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#201 Andreas von der Heide - We Have Entered A New World Order - What's Next?

47m 11s

#201 Andreas von der Heide - We Have Entered A New World Order - What's Next?

Andreas discusses his personal journey into geopolitics, influenced by his Swedish-German heritage and early travels, which fostered a constructivist approach to understanding different national rationalities. He explains that the post-Cold War transition to a multi-polar world, now evolving into a US-China bipolar rivalry, was an anticipated development driven by competing interests. A key theme is the enduring importance of controlling global trade and maritime choke points for world dominance, a principle currently challenged by Chinese and Russian initiatives. He emphasizes the difficulty of aligning long-term geopolitical trends, which unfold over generations, with the short-term decision-making cycles of democracies and businesses. Regarding the Middle East, he notes its persistent strategic significance is fundamentally linked to energy resources, predicting continued conflict as long as global energy dependence remains. The discussion underscores the value of firsthand experience and a multi-faceted analytical framework combining structural, realist, and constructivist views to comprehend global dynamics.

Transcription

7782 Words, 42200 Characters

English
Welcome back everyone. Today I'm very excited to be joined by Andreas. And Andreas, thank you so much for taking the time. I know it's very busy time, so I appreciate it. Thank you so much, Christopher. It's always a pleasure to meet you and even not physically being in Oslo, but at least through this medium. Likewise, so there's a lot of things going on in the world. And obviously today, geopolitics is going to be the main topic, but just to introduce you a bit Andreas, unfortunately, I've heard your stories on sort of your travels and how you ended up studying military history. But for the audience tuning in, can you sort of ping the picture on what influenced you growing up and why you decided to spend so many hours and years talking about geopolitics and studying it? Yes, I mean, for me, I've been thinking a lot about this lately, getting older, you tend to kind of reflect on what took you to where you are. And I used to believe that there was more like coincidences, but now I'm starting to see a broader, more broad pattern in my history. And my background is, I'm half Swedish, half German, so my father came from German in 1957, and we have our roots in East Prussia, which is then today Russia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, etc. And my mother is Swedish. So I think that that's kind of a starting point for me to have kind of growing up in a very Swedish context. I always had this understanding of that the world could be viewed differently. And not the least, because my German relatives fought in the Second World War on the wrong side, so to say. Even though my grandmother's father was heavily engaged in anti-Nazi activities before and during the war, which I came to understand quite recently. So I think that having those two perspectives kind of helped me growing up. And also being something so exotic as a Catholic growing up in a very broad stand, Lutheran Sweden, also gave me kind of the understanding that there are many different ways to view the world. And my original plan was to become an officer in this Swedish armed forces, but after my mandatory military service in 19293, I decided to study history. And that brought me into the field of geopolitics. I started with Russia, the Soviet Union, and then kind of brought in the scope from there. And then this is what I'm doing my entire life. I wrote my bachelor's thesis on the red threat, talking about Russia that was that I saw becoming what Russia actually is today. And then that kind of led to the next thing which was 11 years with the International Councilist Registry, where I was responsible for Asia-Pacific in the Middle East. And later also the CEO, which brought me to North Korea. In the late 90s, I started traveling quite early to Russia, been to Iran like the last 20 years, many times every year. So that kind of disattraction for the other and trying to engage with the other and understanding the other has been kind of my driving force. And then I spent a few years at SOB as a new vice president, defense and aviation company. And then 15 years ago we decided to start our geopolitical advisory company, Concilio, based on the assumption which was obvious to us 15 years ago that the geopolitics was going to be the main kind of decision-making factor for Swedish companies and owners of Swedish companies moving forward. So I'm not sure if that was an answer to your question, but it's always being aware of different perspectives, being very curious, trying to meet people, rather than kind of convince them to believe what I believe. But trying to understand. Do you think that you know sort of the traveling and sort of understanding different perspectives? It's such a massive quality if you're really going to make a difference in geopolitics, because it seems like if you're based from one place only been there, okay, you read a couple of books, but to truly have that perspective on what's going on. It's closely impossible if you haven't been on the other side and actually felt it. And that's more than reading a history book. You can do that as well, of course, but there's dimensions here in order to truly comprehend all these puzzles into interconnecting. I think there are a few different parts that kind of interconnect. And the first one is that I started with a kind of theoretical understanding of geopolitics of states, of interest, military power, security policy, etc. And then quite early I was, I had a privilege of starting to travel to Russia and beyond. And that gave me also this kind of first hand hands-on experience of meeting the others. So I did not study geopolitics only from a desk, but I actually met people who acted geopolitically all the time. And then I was also very fortunate to have, when I started at the Stockholm University studying history, I had some teachers who were the pioneers of gender studies. Like we had some lectures by one here, the inventor of the gender theory, the under system theory, and the existing of Lourin and mod Edwards, etc. And they were structuralists. So I early became aware of this kind of invisible structures shaping the boundaries for our actions. But at the same time, since I early on started meeting people with different perspectives, I became a constructivist. So I came to the conclusion that, I mean, the way Russia used the world is rational from a kind of Russian perspective. And also when I started to travel to North Korea, people were writing articles about this kind of unpredictable irrational state. And I came to meet people who kind of embodied a state which was highly predictable, highly rational, highly logical, because I mean, their rationality was to preserve the system and the power in the Kim family. And they've been, I guess they've been one of the most successful states in terms of kind of enforcing their priorities since the 50s. So a combination of structure, individuals, realism, but also constructivism at the same time. And then ultimately, I think the greatest benefit for me is that I never worked for the government or governmental agencies. I served the Swedish capital which made me able to meet and engage with people without having to kind of respect the boundaries of diplomacy or political protocol. So I could actually engage with people in a different way compared to if I would have been diplomat or a politician. So I think that gave me early on an opportunity to meet people without having to think about diplomacy and politics. And also I think that lately I only represent myself. So I don't have to kind of be so cautious in who I meet, what I say, what I think, etc. Great answer. So I mean, diving into a bit of the world, as we see today, I mean, you touched upon it a bit already, but if you're going to start just broadly, are you by any mean surprised by the world you are seeing today? Or as then this has been written, it just within no the timing, but all the signals pointed us in this direction. And also a big question, but if we could just start broadly taking the world as a whole. I'm absolutely not surprised. I think that most things in the world are actually advancing as predicted. And that's not me, you know, having other information or being smarter or more intelligent than anybody else. It's just that we tend to want to view the world as we want it to be rather than as it is. And human beings are fundamentally optimists. And we want to say, you know, good things and we want to believe in the goodness of others, etc., etc. But I think that if we go back to the cold world, which was a very predictable and stable world, centered around the conflict between capitalism and the West and communism and the East, the rich nor and the poor south, highly predictable, stable. And over this we had the kind of mutual or short destruction, nuclear weapons, making sure that nobody rocked the boat. That was a very stable and predictable world. And with the fall of the wall, that was replaced with this multi-polar world, where different forces had different interests. And kind of this saga war situation where people try to steer the world in a direction that is according to their interest. And I mean, one example is that we early on started to talk about the possibility of the US and Europe not being fully aligned when it comes to interests. And then, you know, Trump was elected the first time and that became quite obvious. So I think that the world is actually progressing the way it was anticipated after the fall of the war, with a very highly volatile, highly rapidly-changing world replacing this stable, predictable cold war kind of world order and then lately we are now approaching this more multi from a multi-polar world into a more kind of bipolar rivalry between China and the US and I think this it's against that kind of it's through that filter you need to view American policies today so now and I was not the only one to write about Russia becoming what Russia is today in 95 that was kind of mainstream position among a lot of the kind of analysts in the analytical community globally that Russia was going to develop into what Russia is today. Is it correct Andreas? If I understood you correctly when I heard you speak that you know sometimes we discussed this whether it is a bipolar world or a multi-polar world but I think your angle was that you can't really tell because you lived in both simultaneously or something like that can you frame that in because often that's the headline right the bipolar world and the multi-polar world what is the right framework to just understand this? I mean that can also be if we go back to previous question first and say that okay so the processes I mean the long lines the macro that's kind of obvious we can predict it we can actually I'm working a lot with developing methods to actually quantify your political change and it's possible to do it it's of course a simplification and but at least the trends and the long lines the processes they are kind of predictable but we seem to be focusing a lot on phenomenon so we wrote a paper on the coming world Russia like 14 years ago and in that paper we said that that based on the understanding of what we see today the most likely outcome is that there will be friction between the West and Russia and ultimately that will really to kind of Russian expansionism and that will most likely be a war between the West and Russia we didn't predict or foresee the war in Ukraine it could have started in Moldova or in the Baltic states or in Georgia but this kind of general process of conflict between the West and Russia was obvious to us and for our clients for Swedish companies invested in Russia it didn't really matter 14 years ago where and how the war would start the important thing for them was what was going to happen and what would the consequence be for them and the consequence would be to live and then you add time into it if we would advise Swedish companies to live Russia 14 years ago that would have been a very bad decision you know destruction of of capital shareholder value etc etc so that puts me into answering your second question which was bipolar multipolar so you have to think about the compass direction where where is the world going and that's that's kind of easy high level but then you need the clock as well because it's more difficult to predict when things will happen then then then the kind of long lines and this is where we tend to fail as human beings because we kind of underestimate time because we are biologically programmed to kind of we have very short life spans we are one of the few species that are actually alive as long as our offspring reproduce most other animals kind of die when they stop reproducing but that gives us as human beings a unique kind of position to look one generation forward and one generation backwards so that's fair amount of time three generations but still if we consider these processes of of geopolitical change we have the fall of Rome that was like 240 years so there is a kind of mismatch between our ability to understand time and the time it takes for this long geopolitical change like we had the Vienna Congress 1815 and then we had 99 years of political consolation in West Europe until 14 and we had the outbreak of the first first world war so it's very long time 240 years plus for Rome to fall and 99 years from the Vienna Congress to the first the first world war so I think that this tells us that we are now in a multi-polar world that replaced the Cold War but we're approaching entering this bipolar rivalry between China and the US which by the way was clearly communicated 2009 by Obama when he said pivot East and the US will now live Europe for Europe to take responsibility for so I think that that's the question that's the answer to your question that we are in both because there is an overlap like the Romans for a hundred years lived both in Rome and the fall of Rome so it's there is no single breaking point between these processes I love that perspective because I just heard an interview of Alexander Stubben India talked about his new book and the Indian gentleman said that you have to remember that the 70 years you talk about that's 1% of Indian history is nothing it's like the timeline you're talking about that you want to get back to that's just 1% of our history is like a bleep on the radar exactly to your point right so if you put this in this context right it's just as you said probably and then I mean this is put on because then I mean in my professional life giving advice to owners boards and management teams of of large multinational companies they don't have a hundred years some of the families owning companies they think in generation terms but boards for management teams they think next quarter or what should I do next year etc so there is also this mismatch of my understanding of the long lines and the advice I have to give to companies and the owners of companies today the same goes for the politicians so Western politicians they have like four to five years to to kind of fulfill their political agenda and we are talking against you know rivals or opponents who have like a hundred years in the case of China from 49 to 49 the 100 year plan to kind of rebuild China into to you know the center the center of the world or Russia I mean they don't have to to think about these political cycles in the same sense so there is also a disadvantage for democracies or for for for companies acting in the market economy compared to planned economies or dictatorships I mean there are a lot of advantages of being living in a free democracy which I of course promote but still you you see the kind of difference in perspective here definitely so today I wanted to talk a bit about maritime sea I mean it's such an influential topic and we see it in geopolitics as well but I want to start with just reading out loud a quote which I know you are very profound of so or whoever commands to see commands to trade who's ever commands to trade of the world commands the riches of the world and consequently the world itself can you share why that quote today it's so important and maybe also why it always has been important to think of this sense because you see it today in the choke points that will come into but can you introduce Sir Walter why did he say it why is it still as true today I would imagine as it was back then so he said is around I guess now 1500 eight or something 1570 and he was the the key advisor to the Queen of England and and this is kind of the basic policy statement by the West saying that we need to control the global trade and the markets of the world because that will ultimately give us control over the world and this is what led them to the to the Suez Canal Gibraltar Panama Canal Singapore you know the trading points and to pound sterling and later the US dollar to be kind of the of the global trading currencies so this understanding of the one who controls trade and trade flows will actually have have global power this is one of the fundaments that built the Western dominance the last kind of five 600 years and this is now being challenged by others like China and Russia so I think that this is this is so obvious you listen to me a couple of weeks ago in Oslo when I was talking about the possibility of a closing of the straight to hormones and this is just one of the short points and we have the red sea etc so I think that what we see today is that we see we now realize in the West that others like China Belt and Road Initiative and Russia Northeastern passage have been doing a lot of things under the radar buying icebreakers China has observatory status in the Arctic Council etc etc and suddenly we realized oh wow these guys are now actually providing alternatives to the global trade routes which gave us control of the world and this is you know something we have to deal with and one of the ways to deal with it is of course I need it I want it I shall have it Greenland because Greenland is very important in the ins context the one who sits in Greenland controls the Western Pass north western passage and Northeastern passage and with the climate catastrophe approaching we also know that this would soon be ice-free and that's where a substantial part of global trade will be 50 years from now so these things are heavily interconnected power trade and global dominance you know the only rule in real estate is it's all about the location the location the location And I think Donald Trump, you can say a lot about him. it has been in real estate. And I think the translation to geopolitics, it's all about the choke points, the choke points, the choke points. And you see that quite clearly in the initiative, right? - Yes, and I think it's also kind of clearly expressed in the new American National Security Strategy. It talks about securing trade from A-shirts, et cetera, et cetera. So, and if you look at it, they are now in control. They push China out from the Panama Canal, Venezuela, heavily engaged in Greenland, which way by the way, always need to be, you know, drawing a strong red line around, because I mean, it's the Greenlanders and the Danes who are to decide the future for Greenland and nobody else. You see that in the Red Sea, you see it now in what's happening around Iran. You for sure will see it sooner or later around Taiwan. So it seems like like what you're saying, it also to some extent goes for the involvement in the war in Gaza, because that's also very strategically located in the Middle Terenian and on the kind of way into the spheres canal. - How is it challenging for you to say your perspectives on Middle East because it's such a complex picture, or is it easy to sort of to understand why we are here and why it will be such a complex area going forward, giving where it's positioned, giving all the energy. It provides to H-Shut, et cetera, or how do you even comment on that, because it's also a situation where you can say something today and tomorrow that news is outdated because of end of the war, some deal got made. How do you frame in the Middle East in general, which of course affects so many different topics, especially energy for one? - I think what you said now is so important energy. So as long as we are dependent on energy from the Middle East, you will always have this kind of competition, or I mean, it's an understatement and it really taken into consideration the immense human suffering on all sides we see now is kind of just talk about power and energy influence, but I think as long as we have need for this energy, this will of course be contested kind of area because it's not really about physical control of land, it's physical control of energy resources and energy infrastructure. So with that as a kind of basis for the assessment, this will of course continue as long as we are in need of that resource. Then we also have the kind of global trade. We have the Red Sea, we have the Mediterranean, we have the Strait of Hormuz, et cetera. Should the North East and Passage in 50 years, 100 years take more of this, of this trade, of course, that relevance will decrease. And then it's a very complex area because of post-colonial heritage. I mean, we draw a number of lines on maps and decided which state gets to be where. And that is of course in a post-colonial perspective, creating a lot of challenges. And then you have so many different dimension. You have the Shia, Sunni, you have what remains of the which actors were on the Soviet side and which were on the US side, which is funny, interesting when you talk about Yemen. South Yemen, North Yemen, one being with the US, someone being with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. You have a non-Arab dimension. So there are so many layers of potential conflict, which is being utilized to kind of advance interests in this part of the world. So if you're a shipping company or an energy investor, is it all about understanding the different scenarios and don't be so stubborn on the result, or is it to understand the end game and what will come, and then timing becomes the art of the decision? I think it's both. I think to some extent, I mean, we should regard this as an opportunity. Of course, the ones who are able to navigate this if we talk about companies are, of course, great winners. So it's about risk appetite, calculated risk. And in order to take the right decisions, you need to have scenarios. I mean, we have it constantly. You can look it up on LinkedIn because we recently wrote about it as well. So what we do is that we measure a lot of data. And then we have very kind of broad scenarios for different regions, including the Middle East. And then every quarter, we move a ping pong ball on the shark closer to one of the four corners. And with the Middle East, we have steadily been moving into, I think we call it increased turmoil from proxy conflict. So I mean, this is actually, you can understand this. You can calculate it. You can quantify it. And if you do that, you can take informed decisions on the right amount of risk in order to capture the opportunities. So that's, I think, short term. Understanding scenarios, taking the right amount of risk, factoring that into your business model and your kind of financial decisions. Ultimately, I think understanding the long game and end game, I mean, end timing is, of course, highly relevant for any company with a long-term owner. So especially, I mean, if we look at Norwegian shipping companies tending to have a physical owner of flesh and blood, a family or an individual, being the solo owner or kind of the dominant owner or at least the embodiment of some kind of corporate culture. And if you have that long-term vision based on ownership, understanding the end game and sequence leading up to end game is, of course, important because then you can plan investment decisions for the next generation, et cetera, et cetera. Definitely. One thing that peaks my interest is, of course, one thing is to hear-- I mean, the politicians talk about why they are initiating this and reading press releases, et cetera. But it feels like there's always deeper reasons on the ground. And one thing I find particularly interesting in this Middle East is that, of course, there's a huge race of becoming the most dominant player in AI. That's the big thing. That's the rivalry. Whoever gets superintelligence first, whatever it will look like, will be an advantage. But the thing is that AI is so closely connected to cheap energy, is of the input. So, of course, it's strategically important to have a lot of cheap energy, because it sets you up for AI, right? That's also the something you have to calculate in the scenarios you're talking about here. Those underlying reasons why some initiatives can also become a proxy. And you focus on those reasons, but underneath, there can be plenty of reasons that will never will be openly discussed. But as you use this as a profession, you have to see deeper as well, if that makes sense. Absolutely. And I think, for instance, if we talk about energy, China is still dependent on energy from the Middle East and from Russia to some extent. And this is, of course, something that Americans are well aware about. And we are now entering into a much more open rivalry between China and the US. And of course, having energy is important, but also making sure that the other is not having energy. So if the US will be able to make sure that China does not get the energy needed to achieve whatever industrial ambitions they have, this is, of course, a strategic gain for the US. And this is also how I think we should view some of the US policy against Russia. And I've said this since the first day of the full-scale invasion, it's not in the interest of the US to see Russia lose the war, because that does not necessarily translate into that they want Russia to win. But if Russia would collapse, of course, China would strengthen itself east of Europe, and that would affect the US negatively. So I think that you're fully right when you say that there are a lot of things under-- there is an iceberg under the surface as well. And having at least been thinking about it, I think that some things that are happening in the world gets a bit clearer. But is it one of the most fascinating things to consider when you look at US and China? Is that also how interconnected those two economies have been to each other that released them? We've seen different tries and terrorists, but they're so interconnected, as almost hard to pull them apart in some sense. I would even say it's impossible. And I think that this is the understanding that now is slowly emerging in circles in Washington, DC, that we need to contain China. We US needs to contain China, but we also need to incorporate it. And I mean, if we look at Sweden, of course, we should consider China as a systemic rival in the sense that we are for democracy, free trade, openness, freedom, et cetera, and China is a one-party totalitarian state. Still, we are heavily dependent on the Chinese market and not the least Chinese innovation. Because today, the risk is not that Swedish companies are being copied by Chinese companies. The main strategic risk is that we miss the kind of innovation train that is now soon to live the station in China. So we as Europe need to be. to have a balanced approach to China where we engage, where we kind of benefit from their developments, their market, etc., etc. But at the same time, we see them as a systemic rival. So the world needs to have a bit of, I mean, you have to have two thoughts in your mind at the same time. So China is a rival, but we are also absolutely dependent on China and they are dependent on us. And ultimately, maybe that's what at least creates also some kind of common interest to solve some of the global challenges ahead. Definitely. From your perspective, Andreas, what are some of the more important questions you ask yourself standing today and looking ahead? Are there any topics or places where you look that in one year, the audience would be surprised, but you already see in this or is it just very hard to see where the puck is going in terms of events, of course, I can be triggered by different stuff. I think that, I mean, if we look at the compass. So north, we have our region, which is becoming increasingly important, green land, north-eastern passage, climate changes, of course, driving this as well. You have access to new energy fields, you have minerals, etc., etc. If we look to the west, what we are seeing with the US is I would argue it did not start with Trump. I mean, even Obama said 2009, pivot east, the US needs to focus on China, Europe needs to take more responsibility, which I guess is fair point also from remember also that the US, they were neutral in the first world war until 1970. They were absolutely neutral between the two wars and in the second world war until Pearl Harbor. So it's a bit of a similar situation here where the US is now withdrawing from us and focusing on what they see as their existential threat and also domestic issues that they believe they need to prioritize. Ultimately, I think that we will find each other again as we did in 17 and as we did off the Pearl Harbor because we share a lot of values and history and culture. If we look to the east, it's obvious that Russia is an existential threat to our part of the world and our part of the world needs to deal with it and then comes dealing with the peace after winning the war. We need to have a relationship in the coming 100 years, 200 years with Russia, etc. And then if we look at the global South, that's a big opportunity for us in terms of political, politically and economically, it's an important part of the world if we bandlet all together. But I think most of those lines are clear. Some of the events of course are hard to predict along this kind of macro trend. How will the war in Ukraine end and when and of course it needs to end with some kind of Ukrainian negotiation from a strong position ending in a peace that is in the interest of Ukraine because that's ultimately in the interest of Norway, Sweden, Finland and neighboring countries. And then long term we need to deal with this kind of combined relationship to China. My biggest fear is of course not to predict some of these events when we'll tie one happen. And how will escalation around happen. But I'm a bit what I think a lot today is I think around what can we learn? Which states are able to sustain this increased level of complexity without kind of falling back? Because to me it seems like being able to adjust to increased complexity makes you grow. And when you cannot absorb more complexity you kind of implode. And the question is which companies will sustain this, which states and what can we learn from history in order to continue to develop our societies and companies. So finding the formula for that is something that I'm actually working on. And then I'm a bit scared because we were right with with Russia 14 years ago. We were saying that Brexit is a possibility. We said before Trump won that the US and Europe would not necessarily have correlating interests in all respects. My fear as an analyst and as a driving business is that we become too complacent and say we were right with this and that rather than trying to think about, I mean 15 years ago when we started the company it was a bit odd to start the your political advisory company. It was for sure not easy to talk about Russia 15 years ago. So what do we need to say today in order to make us say the same in 15 years? Me as an analyst and a conciliate company. What do we need to say today that might not be mainstream in order to be able 15 years from now say what we are saying now that we were right whatever that is. Yeah, I mean and you can also add on top of that, you know, I'm not exaggerating but in the Nordics it's not always you know, you're not a good messenger if you bring the news that no people want to hear. You can also. And this is funny because today I'm fundamentally an optimist so my main message is that this will end the way we want it to end because we have agency, we are brave, we are strong. We might be a global minority in terms of values. I mean it's less than 15 percent of the global population that lives in states that actively supply weapons to Ukraine and have sanctions against Russia. Of course that's not the wrong position because I mean it's still a minority in that respect but it's the right position of course. So I'm fundamentally an optimist. I was accused 15 years ago for being pessimistic and saying you know we will see high volatility, we will see more conflict, we will see lack of democracy, increased you know, authoritarianism, end of globalization. I mean all of those things we said and and wrote before both of course we were accused, I was accused to be pessimistic. Today I talk about you know seeing the light at the end of the tunnel because we need to come together and we need to fix this and I think that we see a lot of good things happening in Europe. And I mean living today is I mean it's a great time to be alive. I mean if you look at mortality rate, life expectancy, literacy, internet penetration, child mortality, I mean most indicators are actually telling us that living today is not that bad. Definitely. I think you know when you do those scenarios and you said the models you're working on, how much do you spend time on demographics because there is a saying that demographics is destiny. It's used a lot of investments because where you have a population growth you will usually have a growth in the economy. That being said we are maybe entering a new technology phase where some countries will be happy to cut down the population a bit because they don't want to have people who don't have work to do. So demographics any two cents on that as a category as being discussed a lot as well. It's one of the data points. I'm actually working now on a model which is actually you know me taking together what I learned since 1990 you know when I started university, 1993, 1994. So I just recently realized and you can read I just recently wrote three pieces on LinkedIn, longer articles, one on Rome, the US and China as being states absorbing complexity and then you know the fundamental law of history you know and then I wrote this week based on on reaching the threshold of complexity and so I'm working on this now and of course demographics when we analyze states is one of the data points. It's easy for me to actually start to use live data in my models now and measure complexity and the ability to kind of have this complexity integrated in order for further development. When it comes to companies it's a bit more difficult because a lot of the data I need is not openly available. It's you know HR data, financial data, internal kind of supply chain data etc etc. So I spend a lot of time on these models now and it's like suddenly all what I learned since you know the early 90s is now coming together but demographics I mean you mentioned that some states and we say that in the West that China will not be able to sustain and succeed because they have you know bad demography. If you talk to some Chinese analysts they say oh it's a blessing in disguise that we will lose 300 million people because we will win the AI race and when we have all the factories fully automated driven by AI it's good that we don't have a lot of unemployed industrial workers because that's what you had we had it in Sweden in the shipyards in the textile industry in agriculture etc etc. So it depends on perspectives again so when looking at China outside in it looks bad but if you actually go in and look out and you think about it that way that the premise for that reasoning is winning the AI race I fully automating and digitalize the did it, converting into digital factories, all of your production base. And you don't need people. If that's the premise of the reason, then it's, you know, a good thing to, to not so it depends on perspective. Definitely. So time is going so fast on the rest. I thought we can just have some more quick fire questions with some topics because I would like the audience to learn the answers from you. So just one question, you know, which countries or regions do you believe are underrated from an investment perspective, a growth perspective in this period we are entering. One comment can be that maybe now Europe looks so bad in so many ways that it's actually underrated while the typical suspects that you would always say India, we would always say the neutral state. You would tend to say they are underrated. But you know, just a question, well, my comments attached of course, but very short also then the first one, it depends on it depends on your market. It depends on your business. It depends on your own shape. It depends on et cetera, et cetera. But broadly speaking, I think that Europe is of course underrated. We talk about about over regulation, lack of kind of innovation, et cetera. I think that Europe with the right reforms will get its act together. And I mean, either we die or we reform. And I'm fully convinced that we will reform as we did many times in history before. So I think that we are a bit too pessimistic. That does not say that we need political reform deregulation. You know, we need less regulation, more competition, you know, more innovation, et cetera. But if you look at demographics, of course, Africa, you cannot bondle it together. But many parts of Africa looks very interesting for the future. Overall, I think that Latin America was when the US is kind of trying out to push China out, which will happen in the coming like five, 10, 15, 20 years. That's also a very interesting market. And then when you have this kind of fallout between the US and other parts of the world, that's a very interesting gap for Europe to fill. So global south, but I was believing in Europe, not necessarily the European Union, but Europe. And then we can talk about with an Norwegian context, what do we mean when we talk about Europe? So the next one, any favorite books you can recommend the audience. I know you read a ton of books. I've also seen some recommended in your slides. And I'll share them on YouTube so people can get the cover of the books. Can you point any direction to important books that you have read for people who want to understand geopolitics, get a foothold on it that they can start reading? That maybe it's not on the radar, obviously. For me, I think the two most important books for me was a clashes of civilization and the history and the last man, because they kind of presented two different versions of the world as it was going to emerge after the fall of the wall. They are, of course, obsolete in some sense now, but also, you know, all these books, prisoners of geography, et cetera, et cetera, very interesting books. And I think that if you have the guts and if you are able to kind of filtrate and accept that that these other views of you in the world, I think you need to read Alexander Dogan, Putin's brain, and then you can dislike, you know, whatever, but understanding Russia, I think you need to read Alexander Dogan and unrestricted the war, unrestricted the warfare, the book describing the kind of Chinese thinking on warfare. So that's the four books and then prisoners of geography being the fifth perfect output them in the show notes. So a lot of people tuning in are young professionals want to create an interesting career. From what you have seen, the people you have worked with, you of course, advise many boards, many companies, you interact with great business people on different levels and also politicians. Any advice you can share for people who want to make a dent in the universe, working with geopolitics or the topics you have been working on, do you have any common advice or things you have seen that makes people tick and make them do well in geopolitics? I think we have a lot of engineers, lawyers, you know, and we need more engineers and more lawyers, but I think we need historians, we need people also understanding the human psychic, understanding behaviors, understanding motivation, how we understand the world, so social sciences and history, I mean that's something that is greatly needed. And then I think my only career advice is follow your heart, I mean be passionate. So I started to study history, my mother was crying because I mean I would be you know an unemployed professor somewhere, you know. So I think that follow your passion, if you like history, if that's really what you know get you emotionally engaged, go for it, if you like engineering, go for it, and then everything is your politics. Last topic, you know, I think I asked you a question that go to where the puck is headed, isochi, can you share two cents, why you spend so much time on it, your passion for it, in my hometown in Tromsau, we're trying to build a good isochi club as well, why have you been so passionate about isochi, and is there any lessons there we can also tune into this conversation? I mean to confess then, I'm the chairman of the biggest, the most successful sports club in Sweden, a year within the year, which was founded in 1981, and we have Swedish gold medals in 25 different different sports for me, I think that it's more like sports and I mean I used to be a boy scout leader as well, so engaging in the local community is so important not only because it's the right thing to do, but that's where you build real relations and that's I mean when you have those real relations which are working with complete different things than yourself, then you learn a lot of new things, you get new perspectives, etc, so it really can't so get you thinking, meeting people with different background, different professions, different study, etc. I had that in the mandatory, you know, Swedish armed forces, whenever what was called in, and I find the same in sports, it's purpose, but it's also meeting people with other perspectives. And it's teamwork as well, right? You can't have success if you're not able to work in teams basically, so that's the beauty of sports as well. Yes, absolutely. Where can people find your work and sort of stay touch? It's linked in the best place. We also attach to the show. I think in the rest, and then I do a lot of things in Swedish, of course, we have a podcast, so if you're able, you can always tune in, we are considering actually making more podcasts in English, etc. But don't hesitate to reach out, and if you're a company and you need advice, of course, that's my core business or a government, but that's problem. I'd recommend checking it out, and we will attach all the relevant links so people can continue in and also learn more about the work you do, and then Andreas, thank you so much for taking the time. It was a pleasure. Thank you.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Andreas's multicultural background (Swedish-German) and early exposure to different perspectives, including family history from WWII, shaped his approach to geopolitics, emphasizing understanding over persuasion.
  2. He argues that the current geopolitical shift from a stable Cold War order to a volatile multi-polar world, now moving toward a US-China bipolar rivalry, was predictable, driven by differing national interests and structural changes.
  3. Control of global trade routes and maritime choke points (e.g., Straits of Hormuz, Suez Canal) remains a fundamental source of power, as historically noted, and is now being challenged by initiatives like China's Belt and Road and Russia's Northern Sea Route.
  4. Understanding long-term geopolitical processes requires a generational perspective, contrasting with the short-term cycles of democracies and corporate planning, creating a strategic disadvantage against states like China with century-long plans.
  5. The Middle East's strategic importance is tied to energy resources; as long as global dependence persists, the region will remain a contested area for control of energy infrastructure and influence.

Summary:

Andreas discusses his personal journey into geopolitics, influenced by his Swedish-German heritage and early travels, which fostered a constructivist approach to understanding different national rationalities. He explains that the post-Cold War transition to a multi-polar world, now evolving into a US-China bipolar rivalry, was an anticipated development driven by competing interests. A key theme is the enduring importance of controlling global trade and maritime choke points for world dominance, a principle currently challenged by Chinese and Russian initiatives.

He emphasizes the difficulty of aligning long-term geopolitical trends, which unfold over generations, with the short-term decision-making cycles of democracies and businesses. Regarding the Middle East, he notes its persistent strategic significance is fundamentally linked to energy resources, predicting continued conflict as long as global energy dependence remains. The discussion underscores the value of firsthand experience and a multi-faceted analytical framework combining structural, realist, and constructivist views to comprehend global dynamics.

FAQs

Andreas's mixed Swedish-German heritage, including family history from World War II, and growing up as a Catholic in Lutheran Sweden gave him early exposure to diverse perspectives. His military service and subsequent studies in history, particularly focusing on Russia, further deepened his engagement with geopolitics.

He believes theoretical knowledge alone is insufficient; meeting people from different cultures and experiencing their perspectives firsthand is crucial to truly comprehend geopolitical dynamics. This approach helped him see rationality in states like Russia and North Korea from their own viewpoints.

No, he is not surprised, as he views most developments as predictable outcomes of long-term trends. He attributes this to human optimism often clouding objective analysis of global shifts, such as the transition from a Cold War bipolar order to today's multi-polar or emerging bipolar rivalry.

He explains that the world is in an overlapping phase, transitioning from multi-polarity to a bipolar rivalry between the U.S. and China, similar to historical periods where old and new systems coexist. This shift was signaled by policies like the U.S. 'pivot to Asia' in 2009.

The quote highlights that controlling global trade routes has historically equated to global power, a principle that underpinned Western dominance. Today, this is challenged by initiatives like China's Belt and Road and Russia's Arctic routes, making strategic choke points critical in geopolitical competition.

Choke points like the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal are vital because they control global trade flows, energy resources, and military access. Controlling these locations translates to significant geopolitical influence, as seen in current tensions in the Red Sea and Arctic regions.

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