10.70- The Kornilov Affair

[Music] Hello, and welcome to Revolutions. [Music] Episode 10.70, the Cornelaw Affair. [Music] The July days were a very close call for the provisional government and for the Soviet. The armed demonstration in Petrograd had been aiming at ending the unsustainable dynamic of dual power by overthrowing the government and investing all power in the Soviet, what better way to solve the problem of dual power than eliminating one of the two powers. But when the moment of truth came on the evening of July 4, 1917, however, the leaders of the Soviet refused to bow to these demands. And though both the Soviet and the provisional government weathered this particular storm, the prestige of both was badly damaged. The provisional government was still intact, but remained just as unpopular and ineffectual as ever. The Soviet, until this moment the universal darling of the streets, now generated growing contempt for its refusal to become the avatar of the streets demanded. Forces on both the left and the right rightly saw a golden opportunity to take advantage of the staggering stumbles of a center that could not hold. But though we ultimately know where this is all headed, in July of 1917 the staggering and stumbling center tried to hold, but to hold it would need new leadership. The Prime Minister, Prince Levov, who had done everything in his power since February to unify a coalition of liberals and socialists, admitted he could not do the job, exhausted and demoralized he admitted defeat and resigned as Prime Minister on July 7. And when he resigned, he retired from public life entirely, retiring to a monastery he hoped he would be left alone until he died in peace. There was only one man who had the influence, prestige and energy necessary to succeed him, and that was Alexander Karenski. Without setting down his portfolio as Minister of the Army and Navy, Karenski became Prime Minister of Russia. It was quite the ascent to power for the Son of State bureaucrats who had made a name for himself as a radical lawyer and journalist and who had previously spent time in prison for his unsavory political connections. That Alexander Karenski was now considered the only man who could lead Russia was if nothing else, proof that a political revolution had in fact occurred. In the month since February, Karenski appears to have undergone something of a transformation. Little by little, event by event, he replaced his radical idealism with a kind of egotistical resolve. From a belief that a free and democratic Russia was sure to flourish after the fall of bloody Nicholas to the belief that he alone could save the Russians from themselves. In the wake of the April crisis, he was already lamenting he had not died on the barricades back in February and further lamenting the fact that the Russian people could probably not be led without whips and chains. But rather than becoming so disillusioned that he quit politics and retired to a monastery like Lavov, Karenski convinced himself that he was the one who was going to save Russia and save the revolution. He had begun his career believing that he was something of a Russian mirrorbo. Now he believed he was destined to be a Russian Napoleon Bonaparte, rescuing it from military defeat and political chaos. After becoming Prime Minister in the first week of July 1917, Karenski let all the power he now wielded go straight to his head. Almost immediately, he moved into the Winter Palace, ancient residents of the Tsars. He set up his offices behind a giant desk of Tsar Alexander III and slept in the bed of the Romanovs. He surrounded himself in imperial trappings and even ordered the flag raised and lowered from the Winter Palace as he came and went, copying the old system of alerting Petrograd when the Tsars were physically in residence. Fully believing now that he alone could unify and save the revolution and sensing that the Soviets' hesitation to seize power in the July days was proof that the moral authority they held over Russian politics, that they were actually the real power in Russian politics, was a spell that was on the verge of being broken. Karenski ordered them to vacate the Torrid Palace and find a new home. The pretext for this move was that the government was planning on reconvening the Duma and the Soviet had only been allowed to meet the Torrid Palace because the Duma was not in session. The order itself was a clear signal Karenski was going to try to alpha-dog the Soviet into a place of submissiveness. That they complied with the order and moved their assemblies, meetings and offices to the Smolni Institute, a former finishing school for the nobility, further indicated that after the July days it was possible to turn the tables on the Soviet. They had been pushing the government around since February and having failed to seize power when it was offered to them, Karenski and his government realized they could start pushing the Soviet around for a change. There was one small hang-up to Karenski's vision of himself as a Russian Napoleon Bonaparte. He was a lawyer and a journalist, not a soldier. In his role as Minister of War he had taken to wearing military uniforms, but that was mere theatricality. But if he was envisioning a Bonaparte's model for post-revolutionary Russia, that was obviously going to require the military as a major pillar of support. Karenski needed a military figure who was popular with the troops, popular with the public generally, but also willing to do what might be necessary to impose order on a now perpetually chaotic home front. Karenski believed he found his man in general Lavra Cornelov. Cornelov was a 47-year-old career army officer. He had been born on the periphery of the empire among the Siberian Kossaks. His father was a peasant who had served as a soldier, his mother was a housekeeper. Cornelov himself served all over the empire, including Stintz and Central Asia and the Far East. In the Russo-Japanese War he had risen through the ranks on a combination of courage and talent. When War War 1 broke out, he commanded to division on the southwestern front and was promoted to major general in 1915. But shortly thereafter he was captured by the Austrians after refusing an order from General Bruseelov to retreat. Already popular in the press and amongst his troops for a kind of salt of the Earth heroism, Cornelov won further fame by escaping Austrian confinement in 1916 and successfully making it back to Russia. The leaders of the February Revolution had considered Cornelov politically reliable enough. He was given control of the Petrograd military district in March 1917. But then he became something of an uncomfortable liability in the midst of the April crisis. Cornelov demanded full authority to use the military to indiscriminately restore order. When the provisional government refused, he requested to be transferred back to the front. A request that was quickly granted. Returning to his old stomping grounds on the southwestern front, Cornelov led an initially successful wing of the June offensive which was then stall and forced to retreat. Much to his angry disgust. In Cornelov's estimation, the failure of the offensive was obviously caused by the infamous order number one. Order number one had disastrously replaced military discipline with disobedient committees of soldiers who could not be ordered to do anything they didn't want to do nor punished for their refusal to obey. Karenski, who had very recently believed the democratization of the army would propel it to ultimate victory, now agreed with the assessment of the senior staff that order number one needed to be tossed out if Russia was going to withstand the German offensive now rolling them backwards. This was going to be dicey politically and somebody like Cornelov seemed to be the perfect vehicle for it. He was popular with the rank and file as well as enjoying a positive reputation in the press as a national war hero. Nobody took him to be in a aristocratic reactionary of the old school and so his clear determination to restore order and discipline in the ranks would be taken for what it was, a determination to restore order and discipline in the ranks and nothing more. So in mid-July, Karenski fired General Prasilov, who had been recently elevated to the post of commander in chief, effectively dumping on him the failure of the jun offensive and then he turned around and offered the commander in chief spot to Cornelov. But Cornelov did not accept straight away. He had conditions which he transmitted to Karenski on July 19. He wanted a completely free hand to run the military as he saw fit. The most controversial specific demand was the restoration of the right to execute soldiers from mutiny and desertion including the garrisons in the rear who were presently protected from such punishment by order number one and the soldier's declaration of rights. His most controversial general demand was a statement that he would consider himself responsible only to the nation and his conscience. Now these were somewhat provocative demands after all there are other authorities he needed to consider himself responsible to but after some careful clarifications brokered by deputy minister of war, a guy named Boris Savinkov, a former member of the SR combat organization turned militant nationalist, the two sides came to an agreement. On July 24, General Cornelov became commander in chief of the Russian army. Cornelov's elevation was cheered by everyone to Alexander Karenski's right. The general's demand for the right to impose discipline and authority were leaked to the press and he was hailed as the savior of Russia. There were those after all who had supported the February revolution because of the gross incompetence of Nicholas and Alexandra. in the five months since their abdication, and by the way, it's only been five months. Things only went from bad to worse. But while Cornelof absolutely believed Russia probably needed a full-blown military dictatorship to see it through the present crisis, we should be clear again that he was not an outright political reactionary. He in fact said, and I'm quoting here, "I am not a counter-revolutionary. I despise the old regime, which badly mistreated my family. There is no return to the past, and there cannot be any. But we need an authority that can truly save Russia, which will make it possible, honorably to end the war, and lead her to the constituent assembly." So far as I can tell, this is what Cornelof was always trying to do. He was thinking the thing that General sometimes think, which is that a period of temporary military rule might be required to allow space for a democratic government to form. Whether he had any deeper thoughts on the implication of unilaterally imposing military rule on Russia, we do not know. But General Alexeiev once commented about Cornelof that he had "aliance, heart, and a sheep's brain." For the time being, however, General Cornelof publicly acknowledged the proper authority of the provisional government, now reorganized under Prime Minister Kurenski. And this was the third government since the February Revolution, which again, it's only been five months. But privately, he neither liked nor trusted the ministers. When he met with them for the first time on August 3rd, Kurenski warned him not to be too frank or open about anything, because some of the ministers were happy to make strategic leaks to the press. In particular, this side I was directed at Minister of Agriculture, Viktor Chernos. Cornelof left this meeting and returned to military headquarters, convinced the provisional government, as presently constituted, was hardly worthy of leading Russia. He had his doubts about Kurenski too, but concluded even in private, that Kurenski was at least a sincere patriot doing his best to save Russia. Kurenski, meanwhile, was becoming very concerned with the response from the right to the elevation of Kurenski. He was detecting an awful lot of outright open-solivating for Kurenski to ride in on a white horse and save Russia from the menace of the Bolsheviks, who were obviously German agents trying to destroy the country. In a further meeting between Kurenski and Kurenski in Cornelof on August 10th, the general told his prime minister that what he really wanted and what he probably needed was something like the power General Ludendorff now enjoyed in Germany. Supreme authority over all private and civilian affairs connected to the war. This would include railroad, communications, and industry. Kurenski was incredibly non-committal about this, and started to worry that maybe he had promoted a man with his own dictatorial ambitions. In an attempt to prevent a right-wing coup and reforge something of the revolutionary consensus that had existed in February, Kurenski convened what is dubbed the Moscow State Conference on August 12th. It brought together a whole array of people who had driven support for the February Revolution in the first place, endost realists, businessmen, military officers, and conservative liberals who had made up the old progressive block, but also invited, or moderate socialists, intellectuals, lawyers, and journalists, leaders of the trade unions, and lower ranking officers. They had all stood together in February, and Kurenski hoped to bring them back together here in August. But the State Conference only proved that the unity of February was over. Meeting in the Bolshoi Theater, the delegates divided themselves physically between left and right in the hall, which is to say that the left sat on the left and the right sat on the right. Over the next several days worth of speeches, if the left liked what they heard and applauded, the right sat in Stony Silence, and if the right liked what they heard and applauded, the left sat in Stony Silence. General Cornelaw arrived in Moscow for the conference and was given a hero's welcome at the station, flanked by Redrobe Turkmen bodyguards, looking in awful lot like a personal Praetorian guard, flanking him wherever he went. Cornelaw's speech was simple and honestly pretty milk-toast, but the right applauded him rapturously, feeding Kurenski's perception that Cornelaw was possibly the spear point of counter-revolution. Kurenski's closing address in contrast was a disaster. He had clearly lost his touch and gave a rambling and at times nearly incoherent speech. One delegate, sympathetic to Kurenski, was forced to admit one could hear not only the agony of his power, but also of his personality. If the Moscow State Conference was meant to reunify the center, it failed spectacularly. But this was not actually the death of Kurenski's fortunes, nor the fortunes of the provisional government. It was not even the cause of a major breach between the Prime Minister and his commander-in-chief, and in fact as we are about to see, they were basically still on the same page. Now one thing that cannot get lost in all of this is the context of the war. The June offensive had failed, and Russia's armies were falling back in disarray. The central powers had paused to catch their breath for most of July, but in August the Germans stood poised to launch an offensive into Latvia, putting Petrograd itself in danger of being captured. With this grave emergency looming out on the front, and the politics in the rear still a confused fractured and dangerous mess, both Kurenski and Kornilov moved towards the conclusion that martial law was going to have to be declared. The subtle distinction between them though was that Kurenski believed that martial law would prevent a coup from the right, and Kornilov believed it would prevent a coup from the left. The Germans finally launched their expected offensive into Latvia on August 19th. After a temporarily stiff but ultimately failed resistance, the Russian armies retreated, and the Latvian capital of Riga fell to the Germans, putting the Germans on a perilously direct line to Petrograd. The only good news was that the Russian army withdrew in good order, and was able to reestablish a defensive line preventing any further advances. For now. The fall of Riga was the immediate context for the dramatic political events that are about to unfold, events which give us the title for today's episode, the Kornilov Affair. But in an era of drama, peril, danger, violence, and desperation, the Kornilov Affair resembles nothing so much as an episode of a bad sitcom. Seriously, you know those plot lines that hinge entirely on characters saying lines of dialogue to each other that lead them to take away different understandings of something, even though the misunderstanding between them only exists because the script demands it, and to even remotely normal people would realize immediately there was a misunderstanding it just resolved whatever the issue was. Well, that's the Kornilov Affair. It is not a political plot, it is a sitcom plot. At the center of this sitcom plot is a guest star named Vladimir Lavov, no relation at all, to Prince Lavov. This Lavov was a Moscow industrialist, Octoberist delegate to the pre-revolutionary Dumas, and someone who was heavily involved in the progressive block. Lavov was among those who believed discipline and order were now what Russia needed, and he decided to insert himself into the picture, with the alleged goal of keeping Prime Minister Karinsky and Commander-in-Chief Kornilov on the same side. But through his bungling, misrepresentations and miscommunications, he almost single-handedly drove them apart. On August 22nd, Lavov went to meet Karinsky. He told the Prime Minister vaguely that he represented certain right-leaning groups ready to take drastic action to save the country. Karinsky was skeptical, but told Lavov basically, "Okay, go sound them out and report back to me." Karinsky later said he just did this because he wanted more information from Lavov, but Lavov left believing he was now like Karinsky's emissary in a plot to stage a top-down military coup. Lavov then got on a train and headed to military headquarters to meet General Kornilov. Meanwhile, out at headquarters, Karinsky's actual emissary, Deputy Minister of War Savinkov, was having his own meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, where the two agreed that Kornilov should take steps to neutralize ultra-conservative plotters in his officer corps, but also to send the third cavalry corps to Petrograd to act as protectors of the provisional government. Kornilov said he wanted direct military control of Petrograd, but Savinkov told him that was impossible politically. Kornilov acquiesced and agreed to send the third cavalry corps, and they would be put at Karinsky's disposal in the increasingly likely event that the government had to declare martial law. There were rumors swirling the capital that the Bolsheviks were planning to stage another major demonstration on October 27, which was the six-month anniversary of the Petrograd garrison's mutiny. Even if it wasn't armed or violent, this demonstration might prove the perfect pretext for declaring martial law. The only hang-up was that the Bolsheviks were absolutely not planning any demonstrations on October 27. They were barely keeping their heads above water at this point, but oh boy are they about to come roaring back to life. Just as Savinkov was departing back to Petrograd on August 24, Levov showed up that same day at Army headquarters and requested a meeting with Kornilov. Levov claimed to be Karinsky's agent, and Kornilov assumed that this was a follow-up to the discussions he had just had with Savinkov, and he never bothered to check with Karinsky whether Levov was legit, which he very much was not. Levant then floated three potential scenarios on how to administer martial law. The first option was Kurenski declares himself dictator with Kornilov supporting him militarily. The second was forming a directory-style government, essentially a small executive committee with seats for both Kurenski and Kornilov, or then finally the third option was Kornilov being appointed dictator with Kurenski supporting him politically. Levant asked the general which he preferred, and Kornilov said, "Well, if I had my choice it'd be option three." The cleanest and easiest solution was for a general to run a military dictatorship. But he also said this is just his preference and he'd support whichever. But whatever they decided to do, Kornilov said Kurenski and Savinkov should come out to army headquarters where they could all work out a new government safe from the mobs of Petrograd. But as he was boarding the train back to the capital, Levant apparently had a brief talk with one of Kornilov's eights, who said in an offhand way that it didn't really matter which plan was put into place to start, because Kurenski would only be needed for ten days and then he could be dispensed with. Now my read on this though is that the officer in question was far more of an intriguer than his boss, and he was speaking only for himself here, this is not something Kornilov was secretly planning. Levant then returned to Petrograd and met with Kurenski on August 26th, bearing incredible and not even remotely accurate news. He told Kurenski that Kornilov demanded full dictatorial authority, mischaracterizing completely what Kornilov had said that the third option was merely his preference and hardly a deal breaker. Kurenski was at first incredulous and didn't believe it, this was quite an about turn for Kornilov. But then he seemed struck by two ideas simultaneously. First, maybe without Kurenski knowing it, Kornilov had entered into a battle of wills with him, and was about to attempt to overthrow him in the provisional government and staged the very right-wing coup Kurenski himself feared. And second, that even if none of that was true, he now had a really great way to rehabilitate his standing with the left, to expose and destroy an alleged right-wing plot and emerge as the unrivaled defender of the revolution against agents of reaction. Now I think up to this point, August 26th, 1917, Kurenski saw Kornilov as an ally working towards a shared goal. But from this point on, I do think it becomes clear Kurenski did everything in his power to set Kornilov up to take a fall. After their meeting, Kurenski invited Lavav to come back to the Winter Palace at 8-bat evening to engage in a series of cables with Kornilov. When Lavav didn't show up on time, Kurenski went ahead and initiated communications at 8-30. But remember, this is a sitcom plot, not a political plot. So what Kurenski does, and I am not making this up, is he simply pretended Lavav was in the room with him and further pretended to be Lavav in the ensuing back and forth. Kurenski opened by saying, "Do you want to proceed as you indicated to Lavav?" Kornilov, believing he was talking to both Kurenski and Lavav at the same time, and believing the three options were still on the table replied, "Yes, but we do need to come to a decision quickly." Kurenski then impersonated Lavav and said, "The Prime Minister wants to know if you want to do what you indicated to me privately you want to do." Kornilov said, "Yes, Kurenski and Savinkov should come to headquarters at once." They then exchanged a few more lines before the communication line dropped. Kornilov walked away believing the third cavalry corps would proceed to Petrograd, Kurenski and Savinkov would depart Petrograd, and within a few days they would collectively declare martial law from Army headquarters. Kurenski walked away believing Kornilov was demanding he be made dictator and demanding Kurenski come to Army headquarters where he would be made hostage and then later possibly shot. Or, what is also just as likely, Kurenski kept this entire farce of a conversation just vague enough that he could now run off and claim that's what Kornilov planned to do. Kurenski immediately convened all his ministers and informed them of what had just transpired in his own words. He told them Kornilov was preparing to stage a military coup d'etat and he had proof. Kurenski then told them the only way to see this through was for the government to resign and vest all power in Kurenski himself. After a great deal of heated discussion that went on overnight, the ministers ultimately agreed. At 4am on August 27th, they vested Kurenski with supreme executive authority and then collectively resigned. Kurenski promptly sent a cable to military headquarters relieving Kornilov of his command effective immediately, ordered another general to take over and place Kornilov in custody. When Kornilov received this cable at about 7 or 8 o'clock in the morning, he understandably blew his stack. But he moved very quickly from believing Kurenski had out and out double crossed him and considered it far more likely that the rumor of another Bolshevik insurrection scheduled for August 27th had been true. That overnight something momentous had happened in Petrograd and Kurenski had probably been taken hostage by armed Bolsheviks who were now forcing him to issue orders under duress. So Kornilov ignored the cable, sent orders to the 3rd cavalry corps for them to advance on Petrograd as fast as possible, and then prepared, at least in his own mind, to rescue the provisional government from the clutches of what was surely another Bolshevik insurrection. But of course, there was no Bolshevik insurrection. There was nothing even close to a Bolshevik insurrection. The Kornilov affair is a farcical, miscommunication full of unfounded assumptions all the way down. And the great historical irony is that by ignoring Kurenski and ordering the 3rd cavalry corps to proceed with all haste to Petrograd, Kornilov did more to single-handedly rehabilitate the Bolsheviks than anyone. After the July days, something like 800 Bolsheviks had been arrested, and it kinda looked like they were done for. Lenin even said they're gonna shoot us. I mean, now's the time to do it. But with many socialists, including Kurenski, increasingly worried about a right-wing coup over the summer of 1917, instead of grinding the Bolsheviks to dust, they let their foot up. And though the leaders were still in custody, many party members had been released, and the backlash everyone had feared after the July days turned out to not be the catastrophic crackdown they feared. In fact, just a few weeks later, here we are with word ripping through Petrograd that a right-wing coup was upon them, Kornilov has sent troops to overthrow the provisional government, the Soviet and the Revolution. Suddenly, the Bolsheviks went from potential threat to potential saviors, because they were, if nothing else, the most heavily armed and militant defenders of the Revolution in Petrograd. Scramble in defense. The Soviet called all the Socialist parties in Petrograd together, and they hastily formed what was called "the committee for the struggle against the counter-revolution". Bolshevik representatives were not only invited to participate in this committee, but asked to take the lead. In addition to mobilizing their own armed cadres, the Bolsheviks demanded 40,000 workers be armed at once, significantly augmenting the ranks of what were called "the red guards". Militia units of workers under arms. The first red guard units had been formed back in March and April, but they now jumped in size, and more importantly for future events, they were being organized by the Bolsheviks, who almost overnight went from being considered armed activists causing trouble for everyone, to being the most uncompromising and clear-eyed defenders of the Revolution. In the end, though, the Bolsheviks did not have to lead Petrograd in street fighting against Cornelof's forces. Railroad workers successfully tore up all the tracks leading into the capital, and the third cavalry divisions' transports were temporarily halted in their tracks on August 29. While they sat idle, representatives from Petrograd went out to meet and mingle and agitate among the troops. Party leaders, garrison soldiers, workers, deputies all went out to implore them to please stop. There were no disturbances in Petrograd. The people were merely rising in defense of the provisional government, who you are posing a threat to. And this completed the force of the Cornelof affair. Only a few of the cavalrymen had any idea why they were even being ordered to Petrograd in the first place. And those who did have some idea believed they were the ones being sent to defend the provisional government. So they're like standing around looking at each other with one side saying, "I've come to protect the provisional government." The two sides engaged in discussions through the night, and by the morning of August 30th, the whole thing was over. Now fully brief that the only emergency threat to the provisional government was the third cavalry corps itself. They then now refused to move until they received more official clarification. And this loss of momentum alone effectively ended the threat. The commander of the third cavalry corps was escorted to meet with Karenski. Now we have no account of their meeting, but it was probably a supreme dressing down from the Prime Minister, which the commander no doubt received with angry contempt. Knowing as he did, and this is true, that Karenski had been the one who ordered the cavalrymen to be sent to the provisional government. core to Petrograd in the first place. Kurenski was now heavily amping up the accusation that Kornilov had done everything of his own sinister initiative, but the historical record more than confirms the transfer of the third cavalry core to Petrograd was done at Kurenski's initiative and probably with the intention of declaring martial law. It was only after he did this that Kurenski changed his mind and decided to pin all the blame for any attempt to declare martial law on Kornilov and Kornilov alone. After all, Alexander Kurenski is no military dictator, he is the defender of democracy against the right-wing counter-revolutionaries. Disparing for himself and for Russia after having received this absurd dressing down, the commander of the cavalry core left his meeting with Kurenski, went to a private apartment at Petrograd and shot himself in the heart. But the Kornilov affair now abruptly ended, anyone who might have supported him, loudly disowned him. He was peacefully relieved of command on September 1 and placed under house arrest, and he would remain in custody until November. When the Bolshevik revolt Kornilov had long predicted and tried to avert, finally happened. Kornilov and other loyal officers in custody with him escaped their jail cells and went off to form the core of the volunteer army, one of the main pillars of the White Army in the coming Civil War. Having successfully thwarted a right-wing coup that was probably never a right-wing coup, and having rehabilitated and rearmed the Bolsheviks, Alexander Kurenski now stood as the effective dictator of Russia. And next week, we will head into September 1917 and see him make his final fumbling attempts to be the great leader Russia needed him to be. The great leader, he believed it was his destiny to become. But of course, we know what Alexander Kurenski's destiny really was. The man known to history has the leader overthrown in the October Revolution.