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1ON1: VICE GANDA On Leaving Showtime For Surrogacy?

44m 4s

1ON1: VICE GANDA On Leaving Showtime For Surrogacy?

The transcription covers two main topics. First, it discusses the Democratic Alliance's (DA) recent congress where John Steenhuisen was elected as the new federal leader. He presented a four-point strategy aimed at expanding the party's support to become South Africa's largest party. This involves showcasing the DA's governance competence, actively listening and building emotional connections with communities beyond its traditional base, acting as a strong and principled partner within the Government of National Unity (GNU), and fostering a positive belief in the country's future. Analysts note the leadership's younger demographic and Steenhuisen's personal affability as potential assets in bridging the gap between the DA's perceived administrative efficiency and the need for deeper voter trust, without resorting to racial identity politics. The second part shifts to a critique of draft changes to South Africa's basic education history curriculum. Commentators express concern that the proposed curriculum excessively narrows the focus to pre-colonial African civilizations, colonialism, and the liberation struggle, while entirely removing pivotal 20th-century global history. This includes the French and Russian Revolutions, the rise of Nazi Germany, the World Wars, the Cold War, and post-war economic miracles. The argument is that this omission deprives students of essential context for understanding modern political ideologies, totalitarianism, and pathways to economic development, potentially leaving their education parochial and incomplete.

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Hello, hello, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to another episode of The Daily Friend Show. I'm your host, Nicholas Larama, today joined by Mr. Terence Carrigan. Let's get into the first news story of today, and that is that over the weekend, the Democratic Alliance elected a new federal leader that being current Captain Mayor Jordan Hill Lewis, who was the favorite to win the race. In his opening speech as leader of the DA, he talked about a four point plan to make the Democratic Alliance the biggest party in South Africa. He said, "The question is whether the DA can lead the country, whether we can become the largest party in national government. As your newly elected leader, my answer is resounding. Yes, we can." He says that there are four steps. First, the DA needs to show that the DA governs well for everyone. Quote, "Where the DA governs the basics work, budgets are managed responsibly. Competent people are appointed, institutions function, services are delivered. And when we do the basics well, it is the poor who benefit the most because getting the basic right, the getting the basics right means the economy grows and jobs are created." Most people already know that the DA governs better. Now we must win their trust so they vote for us for the first time. This is part of the second point he says. We must start by listening more carefully. We must not come with the answer before you've even heard the question. We must be more present in more communities. And I mean really present, standing with people shoulders to shoulder helping them solve their problems. Of course, connecting with more voters doesn't mean neglecting the people who have supported us over many years. I completely reject the idea that politics is a choice between competing groups or that we must trade one community support for another. I believe that if we work with focus and discipline, we can build a party that truly represents the hopes and aspirations of all South Africans. This third point was that the DA needed to be a strong and principled partner in national government. You said, "The government of national unity is a complex and fraught thing, but we must never forget why it exists. It exists because South Africans rejected the client. It exists because people want cooperation, not chaos. And it exists because the alternative, a radical coalition of populism and destruction would place our country in grave danger. The DA did the right thing by stepping forward and accepting responsibility." He said, "However, that the DMS Rambo is not in government for positions or titles. We are there to show the DA difference in the in word and deed. And that is why we will continue to oppose policies in the GNU that block progress. We will show that it's possible to build a better health system that better services the poor without taking anything away from those who have worked hard to afford medical aid. We will oppose crony enrichment schemes and see the same politically connected elites making billions, while millions of people remain poor. We know we can build a model of empowerment that delivers real advancement for millions, for millions more families. And that the DA would work to lifting millions out of poverty." And he said the fourth part would be leading with a belief in South Africa. We will not listen to nay says to people who say this country cannot be fixed to the ones who say the decline is inevitable. I love this country and I deeply believe in its future. Other major leadership positions that we've decided so the DA has sort of a number of federal chairs. And then it also has a federal council, which is a sort of separate body. So Helen Zilla was until this congress, the chairperson of the federal council. Ashall Serapan has replaced her in that position. He's also the deputy finance minister of the deputy federal chairs. You've got the current education minister, Sylvie Wakerube. Also the DA mayoral candidate for Tswine, Sylia's brink and current DA minister of communication in Solimalatsi. The federal finance person chair is Mark Berk, who is one of the DA's spokesperson people on finance. And on federal council, you've got JP Smith, Thomas Walters and Karl Ploughham. So Terrence, I think no real surprises in this DA congress, really. Oh, sorry. And the federal chair is Solim Smuggler, who is the halting leader. So no real surprises, I think. We've really seen lots of commentary. Here's one headline I saw on, I think, news 24 interviewing DA delegates at the congress. DA is not a white-only party, here. Mass clear messaging will attract DA voters, say delegates. Also some discussion of the DA's Ashall Serapan, who describes as the party's number two, saying that he won't be leaving treasuries or some sort of some continuity there. What do you make of the DA congress and what do you make of George Halluay's pitch to voters? Well, as you say, there's nothing particularly surprising in any of that. I think that what I take away was essentially the generational change. I think the average age of the DA's leadership goal, which is now less than 40, I think, is somewhere around 30-39. That's quite remarkable. Compare that to pretty much anyone else. I would draw comparison to the election of Helen Ziller. I remember there was a great deal of hype around that. She was, at that stage, very popular with the media. She was seen as the breath of fresh air because she wasn't confrontational like Tony Leon. She was more empathetic. I think that the investment in those narratives proved to have gone sour. I think she showed us all to be a great deal, more peugeotistic than Tony Leon. What stuck with me was watching George and Hill Lewis a few weeks ago speaking to Dan Quarter, who I think it's fair to say is not always a great fan of the DA. Quarter said, "I really want to dislike you, but I just can't." I think that is something that he brings. There's a certain affability about it. And with, I think a sense that he is performed well as a mayor, that he understands the issues very well, that he's resolution what he believes, but is open to discussing various options. That he is able to look outside the DA party box, if you like. I think that is very unusual in South African politics to find someone holding an office of state who does have that cross-party appeal. I think George and Hill Lewis is one of them. What I was finding interesting is they're big priorities going to be crime. In a way, this is almost cycling back into the 1990s, where that became a fraught issue because if you raised crime, you were being an Afro-Pessimist and well, crime was a metaphor for black people. And there's no real crime problem in South Africa now. So that's something that has, I think, been marginalized. It's now very much a background concern. I think that by putting it back firmly on the agenda and saying this has to be an absolute priority. You're connecting with something that I think people across society feel very viscerally. And I think also one that is necessary to get economic growth rolling again. If firms have to spend billions protecting themselves, there's no great investment case. Yeah, exactly. I think, to me, what's quite interesting about this is how Hill Lewis is really grabbing onto the mismatch between this general, relatively positive sentiment about the DA and its ability to govern. And we do see that in various polling. And he's correct when he says that when you ask South Africa, even people who don't vote for the DA, which party governs best, a lot will say ANC. And more will say the DA, even if they don't vote for it. And that is very interesting. And the reason that people don't vote for the DA despite this now being more widely accepted in South Africa has been a sort of head scratcher, I think, for people across the whole political spectrum. And one of the reasons is, as our colleague Herman Pretoria says, is about the feeling that this is, these people are not really with you. They're sort of cold and mechanical. And that's the reason why I think this is, you can't really trust them because maybe they'll govern more efficiently, but maybe it'll just be more efficiently to mess you around or discrease you over. And John Hill Lewis kind of openly said in his second point that we must kind of build this emotional connection with voters more. And that's a tricky thing to do because there's no policy you can. that there's no sort of magic thing you can do that gets people to trust you. But this is how electoral politics work. At the end of the day, voters in every democracy often vote on the idea of who cares the most about me. You can see this in US elections, you can see this in British elections, all these things. And that has always, I think, been the DA's Achilles heels. It's not been very good at building that sort of mushy stuff, particularly outside of minority communities. Right. So, I don't know, Terence, what's your thoughts on that? I mean, do you think, as you say, this might go with an affability thing you talked about? I saw an interesting podcast this morning done by a gentleman with a former association with the DA who no longer has an association with him. And he was commenting on this and said, well, hey, like Boatbuss. Let's just say his version is probably a lot more personal and a lot more different circumstances. Different circumstances. Anyway, he said, well, you know, the DA is, you know, it looks like it's going to have to, it's going to try and appeal to a socialist and communist mindset. And I disagree with the with this characterization of where most of Africans are. But, you know, yes, I think there's a grain of truth in that that the DA will have to bridge that very delicate chasm between your ideological convictions and marketing your solutions to people who don't share them. Affability, certainly, certainly plays a role. But something that I think has defined as defines South African politics is this idea. And I think maybe the word you look for is affinity that, you know, many, there's a phrase that was used, probably until about a decade or so ago, people would describe their political loyalties in terms of, in terms of the B verb. So it would be I am ANC. Not I support the ANC. That was, that was very bound up to, to, to one's identity. I think what's happening and maybe the, the, the DA kind of, the, the generational change illustrates a broader process is that the, the, the brand recognition that has kept, has kept people in those, in those affinity groups has started to crack. 20 years ago, the ANC could claim to speak with some authority. Certainly it was treated with a great deal of difference, even after certain pathologies that become well known. I think today, even their own supporters would find that laughable. So yeah, you know, on the other hand, give this a year, wait for the, wait for the honeymoon to run out and then we'll, we'll, we'll do another podcast on it because things are about well, they're very different than. Yeah, no, politics is always a difficult thing to predict. And what I'm pleased though about this is that there isn't this sort of over racialization of this discussion because previously when the DA has tried to essentially make this move from being sort of as competent to being sort of as caring. It's done it, but there's quite sort of blunt sort of racialist thing that the, the, you could, I would have called it back at the time and I probably still would call it the ANC light approach. And this was exemplified by Lucy Mamanne, but there was also a lot of, there's a lot of focus on race. Mamanne would say things he said in the famous speech ones, if you don't see my blackness, you don't see me, there was support, the sort of tetra support for BE, there was this like quite a aggressive focus on demographic representivity within the DA and, you know, affirmative action within its ranks, that sort of thing. And Jordan Hill Lewis here doesn't seem to be, he seems to be wanting to achieve the objectives of that policy without the methods. He's saying we do want to connect with people who haven't voted for us, most of whom in South Africa are black with it. But we don't want to do it by this kind of cheap racial pandering, this sort of like, oh, look, I look like you, therefore we must vote for each other, you know, kind of almost getting on board the racial blocks ideology. And to me, that's quite refreshing because that is always a temptation for the DA. When I was a DA activist and politician, you know, what was the number one thing that DA supporters would say to me out there would say, no, no, the DA needs a black leader because then black people will vote for it and then it will take over the country, which is something as non-racialist. We reject this is not, you don't, you know, choose someone on the color of their skin, you choose them on their capability. This is our core belief and the DA seems to be holding to this at least in broad strokes. So what's your, what's your take on all that? Agreed. But, you know, I think here's the great trap. If you, if you play that game, you can see the principles. People who are receptive to that message will go where they can get the real article, not a right for some of you. Yeah, good. And then we see my live-perch did work. Yeah, they will give you what you want. Look, unfortunately, I would say of every type of nationalism. Nationalism formed around race is the most intractable because unlike, let's say civic nationalism, it doesn't allow the possibility of people of others joining in. You know, you, you know, demography therefore becomes destiny. Look, and I think that for those concerned about diversity, and I mean, he had ethnic or racial diversity, the DA, I think, you know, produced a slate at the end that was, that was, that was diverse. Certainly, more so than any other, than any other major party. You know, the, you would have to go back to the ANC maybe in the late 1990s to find something, on its, on its benches, that was, one leadership that was comparable. So yes, you know, they seem to be making, making progress whether this will be the turning point and the, and the sayable proposition at the hope that remains to be seen. Yeah, and, and I think that's key is, is, is one of the difficulties is, is, as, as he'll do, sort of mentioned, you need to kind of keep people who've already supported you, you need to feel like you're still on their side, but you also need to attract new people. And it's very easy to say, no, no, you see, we don't care about those old voters anymore. Just care about these new people coming in and that's, that's, I think, a thing that is, and it's not, you know, you get people often reduce that to race, but I think it's far more complicated than that. It's, it's to do with these kind of emotional connections of fighting for who you seem to be standing up for. And I think the, the, the DA's fight against that on the budget last year was probably a real breakthrough moment on that because, you know, a lot of South Africans who are not traditional DA supporters could look at that and say, well, this is any party that really sees you making a big noise about an issue that I really care about, which is that. This is something everyone understands. And that's why I think in retrospect, it's going to continue to be a turning point is for African history. I don't know. Maybe I'm getting ahead of my key here. Well, the final point on that and his loss, his loss to second to last was four points, was being a principle, a strong principle and an active member of the, of the GNU. See, this is, this is interesting. The GNU is popular. And I think, you know, I think that that that that for people leading to a more ideological appreciation of politics like ourselves, maybe something that we sometimes want to hold our nose about. Most, most voters don't see things like that. They can at least take away the principle, the, the claim that these are parties trying to work together for the great and good. Not as we'll discuss in a later story. I don't think this is always the case. But nevertheless, I think that this has, this has been, this has been something from which the DA has, has, has benefited. I think probably markedly more so than the ANC. Yes, yes. Okay, let's move on to our next story. Now Terence, both you and I are very keen on history, we're both sort of amateur history, story and amateur history and joyers. We could talk endlessly about this event and this battle and this thing and that. And so this story is kind of a bit close to our hearts. So there was an op-ed written in the daily friend, dot, zero dot, zero by our boss, John Endress, talking a little bit about the Department of Basic Education's new draft curriculum for history. Now this is the product of a panel which was appointed by the former Education Minister Angie Muthlerka, but it is being, uh, gazetted this sort of draft thing has been gazetted for public comment by the DA based kitchen. the occasion minister, Saviour Corrubet. And the sort of initial public description of the Spites defenders was this kind of slightly bizarre. Oh, we're moving away from Eurocentrism and we're moving, we're getting rid of young fund rebbeck as being the be all and end all of the history books. Now just on that point, and we'll get to this more specifics. This is kind of silly because, I mean, I'm attriculated in 2011. And it's not like young fund rebbeck was already the scent of our history curriculum back then. Our history curriculum has changed quite significant since '94 and the way this was sold to me seems very kind of disingenuous. It's sort of almost exaggerating in some ways, some of the differences from what's already happened. But anyway, reading from John Andrews' piece, most commentaries so far has focused on tone. Some welcome the proposed shift towards African empires and broader themes as a long-due of a correction. Others worry the result will be parochial, but both reactions miss what is a stake. A school history curriculum is a finite container. Anything you put in it displaces something else. Under the current curriculum, grade 11 covers the Russian Revolution, the rise of Nazi Germany, the Great Depression and ideological contests between capitalism and communism and fascism that defined the 20th century. Grade 12 covers the post-World War Order, including the Cold War's Global Phenomenon. Under the proposed curriculum, all of this is gone. The entire further education and training phase which covers 10 to 12 becomes a study of pre-colonial African civilizations, European colonialism of Africa, the liberation struggle and transition to democracy. Some of these are central topic, but the question is, what is lost? The French Revolution, which gave the world the language rights and equality that the ANC itself drew on in 1994, appears no one in the proposed curriculum as a standard-owned subject. The Russian Revolution, the mass deaths under the 20th century totalitarian systems from Stalin's purges to pole-pots killing fields are entirely absent. So the post-war economic miracles, Germany and Japan rising from rubble followed by South Korea, Singapore and coastal China. Those stories answer questions, which South Africa is still failing to answer. How does a poor society become a rich one? There was other commentary on this as well. There's been some concern that in the grade nine section of the curriculum, while it still teaches the Second World War, the amount of time spent talking about the Second World War and the fine-mar Germany is reduced by about 20%. So there's some concern that this will lead to a kind of glossing over of important details and lack of understanding of this period. Professor Jonathan Janssen wrote a very aggressive condemnation of this, coming at a slightly different angle. Talking about, firstly, how he thought that this was all a school a place for party, petty partisan politics. This is from Jonathan Janssen's piece. The reason you do not see this angst around mathematics or geography curriculum is that manipulating history as a subject is the ideal terrain for indoctrination. He goes on to say, where will these super-duper teachers come from to teach the new history? And especially if we've made compulsory in the FET or senior phase of high school. From nowhere, we do not have enough of them in all of our schools. And there is nothing worse than teaching a radical curriculum within competent and non-radical teachers who have no idea what it means to teach history as a skill set. There's, by the way, a reason for the precipitous decline in the number of students taking history since the 1990s. Parents recognize that this is ideological opportunism. Give up our children's subjects with real-life work applications. He also said, quote, "Nor of the many students taking history because of an immense intellectual interest in our inglorious past. Most of the children I know take history as a subject because it is easier to pass than a contancy or physical science. The parent needs to take a cold shower. The Rikindal public spat-byte history in the school curriculum is a bested distraction from a dysfunctional school system for the majority of our children." So a lot of views there. Parents, what's your take on all of this? OK, I've spent the last couple of days mulling over it. My big-- I have a couple of concerns. First of all, the study of history as Jonathan Jonson alluded to actually does have real-world applications, but not because it teaches you content. Content is, in a sense, secondary to the skills that it imbibes, which is processing information, training your memory, learning how evidence works. When I was a student in the 1990s, there were some fairly large companies that used to come stuffing around for recruitment. And one-- it was interesting that many of them would actually go to the history department because Meritzburg's history department recognized this quite good. The small niche-- Zulu history was a big thing, the in fact, oral history, which features quite prognolinity in the syllabus, was pioneered in that department. But it's not because you had people who could talk about the Anglo-Zulu War, it's because you had people who could take information and process. If we reduce this all to content, then it really doesn't matter. And I think that the kind of smoking gun that that is behind a lot of official thinking is this separate but not unrelated proposal to make it compulsory. Because it's just assuming, well, anyone can teach us. We shove a textbook in your hand. You read it out. They take away the party line. A good history teacher, I think, is probably as difficult to find as a good maths teacher. It's something that requires enormous preparation. And a profound ability to actually understand what kids are trying to say and how they can improve on it, what they're missing, what information is extraneous. So that's point number one. Point number two is that, yes, I do feel that particularly in the FET phase, it's baroqueal. This is not to say that African history is not important or valuable or worthy of study. But I do think that, as John says, it's a fine art container. And yes, 30% or 40% African history, that's good 100% African history. I think that's something of an overshoot. I can also tell you this, whether or not South Africa is an African country as a far from settled proposition, maybe on the continent, but this always seems to me to be an elite fascination. The kind of thing that goes down very well among university academics, some of whom have their sites firmly sat on the European or American birth as the ultimate career objective. I remember a couple of years ago listening to this American professor of Pan-African studies from Syracuse University in New York. He was jetting in for an AU conference, and then heading back to the United States after having preached the Gospel of Pan-Africanism. And I think the big devil will be in the following detail. How is this actually going to be taught? Is this going to be a case of identify the goodies and baddies? Or you don't want to talk about liberation struggles fine. Bear in mind that wars have multiple sides. South Africa did not-- there was no military victory. There was a costly stalemate from which people stepped back. And if the idea is somehow to apportion goodies and baddies, the sign will virtue to one side. And to dismiss out of hand any arguments that don't support it, then you're just wasting every one's time. Now tell you this, just as the ANC and their brand of African nationalism became a global core of silver in the 1980s, Africana nationalism had much the same-- they had much the same cachet for a long time in the early 20th century. These were the original plucky underdogs who had stood up to the British Empire and rescued their own culture and everything. So yeah, history is complicated. That's where you need good history teachers. That's why you must not make it compulsory, because you want people to take it out of their interest. Completely agree on that point. I think that history is actually generally already, even though it's not compulsory, is not taught very well. And making compulsory don't make that problem much, much worse. It's very difficult to look at some of these changes here. And some of these things absolutely fascinate me. Should you learn about the Ethiopian empire in antiquity? That's to me, that's a fascinating subject. It's something that should be more widely understood. As is parts of African society not been properly studied by the general public, yeah, sure. I agree. And some of the-- I think are important kind of situating yourself in the world. But for me, when you start framing this as African history, you're kind of already displaying that you're sort of in this pan-Africanist box. Like, Africa as a concept is an arbitrary distinction if you trace historical roots back to, essentially how the Greeks viewed the world in the classical era. That there were three continents, Europa, Asia, and Africa, and Africa is just the one at the bottom. Like, North Africa, for example, has so little to do with the rest of Africa in so many ways. Yes, there has been contact between Sub-Saharan and North Africa, but that's primarily a Mediterranean-focused society for the vast majority of its history. And even still today in many ways. West Africa has surprisingly little to do with East Africa. Central Africa is a very different history. Just South Africa. The idea of Africa as a continent is to me always been a way to kind of smuggler in a sort of weird racial nationalist view of the world. Because Africa has black people, therefore it is one thing. And that to me, I think, is silly and not true. And so I think that's a starting point where all of this can go a little bit off the rails. I don't know, 10, 20, 20, 20. Well, look, here's, there are a few, although I do think that there are some moments of great value in what's being proposed. There are a few indicators of the ideological provenance of the so, for instance, there's a short section on learning about world civilization. So you can choose, you have to do Mughal India, which is interesting, I don't know if that's who we've done before. You have to do middle-kingdom Egypt. I'm impressed at that. Understand that it's between old-kingdom, middle-kingdom and you-kingdom. Very good. And then you can choose China, Greece, or South America. South America is just like, you know, it's just there. I don't know. Do you get to the Aztecs there because that's on South American? That's central. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Or a Maya. But, you know, okay, let's just talk about being a bit sloppy. And then you must decide, you must explain why later people thought all these civilizations were inferior to Europe. And I was thinking about myself, okay, first of all, Chinese culture has generally regarded itself as superior. The whole concept of China, the middle kingdom. Literally, the Chinese emperor sent away a Jesuit missionary with the most advanced maps of the world because they didn't put China in the proper place. So, you know, the sort of ethno-centricity is not unique. Secondly, I don't know who has said that middle-kingdom Egypt was somehow inferior to anything. Even the heyday of European colonialism, it was, it exerted an enormous attraction. Napoleon went to try and beat the British in Egypt and sent people along to try and decode the permits and things like that. Yeah, there's also a section there of us, the sort of European racism that a lot of the foundational Egyptology was done. Yeah, so, look, you know, there was a there was a British historian who said that when we constitute the past in terms of our present, you end up producing a giant optical illusion. Yeah, look, to me, one of the concerning things about all of this is that the the date of submission for comments on this is the 19th of April. So, that's what six, six days from now. I think, yeah, go ahead. Let me say one other thing. I can't help thinking that this may have been, when I think that's the next story we're going to get into very briefly. There could be something in this that has to do with officials at the education department wanting to create a difficult situation for the minister. This curriculum was pushed by a predecessor from the ANC. Now, I think that it was ill advised to sign the proclamation. I think there's that there are many issues that need to be dealt with. But I think that this is the kind of thing that as Professor Janssen said does have a sort of incendiary potential to offend many people within the DA's traditional sport. I'm thinking white people, but also it's been noted that there's very little about the Indian experience in South Africa. But now that she's signed it, she's either committed to it, which offends them, or it becomes a case of, well, if I backtrack on it, then I'm doing someone else's bidding. Well, presumably some of this stuff can be changed before it reaches the final conclusion. But yeah, I agree there is that interesting political angle to it. And we'll have to see what comes of this. Because at the end of the day, our history curriculum should be, as you say, about teaching, sort of examination, critical thinking, hard to sources, what is bias and comparison between things, giving people a general idea of how we got to where we are. And not just a bunch of indoctrinating nationalist, chess beating, I mean, the plenty of countries that have done that and the never works well for anyone. Okay, so we've gone along, but this is I think an interesting story to still talk about. So please indulge us on this one. It's our final story. There is a lot of concern in the GNU about how ANC so-called study groups are undermining the GNU allegations from the DA and the UDM and other parties in the government of national unity have said that senior officials are meeting with ANC MPs in these sort of informal outside the structures groups where they give them briefings on everything that a department is doing and pieces of legislation that are being drafted and such. And essentially that they are looting with senior officials outside of the normal frameworks, ANC MPs and to shape how everything happens when it comes actually to parliament. Some of this has been pointed out by basic education minister from the DA, Sivirwa Garube, who at the end of March, wrote a letter, which we discussed before on the show, denouncing sort of saboteurs within her own department saying that they would be trying to do all sorts of things to smear her in order to protect their corruption. Deputy Minister of Defense Bante Colomisa from the UDM said to the Daily Maverick that the practice of officials giving exclusive briefings to the ANC was old ANC policy. You said quote, "They have been practicing this for years and almost all departments." And that the South African National Defense Force was no exception. The acting secretary of defense, four defense and other senior military officials attend these meetings. Peter Pruon-Nabal, from the Freedom Front Plus, said that he had put out the directive to stop this and that it was happening in his department. Billy Alcamp and John Stanhazen from the DA said that they didn't believe it was happening in their departments, but they knew it was happening in other departments and that they were completely opposed to it. Colomisa also said the informal and secretive study groups preceded the formal appearance of government departments before called portfolio committees, joint standing committees, and select committees. It is in this context that informal study groups emerge allowing these MPs to exert influence over administrative decisions and direction. Notably ministers or deputy ministers from other parties in the GNU are systemically excluded from these sessions. D-A-M-P-M-A-POW and former international relations spokesman said these ANC study groups are often used to engage departmental officials in shape draft reports before they are formally tabled. She also says that because the ANC chairs most of the 45 committees in parliament, the concentration of chairing part gives the ANC significant control over agendas processing an overall direction of oversight, which is precisely why practices like these pre-meetings and selective engagements and civil servants and parliamentary content advisers who are by law required to be politically neutral professionals has such a material impact on how parliament functions in reality. There is the inevitable result of the policy of catered deployment. There's a couple of things going on in the yes catered deployment is a big issue, but also structurally until the 1st of April the political executives of every portfolio. So ministers and MECs had ultimate authority over the human resource functions and their departments. This was changed with a signing of an amendment. Now those who've read my column today will get a sense of this. The ANC has never wanted a non-potizen civil service. I think that having lost their monopoly on political power, this is starting to become exposed, at least as far as the mechanics of it go. The question becomes, having changed the law to professionalise the civil service, you still have to reckon with 30 years of deliberate, intentional politicisation and using the state as a vehicle for patronage. My concern is that these informal study groups, you can prohibit people from participating, as Minister Flinibault has done, who's to say that it's not so much a guy in a suit going to parliament with a briefcase and he's AIDS and it just becomes a thing on a WhatsApp group. This is where we cross that line from legislation into culture. The idea that I occupy this position and it is unethical for me to do this, not because somebody might catch me. This gets back what we were saying about history and the way it's understood and taught. There's a great deal to be said about post-colonial Africa and why it became what it became after a very promising start. One of it was simply the failure to construct states that functioned and the use of the practice that became known as neo-patreonialism where you have a civil service, you have formal lines of authority. But they're really matter because things are done informally because we are connected by bonds of family or ethnicity or simply because you ask for your back, use your mind. Places like Kenya, Kwa Tevoa in the initial independence period did quite well under this. The problem is that you were not building the institutions. This is my great concern for South Africa. South Africa cannot survive without the institutions of accountability that have been designed for it. This has been designed to undermine them. Yes. It's a very serious concern and it's going to be interesting to see how the non-A&C parties deal with it going forward. It is interesting to see a lot from Bontolamisa in this one because his party has generally speaking been much friendlier towards the A&C and been much more willing to work together with it. I'm complaining about this very specific issue here. I think is an interesting indication. This is really rubbing everyone up the wrong way. He's not an A&C. Okay. Well, we've gone very long. So I beg your intelligence. Thank you very much for listening. We hope you found the show interesting and we will see you tomorrow on the Daily Friendshow. Cheers everyone. The Daily Friendshow and the Daily Friend or a project of the Institute of Race Relations, the IRA. The IRA is a think tank which was founded in 1929 to study race relations in South Africa and works to change government policy to improve race relations through non-racialism and to ensure the prosperity or South Africans. If you like our work and would like to support us, please go to ira.org.z/and click support the IRR or you can go to the DailyFriend.co.z/and click the fund us button.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. The Democratic Alliance (DA) elected John Steenhuisen as its new federal leader, who outlined a four-point plan to make the DA the largest party in South Africa.
  2. The plan focuses on demonstrating good governance, building trust with new voters through emotional connection, being a principled partner in the national unity government, and promoting belief in South Africa's future.
  3. The DA's leadership reflects a generational shift, with an emphasis on affability and cross-party appeal, while avoiding racial pandering to attract broader support.
  4. A separate discussion critiques proposed changes to South Africa's history curriculum, arguing it removes crucial global historical events like the World Wars and the Cold War, limiting students' understanding of key political and economic concepts.

Summary:

The transcription covers two main topics. First, it discusses the Democratic Alliance's (DA) recent congress where John Steenhuisen was elected as the new federal leader. He presented a four-point strategy aimed at expanding the party's support to become South Africa's largest party. This involves showcasing the DA's governance competence, actively listening and building emotional connections with communities beyond its traditional base, acting as a strong and principled partner within the Government of National Unity (GNU), and fostering a positive belief in the country's future. Analysts note the leadership's younger demographic and Steenhuisen's personal affability as potential assets in bridging the gap between the DA's perceived administrative efficiency and the need for deeper voter trust, without resorting to racial identity politics.

The second part shifts to a critique of draft changes to South Africa's basic education history curriculum. Commentators express concern that the proposed curriculum excessively narrows the focus to pre-colonial African civilizations, colonialism, and the liberation struggle, while entirely removing pivotal 20th-century global history. This includes the French and Russian Revolutions, the rise of Nazi Germany, the World Wars, the Cold War, and post-war economic miracles. The argument is that this omission deprives students of essential context for understanding modern political ideologies, totalitarianism, and pathways to economic development, potentially leaving their education parochial and incomplete.

FAQs

The new federal leader is Jordan Hill Lewis, the current Mayor of Cape Town, who was elected over the weekend.

His plan includes: 1) demonstrating good governance, 2) building trust by listening and engaging communities, 3) being a principled partner in the national unity government, and 4) leading with belief in South Africa's future.

The DA aims to build emotional connections with new voters by being more present in communities, while also ensuring it does not neglect its long-term supporters, rejecting the idea of trading one community's support for another.

The DA sees itself as a strong, principled partner in the GNU, focused on showing the 'DA difference' by opposing policies that block progress and promoting effective governance, rather than seeking positions or titles.

The average age of the DA's new leadership is under 40, around 30-39, marking a significant generational shift compared to other major parties in South Africa.

He seeks to connect with a broader demographic, including black voters, without resorting to racial pandering or identity politics, focusing instead on capability and inclusive representation.

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