After Ankara: First Reflections on the 2026 NATO Summit

[MUSIC] Hello, welcome to Roussian London. I'm Rachel Elohus, Director General of Roussie, and this is the Global Security Briefing, the podcast from Roussie's International Security Team that provides insights on security developments around the world. We're recording this the day after the NATO Summit in Ankara has concluded. And to make sense of it, I'm joined by three colleagues who each bring different regional lenses. One of Lungescu is the former NATO spokesperson and Roussie distinguished fellow, Nadia Suskoria, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Security, and Burjou Oshchelik, the Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security at Roussie. And as an additional benefit, Burjou and Wana are in Ankara, so they'll be able to tell us a little bit about the atmosphere on the ground as well. The NATO Summit in Ankara was built as a moment when a new version of NATO would take shape. A stronger Europe taking on primary responsibility for NATO's conventional defence with the United States stepping back but not stepping away. If last year Summit in the Hague was about the headline pledge of 5% spending of GDP on defence, this one was about delivery, converting record levels of European defence investment into real capability, ramping up defence production and sustaining support for Ukraine. Looming over the San Bition were the Pentagon's decision to shrink the pool of American capabilities assigned to NATO's defence plans. Secretary of Defence Hegseth remarks on potential changes in U.S. force posture in Europe under the Pentagon's forthcoming global posture review, and the question of whether Europeans can convert cash into capabilities at the scale and speed required, particularly in critical capability areas such as deep strike, where U.S. assets cannot be replaced either quickly or easily. The Summit also convened at a moment of fragile unity, a year of transatlantic strain over defence spending, Greenland and the War on Iran meant that much depended on the mood in the room. To minimize opportunities for disagreement, allies abandoned the traditional Summit communique and opted instead for a one-page declaration that was agreed by all 32 allies in advance. Positively, the declaration included a reaffirmation of Article 5, Russia named as a long-term threat, over 70 billion in military assistance to Ukraine for the next year, and a call on Iran to respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. But let's take a step back and consider what the Summit says about long-term trends in the geopolitical landscape. What did the Summit deliver and what did it leave unresolved? Let's start with some atmospherics. Burju and Wana, you're both on the ground in Anker for the Summit, and even though NATO summits have now become an annual occurrence, each has its own character. What was the mood like or what is the mood like on the ground? Burju, let's start with you. Thanks very much Rachel, and it's great to be on with you and colleagues reporting from Ankara, so to speak. I think it was important to be here. There was going into this summit as you rightly laid out a sense of fragility around what unity message might emerge. There was certainly some concern in Ankara about what the Summit would turn out to be like. The city was on high alert security precautions in place to a very high level to ensure that the Summit and adjacent events went as smoothly as possible. And from that sense, I think the outcome, I'm sure we'll get to this, but the outcome was a success. I don't think it could have gone any better from the point of view of Ankara, the foreign policy and security defense circles, as well as the wider NATO umbrella. So I think there was a sense overall in terms of atmospherics that there was a lot writing on this, and there was a high expectation that the allies had to strike the right tone. That yes, we are in the midst of geopolitical turmoil, a sense that the international order is being realigned. There's both known and unknown threats looming on the horizon. But there was a sense also that there needed to be cohesion, coherence and collective unity. And so the pressure was really on. And I think now the day after as we record this, there is a sense that whatever success looked like going into the summit, I think that was achieved in many ways. That's good to hear. Yeah, summits are always quite a production. Lana, as you know, having been the longest serving NATO spokesperson, how did this one stack up and how do you assess the mood on the ground in Ankara? Yeah, indeed, summits are always a production. And this was I think a super production from many, many points of view. I think the host, Turkey, was very well prepared and did its best to give a very warm welcome coming in from the airports. You could see the flags of all the 32 NATO allies. There were big posters saying NATO, the keys to peace, the key to security. And my taxi driver, on arrival at the hotel, even actually opened a box of Turkish delight and gave me some, which was delicious. And it's not often that you can talk about the theme tune for a summit, but for this one, I think there was one and the song was "Love is in the Air" because President Trump at the end of the summit said there was tremendous love in that room. This was a tremendously successful summit, amazing, really. All the leaders are doing a great job for their country. The world is doing well. And that's not often that you get to hear that from President Trump. And indeed, the mood that he was going to be in on arrival in Ankara and during the two days of the summit was the big unknown, because I think a lot else had been prepared in advance exactly as you outlined. Thank you, Anna. Well, we'll return to that because looking at it from here in London and reading the press, we've got a bit of a mixed picture about how well or poorly things went and what exactly the mood was, particularly from President Trump. But let's go a bit deeper. Natya, you're on our international security team. You're covering among other things Russia. So let's start with the view on Russia, because that is one of the two named threats in NATO's strategic concept alongside terrorism. So in many ways is the organizing threat for the NATO plans and everything that was happening at this summit. And frankly speaking, there was a lot of nervousness that the United States might not support strong language on either Russia or the reaffirmation of NATO's collective security guarantee the so-called Article 5. But yet they did. When you look at that declaration, it's right there upfront in the first two paragraphs. So what are your initial reflections on the summit? And what did it tell us about how the alliance sees the Russia threats? Thank you very much Rachel. I think the first thing that stood out from this summit for me was that despite quite real concerns going in the alliance ultimately held the line on both Russia and the Article 5. That in itself is I think very significant, even the current tensions. And there has been, as you mentioned, the degree of nervousness, particularly given the signals from the Washington over the past year that we might have seen some sort of delusion in how Russia is framed or ambiguity around collective defense and the commitment towards it from Washington. But neither of these materialized, and instead the language is quite clear, Russia is described as a long-term threat to European and Europe Atlantic security and stability. And that reinforces continuity with the trajectory that has been set since 2022 rather than any signs of softening of this policy. At the same time, Ankara was framed very deliberately as a delivery summit. So the emphasis is not just on identifying Russia as an ongoing threat, but demonstrating that NATO is structurally adapting to that reality and to the threats coming from Russia, through spending industrial capacity and supporting Ukraine. On defense spending, the commitment to move towards 5% of GDP building on last year's agreement is quite crucial. Internally, I think it helps manage transatlantic tensions, particularly dealing with the U.S. administration that has been very much openly critical of European allies and their burden sharing. And externally, I think it signals to Moscow that NATO is not only united politically, but increasingly serious about long-term preparedness when it comes to coping with the Russian threats. I think the most important part for me was the approach to Ukraine, the 70 billion euros pledged for 2026 with the commitment to sustain it at least the same level in 2027, which once again underscores the support is becoming more institutionalized and importantly more European led. But I have to also mention that the political side, especially when it comes to President Trump's tone, was quite important because we have seen more supportive tone towards Ukraine than many expected. He expressed the willingness to give license to make patriots, to Ukraine, something that Ukraine has been asking for a very long time. His willingness to endorse continued assistance, at least for now, I think helps to preserve the cohesion of the alliance at a very critical moment. And I think this softening in a way is also due to key of demonstrated effectiveness and particularly the use of long-range drone strikes that have been very much efficient in terms of targeting Russian energy infrastructure and military facilities. And these operations have not only imposed material costs on Russia, but also showcase to European allies, but most importantly to the United States that Ukraine's capacity for innovation and asymmetric impact is only increasing. So in that sense, I think it was a successful summit for Ukraine, as well as in terms of demonstrating that the allies are very much in line when it comes to dealing with the Russian threat. Well, thank you for that. I think one of the things that you said in here that I'd want to draw listeners attention to is, you know that the Declaration reaffirms the alliances and all allies commitment both to Europe and Euro-Atlantic security, particularly when it comes to Russia and with Russia being a concern for both of those theaters. I think some who watch this closely would have been concerned that the United States would try to characterize Russia as a challenge for Europe rather than the broader Euro-Atlantic community. So I appreciate you drawing that out, as well as the role of Ukraine, which we'll turn to in a bit. But Grzuc, if I could bring you in, it's really impressive show of support from Turkey and hosting this summit in Ankara, and of course, Turkey bridges in a way Europe and the Middle East. And this summit included a session with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners. It mentioned Iran in the Declaration. That's not usual practice for a NATO that in recent years has been very focused on the Indo-Pacific, and that's been taking up space. What's your initial reaction to how the Middle East was handled as a region in the summit? And what does that renewed focus mean? Well, I think that's exactly right. I would say my initial reaction is that the Middle East and Iran most directly featured more prominently than has often been the case in previous NATO summits. And that's unsurprising, given where we are. During the course of the two-day summit, we saw an escalation, a military escalation once again between Iran and the United States, with even quite direct and difficult language by President Trump around the fact that the MOU was nearly defunct, was dead between Iran and the United States. And again, that for many of us who have been tracking this issue does not come as a surprise, given the ongoing threats in the straight-of-form moves. I think the session with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners and the explicit reference to Iran not being allowed to have a nuclear weapon in the summit declaration, as well as a call upon Iran to respect freedom of navigation in the straight-of-form moves. I think this all combined collectively suggests that the alliance is, again, treating the southern neighborhoods not as a peripheral issue, but as part of NATO's wider strategic environment. But having said that, we also need to qualify it. And that Mark Mute said that the Middle East and Iran specifically is outside of NATO's main territory. But the fact that the summit was being held in Ankara, with a geographic proximity to the Middle East, its neighboring status with Iran, I think that also underlines that some allies within the NATO architecture inevitably and naturally have closer bilateral links and interests when it comes to certain complex theaters. So just to underline the emphasis on the Iranian issue and the Middle East becoming more central, it doesn't mean the NATO is becoming a Middle East security organization in any way, despite the bilateral links and the participation of the ICI partners. But it does show that issues like Gulf security, maritime security, and regional escalation are, I think, increasingly understood as directly connected to allied security, to resilience, to deterrence. And we saw a lot of talk about the issue of resilience when it comes to critical national infrastructure, to cyber networks, asymmetric threats. And just to note, finally, I think the reference to Iran in the summit declaration is especially important. It draws attention back to this conflict theater. It presents the challenges there is one that NATO must inevitably engage with, despite the views of individual European states. We have various theaters we've talked about, Ukraine, Russia, Indo-Pacific, but the issue that Iran has presented and this war has presented is the realization that maritime security, consensus and a coherent approach to maritime security, this is all intertwined with and embedded within wider themes that NATO must engage with around resilience, energy security, trade routes. And this is unfortunately a challenge that the alliance must be able to address. On the Turkey note, if we just have a moment, I think it was, again, important that the summit was held in Ankara, I think that from the Turkey's perspective, it was important to signal that Turkey is ready to be seen not only as a flank country, but as a central one. And there was a direct reference to this language in declarations or statements spayed by the Turkish Minister of Defense and others across the summit and society events as well. The Turkey played a more central role now or aspired to play a more central role. And the older language, the conventional approach of treating Turkey as a flank country should be reconsidered because it might be outdated, given the nature of conflicts has shifted the center of gravity within the NATO alliance. Thank you, Burtu. I really appreciate that a reminder of not only the interconnectedness of the various regions, but how what happens in one area, like around Iran and the issues of freedom of navigation through the straight of our moves, even if you're not involved, even if you want to sit that one out or pretend like it's not your primary security challenge, that could have effects in the Indo-Pacific in the North Atlantic. And so we've got to have a much broader rounded view of how everything is interconnected. But, Ana, can I bring you in either to react to what you heard from Natia and Burtu, but also to give your own observations on what the summit outcomes mean for Europe and for the European pillar of NATO. So, going into this, the focus was really on whether European allies in Canada would demonstrably show and take steps towards making NATO a bit more European and taking over the share of the security responsibility from the United States, particularly on the conventional side. So, all eyes were on whether that would be delivered, whether it was in terms of spending capabilities or support to Ukraine. What do you think? I think we are seeing increased delivery from European allies and Canada with a 20% increase in defence investment since last year, which is absolutely significant. And we're talking about $250 billion extra on defence, which of course is a lot of money and also means a lot of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And I think that sense of delivery of increased self confidence on the side of European allies in Canada also contributed to making the summit a success and led to this love is in the air sort of mood music, because it enables Europeans in Canada to take the sometimes hostile rhetoric and the transatlantic turbulence coming in from the White House. Because perhaps in a cooler, more detached way, not to over react, but to make the point of the delivery to ensure that the summit was conducted in a more constructive atmosphere and focused not so much on the laggards, but on those who delivered. And from what we heard about the discussions in the room, President Trump actually made a point of mentioning the countries that are delivering and making significant progress on the 5% of GDP on defence commitment from last year summit in the Hague. And he specifically mentioned Poland, the three Baltic allies, Germany, Norway, and rather than as people were afraid he might do, naming and shaming those who were lagging behind. So I think that made a very big difference because then around the table everybody stepped out and mentioned what they were doing and how they were going to move forward. Just to add perhaps to what Bourgeois rightly saying on Iran, the Middle East and Turkey, the language in the anchor summit declaration, the language on Iran on the nuclear program on freedom of navigation is not new as such. And it shows that these are long-standing concerns for NATO and we should remember that it was back in 2010 at the Lisbon summit when NATO actually decided to develop a ballistic missile defence system and the main reason was Iran as well as North Korea. And we've seen that ballistic missile system being actually effective in downing for Iranian missiles directed at Turkey, where of course we have an important radar that is part of that overall NATO system. Yes, that's a very important reminder that this is a new business and in fact you're seeing some of the groundwork that NATO put in place more than a decade ago, really delivering. But you know, I don't want to spoil the love is in the air mood here on, but having not been at the anchor summit, I do have to ask you did say that around the table and enclosed doors president Trump was quite complimentary of those who were meeting the defense spending targets. But in public, he was actually quite critical. We had very unpleasant statements on Greenland and the need for the United States to to get or own Greenland things we'd heard before. And Spain was really called out for being a less than stellar ally that was not really worth having relationship with. From my perspective, this is almost opposite of how it should be. I think in a normal relationship, you would have those difficult conversations about who's not performing well or living up to expectations behind closed doors. And then when you would have the praise with the press in the room and externally, did that surprise you? And then also, why didn't Trump's public statements on Greenland and Spain affect that good mood that you described? Yeah, indeed. That difference in tone, the two Trumps, the aggressive Trump and the more loving, inclusive Trump were both there in Ankara. So you never quite knew which Trump was going to turn up, which is also a problem with the unpredictability of President Trump and the unpredictability that that injects into the transatlantic relationship writ large and the undermining of transatlantic trust, which of course is key to the alliance. And that's why I think personal relationships and personal chemistry. As you know, Rachel and everybody who's been part of international diplomacy and symmetry knows these play an absolutely key role, but an underrated role, unless you're in the room, you don't see it in action. And so I think that these key relationships on the one hand with Secretary General Mark Ruta and on the other hand, with President Erdogan, were absolutely key to making the summit a success. And those of us who were there, on the second day, we noticed that there was a gap of about one hour between the moment when President Trump made some very abrasive statements on Greenland, for instance, and on Spain at the top of the bilateral with Mark Ruta. And then it took a while before they had the family photo. And my understanding is that in between, there was a lot of work behind the scenes to remind President Trump that there was a framework for a solution when it comes to his security concerns about Greenland and the threats posed by Russia and China in the high north. And that's been done through a NATO deployment called Arctic Century. And of course, there are ongoing a different diplomatic track between the US and Denmark. And the same thing in terms of Spain, Germany, Spain came with a 15-page list of all the contributions that it's making to transatlantic security, Germany, as well, explained how much it's doing and increasing its part of responsibility in Europe. And I think Secretary General Ruta was able to convey these things behind closed doors. And I think also perhaps to warn President Trump that an abrasive tone only risks further undermining trust, but also the ability of American defense industry to do business in Europe, which directly affects probably at least 200,000 jobs in the United States. There's a lot of money at stake. There's a lot of jobs at stake. And that undermining that trust further and denigrating his allies would only mean that they would be fewer contracts for American industry. And obviously that's something that President Trump has to keep in mind ahead of the midterm elections in November. That's an excellent point, Lana. And if I think about recent weeks, we've actually had a couple of examples where US industry has lost out to European competitors. We had a Danish decision to go with San T, which is a French Italian system, rather than the traditional patriot air defense system. We had a NATO making the choice that they would go with South's global eye surveillance system, rather than Boeing's E3. Now, there are probably other considerations here than politics among others, delivery times, cost, capabilities. But you can't look away from the fact that the politics is playing into this and forcing Europeans and others to think about whether there could be other options that would decrease that over dependence on the United States in terms of defense capabilities. Well, let's turn to defense capabilities. A big focus of this summit was actually on, as we said, delivery, but in particular, the defense industrial aspects. Despite the spending and despite all the fine statements about how European allies and NATO are going to step up to deliver and to create a more European NATO, there has been some frustration from industry that they haven't received the demand signal that they need to open new production lines and to start producing at scale. And equally, there has been a lot of frustration from allies that there's so much fragmentation in the market. But this summit really did see almost an entire day dedicated to those defense industrial relationships. Want to maybe let's go back to you initially and tell us how you think that played into this summit and whether you saw good progress. Indeed, Rachel, the NATO summit defense industry forum was for the first time actually part of the formal summit agenda, which also sends a message because the focus was very much on delivery and on the transatlantic defense industrial base. As Mark Rutte put it, we're focusing on made in NATO. So not just made in Europe or made in the US, but made in NATO. And so there were over $50 billion worth of contracts and procurement agreements and memorandums of understandings of all types of different capabilities, involving investments in Europe, American investments in Europe and European investments in the United States. So deals with companies on both sides of the Atlantic, which was very much the focus. And it was again, a big co-production. You could see there was tech music and big video screens with imagery of drones and planes and all sorts of equipment. So quite impressive. And some of the capabilities involved were exactly those where NATO and NATO allies still have gaps, particularly in Europe. So for instance, the procurement of Triton, uncrewed aircraft for NATO maritime surveillance from Northrop ramen in the US. But also, as you mentioned, the drone procurement of 10 SARB global eye aircraft to modernize NATO's fleet of surveillance planes. For the first time, as you said, a European manufacturer involved in what is a big important NATO capability. But also expanding the existing fleet of A400M planes, which are multi-role aircraft, both air-to-air refueling, Medivac and heavy transport. And a new initiative, which is called the drone edge initiative, increased investment in counter-drome systems to the tune of some $40 billion over the next five years. And to come back to your point about the demand signal, NATO has also released its first public, unclassified demand signal to give industry greater visibility of NATO capability requirements. So that's something that obviously will not go into the granular details for each country, but it'll be more of an aggregate, just to give that demand signal to allies. There's also a UK-led, new deep precision strike capability project, and lots of other things. So there's been a lot of focus on signing deals, on getting deals to move faster ahead. And so the idea is to start cutting red tape when it comes to procurement, but also to have as much diversity and flexibility as possible, and to allow NATO allies to come together to do more together, rather than just duplicating efforts and fueling that defense inflation that we've already seen. Yes. I remember a time when duplication was seen as a negative characteristic among NATO allies, but in these difficult times, that duplication in certain areas can provide the resilience that we need to react when things don't go as planned. Berger, you spent quite a lot of time on the ground, running one of the side events together with our partners at CEDA, and you were interacting with Turkish industry. How are they reading this? Do they feel that there is a role for Turkey in building up the defense industrial base and capabilities of the alliance? Yes, absolutely. That's a short and firm answer. Turkish industry, the Roquet son, the major player, certainly see a great opportunity here to meet this great demand. I think one takeaway was that, yes, this was a summit of delivery, of execution, to move from the pledges to actual spending. But the message was also clear that it's not only about increasing defense spending, but how those investment decisions are made. So which kind of capabilities are allies investing in? Are they the correct kinds of capabilities? Will they contribute to long-term resilience and stability? From Turkey's point of view, I think the message was that Turkey is ready. The concern is that is NATO direction of travel going towards a European pillar, the Europeanization of NATO debates around the future identity of NATO. We're very prominent. One of the messages that emerged in, I think, quite strong terms both in the summit declaration, as well as various bilateral and general conversations, was that there's a commitment across allies to do away with defense trade barriers and delivery. originators, partnerships to maximize defense industrial depth and cooperation. And that is the official language. And that extended a level of reassurance to Turkey in my understanding, but it perhaps it didn't go far enough to ensure that Turkey's defense industry can act freely without concern over lingering and still-in-effect sanctions. And again, is notable is that from the UK's point of view, a defense and security partnership agreement was signed between President Adelaun and Prime Minister Kierstarmher, and that was aimed at strengthening military and strategic cooperation between two major members of the alliance who are both non-EU members. And the statement from the UK side around this agreement was that it reflect to share commitments to strengthening Europe's role within NATO while maintaining close transatlantic ties. This follows from previous defense pact agreements between the UK and Turkey, and this has also a component of greater intelligence sharing and a commitment to shoulder greater responsibility for building a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. I think that was a key takeaway there. There was also discussions with Turkish defense industry partners on a longer term planning to reduce dependency on Chinese origin, critical minerals in raw materials, and what could be done there in terms of R&D innovation in the longer term. Again, focusing on the Turkish point of view, I think a key message was a very strong consensus that Turkey no longer wanted to be viewed as a vendor, a contractor, a mere supplier of cheap drones. That there was potential there that Turkey has and continues to demonstrate capability across a number of critical platforms that will add value to the alliance from maritime security to cyber. And there was optimism, but there's always, I think, a fair share of concern as well about will it be possible to translate President Trump's commitment or pledges to actual action on the ground? And this most prominently, perhaps, can be articulated in the sense of the Turkey's rejoining the F-35 program. Where President Trump's strong signaling around his personal view that there were no barriers that Turkey should rejoin. And this was obviously received very positively from Ankara. And will this translate into congressional approval? What next steps must be taken for this to become a reality? And then, of course, what will this mean in terms of various comparative advantages and friction, tension between Turkey and Israel in that sense as well in both NATO and then the wider Middle East bilateral ties? Well, it's certainly a tangled web when it comes to defense industrial cooperation. Your mention of the F-35s and Turkey not having those listeners might not know the reason that Turkey was not allowed to get the F-35s and is under the sanctions regime is because of its purchase some time ago of the S-400 system from the Russians, which was seen as incompatible with having this fifth-generation aircraft. But in all fairness, to this situation, Turkey in some ways some would say turn to the S-400 when they were not able to get the patriots from the United States and secure congressional approval for that. So a really interesting development that President Trump has said that he would license patriot production within Ukraine. So a lot to think through here if we really want this coherent defense industrial capacity that's working for the benefit of all allies and really leveraging the strengths that exist. So on that note, Natya, I mean the other partner that we need to talk a little bit more about is Ukraine and the role that they've been playing in terms of defense industrial capacity. I think I saw a lot of at least bilateral agreements for co-production and co-development. And then of course there was that reference that President Trump made to production of patriots in Ukraine. How are you reading the role of Ukraine in terms of these capability announcements and this desire to ramp up production? And then as the second part of the question, do you expect Moscow to respond to either this or other things that have come out of Ankara? Yes, firstly I think for Ukraine it's absolutely crucial to make an emphasis on long-term preparedness because I think in Ukraine nobody really believes that there will be any sort of ceasefire or peace deal achieved. And I think what we see so far there is at least less reluctance from President Trump's side to back Ukraine with this regard because I do believe that eventually he also realized that you can't really rely on Russia negotiating fairly in this peace process. And we see that the peace process has largely been stalled for a while now. So in that sense I think one of the key achievements of this summit is to have at least for now verbal confirmation from President Trump that he will be able to support Ukraine with this regard. And Patriot systems is something that Ukraine has been asking for a very long time. So this would be a real breakthrough if Trump follows up on his promises. But when it comes to how Russia would interpret what happened in Ankara and especially NATO's emphasis on boosting its defense capabilities, I think the messaging that we see so far is nothing new. The spokesperson of the Russian foreign ministry, for instance, Maria Zakharovah has mentioned that this once again highlights that NATO is inherently confrontational aiming to militarize Europe and effectively becoming a direct participant of the war through its support of Ukraine. So we have been hearing these messages for a very long time. But I think it plays a certain role domestically in terms of portraying Western supports towards Ukraine and especially NATO support towards Ukraine as an existential threat for Russia. Because Russia finds it more and more difficult to justify its long-term war efforts. As we see that Russians are already concerned about how this war is evolving. And especially with recent Ukrainian successes in terms of their drone attacks, there are less Russians who are enthusiastic about the continuation of this war. So these messages are particularly important to be voiced from the Russian perspective, as the Russian war effort is having less and less domestic support. And internationally, I think it aims to delegitimize NATO's support to Ukraine by portraying it as escalatory and irresponsible. Not that many partners resonate with this message, but Russia needs to voice this message so that it portrays itself as a more or less rational actor. And I think in terms of the implications, perhaps one of the most consequential implications over the long term is for Russia's defense industrial adaptation. And I think Moscow will eventually interpret the outcomes of Falkar Assamid, particularly the emphasis on higher and more sustained NATO defense spending as a confirmation that it is entering a long confrontation with NATO. And as a result of it, I think it will continue to expand production capacity as much as they can and deepen external procurement networks, particularly relying on existing partners who have been boosting Russia's defense industrial capabilities, but also seeing efforts to stabilize domestic production and reduce critical dependencies. Of course, this will all depend on how long Russia will be able to sustain its war economy. We know that they are already experiencing problems, but I think we will see a long-term emphasis on this particular area, as well as intensification of the use of so-called asymmetric tools against European allies. I would see this as a long-term threat, which would involve all sorts of capabilities that Russia has already been employing against the Western allies, such as cyber activities, sabotage, information operations, as well as other grey zone pressures that Russia is well known to use against the Western allies. Excellent. Well, thank you, Natia. That's certainly a lot to keep our eyes on over the next year or so, could go in a lot of directions. I'm aware we're almost at the end of our time, so I'd like to bring it all together from each of you, and let's start with you, Anna. What is the single outcome from Ankara and the summit that you'd point to as the real achievement? And what's the one thing you think might come back to bite NATO? I think the change in tone, both on Ukraine, which I think was very, very noticeable, very different from the infamous meeting in the Oval Office between President and Ineskin, President Trump. President Trump now praising Ukrainians for the amazing job they're doing, and saying that they, more than any other country in Europe, would be able to produce the patriots in Ukraine. I think that is very significant, as well as what we described as the love fest within the NATO Alliance as such. But I think, of course, nobody knows how long the sort of love fest last. With President Trump, we had a very similar mood almost exactly a year ago in the Hague, and that lasted for about six months, and then at the beginning of the year, we went back to serious issues on Greenland, and now of course, with Iran. So I think delivery will be key, both for Europeans, and also in terms of what happens with the military assistance to Ukraine. And one indicator of that may well be the Pentagon six months review announced by Secretary of Defense Pete Hexeth before the summit in terms of the American presence in Europe, which of course will take into account in a different way this whole debate about which country is implementing the 5% goal of investing GDP on defense. What sort of capability targets are they hitting and as well as perhaps the whole issue of basing which we saw the debate over basing in Spain and other countries for the US operation in Iran. People close to the review are saying that the outcomes are not predetermined. So from that point of view, I think the focus will remain on Europeans to deliver as they have shown they can do here in Ankara. Excellent. Thank you. Any final observations for us? Well I would say that the positive takeaway was that we saw a reaffirmation of the value of multilateralism and a commitment to multilateralism. And I think that sends the right message, the right tone, particularly from the point of view of Gulf states, which we haven't really had a chance to talk about in depth. But now at the time of recording, you sit on the precipice of a renewed cycle of either tit-for-tat strikes between the United States and Iran or a larger risk of escalation around the straight-up or moves and the potential collapse of the MOU. So from the point of view of Gulf GCC states, the sense of unity of potentially normalcy, consensus around the value of multilateralism, I think that will be well received. The concern, of course, is, as I want to point it out, about follow-through an execution, delivery of these commitments. Will there be some backtracking from the U.S. administration on some of the pledges made? The bigger picture, again, just to circle back to concerns of military escalation around Iran. We saw over the course of the war that kicked off on the 28th of February. The present Trump was very visibly evokely angered by NATO's lack of initiative and participation in the U.S.-led and Israel-led war on Iran. So if the situation deteriorates even further, will that then rupture the goodwill, the love fest that we've been describing between the United States and NATO? I think Iran will continue to feature quite prominently in our assessments of both the alliance, the resilience of it, as well as very bilateral links around the straight of hormones as well. Thank you. Natia. I'll be very brief here because I completely agree with colleagues. I think the single biggest achievement of the summit was that NATO managed to keep the political unity, but also to translate this political unity into concrete steps. And I think it's particularly significant when it comes to Ukraine, the decision and the willingness of the United States to provide license to Ukraine for patriotic missiles. I think he's potentially the biggest achievement of this summit. But I think when it comes to the most likely challenges that may bite back NATO is the unpredictability of the transatlantic relations, because we know that President Trump has notoriously changed his mind multiple times before, as well as he's standing when it comes to Ukraine and how the US should be supporting Ukraine. So I think this remains an ongoing challenge. Well, thank you to all our panelists. It's clear that you've been following this closely and you've pulled out all the most important points for us, but we've got to watch closely because for every measure of progress there could be a surprise coming from another direction. Before I let you all go, I have to ask Lana about the infamous white cats. They're not really infamous. They became a total media sensation at the press center, which was located in the presidential library. And so there's this bunch of white Angora cats and one of them who is called Lokum or Turkish Delight also has an adorable kitten. And so journalists just went crazy over the cats who was of course sort of exploring the laptops, just being handed over from one journalist to another, everybody was taking selfies. And of course, Turkey and Angora in particular, I think are very well known for their love of cats. So I think this was a demonstration, not just of Turkey's convening power, geopolitical power, military industrial power, but also fluffy soft power, if I could call it that. Well this brings us to the end of today's first reflections on the Angora Summit. And again, thank you to this week's panelists, Natia Suscorria, Berjou Escelik and Wana Lungescu. Global security briefing is available on all major podcast platforms. Please like and subscribe. For further information about the work of the International Security Studies Team at Rusey, please follow us on xformally known as Twitter. And also find out more about the ISS teams research on regional security issues around the world on the Rusey website. But for now, it's goodbye for me, Rachel Elliduz at Rusey and London.