sins of commission, of deals you do, are what's really going to hurt you. It's what you don't. The first, and this happens shortly after Bill joins, but as all of this architecture, all of this infrastructure is starting to get spun up, that's when Google shows up. Does Google pitch benchmark? Well, it's unclear to me exactly what happened. Bill talks about it a lot. I think this is one of his few biggest regrets. He said that publicly. He had just joined the firm, and Google appears. And some subset of the benchmark partnership, including Bill, heard about them, met with them, had an opportunity to pursue. And Bill always frames it as they failed to pursue Google. Not that they passed or that there was a full part, but they didn't pursue it with the typical benchmark and Bill hyper-competitiveness drive to win that we all know. They declined to pursue. Would they have beaten John Doerr for Google? Maybe, maybe not. Debatable. Would they have beaten Mike Moritz for Google? Again, maybe, maybe not. Mike had done Yahoo at that point. Maybe slightly more believable that they could beat Sequoia at that point in time. But could they have beaten one of those two firms to get one of the two primary VC slots in Google? Almost assuredly. I mean, at this point, they're not going to be able to do that. They're not going to be able to do that. At this point, this was Bench where they had just done eBay. They were at the height of their powers. They were the internet firm. Google was the next internet company. They had the relationship with Bezos, even though Kleiner had the tighter relationship. But remember, Bezos was a very influential and large seed investor in Google. So gosh, that's a big miss. Yeah. Okay. Google's a miss. Google's a miss. Okay. That's one. Next, a much smaller miss, but still a big miss for a different reason. They've got this Europe fund now, right? What happens with a really promising European company that has aspirations to be a Silicon Valley company and go global? Does the Europe fund do it? Do the core benchmark Menlo Park partners do it? Wait, can I guess where this is going? Yeah. Skype. Skype. Skype. That emerges a couple of years after all this gets set up. Out of Tallinn, Estonia. Out of Estonia. And Bill talks about this too. He met Skype, likes Skype, he's got this right up his alley, right up Benchmark's alley. eBay ends up buying Skype. But should Bill do it? Should Benchmark Menlo Park do it? Should Benchmark Europe do it? Are they trying to hand it off? In the process, they lose the deal. So that's another miss. And then the third miss that is not directly, specifically related to the international expansion, but I think is more symptomatic, perhaps, of the sort of taking your eye off the ball. But a Google-sized miss is they miss Facebook. And so we know Sequoia is out for Facebook because of Sean Parker, the pajama pitch, you know, all that, the bad blood. Sequoia can't do Facebook. Who else could do it? Kleiner was still Kleiner at that point, right? The tumult hasn't started there. Totally. You know, Excel ends up doing it. Excel is a great, great firm. And Jim Breyer does, you know, like, not to take anything away from them, but like, absolutely, Benchmark should have been and was in the conversation. And this is 04-05. Yep. For the Series A, for the $100 million valuation of Facebook, you know, very similar to that Google round. What happened? Well, specifically, what happened was Benchmark had invested in Friendster and so was conflicted out. Now, you could argue that was an unavoidable mistake, you know, but like, boy, does that hurt. And supposedly, I think it was Bob, Kegel, who was on the board of Friendster. And at that point, there had been some CEO turnover at Friendster. Jonathan Abrams, who then started Noozle and Founders Den, was the original founder of Friendster. I'd forgotten that. Oh, my gosh. With the original acquired meetup at Founders Den. Indeed. And now runs APIC Capital. They had brought in Tim Kugel as CEO of Friendster at that point. Tim had been CEO of Yahoo. Tim blocked Benchmark from pursuing Facebook. Oh, is that really what it was? Did they know about Facebook? They never got to look at it because of Friendster? That's the story. And supposedly, you know, Mark Zuckerberg loved Bob, loved the Benchmark team. Who knows, right? But like, my point is, if you want to be a generational defining venture firm, by definition, you have to invest in the generational defining companies. They did that with eBay. And then the international expansion happened. And then for a whole variety of conflicts and reasons, no Google, no Skype. You know, Skype's not generational defining, but like they should have been there to do it. No Facebook. Bummer. And I think you can probably trace most, if not all of that back to probably making the wrong architecture decisions. Right. So this sort of like 2001 to 2010, actually not a great decade for Benchmark. They had some good investments. They'd open table. Well, not to 2010. I would say until 2006, 2007. Okay, fair. But like, if we look at the biggest wins out of that period, it's probably open tables, Zillow Grubhub, Instagram wouldn't have been yet. Nope. So that's probably those three that we just mentioned. Yeah. So finally, after all this, and I don't know if this was before or after Excel doing Facebook, but right around the same time, legend has it at one of the Menlo Park Monday partners meetings. I think it was Kevin Harvey who finally kind of just said, well, probably everybody was thinking at that point in time of guys, why are we doing this? We don't need to be wandering in the woods. Can we go back to focusing on what we all actually want to do here, which is invest in California with the right size funds, do early stage, focus only on the game on the field and not do all this. And kind of, you know, supposedly one by one, everybody's like, yeah, actually, that sounds a lot better. I mean, this is after that article came out in Bloomberg, that I think is pretty illustrative of the time. It was in 2000. And the title is still the benchmark to bet on. And it ends in a question mark. I mean, it's funny because like 2000, this is still very early in their wandering in the woods years of everything you're talking about right now, but it raises a lot of the right concerns. Yeah. And there's a great quote in there that I'm sure everybody involved regrets, but I think it was Mark Kwame from Sequoia. Yeah. About does benchmark have the technical prowess to, you know, relate to the next generation of founders. That was a good dig. Like, hey, they're not technical. And, you know, how are you supposed to work with technical founders? It was a good dig. The other screw up that they had is they really started changing strategy on their core stuff, too. They did a late stage mezzanine investment in 1-800-Flowers. That was not a good investment right before their IPO. Why are they deploying capital into that? They had a billion dollar fund. They had to put that money to work. Yep. To get on to the next one. So, you know, again, the benchmark rollercoaster continues. So it was up, it was down, it was up, but now it's down again. And this kind of thing is why you need to treat the partnership with such delicacy. This is where the relationship stuff really matters, where you need to have built that foundation of safety and trust so that you can call each other on, hey, we got to like massively unwind a huge thing that we did here as a partnership and not take it personally and know that that person is thinking with all of our best interests in mind and not thinking less of me as a human because of it. Totally. And, that happens. So, kind of that 2004, 2005 era, you know, post-Facebook, they do that. They spin off Europe. They spin off Israel. Becomes Balderton. And then Michael Eisenberg goes and starts Aleph in Israel, both of which have become great funds. Yep. Yep. You know, we didn't talk to either of those teams, but I would imagine they're, you know, hey, like they exist. They're great firms now because benchmark helped set them up. So, you know, it's not like this was, not any value creative for the world. it just came with some real trade-offs right so around this time the first actual wave of retirement of stepping back of some of the original partners happens and this is the test right are they actually going to take no further economics are they going to live up to the founding principles they were on the other side of that table at this point 10 years ago and they've now been wildly successful they've had ups and downs at benchmark it's time to refocus the firm what are they going to do and they do it they actually do it they resist the temptation david burn and and they had brought on another gp during that period alex balkansky in the 2005-2009 fund they raised then they all step back and they don't take tail economics meaning they're out of the management company no longer formal decision making power in the firm the current ownership structure the management company transfers to the current gps and they don't take carry in the new fund they keep working keep having carry in the boards that they're on from the old fund their lps their big lps and their big lps yes in the future funds going forward with their own personal money but they actually won't take carry in the boards that they're on from the old funds they're big lps and they're going to make a clean break they do the transition that they had asked for so many years ago so what's the gp group look like at this point so at this point heading into fund six or in the mid 2000s the lineup is bruce bob kevin and bill so we're down to four and three of the original founders plus bill still like a very good lineup but you probably need some more firepower to really pursue what you want to do here well and kind of like what you were mentioning in the 1996 recruitment where they went and got dave burn the spree of recruiting that they go on here to inject a little giddy up back into benchmark they go and get hitter after hitter after hitter it is the most impressive lineup of venture capitalists to all suddenly join the same firm this retrospectively feels like the heat none of these people were these people yet no and peter fenton is the first of these new blood to come on board he has a quote at tech crunch disrupt 2020 many many years later talking about this and he's asked about bill and his time in this period of benchmark and he says bill like me isn't a founder of benchmark but in a sense we have acted as though we were founders of benchmark and this is a refounding of the firm with the with the blessing and direction of not direction of what to do but like the prescription from the original founding group to go forth and do your thing and figure out what's going to work now yep and in many ways it's just back to basics it's back to basics but it's back to basics in a way that makes sense for the moment so what do they do peter fenton is the first person to come on board and peter joins from excel and peter joins from excel which is a very important thing which had just done face facebook and peter wasn't directly involved in the facebook investment but was part of that relationship with dda the other thing about peter that we heard from folks talking to was at that time the existing group of gps at benchmark and in particular bill they found that you know as they were going and meeting companies everything that they would get interested in as they were going around the valley they'd show up and peter had already been there it's like you know they saw him coming out the door he was one step ahead of them in all of these companies peter has an interesting background his dad is noel fenton who was an entrepreneur and then founded trinity ventures the venture capital firm trinity oh i didn't realize that yeah so peter kind of grew up in the business well first his dad like hated vcs and then yes he became a vc yes founded trinity which is a common path i think it's like i want to do things differently totally but he fits the bill you know just like bill when bill joined he was early 30s he had an established track record he was young he was hungry he was up and coming he was a baby gp in excel but he was not a full gp is that a formal title yeah baby gp that's the formal title here's what i would love if acquired can have some influence on you know our industry this is what i'd love i want transparent titling on linkedin or whatever just like be clear about what you are so does every founder yeah right exactly like i'm a baby gp i'm a you know old crusty senior gp i've hung around too long i have a lot of economics but i'm not currently doing deals exactly exactly so peter's a baby gp he's had a bunch of early wins at excel and he's clearly out there hustling he's clearly smart they make the pitch to him to join and again it's you know on the one hand it's an intelligence test like it was an intelligence test for bill to join on the other hand there's some questions about benchmark right now yep oh it's the first generational transfer it's like oh this is a firm that had one big win and some other wins in that fund i mean look if you 90x a fund or whatever and only 40x of it comes from one company clearly you had multiple winners but like one fund that was really great and it's been a tough several years and a bunch of those people from the big successful fund are stepping away bill girley hasn't become bill girley yet and so what am i joining and how certain is it so those are the questions on the benchmark side there's a massive question for peter on the excel side even let's take off the table whether excel made a counter offer for him to be a grown-up gp or not whether they did or didn't is irrelevant he had gp economics even if they were baby gp economics in the facebook fund and he's walking away from that to join wow yeah that's not an intelligence test that's an emotional decision that's a gut check do i really really believe in this sort of refounding of benchmark this refocusing on this model do i think it can work do i think bill and i and other people we recruit can bet on the future here and it'll be worth me walking away from facebook fund economics yep so he does so he takes it he takes it i think he's probably pretty glad he did it becomes a great decision for everybody involved word order peter goes on to do twitter docker zora hortonworks new relic elastic he brings brett taylor of google maps and then facebook fame into benchmark as an eir they do quip together yeah and peter fenton had been an investor in friend feed when brett taylor started that before brett sold that to facebook you're right that is how he made the journey from google and google maps to facebook yes and unbelievably brett has been an investor in friend feed for a long time and he's gone on with the quip acquisition by salesforce to become the president co-ceo of salesforce with mark benioff and also is the chairman of the board at twitter who is the central spokesperson for this ongoing lawsuit with elon musk wild the brett taylor universe is unbelievable the brett taylor cinematic universe yes i love that i don't know which avenger he is but he's one of them yes okay so peter is new partner number one kind of coming in in the next slot after bill who's next next is mitch lasky who mitch i think is really like super under the radar and kind of a unsung part of what comes to be the fab four era and they truly are the analogy is the beatles here mitch had been founder and ceo he's been a games industry guy he worked in the games industry his whole life and then founded and was ceo he started a game studio of a early mobile games company called jam dat that bill had led the series c in and was on mitch's board and the super random that mitch you know he was later in his career he'd been a founder like he didn't like vcs either like why would he do this why would they recruit him so jam dad had gone public and then had gotten acquired by ea in short order during this period where benchmark didn't have a lot of wins it's the plate of all good games companies you get acquired by ea eventually indeed ah trip what a great episode we did with trip back in the day yep so mitch had actually sort of purveyed over one of the bright spots for benchmark during that era and mitch criminally so few people aren't familiar with him he just went on patrick's show on invest like the best great episode you gotta go listen to it like if you want to understand mitch and why he's so special go listen to that episode games investing but also just broadly why you would want him in your partnership and i got to work with mitch on the board of a company called play fab that was started by james gortzman who's now andreessen horowitz's gaming gp it all comes full circle small world but he joins next and mitch would have some incredible wins in these coming funds not just in gaming you know gaming he would do that game company which is under the radar but he's doing incredibly incredibly well it's literally called that game company david's not like forgetting a word here that is the name of the company and several other gaming investments but also snap and discord big big big time wins mitts joins next and then the final member of the fab four gets rounded out they recruit from facebook and this is still when facebook is a private company leaves facebook as a private company having been employee number five at facebook and before that employee number i think less than five at linkedin matt kohler matt kohler is the single best person at understanding consumer social products and maybe all consumer products and maybe all consumer psychology in the entire world a he's super smart understood but like he was there like talk about knowing the future you know don valentine knew the future because he had been a national semiconductor and you know worked with the traders aid and all that and like he knew what was going to happen matt had been at linkedin and then it benefits like he knew the future and just had this fundamental unfair advantage over everybody at that point in time and he also got all of these new folks and bill got what aws meant for the industry and series a investing and the difference between formation stage and seed investing and investing in data and traction yep matt is the person who we have referred to on previous episodes when uh kevin sinstrom was negotiating to sell to facebook and due to the court documents there was a uh conversation leaked about kevin strategizing over aim with a very strategic advisor about how to position the sale to facebook and of course who would know mark zuckerberg psychology and what facebook would and wouldn't do better than employee number five at facebook and matt kohler of course is that confidant and he also has one of my very favorite lines that i before doing this episode had assumed was a truism of venture all along but i now realize was a specific moment in time truism that something had changed which is he says you know our job is venture capitalists is not to see the future but to see the present very clearly and that all of a sudden became true at that moment in time thanks to aws thanks to the facebook platform and where you could now do these series a's these still early stage quote-unquote investments where there was no product risk there was no adoption risk there was no market risk you were still looking at early data but you could look at an instagram you could look at an uber you could look at a snap and you could look at the data and you could say my god this is working yes it is awesome watching 10 and 15 year old videos of matt on stage at conferences talking and just basically being 10 years writer than everyone else he has a quote i think he's on stage at a tech crunch disrupt with maybe mike errington in 2011 ish and he's like i don't think anybody understands mobile advertising this is going to be so huge this is much more like tv advertising everyone thinks it's going to be less valuable i think they're all wrong the primary thing you have to understand is this is basically a tv where we can take over the whole screen and then there's it's enriched with all this other data and all this other location and people so misunderstand the potential of mobile advertising and of course mobile advertising would go on to become an enormous market and he was very right about that i've never met matt but in the countless hours of him speaking at various things that i sort of watch he just has the demeanor of a beetle well i think they all were at this point in time you know in this era they genuinely were i mean let's talk about so fun six is sort of the transition here wait matt didn't have a background in venture do you know if he was like a big angel investor i don't think so i believe he had always wanted to get into venture but you know and mitch didn't have a background in venture either you know both of them actually were we talked about the benchmark spec for hiring a gp the best way to be reasonably confident in someone's ability to be a good venture capitalist is someone who's already been a good venture capitalist right they were making more riskier bets on both mitch and matt both of which paid off hugely for the partnership yep the other thing that matt identified i think long before much of the rest of the investing world and world at large was the dynamics behind uber even though ended up doing the investment but they worked as a partnership to source and we'll talk about it but matt had this saying back then that it was partly you know informed by his experience with uber i think of the smartphone is going to become your remote control for the real world and that was an outlandish thing to say in 2010 2011 but like my god was he right yep okay so you have the slate now you have the fad for you have bill girley you have peter fenton you have mitch laski and you have matt kohler and of course i think bruce dunleavy is still an active partner at this point too i think bruce and bob are still active at least in fund six maybe a little bit into fund seven but fund six is the transition and fund six is you know great i believe it'll probably end up being uh you know 5x plus 5 to 10x fund instagram's in that fund that's like matt's third or fourth investment which my god i mean they returned the fund on the investment and they're not going to be able to do that again they're going to be able to do that in the future and they're going to be able to do that in the future and they're going to be able to do that investment but like with the sale to facebook because it sold like 12 months after they did the series a i mean imagine doing a series a investment i don't remember the valuation of instagram series a call it 50 million maybe less right to 20x in a year yeah it's crazy very hard to turn that down it's also funny that sequoia claims instagram was one of their investments where it sold 48 hours after they invested they were an investor for two days you know hey branding success in venture capital leads to success in venture capital bill told me that once so uh instagram's in that fund asana which was actually matt's first investment which was former folks from facebook you know that took a long time but they end up getting public on that new relic horton works a bunch of peter fenton ipos are in that fund new relic which was incubated in their office yep because peter had invested in lucerne's previous company when he was at excel to bill's point about repeat entrepreneurs and enterprise are as close to a sure thing as you can get by the end of fund six it's clear there's something special going on here and then that leads into fund seven which i think was 2011 and they raised 550 million dollars for benchmark fund seven and it's the four of them benchmark fund seven is about as close as you can get to speed running in venture capital this is a group that had perfectly gelled from fund six the world was their oyster they raised the perfect size fund with the perfect gps who have expertise in all the things that were going to flourish in the next decade and they could look and they could just execute and you could argue fund one was like this and certainly from a returns perspective fund one was actually better than fund seven but they had to wander in the woods to find their way this was just like a perfectly set table yes 100 on all that and two things i would add one i think they knew a secret that very few other people in the industry knew which was this series a is like in a favorably mispriced asset right which it's not now right like when someone thinks it could be the next facebook like that's why clubhouse gets done at a hundred million immediately and then shortly thereafter billion most series a's are not done post product market fit anymore now seed and a and b are often pre-product market fit when there's a thing that is the next big consumer social app and it's showing signs of that everyone knows exactly what to look for and prices it appropriately yes but that had not happened yet by any stretch so that's one thing i did and then two they had the swagger they knew they had a secret they knew they had the right team they knew they had gelled as a team and they were willing to just go run and you know not overthink things and play the game on the field it was a perfect balance of gut and intellectualism so this fund is ridiculous uber uber snap discord that gaming company stitch fix duo security docker elastic next door and we work and we work i mean at the time that they got liquid i do think it was a very very very profitable investment for them yep they got money out of that in the soft bank uh shenanigans a quote from talking to folks part of the firm and you know other enterprises like that it was quote-unquote swashbuckling insanity but in an absolute in a good way in every dimension wait is riot games and fund seven that must be fund six i think riot might have been fund six yeah but that was another great mitch investment yeah benchmark fund one was one of if not the best fund of its size and scale ever benchmark fund seven is one of the best if not the best fund of its size and scale ever so according to a 2018 wall street journal article they reported that before fees the 2011 fund was sitting on a 25x on that 550 million that is a venture fund a full-sized venture capital fund that 25x of course it may be lower than that now but i think it's still north of 20 depending on when they got liquid on on what because this is something we'll talk about in playbook benchmark knows how and when to sell in addition to how to identify these phenomenal companies i think the benchmark philosophy is that they don't want to hamstring the next generation with any of their decisions it's funny all i have is these sort of like gut feelings from talking to people but i think the way benchmark kind of works is when they hand it over to the next generation generation. First of all, they don't do it all at once. They sort of like do it in this blended way so they can carry a lot of the institutional memory with them. But it's, you guys do what's right for you. Here's what worked for us. By the way, what worked for us probably will work for you, but you need to make that decision on your own. And again, I don't think it's said. I think these things are kind of unsaid. Yeah. So listeners, the Fab Four era, just to like put a fine point on this, you had by this point, the very best marketplace investor in history in Bill Gurley. You had Matt Kohler, who literally helped create the DNA of the modern social media company as an early Facebook employee. He's investing in consumer social. And again, these are too narrow of swim lanes. They're doing other stuff. You had one of the best games investors to ever live investing in games with Mitch Lasky. And these are super clear swim lanes. And it was the best decade of all time to be investing in the categories of marketplaces, consumer social, and games with mobile having an undercurrent of all of it. And on top of all of this, you have Peter Fenton as a utility player, and like a total shark across all categories from doing the Twitter investment to New Relic. Yep. Especially, you know, open source software and enterprise and bottoms up adoption, you know, he did great there. But you know, they all blended to like Mitch did snap, you know, but the point is, it doesn't matter. Like it was a refounding of the firm back to those original principles of like, it genuinely was they were functioning as a team. Matt found Uber, but Bill was the right board member. And like, you know, well, we'll talk more about Uber in a minute here. Yeah, let's do that. Because I think so far, this has been the benchmark glory fest. And I think the takeaway is overwhelmingly positive here. But let's continue to paint some of the tradeoffs and some of their tougher moments. Two things just to put the cherry on top of the fun seven fab four glory fest in March of 2015, which really was like, kind of the apex, I think of this era. Ironically, after Eric joined, so there were five at this point, but Eric had just joined Eric Fisheria, who we'll talk about in a sec. But Forbes comes out with this article, man, I remember this article. It's just like, it'll always be seared in my memory, you know, working in the industry being post GSB back in Madrona at this point in time. And like, this article comes out in Forbes called the benchmark way. Five partners because it was five at this point, Eric had joined, who make other VC firms look outgunned and overstaffed. And it was just this chronicling of the fab four era and all these companies we've talked about, like everything they touched turned to gold. We listed all those companies that are all, you know, other firms would kill to have one or maybe if they were in their wildest dreams, two of those portfolio companies in their funds. And they had like 12. And they own like 20% of each of them. Yes. It's not like they're like cutting little checks here and there. On average, each partner takes one board seat per year. And when they take a board seat, they invest at the series a and they own 1520 plus percent. In those days. I mean, I think it was 20 plus 20 to 25. Yeah, pretty wild. Yeah, wild. All right. So we talked about Uber. Yes. Yeah. Well, that was a journey. And ends up being the bulk of the returns in fund seven, even amongst all those great companies. In 2018, when that Wall Street Journal piece came out, their holding in Uber was worth $8 billion. So that alone would have 16x the fund. And I think at that moment, they sold some to SoftBank in a transaction at that point in time. Yep, that's their thing. They've gotten liquid on a lot of things sort of like along the way you got February 2018 benchmarks sold almost half of its stake in snap and realized a billion dollars in gains. Somewhere I don't remember the timeframe exactly. But benchmarks sold $900 million worth of Uber shares to SoftBank and at that point still owned $7 billion. And to rewind to snap for a minute, benchmark I think was instrumental in encouraging pushing snap to go public as soon as they did. That member we did that whole episode way back in the early days of like, holy crap, snap is going public after like four years of existence. You know, that's crazy. Right? You know, there was a whole structure. It's all in the SEC filings of Evan got a like massive like $600 million plus bonus for a successful completion of an IPO. Did it. They're very good at this. Yes. Even this knowing when to sell thing, WeWork, they sold a lot of WeWork shares to SoftBank. And I think it's actually still part of some ongoing litigation where SoftBank didn't want to complete that transaction. But as an aside, actually on WeWork, I was watching a video with Peter Fenton and he said, we were involved with WeWork. That guy was as pathological as you could possibly imagine and then go further. The stories would blow your mind. I almost feel like we're just not going to get into WeWork on this. episode. We did that whole thing with Dan Primack. Yeah, no. Either way, that's not the point of this episode. You can hear about that elsewhere. We should definitely though talk about Uber. Yep. All right. Uber. So famously, Gurley had been studying the space, had been looking at, do you look at Taxi Magic? Taxi Magic. We talked about it all on our Uber episode. Like he had literally been searching for this company. He tried to get Taxi Magic to become Uber. It didn't happen. So much great history. Go listen to that. The original Uber pitch is actually Garrett Camp coming in. And pitching the limo thing. And Travis isn't CEO yet. And then finally Travis gets in the seat. There's some product market fit. It seems to be happening. Benchmark invests. Gurley joins the board. 2011, I think that happened. 2011. A $10 million Series A at a 10 or 11 at a $60 million post money valuation. And one of the first investments out of Fund7. Yep. There's some such great fun stories of that era that I think it's just fun to think back on like a happier time in Silicon Valley and show the sort of like swashbuckling insanity of Benchmark at the moment. They knew they wanted to do the deal. And so like before, you know, the final sort of partner meeting, Travis was pitching at Sequoia right before and Uber was active in San Francisco, but wasn't active on the peninsula down on Sand Hill. And so he had taken like an Uber down from San Francisco to all the firms on Sand Hill road and told the Uber, like, Hey, just wait for me. Like, you know, nobody else is going to call you here. The benchmark guys knew what was going on while Travis is inside at Sequoia, just up the street, they call the Uber away. So then Travis has to run, uh, literally run down Sand Hill, which if you've been there, it's like a quasi highway, like there's multi-lane like anyway, then after they do the deal, they send him a pair of Nikes as like a joke. Fun stuff. And then, uh, right after that, Travis goes on J Cal's show on twist, one of the best twist episodes ever episode one 80 and talks about the deal. And, um, is that where he talks about the Michael Ovitz episode too? He talks about Ovitz and just watching that. I was like, man, like God, Travis was sharp. Was, is he's just behind the scenes now. You know what I mean? Great upside, great downside, but like, man, he was good. And Uber was good. And those days were something special. Anyway. So, Jason asks Travis in that moment, the deal had just gotten done. Jason had been an angel investor. Of course. I was like, Jason, an angel investor in Uber. Oh, did he, was he the third or the fourth angel investor in Uber? We'll have to ask him about it. Like I didn't got to J Cal. We love you. But Jason asks Travis on this episode, why'd you go with benchmark? Why'd you go with bill? And Travis just like, doesn't blink. He's like, they're the best. I went with them because they're the best. I didn't want to work with anybody else. I knew it was bill. I knew it was bill. I didn't want to work with people. I knew it was benchmark. They are the right partners. They are the best period. That is what two other portfolio CEOs said in the exact same way that I had talked to privately to prepare for this show. And I shouldn't share who they are, but they're like, oh, well, because they're the best. There was no other need for explanation. Yeah. And I actually got lots of other explanation. Like they're this unbelievable partner and like, they actually can help you recruit executives. And they're truly like, like three people told me they feel like a co-founder. Oh yeah. We can, we can get into all that in analysis, but oh man, the Uber day, it really was fun. I mean, I'm just like, I'm so nostalgic and wistful now. Like, God, there's day, remember those days, 2010 to like 2015 for the whole industry. It was just a different time. So much happier. Feels like it. Right. And I'm trying to figure out, is that because there was like, was tech like intrinsically better then, or did we just not think about the downsides? We just didn't know, you know, I don't think anything was actually different. It was just, it was still early. Yeah. And frankly, like there weren't enough hooks in most products yet to make you hopelessly addicted. The sophistication of applying all the behavioral psychology and the machine learning that applies a lot of the models to like, just the ruthless execution of capitalism. I don't think we realized it yet. And it was just much more nascent. Of which Uber, you know, becomes a prime example. Yeah. I mean, y'all know what happens. It's interesting, right? Like, so what's the right way for us to talk about this? So there's a thing that we should definitely talk about on the Benchmark episode, which is Benchmark with their board seat on Uber ends up suing the founder along with a group of other people. Give me the like 60 seconds on like how we got to that point. Uber had a lot of bad stuff that all sort of happened seemingly all at once. Delete Uber. But like, how did we end up in a situation where we're not able to do anything? How did we end up in a situation where we're all looking at each other going, we need to replace the CEO. Otherwise the company will destroy all the value it's created. So I think there are multiple threads to explore here. One, all the reasons I think we're wistful for, I'm wistful for 2011, 2012, you know, when things were just simpler and happier. Uber, I think was, you know, it was at the forefront of all the stuff that made now a less wistful time, you know, everything, you know, you said, and some of those were the company's fault. And some of those were Travis's fault. And some weren't, you know, you look back at like, delete Uber, that was just an absurd situation. Like Uber was trying to do the right thing. Yes. But that was an example of a company that, you know, how luck is about maximizing the opportunity for good fortune to happen to you. This was the opposite. They had built up so much ill will, that a pure misunderstanding about the way that they were trying to help launched a gigantic social media campaign where people assumed they were acting with malice. Yep. Then you had the Susan Fowler stuff. In which case many people at Uber were acting with malice. Yes, yes, no doubt about that. You know, there was the attitude that I think needed to, you couldn't have built Uber without of the, hey, the existing laws and regulations are stupid, and they don't serve consumers, and we need to fight them. Yep. And the company and Travis never changed that stance. Whereas public opinion started on their side. And then as things just escalated and escalated and escalated, moved first slowly and then quickly over to the other side. Yeah. And I don't think the company and Travis moved along with them. And, you know, that's a tough position for the board. So I think that's another thread. And then I think the last thread, and I think this obviously, right, like the Uber situation and the WeWork situation too, to a certain extent, but obviously the Uber situation is the end of the Fab Four era. You know, there's like Taylor Gurley stays for a while and like this new, we'll get into all that, but that's the end of like the Beatles, you know, just like the four had a 10 year run. Yeah. It stopped being fun. And I think part of that, I suspect was the pressure. You get to a certain point with Uber and, you know, a few years in, like, so we start out with Benchmark and Bill and Travis and the company are besties, you know, lock arms for life. Right. And you listen to that twist episode with J Cal right after the series, a, you listen to all of that stuff. And then it, it doesn't go right from that to like suing the company. No. There's a few years in the middle where Bill starts sounding the alarm in Silicon Valley about all sorts of things and not talking about Uber, but clearly he's talking about Uber. And not naming Uber, but saying things like, hey, maybe valuations are out of control. Hey, maybe it's not in the founder or any of the company's best interests to be raising this much money at these valuations. Or, you know, if you are going to, to be in the private markets where like there's so much opacity for everybody involved, it was unprecedented. Uber hit what, a $70 billion, I think, valuation 80 on the private markets. Yep. Or maybe 80 was the number that it was anticipated to go public. Could be. I know it was at least 60, I believe valuation, whatever it was that had never happened in history before. Never by any order of magnitude had that happened. And all of a sudden the rules of the game have changed and things are very different. And the amount of pressure on the company, on Benchmark, on the board, on the LPs of Benchmark, a point that I hadn't thought about until I started thinking about in this research. Say you're an LP in Benchmark. Some university endowment. You work at that pool of capital that is an LP in Benchmark Fund 7. Uber is not getting marked to market, but you are getting your quarterly marks from Benchmark Fund 7 based on the valuations that Uber has achieved. Which has comp tied to it. Which has comp, your personal comp as, you know, an employee of the organization as LP. And for the future planning of like the disbursements from the, like it reaches a point where like the amount of capital involved is so meaningful here to so many players all up the stack. Thousands and thousands of people, in addition to all the employees and all the customers and the drivers on the platform, like you actually have these thousands, if not tens of thousands of people impacted by these paper valuations at Uber, right? And so the amount of pressure to kind of land this plane, so to speak, reaches just like crazy heights. You know, and look, is this anybody's fault? Is what like, who do you blame? I don't know. But like, I think this happened. Yeah. And so then it was like, okay, we need to get public. And we need to get public in a way where people don't fear that the company is going to fall apart. So we need to stay on the same order of magnitude of the current valuation, so that the world doesn't fall apart for us and all the other investors and all the LPs and all of the investors in this thing so far. And so if you have a disagreement about that, there is sort of a greater good than any single relationship you have with a founder. Right. At a certain point, the level of scale, that you're impacting here becomes way more than just like, you know, you and your board member or like, you know, with the way Silicon Valley even even go back to the bubble, we were talking about webban. You know, webban gets liquid goes public trades on the public markets up to $8 billion. Crazy, right? Here we're talking about $80 billion in order of magnitude more on the private markets. Yes. Yeah. Pressure cooker. So benchmark goes through with this, they know that they have a little risk to their reputation based on suing one of the most iconic, successful founders of all time, who many other founders want to be like, and many other founders don't want to be like, right? There's a lot of people who deliberately do not want to be Travis. But still, this is a Rubicon crossing move. Right. And it's interesting. In some ways, there's actually two ways where I don't think it's that big of a deal. Let's start with the one that's more arguable. So getting sued by someone that's not a big deal, that's a big deal. And that's a big deal. You've signed a very heavy contract with people talk about it, like, wow, no one will ever do business with them again. That is a thing that's like sort of unique to startups and venture capital. There are lots of other agreements and lots of people who do business together where like, if you start doing ill will by the other party, there are lawsuits. I don't know why everyone made it out to be this big deal of like, because Silicon Valley runs on trusts and love and you raise a big debt pool, and then you don't use the debt pool for the intended purpose. Well, like the LPs in the debt pool sue you for that. You don't have to look very far. Look at venture capital's cousin, private equity, right? Like, nobody would bat an eye here. Not that I would ever want to be in that situation. And not that I would ever take any of the first 10 steps that get you to that situation. But like, it always struck me as like, people are getting really holier than thou around like this Rubicon of a lawsuit. Then there's the second thing of like, okay, did it actually impact them as much as. sort of people projected that it could? Was this really an existential risk? I think the answer is no. Yeah, I think the pretty clear answer is no at this point. Yeah, I think it's definitely a tool that gets trotted out. You know, if you already have all these other things stacked against you, like Benchmark doesn't have a platform team and like. Oh, we haven't even talked about that yet. And on top of that, they sued Travis, remember? It's like the cheapest shot you can take. But it's a shot you can take. And you can bet that people take that shot when they're competing for a deal that's really an important one. I think pretty unambiguously at this point, both in my opinion, and just looking at what's happened in the intervening. God, it's been five years since then. The answer to that of like, does this meaningfully negatively impact Benchmark is no. Directly, no. And probably hasn't. But there's some question around, is there some pajama pitch moment where they're not getting to see something because of this move? It's probably not this move. I don't think it's happened yet. But you know, startups take a long time to mature and we don't know what they didn't get to see and why. And so who knows? Yeah. So directly, the answer in my mind is clear cut, no. Indirectly, yeah. Very little doubt in my mind that this precipitates the end of the Fab Four era. Yeah. That's probably the biggest value destruction. This is the Yoko Ono moment. It causes people to retire earlier than they otherwise would have. I don't mean to blame Yoko, but like, you know, whatever your pet theory is for why the Beatles broke up. This is the end of the era. Yeah. Dude, I watched the documentary. It's because Paul was full of himself. That's the reason. Amazing. I haven't watched it yet. I gotta go. We've been doing too much research. It's so good. So, you know, all that comes to a head in 2017 and into 2018. 2018, they do Fund 9. Matt and Mitch step back at that point. Bill sticks around for one more fun cycle. And then, of course, you know, probably everybody knows at this point, they're going to do Fund 9. And then, of course, they're going to do Fund 9. And certainly if you're still listening at this point, Bill has stepped back now at this point. And Peter is the only current active GP from the Fab Four era. So what's benchmark today? Well, flashback to start the answer to that question. We got to go back to 2014 when they bring on another non-spec GP. Yeah. An operator, a CEO. We are, of course, talking about the one and only Eric Mishria. You introduced me to in 2013, 2014 when he he was visiting Seattle. We all got drinks together. Right. That's right. We went to. Oh, what was that great bar? I don't remember. Somewhere in Pioneer Square in Seattle. In Pioneer Square. Yeah. And Delicatis. Yes. That's right. And at the time, I was freaking out because I was like, oh my god, this was the guy with Ben Horowitz who did Loud Cloud. I had just read The Hard Thing About Hard Things, and I was like, oh my god. So fun. It is incredible, the fact that he worked with Ben on. And Mark. Yeah. He was VP of Marketing. Loud Cloud and Opsware, and then ended up at Benchmark and not Andreessen Horowitz. So he joins, and kind of quietly, Eric, for anybody who knows him, is sort of an understated guy. But total class act. Fits the Benchmark, understated, classy, always go above and beyond, be incredibly responsive, courteous. That's the. Despite being, I'm going to say this in the most kind way possible, a killer, he has all those characteristics too. He's so sharp and so kind. Yes. All of the above. Sort of quietly in the midst of all this, of the transition out of, through the setback half of the Fab Four era and now into the new era, Eric's just killed it. There's no other way to put it. His first deal was Confluent. Series A, $7 million at a 24 post. Company's trading at a $7.6 billion market cap today. Then he did Amplitude. He did Benchling. He did Cerebrus, one of our pet favorite semiconductor companies. Yeah, he fit right in. So you've got Eric. So now in 2017, really kind of in the midst of all the Uber stuff going down, Benchmark brings on another general partner. In some ways, actually, like the very perfect Venn diagram hybrid spec, if there ever were a spec for a Benchmark general partner. And in other ways, the most different general partner that they've ever had a Benchmark. They bring on Sarah Tavel. Good friend of the show. The first woman investor and ipso facto GP. At Benchmark ever. She worked at Greylock before. She scouted the Pinterest investment and then famously went and worked at Pinterest and helped scale the company. Well, that was when she was at Bessemer. And this is why I say. Oh, you're right. Bessemer to Pinterest to Greylock. Sarah, in so many ways, is like. Literally, I think if you were to ask Dolly, to paint a picture of a Benchmark GP, it would come out looking exactly like Sarah, because she started her career in venture as a junior analyst at Bessemer, at which she sourced Pinterest, which was a very non-consensus deal at the time. She then goes and joins Pinterest as a very early employee, spends years there helping scale Pinterest and working with Ben, the CEO, and building that company. And then she goes. She goes to Greylock and joins Greylock as a baby GP. I love that you keep using the baby GP. Hey, I didn't make that up. We heard that in the research. Not about Sarah, but about Peter. So, I mean, literally, I can't imagine a more qualified partner to join Benchmark. And in some ways, she's like the bill protege that sort of takes his place afterwards. She does a lot of consumer. She does marketplace investing. She's very analytical. She's a big frameworks thinker. She writes a lot. She's a big framework thinker. She writes a lot. She's a no one's a clone of each other, but you can sort of see where Sarah's swim lane sort of emerged from when they were thinking, who do we need someone like? Well, here's the other interesting thing about Sarah and why I think she's a great fit to everything we've talked about at Benchmark here. Yes, you're totally right. She fits that swim lane. But do you know what her first investment was at Benchmark? Ooh, I do not. The very first investment that she made after she moved over from Greylock and joined Benchmark was Chainalysis, which does not fit any of those categories and was a very, very non-consensus deal to do in the middle of ICO crypto winter in 2017, early 2018. She did, I believe, the Series A and Benchmark, I believe, owns a meaningful part of that company, which is currently valued at $8.6 billion. That's the most risk-adjusted way to do crypto. It's like buy the enterprise security, analysis tool. But I think it's so funny. It really just fits the Benchmark. She fits Benchmark. And that investment of, hey, knowing a secret, right? That other people aren't willing to recognize. Making a correct non-consensus bet. Yep. You keep saying correct non-consensus. And it's funny. All of the Benchmark partners, or at least some Benchmark partners from every generation, reference that Howard Marks. Axiom very often. And this is awesome because we just had Howard and Andrew on the show. But Andy Ratcliffe says it, Bill Gurley says it all the time. Of course, in order to make money in investing, you have to be both non-consensus and right. And I have heard another addendum to this from a Benchmark partner that I thought was pretty interesting. You want that to be true when you make the investment, but you don't want to be very non-consensus for long. You want to quickly be consensus and right. You just don't want anybody to see it until you make that bet. But you don't want to make that bet and then be sitting there for five years still non-consensus. Knowing the personalities involved, I can tell you exactly who said that, but we will protect their identity to protect the guilty here. But it is a great point. And it is the point that I wanted to make in regards to eBay. That is the takeaway of you seem like a whack job buying the company that facilitates selling Beanie Babies, which seems like a non-market, to within a year having whatever it was, 100,000% growth. There's something like that on that investment. So that was 2017. So you got Eric joining 2014. You got Sarah joining 2017. And then the next year, 2018, you have, surprise, surprise, another spec hire joins Benchmark as the next GP. Of course, we are talking about Jathan Puduguta. He is a spec hire. And while he's been very successful and blah, blah, blah, we can say that one of his greatest successes is joining, us for the only episode that we've ever done, not about anything related to acquired or tech or business, where we analyzed the last Star Wars movie together. And you two liked it. And I was like, what? Okay, wait, wait, we can't get into a holy war here because that's. No. We're treading enough controversial territory here. We don't need to go into Star Wars. But that's on the LP show from like four years ago or something. So Jathan, total spec hire for Benchmark. It was like 30-ish. He came from it. NEA. He had already done Elastic and MuleSoft and MongoDB. Knocked it out of the park on all three investments. One got acquired by Salesforce. The other two went public. The exact thing that we were describing of like, be in venture for seven-ish years and then have 20 amazing years ahead of you. Jathan is exactly that. So now you've got two great enterprise investors with Eric there and Jathan. Not to mention, it's not like Peter has left yet. You still have Peter Fenton there. Yep. And that brings us to the most recent person to join as a general partner at Benchmark, which is Miles Grimshaw, which was last year, David? Yeah. Maybe a little over a year ago, but not long ago. Miles, of course, was the wunderkind at Thrive Capital involved in helping build that firm as a baby GP. All these baby GPs into, yeah, an incredible success there, but not part of Benchmark. What companies was he involved with there? Airtable, where he met Peter, and Benchling, where he and Eric overlapped on the board. And I think Miles was very early to Benchling. Very, very early. Definitely before Benchmark and Eric. Yeah. If you want to be a GP at Benchmark, just be on boards with them. That seems to be the takeaway. But even better, join boards before they join. And then have those companies be incredibly breakout successful companies. I think that's the answer. That's the playbook. So that's the lineup right now. You got the elder statesman with Peter Fenton. You have Eric Vishria, Sarah Tavel, Chetan Putagunta, and Miles Grimshaw. And that is the current Benchmark partnership. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig. Yes. There is a reason. There is a reason why the best product teams rely on Statsig, whether they are iterating on their core product features or shipping AI-powered experiences at scale. Yep. In the crazy speed of today's AI world, shipping fast is just table stakes now. It's basically trivial to build and deploy your app constantly. The real advantage is how quickly you learn what changes actually created value for customers and how fast you can use that signal to guide what you ship next. This is where Statsig comes in. It brings experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics into one unified system so teams can ship safely, test rigorously, and directly link what they changed to how users actually behaved. So if you want to make learning your competitive advantage, whether you're building new AI experiences or just evolving your existing core product, go to Statsig.com slash acquired to get started. Okay, David. Analysis of Benchmark Capital. This is like a hell of an undertaking. Is it Benchmark Capital or is it Benchmark Capital? or is it benchmark? I know they used to say benchmark capital. Well, the entity itself has been Benchmark Capital. At least their goofy website. Oh, we didn't tell the story of the website. Oh, we got to. Okay, we got to do it here. We got to do the story of the website. Let's do it. Yeah. So yeah, as Ben has been talking about in the episode to do the Wayback Machine, they used to have a truly goofy website. Yeah. But I actually think I know something that you don't. Oh, okay. Go for it. All right. Website. So many people know that Benchmark has a website that just says Benchmark. I think it has some contact information. A link to their Twitter feed. Yes. Which, of course, lists their announced portfolio companies in a Twitter list. And I assumed that was always the case. I assumed they just never updated their website because they thought that would be a, you know, a way to keep the mystery a little bit or at least keep our operations simple. They were actually the very first venture capital firm to have a website in the early 90s. Oh, I did not know that. I guess in the mid 90s. Yes, they were. They were very early to adopt it. And we'll put links to this Wayback Machine. It's just awesome. I mean, it is like hilariously goofy. And you can find directions on how to drive to pitch them. And they evolved it a few times. It sort of got more and more modern. And then Matt Kohler joins the firm and says, hey, I think we really need to update our website. You guys, like, this is embarrassing. Oh, I actually heard the story was the opposite. It was that the other existing partners when he joined were like, you're the new guy, your initiation ritual, you're coming from Facebook, like, you deal with the website. Oh, I actually don't know which direction it was. But anyway, I think he worked on it a little bit. He sort of came up with some ideas. He, you know, needed to make it more web 2.0, more interactive, incorporate live things. Ultimately, one problem was it ended up putting Benchmark too far forward. It was almost like taking credit for these entrepreneurs' success. And that is antithetical to everything Benchmark stands for. They want to be in the background, they want to be the entrepreneur show, they want to be. that sort of quiet confidant and partner. And they think that the best founders will be attracted to the idea that they're not taking credit by featuring those companies on the website, which I think is sort of an interesting rationale for it. I think what really happened, or at least what also happened, is Matt was showing it to the rest of the partnership in these early revisions and got a whole lot of feedback and a whole lot of opinions. And it ultimately ended in just saying, hey, actually, I think we shouldn't have a website at all because I don't want to deal with this. Which also ended up brilliant because it totally added to the mystique, especially in that Fab Four era. So great. All right, let's land this plane. Let's land this plane. So let's talk about power. I think that's a good place to start it before we get into Playbook. Great. I'm not sure there's a more perfect and pure illustration of counter-positioning than how Benchmark started. Yep. Agreed. And I think it goes deeper than just like, oh, if you were a very powerful, very wealthy senior GP at a different firm, you'd have to give up a lot of your economics and no one would do that. And so therefore, no one's going to do it. Other firms were not set up to exclusively have partners that were truly equal to each other in value. Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Price is what you pay, the carry that you have to pay someone out and the salary that you have to pay someone and value is what you get in terms of value. And so I think that's a good place to start. of them bringing great deals in and contributing something to the partnership. No other firm was set up to have equal value employees. So you couldn't make everyone equal because it wouldn't solve the problem. Yep. So every other firm couldn't do this. Now, it doesn't mean that this is better, but it is for sure that no other firm was set up to actually do this. A hundred percent. And I don't know where this falls on this, but there's also, because of everything we talked about this whole episode, because of this all-star team dynamic of like, for this model to work, everybody has to be an all-star and has to bring it all the time. And you have to be committed and capable of being the best on the field. It's also a barrier to entry to other firms starting and copying the model. Like, sure, you can try and do that, but like, you got to be the best. And other firms have, lots of firms out there have equal partnerships and no, no associates, but none of them have 25 X to $500 million fund. And so it's almost like every decision you make is very risky because once it falls apart, it's done for good. Yep. Because no one, you're not going to go attract the next Bill Gurley if you've been mediocre for a couple of funds. The next Bill Gurley doesn't think that the other partners are. Exactly. Yeah. Exactly. So I think one funny thing is realizing how much this sort of faded away. When you're an upstart, you need to be really loud and overt about this stuff. And when you're on top, you can sort of let. Let the community speak for you, which is what they do now. But I love this. From Benchmark's 1997 website, this just like says it in prose. Many venture firms recently raised mega funds. They're actually laying out, here's why you should go with us, not other firms. But the numbers in this are really funny. Mega funds capitalized at more than $40 million per partner. This can lead to an overextension and a lack of accessibility and responsiveness to portfolio companies. Some investors have been known to hold as many as 20 board seats at one time. That was before people learned the trick of just don't take freaking board seats. I love that they just were like, oh, I don't know, let's just type this all out. Well, you know, back in that era, early, everything we talked about at the top of the show, these guys were pirates. It was great. I love it. Totally. There's another interesting quote in there where you can really hear Dave Byrne's background coming from executive search and being in a very services-forward business. That was not the common belief among venture capitalists at that time. The belief was, we walk on water and people would be happy to work for us and take our money. And I think Dave Byrne really brought this, like, we are service providers mentality to it. And I think that's also very Bob Giggle. That ethos, I think they all shared that. Good point. So it says, benchmark is structured to provide a high level of service with maximum investment flexibility. Our capitalization of $20 million per partner allows for an average of six board seats and ensures the right level of partner attention and support regardless of investment. Good point. Good point. money. Yes. And Benchmark has very explicitly not done that. Yes. And part of it's operational. I genuinely do think it's funny. I came into this research wanting to believe like they create all this mysticism so intentionally. And like, I don't actually think, I think they embrace it. I think they embrace the sort of like opacity and mystique of Benchmark. But I think most of it actually originally stems from work we want to do and work we don't want to do. And they like only bring partners in who want to do a very particular style and craft of venture capital investing. And those people end up sort of perpetuating the resistance to, I don't want to be a growth stage investor. I don't want to deal with the conflict of a founder looking to meet for their series B or C. Well, and that's when things are going sideways at a company. It's also a conflict when things are going well. You know, I talked to a founder about this where things are going well. And he had a great point. It was like, you know, all of my other VCs have these, you know, growth funds. And, you know, they do lots of stage. Like, whenever I go to raise a new round, all the conflicts come out. It's like, everybody's trying to ram money down the throat, outside investors, inside investors, blah, blah, blah. And Benchmark is in a position, I think this is a legitimate point to make, where they can help make a round, the best round come together without the conflict of having to force more of their own money down the company's throat. And where this shows up for a founder is, how nice is it to have your board member be someone that you're not pitching? Board meetings aren't pitches because they are not your next round of capital. That is the thing. Like, with PSL Ventures having a $100 million fund, that is the awesome thing for me is like, we're also not your next round of capital. We aren't going to lead your Series A. And so like, you actually get to have a more real relationship. I do think for Benchmark, I suspect they've done some bridge rounds here and there, or their participation in a round signals something to the next round investor. So it's not perfect. You do need to keep your lead investor excited about your company. But they definitely need to have a little bit less of a conflict then. Yeah. It's a different motion than just about everybody else in the industry. Yes. I think this is the right point here to say too, obviously we know all of the current generation of Benchmark partners, and we've had a bunch of them on the show in the past, and we know lots of folks in the ecosystem. You know, there's always kind of this question with any VC and with Benchmark too, of like, oh, they say XYZ VC says they're dedicated to the craft and they do all this, but like, really, you know, but how can we help? You know, like that kind of stuff. We've talked to enough people, we've lived, we can genuinely say like, that's not the case with Benchmark. They really do. They do the great, like, everybody we talk to, like, they grind. We've seen it. We've been there, like, they actually do it. It's also the benefit of not having other responsibilities, like none of them are managers, none of them have any other career aspirations. So they literally can dedicate 100% of their time to their portfolio of companies that they currently work with and the next set of companies they could work with. Surprising to me, whenever I meet with a Benchmark partner, how much time they have for me, it feels like a Buffett-esque schedule, rather than like, a lot of times we meet with people in our racket and they're back to back in 30 minute meetings all day. It never feels like that. And I'm like, don't you guys have something more important to be doing? But the architecture of the partnership is such that you can allow for a lot of breathing room in your calendar. Yes. Should they have a growth fund or not? Like, it's a good question. It's an interesting question to discuss. This is the moment where we should see the Benchmark model really work. Right. Last year was the moment where it should really not work. Right. And actually, I think it continued to work pretty well through the previous cycle. But if it really, really works, this market and this year should be a good year. All right, let's go into playbook. The first thing that I just want to say after doing the research is they are just not a thesis-driven firm, period. I think a lot of people want you to have a they've been so good historically, especially the Fab Four, maybe a little less today, but definitely the Fab Four of saying, oh, no, I don't have themes. I don't have like a thesis. I don't have like an area I invest in. We just follow the founders. And I'm good at understanding if something is unbelievably compelling. And I can sort of like these days model it out more and project and work on trends. And in the old days, understand someone's personality more and their gut more. But either way, like the partners aren't coming in with, I believe this market is going to be the huge thing. And that's why I'm here. I'm here to help you. And that's why I'm betting on these 10 companies. Yep. I think part of the DNA of the culture of the firm is they're all learning machines. I think that is what they screen for, you know, and that takes like so many forms. But one obvious, you know, fun form that I can't believe we haven't talked about yet is they do these dinners. They started them during the Fab Four era. Just legendary. Legendary. They have this custom-built table in the office on Monday nights after the partner meeting. They do these dinners. They invite somebody, you know, Bezos comes in. Comes every year. Like, this is crazy. Public company CEOs. And yeah, so Michael Lewis, you know, blah, blah, blah. You know, part of that, I'm sure, is just fun. But one of the things they do in those dinners, and I'm sure one of the reasons they started them, they bring the CEOs of companies they missed in. Brian Chesky's come to those dinners. Tony Hsu from DoorDash has come to those dinners. When they miss, they want to know why, and then they want to adjust. Yeah, that's a great way to phrase it. It's funny. My playbook theme that I had was they are and I think it dovetails off of what you were just saying. I came into the research thinking Benchmark has had one opinion about what venture capital should be and always did that. And that's just like not true. All these dot-com partnerships, playing around with mezzanine investing, even recently trying growth investing. Like in 2011, at the beginning of the Fab Four era, they did a late-stage growth investment in Dropbox in their $4 billion round. Weird, right? Israel, Europe, dollar fund. They made some noises in the most recent fund announcement about they might do some public company investing, you know. They held OpenTable for a long time while it was still public, which I think this is something that puts a fine point on the analytical side of Benchmark, and particularly Bill Gurley's analytical side, which is I also came in thinking, they know when to sell. They always sell going into the IPO, or they sell a lot because they know that they are private investors. And the goal is to get into the companies that are going to IPO for the most and then exit near IPO. But actually, I think what they are is, in some ways, they're value investors. They're good at understanding the intrinsic value of something, which I think is why we saw them dump WeWork, but why they were holding OpenTable while still public in the terrible, whatever that was, 2008, 9, 10, that era where it was just massively undervalued because lots of public companies were massively undervalued. So I think that illustrates for me, like, sure, there are lots of quote-unquote rules for how Benchmark works, but the main thing that they're good at is breaking them when it makes sense to break them. Yep. I think we could go on on some more playbooks here. I've got plenty. I mean, one I want to highlight quickly is just the All-Stars team aspect of Benchmark. We've beat that horse plenty through this episode, but if Sequoia is the Yankees, Benchmark is the All-Star team, and those are two very different conceptions. I think we might have an opportunity to do some more Benchmark playbook discussion. Ooh, I think I know where you're going with this. Yes, I think we may too. One open question I have going forward, and I just want to leave listeners with this at the end of the playbook, is really around consumer investing in the future going forward. Because all of their biggest wins in the past have been consumer companies. Uber, Snap, eBay, Riot, Twitter, Discord is still privately held, but will be a big win. These were all very contrarian bets at first. And we've talked about people thought they were idiots for investing in eBay, because big consumer investments seem really weird. And as more and more prestige has accrued to the firm, will they try and keep that prestigious track record going, or will they do really weird consumer stuff? Are they going to do more of these near-risk-free, early-stage enterprise investments? And if you look at the partner team right now, they're set up really well to do that. So in the current partnership, Sarah, no doubt, is a primarily consumer investor, but she seems like the only one that's really actually focused on it. And the swim lanes are not as clear as they were in the Fab Four era. So I think their next partner will be really telling on this. And I think it'll be interesting to see, does Benchmark stay a great breakout consumer investing firm, or do they look a lot more like high-performing SaaS B2B enterprise investors? It's also just a weird moment in the consumer investing landscape right now, too. That is probably the counterargument. The Fab Four era was at the beginning of mobile. And so when there's a massive disruptive paradigm and trillion companies could get built, you probably should try. Actually, trillion dollar companies is probably the wrong thing. But IPOs that could be like $100-ish billion IPOs, that's probably the right time. And so until it becomes clear with machine learning or AR or crypto that we have the next iPhone moment, maybe this fund is the time to be going more enterprise, and then we'll come back to consumer. I don't know. Yeah. Okay. How are we going to grade this thing? Let me throw something out. I think grading is a relic of the product. It's a relic of the past, unacquired. Oh, boom. I love it. I think I'd like to pull a benchmark here and say grading made a lot of sense for us. You are Kevin Harvey in 2004 in the partner meeting being like, why the F am I getting on a plane to go to Europe? I need to be here. There's just too many episodes that are this style where we're like, let's cover this incredible story that is no doubt. I mean, we just named two of the highest returning venture funds of all time. What are we grading them? A plus? This is stupid. Yeah. What are we going to say here? Done. Yeah. Grading to be revisited in some future episode where it makes sense to do that. Yeah, or not. It's stupid. The grade is obvious by the time we. I'm at five hours and eight minutes recording here. If you don't know the grade, whatever. Yes. Dead. Carve-outs? I have two. One of them is directly related to this episode. Literally everyone listening to this should go watch Running Down a Dream on YouTube. Ah, the best. It is a talk that Bill Gurley gave to a, I believe, a room full of MBAs at University of Texas. It's inspiring, informative, educational, slightly analytical, but mostly it's the best of VC pattern matching applied to helping people understand what to do with their lives. And Bill's just a terrific speaker. Heartily seconded. Yes. My second one is the Smart List podcast. If you watch Arrested Development and you like Jason Bateman and Will Arnett, it is the two of them and Sean Hayes, who is on Will and Grace. And it is so funny. It is just some of the best bullshitting of people sitting around. They have guests on. I just listened to Chris Pratt. There's a Bradley Cooper episode. They're so entertaining. It's just great to just leave on in the background. I don't know. I want to bring some Smart List to Acquired. Love it. I love. I do the same thing. It's like. Outside interest. This is kind of related to the benchmark dinner thing. There's so much we can learn and bring from other podcasts, other shows, other mediums that are not at all our world business attack to make Acquired better. Ah, so bad. Okay. I'm going to do the same model as you then. My related to the episode carve out, I already mentioned it earlier, but go listen to Mitch on Invest Like the Best. It's such a good episode. He's just so, so entertaining. Both Mitch and Patrick. And okay, so that's my related. And then my unrelated. You know, I'm going to go with what I've been. A re-carve out, but a. A re-carve out. A re-carve. I'm re-carve outing. No, but an updated and expanded. I mentioned Ursula Le Guin on the. I think it was on the amazon.com episode where I'd started the Earth-C series, Earth-C Cycle. And I'm now like four books in and it's really good. She's really good. It's very, very different science fiction. All of her stuff is so different from one another. Highly recommend. All right. We would love to have you in the Slack. 13,000 other smart, courteous, kind people in the Acquired community. Acquired.fm slash Slack. We've got a job board. Acquired.fm slash jobs. Find your next great career move. Finally, we have merch. Acquired.fm slash store. All right. All right. With that, listeners, thank you so much. And we will see you next time. We'll see you next time. Is it you? Is it you? Is it you who got the truth now?