A Defining Moment for Latin America

This is The America's Quarterly Podcast. I'm Brian Winter. Latin America has been a major center of the world's attention so far in 2026 and not only because of Venezuela and President Donald Trump. Today, on the podcast, we'll try to take a step back and understand the current moment and its implications for the region's long-term outlook. We've heard for many years, many people urge the United States to pay more attention to Latin America, but I think one can say to those people, "Be careful what you wish for." There was always a paradox of the heart of this, which was that there is no region in the world that has a greater impact on the daily lives of citizens of the United States than Latin America. And yet there was no region in the world that was lower down amongst the priorities of American foreign policy. In times of great turbulence and change, you try to turn to people you trust. People who you know will be able to situate the current firehose of news in a larger political and historical context. For me, one of those people has always been Michael Reed. Michael was the longtime Latin America editor for The Economist. He wrote, as its bellow columnist, "He's the author of several very successful books about the region, and more recently, he has been a contributor to America's quarterly." Today on the podcast, we'll try to take a deep breath and really think about what recent events mean for the region's political and economic future, from the U.S. military operation in Venezuela to the future of the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship, to upcoming elections this year in Colombia, Brazil, and Peru, the latter two countries being places where Michael lived and worked during his storied career. So many questions, only 30 minutes for answers, so let's get down to it. Michael, welcome back to the America's quarterly podcast. Thanks for having me again. It's pleasure. Michael, a few years ago, you wrote a masterful book about Latin America called Forgotten Cotton. The title, of course, reflected Latin America's relative obscurity, at least in geopolitical terms, in the post-Cold War Order. I don't think anyone would call the region forgotten right now. Latin America is front and center, making global headlines just about every day. In the broadest terms, how are you thinking about this current moment? What are the challenges and perhaps opportunities that may come with the region's return to prominence? Well, we've heard for many years, many people urge the United States to pay more attention to Latin America. It was not a view I particularly shared. I actually think that countries develop mainly through their own efforts, but I think one can say to those people, be careful what you wish for. There was always a paradox at the heart of this, which was that there is no region in the world that has a greater impact on the daily lives of citizens of the United States than Latin America through drugs, migration, people to people ties, trade, tourism, etc. No? Well, that has changed. It's changed with a bow. Literally, if you live in Caracas, it's changed officially with the National Security Strategy published in November, which put the Western Hemisphere, in other words, Latin America mainly, at the top of priorities foreign policy priorities for this administration. So it's a new world, it's a new world in general, it's a new world for Europe, it's a new world for Latin America as well. Challenges, well, as Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, eloquently said last week in Davos, we face a rupture in the world order. And for middle powers, it poses a challenge. If the great powers, and this is the United States and China, basically see relations as determined by hard power. And that applies, I think, to Latin America as well. It's a challenge. Carney suggested in the alliance of the middle powers. That may be of interest to countries like Brazil, I think, in particular, but it's easier said than done. Opportunities, I think there are one or two, actually. Interestingly, the National Security Strategy in its section on the Western Hemisphere mentions nearsharing. So the idea that America first means an end to nearsharing, well, clearly there's some debate or doubt about that. And the other big opportunity, I think, clearly lies in the field of critical minerals, of which the Latin America has a lot. Clearly there are other suitors as well. And the challenge for Latin America will be to ensure that its national interest prevails while it collaborates between the United States and other powers in that field, which is in its interest. Michael, on those two fronts, critical minerals and nearsharing, I have been trying to assess just how serious the Trump administration may be about working with Latin America in those areas. They seem split. There seem to be some people in the administration who believe in nearsharing or in supply chains, whatever you want to call it. Binding the economies of the Americas even closer together. They see that as a way to stay competitive, improve US manufacturing, depend less on China. But then you listen to, well, to essentially to Stephen Miller, who seems to believe not in nearsharing, but reassuring from the US perspective, ultimately bringing everything back to the United States if they can. Do you have any sense of where they'll ultimately land? Well, you're much closer than I am. I'm in seen from this side of the Atlantic, and I think it's clear that the operations sudden spear and the use of the Delta Force in Caracas was the result of a coalition between the MAGA group led by Stephen Miller, who want to crack down on drugs and migration for domestic political reasons. And Marco Rubio, who is both a China hawk and also somebody whose main discernible aim in life, political aim, is to achieve the overthrow of the regimes in Cuba and Venezuela. And so their interests coincided. How long that coalition will last? We'll have to see. It would depend on events and political developments, no doubt. But then specifically on USMCA, we have seen on trade a lot of about turns. And I do think it's one issue on which corporate America has other deep interest. And so I don't take it as given that USMCA will not be renewed in some form or another. Yeah, we recently published an interesting article from Kelly Maimon Hawk for America's quarterly that made an argument for why USMCA may survive after all. She essentially cited the fact that with President Trump facing midterm legislative elections this year and inflation and affordability continuing to be such big domestic issues that this is an administration that essentially cannot afford to just walk away from its trading relationship with Mexico. But let me ask you another question about how you see the Trump administration. We've been talking already a lot about Venezuela in the past year since he returned to office. President Trump not only deposed Nicolas Maduro, but he has also threatened Mexico and Colombia with tariffs and military strikes spoke of taking back the Panama Canal has moved to contain Chinese influence. It's a much more aggressive approach to the region than in the first term. How do you explain the difference? Well, I remember when you kindly invited me to your podcast a year ago. I remember I talked about the Roosevelt coronavirus to the Monroe doctrine and reminded your audience that the Monroe doctrine was defensive in its inspiration directed against European absolute monarchies and it was the Roosevelt coronavirus of Teddy Roosevelt which was imperialist and which are targeted to the United States right to intervene in cases of chronic wrongdoing and impotence and a weakening of the ties of civilization. The words were roughly that. I think we've now seen with the Trump corollary something closer to the Roosevelt corollary than to the original Monroe doctrine, but there's a difference. In the years after Teddy Roosevelt's presidency, the US intervened about 30 times in the Caribbean rim, but a lot of its efforts were actually directed at nation building, even if they ended up building Jean-Darmeries for dictators, but the inspiration was progressive in the sense of that early 20th century movement in the United States. Whereas I think Trump has learned from Iraq that he doesn't want to be in the business of nation building and certainly the mega-based doesn't want the US to be involved in that. So we saw in Caracas what looks like one and done operation, though, who knows. I think it's certainly possible. We could see a kind of kinetic operation in Mexico ahead of the midterms for effect, something that would be great television to use the president's words on another occasion. I think that would be complicated for the Mexican government. I think it's less likely that being intervention in Colombia mainly because whatever president petrars antics on social media, the US intelligence and security relationship with Colombia remains extremely deep, and as far as one can tell, undisturbed. So I think beyond the Caribbean basin, I think we'll see political interventions in other elections, but I think it's unlikely that we'll see military operations. But this president actually makes a virtue of unpredictability. So that makes fools of all of us who try to predict what might or might not happen. I tend to try and avoid it. Well, we've both spoken and written over the last few weeks and months about the possibility of a backlash against this new wave of US interventions. The 20th century is full of those kinds of counterreactions. But my question for you, Michael, is this time different? Because Donald Trump does have the support of figures like Javier Miele, Daniel Noboa, Jose Antonio Cas, now in Chile, Rodrigo Pasa in Bolivia. Do you think that maybe this talk of a backlash is exaggerated, considering the fact that voters keep electing his conservative allies? I think for now, it is. And the main reason for that is that Nicolas Modordo was wholly lacking in any legitimacy. And that the Latin Americans have experienced the cost of the mismanagement of Venezuela at first hand in the shape of most of the 8 million Venezuelans who have left their country since about 2014, 2015, have ended up moving to other Latin American countries. And the specter of Venezuela, the failure of Venezuela, the collapse of Venezuela, I think is a very powerful impact across the region. And therefore, while opinion polls show that while obviously left of center governments issued complaints, issued diplomatic complaints, the polls show that the majority of Latin Americans and the vast majority of Venezuelans favored this operation. Now, I think it all depends on what happens now in Venezuela and what other operations they might be. I think certainly if the Venezuelan policy descends into a kind of crude oil grab against the interests of Venezuela, on the one hand, on the other hand, if you see other operations against other countries, then I think you certainly could see a nationalist backlash in the region. Remember that in Brazil, when Trump applied very crude tariffs for political reasons against a country with which the United States has long had a large trade surplus to try and support Jaya Bolsonaro. The immediate effect was a 10-point boost in Lula's popularity in President Lula's popularity. And he did not back down. And rather, Trump backed down on most of those things. So we have two situations. We have the shift to the right, which is I think largely for domestic political reasons, though Trump is a factor. And then we have the potential in some places for a nationalist reaction, depending on what happens now. Like you, I suspect that Maduro was a somewhat unique case. I was interested to see the other night in a debate of conservative presidential candidates in Colombia. They were asked, would you support some sort of military strike by the United States and Colombian territory? I thought it was interesting to take just one example. Vicki Davila, a Colombian journalist who's now one of these presidential candidates. She held up a piece of paper that said, "A pollo sea violación, de soberanía no." You know, that's support from the United States, yes, but no to a violation of sovereignty. And that suggests that even for some on the Colombian right that some sort of, you know, unilateral strike for the United States would be stepping across an unacceptable line. Indeed, I'm sure that's true. I mean, there are several reasons why on the whole, you know, I tend to think it's unlikely. And that is one reason. No, I mean, as I said, you know, Maduro was uniquely discredited in the region. Let's talk, Michael, about Venezuela a little bit more. When the capture of Nicolas Maduro happened, I was surprised that they left Delci Rodriguez in place. A couple of weeks later, I have come to see the logic. My question for you is, you know, do you think there is a chance that this whole strategy does work? And that in 12 to 18 months, we might have a Venezuela that is both democratic and relatively stable? Well, I think there's a chance of that, but there's certainly chances that it won't happen. But I mean, I think there's a kind of unstable equilibrium in Venezuela at the moment. It's unstable because Delci Rodriguez has a little legitimacy. You know, she owes the job to Donald Trump, whereas Maduro owed the job to Hugo Chavez. Clearly, there are differences within the regime, different approaches. She is being asked firstly to do a 180 degree turn on Venezuela's international alliances and on many of its economic policies. And I think, and this is the other element in the dynamic nature of the situation. Michael Rubio at the end of the day is a Florida Republican, and his constituency is home to much of the Venezuelan opposition and the Cuban opposition. And I think he is sensitive to that. And so I think the US will push to some degree for a political opening and liberalization in Venezuela. And then the balls start going up in the air, and the situation becomes much more unpredictable. I mean, would Trump be perfectly happy with Venezuela's authoritarian regime that remains in place, but sends lots of oil to the US quite possibly. But I think the political dynamics go beyond that. But Delci Rodriguez is at least maintaining the unity of the regime. And what needs to happen in Venezuela, in my view, is that the US needs to find military leaders with whom it can do business and who will accept a democratic transition, because otherwise the risk of a complete breakdown of order are quite significant. My sense is that Delci Rodriguez is probably playing for time and hoping that the United States that the focus will change. And look, I mean, we've had a turbulent week or so with everything happening in Minnesota. I suppose there could be some other change in the world. China could invade Taiwan. And suddenly the Trump administration wouldn't have the bandwidth anymore for Venezuela. I sometimes wonder if maybe if it was just up to President Trump that his attention might go to other things, but then I think about Marco Rubio and how important this seems to be to him, this being Venezuela, Cuba, Latin America as a whole. And I just can't imagine him losing focus here. He in the administration strike me right now is almost like a dog with a bone. And they're just not going to let go. Yeah, I mean, that's, I mean, I tend to think that. And I think the big question hanging over all of this is, would a weaker President Trump be more aggressive, or less aggressive, and President Trump in foreign policy and time will tell? We'll be back after a short break. Few relationships are as volatile right now as the one between the US and Mexico. What can we expect in terms of security, trade, markets, and more in 2026? You are welcome to join us at America's Society on Tuesday, February 3rd here in New York City as we pursue some answers. The conversation will be moderated by Julio Vajero of Noticias Telemundo. Our speakers will be Shannon O'Neal of the Council on Foreign Relations and Ariana Ortiz Bolíne of Moody's to explore what some call the United States most important bilateral relationship. You can RSVP and find more information at ashyphencoa.org/usmex. Another item from recent headlines here, Michael. We've been talking about this right word shift, about how security and anger overorganized crime is one of the main underlying reasons for that shift. The United States recently announced it will invite military chiefs from across the Western hemisphere for a meeting with General Dan Cain. He is the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, the top military figure in the United States. The New York Times called this the biggest meeting ever of its kind in Latin America. Do you see room here for a substantial improvement in the way militaries coordinate to share intelligence and battle-organized crime groups across the region? How important could this be? Well, it's a return to the days of the Cold War. When there was close collaboration between the militaries in the United States and in Latin America. Whether it's that's the best way to tackle organized crime is I think a very big question. I mean, it's clearly essential that more is done to tackle much more is done to tackle organized crime. As you've just mentioned, it's one of the main reasons for this shift to the right. And it's clearly something which is undermined states and undermined sovereignty in Latin America. But I think all the evidences that the way to tackle this more effectively is for the civilians to be in charge, for there to be an integrated approach that centers on intelligence in which the armed forces may well have a useful role to play and coordination between prosecutors, investigators, police, charges, and prisons. And military force may be required on some occasions because of the arsenals that organized crime commands. It should not be the vanguard of a successful approach against organized crime, in my view. I think it's also important to say that although it is at the top of the list, of reasons for the shift to the right, there are other reasons as well. And they include the general failure of left-wing governments to boost economic growth in this tougher world of higher debt and more protectionism. And a general sense that Latin Americans want more capitalism as Rodrigo Paz said in his campaign in Bolivia, he promised capitalism for all Bolivians, rather than state regulation, at least for the time being. Well, so let's talk about some of these upcoming elections in the region. And I want to start with, it's unusual to start with Peru, but let's do so. One of them is that this election seems to be like the high stakes craps table of Latin American elections right now because to try to gamble on this result would be madness, given how fragmented the field is, some three dozen candidates. But the other reason I'm starting with Peru is because you've spent quite a lot of time there over the years. Can you bring some light to how you're thinking about this election? Well, I was going to say it's never a mistake to start with Peru. It's always good to have it at the top. Though it is in a complex situation in which, on the one hand, the economy is once again doing better than the regional average in investor confidence has increased. But the political situation is a more rass of fragmentation and uncertainty, no? The party system broke down some time ago since 2021. There have been 160 different ministers, including 15 ministers of the interior, which is a degree of decomposition of government, which is obviously worrying. I don't take the polls that are seriously yet until next month. The election is in early April. Most Peruvians there is sensibly take no notice of politics until much closer to the election. They have better things to do. But the polls start becoming relevant in February and usually you see movement and you see some candidates acquiring momentum. And that's when one can make a more serious analysis. I do think there's a risk of a continuation of incoherent government. There's a risk of a populist. We know there's a risk of two candidates getting through to the second round with only 15 percent or less of the vote as happened in 2021. It could well happen again. There's an outside risk of what one might call a left-wing populist. Though the extremes have tended to meet in some ways, I do think the fall of Maduro and the fact that the Cuban regime is on the defensive, lessens the danger if you like, of a repeat of a Pedro Castillo who was seriously backed by Venezuela and Cuban. Pedro Castillo, who won in 2021 and who then departed after attempting a self coup at the end of 2022. So I think the picture may become a little less unclear. Let's put it that way in the next few weeks. One more question on Peru. I suppose it might be tempting for some of our listeners in the private sector to see that recent recovery of the Peruvian economy, stability and macroeconomic indicators. They might look at Peru and shrug and say, maybe it doesn't matter who wins. Do you agree with that? I'm not holding it. I mean, I think it's palpable that the animal spirits are being released again in the private sector because there's a view that they survived Pedro Castillo. Terms of trade for Peru are extraordinarily positive because of high mineral prices. Peru is blessed with large quantities of both copper and gold, even if half the gold is mined and exported illegally or semi-legal. There are mining projects which could be developed and there have been holdups in the development of mining projects in recent years. I think the problem is that you need government to do things like ensure social peace around mining projects. Companies can't do it all on their own even if some have been forced to try to do almost that. The other basic problem the country has is that 73%, 72%, 73% of the labor force works in the informal economy and even if formal jobs are growing now, that's a massive figure. It means that the majority of the population actually thinks that the state has not helped them at all to achieve whatever they might have achieved and secondly, they don't have a straightforward relationship and normal relationship with the rule of law and that is a fundamental problem and the political system, part of the collapse of the political system is related to the informality of the country. So I mean Peru needs, in the medium term, in needs to adapt its legal system and its institutions to social realities, no? And that means recognizing that there are more elites in the country than there used to be and those elites are of various kinds. Colombia, another interesting upcoming election, this one looks almost certain to have Yvonne Cepera who is the candidate of the left supported by current president Gustavo Petro, in a runoff against someone from a very large, very fragmented field. The current front runner in polls is Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer who appears to be modeling himself both in his looks and his rhetoric in many ways after Naib Bukele. What impressions do you have of that race right now? Let me say that I think that perhaps if Yvonne Cepera would win, it would be because his opponent in the runoff is de la Espriella, who is a man with shadows in his CV, let's say. And I think many Colombians would find actually both of those options not acceptable. Clearly Cepera has a strong base of support because president Petro has retained a solid 30% of popular support because a lot of poor Colombians think that he is on their side and in a classic populist fashion. One laments, the collapse of the central, the weakening of the center in Colombia as in many other places. I'm in secure Fajardo who figures but not very highly in the polls, who has been a candidate before, who almost got into the second round last time and would have won the second round probably if he had. I think he's not finished. I think Alvaro Uribe in many ways is a potential kingmaker and as far as I know he is not yet endorsed anybody. But I think the election is looking worrying in terms of the prospects for Colombia. I think in both Peru and Colombia and Brazil, which you might or might not be moving on to, I think it's quite likely there will be an election intervention from President Trump. And we'll see whether that would be effective or not. My final question for you, Michael, is about Brazil. You lived in Brazil in the 1990s. For all of that time, since then, the central figure of Brazilian politics has been Lula. Do you expect that he will be elected for yet another term as President? It would be his fourth and he would be 81 years old on election day? Well, let me say that Lula has great force but is a great politician and has achieved a lot for a lot of Brazilians. That said, I think it's sad that he's going to be a candidate again. He insists that every term that he's in much better physical and mental shape than Joe Biden was. But age is clearly a factor. And I also think countries need change from time to time. No. I think the race will be close, as my sense. And I think either side could win. It obviously depends in part on who candidate of the right turns out to be whether there will be a plausible candidate of the center right or not, or whether it will be Bolsonaro versus Lula again, Bolsonaro in one former or another. Lula is obviously a great campaigner. The economy has done reasonably well. Living standards for poorer Brazilians have improved. The country left behind the world food organization hunger map last year, I think. So Lula certainly could win, but whether he will, I think it's, you know, we obviously can't say at this stage. Michael, I always appreciate your time. Thanks so much for joining us on the ACU podcast. Thank you. Thank you for listening to the America's quarterly podcast. If you enjoyed this episode, please leave us a review, give us a rating, and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. The America's quarterly podcast is produced and edited by Miranda Masariegos. Our sound engineer is Gabriela Bias.