Amazon’s quick-commerce wildcard is Prime

Before we get to today's episode, I want to tell you a little bit about the Ken's corporate subscriptions. Hi, I'm Praveen Gopal Krishnan, the Chief Product Officer of the Ken. And corporate subscriptions are a product that we have where members of your team in your organization, maybe it's a starter, or maybe it's a big company, you can all get together and read the Ken under one subscription. The corporate subscription gives you complete access to the Ken. And what happens is that when a team starts reading the Ken together, they tend to basically start seeing things a little differently because they get a sense of how things connect together, things like companies and markets and customers and themes like AI and FinTech and startups and listed companies. And when they see all of this together, they start to make much better decisions. And you will see the difference. You can get the Ken's corporate subscriptions for as small as 10 members for your team, all the way to your entire organization. And this can all be managed under one subscription. If you have a learning budget, I recommend using it. I think it is very, very well served. And the link to this is in our show notes. And trust me, you can actually go and buy a corporate subscription for your team. Right now, it'll just take you less than 30 seconds. Now, back to our episode. So today's episode is about this thesis that I have. I hate to use the word thesis. I feel like a VC, but here is what I think it is. Now, everyone talks in terms of quick commas. They always talk about Blinkit. They talk about Zeppro, they talk about InstaMar. And they say that, oh, these are the companies that are fighting it out for quick commas. And the way they describe it is they say, this is the number of dark stores, this is the contribution margin. And wherever new companies start to come in to try to do this, they always measure them with these same and similar set of metrics, which is, what is the market share, what's the dark stores, are you profitable at the dark store level, et cetera. I think that there is something that they're missing. And the thing that they're missing is Amazon. Because what Amazon has done is Amazon is launching quick commas. They just launched this product called Amazon. Now, actually, it's been around for a while, but now they're really scaling it up. And the way that Amazon is building it, they're building it not as a business, but as a feature of a subscription. And that this particular difference, this asymmetry, is essentially what I think everybody who's talking about quick commas has not been able to understand really well. And I'll explain. They had the Q1, 2026 earnings call. This happened on April 29th, and Andy Jassy, who's the CEO of Amazon. And he actually talked about quick commas. He did not talk about dark stores. And he did not talk about delivery times. He did not say a number of cities and all that. But here is what he said. Quote, it all started last year in India, where orders are increasing 25% month on month with prime members tripling their shopping frequency once they start using it. See, he did not say, you know, like, oh, we are catching up with Blinkhead. We're getting a contribution margin, et cetera. The very specific KPI that he spoke about out of every metric that he could have spoken about was that prime is essentially what is going to be the flywheel that Amazon is hoping to turn faster and faster. And the way they have done that is they have introduced quick commas into it. So it's basically prime that's wearing like a quick commerce costume. And so I think this is the quick commerce wildcard in India that's going to change the way we see this business and the way we think about quick commerce. Specifically, when we talk about Blinkhead and Zepto and InstaMot, and we'll talk about all of those things. [MUSIC PLAYING] [MUSIC PLAYING] Now, this is just a thesis of points. It's just a theory. I have two wonderful guests who are here to break this down and to tell me why I'm wrong or why I'm right, hopefully. And my first guest is Vishal Gailot, who is the chief business officer of Hopscotch. Welcome, Vishal. Thank you so much, Praveen. Vishal, of course, has done several things before this. He used to be at Mintra. He has also been an ex-founder. Vishal, tell us a bit about Hopscotch and what does it do? I think some of our listeners probably know about it. And we were just discussing it before this call started. So we build and sell kids clothing with the largest independent brand in the country. I think what we focus on is essentially are just fashionable trendy clothing for kids. If you're looking for something basic, we are not the shop. But if you're looking to dress up your kid, we have a very wide range of trendy options. So that's what we do. We service primary moms who have kids ranging from newborns all the way to 12 year olds. And how big is Hopscotch? What numbers can you share with us? Well, numbers are slightly difficult to share. What I can say is that we are the largest independent kids where brand. We are also quite unique in the sense that almost 90% of our business is D2C. So we are a mix of a brand plus a retailer. And 10% of our business comes from our partners on Mintra, Amazon and the likes. So yeah, we are an online only play. The company has been around for 10, 12 years. It's gone through a few different avatars starting from earlier. And all kids things marketplace to a fashion marketplace and finally in its current avatar and a profitable avatar, which is a D2C kids wear brand. Nice. Vishal, now tell, what do you think about my wonderful theory of what Amazon is doing to quick commerce? Yes, I think Amazon is interesting because in some ways, I don't think they already have a choice. I think they've been caught napping at the wheel. And I think I see, I see I just release their numbers. And I think it's safe to say after more than a decade that Flipkart has proven to be the big daddy of e-commerce. And Flipkart is the Amazon of India. Amazon is not the Amazon of India, right? You were waiting to make that statement. I like it. I think this is the first time that somebody has said that in those words. But he has your absolutely correct. Please go on. So yeah, I think they've constantly kind of been losing market share, which is, you know, you can argue how important market share is. But for a large retailer whose business is to run on thin margins, scale is finally what will make money, right? You can't be a small player with thin margins. So quick commerce is in some ways an existential kind of opportunity. I do think that, you know, if they can't make this happen and kind of, you know, win this game, it's very likely that, you know, four to five years down the line, Amazon says, hey, you know, India is too messy, too tiny, not worth it. And they exit like they have exited other geographies in the past, right? But the, you know, the e-commerce game, it seems, is kind of, you know, they've kind of not been able to wrestle that away from Flipkart. And the quick commerce is very early days. I would still say, you know, that I think the unlikely to win this race simply because of, you know, their DNA and, you know, this is just too new for them. And the incumbents, which are, you know, it's strange to call a, you know, four, five year old company and incumbent. But the incumbents are very hungry and very well capitalized and very astute as well. So, yeah. I will say, Vishal, that if you had called me on this podcast, I don't know how that would have happened. If you had called me on this podcast, like maybe a year, year and a half back, I would have said almost exactly what you said. In fact, we did that episode at two by two. We had this episode, I think, maybe around a little more than a year and a half back called, are we past P-cams in India? Where we exactly said, moral is the same thing. Look, Amazon has been around for so long. What is this? This is like, you know, you're such a big company, you're such a huge organization, and you're really not committed to India and you're really understood in India. And I think we are past. And of course, we started off that episode with, remember when Jeff Bezos came to India dressed in like his Sherwani on top of that Lorry and all of that. We spoke about all of those things and we said, okay, we said-- $2 million check. $2 million check, exactly. This huge $2 million check. And we said, okay, are we past P-cams in India? That was the episode. I have changed my mind. I mean, not specifically about that. I think Quick Covers for me is a completely orthogonal thing. And I don't think we are seeing it the same. And I hopefully I'll persuade you by the end of this episode. But another person whom I'm counting on for support, hopefully, is Aditya Suresh, who's the head of research at McQuirey. Of course, listeners of Dubai too will know that Aditya has come on this podcast, like at least a couple of times. And in my opinion, Aditya is one of the most sharpest and astute observers of Quick Covers in India, specifically from a market standpoint. He puts out-- McQuirey puts out these research reports about. Blink it and Insta-Mart, Flipkart and all of these other companies and I feel like he has a very sharp understanding of What's really happening at the market level at the dark store level at the profitability level? And so yeah, welcome Aditya No, Praveen, thank you and the Kent team for having me and the show again. Huge respect for the podcast Looking for his discussion. Okay now help me a bit The reason why I got you here was because when I saw Andy Jassy statement and I saw Amazon now and I was looking at this growth numbers By the these growth numbers were at least stated and I thought okay, this is interesting something is happening over here And I kind of like texted Aditya and I was like are you following this and Aditya is like very closely So I said okay great So Aditya, what's your broad sense of what's happening over here? Maybe you can start by basically before you get to Amazon specifiy you can tell us about what's really happening with quick Comers right now Yeah, I think that that that broader framing is is important. So Again, I have huge respect for all the companies and what they're building this great product market fit all these things My comments are from a public markets lens and so from listed equities and stocks and etc And I will try to anchor the discussion in numbers as much as we can based on kind of the What's available publicly, right? So let me just take a step back and the kind of broader kind of step back position is that Whilst in food delivery the broader kind of framing is that this is a platform business this consolidate simply into let's say to play a market Quick commerce is very different, right? So quick commerce is physical inventory retail At a micro market with a delivery cost obligation I think that that definition itself is really important is to kind of think about and at least that's the way I frame it Because then you kind of it leads you down a different path and the path is that you for whatever growth you're going to see as a platform in Or as a kind of from as an app whether it be in city within micro markets It really is constrained by that physical comment right you're setting up dark stores in micro markets you're turning inventory And what competition really does to set dynamics is quite profound and so we get so through the course of discussion Would love to kind of get get through get through those comments now Within that that that dynamic there is no necessarily unique cohorts which all these kind of apps are kind of targeting or tapping into whether be a blanket audience to mark or a zepto Empirically, empirically when you kind of look at all these kind of app tracking data for example with sense tower you can actually look at app engagement right whether be Daily active users by monthly or weekly by monthly songs or fourth There is no distinct Advantage for any of these kind of juicy native apps, right? So the app engagement statistics itself in particular for some like a blank it or zepto Look at that data is fairly Similar so that's basically telling you is that There is no real winner They call kind of dynamic which is at play as yet. There's a clear leader in the market And you also have kind of this dynamic where consumers are kind of app hopping and so you're just like going for the next best deal Now kind of enter Amazon and Flopcott here. I think there is a very distinct dynamic which is potentially at play So customers were app hopping because there's a real kind of closing of the loop with the with the QC natives I think what's going in the favor of Amazon and with kind of Flopcott at recent theory is that there is that closing of the loop So for example if I'm going to Amazon now and and and and fulfilling my my kind of daily or weekly basketball whatever it is from Amazon now And I am going to say cash back which I can then use in the broader wider e-commerce marketplace I am drawn back to Amazon more For set purchases right so I think there is that closing of the loop element which is potentially really powerful in putting of Amazon Flopcott Also for something I thought I right with the daughter group in big basket Now app engagement with big basket it has It's kind of middleing so so we'll see how that kind of skates But in theory thought on you there's a good closing of the loop as well Similar in theory with the offline kind of value chain with your geomart and all these guys So I think with Amazon coming back to your kind of your your points I think something has changed to the landscape This closing of the loop is a fairly powerful dynamic for us to think think through point one And point two is what I'll kind of make as an assertion is that When you think about Flopcott and Amazon has broader e-commerce marketplaces So these platforms these with Flopcott I can see that they spend about 20% of their revenues on ads What do these spend as ads for? It's a drive engagement right So I could make an argument that okay, and so me spending let's say 500 million dollars on ads marketing I can effectively even if my kind of my operations with minutes is not fully economical That's spend which I'm willing to willing to to to to to kind of from To do to kind of drive more kind of Opening of our app every day, right? So driving more engagement and so it's sort of the point back kind of Amazon saying that for users Who are on on now? Their kind of engagement is up like off frequencies up to x3x etc I guess really potentially powerful dynamic for us to think through so I am off the view that both Amazon and Flopcott and a wider kind of Market participants whether be big big basket At the starter group lines etc all these are relevant not just the QC natives Thank you, I knew I could count on you but just for Once for our listeners could you just like describe what do you mean exactly by closing of the loop? I think you've described it, but just one more time if you can talk about that closing of the loop is simply just rewards right So so by that what I mean is that I get some get some reward for coming back to the platform You so for example if I am getting a cashback With Amazon now for my kind of purchases of whatever milk bread egg whatever the basket size is High the basket size more the cashback and those that cashback I can then use on the wider Amazon ecosystem which not really defined by the rules of let's say fast delivery It just as a user behavior it incentivizes me to keep coming back to To the platform right so so that that I think is a meaningful kind of Yeah potential flywheel which is that play With Flipkart it's with the with the kind of firm it's with a super coins etc With the total group it's with new right and so all those are interesting dynamics but but again for five minutes takes back to a zepto or a blinker or a swiggy etc they may be some but not as powerful Number one Amazon is a company that Like we know about how Amazon works in India in the sense that it's primarily always seen as this organization and this e-commerce company There's mostly for elites like a long time back. I wrote about this thing how India's consumer market basically is extremely shallow And at the top of it you have these set of users that I called India's California users Which I said is roughly around 10 million users and these are the people who use Amazon Prime they go to the Starbucks of the world Most of the high-end D2C companies They know they are their customers Mo kabara You know those kind of brands they are the ones that sort of like tap out at this 10 million users Now within that I think the theory that I had was that look Amazon is really big in here because Amazon has done a very good job of penetrating this market and because they've penetrated this market the number of Amazon Prime customers in India At that point in time they haven't publicly disclosed this but somebody told me that it is somewhere at the time of like five to six million Users this was against some five six years back It's a reasonable that is probably gone up to like maybe like eight to ten million use if I had to bet I would say It's somewhere in the eight to ten million mark Now think about this. So if you have eight to ten million users who have basically bought a prime subscription and they are these high-end Elite users now those are the users who are going to essentially shop on Amazon By the way, if you look at Amazon's purchases and you look at Amazon's GMV A very senior person back then I told me that oh if you take Amazon's GMV and you actually like split it by prime versus non prime Close to like over 50% to 60% of it comes from just prime. So they have this really small set of customers who are just disproportionately contributing to Amazon's GMV which means that There these users were buying again and again and again now in this context if you layer in Amazon now now what Amazon now done has done is that it has for these set of users it has created another reason To keep using Amazon which is that oh I would previously get it the next day or probably get it in two days. Oh now I can get you know things immediately in 30 minutes Awesome So I'm going to keep using Amazon now and because I keep using Amazon now that's essentially a That dynamic because you've already paid for it earlier and now you're already like stuck in so you're from Amazon's perspective they're not really they don't have to acquire customers They don't have to burn money like the blankets and the zeptos and the instruments of the world Instead they are just taking their existing users and saying now we're giving you now as a feature And that has second order effects now to growth possibilities for an instrument for a zepto But I think most notably for blanket that's really the broad theory of it. Vishal. Yeah I think just had a question for that there before we go there right I think I do kind of you know here the point of this being a very physical retail kind of a play. Last mile costs are real and a very important part of it. And the way, say, Guru Gautam behaves versus how a band-up behaves versus how a white field behaves might be very different. So you can't just to rinse and repeat. You need micro market strategy. And hence, the argument that this might not be a winner takes all market. So incorrect. From your perspective, do you see they say, you know, five years down the line, like, you know, five, six largest companies, all kind of co-existing and, you know, they're emerging like, you know, hey, this company is great in Karnataka and Tannado and, you know, this company is great in NCR. Like, you see that emerging or do you think it's more do-upadi? I'll let Aalithya jump it, but I will say that one interesting point that Aalithya said, which again reinforces my argument is that he says that there is no fundamental competitive advantage between any of these organizations, whether you're a blanket or a zept or an instrument of the world, it finally comes down to just execution and arguably where you put your dark suit. I think those are the two. So because there is nothing fundamentally different in the physics of it, I would argue that Amazon has a fundamental difference and that fundamental difference is prime. But yes, Aalithya, you can answer Vishal's question. Yeah, no, I mean, so Vishal, I'll make two points. So first is, yeah, I, this entire consolidation to a do-oply, which is a consensus opinion, because at some point competition is going to tie down, they're going to say that, you know, what the economics don't work, I just don't see it that way. And the reason why I don't see it that way is a following, right, is that. So, for example, six months back, nine months back, or when, when pre-19, this podcast one year back, there was no discussion about Amazon flip-cards scaling to thousand doxters, right? It just wasn't there. It was kind of a loose passing comment, but not too much else. Now, that is relevant and the large kind of e-commerce players, I think there is longevity here to think through. But then to be quite candid, the bigger thing which I, which I continue to kind of think about is just the response from offline retail, right? And let me explain what I'm saying. Now, I'm not defining this as the offline retailers are going to be able to deliver in 10 minutes, right? That's not the, that's not the dimension. But think about what GeoMART is in theory kind of trying to build, right? What they're saying is that I have this wide network of stores. It's a sum cost in there. They're kind of context. And I'm repurposing that be the entire store or be small parts from existing physical retail. And I'm turning around inventory, which I've already kind of invested in. And that only kind of, only channel retail with this, the last piece is simply about, is it me kind of delivery to you and say two hours or four hours from the store? I'm delivering that to you in 30 minutes. So the point is that I think there is a something which I think about is also just that is 10 minute delivery in itself. Yes, there is a use case for that. And maybe that's specific use case. Maybe there is a bit more consolidation. Like why would I rely on certain any of the offline guys or flip-cart and Amazon any of these guys kind of like pedal back. I'm not, it's not clear in my mind. Food delivery was an experiment, right? So in 2018, 2019, we went to that back. This was coming off place where there was these up, um, large e-starters, uh, BBC kind of funded. And at that time, it was an experiment. Uh, and it was contingent on, uh, capital coming into that kind of, uh, into that ecosystem. Right? And so that market, I think again, the platform nature market, you just match making, uh, that they'd kind of lend itself more to it. Wobbly, you've seen that in, in other parts of the world as well. This one, I would define, uh, the marketplace in itself very differently. Yeah. And I would argue that food delivery is not as closely aligned to prime as, uh, this is, but that's my, that's my central argument. Come on, we shall tell us. Yeah. Look, uh, see, I'm, um, I think, um, I think there are parts of this that I do agree with, which essentially, I think you know, a lot more money is going to continue to come in, right? Hmm. I think everyone who's got, uh, you know, big wallet will feel that this is not an opportunity that I should miss out on, right? Uh, so, you know, that as we wanted, reliance wants in everyone wants in, right? And we've seen this happen in the past, right? Uh, I think, you know, there's similar flurry back where e-commerce started becoming big, right? Everyone jumped in, right? And, you know, if, uh, if you have to kind of, you know, place bets in some ways, right? I, I think the DNA required to really deliver service at scale, at speed, um, is not simply, uh, capital, uh, capital, uh, capital game, right? So you might have the inventory sitting with you, but can you relentlessly deliver the supply chain experience day and day out, uh, lax of time during the day is, uh, something that, you know, I feel the new age companies are just tuned to do. So for example, a zepto starting off with the founders doing the deliveries themselves and building their dark store network and really understanding the nuances of, uh, you know, how to think of pick back, how to think of last mile, how to think of density. Um, these are non-trivial advantages. Um, and if I have to boil down the advantage of bling kit and zepto to one word, I would say it's the founders, right? Um, I do not think Zomato would have been able to pull this off as a department, right? Um, I think this is essentially, you know, I'll be in there being a force of nature who just refused us to go away. And, uh, and the pivot that they did from being grofers who died almost died so many times to just committing to this pivot, right? From, you know, changing your logo name, everything, everything the way that they run internally, just like I think, you know, just like balls of steel, man, like, you know, you can't execute that in a large company, you know, corporate corporate, you know, sensible way of thinking, right? You take incremental bets, right? Um, and in a way, I feel that's also what has kind of been a bit of a shackle for Insta-Mart, right? Yes. Um, everything going for them, um, but, you know, like, you know, uh, Harsha there and Deepinder there, they built this giant businesses. And now this new thing coming up as a department needs very, you know, logical, sensible investments, right? Um, and that's not going to get, get, get there. Right? So it needed Albinder, it needed the, you know, the, uh, young lot of zepto to get this industry moving. And now everyone's trying to play catcher, right? Uh, I think it's going to be a question of whether someone fumbles, right? Um, and that happens, right? That happens frequently, right? If, if, if I think, you know, for Amazon to win, I think obviously they, they have to play their card, but they will need a little bit of a stroke of luck from Blinkit fumbling the gate, right? And I think, you know, P. G in that way, I agree with you that this is mostly a, you know, tier one city is a Amazon versus a Blinkit game. Slip card is not relevant here. Zepto is not relevant here. I think it how that evolves will also be very interesting, but, you know, Slip card has its broader base. Amazon has its, you know, narrower base. And that, you know, that California customer is what both of these guys are fighting for, right? Um, so I definitely don't see fires down Blinkit being a very big outcome. And Amazon being a very big outcome. Uh, so it's in my mind. It's not quick, common sources, quick, common, like, you know, this tier one retail being fought out between these two companies. Yeah, I think, I mean, now I'm like, I'm seeing nuances in what both of you are seeing. There are parts that I agree that are parts that I disagree with both of this. So, for instance, for Aditya, I think Aditya sees this through the lens of closing the loop for in some sense, even though you didn't explicitly say it, Aditya, or actually you did. You basically are saying that look, Amazon and Flipkart are kind of in one category for me of closing the loop, right? You put supercoins for Flipkart and this thing, Amazon, of course, you basically cash back. I don't see it that way. I think Flipkart is different. I think Flipkart does not have fundamental advantages that Amazon has specifically with prime. So for me, Flipkart is a different beast all together. So, I'm going to keep Flipkart on the side. Now, I'm going to talk about a story that my colleague Nuha published and she published it in July 2025. This is just when Amazon had a new person take over and this person's name is Samir Kumar, who basically, and the title of the story is, inside Samir Kumar's plan to bring order to Amazon India's chaos. Okay, and the story says that the access through which Aminathan is going to win and create profitability is, in EGES's prime. And here is a quote, quote, the exception is prime, which combines shopping perks with a streaming bundle, making it Amazon's single biggest differentiator in India's e-commerce market. For instance, Prime Day 2025, the retailers biggest sales event that recently concluded saw a 70% surge in new signups from Taya 2 and Taya 3 cities. The orders peak at over 18,000 per minute the company claimed. Unsurprisingly, Prime is Kumar's chosen path to profitability. After all, Prime uses pen nearly twice as much as their non-prime peers and contribute to more than half of Amazon India's business. Two category managers said, "The second emphasis is on speed. Something the previous leadership thought wasn't worth their time. Per at least three managers. A couple of months ago, the company finally launched its quick commerce service, Amazon now in select cities." So you see now, my theory is now coming into shape, which is that here is Amazon India that's got a new leader. This new leader says, "Oh, we have to get profitability." And they're like, "How do we get profitability?" "Oh, I guess Prime." And now they've combined the two. And I feel like these two getting combined now has some interesting effects. Yeah, so sorry, before you react, I just wanted to kind of acknowledge what you said that, when I say founder, I don't really mean that you specifically have to be the founder, but I just meant the person who is essentially kind of, let's say needs a bit, desperate for a bit, and will not back down. So I would say Kalyan is as much a founder as Albin Der Ritz. So even though you're such an anbini, started the company, but Kalyan has been that force to take Flipkata head. I think that's also, like Amit was Amazon India founder. He was that force of nature and I think he said it up. I think with Manish, what did happen was, I think Manish brought all the, I would say, again, like it, all the sensibility. I think he was also very profitability focused. And in some way, it seems that in that drive, the typical profitability versus scale question keeps coming up and Amazon took a few choices, which ended up with just market share getting eroded over a few period of years. And again, when QuickCommerce came up in 2020, a lot of very smart people, including myself, just wrote it off as the zero-interested phenomenon. This is nonsense. It is just too much free money floating around. I wish I'm not, not just you, you're of course very smart. We are little less smart. We also wrote it off at the cat. In fact, I very famously wrote a bunch of stuff about QuickCommerce, which I really had to pack down later. So yes. So we all wrote it off. So I did not even download any of these app for the longest time because it would mean admitting to myself that I was strong, but how desperately rock. And I imagine a similar conversation might have transpired at Amazon and Flipkata. And that's what happens I feel when you have with, say, founder mindset people, I would say, the ability to admit that you are wrong is very high, simply because you've been slacked around so much in the past. When you have very high achievers who only kind of write from their education to their professional careers done very well. The ability to say that I was wrong and let's revisit the decision is very hard. And I feel, you know, Amazon as an organization now has admitted that they were wrong and hence the leadership change, hence the investment in QuickCommerce. I just feel it's too late. I think this was again, just like, say it was Instant Hearts game to win. If not them, it was Amazon's game to win. Right. Once there was proof that QuickCommerce is working, I think the Amazon brand, the power of prime, the power of selection that they had, the brand equity that they enjoy with tier one customer, it is their game to do. They just have been very slow. And then question, it's very strange that, you know, we are talking about bling kit as an incumbent at this point of time. We always say that, you know, can the startup find product market fit faster than the elephant can dance? In this case, we are almost seeing the other way around that, you know, blink it has become the elephant and Amazon now needs to dance. So it's a strange kind of a situation the company finds itself in. Got it. I'll let you jump in. And I also want to specifically ask the two of you, can you critique this mechanic and this flywheel that I drew out, which is that Amazon has prime and because they have prime, they have all of these set of customers. So in some sense, they acquire them for different reasons because they acquire them that gives them an unfair advantage as compared to say as a motto or an instrument or a zeppto. And so they can add Amazon now as a feature because that Amazon now creates now stickiness, that is now the new flywheel. Right. Is this something that you believe in? Is this something that you don't believe in? Do you think this possible? Sorry, go on. I'll let you. Yeah, looks, I think that the first is, at least I'm of the opinion that is going back a little bit to it, to kind of wish I was saying and fully take points. But I do think that you can be late to the game and still be meaningful. And a good case of point this was, say, for example, maybe, forgets back. So it's a wonderful, if you kind of like follow through kind of zeppto's and kind of funding rounds and that kind of lead into kind of highest pens and then that lead into kind of higher kind of traffic. What I started to get at is there's not been too much of meaningful sticky stickiness, right, in the in the customer base. You are kind of effectively still buying largely undifferentiated daily essentials from these platforms. And so to that extent, wherever I'm getting the best deal in a general kind of sense with the, let's say if it's within 12 minutes or 14 that's generally been okay. So again, when you look at the app engagement data, there's been no meaningful kind of standout, right? Like so yes, Blinkit is the larger player in terms of GMV. And that also ties back to the larger footprint in terms of dark stores and kind of reach. But in terms of app engagement in itself, when you look at, say, Blinkit versus zeppto even today, there's not much difference. So I think there is at least this mindset which I have, which is that you can be late to the game and still win at least in certain periods of time with higher incentives, higher discounts, maybe a better sort of thing. You can still drive market share. So this app hopping concept is at least my, so the supply is not unique. The SKU is not necessarily unique. So then in that context, it becomes a word who's giving me the kind of cheapest, cheapest basket, and even that, like some people will kind of make these comments about, hey, xyz app is cheaper based on some, some, some web scrapers, etc. But all this is super dynamic. It keeps changing all the time. And across micro markets and across cities. So I do, I do, I come with a mindset that customers are willing to hop apps rather than being just a food delivery, just either as to a zymata full stop. The other dynamic is that, so I mean, I actually strongly agree with you. So the, the flywheel, which kind of laid out is broadly speaking that that closing of the loop, which I was trying to get at, which is at, well, quick comments on its own through Amazon now may not be meaningfully profitable in terms of economics. Let's say even this is a business where you're running it at contribution breakeven. Even that, I think there is a time to get there. Sugi Insta Mart is still at a contribution level lost making, right? And there's a whole kind of point to be made about that. But anyway, so the, the broader dynamic was that, so even if Amazon, if you made a document that, you know, like Amazon now is going to run the business such as you're going to be CM neutral. The central cost could be absorbed by a wider number of, as you say, services or features, right? On a larger kind of platform. And you mentioned prime, prime is interesting, but when you think about Amazon as Amazon's monthly active users, it's about 250 million, not the 10 million, right? And if you think about say Flipkart and say, me show, there about 300 million, different, me show is different. But anyway, so Flipkart 300 million monthly active users, not transacting active. Amazon is at say 250. But then again, when you look at the number of say weekly active, divided by monthly active users, how many people have actually opened the app once a week? That ratio for both Flipkart and Amazon is about 70%. If I did this as daily by monthly, it's about 30%. And then within that, if I can then think about driving more purchase frequency from a much wider subset as well, I think it's relevant. So I would not restrict the argument to prime though, but I can see how it works the strongest would prime. But I think there's a broader customer base to potentially tap into as well. Yeah, I think it's hard to argue against it. And which is why I kind of say that, you know, Amazon should have been winning this, right? It's like, they have, it makes complete sense, right? But I think, unless they, I feel that doesn't get done by being a feature, I think if they re, I think it needs commitment and commitment, total commitment to becoming a quick company, right? Which is to say that we don't want to compete with Flipkart or Me Show. The money lies somewhere else, and that's the market to win, which is in some ways then Amazon, India, because comes slightly different from Amazon globally. And that kind of just reinventing of yourself is very hard. So, I struggled to see that happen just with a feature. I feel it needs deeper, I would say commitment and the, you know, winningness to walk away from say the non-prime business, right? And I think the second thing I would say is that, you know, for quick versus, you know, regular e-commerce plays, I would be very very of comparing, you know, app engagement rates and, you know, because they're, the customer, the role of these apps in the customer's journey is very different, right? The quick comers are very bottom of the funnel. You are opening these apps when you need something, right? So, I would imagine the conversions of traffic to orders would be extremely high, it could be as high as, you know, 30, 40% right? Because you're opening the app generally when you have a need, right? 30%, 40% really, you think so? Yeah, some of the meat delivery companies have, you know, more than 50% conversion, right? So, whereas e-commerce companies run on this fly-weight of, you know, you have to get a lot of traffic because only 2% convert, right? Because you are not in the market all the time, there is a certain thing of, you know, impulse purchases, you know, browsing, new, exciting things is fun. And you are on these apps. So, you, you'll see that, you know, these apps are almost always on sale. They're not always on sale, but they figured that, you know, you need an incentive to get customers into the door. And if you have a lot of people in the door, 2% will convert, and that's my business, right? I have to, now of course, you know, try to take that 2% to 2.03%, which is never going to be 20%. Right? Whereas, so basically for, you know, for the blankets and zip-tops of the world, you have to solve for top of mind, right? When a customer needs something quick, do they think of you and come to the app? This conversion is done, right? Because at that point of time, there is a need that is led to the customer to that door, right? Whereas in Amazon, Flipkart, Minthra, all of these, it is much more about, hey, you know, person has time on their hands, their ideal, their browsing Instagram. How do we kind of, you know, take up some of their time and show them these new interesting products that they might never buy? But as long as traffic keeps happening, I will kind of be able to win, right? So it's a different kind of, you know, mindset, the customer is in and that's where I feel, you know, unless Amazon reenvents itself, if I find it's very hard to kind of straddle the two worlds, which is also by, you know, Zomato and Blinkit, being separate apps makes complete sense to me. I think again, Instamart took this call very, very date. It's a completely different needs date. - Just a few points there, PGK. So I think the additional kind of points which I'll make there on this is that, so ultimately when you think about Quick Commons, right? We're speaking about Darkstores, turning inventory into Darkstores, Quick. - Yeah, it's a food delivery kind of, almost we define demand as transacting users, frequency order value equals GMV. Here, I think the supply side is far more the kind of rate limiting step in. And then how much you kind of buy this dynamic of Quick Commons is going to be meaning to be kind of disintermediating the Kiranas, right? In broad terms, the supply side. Now, I think the key kind of point there would be that, I don't think Amazon and Flipkart are going to be too far away in say six months time or by the end of the year, purely in terms of number of Darkstores. - Yeah. - Right? So for example, so Blinkit, let's say, is slightly about 2000 Darkstores, about 2,200, we'll plan to go towards about 3000. So they are more aggressive in the kind of pieces store expansions, when you kind of look at, like for example, with Instamart, Instamart, kind of the number of Darkstores, they had kind of, they'd gone a different path, right? But they seem to have kind of almost paused a bit. So they're called about roughly around about, say, 1200, they're about to kind of Darkstores. But when you look at say Flipkart, Flipkart's already at 800, and they're likely to get that 1200 mark in the next day, maybe six to 12 months, right? More likely six months. Amazon had started small in kind of a few places, but all the latest commentary speaking to, we also going to get to about 1000, right? So if I, if you define it like that, then you're basically looking at in six months time here, Amazon now, Flipkart, Zepto, Instamart, at least these four, is going to be around that 1,200 kind of mark, right? And effectively, all these kind of Darkstores are sitting on the same point of a map in a micro market, right? Blinkit is expanding wider. And so there is that dynamic, which is kind of a bit different, which you can speak about. But then effectively, then what will happen is at that point, the difference between the Instamart or the Amazon or the Flipkart or anything else, is then just start a product market fate. And then that shows up in terms of the throughput per Darkstore. I'm out of orders you're doing per Darkstore, that then shows up in your cost, higher than the throughput, better, right? And so what I'm trying to get at is, I think you can still drive economics, which are close to about contribution break even. I don't think you're going to drive profitable economics in a meaningful way. So for example, with Instamart, they're still at a contribution level loss making. Their guide is for this to be about break even, and there's a journey for this still, but let's say in the next quarter, but even at that point on a bitter basis, they're burning, they're a bit of loss, it's going to be at least $400 million annually. And the ability for you to close that is not obvious. And the reason for that again is because what's really happening with competition is that you have all these different players coming in and when all these different players can come in and sit on the same point on the map, on the cost side, for that ecosystem, the throughput is going down in general, which is driving up cost, cost to a gigabur in general, there is inflationary pressures because said dynamic, leases go up as well. So the cost side you are challenged, discounts is somewhere there too. And then on the revenue side, the whole theory is that you're going to run the business such that you're going to drive so much of product market fit that I'm able to drive up my take rate, drive up my ad dollars. The ability for you to kind of collect that also kind of reduces. So whether it be an example Amazon reducing the lower, reducing the threshold beyond which they sought for delivery fees, that's kind of dropped, right? As if going to come in. So it's both right, both your revenue side gets squeezed and your kind of cost side gets inflated. And as you say using Instamater as an example, Instamater if they're a bit lost about $4 million, it's a problem. And so the difficulty, at this point will simply that, therefore like from just a product which is relevant, Amazon and a flip card will be relevant in micro markets. It's not going to be a generic kind of comment that Amazon is the player of Pan India, right? It may be relevant in certain areas of Bangalore, certain areas of Bombay, right? Rather than being these global kind of generic comments. Great. I'm just going to like say this exactly reinforces my point and I will take the same thing to talk about it. So if you take about this, right? Like one of the things, let's talk about Darkstores for a second and Darkstores economics, right? So thank you. You're correct about the number of Darkstores, et cetera. I feel like there is one wrinkle that has people have realized now, which I think is that people have realized that QuickCommerce is not a traditional kind of a scalable business. So in the sense that it used to be that well, you have gotten into Metros, now you go into Tyre, when you go into Tyre, to go into Tyre, then keep expanding, expanding, expanding. I think with QuickCommerce now multiple analysts, probably including you, you've probably sort of figured out that, you know what, the Metros kind of makes sense within these four or five cities, if you have Darkstores at this certain level of density, forget about competition for a second. You can kind of make the math work. The minute you start to go down into certain kinds of markets into X number of cities, beyond the top, I think 15, 20 cities, it starts to look really shaky. So that's point one. This is exactly and precisely Amazon's advantage because Amazon knows now, I don't have to go into 100 cities. I don't have to go into 300 cities. I don't have to go into finite cities. I have to stay exactly where my customers are because they just happen to be there. So I just have to stay within these markets that I already know works. I keep my Darkstores there. I agree, there is going to be competition pressure. That's the supply side. On the demand side, all I have to do is, I have to just trust my users, whom I have already acquired to basically say, look now you can just order, it'll come to you within 20 minutes, 15 minutes, 10 minutes, whatever that number is now, or whatever they are legally allowed to say. And that's it, they get that product over there. So that is why I think Amazon has this unfair advantage. It's a prescient point. Yeah. I'd like to believe so. Okay, question for you, we shall just randomly, I mean, you can talk about this as well, but I'm just curious because you also run Hobskotch. Do you face any kind of, what's the fastest delivery that you do? I imagine it's close to slightly different, but still. Okay. No, I think we've always known that faster delivery is an unlock for demand, right? To deliver faster is not just about, you know, you don't just like, you know, have higher stickiness with the customer, you unlock demand, right? Customers who would not origin, otherwise by will kind of, you know, buy from it, it's like, you know, you might not, buy an ice cream if it comes to you in 45 minutes, but if you've just had dinner and if it's coming in 10 minutes, you unlock that demand. So I think, you know, a fashion that way is very different from other categories. I think fashion fundamentally has so many skews. If you look at your, it's unique that way that, you know, even if you have a loyal customer, you have to sell a new skew every type. You look at your wardrobe, you have, you know, might have the same brand, but we will have different SKOs. So, width is a real, is a reality of fashion. It is important. And that makes, you know, replication and dark-store model slightly difficult, right? That being said, I think at this point of time, you can't argue against quick. There's enough, you know, demand from validation and a lot of people are trying to build it in a different format. I think my thesis is that, you know, we have to kind of understand a quick enough kind of a model. It doesn't need to be 10 minutes. Sure. But I imagine for all of fashion, right, this will move in the direction that your same data deliveries need to be like 50% of your business. Right. So, that, so you might not need, say, you know, 20 dark stores, but you might need, say, four fulfillment centers within the city, right? Which allows you to do same-day delivery, so you can get it within a couple of hours by evening and all of that, right? But the 10-minute thing I don't see it happening in fashion, either do I see the, you know, customer need being there. That being said, you know, I think speed is very critical. I think, you know, Bezos is famous to say that what doesn't change in next 10 years is that customers will want things cheaper. They'll want it faster, right? And Blinkit and Misha have very kind of stretched that to the extremes. Misha has said that I'll only optimize for cheaper, cheaper, cheaper. If it adds two days, but it saves 10 rupees in logistics cost, I'll do that. And they are winning that market. No one can touch them. Blinkit has gone the other direction. They are betting on people paying for convenience, people being not too price sensitive. As long as they can, you know, continue to service the customers in the bestest past manner, right? I think the dark store density is going to be a limiting factor. And that in some ways is also why, finally, I feel it will result in a dualistic nature. I think, you know, Instagram is on probably the weakest footing and you can't compete with a incumbent by doing the same thing that the incumbent is doing, right? Unless you do something drastically different, where which kind of compels a customer, it's a, you know, first club is doing, right? I think Instagram, that's a space that Instagram probably can do. Sorry, you mean Instagram. Instagram. Sorry. It's pretty too much time. Good. I'm kidding. But, but yeah, I think, you know, so there will be, you know, there will be this period of, I think, you know, maybe another 12 months of very intense competition. But if the markets remain like the way they are, there is going to be a lot of pressure to kind of do the right things. I think capital is going to be harder to come by. And as capital kind of dries up, some of these companies will have to kind of, you know, take bets in other areas, right? And that's going to see, I think, you know, just a few clears survive. So by, you know, I would say, I know if you're doing prediction, but we should at some point, what does this look like in 2030? We will. But I was just curious, does hopscotch do a quick service? No, we don't. We kind of, you know, dabbled with it, we've experimented with it, but again, you know, our mainstay is partyware, right? For kids. And that by nature is so high with because, you know, when you're dressing up your kid for your birthday party, you want that kid to be unique, you don't want five kids to be wearing the same dress. So it is by design, you know, wide and shadow and doesn't learn itself very well. So we are doing a lot of investments in speed, by the way, right? So our share of same day and next day is going to triple over last year this year, right? And that's a, you know, very clear. You can see that, you know, improvement in metrics, both in terms of conversion and RTOs and all of that, right? But the two or three are thing is something that we are, you know, we've dabbled with it. We've not seen anything meaningful, different from same day. It's very interesting. You mentioned partyware and the inside that partyware by definition needs you to stand out. And because it needs you to stand out, you cannot have a few standard SKUs over there. It needs a significant width. And I'm not talking about the specifically through the lens of kids partyware, which, wow, okay, I never thought of it that way. But if you look at partyware in general for commerce, and there are a bunch of these fashion, commerce companies like there are these companies like slick. In fact, we did an episode on this as well. And one of them, quite a few. Quite of them are there, right? And one of the things the use cases we had when we discussed it that episode was specifically about partyware. And said, oh, the reason I was like, who the hell is going to take for who wants something in like 60 minutes? Which of course, sounds like what, you know, somebody like us said five years back who wants to go in 10 minutes. But so I was being very cautious this time. I wasn't writing it out, but I was curious. I was like, who wants it in 60 minutes or 30 minutes or something. And this time, and the answer that I got was well, partyware. Partyware is the thing. But I guess this is the difference. But I think kids and adults are very different, right? When there's, you know, the adult fashion business is being built on top of this partyware that, you know, there is this person who's come back from office who wants to go for a party, doesn't have, you know, anything interesting. And I think when we talk about kids partyware, it's way more planned, right? Mom's obsessed about their kids, but there's months in advance. So it's not the, you know, the the where of the clothes is not the buyer here, right? It is not a party that is happening at the end of the day. It is party happening at a predetermined time. It's a family function. It's a family wedding. It's a kids birthday. All of these occasions where a mom wants the kid to stand out. That's, you know, I would say, our breaded butter, right? But I think, you know, in the adult fashion world, the concept of party is very different. It is much more impulse there. There's a lot more yolo going on. And, you know, if I was to do a fashion quick commerce, I would take the same bit. Interesting. So let's just go back to Amzen very quickly. I think I'll just ask like two questions for the two of you. I think number one is that I feel like as a result of this, the reason I find the super interesting is because it is, I think for the first time, there is some access through which a blanket is now getting challenged or I predict will get challenged, right? Until now, the tradition story for quick commerce has been, well, there is the blankets, which are side of kind of corrected and scaling, scaling, scaling. And, you know, even though it's contribution margin has just done positive, I think they are going to basically figure out how they do this. Better efficiency, better density, better execution, better throughput, all of those metrics that are that they're described. Then there is the zepto, which is kind of like being super aggressive and Instamart is kind of squeezed in the middle between the two. And in fact, by the way, just I know neither of you brought this up, but I must say that it's a pretty bad time for Swiggy right now. I think things are getting quite worse for them. They were already stuck in the middle between these two. But if you see the sequence of events over the last few weeks and months, I know other things I don't expect you to comment on what other people write about Instamart, but we should say that JEM financial had a pretty scathing. And quite frankly, I was very surprised to see that report, where essentially at the end of the day, they were sort of like saying that the value of these businesses, you might as well just sell it off. It's not worth what you're doing right now. You cannot do this dual thing of chasing profitability as well as chasing growth. So they kind of seem to be stuck in the middle last week. Swiggy tried to basically change and become an Indian owned company and they got blocked by mutual funds. So there is governance kind of pressures that are also holding their back. So it seems like a pretty tricky time to be Swiggy. But today's not about Swiggy, but it's about Amazon now and Blinkit. So I think questions for the two of you. Other things I suppose I asked you that you are going to be keep tracking this now. What is the one metric that you're going to keep an eye on for Blinkit? Because if this thesis is sort of true, that Amazon is now going to basically take a chunk out of Blinkit by creating this wall around them. I imagine there is some number of Blinkit that you're going to be keeping an eye out for to see. Because Amazon is not a listed company, right? So you only look at Blinkit's numbers to get a sense and a signal of, is the Amazon thing working? Yeah, look, there's a very, very specific metric, which is it's simply again. So this is in aggregate, what is how is throughput per dox to going to trend? And the broad of framing of this is that when you think about, wait, for example, right? So when Blinkit says that, you know, we are going to grow at say 60% each year for the next say three years. And this is on the back of rapid growth, exponential growth in the prior kind of a couple of years. If you disaggregate that growth as in the unsupply side, say counter dox was expanding, the value per dox to expanding and then the velocity of orders, the delta there, the biggest driver of Blinkit as a kind of a quick almost business. How do I get a chance to grow at 60% is going to be about this velocity of orders rapidly expanding on a per dox to level in an aggregate sense, right? That is the aggregate experience. Mirrors what's happening in, let's say, for lack of a better reference, Mirrors what's happening? happening in a good guy where they have a strong, strong kind of firm foretold. So the point is that to the extent we are going to we're not going to see that that meaningful improvement in the velocity of orders for blanket. Then I think that that's in fact, yeah, as a flat to down equals a meaningful problem, both on what is embedded as growth expectations and also what is embedded, therefore, as this expansion and profitability. So yeah, for you, for any player is one metric. It's this a physical inventory turn retail business. So inventory turns right inventory turns at the dark so level. There are limits to that. And all these operators are betting on this thesis that you know, my design capacity is say, let's say 2000 orders per dark store per day or say 2500. Today, I'm at say 1400 or in Sugees case, let's say 1100. This is going to catch up as time goes by. I struggle with that concept. But yeah, that's that's kind of what I'm looking at the most. Yeah, God, and you're and you're basically what your assumption is that if that number stays flat or if it starts to decline, and I would imagine specifically in Metro markets, specifically in the bangles and the delis and the, you know, these things of the world, Mumbai's of the world, if you are able to look at that number and see that number kind of flat or light of declining, I guess the signal to you is that there is some competition pressure coming and chances are, at least if my theory is correct, the chances are the competition pressure is coming from Amazon. Yeah, so I think it's going to be harder to quite candidly disaggregate where and why, but you and also it like disaggregate between, is it Metro or here to et cetera? So we don't know quite candidly. In general, if we had a hypothesize, I think that hypothesis is correct, where the like a Google type is going to have a higher order frequency per dark store, probably higher values against the hypothesis, we ran the validated data to kind of back that. But yeah, so so if, if, for example, we're seeing that that improvements, right, stall, that is a problem both on what is embedded as growth for the company, and also what is embedded as margin, because these two are kind of interlinked that if I don't have the high velocity of orders, I don't have my high GMV growth anyway. And if I don't have the high velocity orders, my my cost structure is largely out of whack, and so I'm not making that 45% kind of margin. So yeah, so it's going to be harder to disaggregate that comment, but I would say that competition is hitting this from multiple dimensions. Vishal, I'm going to put you on the spot. Last question, you are the operator among all of us, you understand the realities of all of this stuff. If I put you, I waived a magic wand and you're sitting inside blanket, reporting to Albinder, the CBO, and if you listen to this podcast, and there is this guy who's making this theory of Amazon now doing this coming for blanket in this way, what would be a response or what would be a strategy that you would consider? Yeah, I think I've mostly seen, you know, founders to be very paranoid, right? And contrary to what people say that, you know, you need to be restaking to be on to pro-no, I think you need to be very discovers. And and paranoia is that, right? Like taking every threat very seriously, not brushing anything away just simply because you have the pole position right now. So I would I would I think if you know, I would take the Amazon bit very seriously, especially given the say, you know, new leadership, commitment to capital and all of that. I think the strategy for blanket for is is not for me to say, I don't think I understand the business deep enough, but I would definitely not write it off, right? I do think that, but I do think that, you know, four, five years is a very long time and we'll have a very clear, you know, answer, emerge and it's not going to be flip card versus Amazon. I think it is going to be a blanket versus an Amazon that plays out for a very brief period of time. I think customers like us are going to be extremely happy. We'll get offers we've never had before. But you know, then then things will stabilize to a relatively simple model, low margin model, never the rest, but I think there's going to be one layer which has 60, 70% market share and then there'll be a bunch of other players. Can I throw a lot of spanner of the works? PGK, please go for it. What about the government? What about regulation? Right? So it's like all of these different players and over of say five year time period effectively, what we're saying is a not profitable ecosystem is basically eating the share of the offline retailers. Right? And I think there are kind of societal impacts to kind of consider and think through. There is going to be, yeah, we'll see, right? What that means in practical, practical terms. I could respond to that. I feed you. I have a very, you're very optimistic about our government and governance. I think India is a very kind of weird situation where we are in some way like late stage capitalism meets early stage governance. I think we're commerce works because we're roadstores. Right? So I think as a consumer, it works beautifully and more power. But given that our economy is so unorganized. Right? And we do kind of think here about whether we're kind of driving more like these gig workers coming on to Eshram and kind of more incentives and all that stuff. It is an informal economy. And so I take a point that this may be something which is sometime away, not a basic case. But I do, but when we are kind of saying that there's going to be rapid growth in quick commerce as a category in general, what we are saying is that the offline retailers are being significantly disrupted and the seated mediated. And I don't know what shape and form that takes. I can give you some examples about other markets where you have seen the governments look to kind of come down and kind of change the way that works. But it's something which I think about telling you not a base case, clearly not in our kind of thinking about these companies and stocks. But I do think about that. I'll give my only point of view on the governance and the regulation side of it, which is, I don't think the regulation is going to come in from a force of Kiranah Stoots. I don't think that's going to happen. But I do think there is actually you bring a very interesting point of what actually happened in e-commerce because when e-commerce really came, there is this whole thing and they figured out no, no, no, we have to change from this marketplace model to inventory model. So they did all of those pressures, which was also like driven by competitors and other people around saying that you can't be both a player and a marketplace. I feel that if Amazon starts to do this where they start to use prime and they start to create this flywheel and they sort of combine their e-commerce business with this quick commerce business as a feature. Oh, I think now it's going to get interesting. Then there is going to be more nuances coming into share holding. Do you own this holding company? Is it inventory model? How who owns the thing in the dark store? I feel like those things may come out. But that case, big basket is good, right? Big basket is fully on in India, blink it has moved to a structure. Insta Mart is not there. So it's an interesting fluid landscape. Interesting. If at the end of all this, we came to the conclusion that the person who's like most positioned is now a big basket. Thank you so much, Vishal. Are we out of here? Yes. Are we doing back, you know, predictions for 2030? Sure. Let's do predictions for 2030. Go for it. Yeah, my prediction is to cut. Sorry, not to cut. Amazon Exits India and blink it becomes the big daddy. I also feel Sipkart acquires Zepto at some part of time. And it's 2030. It's valued at $100 billion and its IPO is 18 months away. So good. Well done. Oh, what a fun. Sorry. I'm going to give you a bit more of a philosophical ending comment, which is going to be that there were buying to this field of dreams argument or the prerid plan grab. I'm the in the latter. So I do think competition is going to widen from multiple different dimensions. That's going to be lost. So going to persist for much longer. I don't see consolidation in the marketplace. Do I see a clearly defined winner as yet? I don't. I do think that the offline players first, if they can get their act together and there is some cost, the dynamic, which is app, which kind of inherentity kind of supports them. I think Amazon closing the loop is super relevant and interesting. So I'm in fact almost about say that I really think Amazon's positioning is interesting. I think big basket positioning in theory is really interesting. I think geomart is interesting. When the QC natives, big basket, as I blink it is clearly the superior operator compared to kind of what we can see with the instrument. Okay, I'll of course, Aditya is equity market persons. We're going to make crazy predictions going forward. Otherwise, like few stocks will fall. I'll actually go. I have no such problems. So I'll go 20 30. What do you think is going to happen? Okay, I think that Amazon Amazon is going to continue to exist. I don't think it's going to have a market share of more than 10 to 15%, but it's going to get the 10 to 15% that matters. I feel like Blinkit and Amazon together are going to basically control a big chunk of the most lucrative quick commerce market. It becomes very apparent that quick commerce works only in like the top and cities and N is probably like maybe 15, 20, 25. I think those two are going to control it. I think Zepto is going to be a very formidable company. It's going to be taking the whole price conscious people, those kind of customers that's going to keep them. As much as I hate to say it, I don't see what's, I don't think InstaMot exists. I don't know what that means. I don't know whether that is means that they're acquired by somebody, whether they have scaled down, but I don't think InstaMot and its current shape exists. I think it's going to be a different kind of a company. Which is also why that other industry said no point, like your might as well market down. Anyway, great. Such a wonderful episode. Thank you so much Vishal Aditya. We'll see how this plays out. Love you. Thanks so much, Praveen. Thanks, Aditya. Thanks for hosting. Cheers. [Music]