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175 Rebecca Wexler

from Excited Utterance

31m 58s

175 Rebecca Wexler

This episode of Excited Utterance features host Alex Nunn interviewing Rebecca Wexler, the Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, about her paper "Law Enforcement Privilege," recently published in the Michigan Law Review. Wexler explains that the criminal legal system depends on open proceedings so courts can review whether police conduct complies with the Fourth Amendment, yet an obscure common law privilege allows law enforcement to withhold information about investigative methods while still introducing the resulting evidence. She describes the doctrine's intended two-step structure, a threshold assertion followed by balancing, and argues that courts have effectively eliminated the threshold step, forcing defendants to show that unseen information is necessary and allowing the government to substitute weaker alternative proof. The Stingray cell-site simulator saga illustrates the stakes: police used the devices without warrants for years while concealing their use, until a pro se defendant's research exposed the practice. Wexler's archival work traces the privilege's lineage back to 1723 England, Wigmore's treatise, and Learned Hand's 1950 opinion, challenging the view that it is a modern invention. She offers a skeptical account of calls to abolish the privilege, noting risks of parallel construction and evidentiary distortion, and proposes tying the threshold claim to law enforcement's own pre-dispute confidentiality practices. The conversation closes by connecting these issues to emerging challenges involving artificial intelligence and algorithmic policing.

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Speaker 1Excited Utterance, the evidence and proof podcast, episode 175, Rebecca Wexler, the law enforcement privilege. Welcome to Excited Utterance. I'm your host, Alex Nunn, from the Texas A&M University School of Law. Excited Utterance is your podcast for cutting-edge scholarship and developments in the world of evidence and proof. We bring virtual workshops to you throughout the academic year. Joining me on Excited Utterance today is Rebecca Wexler, the Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Now, as many of our listeners likely know, outside of perhaps Edwin Winkle Reed himself, there's no greater expert on the law of privileges in the country than Rebecca. And we have a real treat for the podcast today because I had the chance to sit down with Rebecca and chat about her new paper entitled Law Enforcement Privilege. And in the article, which was recently published in the Michigan Law Review, Rebecca recognizes that our criminal legal system depends on fair and open proceedings if we are going to vindicate the rights of defendants, particularly their Fourth Amendment rights, against evidence acquired through unreasonable searches and seizures. If the police, for example, can use claims of secrecy to thwart criminal defendants' access to evidence, well, then our entire system of adjudication breaks down. And yet, under a seemingly obscure common law privilege that's made a resurgence in recent years, police and prosecutors are using secretive methods to collect information that's used in many cases. And at the same time, they're withholding information about how those secretive systems actually work from defendants. The doctrine that enables this, the law enforcement privilege, is the focus of my conversation with Rebecca. And I hope you enjoy hearing her expertise on the topic today. Rebecca, welcome to Excited Utterance.
Speaker 2Thank you, Alex. I want to say actually how appreciative I am to be on the podcast and that I have benefited so much from listening to the Excited Utterance podcast over the years.
Speaker 1Awesome. Well, thanks for that. It's so fun for, I think, both Ed and myself to be able to talk about so many fun projects and exciting projects. And certainly, I think yours today fits that category. So your paper that we're chatting about today, it opens with this really cool observation, an observation that I didn't really think about before. You walk the reader through all of these numerous landmark Fourth Amendment cases that were all familiar with, Mapp, Katz, Riley, Carpenter. And you know that despite the centrality of those cases, as we think about particularly Fourth Amendment law, none of them would actually exist if the police had managed to keep their conduct secret. And yet, in this particular paper that you have written, you note that this obscure common law doctrine called the law enforcement privilege is making exactly that kind of secretive system work. And I think that's a really cool observation. Secrecy possible. So really cool observation. Maybe to begin, you can share with us, what exactly is the law enforcement privilege and why does it need to be on our radar?
Speaker 2So I think you put it well, you know, we depend for better or worse on the courts and on criminal cases specifically to oversee whether police are engaging in unconstitutional conduct. And the courts can only do that, judicial review would only function if the courts have access to information about what law enforcement is doing. And so I think it's a really cool observation. But there's this common law privilege called the law enforcement privilege that allows police and prosecutors to keep investigative methods secret while still introducing the results of those methods in court. Courts are pretty vague about it, but there are some basic outlines we have. It's a two-step privilege. So law enforcement first has to assert the privilege and there's some threshold requirement for asserting the privilege. We'll talk later that I think that threshold requirement is not working very well. It's extremely vague and malleable and basically means they can assert the privilege for any investigative method under the sun. And then there's supposed to be a second stage, which is a balancing stage. So as I'm sure you know, and our listeners know, there are some privileges that are characterized as absolute privileges, like the attorney-client privilege. Once you have it and you meet all the qualifications, it can't be defeated. There's no balancing. And then there's other privileges that are qualified, which means, yes, you have it, you're a legitimate claimant, but we're still going to take account of equities on the other side and decide whether we're going to force you to hand the information over anyway. And the law enforcement privilege is supposed to be a qualified privilege, which means that even if law enforcement legitimately asserts it, the court's supposed to influence law enforcement's interest in secrecy against an opposing party's interest in obtaining the information. So that's how it's supposed to work. I think the big critique of the paper is that the courts really haven't done enough to establish requirements for asserting the privilege in the first place. So that step one threshold claim is a kind of non-existent barrier. And they just jump straight to the balancing part. And that's a problem because when courts the equities for privilege, they often require the parties seeking access, let's think of criminal defendants in this case, to prove that they have a greater interest in accessing that information than they would generally have to prove to get stuff in discovery. So for instance, they might have to just prove something is relevant or likely to be admissible to get it under normal discovery or subpoena power, to prove that it's material to get it in discovery, to prove that it's likely to be relevant and admissible to get it with a subpoena if you want the criminal to know that it's relevant to get it in discovery. So that's a higher burden. And in addition, even if they come out and explain why the information is necessary, sometimes the law enforcement can come back and say, well, then we'll give you some alternative information instead, and that should satisfy you. So as an example, instead of showing you the actual mechanics for a internet monitoring software program, I'll just give you a law enforcement affidavit that explains how it works. And the court might say, well, all right, now you've got that, that's good enough. We're going to uphold a privilege on the balancing test, even though it's not nearly as good as having the real thing that you could use to, say, impeach the affidavit, which you'd be entitled to if no privilege existed.
Speaker 1Awesome. So that's a great picture of what the law enforcement privilege looks like in theory. And now to help us all see how it looks like in practice, I want to bring up this story that you have in your article about the Stingray, this kind of technology that's cell site simulator, and kind of gives us a picture of how this technological secrecy, law enforcement secrecy can really run amok. So what happened with the story of the Stingray, and what does it tell us about the law enforcement privilege?
Speaker 2Cool question. So Stingray, so just to explain what it is to start, it's a technology that pretends to be a cell phone tower, and tricks phones in the area into connecting with it instead of a real cell phone tower, and then collects information from the phone. And for many, many years, domestic law enforcement used these devices without a warrant, and without revealing to courts that they were using the tools. So how did this work? They would use the Stingray to collect location information from a suspect's phone, for instance. And then they might tell the court that they had located the suspect based on a confidential informant tip, not even revealing that any technology was involved at all. The story of how this came to light is actually pretty interesting. A pro se criminal defendant who had been convicted of some kind of sophisticated crime, had been convicted of some kind of sophisticated wire fraud scheme, litigated for years from prison to try to get access to information about how police had located him, because he thought the only way that police could have identified his location was by, he said, quote, beaming rays into his living room and sucking up data out of his devices. And he turned out to be correct. He located a purchase order from the local police department for one of these devices from the Harris Corporation, which had previously been thought to, I think, only have been used in military contexts. And so this exposure led to a wave of litigation and legislative reforms. Courts finally reviewed the use of these devices, and a number of courts held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to use one of these devices. And so in retrospect, we know that for over a decade, law enforcement was regularly using the devices without getting a warrant, conducting unconstitutional searches that were also evading judicial review. How did they do this? A lot of stories have swirled around about it. Some people say, well, you know, it was like Harris Corporation's trade secret. But that explanation never really satisfied me. Harris Corporation did require some kind of protections on the use of the device. But you don't even think that a private company could somehow prevent closures that were compelled by a court. There were NDAs, non-disclosure agreements, that the FBI required law enforcement agencies that were purchasing these devices inside the country to sign. But then you got just a contract, again, a contract when it seemed to be able to defeat a court order. Some of these NDAs, law enforcement promised that they would keep the use of these technologies secret, even in the face of a contrary court order. How could that be where there's just illegal agreements? Contract law doesn't defeat subpoena. And I realized, well, actually, there is this evidentiary privilege authority that gave real teeth to those NDAs. Because effectively, what the NDA was saying was, you, law enforcement agency, agree that you will assert law enforcement privilege in court if you're ever asked to reveal information about how these technologies work or even their mere existence. And it turns out that when you dig into the law enforcement privilege doctrine, it actually entitles them to do that. And so, you know, I don't think that's a good idea. So it seems to
Speaker 1me like the defense side critique of the law enforcement privilege is incredibly compelling. And so I want to be sure that we're being, or at least I'm being clear, too, about the flip side of the argument in terms of, well, what is the prosecutorial justification or argument that the law enforcement privilege has a genuine, non-frivolous, normative good that as a policy matter we should pursue? And you do a fantastic job of building this side out on your paper as well. And if you would share the flip side of the argument.
Speaker 2Absolutely. So look, there are some investigative methods that are lawful, that are constitutional, that can be undertaken with a warrant if required, that are important to investigate very serious crimes, and that would not be effective if disclosed to the public. The example that I'm going to give you is the example that I'm going to give you is the example that I find personally quite compelling, is law enforcement use of malware or hacking tools that exploit vulnerabilities in existing computer networks. And there is an example of a case where law enforcement, the FBI, was using one of these vulnerabilities to identify computers that were visiting a site distributing child sexual abuse material. And the exploit that they were using was the use of malware or hacking tools that exploit vulnerabilities in existing computer networks. And the exploit that they were using was the use of Even without informing a large number of would-be criminals about how it worked. So this is an example of a kind of a bottleneck situation where that vulnerability once patched, it could be patched by a small number of people, but it renders the tool ineffective at scale.
Speaker 1Perfect. And it's almost like when writing the article, you read my mind because in the paper, my intuition was like, okay, well, let's just get rid of the law enforcement tool. And I was like, okay, well, let's just get rid of the law enforcement privilege entirely if it's causing all of these problems. And the prosecutorial benefits, although they exist, potentially are giving rise to all these negative consequences. But in the paper, you push back on that notion and offer what you call a, quote, skeptical account of the existing critiques. So let's start with the historical one you offer, the widely held scholarly view that the law enforcement privilege is a recent innovation. Maybe it dates back to J. Edgar Hoover. You noted that that scholarly intuition is wrong. So tell us about your archival
Speaker 2research. So it turns out, looking back at historical cases, we can find examples of courts allowing law enforcement to introduce the results of secret investigative techniques as far back as the 1723 trial of Bishop Atterbury in England. And let me qualify that to say, look, this was an English case. It's not binding on U.S. courts. This was a bill of attainder, not a regular criminal case, highly politicized. So there's certainly reasons to think that it might not have been representative of general practice. There's also reasons to think that courts in the U.S. engage in the same kind of protections for public policy purposes. So just as an example, Wigmore's treatise that was published in the 19th century, which we all know was hugely influential over U.S. courts, identified a privilege for official documents broad enough to encompass all kinds of law enforcement methods and specifically distinguished it from the national security privileges for state secrets or military secrets or diplomatic secrets. So this was a privilege that applied domestically to domestic official documents, broad enough to encompass law enforcement secrets. And then Wigmore cites Atterbury in the 19th century. So this was a privilege that applied domestically trial as a precedent for U.S. courts to read and follow. So that's another example. But the end of the day, the common law in the United States has long encompassed a wide array, a variety, a bundle of vague governmental privileges, investigative privilege, official information privilege. There was a privilege for the U.S. But at the same time, there was a privilege for information that arson investigators were collecting. And in the 30s, there was a privilege for observations that IRS officials were observing when investigating untaxed liquor distribution in the early 1900s. And there's a whole array of government privileges that courts could choose from to protect that information under the same policy rationale that's currently used to justify this thing we call the law enforcement privilege. So my conclusion Oh, and one more thing. Add another example. And this one's a little bit controversial. But Judge Learned Hand in 1950 wrote an opinion, United States versus Copland, that I think a lot of people mistakenly characterize as rejecting a law enforcement privilege, a law enforcement investigative privilege. But I think actually acknowledged that it exists and can be legitimate in some circumstances. And this was a case where the FBI and the FBI were not going to be able to admit to undertaking illegal wiretapping. And punchline is that Judge Hand held that they had waived the privilege in that case for the illegal wiretapping method, because they had introduced the privileged information to the judge in camera in order to satisfy their burden of proof on another legal issue in the case. And so Judge Hand said they had waived the privilege in that case by virtue of that conduct in that case. But by doing so, actually acknowledged that they might legitimately assert it in another context. That was 1950. That was before the J. Edgar Hoover campaign that supposedly created the modern version of the privilege. I will admit that the exact phrase law enforcement privilege, the terminology is relatively new. And you can trace through the history of the law enforcement privilege moving forward. But the change in terminology doesn't mean that it was a novel substantive protection.
Speaker 1So you've completely convinced me on the historical account. I think that your research of the providence and lineage of the law enforcement privilege, it's super impressive. But I feel like it's incumbent upon me as the author of The Living Rules of Evidence to say, well, perhaps we shouldn't be bound by history, right? Let's focus on the normative question of whether the law enforcement privilege should be protected. And I think that's a great question. order, it'll leak.
Speaker 2And that's the kind of where if you increase the likelihood of the leak, and it has a very high harm, if leaked to just once destroys the entire tool at scale, it really would put law enforcement in the position of having to be very selective about which cases they can prosecute to undertake that risk of a leak, knowing they're going to blow the source, they have to disclose it too frequently. That's called a disclose or dismiss dilemma. And I think there are some circumstances where that's a legitimate concern. So that's one reason why I don't want to abolish the privilege entirely. Another reason is that I think that because the argument in some of those, you know, potentially extreme situations, where we might want to protect that investigative method, because those are so compelling, that if you don't give law enforcement, any opportunity to assert privilege, they might try to maintain the same level of secrecy through more harmful means. And here are some of the more harmful means they might rely on. They might choose to engage more in something called parallel construction, where they initially investigate using the, say, malware exploit that they don't want to disclose, but then they just never tell anybody about it at all. They don't ever reveal it to the court. And instead, they conduct some separate secondary investigation without using the secret tool. And that's what they present to the court. And so now, not only are they still maintaining defendants, still doesn't get to evaluate, the court doesn't get to conduct judicial review on the initial investigative method. But we don't even know that the investigative method existed. So we're in a worse situation in terms of public transparency, democracy, accountability than we would be if we knew they were asserting some privilege for some secret. That's an example. But there's other things that they could do. Prosecutors could choose to just dismiss more cases if they're ordered to disclose methods. And dismissing cases has costs, especially with very serious crimes. It can lead to dangerous people going back into the community to reoffend. And judges who are worried about those outcomes could also distort evidence law by bending the relevance rules. This one I was citing. Was that your piece, Alex, that I was citing?
Speaker 1Yeah, me with Ed and Julia Simon Kerr.
Speaker 2Yeah, exactly. Your piece with Ed and Julia Simon Kerr is an example where, you know, we see courts kind of treating evidence rules malleably. And they might do that with relevance. They might do that with relevance rules by trying to make a decision that the investigative method is actually irrelevant, which isn't really true. They're just scared to order it disclosed. If we give them the above-board option of upholding a privilege, then we get more information and keep the evidence rules a bit more integrity on the meaning of relevance or materiality.
Speaker 1All right. So the existing critiques certainly don't get us where we need to go in thinking about the optimal deployment of the law enforcement privilege, if you will. So you offer your own proposal in the paper for how the law enforcement privilege should be conceptualized, but also how it should be employed by courts. So if you would, this kind of ties back into what we talked about at the top of the podcast in terms of how this privilege actually works. Maybe you can quickly remind us of that process and then that dovetail into your proposal for tying privilege claims to law enforcement's own pre-dispute conduct.
Speaker 2Yes. So if you recall, the current doctrine says that there should be these two steps. There's an assertion of the privilege, the threshold claim. And then if you satisfy the claim, like you are a legitimate privilege holder, you've claimed it in an appropriate way, then what it gets you is balancing. And the problem is that courts often skip the first step and go straight to balancing. And I identified that that could be game over for the opposing party that's trying to get access to the information because it raises their burden to show that information is not just relevant, but necessary, which is a real catch-22 if you haven't even seen the information to show that it's going to be necessary. And then the government can just refute, even if you succeed at that initially, by giving you some weaker watered down alternative form of proof. And they don't have an entitlement to do that if there is no privilege in the first place, because usually we don't get one side having the power of telling the other side which evidence to use to litigate their case. So the only way you see that they get to do that is if they don't have the power to tell the other side which evidence to use to litigate their case. So the only way you see that they get to do that is if they have legitimately claimed the privilege. But the diagnosis I made is that the current doctrine basically puts no limits on law enforcement's ability to satisfy that first threshold step of claiming privilege. There's just nothing. Courts have effectively defined the threshold claim as equivalent to the underlying policy rationale. So law enforcement just has to invoke the policy rationale and say, here's a method that would be less effective if generally known. And they get over the threshold hump. That's a real problem, because that rationale taken to its extreme applies to pretty much anything that law enforcement does. So it's not just the malware zero-day exploits for investigating serious crimes. It's even the generally known fact that police can collect fingerprints at a crime scene. Say, okay, well, even though that's generally known, lots of people continue committing crimes without putting on gloves. Therefore, public disclosure of investigative methods does not interfere with law enforcement's investigative success. But we don't have any empirical evidence of how many more people would commit crimes without wearing gloves. But we do have evidence of how many more people would commit crimes without wearing gloves if nobody knew that law enforcement could collect fingerprints. So there's still a plausible story, even with that widely known investigative technique, that it would be more effective if it weren't generally known. And if you can apply that theory to fingerprints, you could apply it to almost anything. We're in a space where it's very hard to come by empirical proof of chilling effects on investigative methods' success. And so that gives law enforcement a plausible basis to basically assert a threshold claim for anything under the sun. That's not okay. So my proposal is that courts should limit the threshold claim by asking law enforcement how law enforcement itself handled the security or confidentiality of the information before this dispute arose. If law enforcement took reasonable precautions, to keep the information secret, if they only revealed it to a limited number of law enforcement officials, if they required some sort of protective order or non-disclosure order when they revealed it, if they required the information to be returned after an investigation, then you could say, "Huh, okay, maybe there is some evidence here that law enforcement itself values the confidentiality of this information apart from the advantage it gives them in this subsequent litigation." And at the same time, you can say it's also a measure of how much of a risk of leaks law enforcement has found to be acceptable in the past. So if a court can fashion a protective order enabling disclosure to a defendant or a civil litigant with protections that match or exceed those law enforcement itself previously applied to the information, the court should still feel quite confident about ordering disclosure.
Speaker 1Rebecca, as always, such an insightful paper. Thanks so much for sharing it with us today on Excited Utterance. Well, Alex, I really appreciate it. It's always a pleasure to talk with you, and I appreciate the opportunity. Thank you. So in our modern era of technological change, to say the least, I think privilege, as law, is going to be one of the most dynamic and exciting fields in the world of evidence, as artificial intelligence takes on a new prominence in society and culture, as the police and as prosecutors increasingly rely on algorithms to make investigatory and adjudicatory decisions, as the means by which individuals in everyday life acquire information and communicate with one another. As it changes and changes rapidly, courts and state legislatures are increasingly going to be called upon to think about how those technological changes intersect with privileges and adjudicatory fairness. And to be sure, this is not an easy calculus because privileges play an important role. There are many conversations, there are many business secrets, there are many investigatory tools even that benefit from the secrecy that they are afforded from discovery and from admission at trial by the law. But at the same time, of course, on the other side of the calculus, are those personal liberties afforded to defendants by the fourth and sixth amendments. And so in the years ahead, what we are going to see, just like we've seen with Rebecca today and courts wrestling and state legislatures wrestling with the proper balance for the law enforcement privilege, is an increase in the frequency in which courts and at the state level legislators are called upon to strike a balance between necessary secrecy on the one hand and defendant rights on the other. Most notably, we saw this in the news just last month when Judge Rakoff had to determine how does a conversation with an AI agent fit within the attorney-client privilege. And those types of conversations are only going to become more common, not less, as it seems every day we wake up to some sort of new technological revolution. Fortunately though, we have experts like Rebecca who are going to be talking about how to make sure that the law enforcement privilege is in place. Thank you, Rebecca, who provides such fantastic insight on how to strike this balance. And I hope you enjoyed hearing from her about the law enforcement privilege today. Support for Excited Utterance is generously provided by Vanderbilt Law School's Branstetter Litigation and Dispute Resolution Program, as well as the Texas A&M University School of Law. The producer is Ed Chang, and the production editor is Anirudh Murilla. Additional assistance was provided by Lizzie Herrera. And background music is provided by Kirsten Castle-Greer, Felix Wong, and Alex Kru. I'm your host, Alex Nunn, and I hope you'll join us again next time when we take on another work in the world of evidence and proof. you

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Rebecca Wexler's paper "Law Enforcement Privilege," published in the Michigan Law Review, examines a common law doctrine that lets police and prosecutors keep investigative methods secret while still introducing their results in court.
  2. The privilege is meant to be qualified and two-step, with a threshold assertion followed by judicial balancing, but courts often skip the threshold step and move straight to balancing, which raises the burden on defendants.
  3. Landmark Fourth Amendment cases such as Mapp, Katz, Riley, and Carpenter would not exist if police had succeeded in keeping their conduct secret, showing how secrecy can thwart judicial review.
  4. The Stingray cell-site simulator story illustrates the problem
  5. Wexler's archival research challenges the scholarly view that the privilege is a recent innovation, tracing protections for secret investigative methods back to the 1723 English trial of Bishop Atterbury and through Wigmore's treatise and Learned Hand's 1950 Copland opinion.
  6. A skeptical account of the existing critiques shows that abolishing the privilege entirely could push law enforcement toward more harmful practices such as parallel construction, case dismissals, or distorted relevance rulings.
  7. Wexler proposes limiting the threshold step by examining how law enforcement itself handled the information's confidentiality before the dispute, such as through protective orders, limited disclosure, and return requirements.
  8. The discussion connects the privilege to broader debates about artificial intelligence, algorithmic policing, and the need to balance necessary secrecy against defendants' Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights.

Summary:

This episode of Excited Utterance features host Alex Nunn interviewing Rebecca Wexler, the Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, about her paper "Law Enforcement Privilege," recently published in the Michigan Law Review. Wexler explains that the criminal legal system depends on open proceedings so courts can review whether police conduct complies with the Fourth Amendment, yet an obscure common law privilege allows law enforcement to withhold information about investigative methods while still introducing the resulting evidence. She describes the doctrine's intended two-step structure, a threshold assertion followed by balancing, and argues that courts have effectively eliminated the threshold step, forcing defendants to show that unseen information is necessary and allowing the government to substitute weaker alternative proof.

The Stingray cell-site simulator saga illustrates the stakes: police used the devices without warrants for years while concealing their use, until a pro se defendant's research exposed the practice. Wexler's archival work traces the privilege's lineage back to 1723 England, Wigmore's treatise, and Learned Hand's 1950 opinion, challenging the view that it is a modern invention. She offers a skeptical account of calls to abolish the privilege, noting risks of parallel construction and evidentiary distortion, and proposes tying the threshold claim to law enforcement's own pre-dispute confidentiality practices. The conversation closes by connecting these issues to emerging challenges involving artificial intelligence and algorithmic policing.

FAQs

It is a common law privilege that allows police and prosecutors to keep investigative methods secret while still introducing the results of those methods in court. It is supposed to be a qualified privilege with an assertion step and a balancing step.

The criminal legal system depends on fair and open proceedings, and courts can only review police conduct if they have access to information about what law enforcement is doing. If police can use secrecy claims to block defendants' access to evidence, judicial review and Fourth Amendment rights are undermined.

Courts have not established meaningful requirements for the threshold step of asserting the privilege, so law enforcement can claim it for almost any investigative method. Courts then jump straight to balancing, which raises the opposing party's burden and lets the government offer weaker alternative information instead.

For over a decade, law enforcement used Stingray devices without warrants and without telling courts the technology was involved, sometimes attributing location information to confidential informants. Exposure of the devices led to litigation and reforms, and many courts held that a warrant is required.

Yes. Some lawful and constitutional investigative methods, such as malware or hacking tools exploiting vulnerabilities, are important for serious crimes and would become ineffective if disclosed. Without a privilege, law enforcement might resort to worse practices like parallel construction or dismissing cases.

No. Wexler's archival research traces protections for secret investigative methods back to the 1723 trial of Bishop Atterbury in England, and Wigmore's 19th-century treatise recognized a broad privilege for official documents encompassing law enforcement methods.

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