#464- THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE

You're listening to an Air Wave media podcast. Are you earning and investing in the stock market? In real estate? How about in relationships? Are you earning and investing in your life? I'm Doc G, semi-retired hospice physician and host of the Earn and Invest podcast, where we have the 201 or next level conversations about money and life. Not only how you make money and grow it, but also how you use your wealth to create a better and more fulfilling existence. Join us every Monday and Thursday wherever you listen to fine podcasts. This episode of the podcast contains explicit language. [Music] Hey everyone, welcome to episode 464 of our Civil War podcast. I'm Rich. And I'm Tracy. Hello y'all. Thanks for tuning into this episode of the podcast. After using a couple of shows to set the stage with this episode, as promised, we'll finally get to the battle of Elasti, which took place in northern Florida in February 1864. Yep. And when we left off last time, the federal commander in the field, Breeder General Truman Seymour, had decided to set out and march west from the railroad junction of Baldwin, heading deeper into the interior of northern Florida. For his part, John Hay, Lincoln's man on the scene in Florida, was growing weary of Seymour's constantly changing outlook, as Seymour vacillated between aggression and overconfidence and caution and doubt. Hay noted that since the beginning of the campaign, Seymour had seemed "very unsteady." Meanwhile, the Confederate commander, Brigadier General Joseph Finnegan, was receiving reinforcements and overseeing the construction of a strong line of fieldworks east of Lake City, near Elasti, a stop on the Florida Atlantic and Gulf Central Railroad. Finnegan himself had no experience leading men in battle, but fortunately for the Confederate cause, as part of the reinforcements rushed to aid him, was a brigade of Georgians, commanded by a combat-tested officer, Brigadier General Alfred Colquitt. Colquitt and his men were most recently stationed in South Carolina at Charleston, but they were veterans of the peninsula, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. On the federal side, Truman Seymour's decision to advance west toward Lake City came as a surprise to his superior, Major General Quincy Gilmore. Gilmore's last instructions to Seymour had been to fortify Baldwin and secure the ground already won in northeast Florida. Then Seymour had said he was outnumbered by the Confederates at Lake City, and he was contemplating withdrawing back to the coast to Jacksonville. But now here was Seymour saying he was going to set out an undertake an offensive movement by marching west farther into the interior of Florida. Well, Quincy Gilmore, from his headquarters up in South Carolina, at once sent an aide off to Florida to communicate orders, cancelling Seymour's planned offensive. But bad weather delayed the messenger, and he didn't reach Seymour until after the battle of O'Lesty was over. So when Truman Seymour decided to march west toward Lake City toward a confrontation with the Confederates, it was on his own initiative and against the wishes of his superior, Quincy Gilmore. However, as Rich just said, time and distance meant Gilmore, from his headquarters up in South Carolina, would be unable to cancel the movement before the critical battle of the campaign would be fought. The Federals set out from Baldwin on the morning of Saturday, February 20. They headed west using the Lake City and Jacksonville Road, which roughly paralleled the tracks of the Florida, Atlantic, and Gulf Central Railroad. Private Abraham Palmer of the 48th New York described the march to O'Lesty as "a terrible one." The roads often running through swamps where the water was knee-deep. Yet there were recompenses, for the day was clear and beautiful, and often the sandy roads ran through pine forests, and the resinous odors of the trees gave a balmy fragrance to the air. And such was the brave spirit of the men that the anticipation of meeting the enemy on an open battlefield where they hoped at last to conquer them cheered and quickened their steps. On the Confederate side, Joseph Finnegan's plan was to have Colquitt, with two of his veteran regiments, engage the Yankees out in front of the field works that the rebels had constructed. Colquitt was to make a fighting withdrawal and draw the Federals back toward the main Confederate position. Finnegan was sure that once the Yankees were engaged with Colquitt's troops, they would pursue that force when it pulled back, and thus the Federals would be caught in Finnegan's trap as they ran up against and battered themselves to pieces, attacking the Confederate field works. While on paper, the plan was a good one. The defensive works were definitely strong, and ponds and swamps protected the rebel flanks. Leading the federal column were Lieutenant Colonel Guy Henry's cavalry and mounted infantry. They were followed by Joseph Holly's brigade, William Barton's brigade, then the supply wagons and ambulances, and finally James Montgomery's brigade. Interestingly, all three of Seymour's infantry brigades here were commanded by colonels. Henry's mounted Yankees first made contact with Confederates about two miles east of O'Lesty at about two o'clock that afternoon. Henry encountered the rebel cavalry screen and two regiments of Georgia infantry from Colquitt's command that had been advanced in front of the Confederate works per Finnegan's plan. Realizing he had run into a rather substantial enemy force, Henry halted and waited for Holly's brigade of federal infantry to come up. Meanwhile, Finnegan was going off script as he decided to deviate from his original plan. He issued orders to Colquitt to add two more Georgia regiments, a Florida battalion, and a two-gun section of artillery to the advanced force and drive away the Yankee horsemen. As Alfred Colquitt went forward with these additional troops so he could personally direct the ensuing action, Finnegan issued another order, this one to Colonel George Harrison, directing more Georgians and more artillery to also move forward outside the field works. So now Finnegan was committing the bulk of his command to a forward movement outside his carefully prepared defensive works. This was because he'd received reports that led him to believe the Yankee horsemen were supported by only three regiments of federal infantry. Finnegan felt that such a small enemy force wouldn't be drawn into his trap and batter itself against his works. However, since the federal force was so small, Finnegan thought he could rather easily destroy it if he advanced a strong force out into the open pine woods in front of his field works and engaged the enemy there. As the Confederates deployed into line of battle in the pine woods in front of their field works, on the federal side, once Holly's brigade caught up to Henry's horsemen, the 7th Connecticut was sent forward as skirmishers to develop the rebel position. As the 7th Connecticut was making contact with the rebels, Holly deployed the rest of his brigade, placing the 7th New Hampshire on the right and the 8th United States colored troops on the left, while Seymour placed two batteries of artillery in the center of the line and one on the left. That Seymour's command contained substantial numbers of black soldiers was well known to the Confederates, and that knowledge was a source of bitter anger among them. As the rebels were going into battle, one regimental commander inflamed his men by telling them the federal force across the way "is made up largely of Negroes from Georgia and South Carolina who have come to steal, pillage and murder, kill and rape our wives, daughters and sweethearts. Let's teach them a lesson. I shall not take any Negro prisoners in this fight." Both sides would bring about equal numbers of troops to the battle. On the Confederate side, reinforcements had brought Finnegan's total up to about 5,200 men by February 20th, while on the federal side, detaching troops for various duties meant Seymour advanced to a lusty with around 5,500 men. The firing picked up all along the line, as on the federal side, Holly deployed his brigade. The rattle of musketry was punctuated by blasts of cannon fire as both sides' artillery opened up. The effectiveness of artillery fire at a lusty would be limited by the nature of the battlefield. Although there was little underbrush, which meant long lines of sight, the trees in the piney woods were obstacles to shells and cannonballs reaching their targets. Only at close range, when firing canister, which turned the cannon into giant shotguns, would artillery retain much of its effectiveness. Now that battle was joined, a mistake by Holly cost the Federals dearly. On the right side of his line, Holly knew what he wanted the 7th New Hampshire to do, but in the heat of battle, what he wanted was not what he said, and the men ended up facing every which direction. The confusion was compounded by the heavy musketry the rebels were pouring into the regiment. As men fell left and right, companies began to melt away, then almost the entire regiment started for the rear. With that, for all intents and purposes, the right side of Holly's line had ceased to exist. When much of the 7th New Hampshire fell back to the rear, their retreat exposed the Federal artillery and the 8th United States colored troops. The men of the 8th now found themselves almost the only Federal infantry holding the line on what had been Holly's left. They had never been in combat before, and as they had moved up, their officers had not even ordered them to drop their knapsacks or load their muskets. In a letter to his sister, Lieutenant Oliver Norton of the 8th United States colored troops, who had previously served with the 83rd Pennsylvania on Little Round Top at Gettysburg, wrote, "Military men say it takes veteran troops to maneuver under fire, but our regiment with knapsacks on and unloaded pieces, after a run of half a mile, formed a line under the most destructive fire I ever knew. We were not more than 200 yards from the enemy, and what did the regiment do? At first they were stunned, bewildered, and knew not what to do. As men fell around them, they seemed terribly scared, but gradually they recovered their senses and commenced firing, and here was the great trouble. They could not use their arms to advantage. We have had but little practice in firing, and though they could stand and be killed, they could not kill fast enough." Naturally, having almost no practice loading and firing their weapons proved a huge handicap to the regiment. To make matters worse, the 8th commander, Colonel Charles Fribli, was killed shortly after ordering the men to pull back. Lieutenant Norton said, "After seeing his men murdered as long as flesh and blood could endure it, Colonel Fribli ordered the regiment to fall back slowly, firing as they went. As the men fell back, they gathered in groups, like frightened sheep, and it was almost impossible to keep them from doing so. Into these groups the rebels poured the deadliest fire, almost every bullet hitting someone. Color bearer after color bearer was shot down, and the colors seized by another. Behind us was a battery that was wretchedly managed. Lieutenant Lewis seized the colors and planted them by a gun, and tried to rally the men round them, but forgetting them for a moment, they were left there, and the battery was captured, and our colors with it. Colonel Fribli was killed soon after his order to fall back, and Major Burrett had both legs broken. We were without a commander, and every officer was doing his best to do something he knew not what exactly. There was no leader. Of the 550 men the 8th USCT took into the fight, 310 were listed as killed, wounded, or missing. The battery mentioned by Norton was Captain John Hamilton's Battery E, 3rd US artillery, and Norton's accusation of mismanagement is unfair, since the battery had been exposed to the same murderous fire as the black troops and decimated by it. Two of the guns couldn't be removed, and were lost after 40 of the battery's 50 horses were shot down. On the Confederate side, the battle thus far was going splendidly, and Finnegan's decision to advance his troops in front of his carefully prepared field works and engage the enemy there in the open was paying dividends. Corporal Henry Shackelford of the 19th Georgia described how his regiment went into the fight. "We moved on down the railroad, which was as straight as an arrow. We filed off to the right in the woods and formed a line, shucked off our knapsacks and all heavy baggage, and threw out skirmishers. They were not out long before the enemy made their appearance, advancing slowly. We could see them a half a mile, as the country was quite level, and no undergrowth. They soon drove in our skirmishers and firing commenced. One could plainly see the blue coats in fine order. The order was given, up and at them, which was no quicker said than done, and then, what an awful roar of cannon and musketry, men falling and groaning, officers giving commands, the balls flying as thick as sleep, cheer after cheer went up, onward we pushed, firing and yelling." While Finnegan remained in overall command, Alfred Colquitt oversaw the fighting as it developed on the battlefield. Colquitt assigned Colonel Harrison to take charge of the left side of the Confederate line while he, that is Colquitt, led from the right. Colquitt's and Harrison's job at O'Lesty was made easier when Seymour fed his troops into the fighting piecemeal, allowing the Confederates to maintain numerical superiority at the actual point of fighting, meaning the Rebel line of battle could overlap the Federals, especially to the north, in Harrison's sector. The initial phase of the battle had been a disaster for the Yankees. Holley's brigade had been roughly handled, but now Seymour brought up the next formation in his column, Colonel William Barton's brigade. Barton threw his three New York regiments into the fray. With Holley's brigade collapsing, it was now up to the New Yorkers to try to reverse the tide of battle and save the day for the Federals. Barton placed the 115th New York on the right, to its left was the 48th New York, and the 47th went in to their left. The portions of the 7th Connecticut and 8th United States color troops that hadn't fled to the rear were placed on Barton's left. The 8th's flank rested on the railroad tracks, and fire from a large artillery piece the Confederates had mounted on a flat car did fearful damage among the Federals. One rebel cavalryman said that the mouth of the 30-pounder parrot "looked to me to be as large as a flower barrel, and they shot that big gun about every five minutes. They shot chain and pot shot from that big gun. The chain shot would cut pine trees down like broom straws, killing and wounding many each time it was fired." Meanwhile, at the opposite, or north end of the Federal line, the 115th New York was making a gallant stand, but they were taking fire from two Georgia regiments and things were looking grim for them. Remember, we said that here the rebel line of battle overlapped the Federals, which meant the 115th New York, holding the Yankees' right flank, was in trouble anyway, and the heavy Confederate musketry only multiplied their problems. However, at that crucial moment in the battle, the Confederate fire dropped off dramatically because the rebels' cartridge boxes were all but empty. You see, the Georgians had arrived in Florida minus their ordnance wagons. Venigan had ammunition brought forward in train cars, but it hadn't yet been distributed to the troops. Now, at the moment of crisis, Colquitt and Harrison immediately sent staff officers racing back the half a mile to the train cars. When the fresh supply of cartridges arrived at the front, Captain John Keely of the 19th Georgia said that, quote, "We grabbed them more eagerly than hungry men ever grabbed loaves of bread, and now, in a minute, we were again masters of the field, for on our next volley, the enemy fled precipitately." 400 years ago, a trio of tiny kingdoms were perched on some damp islands off the coast of Europe. Within three short centuries, these islands would become the centre of an empire which ruled a quarter of the globe and on which the sun never set. I'm Dr Samuel Hume, a historian of the British Empire, and my podcast Pax Britannica follows the people and events that built those islands into a global superpower. Listen to season one to hear about England's first attempts at empire building. Season two covers the chaotic years of civil war, revolution and regicide, which rocked the three kingdoms and the fledgling empire. Season three is all about how Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell rules the powerful Commonwealth, battling the Dutch and Spanish empires for the Atlantic world. Season four has just begun with the restoration of the stewards, with England ready to expand its colonial empire in America to dominate the Atlantic slave trade, and for the East India Company to set down firm roots in Asia. Learn the history of the British Empire by listening to Pax Britannica everywhere you find your podcasts, or go to pod.link/pax. All you need is a few minutes to start your day off with something historic when you listen to the This Day in History podcast. Every day there's a new episode for you to listen and learn about what happened that day way back when. Today could be the day a famous mobster met their end, or the first milestone for humans in space. Who knows what history today holds. Find out when you listen and subscribe to This Day in History wherever you get your podcasts. That's This Day in History, wherever you get your podcasts. Even as ammunition was running short on the Confederate side, it was running low in the federal ranks as well. On the right of Barton's brigade line, the hard-pressed men of the 115th New York had shot off almost all of their cartridges. In the center of Barton's line, the 48th New York was also running low on ammo. On Barton's left, the cartridge boxes of the dead and wounded had been scavenged to keep the men of the 47th New York in the fight. With each new volley delivered by the Confederates, Barton's line wavered and trembled but did not break. However, the New Yorker's stand was becoming desperate. Barton obviously needed to start withdrawing his battered New Yorkers before his retreat turned into a rout. And fortunately for the Yankees, at that moment, the troops of Seymour's 3rd Brigade, commited by James Montgomery, came up. Montgomery came onto the field with only two regiments in his small brigade, the 1st North Carolina and the 54th Massachusetts. The regiments had a trying ordeal just reaching the battlefield. They had been about six miles away when the fighting started, and at the distant rattle of musketry and boom of cannon fire, Montgomery had sent an aid forward to ask for orders. But rather than waiting for instructions, Montgomery started marching his men toward the sound of the guns. The men in the two black regiments had already marched some 12 miles that day and had just halted for a half hour rest. The rest was cut short when Montgomery started them forward with the 54th Massachusetts in the lead, followed by the 1st North Carolina. One of Seymour's aides galloped up and found the 54th commander, Colonel Edward Hollowell, telling him, "For God's sake, Colonel, double quick or the day is lost!" Hollowell immediately gave the order, and the last two miles to the battlefield were covered on the run, with the men throwing away their napped sacks and anything else that would slow them down and loading their muskets as they jogged along the sandy road. As they neared the battlefield, they were met by scenes of a defeated army. There were hundreds of walking wounded and shirkers streaming to the rear, many of whom were only too eager to let the men of the 54th know that the battle was already lost and they would all surely be killed. Undeterred, the men of the 54th raced forward, followed by the 1st North Carolina. The two regiments came onto the field and formed a line of battle just in front of Barton's battered New Yorkers. It was now after four o'clock, and there was only about an hour of daylight remaining on this late February day. If Montgomery's men could make a stand and keep the Confederates from steamrolling forward, it would give Truman Seymour time to extricate the rest of his little army, and the Federals would live to fight again another day. It was up to the Black Troops of the 54th Massachusetts and 1st North Carolina to keep the defeat from becoming a disaster. Montgomery put the 54th in on the left while the 1st North Carolina was placed on the right. Both regiments were immediately hotly engaged by the Confederates who sought to brush them aside and seal their victory. There, in the pine woods, as the sun set and the shadows lengthened, the Black Troops and the Confederates trying to push through them engaged in a savage firefight with the rebels using their superior numbers to advantage and exerting increasing pressure on the two federal regiments front and flanks. Finally, under that unrelenting pressure, the 1st North Carolina's line wavered and then buckled. As the tide of battle turned decisively against the Federals, Surgeon C.P. Heichold tried to evacuate as many of the Black wounded as possible. Heichold made sure the Black soldiers were the first to be loaded onto ambulances, since he feared what would happen to those who fell into Confederate hands. He was later criticized for his decision, but said, "I know what will become of the White Troops who fall into the enemy's possession, but I am not certain as to the fate of the colored troops." When the 1st North Carolina retreated, the right flank of the 54th Massachusetts was left uncovered, and that regiment was now left to face the full weight of the Confederate onslaught alone. However, it was now around 530, and night was settling over the battlefield. The rebel advance ground to a halt in the growing darkness, and the 54th Massachusetts was able to withdraw in good order. An officer in the 54th would write, "Our regiment lost one man in every five, going in 500 strong and losing 100 in killed, wounded, and missing." General Seymour said to Colonel Hollowell, "The day is lost. You must go in and save the army." "We did go in and did save it. Check the enemy, held the field, and were the last to leave, and covered the retreat." When one considers the numbers engaged, the short duration of the battle, and the resulting casualties, O'Lusty is actually one of the bloodiest engagements of the Civil War. During the battle, the Federals lost 1,860 men, killed, wounded, and missing, or approximately 34% of those engaged. On the Confederate side, casualties totaled around 945 men, or approximately 17% of Finnegan's effective force. This breaks down to a rate of about 700 casualties per hour for the four-hour fight, an astounding number given the fact there were only around 5,000 men engaged on each side. Of the federal total, just over 500, or about one-third, were from the three black regiments. Of the fighting's aftermath, in his book The Battle of O'Lusty, 1864, The Final Union Attempt to Seize Florida, Robert Broadwater writes, "The smoke-shrouded field was witnessed not only to the darkness of the night, but also to the darkness that existed in the hearts of some of the Confederates, who now walked over the ground." A member of the 4th Georgia Cavalry, Private William Pennamon, was riding over the battlefield after the federal retreat, and noted, "It was niggers dead, niggers wounded in all directions, some severely, others not so much so, groans and prayers heard from them in all directions." In the darkness, Pennamon was confused by the sound of firing, "going on in every direction." He said the shots, "sounded almost frequent enough to resemble the bark of skirmishers." Coming upon an officer, Pennamon asked about the meaning of the firing, and was told, "shooting niggers. I have tried to make the boys desist, but I can't control them." Pennamon again went over the battlefield the next morning, "when the results of the shooting the previous night became quite apparent. If a Negro had a shot in the shin, another was sure to be in the head." There are several existing accounts of the atrocity mentioned in letters and reminiscences. Corporal Henry Shackelford of the 19th Georgia, in a letter to his mother, told her the wounded blacks, "would beg and pray, but it did no good." The Confederates captured about 200 Federals at O'Lusty, and although no one knows for certain, it's estimated that 50 wounded black Federal soldiers were murdered on the field that night, rather than being treated as prisoners of war. As the retreating Federals trudged eastward, they could have rallied at Baldwin, where there were prepared defensive positions, but Truman Seymour's only thought was getting back to Jacksonville as quickly as possible. Seymour's defeat at O'Lusty and retreat all the way back to the coast put an end to Quincy Gilmore's grand plans to conquer northeast Florida, cut off the flow of supplies to the Confederate military, and have the Federals use the middle counties of the state as a recruiting ground for new black troops. The resounding Confederate victory at O'Lusty also dashed Lincoln's hopes of reconstructing Florida fairly easily, here early in 1864, using the President's 10% plan to bring the state back into the Union. Lincoln hoped a reconstructed Florida, beholding to him, would benefit him in the upcoming presidential election that fall, but it was not to be. As it turned out, Florida wouldn't be readmitted to the Union until the summer of 1868. As we tried to show Seymour's waffling about what to do, followed by his decision to march west toward Lake City, represent a rather baffling sequence of events that led to the clash at O'Lusty. Then on the Confederate side, Finnegan's decision to not fight behind his earthworks after all could have went horribly wrong, but fortunately for him, he benefited from having two capable officers, Colquitt and Harrison, who took charge on the field. Then Seymour also helped Finnegan by feeding the federal troops into the battle piecemeal, one brigade at a time, which allowed the Confederates to maintain numerical superiority at the actual point of fighting. PGT Beauregard, the Confederate Department Commander up in Charleston, believed that Joseph Finnegan had missed a golden opportunity to destroy Seymour's force when he let the Federals retreat all the way back to Jacksonville. As you guys may recall, Beauregard had started out with little confidence in Finnegan, and that didn't change in the aftermath of O'Lusty, so Beauregard replaced Finnegan with Brigadier General William Gardner. Gardner in turn would be replaced by Major General Patton Anderson. With the Yankees in Florida holed up in Jacksonville and other coastal enclaves, Gardner and Anderson contended themselves with adopting a defensive posture to guard against any other enemy incursions into the interior of the state. For the remainder of the war, skirmishes and the occasional raid became the order of the day as Florida once again became a military backwater. The Federals were content to maintain their garrisons at the points they controlled, while the Confederates satisfied themselves with settling in and watching them. One of the most important results of O'Lusty was that it again showed that black soldiers were the equal of whites on the field of battle. The 54th Massachusetts, as it had at Battery Wagner, once more covered itself in glory, here by being the last federal unit to leave the battlefield. The 1st North Carolina also did credit to themselves, and even the inexperienced men of the 8th United States colored troops earned praise for their performance under extremely difficult circumstances. All in all, the Battle of O'Lusty served as yet another example of what black troops could do as soldiers. That means it's time for this episode's book recommendation, and our recommendation this time is "The Battle of O'Lusty - The Final Union Attempt to Seize Florida" by Robert P. Broadwater. For a battle that's not that well known, even among most Civil War buffs, there are several good books on O'Lusty, as you can tell from our recommendations for these episodes, and here we'll wrap up this little story arc with Broadwater's book. As a bonus, we'll also mention that in the January 2014 issue of America's Civil War magazine, there's an excellent set of maps for those of you who have that issue and care to pull it out. You can find a list of all of our book recommendations if you head over to the podcast's website, which is www.civilwarpodcast.org. Also at the website, you can find some contact info for us if you'd like to drop us a line. There are a few photos if you'd like to see the faces that go with these voices, and there's also a link to the podcast's Facebook page. And of course, there's some information about how to become a member of the Strawfoot Brigade over on Patreon and support the podcast in that way. It's the supportive members that keeps moving the podcast forward, so we're very grateful for the folks in the Strawfoot Brigade. We want to give a shout out to the newest members, so a big thank you to Diane, Jamie B., Mark D., and Owen R. We're also grateful for Shane Elles' donation and appreciated the note that a company did. Thanks, Shane. And thanks to all of you for listening to this episode of the podcast. Tracy and I do hope that you join us again next time, but until then, take care. Thanks, everyone. Bye. [music]